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THE CHANGING DIVISION OF POLICING LABOUR

(WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE POLICING OF SHOPPING CENTRES)

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C O N T E N T S

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| ABSTRACT | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION | 2 |
| CHAPTER 1 Literature Review | 4 |
| CHAPTER 2 Concepts of Private Security | 53 |
| CHAPTER 3 Designing the Research | 86 |
| CHAPTER 4 Implementing the Research | 114 |
| CHAPTER 5 Conclusions | 173 |
| REFERENCES | 204 |

ABSTRACT

A study of the policing of six shopping centres in the north west of England using non-participatory observations, a Likert Scale survey and anecdotal data as a means of examining the changing division of policing labour. The study draws on research carried out in Britain and North America which suggests that although there are strong negative perceptions of the average security officer, the security industry continues to expand.

The study examines some of the theoretical concepts used to explain the continuing development and expansion of the private security industry by focusing on one particular sector of the contract guarding division of the industry.

Whilst it is accepted that the examination of such a small part of such a large industry can do no more than provide a snap-shot of how policing provision is changing, the conclusions drawn are used to make recommendations with respect to the regulation of the industry.

INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the changing division of policing labour with particular emphasis on the private policing of shopping centres.

Chapter One consists of a review of the literature, tracing a brief sketch of the historical background of private security in Britain and North America. Attention is drawn to the fact that although the bulk of the literature on the subject is either American or Canadian, private security in North America, unlike public policing, began and grew in direct relationship to the needs of North American society. It examines contemporary studies of private security in Britain focusing on the works of Johnston and South. It also examines contemporary studies conducted in the United States such as the Rand and Hallcrest Reports, raising questions about public perceptions of private policing and examines some of the theoretical concepts used to explain the continuing development and expansion of the industry.

Chapter Two examines theories such as the Junior Partner Theory, Economic Theories, Radical Theories and Consumer Hypothesis (as formulated by the researcher). The public/private police relationship is examined by contrasting and comparing these theories and examining the five stage relationship identified by Stenning (1989). The increasing interface between public and private police is considered, particularly in relation to the policing of shopping centres.

The design of the research is discussed in Chapter Three which states the objects of the research, populations to be covered and information sought. The construction of a battery of instruments is described with an explanation of factors influencing the final choice of research tools.

Chapter Four describes the implementation of the research highlighting problems encountered and discusses their probable influence on the final results of the research.

Chapter Five analyses and discusses the results of the research drawing some rather controversial conclusions not only in respect of this particular project but in respect of much of the controversy that surrounds the private security industry. Not least of these conclusions is that over reliance on the wealth of material provided by North American research leads to the formulation of inappropriate questions about the British security industry. British research is largely unco-ordinated and fragmented and therefore ineffective and this can only be countered by government sponsored and directed research. An extensive review of the security industry should be carried out in order to answer a host of questions about the industry before any consideration is given to the concept of licencing and regulation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Historical Background of Private Security

According to Johnston (1992) histories of policing are dominated by what might be called the "Anglo American Model.(1) This model concentrates on the development of social control in England and the United States of America. The model predicates similar reasons for the emergence of policing both private and public in these countries, basing its arguments on the fact that until the American War of Independence (1776) England's dominance and influence over the American colonies was indisputable. Even after achieving independence many of the practices and traditions of the colonists were English born. It is argued that for the most part America's law enforcement and justice system was fashioned after the English system. Evidence of this can be seen in the adversarial court systems employed in both England and North America which contrast sharply with the inquisitional system of most European nations.

Perhaps one of the reasons why this model has held such sway over histories of policing is that it can accommodate both conservative orthodox perspectives posited by commentators such as Reith (1952), Critchley (1979) and Ascoli (1987) and radical revisionist arguments posited by commentators such as Storch (1981). Both perspectives accept the validity of historical arguments that municipal police systems in both England and America were born out of a mix of public and private provision of social control and that even after the institution of municipal police forces, private provision continued to flourish. They differ in the reasons they put forward for the demise of some aspects of social control which existed prior to the emergence of municipal police forces.

The conservative-orthodox perspective tends to suggest that modern policing in England emerged as a simple effect of a number of causes. These causes included the fact that the office of parish constable had fallen into contempt. Justices of the Peace were similarly held in contempt and considered to be corrupt. The Industrial Revolution brought about the expansion of towns, growth of population and increasing wealth. This state of affairs was exploited by notorious providers of private policing such as Jonathan Wilde. His basic method was to order his men to commit a burglary and then in his self appointed capacity as "Thief Taker General" he would receive the victim in his office where he would take particulars of the missing goods, shortly afterwards he would return the goods to the grateful owner on payment of commission.

The urbanising effects of the Industrial Revolution are also seen as undermining the stability which had been enjoyed by rural society, destroying the principle of the universal obligation to serve as parish constable. Critchley (1967) maintains that when the principle of personal service died out, the office of constable sank to its lowest grade and men paid deputies who were "scarcely removed from idiotism". Coatman (1959) tells us that in the towns constables were reinforced by watchmen, who had some of the powers or authority of the constable, the majority of whom gradually came to consist of poor illiterate men who were glad of the small pay and a share of any fees which came their way. Whilst Critchley and Coatman may be correct about the intellectual capacity of some of the people performing the duties of constable or watchmen, Draper (1978) suggests that some of those deputised by wealthy tradesmen or town's folk were astute enough to "sub-contract" the job.

This is why it eventually fell to the otherwise unemployable to carry out the task of upholding the law and maintaining the King's peace.

It could be argued that immediately prior to the emergence of municipal police forces, policing was entirely in the hands of private security since what little public provision existed had been sub-contracted to such an extent that it virtually ceased to be public provision.

A state of affairs existed where the policing of England was in the hands of people appointed and paid by individuals rather than the state or local authority. These persons for the greater part had no legal appointment or authority to enforce the law other than that they were prepared to carry out the responsibility of others for small remuneration. The avoidance of the duty of policing was not in itself illegal, in fact the law made provision for it. Whilst distaste for the public duty of maintaining the King's Peace created commercial opportunity it prompted people such as Henry Fielding to say of those who performed a policing function.

"They are chosen out of those poor decrepit people who are from their want of bodily strength rendered incapable of getting a living by work. These men armed only with a pole which some are scarcely able to lift, are to secure the persons and houses of his Majesty's subjects"

The wealthy were able to avoid carrying out the duties of constable not merely by paying deputies, they could escape service by paying a fine to parish funds or alternatively by acquiring a "Tyburn Ticket". Whilst the Statute of Westminster 1285 required a watch to be stationed in every town, made up of men of the town who would work on a rota basis, an Act of 1699 provided exemption from such duty. Any person who prosecuted a felon to conviction enjoyed lifelong exemption from all parish duties and the relevant certificate (Tyburn Ticket) changed hands for substantial sums of money. Critchley (1967) maintains that those who were contracted (or sub-contracted) to perform the office of constable were "at best illiterate fools and at worst as corrupt as the criminal classes from which not a few sprang".

In contrast the radical revisionist argument posited by commentators such as Storch (1981) suggests that it was not so much the increasing opportunities for crime but rather the need for a disciplined working class that prompted the emergence of modern policing. He argues that capitalism, having subjected the work force to factory discipline, and cash having replaced social ties as the important factor in people's lives generated inevitable social tensions. Storch maintains that the system of parish constables was unable to deal with these tensions not so much because of defects in the efficiency of the office itself but rather because the holders of that office may have shown more loyalty to the local community than to the state. He sees the formation of a professional, bureaucratic police organisation guaranteeing consistent standards of policing under state jurisdiction as the solution. Storch's views are not incompatible with the facts. By the year 1700 disciplined industrial capitalism was already becoming familiar in certain parts of England with the time keeper, the time sheet and a system of fines. South (1987) informs us that the Law Book of Crowley's Iron Works represented an entire civil and penal code running to more than 100,000 words to govern and regulate the labour force. To enforce such a code, Crowley employed a warden and a monitor who were to act as timekeepers and detect and report upon all breaches of workplace discipline. South notes that the parallels with modern private security are self evident.

Parallels with modern private security are not only evident within factory walls, Rock (1983) suggests that as the formal system of parish constable and Justice of the Peace declined provision by private self interest flourished. This private provision was strongly encouraged by legislation that from 1691 had offered substantial rewards to those who brought the prosecution of certain offences. A whole range of crimes of theft and robbery was encompassed by this system of "prosecution as private enterprise".

The sources of rewards reflected the nature of the prevailing mixed economy, coming from the state in the shape of the courts and the excise as well as insurance companies and voluntary associations.

Private provision was not only concerned with recovering stolen property and apprehending miscreants, it was active in crime prevention with stage coach companies and private owners trying to overcome the threat of highway men and thieves by carrying armed guards on their vehicles. A marine police establishment set up in 1798 to police the port of London had four fifths of its costs paid by West Indian Merchants operating in the port. The establishment of sixty officers was so successful that it became a public body in 1800 preceding Peel's "New Police" by 29 years (Draper 1978).

Just as there are differing views for the emergence of modern policing in Britain the Anglo American Model supports differing views for the emergence of policing in America. Silver (1967) argues that fear of riot and disorder were paramount in the development of modern policing. Other commentators such as Lane (1967) and Richardson (1970) suggest that immigration and urbanisation led to increased crime and thus stimulated police development, whilst others such as Spitzer and Scull (1977) have concentrated on the relationship between society and industrial capitalism. Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter (1981) suggest that the development of public police in America finds its historical roots in the scope and range of events that shaped early England. They see English concepts of law, justice, social structure and security being gradually assimilated into early American life. They suggest that one merely has to look at the societal evolution of England to discover why and how certain changes occurred in America. Until 1776 the dominance and influence of England over the American colonies was indisputable and even after the War of Independence many practices and traditions of the colonists were English born.

Although they accept that America's law enforcement and its justice system was for the most part fashioned after the English system, Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter see security in the private sector beginning and growing in direct relationship to the needs of American society. Events such as the American Civil War, the development of the American railway system, two world wars, technological advances, rising crime rates, government regulations and many other factors have in the passage of time combined to initiate and nurture a growing demand for private security in the United States. The point made by Ricks is an important one because although there are many similarities between the British and North American security industries and indeed the security industries of many European countries there are also many subtle differences. Differences due to historical and social development of the various security industries of different nations mean that any comparisons should be made with circumspection.

The conservative and radical standpoints together with other perspectives are still used to explain the continuing expansion of the private security industry but as McClintock and Wiles point out as far as England is concerned:

"Compared with the birth pangs of the police reforms of 1829-30 and onwards, one might be forgiven for missing the event (the rapid expansion of private security). No savagely contested Act of Parliament in any way influenced it. By 1930 a quarter of a million uniformed men were operating in our society under the control of private companies" (1972 p 9).

Johnston (1992) also points to the fact that remarkably little has been written about the history of private security in comparison with the number of histories of public policing and he further suggests that what has been written tends to be from a radical standpoint. Johnston offers Spitzer and Scull and Shearing and Stenning as examples of writers of radical histories arguing that they attempt to trace the history of private security in North America to changes in capitalist property relations.

This review of the literature on private security in modern times will attempt to determine what other perspectives as well as the conservative and radical are currently used to account for the increasing growth of private security. It will also seek to compare the current public attitudes towards those who are contracted to "secure the persons and property" of their clients with the views of security provisions prior to the emergence of modern policing as expressed by Critchley (1979), Coatman (1959) and Henry Fielding.

2. Contemporary Studies of Private Security

In comparison with North America private security in Britain has attracted limited analysis and scholarly attention.(2) South (1988) in his descriptive study of the British security industry traces its history and development examining what is currently happening in the industry and he suggests what might be proposed by way of response. He sees the post war expansion of the private security sector as having revolutionary implications for the nature of modern social control and the policing of society. It is argued that, such a significant increase in resort to private arrangements for ensuring security has fundamentally changed the division of policing labour.

South notes that some commentators whom he sees as principally members of the police service are critical of the expansion of the private security sector. As recently as April 1994 the Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset was addressing a conference on the "Changing Face of Policing" and warning of private security risks (Casey 1994). It is argued that this critical approach though understandable in some instances is not wholly justified in the light of the "symbiotic" relationship existing between police and private security. Just as Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter (1981) argued that the emergence and growth of private security in America was in direct relationship to the needs of American Society. South argues that the increasing complexity of the division

of policing labour in Britain, is a reflection of the complexity of British society. South examines this complexity in terms of the formal/commercial private/informal dimensions of social control and justice. The increasing expansion of the private Security Industry and the fact that it is today "policing" either private property to which large numbers of the public have access or large areas of "public" space, with little public debate, is regarded as being the consequence of social and economic changes, rather than political and legal ones. However, South argues that there is a political if not legal need for democratic accountability of the industry.

Johnston (1992) in his study of private security asserts that until recently research had tended to concentrate on the activities of the public police, that is about the role of police forces now maintained under the Police Act 1964 and has tended to ignore the question of policing per se which he sees as including "hybrid" forces such as the Ministry of Defence Police, British Transport Police and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary as well as the specialist forces employed by port authorities or similar undertakings. In addition to the whole private security industry which Johnston sees as playing an ever increasing role in the enforcement of the law, not only in private but in public space there exist many government agencies such as Customs and Excise, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Health and Safety Executive which carry out law enforcement functions. It is argued by him that failure to include such agencies in any debate about policing tends to obscure the fact that throughout history policing is an activity which has been undertaken by a mixture of public, private and quasi-public agencies.

He disagrees with many models of police history which see a complete break between private provision and the new police. He uses a review of the historical background of police history to support his argument that there was no clear break between the new and old forms of policing.

From a review of the history of private policing and an examination of the various ideologies of privatisation such as conservative, radical and marxist, Johnston goes on to look at the contemporary security industry. Johnston appears to agree with South (1988) with regard to the complexity of policing labour, seeing that complexity as being located in the connections between formal and substantive powers and between private and public activities.

He argues that for no logical reason constabulary powers, that is full law enforcement powers with their associated privileges, can only be granted by or at least through the state apparatus. It has been held again for no logical reason, that Johnston can identify, that the policing of public space can only be carried out by those holding constabulary powers. These beliefs have led to the misconception that private security do on private property what municipal police do in public. This simplistic notion ignores the complexity of social control and dismisses the fact that a whole range of control agencies exist alongside public police and private security. He criticises the sociology of policing for failing to address this issue. He suggests that researchers of private security like researchers of the police have been preoccupied with functional questions tending to concentrate on two issues, the function of private security and its relationship with the public police in the overall division of policing labour. He examines the major theoretical concepts underpinning much of the research on private security, drawing heavily on the work of North American researchers in the process.

Johnston raises questions not only about our concepts of policing but about what we consider as public and private. He illustrates the public-private dichotomy in terms of a strategic arena and suggests that active citizenship is a discourse about public-private provision. Government suggestions that active citizenship should exist alongside the "massive public services" (and policing is surely one of these) to fill the myriad of needs which are not best met by

creating or entering a bureaucratic scheme are seen as a double edged sword. Johnston maintains that such a strategy whilst ostensibly about social responsibility is simultaneously an agenda for reconstructing the boundaries of the public and the private. It is further argued that because the impact of such a strategy is not entirely predictable, active citizenship is a dangerous political game to play for it may well expose and politicise conflicts between different sets of "needs" and rights without offering any just means of resolving them. It is not just police commentators but also politicians such as Bruce George (1984) who have recognised this and called for government participation in and regulation of the Security Industry.

Both South (1988) and Johnston (1992) touch on the subject of social control and Matthews (1989) suggests that privatisation does not sit comfortably with the theme of destructuring, that is decarceration, community care, deinstitutionalisation which began in the 1960's and subsequently failed. This was a complex and differentiated development which was implemented in many different ways, as a result some critics who attacked the "sinister state" now attack the "sinister market". The attribution of blame to private agencies could not be other than acceptable to a government whose social control policies led to an acceleration of the process of centralisation of control of the public police (Johnston 1993) and the mobilisation of the active citizen. A government which Johnston saw as adopting a subtle mode of political intervention setting out a political agenda aimed at the reconstruction of sectoral and spatial boundaries in new forms whilst ostensibly speaking of social rights and responsibilities.

2.1 North American Research

Much of the British research into private security draws inspiration from the extensive studies carried out in North America, both the United States and Canada. It is important to note once again that there is far more overt government

intervention in the private security industry in North America with a good deal of research funding coming from government sources. The first major study focusing solely on private security in the United States was conducted by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971).

This study conducted for the Rand Corporation provided the first in depth look at the dimensions of private security, with an emphasis on contractual security.

The Rand Report 1971 provided a glimpse of the size and growth trends of private security which were generally confirmed by the 1977 update based on the 1970 census data. The Rand Report 1971 was notable for two distinct impressions which it created.

- a) The vast resources and programmes of private security were overshadowed by characterisations of the "average security officer" as underscreened, undertrained, undersupervised and in need of licensing and regulation to upgrade the quality of personnel and services.
- b) Private security was depicted as "private policing" and "policing for profit", to meet the needs of special interest groups, as opposed to public policing which serves the community at large.

The growth of private security, its potential for interaction with law enforcement, and the problems listed by The Rand Report led to two other major study efforts. A Private Security Advisory Council (PSAC) to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was established in 1972 and produced advisory reports until 1977. In 1975 a Private Security Task Force (PSTF) was added to the National Advisory committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The creation of these bodies arose from a recognition of the pervasive involvement of private security in safety and protection. The membership of both these bodies was multi-disciplinary and included members from the academic, law enforcement, business and security communities.

Problems relating to the interaction and co-operation of law enforcement and security resources were tangentially addressed by both groups. The general aim was to establish standards that would help upgrade the quality of private security and prevent abuses and unethical practices. This, it was believed would increase the probability of a greater contribution by private security to crime prevention and control. The standards developed by the Task Force in 1976 were designed, in part, to motivate private security to begin upgrading its various components (Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter 1990).

In the early 80's Hallcrest Systems Inc., was selected by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to conduct a three year national study of the roles and resources of private security as well as the nature, extent and growth of security markets. This research also included a national assessment of law enforcement and private security relationships. The results were published in 1985 as The Hallcrest Report (Cunningham and Taylor 1985).

The Hallcrest Report II - Private Security Trends

1970-2000, presented the results of a descriptive research project carried out in 1989 and 1990. The major purposes of this project were to:

- a) profile the growth and changes in the private security industry over the past two decades
- b) identify emerging and continuing issues and trends in private security and its relationships with public law enforcement, and
- c) present recommendations and future research goals in the interests of greater co-operation between private security and law enforcement (Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter 1990)

In spite of the not insubstantial body of academic research on the private security industry in the United States, one of the recommendations resulting from The Benchmark II Survey conducted by Toffelmire, Duncan and Gale (1992) for the American Society for Industrial Security was:

"In order to provide a stronger base of knowledge about security activities across industries, it is imperative to design better and more consistent research instruments and standards for the analysis of such instruments, to implement such projects on a regular basis and to devise strategies for aggregating findings and data across studies" (1992 p 51).

After two decades of research in the United States, a number of areas of the private security industry were shown to be problematical or at least worthy of further research.

- a) Negative perceptions of the average security guard as underscreened, undertrained, undersupervised and underpaid and in need of licensing and regulation (The Rand Report 1971)
- b) Negative perceptions of a private policing system which existed:
 - (i) to make profit
 - (ii) to meet the needs of special interest groups and not the general public (The Rand Report 1971)
- c) A growing industry with increasing potential for interaction with sworn or public law enforcement agencies (The Rand Report 1971)
- d) The pervasive involvement of private security in safety and protection (The Rand Report 1971)
- e) The need to establish standards which would help to upgrade the quality of private security and prevent abuses and unethical practices (The Hallcrest Report II 1990)
- f) The need to upgrade standards as a probable means of increasing the contribution of private security towards crime prevention and control (The Hallcrest Report II 1990)

- g) The state of law enforcement and private security relationships nationally (The Hallcrest Report 1985)
- h) The growth and changes in the private security industry over the past two decades (The Hallcrest Report II 1990)
- i) The merging and continuing issues and trends in private security (The Hallcrest Report II 1990)
- j) A need to provide a stronger base of knowledge about security activities across industries and a need for better and more consistent and co-ordinated research. (The Benchmark II Survey 1992)

In spite of the involvement of representatives of law enforcement, academia, commerce and the security industry, the industry as a whole in the United States has been slow to react to the research findings.

In 1988 Chuvalla and Gilmore reiterated some of the findings of the earlier Rand Report. They suggested that careful vetting of applicants together with other simple screening methods would help the organisation ensure that only the best qualified applicants were selected. They suggested that private policing organisations face a number of problems when recruiting personnel which could lead to selection of less than the ideal candidate. Among the problems highlighted were:

- a) Hiring people who appear to have so much in common with their interviewers.
- b) Settling for mediocre candidates, because of pressure to fill the position, politics or the feeling that one just cannot afford the best.
- c) Not probing for limitations, lies or details.

- d) Talking instead of listening while conducting pre-employment interviews.
- e) Overselling the job.
- f) Hiring friends or repaying favours.

Layne (1988) had already suggested the following list of pre-employment screening tools for in-house security which would have helped overcome these criticisms had they been universally adopted.

- a) Application form (very thorough and as long as needed)
- b) In depth interview
- c) Criminal history check
- d) Workers compensation check
- e) Physical examination
- f) Oral examination

Layne goes on to suggest that the following types of check may also be appropriate:

- a) Drug screening
- b) Polygraph (lie detector test)
- c) Psychological tests such as the MMPI (personality test)

As well as inadequate screening, inadequate training remains problematical for the security industry in the United States, Chuvala and Gilmore (1992) recognising the need for quality training, maintain that:

"The merits of good training are numerous, improved safety, compliance with regulations and standards, reduction of liability, higher productivity, efficiency, economy, improved quality, enhanced opportunities for advancement and greater effectiveness are some of the benefits. These and others contribute to a worker's comprehension, growth and sense of value" (1992 p 84).

The argument that training would improve safety tends to suggest that what the Private Security Task Force (1975) had identified as a pervasive involvement had de-facto become an essential part of the security function.

Chuvalla and Gilmore suggested a needs assessment study to determine how much and what type of training was necessary and that all training of an individual should be completed before going on the job. They also suggested that no person should be allowed on the job without a completed background investigation and that all personnel in security work should be required to be licensed or trained by a well critiqued programme.

In 1991 Marsh was continuing to emphasise the need to upgrade the quality of education and training available to members of private security organisations in the United States. He maintained:

"Education and training have long been considered the primary methods of professionalising the security industry. However, to date, there has been more flash than substance to this issue. Security managers have become better educated (Moss 1989) but security officers have tended to remain relatively untrained and under educated. The lack of education and training for security officers is due in part to low salaries and the employers' fear that if the officers are provided with better training and increased education they will seek a higher paying job. Thus a "Catch 22" process has permeated the security industry. Security officers continue to lack training and education and the industry continues to fight for professional recognition" (1991 p 180).

Marsh calls for security firms to maximise the human resource potential of each employee and suggests that one method by which this objective can be achieved is through the establishment of co-operative corporate/university security education programmes. Almost fifteen years earlier the Report of the Task Force on Private Security (1977) recommended the establishment of co-operative programmes suggesting that private security degree programmes would enhance the professionalisation of private security.

Hertig (1989) suggested that the level of education should increase with the security position held. Specifically he suggested that security officers should have a certificate or associate degree and supervisors and managers should have a Bachelor's and Master's Degree respectively.

A great deal of the research carried out in the United States concentrates on the role of private policing and identifies at least eight main areas worthy of greater attention these are:

- a) Vetting
- b) Regulation
- c) Pay
- d) Supervision
- e) Provision of a private justice system.
- f) Interaction and co-operation with public police
- g) Training
- h) Loss prevention versus crime prevention.

Conversely research in the United Kingdom and Canada has tended to centre on the debate about private policing and its relationship to the state, commerce and the public police. This research will examine the role of one small section of the private security industry in Britain with particular emphasis on the above mentioned areas.

3. Vetting of Security Personnel

The Hallcrest Report's national surveys of contractual and corporate security managers in the early 1980's revealed that both groups used similar techniques for screening prospective employees. Contract security managers reported the following:

- | | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|-----|
| a) | Application review and interviewing | 94% |
| b) | Reference checks | 80% |
| c) | Criminal history checks | 73% |
| d) | Background investigation | 59% |
| e) | Fingerprints checks | 58% |

Polygraph and psychological tests were used less frequently. The field and focus groups interviews conducted during 1989-90 disclosed no dramatic changes in security screening practices except that fewer polygraph examinations are now administered as a result of restrictive federal legislation (The Hallcrest Report 1990).

Although screening appears extensive, Chuvala and Gilmore were already questioning the quality of vetting carried out by the industry. They suggested that the principal factor in selecting personnel for a specific client and assignment appeared to be the client's willingness to pay certain wages. Actual experience and education were rated the least important factors.

3.1 Vetting in the British Security Industry

Money also appears to be a major factor in the selection of personnel by some British companies. In an interview with Mr P W Rabbitts of the International Professional Security Association, he indicated that many companies in larger cities such as London offer £2.00 or £3.00 per hour for guarding staff. Such low remuneration tends to attract marginal personnel, that is newly arrived immigrants and those of the indigenous population who would have difficulty finding other work for reasons such as poor education or poor employment records. Not only do such personnel receive low salaries, they receive little or no training, have little or no promotional opportunities and tend to use the industry as a stepping stone to more rewarding employment as soon as it becomes available.

This is by no means the picture for the whole of the industry, many of those companies submitting to voluntary regulation select, screen and train applicants to British Standard BS 7499 and the minimum requirements of either the British Security Industry Association or the International Professional Security Association, this would involve:

- a) Application review and interviewing
- b) Reference checks - initially a 5 year clearance with a 10/20 year security clearance obtained during the probation period

- c) The British Security Industry does not have access to Criminal Record information but does attempt to verify gaps in an applicant's employment history

- d) Documentary proof of identity

The processing of an application from initial contact with a company to the offer of a position can take up to six weeks as a result of checks carried out.

One company, Securicor, has introduced psychometric questionnaires, referred to as Biodata Questionnaires, within the company. In Britain, where vetting is carried out, it is claimed by reputable security companies to be of as high a quality as possible. The problem, it is claimed, lies with the unregulated companies of unspecified number who fail to vet personnel or carry out poor quality vetting.

Letters from a number of companies contacted testify to the fact that operatives are vetted to B.S.I.A. or I.P.S.A. standards as a minimum (see Appendix B). However Johnston (1992) quotes incidents such as a company in the north of England which despite membership of the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) employed eight guards with criminal records; an incident when sixteen police officers were injured at an acid house party in Surrey during an altercation with sixty guards from Strikeforce Surveillance (London) who were armed with CS gas, baseball bats and knives and the case of a newspaper reporter who became a bodyguard to Cecil Parkinson, then Secretary of State for Energy, without any check having been made on his credentials. Perhaps muted official response to these incidents which reveal woeful inadequacies in vetting, may have something to do with the fact that the Home Office employed a security officer to protect one of its colleges who was found to have had six jail terms for arson, malicious wounding and burglary.

It would appear that the security industry sponsored British Security Registration Board set up in March 1990 and whose aims were reported by The Times (20.3.90) as being to screen job applicants for security firms by examining their qualifications and employment history is either not being fully utilised by security companies or is failing to meet its reported aims.

Since vetting is closely related to regulation and regulation is considered by government to be a matter for the security industry itself to address, many commentators within the industry, the police, parliament and academia see no likelihood of improvement in standards of vetting until statutory regulation is introduced.

4. Regulation of the Industry

The Rand Report 1971 highlighted the impressions which people had of private security in the United States of America. The vast resources and programmes of the industry were seen as being overshadowed by characterisations of the "average security officer" as underscreened, undertrained, undersupervised and in need of licensing and regulation to upgrade the quality of personnel and services.

4.1 Regulation in Britain

The British Security Industry without the benefit of such research has identified similar problems and the launch of the Inspectorate of the Security Industry (ISI) by the then Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke Q.C. M.P. on 20 October 1992 represents an attempt by at least some sections of the industry to upgrade the quality of personnel and services.

The ISI provides inspection of manned service companies to agreed industry standards and claims to ensure that requirements for security screening, training and other Codes of Practice are met. It offers certification to the quality management systems standard, BS 5750.

BS 5750:1987 is a nationally accepted standard derived from proven quality management practice.

It is recognised worldwide as International Standard ISO 9000:1987 and clearly defines responsibilities and procedures to be followed, thus ensuring that a system operates at its optimum level. The principles of BS 5750 are applicable to all sizes of companies, from the smallest to the largest. The scheme is open to all companies who are capable of showing that the quality system they use for the supply of a service or product to their customers satisfies the requirements of BS 5750 and any relevant agreed interpretative documents. The approval of such a company will be signified by the issuing of a certificate of registration with the BS 5750 Assessed Companies Scheme, which will detail the appropriate BS 5750 standard for a particular type of service or product from a particular location. Where a particular type of service or product is in accordance with a recognised standard or Code of Practice, this will also be identified on the certificate. Where appropriate in conjunction with BS 5750 Quality Assessment Schedules (QAS) are prepared, defining in precise terms the special requirements relating to a specific service or product. These Quality Assessment Schedules have been, and are, developed by the Inspectorate in co-operation with the security industry and in consultation with companies, customers and associated interests and in many cases reflect the requirements of recognised Standards or Codes of Practice (Inspectorate of the Security Industry 1992).

4.2 Registration in Britain

The ISI recognises that manned security companies are and always will be, at different stages of development and as a result offers three different routes to full registration.

a) Enroled Companies Scheme

This scheme is suitable for companies who cannot satisfy the criteria of the Inspected Companies Scheme or the Assessed Companies Scheme.

Certification is of a "probationary" nature and is valid for only twelve months.

This however, provides a level of credibility enabling companies to progress within that period.

b) Inspected Companies Scheme

Under this scheme companies will be ISI inspected against British Standard 7499 and other agreed Codes of Practice including minimum training levels. BS 7499 Manual Security Services is an essential element central to most of the activities conducted by a company.

c) Assessed Companies Scheme

This scheme, in addition to requirements under BS7499, provides companies with registration under the Quality Management Systems Standard BS 5750. Whilst this standard is already well established in other industries, it is still relatively new to the manned security sector (Inspectorate of the Security Industry 1992)

The Inspectorate of the Security Industry was jointly established in 1992 by the British Security Industry Association and the International Professional Security Association. It was born out of the National Inspectorate of Security Guard Patrol and Transport Services established by the British Security Industry Association. The Inspectorate of the Security Industry is governed by a Board of Management, which comprises representatives from registered companies, customers of the industry, security associations and independent security advisors as well as observers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Police. A Certification committee oversees the Registration Schemes and has the authority to issue, re-issue, withdraw or cancel Certificates of Registration. The working procedures of the committee are claimed to ensure that confidentiality is maintained, that no vested interests are involved in decision

making and that any reports to the Board do not break these confidential requirements (Inspectorate of the Security Industry 1992).

Although such regulatory machinery is in position there is no legal requirement for companies to register and government appears to adopt a consistently favourable attitude to self regulation in spite of pressure from various groups including leading members of the industry itself to introduce legislation to regulate the industry.

In 1977, the then Assistant Secretary at the Home Office Police Department, D. Hillary, argued strongly that his Department (F3) would support legislation only if a clear need could be shown to exist, which he argued had not been done. This appears to be the current Home Office stance (Butlin 1993). In 1979 the Labour Government published a discussion paper which outlined some of the arguments for control of the industry. Whilst the paper did not lead to any further action being taken, it did note that if the use of private firms in a way which brought their employees into contact with the public in public or quasi public places became widespread, the argument for some control, e.g. over the machinery for recording and investigating complaints from the public, would be strengthened. It is arguable that such use of private firms is occurring now with the attestation as constables of security officers employed by Protective Security Systems (Police Review 1991), firms such as Range Security patrolling the streets of Merseyside (Police Review 1992) and security firms patrolling housing estates (Evening Standard 1986). The police service has well established methods of regulation and accountability which is right and proper considering the constabulary powers which they possess. Although a private security officer has no more power than the ordinary citizen it is increasingly likely that security officers will be exercising these not inconsiderable powers about as often as a police officer exercises his constabulary powers. The protection and powers

available to the security officer include those conferred by the following legislation.

Section 51 of The Police Act 1964 which creates a number of offences, including:

"assaulting, wilfully resisting or obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty or a person assisting a constable". Even when not acting in support of a constable, a security officer as, any person is empowered by Section 3 of The Criminal Law Act 1967.

"to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large."

In addition to this power Section 117 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gives a constable the power to use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred on him by the Act, except such powers as may only be exercised with the consent of some other person, other than a police officer. Security officers attested as constables under Section 79 of The Harbours, Docks and Piers (Clauses) Act 1847 enjoy this extra power to use force without application of the regulatory mechanisms such as the Police Discipline Regulations and the Police Complaints Authority which exist to prevent the public police from abusing their powers.

The possibility of the use of physical violence by private police was highlighted by Radzinowicz at the 1972 Cropwood Round Table Conference when he remarked on problems concerning unregulated private security. He expressed disquiet about the possible use of dogs and guns, the collecting of intelligence, surveillance of workers, choice of officers and supervisors and the rights of suspects. Whilst such concerns have equal relevance where the public police are concerned, they at least, work to a statutory code of practice as defined by Section 66 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The Codes of Practice cover contact between the police and public arising from the exercise of stop and search powers, the searching of premises and the seizure of property found by police officers on persons or premises, the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by police officers and the identification of persons by police officers.

4.3 Powers and Responsibilities of Private Security

Walters and O'Connell (1985) hold that the major provisions of the Act affect not only the police and the legal profession but all those involved in the criminal justice system. They maintain that anyone involved with the investigation and/or prosecution of offences will be affected by the changes in powers and procedures that resulted from the Act and they suggest that this affects security officers in a similar way to police officers. This view raises two interesting points, firstly Walters and O'Connell clearly define private police in Britain in terms of crime investigation and as part of the criminal justice system, and secondly if private police remain unregulated how can compliance with Section 66 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 be ensured?

It could be argued that the police have wider ranging powers of stop and search than security officers who would usually only be empowered to search either as a result of conditions of service of employees or conditions of entry to any private place. Similarly security officers are unlikely to be involved in the search of premises other than those of their employer or in the identification of persons either by witnesses, fingerprints, photographs and intimate or non-intimate samples. However, a security officer is liable to arrest persons and to detain such persons until handed over to the police. It would seem almost impossible to argue against Walters and O'Connell particularly in respect of Code C of the Codes of Practice concerning the detention treatment and questioning of persons when one considers the powers of arrest available to the security officer as any person.

The powers of arrest available to the security officer, other than those attested as constables under various Acts such as The Harbours, Docks and Pier Clause Act 1847 are the same as those available to any citizen, however the security officer is likely to use these powers to such an extent that it is arguable that some form of accountability is necessary.

Powers of arrest available to the security officer include:

Section 24(4) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which allows any person to arrest without a warrant:

- a) Anyone who is in the act of committing an arrestable offence.
- b) Anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing such an offence.

Section 24(5) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which allows that where an arrestable offence has been committed any person may arrest without a warrant:

- a) Anyone who is guilty of the offence.
- b) Anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.

The term arrestable offence is defined by Section 24(1) of the Act. Arrestable offences are basically offences carrying a sentence of at least five years imprisonment, plus certain other offences under The Customs and Excise Act and The Official Secrets Acts, the causing of prostitution of women, procurement of a girl under 21, taking a conveyance without authority and going equipped for stealing.

In addition any citizen and thus a security officer can arrest for offences under:

- a) The Theft Act 1978 Section 3 Making off without payment

- b) The Criminal Justice Act 1967 Section 91
Drunkenness in a public place
- c) The Vagrancy Act 1824 Section 6
 - (i) Peddlers trading without a licence
 - (ii) Common prostitutes behaving in a riotous or indecent manner
 - (iii) A male wilfully, lewdly and obscenely exposing the person with intent to insult a female
 - (iv) Any person gathering alms or procuring charitable contributions under any false or fraudulent pretence
 - (v) Any person found on enclosed premises
 - (vi) Any person escaping from any place of legal confinement

There is also a common law power of arrest available to the citizen where anyone commits a breach of the peace in his presence, or where he reasonably believes a person will commit such a breach in the immediate future, or where a breach of the peace has been committed and it is reasonably believed that a renewal of it is threatened.

Clearly such powers of arrest together with the power to use as much force as is reasonably necessary in effecting them or in preventing a crime, allows private security a great deal of control over those who come within their sphere of influence. Research has indicated that in Canada, security organisations shunned police powers because the regulation that would come with them would hamper their operations, it was reported that:

"It became increasingly clear to us that the rights traditionally associated with property ownership and common sense actions of what property ownership authorises in the way of protective action are the corner stones of modern security practices. Ownership of property, we found, makes legitimate many forms of security activity, including instances of invasive security behaviour (such as the searching of personal belongings

and vehicles, and of persons), at the same time that it renders unnecessary the exercise of physical coercion or force" (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985 p 370).

The fact that security officers are using powers available to any citizen would appear to be at least one of the reasons why the British government has opted for encouraging self regulation of the security industry. This is in stark contrast to the majority of signatories of the 1987 agreement reached by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe who opted for regulations governing initial authorization, periodical licensing and regular inspection of security and surveillance companies.

4.4 Regulation in European Community

Greece, Eire and the United Kingdom are the only European Community countries with no specific regulatory legislation in force or in preparation. This appears all the more strange in the United Kingdom when such regulatory machinery does exist in Northern Ireland where it is an offence to offer, provide or advertise security guard services without a certificate or to pay money for such services to a person who does not possess such a certificate.

Regulation in Northern Ireland is controlled by the police and is aimed at preventing paramilitary groups from engaging in illegal fund raising activities. Johnston (1992) sees this statutory regulation as being interesting for three reasons. First, though the principle of self regulation was conceded by the very act of passing legislation, that concession has had no impact on Home Office attitudes, the principle of self regulation being strictly adhered to in the remainder of Britain.

Secondly the Act legislating for regulation, The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 focuses on terrorism and although the legislation formally recognises the problems of companies providing fronts for criminals, in practice the vetting procedure carried out by the Royal Ulster

Constabulary has been concerned primarily with terrorism. As a result there is reason to believe that criminals still manage to gain employment with security companies. Thirdly the legislation applies only to guard services and not to security services in general excluding those areas of private security which are undergoing the most rapid expansion (alarms, CCTV, etc). Johnston also claims that the limited scope of the legislation provides loopholes which companies can exploit to their advantage e.g. designating cash in transit personnel as security rather than guarding personnel.

4.5 British Initiatives Concerning Regulation

It is interesting to note that whilst The Rand Report 1971 highlighted the impression that security guards in the U.S.A. were in need of licensing and regulation, during the 1970's British politicians were also raising the issue of regulation. Private Members Bills sponsored by Norman Fowler and Bruce George failed to gain Parliamentary assent for registration.

Although academic involvement in the debate was surprisingly little, with Draper (1978) being one noticeable commentator, public concern was such that the then Labour government issued a green paper on the industry and its state of regulation. A discussion paper was produced by the Home Office in 1979. Consultation and consideration followed these documents and continued under the incoming Conservative government which in 1980 announced its decision that self regulation was the way ahead. The policy of self regulation according to South (1988) saw the foreclosure of the debate on regulation for much of the next decade.

Politicians such as Bruce George (1984) continued to call for government regulation suggesting that whilst the BSIA (British Security Industries Association) is a professional body, originally established to protect the interests of its members, independent lay members on its governing body may help - but may be merely window dressing (South 1988).

Where arguments based on the cost of implementing regulation are raised George argues that whatever costs are incurred are necessary and that these costs should be born by the applicants.

In March 1989 Douglas Hurd, then Home Secretary seemed to lend weight to George's arguments when he said that he wanted to see many more firms within the industry's own regulatory framework and that if this did not occur then government would consider passing regulation to ensure what it did (Mason 1991).

On closer examination Mr Hurd's statement raises a number of questions not least of which is whether government is more concerned about the number of companies or the number of personnel submitting to regulation. It follows from the lack of statutory regulation of the industry that government does not keep records of the number of people employed in the industry. What records are kept hardly produce an accurate figure from which to argue. Pilkington (1989) reports that 140 of the largest security companies are BSIA members and IPSA estimates it has 340 or so, companies as members at the last count, whilst there are up to 1,000 smaller firms that do not come under any regulatory body. In an interview with Mr Patrick Rabbitts of IPSA he put the figure of unregistered firms at anything between 1,000-2,000 but admitted that this was only guesswork. Jordan's Survey (1992) quoted Mr Roy Hattersley speaking at a Labour local government conference in Blackpool as informing delegates that there are about 26,000 security companies in Britain with only 4,000 of them party to the voluntary Code of Conduct and Supervision. Mr Hattersley found it particularly worrying that even without licensing, private security companies were being used in roles formerly carried out by public police and he indicated that a Labour government would be in favour of legislation to regulate the industry.

The Labour party perspective on regulation appears to reflect that of ACPO which tends to be taking an increasingly critical stance highlighted by a particularly damning report

in which 609 companies were said to be giving "cause for concern" and in which the Association demanded some form of statutory regulation (ACPO 1988).

Although members of parliament, ACPO and indeed some members of the security industry itself have called for regulation these calls have tended to be somewhat vague in respect to the sort of initiative which should be taken. Broadly speaking, past legislative initiatives have been of two types, one proposing statutory licensing whilst keeping the present system of regulation and the other proposing statutory regulation by some independent body (Johnston 1992).

Perhaps the vagueness of attempts to regulate the industry may reasonably be linked to the vagueness of what it is that requires regulating. As already identified there are no accurate figures as to the number of companies let alone personnel engaged in the provision of private policing and South (1989) identifies this as one of the major problems of the Green Paper (1979) suggesting that it had no conception of the significance of the breadth of the activities that private security organisation, agents and related bodies deal in. He also sees this failure to recognise the extent of the influence of private security as a major problem, suggesting that if private security personnel are in reality no different from ordinary citizens, a law which treats them alike seems most appropriate. But if in reality they are not, and the law still treats them as if they are, it becomes inappropriate.

He suggests that in reality the personnel of modern private security organisations are growing increasingly less like ordinary citizens.

It is this suggestion that this research seeks to examine by focusing on one small sector of the industry, but a sector which has daily interaction with the public in quasi public space.

5. Pay within the Security Industry

Unions such as MATSA (Managerial, Administrative, Technical and Supervisory Association) representing security officers also favour licensing and regulation but not so much because they see their members becoming less like the ordinary citizen in terms of legal powers but because they see their members becoming less like ordinary citizens in terms of pay levels, status, benefits and other conditions (South 1988) Like much else about the security industry hard facts about pay are difficult to establish, but it appears to be the case that the difference in pay rates between companies appear to be as extreme as the differences in importance attached to selection training and supervision.

Jordan's Survey 1992 shows the manufacturing and installation of security devices to be reasonably well paid but it shows that the average wage for security patrolmen in 1990 varied between £4,500 up to £9,000 plus paid by firms such as Chubb, Securicor and Group 4. However, Jordan's Survey does not catch every security company in its net and there is ample evidence to indicate that pay rates lower than those quoted by Jordan are not uncommon. A letter from the West Yorkshire Low pay Unit (The Independent 30 Sept. 1989) described a group of 12 security guards earning £1.50p per hour and working sixty to seventy hours per week (including public holidays) without overtime payments.

King (1988) surveyed advertisements for nineteen contract companies in the London Evening Standard over a two week period and found average wage rates to be £2.73p per hour. He calculated that this would produce gross earning of £177.40p for a sixty hour week of twelve hour shifts including nights and weekends.

This sort of pay is not uncommon. Private security officers protecting 56 military establishments in the United Kingdom were employed by 21 different private security firms paying between £1.81 and £2.20 per hour who expected officers to work twelve hour shifts with no breaks.

Training lasted two days and was unpaid. (The Times 25 Sept. 1989).

A report by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee (1990) confirmed these reports finding that military bases were guarded by poorly paid people some of whom were afraid of the dark, physically feeble or prone to commit acts of vandalism whilst on duty (Mason 1991). It would seem that in some respects things have not changed drastically since Henry Fielding described the town watch in similar terms (Draper 1978).

Roy Hattersley described the situation in stronger terms suggesting that the last thing this country needs is cut-price, second rate crime prevention, provided by security guards, many of whom have had no training at all and most of whom exist on near starvation wages.

Whilst it is difficult to arrive at an accurate average wage for a contract security patrolman it is fair to suggest that media reports certainly help to form public perceptions of a low paid occupation.

Perceptions of pay rates for security guards appear to coincide in Britain and America.

There is evidence to suggest that pay rates for security officers are much lower than the pay rates for public police or government security operatives. For instance in Britain it was estimated that Sealink saved £10,000 per annum for every British Transport police officer that they replaced with a security officer (Police Review 29 Nov. 1991). The Hallcrest Report 1985 found that the United States government is required to contract with the private sector for goods and services whenever a cost saving of 10% or more can be realised. The Federal Protective Service employs 2,600 Federal protective officers to protect selected government buildings but 2,000 dollars per officer is allegedly saved annually by contracting with guard firms.

The American research not only suggested that security

officers were poorly paid but as the Defence Select Committee (1990) had found in Britain poor supervision was also a cause for concern.

6. Supervision

Within the British security industry there is a recognition that quality supervision and management is a key factor and training courses are available through the regulatory bodies, BSIA and IPSA. However, security firms who are not registered with either of these bodies are less likely than member companies to avail themselves of these training courses since they are an additional expense to the running of a company. If companies are unwilling to spend heavily on the training of senior personnel then the suggestion put forward by South (1988) that licensing, if and when introduced, must ensure that companies are responsible for providing or sponsoring at least basic (and opportunities for more advanced) training appear to have some merit. South goes on to suggest that a situation may arise where companies which have for years relied upon and encouraged recruitment of a low-qualified workforce, prepared to accept low wages and poor conditions, will say that staff are so poorly qualified that they do not merit better.

Little information relating to direct supervision of security staff in the United Kingdom is readily available but certain points may be extrapolated from information that is available.

Many security guards are poorly paid, receive low salaries and there is little scope for personal development leading to high turn over of staff. Good supervision would encourage personal development which should merit higher salaries leading to retention of staff.

Whilst it would be unfair to lay the blame for continuing low salaries at the feet of supervisors since there are obvious links with inadequate training and the profit margins of


security companies, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the factors that affect recruitment, training and retention are also likely to affect supervision.

Studies in the United States notably The Hallcrest Report II 1990 suggested that when serious incidents develop in the community which require assistance, the police officer can radio for help from another patrol unit or field supervisor. The security guard may be at a fixed post with no means of direct communication or may be dependent upon a moving field supervisor who makes contact once or twice during a shift. The Hallcrest study revealed that inadequate communications equipment and poor supervision were frequent complaints of contract security users. Good supervision and good communications and electronic equipment are an added expense, and The Hallcrest Report concluded that the successful security guard company, must balance a need for adequate training, supervision and management with the need to minimise overhead expenses in an industry with intense competition and low profit margins. It is interesting that The Hallcrest Report should link training, supervision and management because the better the training that management provides the less likely it is that personnel will require direct and constant supervision.

7. Training

The Rand Report 1971 created an impression that security staff in the United States were undertrained. However, it should be noted that the Rand study was conducted with a small sample and in one geographic location (Southern California), and it is generally agreed that the sample studied by Kakalik and Wildhorn is not typical of the American industry as a whole. Nevertheless poor training is constantly cited as a problem within the security industry. Anthony Potter (1975) provided valuable insight into the subject of ineffective security personnel with the "Private Security Vicious Circle" (see Fig. 1) (Ricks, Tillet, Van Meter 1994).

In 1988 Chuvalla and Gilmore were still pointing to the inadequacies of training in the security industry. More than fifteen years after Potter had identified the "Private Security Vicious Circle" Marsh (1991) was still calling for improved training and pointing to the unwillingness of employers to spend money in order to improve the education of their staff for fear that they would move on to better paid jobs.



PRIVATE SECURITY VICIOUS CIRCLE

Fig. 1

7.1 Training in Britain

There are indications that the "vicious circle" is not a uniquely American phenomenon. In a cost cutting exercise in the United Kingdom Sealink disposed of the services of the British Transport Police at Parkeston Quay Harwich and replaced them with security guards employed by Protective Security Systems whose officers were attested constables under Section 79 of The Harbour, Docks and Pier (Clauses) Act 1847. Under the Act these officers were given all the powers of a constable within the port area and up to one mile outside it.

According to the Police Federation of England and Wales the officers had undergone a two weeks "crash course" in The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in order to fit them for the office of constable. In comparison an officer of the

Transport Police undergoes a two year modular training programme.

It was estimated that Sealink would save £10,000 per year for each officer employed since the capitation rate per security officer was estimated at £15,000 as against £25,000 for each British Transport police officer. Michael Shersby, the Police Federation Parliamentary Advisor supported by seven other Members of Parliament introduced a bill to curb the use of The Harbours, Docks and Pier (Clauses) Act 1847 to appoint special constables. He said

"The job of policing harbours and docks should, in my view be carried out by regular police officers who undergo proper training and who are fully accountable to the public" (Police Review Feb. 1990).

The Shersby Bill failed to reach the statute books.

Research in the United States has tended to show that where salaries are low, training is poor.

Concern over the training of security patrols was also voiced by Merseyside Police when Range Security planned to begin uniformed patrols of the Hightown area. A Merseyside Police spokesman was reported as saying:

"The policing of public places is the sole responsibility of the police who are accountable to a locally elected police authority. Range Security employees would not be subject to checks on training, employment or integrity" (Police Review Feb. 1992)

Some companies within the industry are well aware of the need for improved training and the National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) which was set up in 1986 to reform the system of vocational qualifications in England, Wales and Northern Ireland provides a comprehensive framework based on high quality occupational standards set by the industry. Two industry Lead Bodies have been set up for the security industry.

Lead Bodies are groups made up of representatives of employers, trade unions, trade associations, professional

bodies, training providers and other interested organisations within industries.

Two Lead Bodies were necessary for the security industry, one to represent the security and emergency systems and one the guarding sectors of the industry.

The purpose of these Lead Bodies is to find out from employers in the industry what functions need to be carried out and to what standard.

The information thus obtained forms the standards of competence for the industry. These standards are then grouped into qualifications and decisions are made about the necessary performance required to obtain the relevant qualifications. The qualifications include national Vocational Qualifications and the Scottish Vocational Qualifications which are accredited by the National Council for Vocational qualifications and the Scottish Vocational Education Council respectively. The awarding bodies include City and Guilds, the British Technical Education Council, Royal Society of Arts and the Scottish Vocational Education Council. These qualifications are claimed to have the full backing of the government, the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry.

National Vocational Qualifications differ from the academic qualifications advocated by American researchers such as Marsh in that they are awarded on the basis of competence in the work place, rather than academic ability. They make definite statements of a person's ability to do their job to an industry defined standard.

Each NVQ or SVQ is made up of units of competence which set out the standard that the industry, through its Lead Body has indicated as the minimum standard. Each unit of competence is a stand alone measurement recognised by employers and can be obtained separately, leading towards a full qualification. Candidates are assessed either in the work place or at a recognised assessment centre.

NVQs and SVQs fit into a framework covering five levels from basic routine work to management level. Under a European Community Directive NVQs and SVQs are formally recognised throughout the European Community thus opening up areas of employment previously restricted by the labour laws of other member states.

Conversely equivalent qualifications possessed by a national of a member state must be recognised by the British security industry.

The potential for industrial espionage is obvious and would appear to make serious vetting crucial for those organisations employing contract security companies.

In Britain assessment of candidates is undertaken by a licensed assessor who has been trained by the Security Industry Training Organisation or a training establishment authorised by that organisation to standards defined by the Training and Development Lead Body. (Security Industry Lead Body 1992).

Although NVQs and SVQs are not achieved as a result of attendance at a course of formal training, the industry does offer courses to provide candidates with the relevant knowledge to reach the required standard for attainment of the vocational qualification. Providers of such training include the Security Industry Training Organisation, the International Professional Security Association and Group 4 Security (SITO 1992).

In an attempt to assist companies in the provision of basic job training and in order to develop a uniform standard across the industry, training courses are organised annually by the Security Industry Training Organisation. Although the level of training offered is not as demanding as that advocated by American researchers, the cost of such training in terms of time and finance are not prohibitive, yet such schemes are not used to their full potential by all companies within the industry.

One reason for reluctance to train is offered by Inspector Lund-Lack, who spent a year as Deputy Chief Officer of the Port of Felixstowe Police, when he suggests that the problem lies with government expecting a private company to ensure that enough money is made available for training and resources (McCarthy 1992).

Of all the problems besetting the American security industry training appeared to be a major problem, being related however tenuously to:

- a) Supervision - poor training means poor supervisors
- b) Pay - well trained staff would seek higher pay
- c) Regulation - lack of regulation meant lack of consistency of training throughout the industry
- d) Interaction and lack of training contributed to the poor image of the industry held by public police
- e) Vetting - where little or no vetting took place there was little training as employers did not regard employees as a long term asset worthy of development.

In Britain the industry has made determined efforts to address the training problem and these efforts are readily accessible to further research and evaluation. It is however, generally accepted that training initiatives in Britain will not be fully utilised without government regulation.

Lack of regulation and the question of how much knowledge security officers have of the powers they may or may not exercise have serious implications for the rights of the citizen. Behind the factory gates in a desperate economic climate research has shown that the rights and liberties of the citizen take second place to profit and that a private justice system prevails.

This research seeks to establish if and how the rights and liberties of the citizen are affected by the private policing of shopping malls.

8. Provision of Private Justice System

In 1976, The Private Security Council (PIAC) to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the United States published a report on sources of conflict between law enforcement and private security. The report appeared to show law enforcement to be quite critical of the motives of private security in not pursuing criminal prosecutions of all criminal incidents.

However, the 1981 Hallcrest Survey reported law enforcement executives as rating private security good or very good at reporting criminal incidents. However, the national survey revealed that for some crimes private organisations commonly avoid the public justice system altogether. It found that the overriding concern of the corporate entity was the impact of a particular loss incident on the overall operations of the company.

When a loss occurred, private security, in conjunction with other internal controls within the organisation was focused on preventing and deterring future losses resulting from similar incidents rather than on the offender involved in the incident. The Hallcrest Report cited this emphasis on loss prevention, in private sector criminal incident responses as a distinguishing characteristic of private security. Since the focus is on management practices of the company and not on the "offender", the treatment of the offender was found to vary greatly, from suspension without pay, dismissal, transfer, job reassignment, job redesign (elimination of some jobs duties) civil restitution agreements or criminal prosecution (Cunningham and Taylor 1985).

If not only management practice but security operative practice becomes the focus rather than the behaviour of the "offender" the question then arises as to whether what is

being examined is a justice system or an economic system. Shearing, Stenning and Addario (1985) discovered that security directors in Canada did not see their organisations as policing organisations and did not want any police powers seeing such powers as a handicap to the security system within an organisation. If employees do not abide by the conditions of service demanded by the employer they will be affected financially.

The fact that a person is engaged in a paying occupation indicates that money is a strong incentive to them and therefore a means of affecting their behaviour.

8.1 This Focus on Loss Rather than Crime

The acceptance by a corporate organisation that the importance of economic considerations is of as much concern to the employee as it is to them (the degree of wealth and therefore the importance attached to it may vary) leads to a focus on loss instead of crime. The focus on loss means that the framework of security is economic rather than criminal. Shearing and Stenning suggest that this change in terminology expresses a fundamental shift in the conception of social control and order maintenance in the private sector. They, in agreement with The Hallcrest Report suggest that the implications of defining a problem as a "loss" rather than as a "crime" highlight the differences in the systems of public and private policing. The behaviour which occurs in the private sector is seen as an injury to a private rather than a public interest. The problem is not defined in moral terms but in instrumental ones. The activity is characterised as a lessening of profit or as the opportunity for loss, rather than as a moral wrong. Such conceptual differences are significant. Guilt and sanctioning become items for negotiation and these negotiations are determined largely by economic circumstances. For instance who suffers most from the dismissal of someone with twenty years service the person dismissed or the employer who loses a wealth of experience?

The focus on loss (or on the opportunity for loss) entails a redefinition of the scope of order maintenance and social control.

Consequently, security activity is extended beyond those problems captured by the criminal justice system category of "crime" to include aspects of loss such as breaches of confidentiality, alcoholism, and absenteeism, worker injury and labour unrest, extended coffee or washroom breaks, health and safety hazards in the work place and waste of materials. Thus "corporate justice systems" tend to include in their jurisdiction any corporate "troubles" which would threaten profit or risk of loss. The traditional distinctions between civil and criminal law, so carefully maintained in the public system, are consequently, frequently blurred within corporate justice systems.

The question of blame is also defined differently focusing as much on those who create opportunities for loss as much as on those who actually cause losses.

Mr Rabbitts of the International Private Security Association would tend to support the findings of The Hallcrest Report and the views of Shearing, Stenning and Addario. He agrees that the main aim of the Security Industry in Britain is to minimise loss, and that such minimisation takes precedence over enforcing the law. He goes so far as to suggest that within a company, company policy takes precedence above the law of the land. He also agrees that the role of private security embraces the prevention of loss due to many causes other than crime. In spite of the breadth of a security officers duties from this economic rather than moral focus, in Britain at least many firms are reluctant to invest larger sums in the training of staff.

Management and operative practices have a single aim to maximise profits. Public and private policing differs not only in the type of justice they serve but also to the extent in which they have contact with the victims of social injustice. Behind factory gates and the shutters of shopping malls secured in the early evening, private police have

little or no contact with the homeless, the unemployed or the mentally ill.(3)

It is little wonder then that the two forms of policing have different perceptions of their role orientations and status and that co-operation is not as full as that advocated by Mason (1991).

9. Interaction and Co-operation with Public Police

As a result of survey and interview data The Hallcrest Report suggested that police and security organisations in the United States of America function largely as mutually exclusive organisations with relatively little interaction or co-operation between them. It was suggested that obstacles to interaction and co-operation included:

- a) different role orientations
- b) different perceptions of status
- c) lack of knowledge by law enforcement agencies about private security

Private security in the United States of America was not perceived by law enforcement agencies as an equal partner in crime prevention and control but rather as a junior or silent partner. There was, however, no open acknowledgement of any form of partnership. It was also found that negative stereotypes of private security are often generalised to all security personnel. Law enforcement officers with superior levels of education, training and pay tend to regard themselves as "professionals" and private security as non-professionals.

One Private Security Advisory Council Report quoted in The Hallcrest Report, states that the perceived status differential between law enforcement and private security created a lack of respect and communication which, in turn, precluded effective co-operation. Whilst some communication and exchange of information does occur it does not occur uniformly.

Five measures were cited by not only law enforcement officers but by proprietary and contract security managers as a means of improving private security. These in rank order were:

- a) more and better training
- b) mandated training
- c) improved selection processes
- d) higher wages
- e) establishment or improvement of licensing and regulation (Cunningham and Taylor 1985)

Shearing, Stenning and Addario suggest that the relationships between police and private security are not as clear cut as The Hallcrest Report would appear to indicate. They suggest that research in Britain, Canada and the United States showed that a sizeable number of positions within private security, particularly the more senior posts are filled by ex-police officers. It is suggested that from the point of view of public policing there are two consequences of particular relevance. Firstly the loss of resources by the public policing sector to the private sector. It is suggested that the inevitable consequence of this loss is that substantial public investment in the training and experience of public police officers is increasingly benefiting private rather than public interest. However in Britain at least the cross-over from police to private security usually occurs after retirement so that benefit to private security is not necessarily a loss to the public service.

The second policy issue concerns the possible sharing of information made possible by the "old boy networks" that have been developed through the movement of police personnel into private security positions.

Shearing, Stenning and Addario admit the difficulty of obtaining incontrovertible evidence that these networks enable private security persons to obtain confidential information available to police officers, as unauthorised divulgence of such information constitutes an offence in

Britain under The Official Secrets Acts and The Police Discipline Regulations and in Canada under Section 11 of The Criminal Code, Provisional Police Acts and Police Discipline Regulations (Shearing and Stenning 1980).

In contrast Lineman far from acknowledging the recruitment of ex-senior police officers as a benefit to the security industry for either of the reasons suggested by Shearing and Stenning sees them as having an adverse effect on the industry. He states:

"The industry is suffering from too many "second career" executives - ex-policemen or ex-military - installed in often senior management positions within security companies and security departments of client organisations.

Since such types are probably already receiving a fair sized pension, their salaries are often not commensurate with the job. This then has a serious deterrent effect, not only on any ambitious middle ranking executives inside the industry, but also on talented outsiders from other industries.

Few organisations seem to have woken up to the fact that the "club" atmosphere pervading security management is inappropriate to cope with an ever increasing rate of change and diversity of operations in the industry" (1986 pp 16-18).

He suggests that the implementation of a concerted, co-ordinated training effort for management and the cultivation of a career structure that embraces the whole industry would do more to improve the image and performance of the industry than the recruiting of ex-police officers (Ashworth 1986).

David Fletcher, Chief Executive of the British Security Industry Association frustrated at lack of government initiatives for regulation of the industry has called for meetings with the Association of Chief Police Officers to establish a Code of Practice for the industry, he believes that such a code should stipulate that police screen security staff. He believes that it is not good enough for the police to demand statutory regulation for the industry because with a conservative government it will not happen. (Police Review 20 Aug. 1993)

The industry itself appears to favour greater co-operation and interaction with the police on terms dictated by the police. It appears to want improved vetting of staff and has made firm strides towards providing the means for improving the education and training of personnel.

10. Conclusion

Historically British and American policing is argued to have developed as a response to similar needs and this holds true whether the argument is founded on a conservative or radical view point. The conservative view that population growth, increasing wealth and expanding towns resulting from increasing industrialisation led to increased crime and to the development of a new system of policing is argued on both sides of the Atlantic. Equally, radical commentators argue that industrialisation meant the need for a disciplined working class rather than tighter crime control. The review of the literature clearly shows that although the initial reasons for the development of a new policing system may have been similar in Britain and the United States any later development in both these countries was in response to the specific economic, political, industrial and social needs of each country, and this is especially true of private policing provision. This point is important because the bulk of research into private policing has been carried out in the United States and has not surprisingly had some influence on British research.

British research has tended to examine private policing in its wider context as a part of the social control and justice system and Johnston argues that this is not unreasonable as the history of policing in Britain shows that policing has always been undertaken by a mixture of public, private and quasi public agents with no clear break between the new and old forms of policing.

Research in both Britain and the North America suggests that there are strong negative perceptions of the average security officer particularly with respect to vetting,

regulation, training, supervision and pay. Private security tends to be seen as serving the private needs of special interest groups rather than the general public. The post war growth of the industry together with its increasing involvement in areas of public safety and protection and continuing expansion into areas of crime control causes grave concern to some senior police officers, politicians and academics.

The following chapter will examine in more depth some of the theoretical concepts used to explain the continuing development and expansion of the private security industry and will focus these concepts on one particular sector of the contract guarding division of the industry, that is the private policing of shopping centres.

NOTES

- (1) Johnston (1992) maintain that histories of policing are dominated by what is termed the Anglo American Model. since this model predicates similar reason for emergence of policing both private and public in England and North America, the model is used as a basis for examining contemporary studies of policing and security in England, North America and Canada. (page 3)

- (2) The study claims that there is an over reliance on the wealth of information produced by North American research. Due to the paucity of research into the English Security Industry the inclusion of North American research findings for historical and comparative reasons was a necessity that could not be avoided. (page 9)

- (3) In general private security patrols have less contact with the socially disenfranchised and the deprived. However as private security encroaches further into the public policing arena this contact is increasing particularly with respect to those security firms who are now patrolling public space such as bus stations, parks, streets, etc. (page 44)

CONCEPTS OF PRIVATE SECURITY

This chapter will examine a number of theoretical concepts with a view to arriving at an understanding of how the private security industry continues to expand and develop in spite of the criticisms levelled against it. Any conclusions drawn will then be focused on one particular sector of the industry, that is the provision of private policing in shopping centres.

1. The Junior Partner Theory

Much research in the past has focused on the relationship between private security organisations and police personnel. The result has been that descriptions of the police/security relationship have tended to assume either overlapping interests between police and security forces or a similarity of policing styles. In other words security personnel have been thought to do on private property what public police do on public property. Given this concept, it is not surprising that the theoretical perspective that has received most currency is the idea that these two policing systems work together as partners in the fight against crime. That is police and private security forces have been thought to share common objectives, in particular the protection of society and to co-operate with each other to achieve these ends. The critical difference between police and private security, in this view, is the fact that they are supported and directed by different sectors of the economy. Both police and security spokespersons who support this view agree that the police occupy the senior and leadership role in this partnership. Private security personnel are viewed as junior partners in the business of maintaining order, assisting the police in their activities and deferring to them as they go about their duties. This view of private security clearly implies that its development does not in any way challenge or

threaten the established order and consequently deserves little attention (Shearing , Stenning and Addario 1985).

South (1989) argues that it was this notion of assisting the police that provided some of the context for the serious take-off of private security in the post-war years of the 1940's and 1950's. The diverse nature of sources of problems facing the police in those years reflected social and economic change, not least increased geographic mobility. A police service that was seen by the sympathetic as suffering from poor pay and poor working conditions with a declining establishment of officers was also seen by critics and some senior police spokespersons as "losing the war against crime". Private security emerged out of this atmosphere of crisis making strong claims to be able to help with the control of crime, but stressing an emphasis on, and orientation to, prevention.

It would appear that this junior and preventative stance was politically acceptable at the level of basic functions ancillary to those of the police, since it has enabled private security in Britain to operate without government regulation of vetting, training pay or supervision. Furthermore the fact that private security was presented in a junior partner role implied that standards of pay, supervision and training were not required to be of as high a standard as those required of the public police.

It would appear that the social and economic trends of the 1990's are similarly maintaining and perhaps accelerating the encroachment of private security into the public policing arena. The Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute research into police functions set up by Michael Howard, Home Secretary in 1993 was to examine core police services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks. Increasing the involvement of private security in what has hitherto been seen as the public policing role is likely to increase demands for regulation of the industry and would logically require improvements in training.

At present security officers may exercise a citizen's power of arrest, they do not have powers of stop and search under The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 they would not be involved in the search of premises or the seizure of property found on persons or premises to a like extent as the public police. If private security detain a person, the junior partner stance stresses that such persons would be handed over to the public police as soon as possible. This means that there is little requirement for security officers to be trained in the detention, treatment and questioning of persons and there will be no requirement for training in identification procedures as laid down in the Codes of Practice to The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Not only does the Junior Partner theory imply a lower level of policing based on prevention and therefore requiring a lower level of vetting, supervision, pay, regulation and training, it implies and enjoys a high degree of interaction and co-operation with the public police upon whom private security relies for a comprehensive back-up service. Public provision of this extensive back-up service at public cost may be one reason why the security industry stresses its subservient role to the public police. R. Bacon, a director of Securicor Ltd stated:

"It cannot be stressed too often that industrial security has never attempted to usurp the functions of the police. It is an entirely utopian theory that security in its broadest sense is a police responsibility. No police force has ever achieved, or is ever likely to achieve, such a predominance in manpower that it can answer all the calls of individuals for protection" (1972 p 39)

Often cited as further evidence of the junior role is the fact that many security forces (both in-house and contract) maintain policies under which security employees are required to call in the public police to take over a "case" as soon as any significant law enforcement powers are considered necessary, despite the fact that in many cases, the security employees have quite adequate powers in law (Shearing and Stenning 1980).

The law enforcement powers available to security employees in England and Wales were detailed in Chapter 1.

What has to be considered is the fact that misuse of these powers could result in litigation and if the employer is found to be vicariously liable, costs could lie with him. Obviously where security officers are poorly trained and poorly supervised the back-up service provided by the public police becomes an economic necessity. Since the Junior Partner role is not only politically acceptable but operationally economic it has always been in the interests of private security not to mount any direct challenge in the area of what are seen as "core" policing functions.

At present there is considerable muddle and concern about the role of the police, in public opinion as well as official documents. Current Home Office models of policing depart from much previous thinking in the matter, this departure is likely to down grade some current police functions to the ancillary level suitable to provision by private enterprise. Evidence of government intent to hive off public police functions is provided by some of the key questions which the Independent Committee of the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute have examined. These included.

1. What police services do the public want and need?
2. What are the core tasks of the police? How and by whom should those core tasks be defined? What systems are most appropriate for accomplishing these tasks?
3. What should be the role of other agencies - voluntary, private and statutory in delivering what might be termed policing services?
4. Are the boundaries and the division of labour between these agencies and the police properly drawn and regulated?

5. What works, how for example, can crime best be prevented and what role should the police play in its prevention?

The Committee recognised that the causes of crime are complex and deep rooted and they echo Bacon's (1972) statement that it is totally unrealistic to imagine that crime prevention might be tackled by the police alone. They also recognised that there is an ever-growing demand on the part of the public for more policing, one consequence of which, has been the largely unregulated growth of private security (Newburn and Morgan 1994).

According to the conservative-orthodox view the emergence of the modern public police in England in the early 19th century was due to widespread dissatisfaction with the post crime apprehension policies of private initiatives in force at that time (Shearing and Stenning 1980). It is ironic that today this same cry of dissatisfaction is laid at the feet of the public police. Implicit in the Junior Partner stance is a preventative before - the - fact approach which is seen in sharp contrast to the after - the - fact approach that economic and political circumstances often force on the public police. Thus it is under the very banner that the public police once marched that security and in particular contract security now sells its services.

Two crucial points are developed from the above observation, firstly, that private security is no longer selling itself as an additional service to the public police but as an alternative. Secondly, that whilst purporting to be a preventative before - the - fact force it does have an extensive after - the fact effect, albeit indirectly by making use of the after - the - fact facilities of the public police.

This apparent volte-face by private security is not as startling as it may seem. Philips (1989) comments that privately run security services and other forms of private

police are the modern analogy of the felons associations of the 18th century. Although some associations did operate their own uniformed patrols with a view to preventing crime, these private institutions made up of local property owners who came together to form organisations and raise funds existed for the prime purpose of finding, arresting and prosecuting offenders against themselves and their property, that is, they exercised a substantial after - the - fact function.

The similarities between felons associations and modern private security do not end with what the former did and the latter appear to be moving towards now but are also evident in the paucity of reliable information about private security. A parliamentary enquiry (1836) listed 189 associations active in the period 1830-1834 whilst The Report of the Royal commission on a Constabulary Force for England and Wales 1893 stated:

"It appears that there are upwards of 500 voluntary associations for promoting the apprehension and prosecution of felons."
(Philips 1989 p 120)

Whilst Johnston (1992) stresses that there was no clear break between the demise of private provision and the emergence of the "New Police", Philips (1989) describes the relationship between prosecution associations and the "New Police" as complex. London associations by and large supported police reforms whilst individual members especially those in rural associations saw no reason why they should have to pay rates to support the protection of other people's property. He maintains that there is no simple connection between the relationship of private associations and the emergent public police. Parallels can be drawn with the relationship between today's private security and public police. Whilst some companies are happy to retain the Junior Partner role and invite regulation and public police advice, other companies see no reason for regulation and are now mounting a direct challenge presenting themselves as an alternative, and what some leading politicians have described as a cut price police force (Police Review 1992).

South (1989) saw little complexity in his explanation of the changing police/security relationship in the 1940's and 1950's.

He cites social and economic change as having a major impact on the relationship, and as giving rise to the junior partner perspective. However, it should not be surprising that the accelerated socio-economic changes of the past fifty years have had a profound effect on the police/security relationship. It is not sufficient to merely examine the relationship itself, for as critical criminologists suggest about crime, the forces which have brought it into being and which have transformed it over time should be examined. This must, then surely apply to the private police/public police relationship.

The acceptance of the idea of external forces acting on the police/security relationship implies acceptance of a relationship in a permanent state of flux. The following perspectives are predicated on the concept of a relationship in flux.

2. Economic Theory

Historians generally accepted that prosecution associations came into being because of the difficulty and cost of detection and arrest and the cost of prosecution for the individual. With the emergence and development of the "New Police" the prosecution of offenders eventually became a part of their remit and the main "raison d'etre" for the prosecution associations ceased to exist. Schubert (1981) has argued that the large numbers of people who founded and joined associations were attacking the inadequacies of the existing system and demanding its substantial reform, this argument suggests that the prosecution associations were forerunners of the public police rather than private security. It is suggested that some association members favoured replacing the old lax system of parish constables with a stricter Beccarian - Benthamite criminal law, in which detection of an offence would be followed by certainty of

prosecution and punishment, in order to deter others from transgressing. A criminal law that promised protection from danger, safety, and freedom from doubt, care and anxiety (Philips 1989).

It has been observed that Chadwick and his utilitarian associates ultimately aimed to replace the system of parish constables and prosecution associations with the establishment of a national police force (Philips 1989). Utilitarianism predicated on the "Greatest Happiness Principle" promised that:

"the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyment, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality and the rule for measuring it against quantity being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self consciousness and self observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison.

This is necessarily the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be to the greatest extent possible secured by all mankind."
(S Mill 1861)

The public police were born out of such promises, promises that they could never realistically hope to fulfil no matter how hard they tried, to the point where:

"the service has become the victim of an unreal middle class expectation of the universally benevolent policeman - an expectation impossible to sustain. Policy and methods of policing will be determined by the nature of the community to be policed and the resources available to carry out the task" (Griffiths 1984).

This fact has not been lost on the providers of security services and those who expound economic theories to explain the expansion of the industry.

In essence economic theories view security as a commodity to be bought and sold in the market place. Different commentators emphasise different aspects of "the packaging" of this product and its appeal to the consumer.

The Oxford English dictionary defines the condition of security in terms of protection from danger, safety, and freedom from doubt, care, anxiety or apprehension. Spitzer (1989) has questioned how this condition and the feelings that surround it are turned into a commodity that can be purchased in the market place. The first thing that became apparent to Spitzer was that security involves much more than the "rules and precepts for human conduct", because the boundaries around security products and services are not as clear as they may seem. Efforts to achieve safety, freedom from danger, assurance and confidence are essential features of everyday life under capitalist as well as other kinds of social arrangements. Thus, argues Spitzer, there is a need to distinguish between those aspects of the "security market" which have emerged to address directly the safety of persons and property and those in which the connection to security is less tangible and direct. The attractiveness and market value of a broad range of commodities is enhanced precisely because they promise a greater degree of safety which is a social need that can be activated in a wide range of decisions to consume. Virtually all commodities can be presented or promoted and ultimately consumed because of their claim to free the consumer from worry, trouble or harm. Examples of this interpenetration between specialised security products and services which are more attractive because they make us feel more secure are the purchase of private houses in good neighbourhoods rather than living in public housing estates, purchase of private cars as opposed to the use of risky public transport. Whilst such products may be marketed as enhancing security it is suggested that in actual fact they increase the opportunities for predacious activities.

"Cars, motor cycles, hi-fi equipment, etc., have become standard property and are poorly protected. Popularity of second homes, cars parked on streets, more and more people insured against theft with reporting becoming a requisite to being refunded or exonerated from civil liability. By lodging a complaint the victims are looking for the state to face up to a massive demand which in most cases remains largely unsatisfied. The public's attitudes and expectations clearly reveal

a generally held belief that state control means that the police and the law are responsible for finding the solution. In practice the police are increasingly unable to fulfil these expectations and public dissatisfaction increases" (Levy and Ocgetau 1987 p 253).

The Benthamite principles on which not just the police but the other branches of the welfare state were founded probably never were physically, economically or politically attainable. The police never have been or are never likely to be in a position to please all the nation, all the time, so long as their remit is perceived as bringing about an "existence free from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyment for all mankind." Private security make much more modest claims and to smaller sectors of the populace. The public police foot patrol officer has for economic and organisational reasons given way to a motorised patrol officer whose primary job involves reacting to citizens' requests for service. These requests for service are met by an organisation whose performance is measured primarily in terms of detection and punishment. Private security forces, on the other hand, have selected foot patrol as their principle means of surveillance (Shearing and Stenning 1981).

Research has shown that the patrolling officer is not necessarily the most effective and efficient way of reducing crime levels (Elliot 1973, Bright 1969). However, foot patrols have been found to reduce fear of crime. Not surprisingly research has confirmed what private security had long since identified, that is, that people are willing to pay for security patrols (Johnston 1994).

Many commentators have linked dissatisfaction with the public police to the expansion of private security whilst recognising that such dissatisfaction is part of a wider fiscal crises in many nation states. In this view private security is seen as filling the vacuum that has been created by the public police for budgetary or organisational reasons. A prime example of this is Sealink's decision to dispense with the service of the British Transport Police at Harwich

and replace them with officers employed by Protective Security Systems. This decision was defended not only on the grounds that Sealink saved £10,000 for each British Transport Police Officer replaced by a security officer but Sir John Wheeler commenting on the decision remarked:

Sealink is right to sack them
Senior management has become complacent and probably inefficient" (Police Review 24.2.89)

The reference to the "probable inefficiency" of senior management emphasises how strongly perceptions rather than facts underpin choices of security provision.

However, police forces such as the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police are not seen by some commentators as public or civil police forces. Lidstone (1980) draws a three fold distinction between the forty three forces in England and Wales, forces created by statute such as the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police and uniformed private security officers with citizens powers. Such distinctions can be expanded (Johnston 1992) to take in regulatory bodies, governmental and quasi governmental agencies. Johnston refers to the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police as hybrid police forces in recognition of their dual policing/security role.

Whilst such distinctions may have some relevance in terms of jurisdiction, they are increasingly becoming irrelevant in terms of vetting, pay, regulation, interaction and co-operation and most certainly training. Forces such as the Ministry of Defence Police, British Transport Police, Port of Liverpool Police, Dover Harbour Board Police, the Port of London Police and the Royal Parks Police all take the nationally recognised Objective Structured, Performance Related Promotion Examination which in theory means that successful candidates are qualified to apply for the relevant post in any police force. The Port of Liverpool Police have excellent liaison with Merseyside Police on training matters, as does Dover Harbour Board Police with Kent Constabulary.

The Port of London Police are trained to the same standards as the Metropolitan Police, whilst the Royal Parks Police carry out their initial training at Home Office district training centres at Ashford and Cwmbrn. The British Transport Police also use Home Office district training centres for initial training and whilst maintaining their own training centre, they, like the Ministry of Defence Police make extensive use of Home Office training facilities such as the Central Planning and Training Unit and the Police Staff College (Hannon and Murphy 1992).

Two important issues are raised here, firstly that as the forty three forces of England and Wales and the "Hybrid Forces" converge in terms of those areas arousing greatest criticism of private security, the hybrid forces appear to be at greatest risk from the incursions of private security. Some private security operations appear to be threatened by an even cheaper and historically older participant in the policing function. Secondly the selling of spare training capacity by Home Office forces is indicative of the fact that economic forces are acting on the public police. Whilst the British Transport Police have lost posts to contract security, who have secured constabulary powers under The Harbour, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, Ministry of Defence Police officers are concerned that they will be replaced by the in-house security officers of the Ministry of Defence Guard Service who themselves now appear to be under threat from the military option of Military Home Service Engagement or Local Service Engagement Personnel. That such military options for the provision of some policing functions is now under serious consideration as an alternative to a statutory police force and indeed private police services should come as no surprise. The use of military personnel in the policing function was very much a part of the "unsatisfactory system" that led to the emergence of the "New Police". Peel himself used the army in small detachments, as a de-facto rural police during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars, which Hay and Snyder (1989) suggest was an evident source of his original idea for policing. What is fascinating here is that as the public police move further

and further away from Peel's original policing concept, and private security move to take on more and more of what were once seen as "core" police functions, the military are now set to enter the policing arena in the Junior Partner role. At the moment the military option is being suggested for a clearly defined and limited sphere but just as social and economic changes have drastically affected the police/security relationship over the past fifty years, changing international and strategic relationships are now driving the military to find new markets for its expertise. Although parallels can be drawn with significant changes throughout the history of policing it would be wrong to assert that what is now happening is a return to the past. The trends that are occurring now are occurring within a new and different social, political and economic climate. What is now being experienced is a departure whose significance cannot be grasped by examining previous epochs but rather needs to be understood within the network of contemporary social relations, both nationally and internationally. The change in the nature of privatisation in recent years is characterised by a change from specialised to generalised provision, from backdrop services to front line provision, from local authority based schemes of contracting out to the decentralisation and erosion of state monopolies (Ascher 1987). Whilst the general public may have come to terms with the idea that the state is no longer the natural provider of such services as health care, education, transport and communications thereby accepting a major transformation in the nature of contemporary social and political relations, proposals to privatise parts of the criminal justice system have elicited a peculiar set of responses (Matthews 1989).

It is widely assumed that whatever may have been implemented in other areas of social life, the provision of laws, punishment and crime control constitute a unique and privileged realm of activity that should be provided by the state. It is argued that one of the essential characteristics of the state is its claim to exercise a monopoly over the use of legitimate force.

The exercise of coercive power and the distribution of punishment are held to have profound social and symbolic implications which cannot be safely discharged to private and particular interests (Matthews 1989)

The validity of such an assumption is questionable, and as Shearing and Stenning (1981) point out even a cursory examination of the principal agencies involved reveals that they already incorporate personnel who are not directly in the employment of the state. The number of private security police in Britain, America and Canada is estimated to exceed the number of public police.

Economic theories of policing do not see the privatisation of certain criminal justice functions as having such profound severe and symbolic associations. It is argued that there is an important distinction between the provision and the administration of goods and services. Whilst it has been assumed that wherever possible, the state should both supply and take responsibility for the implementation of criminal justice and that its failure to perform either of these functions would undermine its legitimacy, it is becoming increasingly apparent that many services can be readily provided by a range of non state agencies. The contracting out of youth services has not destabilised the juvenile justice system, on the contrary the incorporation and expansion of these semi autonomous agencies appear to have extended both the range and depth of state authority. Thus it appears that as long as the state exercises ultimate responsibility, it can effectively disengage from the immediate provision of certain services without necessarily incurring any significant disadvantages (South 1988).

The argument from public police and private security alike is that the state is failing to exercise this ultimate responsibility. The lack of regulation, adequate vetting and an insistence on a minimum level of training are quoted as instances of state failure to accept its responsibility. (Police Review 8.4.94) (Police Review 20.8.93). The watching brief of F3 Department of the Home Office in respect of private security is unlikely to be expanded when the

Chancellor of the Exchequer sees one of the purposes of the government's Fundamental Expenditure Reviews as identifying activities from which the state might withdraw altogether (The Guardian 2.8.94). The exercise of increased governmental responsibility for private policing is directly opposed to stated government aims. As long as government focuses on the "limited" and junior partner role of private security they can continue to argue that self regulation is both politically and economically acceptable. However, if the proposed Military Home Service Engagement and Local Service Engagement options become reality, an organisation that is highly regulated, well supervised and trained re-enters the policing arena. Although the use of such policing/security agencies is envisaged as being restricted to certain Defence Establishments, there is a precedent for its use beyond these boundaries. If the military seek to assume the Junior Partner mantle, private security will be forced to bid for other policing functions wherever they arise.

As a result of government police reforms it is likely that further policing opportunities will be opened up to private security. Reiner (1994) claims that the whole package of recent police reforms is predicated upon a single premise stated in the White Paper (1993) preceding The Police and Magistrates Courts Bill.

"The main job of the Police is to catch criminals
(para 2.2)

It is claimed that the paragraph ignores inconvenient facts such as, only 18 per cent of calls to the police are about crime and only 40 per cent of police officers' time is spent dealing directly with crime. Reiner goes on to suggest that the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks undertaken by the Independent Committee of the Home Office Review team was launched to flesh out what had already been decided by government. The Home Office team was asked to examine the services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the most cost effective way of delivering ancillary tasks.

In other words the inquiry started from a taken for granted concept of core versus ancillary services, and was charged only with ascertaining which concrete activities fall on either side of the line, and which would be most "cost effective" for the police to jettison (Reiner 1994).

In redefining the role of the police, government were ignoring the fact that the police were peace-keepers rather than law-enforcers because the public called upon them to help in many situations not involving any crime. Even where the legal ingredients of an offence were potentially involved, with the consent of the parties and the community the police routinely handled trouble without involving the criminal process, except as a last resort or where the offence was generally regarded as serious (Banton 1964).

The exercise of such discretion and the service role of the police gave valuable opportunities for non-coercive contact with the public, intelligence gathering and "bridge building".

Redefining the police role as coercive, as the catching of criminals ignores the fact that it is rarely clear from the nature of calls made initially to the police what type of incident is occurring (Waddington 1993). What may start out as a service call many eventually become a public disorder or even crime incident.

Important issues are raised by the prospect of private security taking over the service role as Shearing and Stenning (1985) have identified, in their Canadian research what are considered offences in the criminal justice system are often considered opportunities for loss by private security and are dealt with differently. This would mean that incidents which the parties and the community consider should be dealt with by the courts do not in fact enter the criminal justice system.

Incidents that have potential for serious disorder may have been resolved by the public police without recourse to coercion. Where violence does erupt out of an incident dealt with by private security the public police would be forced into a coercive response.

Reiner (1994) argues that policing is a scarce resource and how much of it a society can afford to provide is ultimately a political question.

He suggests that in the face of conflicting demands for service, priorities must be decided upon. These priorities should be arrived at openly in an accountable way, but in the name of economy current police reforms in Britain are moving away from this position of accountability.

Radical Theorists argue that coercive unaccountability always has been the true prerogative of the public police and that the role of private security is similar but hidden in the private arena. Both systems are seen as unfair, ineffectual and as far as the public police are concerned in a state of deterioration (Turk 1987).

3. Radical Theories

In general Radical Theories see policing as being about power and specifically about the power of the state and capitalist interests to regulate the populace and the labour force, since both treat the populace as a means to an end rather than as an end in themselves. Capitalism is regarded as the new ruling class and the state as its guardian. It is accepted that a complex society requires diverse sets of legitimation in order to be efficient, to convert power into authority.

Like Junior Partner theories radical perspectives view the public police and private security as having the same goal, in this case the maintenance and protection of private property and of the alliance between capital and the state. Radical theorists suggest that the structure of formal law under such circumstances is so constituted as to create two kinds of citizenship and responsibility. The labour forces of industrial society (whether employed or not, and at whatever level of qualification - so long as they are sellers of labour) will be bound by criminal law and penal sanction.

The state and the owners of labour will be bound only by a civil law which regulates their competition between each other.

Some radical theorists suggest that there is not only different application of the law (private justice systems), but also that the state and the owners of capital and labour, irrespective of particular battles between interest groups at particular moments of historical development are "beyond incrimination" and most significantly, beyond "criminal sanction" (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973).

Historians agree that between the middle of the 18th century and the middle of the 19th century the word police underwent a profound shift of connotation in Britain. Whereas it had originally meant broad social regulation, especially of those ancient concerns of governments about cities: supplying them with food, controlling nuisances and preventing popular disorders it came to be redefined as a uniformed bureaucratised agency of state law enforcement, with a much more emotive set of associated connotations. This definition of policing is the one that has remained to this time. Regular foot patrols, co-ordinated surveillance and the discriminating use of force were held to be the distinguishing marks of the new police (Hay and Snyder 1989). Storch (1989) suggests that this redefinition of the term policing came about because the ruling elites of the early 19th century were not willing to tolerate the levels of petty crime, popular disturbance and festive tumult that had been acceptable to their forebears. He argues that The Metropolitan Police Act 1829 was one of the major charters of an attempt to create a new baseline of urban order and decorum.

Whereas orthodox commentators such as Critchley (1979) and Reith (1952) tend to suggest that the emergence of the new police was uncontested and neutral in its social impact, more recent studies of police history tend to suggest that this was not the case (Emsley 1987) and (Jones 1982).

There were in fact deep constitutional objections by the gentry in the 18th century and suspicions that lingered on into the 19th century. There was initial and often violent hostility by the labouring classes before the new police received a tentative and then enthusiastic welcome from the urban middle classes. These recent studies of police history have emphasised how political, how much concerned with the social and institutional bases of class power, both at national and local level, the new police were from their beginning.

The new police are presented as being used in the attack on unregulated street trading, the control of vagrants and the enforcement of "middle class" morality and decorum in public places. Private police are viewed as enforcing a "middle class" work ethic in private places. South (1987) quotes the Law Book of Cowley's Iron Works as representing an entire civil and penal code for the governance and regulation of the labour force.

Shearing and Stenning (1987) also examine the relationship of the order maintaining institutions in Canada from a power perspective. They suggest that the post war expansion of the private policing sector has revolutionary implications for the nature of modern social control, arguing that it is unlikely that a decrease in demand for, and use of private policing services will occur. It is argued that there are many advantages to commercial customers in having security services directly answerable to themselves giving them the flexibility of a private justice system. That a definite move towards informal legal and order maintaining systems is occurring cannot be denied (South 1989). The fact that this shift in law enforcement has occurred almost unnoticed is according to Henry (1983) the fault of social theorists. Many social theorists develop analytical models of the legal system in order to determine the hallmark of the distinctively legal and to delineate clearly the lines of demarcation between the legal system and other subsystems of the social order.

By omitting to consider the body of informal behavioural imperatives, norms and obligations they contribute to, rather than analyse, the very ideological processes that render formal law the dominating social control institution.

Henry sees sociologists and anthropologists clearly and uncomfortably demonstrating that law is formulated in a socio-political context; that it serves some interests rather than others; that different social structures or forms of societal organisation display different forms of law and legal systems and that a combination of coercive and ideological processes are at work to ensure the continuation of existing systems of law and through these the perpetuation of existing social structures. Selznick (1968), Shearing and Stenning (1985) tend to argue in support of Henry's suggestion that law serves some interests rather than others and that the changes that are occurring in policing are of a qualitative nature reflecting the priorities of the "new feudalism" of the modern corporate community.

Whilst radical theorists such as Foucault acknowledge that there are important differences between formal and informal justice systems, they nevertheless point to the fact that at the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism (Foucault 1977). From this point of view, although the particular "elite" influencing social control policies may change, the fundamental relationship highlighted by Henry remains the same, the powerful make the policy which controls the masses. In stark contrast to orthodox commentators radical theorists do not see power as being inevitably vested in the state, the sovereign or the law. Whilst they see important differences between judicial penalty and disciplinary penalty, "the former operates by referring to laws and judicial texts and the latter by referring to observable behaviour" (Hussein p 973), they see power "per se" as wielded by a minor elite.

Whether or not power is a negative conception it is exercised in different ways by publicly accountable and unaccountable law enforcement agents. Generally administrative law enforcement agents and privately employed police have greater discretionary powers to intrude upon private space than do the public police. This greater discretion is partly due to the fact that compliance and deterrence forms of law enforcement have different objectives.

The principle objective of compliance law enforcement is to ensure conformity by a demonstration that the means are available to comply or that actions have been taken to prevent infractions of rules or violations of laws (Reiss J 1987). Deterrence law enforcement's principal objective is to ensure conformity by detecting violations in the future. Compliance systems are premonitory and deterrence systems are post-monitory. Compliance systems manipulate means that induce conformity, deterrence systems react to events after they occur. The public police are formally organised around the deterrence model of detection (arrest and punish) and informally organised around a peace-keeping model. Private policing is formally organised around maintaining private orders and preventing their disruption. Their role in enforcing the criminal law was seen as being limited to mobilising the public police (Shearing and Stenning 1981). The informal role of private police in Britain with their attestation as constables, their use in public streets and semi public places such as shopping centres is rapidly expanding so that they are now exercising their power not only in compliance systems but in deterrence systems which for them have no in-built accounting procedures.

Because most private police cannot readily turn to a body of law or to legal roles and procedures to legitimate their actions, they normally justify their actions in terms of "management practice" rather than legal authority. Ericson and Shearing (1986) suggest that in everyday police work formal legal rules are used as an enabling device to justify the particular actions a police officer wishes to take rather than being a determinant of those actions.

If private police officers lacking the justification of constabulary powers can nevertheless feel justified by "management practice" they are in their own minds empowered to act. In either case law enforcement personnel are given authority to exercise power over others. This power exercised by state and capitalist interest often goes unquestioned because of fear, not so much fear of the state or commercial interests but fear which results quite often as an indirect result of their activities.

Most environments not only abound with physical cues that indicate whether an individual's private space is threatened but with behavioural ones that lead people to see their fellow human beings as menacing and threatening, for example loitering youths, intoxicated persons and beggars, some of whom threaten by actual contact. Whenever such people congregate in large numbers they may create a "climate of fear". As activities such as shopping move off the open streets into semi public areas such as shopping centres the responsibility for tackling the "climate of fear" ceases to be the sole responsibility of the public police and is shared with private security agencies. In the case of both public and private police, empowerment to act is attributable in some degree to collective feelings of insecurity (or lack of power) of the general public.

4. Consumer Hypothesis

Feelings of insecurity can be alleviated or reduced according to the wealth of an individual or group of individuals, since wealth can purchase products or services which generate security effects. Commercial interests have not been slow to recognise the lucrative potential of endowing any product with security enhancing features and as a result security commodities can never be completely differentiated from commodities which are invested with security attributes or generate security effects. Once it is acknowledged that the commodification of security is intimately related to individual and collective feelings of insecurity it is clear

that any analysis of security provision must investigate the subjectivity of the consumer and understand the forces shaping his or her security needs (Spitzer 1989).

The public police never have had or are unlikely ever to have the time or the resources to satisfy consumer subjectivity by protecting against the mere possibility of crime. Perhaps because of an unrealistic appreciation of what can be achieved they are perceived by the public as coping inadequately with actual problems. The police view is not necessarily that "the customer is always right."

Sir Kenneth Newman in his report of 1984 stated:

"It is important that members of the public should have a realistic appreciation of what police can or cannot achieve so too it is necessary that police officers expectations are shaped upon the reality of the present and not upon some imprecise aspirations of perfection based on either past or present fantasies" (1984 p 3).

It is the duty of the public police to serve all sections of the public without fear or favour, it has made attempts in recent years to present itself not so much as a force exerting the power of the state but as a service at the disposal of all. This view was neatly encapsulated by Oxford (1984) when he suggested that police forces are not an arm of the state but servants of the community whose confidence they must secure. He believed that success in this depended upon police officers understanding the fears and apprehensions of all groups of people within the community including ethnic minorities, and doing whatever was necessary to enable all citizens to go about their lawful business.

Because the client base for individual security firms is much smaller than that of the public police and because the concerns, fear and apprehensions of clients tend to be similar the expectations of clients with regard to security firms are much more realistic than the expectations of the public with regard to the police. The fundamentally different orientation of security personnel also means that they are better able to satisfy client demand.

The orientation of security personnel in respect of the resolution of security incidents is expressed in terms of "loss" to capital and the "risk" of future loss. The orientation of the public police is conceived of principally in terms of "crimes" against the public interest and the "guilt" of offenders.

The result of defining a problem as a "loss" rather than a "crime" is to make apparent the different demands on the systems of public and private policing.

For private policing the problem is not defined in moral terms but instrumental ones with a given activity being characterised as a lessening of profit or as the opportunity for loss, rather than a moral wrong. Guilt and sanctioning become items for negotiation, and these negotiations are determined largely by economic circumstances. It is felt by corporate entities that the criminal justice system takes too little notice of the corporate victims' perspective and interest; restitution is easier to arrange privately rather than publicly (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985).

For the consumer whose private interests are more important to him/her than the public interest, a form of policing that provides an alternative to the criminal justice system has to be an attractive proposition. Because of the duties of the office of constable the public police are at a disadvantage in competing in the alternative justice "market".

"The duties of a constable derive from his office and have long been thought to be common law duties. However in *George versus Garland* (1980) it was held that the obligations of a police officer had become statutory duties because they are now expressed in the form of delegated legislation (Regulation 22 Police Regulations (1979) S. I. 1979 No. 1470) (Clayton and Tomlinson 1987 p 25).

Johnston (1994) recognises that many forms of private policing emerge at least in part, through user demand. In this respect they are by definition more "user friendly" than many public police services.

The very fact that private security is less concerned with the prosecution of offenders means that historically it has been oriented to the needs of victims. Johnston acknowledges that public police forces have begun to meet the challenge of victims' needs in recent years but argues that they are unlikely to match the private sector in this regard because of their responsibility for bringing offenders to justice. Corporate bodies will and do use the public police and the criminal justice system but in the resolution of "private" conflicts this is seen as a last resort. In dealing internally with security incidents the organisation retains control over the development and resolution of the case (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985).

In Houston and other urban areas throughout the United States a fundamental shift in the method of delivery of policing services is emerging, partly in response to fiscal constraints and partly in an attempt to make police services more "user friendly". The method has been identified as consumer - controlled or client - directed public police employed with private contracts. Two of the primary premises upon which consumer - controlled policing is based are accountability and productivity.

Typically, police officers who engage in off-duty employment are assigned to specific geographical areas with specific tasks. Collectively, the consumers who are funding such service evaluate the officer's performance, which is directly related to the continuation of employment of that officer. As a result, the officer recognises the importance of establishing positive relationships with consumers of the service and develops innovative approaches to community problems. In contrast the public police are paid through the compilation of taxes and are therefore, answerable to every business and citizen in the city resulting in the development of a massive bureaucratised citizen - police relationship (Vardalis 1992). The results of Vardalis's inquiry suggest that employment of public police may not only be extensive in Houston, Texas, but a developing trend of consumption of user fee police service.

What is increasingly becoming apparent not just in the United States but in most of the developed world including Britain is that those with the ability to pay can choose not only the policing services that they want but also the justice system that best suits their needs. Johnston highlights the fact that it is not just commercial interests and wealthy individuals who make use of the alternative justice system but the state as well. Government agencies such as the Ministry of Defence Police, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary as well as exercising constabulary powers also process persons through internal administrative justice systems. Bodies such as the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, the Department of Trade, the Health and Safety Executive to mention but a few have a choice between the criminal justice system and administrative options. Even the military for offences other than serious offences such as murder have the option of an alternative policing and justice system which better suits its needs.

This hypothesis centres on the economic attractions of alternative policing and justice systems but as long as the state subscribes to such alternatives the radical assertions that the structure of formal law is so constituted as to create two kinds of citizenship and responsibility is difficult to refute especially in view of the reluctance of government to regulate such policing and justice systems.

Unlike the public police private security offers a "calculated strategy" tailored to the needs and requirements of each individual client. Consumer Hypothesis suggests that it is this ability of private security to give the client what he/she wants without the restrictions of regulation or accountability that has in no small part had a great effect on the expansion of private security. The public police have recognised the value of packaging their service as a consumer product but not only are they disadvantaged by their legal duty of impartiality,

"their accountants (sitting in the Home Office) and the marketing directors (back in the Chief Constables offices) have separate agendas. There is no common corporate interest, just separate goals; the first to

cut the service offered and the second to protect the brand name". (The Guardian 12 July 1994).

In the meantime private security goes on giving the customer the specific service required at an affordable price.

One of the reasons why private security can afford to provide an attractively priced policing service is that it makes free use of many of the facilities of the public police, particularly where the criminal justice system is to be used as a means of sanction.

By adopting a crime prevention, junior partner stance it has thus far avoided regulation and requires a lesser degree of training to fulfil its functions.

This junior partner stance has not prevented private security from exploiting market opportunities when tasks have been off-loaded by the public police, e.g. cash in transit. The fact that private security can and does in many cases, step so readily into the gap left by the public police would tend to lend weight to the argument that police and private security do perform similar functions in respect of the maintenance and protection of the institution of private property. However, as the role of private security increases the role of the criminal justice system becomes muted as formerly "criminal" incidents become "economic" incidents resolved in private justice systems. Consumer Hypothesis, draws on aspects of the Junior Partner Theory, Economic Theories and Radical Theories, seeing all as having relevance in explaining the expansion of the private security industry. Consumer Hypothesis also sees power as being an important factor in private policing and suggests that the greater the degree of power and control that private policing gives a client over his/her environment, the more likely he/she is to buy the product on offer.

All of these perspectives on private security, to a greater or lesser extent touch on the public/private police relationship and as private security interacts ever more

frequently with the public police in areas such as shopping centres, consideration of that relationship becomes increasingly important.

5. Public Police/Private Police Relationship

Whichever theory for the explanation of the expansion of the private security industry is pre-eminent at any given time, appears to be dependent, to some extent, upon the prevailing socio-economic climate. It is evident that as socio-economic considerations change, then so too does the relationship between public police and private security.

Johnston cites Stenning (1989) in offering evidence of this changing relationship. He points to Stenning's argument that the public police reaction to private security in Canada has passed through several distinct stages; these stages are:

1. Denial: During this first stage public police officers refuse to acknowledge that private policing is a legitimate topic for discussion.
2. Grudging Recognition: This stage was seen to occur when the increased involvement of private security in policing of such locations as shopping centres could no longer be ignored. Such recognition was coupled with an insistence that private security guards were engaged in mere property protection rather than in "real policing".
3. Competition and Open Hostility: This stage was characterised by confusion and ambivalence. On the one hand, the growth of private policing posed a significant threat to the claim of public police to a monopoly over the provision of policing services. On the other hand, public police officers recognised that the private sector provided:
 - (a) a source of post retirement employment
and

(b) a potential solution to the problem of how to meet escalating public demand for policing services when budgets were tight.

4. Demand for Controls: At this stage, public police officers and others were demanding stricter regulation of a private sector which was regarded either as a legitimate component of policing or as a necessary evil.
5. Active Partnership: By this stage there was a tacit and sometimes overt recognition that the private sector had a significant role in policing.

Johnston claims, with some justification, that in Britain, relations have not yet reached the Active Partnership stage. He warns that no assumption should be made that simply because the relationship in Britain tends to have followed the Canadian experience to date, it will automatically shadow it to the final stages. Johnston suggests that the emergence of what is effectively a "mixed economy" of policing has implications for the public police in Britain. The public police will have to decide whether they intend to co-operate with private providers, and if so under what conditions. If they decide to compete with the private sector, the question arises whether they can do so successfully. Will consumers buy the cheapest product or the one which is most heavily regulated and publicly accountable? In other words will consumers pay for the privilege of having an increasingly remote influence on a policing service that is in many cases perceived by the public as failing to meet their needs. When viewed from this perspective, far from being a junior partner, private security appears to be challenging for, if not actually being promoted to a senior role particularly in those service aspects of policing that were traditionally held to be the premise of the public police.

Economic and consumer considerations may well force the public police into a co-operative rather than a competitive relationship in the future.

Commentators such as Mason (1991) urge the public police to opt for closer co-operation, seeing this as inevitable should an acceptable system of regulation for the private security industry ever be introduced. He suggests that the interests of the public can best be guarded if the police service has formal contacts with the private security industry. The police service, it is argued, is in a unique position to monitor the industry through programmes of co-operation whilst at the same time benefitting itself.

He suggests that a co-ordinated policy towards the security industry could be formulated at ACPO level with individual forces being left to develop policies for implementation at local level.

Mason posits three fold benefits from closer co-operation arising out of regulation of the private sector:

1. The police service will gain from being aware of and having an influence on the total allocation of crime prevention and investigation resources, and efficiency will be increased by joint liaison.
2. The private security industry will benefit not only from greater knowledge about crime prevention and investigation measures but also because the police service will be actively supporting it in its attempts to provide a better quality service. This would probably mean encouragement to improve such aspects as vetting, training and supervision.

3. The public will benefit as the public police will be in a much stronger position to prevent the private security industry from abusing its public position.

Recent research by Hayman (1995) tends to support the stages in relationship forming identified by Stenning (1989) as well as some of the benefits suggested by Mason (1991). Studying police and private security working in shopping centres in Essex, Hayman discovered that:

1. There were no significant differences in the work practices of both organisations, each dealing with the same policing issues and in the same proportion.
2. Both the private and public sectors are performing similar functions with overlap.
3. Both organisations consider guidance from the police a necessity.
4. There was a lack of or poor vetting, physical or educational testing.
5. There was a lack of or poor training for the majority of security guards.
6. Both organisations agree that security does a good job filling a gap in policing.
7. No significant indications of poor relationships between each organisation existed.
8. A significant majority of private security view their own industry as appearing to be only interested in profit.

9. Both police and security support the introduction of regulation and licensing.

One particular area of policing where co-operation in the United States has shown the benefits discussed by Mason is in Crime Trend Analysis.

"New approaches to policing have created a great deal of debate and discussion in law enforcement. Along with these approaches are opportunities for prevention professionals and law enforcement. Crime analysis is an especially useful aspect of the newer policing approaches In addition to the emphasis on crime prevention, the newer approaches to policing value crime analysis and problem identification. As police organisations collect, collate and analyse more data and do it better, loss prevention and security professionals can and should take advantage of these developments. Too often police and loss prevention professionals fail to join forces" (Pelfrey 1992 pp 215-219).

In Britain as Mason has identified the public police will always be reluctant to pass sensitive information to private security agencies until a satisfactory regulatory system has been established. Government will need to meet demands for controls and a central register for the 7,000 companies which ACPO believes controls 162,000 personnel (Police Review 16.9.94). Johnston (1994) highlights the two most common responses of the public police which are the fear that police legitimacy will be undermined if the social service functions of the police are hived off to private security and that a two tier system of policing will arise in which those who can afford it will buy protection from the private sector leaving the poor to depend upon the services of a public force denuded of its service role. To radical theorists who already see the rich as using their wealth to buy private justice and the public police exercising the power of the state to control the poor and the socially disenfranchised, such responses are seen as attempts to sustain what they regard as the "myth" of policing by consent.

This research sets out to examine which of the theoretical concepts discussed, is most relevant in Britain today, with particular relevance to the policing of shopping centres. In such areas there is not only substantial public contact but ever increasing opportunities for interface with the public police. The research also examines whether the previously identified negative perceptions of the average security guard in terms of vetting, regulation, training, supervision and pay still hold true and looks at how such personnel are involved in private justice systems. The next chapter discusses the design of a battery of instruments with which to conduct the research.

DESIGNING THE RESEARCH

1. Introduction

A review of the literature on private policing raised a number of issues concerning:

- a) Vetting
- b) Supervision
- c) Pay
- d) Regulation
- e) Provision of a private justice system
- f) Interaction and co-operation between public and private police
- g) Training
- h) The precedence given to loss prevention

The importance of these issues tends to vary depending on the conceptual and theoretical perspectives of the observer as suggested in Chapter 2, which contrasted and compared a number of conceptual and theoretical considerations in respect of private policing, these were:

a) The Junior Partner Theory

This theory focuses on the relationship between private security organisations and police personnel and tends to assume either overlapping interests between public police and private security and/or a similarity of policing styles with shared common objectives and in particular the protection of society (Bacon R 1972).

b) Economic Theory

This theory links the expansion of private policing to the fiscal crises of states and sees private policing filling the vacuum that the public police have created for budgetary and/or organisational reasons. The functions of the police tend to be defined in the context of the criminal justice system and crime control. The functions of private security,

on the other hand, tend to be defined in the context of a private justice system founded on the prevention of loss and the necessity of ensuring that the means of production of the "capitalist machine" are not interrupted. (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985, 1987).

c) Radical Theories

These theories tend to be based on empirical assertions about the role of both the police and the private security industry, identifying both as providers of police services which not only have similar functions and objectives but which serve the same common goal, namely, the maintenance and protection of the institution of private property and the alliance between capital and the state. The radical perspective identifies two separate justice systems rather than two order maintenance systems. It sees one justice system to suppress the sellers of labour and another which acts as a regulatory mechanism between the state and the employers of labour. The researcher identified aspects of all these theories in the provision of present social control measures, which led to the formulation of consumer hypotheses.

Consumer Hypotheses

These hypotheses see the police and private security as service providers who vie with each other in the market place to provide their services to various groups within society.

Hypothesis A

"Consumer attitude towards a service provider will show a positive increase as his/her satisfaction with the service provided increases"

This may appear so obvious as to be unworthy of statement but implicit in the hypothesis is the suggestion that issues such as vetting, regulation, and provision of a private justice system will have different salient values for different groups of consumers. These differing levels of saliency will not occur simply as a result of differing semantic interpretations but are much more likely to occur as a result

of the differing degrees of control, involvement with and expectations of the service provider. These implications led to the formulation of Hypothesis B.

Hypothesis B

"Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over the service provider increases".

The term consumer includes corporate owners of shopping centres, managers or owners of business within the shopping centres and members of the public using facilities within the shopping centres.

The researcher sought to design an instrument that would test the hypothesis stated in relation to the private policing of shopping malls and would also test consumer attitudes to the issues raised in Chapter 2.

A number of problems immediately became apparent not the least being that there were several unmeasured variables capable of affecting consumer attitudes to any or all of the issues raised by the literature review and restated at the beginning of this chapter. These variables were not mutually exclusive and may have interacted to affect attitude formation. Within the financial and temporal constraints under which the research was conducted it would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to identify all possible variables and hence to identify and manipulate the independent variable. It was for these reasons that an experimental approach to the research was rejected.

Ratings as an instrument were also rejected because they are usually made on the basis of overall performance of the service provider. It was implicit in both hypotheses that the assessment of overall performance would differ according to the degree of consumer involvement with, expectations of and control over the service provider, such that ratings could be heavily biased.(1)

Checklists were also rejected, albeit that they can be constructed to test specific hypotheses, because they are time consuming and tend to cast the respondent in the role of observer rather than evaluator. Since the hypotheses were to be tested on the basis of attitudes it was preferable to cast the consumer in the role of evaluator in order to obtain opinions rather than reports of behaviour. Because of the links between opinions, evaluative judgment and behaviour (Tiffin and McCormick 1970), it was considered that any instrument having evaluative content was liable to be less bias prone.

Having eliminated a number of research options it was necessary to address a number of questions in selecting the most practicable, if not the ideal research instrument, these questions were:

- a) What are the precise objects of the research?
- b) Does the research seek to explain or describe?
- c) How will the research obtain the required data?
- d) What questions does the research intend to cover?
- e) What kind of results are expected?

2. Objectives of the Research

In determining the precise objectives of the research consideration had to be given to a combination of technical and organisational decisions for such factors as:

- a) Definition of terms used in the hypotheses
- b) Populations to be covered
- c) Information sought

a) Definition of Terms

Hypothesis A

"Consumer attitude towards a service provider will show a positive increase as his/her satisfaction with the service provided increases".

For the purposes of this research consumers were grouped into three specific categories on the basis of their perceived levels of:

- (i) Control of a given private security organisation
- (ii) Degree and style of interaction with a given private security organisation
- (iii) Expectations of the private security organisation
- (iv) Funding of the security organisation

The categories of consumer based on the foregoing criteria were:

- (i) Corporate owners of shopping centres
- (ii) Managers or Owners of businesses within the shopping centres
- (iii) Members of the public using facilities within the shopping centre

The term service provider denotes any one providing a service to the consumer but specifically in this research refers to the private security organisation providing a private policing service within the shopping centres. However, since public police have access to the shopping centres, any effect that they may have on the policing of the centre environment cannot be ignored.

The term satisfaction simply means that the service provider satisfies the consumer and by satisfy it is meant that the service provider gives what is wanted or needed and that the service he provides is accepted as adequate.

Positive increase in attitude was held to be an overall strengthening of the cognitive, affective and conative components of the attitude towards the service provider. The positive increase for each component of the attitude towards the service provider need not be equal. For example, if the consumer believed private security was doing a good job, and the security organisation continued to provide what the consumer wanted the more strongly this belief was likely to be held. If the consumer was pleased as opposed to angry about the service provided the more positive the emotional loading was likely to be towards the service provider.

If the consumer held a positive attitude towards the service provider the more likely he was to help, reward, support or renew the contract of that service provider.

Whereas it might be expected that a private security organisation would seek to generally influence all consumers positively, the organisation managers might be expected to attempt to influence the contract awarders specifically i.e. the shopping centre owners. It was this line of thought that led to the formulation of Hypothesis B.

Hypothesis B

"Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over "service provider increases"

Control is held to mean the degree of influence that a consumer might have in respect to the service provider and how the consumer might exert this influence not only to direct what the service provider does but to veto what the service provider may have wished to do.

It was expected that the shopping centre owners would have the power to "hire or fire" the security organisation which would give them a great deal of influence over the day to day running of the organisation, and that the shopping centre owners would play a large part in determining security policy.

Whereas business operators within the shopping centres were expected to have contributed indirectly to the costs of providing security, perhaps as a portion of site rents, they were not expected to have the same degree of control over the organisation providing security services within the centres.

Members of the public may have contributed to the funding of private security services by some small fraction of the costs of their purchases. It was expected that there would be little awareness of this and that the public would have little if any control over the activities of private security organisations operating within shopping centres.

The remaining terms of the Hypothesis are as defined for Hypothesis A.

Definition of the terms in Hypothesis A and B and the expectations arising from those definitions led to the formulation of a further hypothesis.

Hypothesis C

"Shopping centre owners, business operators and members of the public would exhibit different attitudes towards service providers operating in shopping centres".

The terms in this hypothesis are as previously defined.

b) Populations to be covered

Having defined the terms used in the hypotheses it was then necessary to define the populations on whom they would be tested. Within the constraints of the resources available to the researcher full coverage of a population was not possible. This meant coverage would be partial which in itself raised a number of questions.

(i) How would respondents be selected?

Before answering this question it was necessary to distinguish between the "target populations" and the populations actually covered by the "survey". Ideally the two should be the same, but because the target populations, certainly as far as business operators and general public were concerned, were so large and so widely dispersed complete coverage was ruled out. Moser and Kalton(1971) suggest that a survey should be considered incomplete if a substantial number of the target populations are excluded. They further suggest that the term sample survey (or census) should ideally be used only if the part of the population studied was selected by accepted statistical methods.

From the outset it was accepted that the survey would be incomplete and that the selection of populations covered could not practicably be achieved by accepted statistical methods. The researcher would have little control over what information was supplied by the corporate owners of shopping centres or indeed by whom such information would be supplied.

Some attempt might have been made to select a random sample of businesses operating within a shopping centre on the basis of stratifying them into butchers, grocers, tailors and electrical goods, etc., but some businesses would be single outlets whilst others would be part of a retail chain. Businesses might vary in floor space, turnover and public access to goods, for instance meat in butchers shops is not usually as accessible to a thief as is a coat in a tailors shop. Equally a joint of meat is unlikely to be security tagged whereas an expensive jacket might well be tagged. Such variables made it extremely difficult to arrive at a means of selecting a representative sample of traders in one shopping centre let alone a number of centres.

Accepted statistical methods of selecting respondents from the general public were also inappropriate. Normal sampling frames such as the electoral register or the telephone book were of little use as it was intended to poll respondents whilst they were actually using the facilities of the shopping centre. It had to be acknowledged that respondents polled on a given day may not have been representative of respondents polled on another day. For instance it might reasonably be expected that at weekends a higher proportion of families would be shopping together, or that peak periods of trading might vary from day to day.

Since a "statistical" sample was not used and as no appropriate sampling frame was available for use with all three groups of consumers the researcher was forced to accept any group of respondents that he could obtain. All three groups of respondents would be asked to complete the same attitude statement instrument. In the case of corporate owners the attitude statement instrument was accompanied by a letter detailing who the researcher was and the object of the research and asking for their co-operation. A total of six letters and instruments were despatched to corporate owners or their agents. The researcher considered this acceptable since only six sites were studied and of these two were managed by the same agents. Having despatched the instruments the researcher had relinquished all control over the information received.

He was not aware of the status of the person completing the instrument, that is senior management or junior clerk or indeed whether the data obtained indicated the company attitude or the attitude of the individual. In addition to the status of the person completing the instrument the researcher was aware that such issues as gender, personal experience, age, social status and ethnicity could also affect the responses made and that he would have no awareness of these overt characteristics.

It was decided to approach approximately twenty per cent of business operators in each shopping centre personally. The researcher considered that by doing this he would have the opportunity to explain the object of the research and answer any questions the respondent may have. He would be aware of any overt characteristics that might have affected the responses and might also obtain useful anecdotal data at the same time. Such a strategy would succeed in the smaller stores but in larger departmental stores the instrument would have to be left at the enquiry desk with a stamped addressed envelope either for later collection or for onward transmission by post. Similar problems to those experienced with corporate owners occurred with the larger stores.

It was planned to poll members of the public as they went about their shopping within the centres. The researcher intended to poll a reasonable mix of male and female and different age groups. The researcher would obviously be unaware of how often respondents used a particular shopping centre, or what other shopping centres they may use which might affect their responses. Even by alternating the approach to male/female respondents and varying age groups the researcher had no control over who would actually take time to complete the instrument and there was always the danger that the data obtained might be skewed as a result of age and/or sex. Having decided on this less than ideal selection of respondents it was necessary to define what information would be sought from each of the consumer groups.

(2)

c) Information Sought

The information sought from each of the groups of consumers was the attitude to:

- (i) the vetting of security guards
- (ii) the supervision of security guards
- (iii) the pay levels of security guards
- (iv) towards regulation of security guards
- (v) towards the provision of a private justice system
- (vi) towards private security interaction with the public police
- (vii) towards the training received by security guards
- (viii) towards security guards making loss prevention as opposed to crime prevention a priority.

Thus the precise objectives of the research were to test consumer attitudes to the above topics and to obtain information in support or otherwise of the three hypotheses, that is,

- a) positive consumer attitudes would increase with increased satisfaction of the service provided by private security.
- b) that consumer satisfaction would be dependent on the degree of control exercised over private security.
- c) that there would be a difference in the attitudes of the three groups of consumer.

3. Description versus Explanation

The sample to be studied was an unrepresentative sample and as such any data obtained could not be used to make accurate predictions about public attitudes towards other areas of the security industry. However, if the research instruments chosen measured what they were supposed to measure and the subjects under observation were adequate to be representative of the traits, behaviours or attitudes being measured then valuable information could be collected in respect of a less than statistically perfect sample of attitudes towards one

sector of the security industry. The information thus gained about the effects of the behaviour of private security patrols on the attitudes of consumers could be used in conjunction with information gained from observational study of the behaviour of private security patrols in shopping centres, to provide a "snapshot" of perceptions of private policing in parts of Britain today.

Temporal and financial restraints had forced compromise in the choice of subjects and the information that might usefully be obtained from such subjects, which in turn meant that the research design adopted was also a compromise.

The research sought to establish as precisely and comprehensively as possible, within the given constraints, the attitudes of three groups of consumers towards a small number of operatives within a specialised section of the security industry. It sought to do this by using anecdotal and observational data as well as attitude scales. In using such a battery of instruments the researcher sought to collect descriptive evidence to test the hypotheses already formulated.

It was considered that descriptive evidence could be used in conjunction with statistical data obtained from attitude scales. The inclusion of contradictory features in the research design is supported to some extent by Hyman when he suggests:


"the better the initial approximation to the laboratory experiment in a research design, the less effective is the inquiry as a descriptive one, and this choice is irreversible and irremediable. Using a descriptive design permits the later test of a hypothesis by "an approximation after the fact" to an explanatory design, but the initial choice of an explanatory design precludes any later approximation to the design needed for a descriptive survey" (1967 p 85).

The distinction between descriptive and explanatory research is often very blurred, any explanation requires description, and it is difficult or perhaps impossible to describe

something without at the same time explaining it (McNeil 1990). Due to financial and temporal restraints it was considered not only methodologically acceptable but essential to concentrate limited resources on achieving understanding through a combination of anecdotal and observed data together with data obtained from a Likert type attitude scale. The use of observation and description as a research tool has a lengthy history not only in the social sciences but in the physical and life sciences too. Most of biology until about 1900 was concerned primarily with description and Charles Darwin proposed his theory of evolution based on previous observations by other biologists as well as many of his own. Emil Kraepelin in the latter half of the 19th century, classified mental illnesses into two major groupings based on a study of case histories, his system with relatively few changes has been in use by psychiatrists up to the present day. Similarly Jean Piaget used observation and description in formulating a number of hypotheses and interpretations concerning the language and thought of the child, his work has had considerable influence on subsequent research using alternative methodology (Plutchik 1974).

In addition to the reasons already stated a descriptive approach was considered more practicable than an explanatory approach for the following theoretical reasons. If the phenomenon under observation, the behaviour of security guards is considered the measurable independent variable and the measurable dependent variable is considered the response of consumers then the attitudes not only of the consumers but of security guards as well will become an immeasurable intervening variable allowing for a mis-match between attitude and action. Rosenberg and Hovland 1960 neatly described this effect in diagrammatic form as shown overleaf (Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993).

Fig. 2



The three-component view of attitudes (adapted from Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960)

The work of Weiner (1985) and Wong and Weiner (1981) indicates that "causal search" is stimulated primarily by unexpected events, particularly those involving loss or failure (Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993). In view of the anticipated differing degrees of control, intervention and expectation that consumers have with the security providers the level of "causal search" is likely to be different. Thefts from shops would be likely to stimulate "causal search" and attribution of blame by traders within the shopping centre. It may or may not stimulate "causal search" and attribution of blame in corporate owners but would be unlikely to have any direct effect on shoppers. If the security provider seriously failed in his duty of protecting

the property of the corporate owners of the shopping centre, for example allowing a fire or flooding to occur due to negligence this would be highly likely to stimulate "causal search" and attribution of blame by the corporate owners. If the blame resulted in increased supervision, imposition of penalties or the threat of non renewal of contract this could have effects on the attitudes of the security operatives which might in turn affect their behaviour. The changed behaviour of the security guards might have effects on the responses of all the consumers which would in turn affect their attitudes. In short the data from attitude surveys was seen as being more relevant if supported by as much descriptive data as possible.

The adoption of a descriptive survey is not unusual where the phenomenon under observation is complex or ambiguous, however if a descriptive approach is to have any relevance then a clear conceptualisation of the phenomenon being observed is an absolute necessity. Hyman (1967) points to Ackoff and Pritzer as providing a clear illustration of how deceptive is the apparent simplicity of the dependent variables that might be the subject of a functional descriptive survey. They cited the hypothetical survey in which the problem is to determine how many chairs people have in their living room. To make such a determination chair has to be defined. If a chair is defined in terms of physical properties, such as size, shape, weight, etc., a chair can always be found which does not satisfy these conditions. For example if one or more legs is taken as a necessary property of chairs this would exclude chairs built into a wall or built on a solid base and hence having no legs. A chair is of course a functional concept; its essence is its use not its structure. In virtually every descriptive survey there is considerable theoretical difficulty in the conceptualisation of the very phenomenon that is described. This difficulty is compounded where the concept is as abstract as attitudes with their close association to attributions, beliefs, behaviour and feelings.

Since the relationship each group of consumers was likely to enjoy with private security was expected to be different, different attributions were expected from each group, hence different beliefs, behaviours and feelings were expected. These expectations on the part of the researcher made apparent the major difficulty of achieving a universal concept of the phenomenon under investigation.

To eliminate bias as far as possible the researcher sought to ensure:

- a) That all consumer groups were describing the same phenomenon
- b) That if it became apparent that the phenomenon being described by the various consumer groups was not the same then the researcher had developed some understanding of why this had occurred.

With these thoughts in mind the researcher sought to construct a battery of instruments that would not only answer the questions raised in the previous chapters but would also give results with the maximum possible reliability and validity.

4. Constructing the Battery of Instruments

In constructing the battery of instruments attention had to be paid to certain basic criteria, these were:

a) Research Concerns

The research needed to be as reliable as possible, seeking to take account of and to balance as far as possible all anticipated bias. The researcher sought to eliminate bias by asking a number of questions concerning the validity of the instruments in his battery, for example:

- (i) Is the instrument measuring what it is supposed to measure?
- (ii) How accurately do the questions asked elicit the information sought?

- (iii) To what extent are changes in the dependent variable the result of the influence of the independent variable?
- (iv) Can the conclusions drawn from this study be generalised to other cases?

In an attempt to answer these questions and refine the instruments so that bias was minimised as much as possible, the instruments were piloted in a group of subjects before use in the final research.(3)

It was decided to conduct the research in an entirely open and frank manner leaving respondents in no doubt as to the object of the instruments used by assuring them of anonymity should they wish it. To this end, maximum transparency was aimed for, with the hope that complete honesty on the part of the researcher would be reciprocated by the respondent, thereby achieving minimum fakeability.

Due to financial and temporal constraints the battery of instruments would be as simple as possible. It was hoped that this would have a positive effect in that minimum complexity would maximise response.

Respondent Concerns

From the respondents point of view the instruments would need to have minimum noxiousness if maximum co-operation was to be obtained. Any questions asked would need to be couched in language that the respondent understood and indeed any answers given would need to be clearly understood by the researcher.

As stated earlier the research sought to use anecdotal and observational data and attitude scales to achieve its aim. Having regard to research and respondent concerns the researcher sought to include the following in his battery of instruments.

a) Field Study

The researcher sought to give an accurate description of the behaviour of private security guards patrolling shopping centres. The study was to pay due regard to the relations between security guards and their environment and security guards and at least two groups of consumers, the shopping public and business operators within shopping malls.

Since behaviour is a more or less continuous matrix of actions and interactions only through some kind of analytic, abstractive process can it be grasped, recorded and understood. The researcher sought to do this in two ways:

- a) By use of sampling procedures
- b) By use of categories

Time sampling in spite of its limitations was decided upon as the appropriate means of sampling because of the restrictions of time and finance. This method of sampling utilises short time periods sampled at regular intervals, and descriptive categories which have been established in advance and which are judged during the sample period. It has been suggested that this type of sampling can be meaningfully used only for events that happen fairly often, at least every 15 minutes on the average. A second limitation relates to the fact that certain sequences of behaviour may last longer than the sample time period, thus producing judgements on "fragmented" sequences of behaviour. Wright (1960) notes that the various sampling plans do not differ generally in terms of reliability or observer agreement (Plutchik 1974) so the researcher felt justified in using this plan rather than any other. The object of categorisation was to group large numbers of observations into a smaller number of classes of actions. Information on such topics as pre-employment vetting, wage rates, and training would obviously be extremely difficult to observe and would be studied by alternative means. The researcher devised seven categories which it was felt could be usefully observed and would provide some of the information sought by the research. These categories were:

1. Visits by Supervisors
This category should give an indication of the level of supervision.
2. Interaction with Public Police
This would include any interactions whether casual conversation or active assistance and would be regarded as a measure of the positivity or negativity of the police/private security relationship.
3. Interaction with Shoppers
This category would provide some indication of the level of satisfaction experienced by shoppers.
4. Interaction with Business Operators
This category would provide some indication of the level of satisfaction experienced by business operators.
5. Abuse of Authority
This category would include any behaviour that was violent, abusive or appeared to cause dissatisfaction to any consumer or that may lend added weight to the argument for closer regulation.
6. Crime Control
This category would include arrest, pursuit of suspects or assistance to the police.(4)
7. Loss Control
This category would include any behaviour obviously not of a crime control nature but aimed at securing the property of consumers, for example fire prevention, ensuring compliance with safety regulations, etc.

Whilst the field study would provide data on some of the topics under investigation it was not practicable to study all the topics by this means.

The interview was considered to be the most practicable instrument for use with security operatives in shopping centres whilst the attitude statement instrument was considered most appropriate for use with the corporate owners themselves.

Having decided on a non-participatory observational study of security patrols it was decided to supplement this with a number of interviews with security operatives carrying out their duties within shopping precincts. The structured survey interview is presented as a data collection device involving situations where the interviewer merely poses questions and records answers in a set pattern. Few field researchers have followed the structured approach preferring to use an informal or unstructured style of interviewing which employs a set of themes and topics to form questions in the course of conversation (Burgess 1984). As already stated this research aimed to be descriptive rather than explanatory and for this reason it seemed proper to follow a long tradition in social science research where interviews have been perceived as conversations with a purpose. This style of interview has been used to good effect by Mayhew in his report of London Labour and the London Poor (1851) and Zweig in Labour, Life and Poverty (1948) and The British Worker (1952). The approach has been defended by such researchers as Finch (1984) who suggests that text book approaches to interviewing provide particular problems for feminist interviewers who wish to validate women's subjective experiences as women and people. Finch argues that it is preferable for women to interview women because women are seen as a member of the "in group" and are more likely to access information than a male who would be viewed as a member of an "out group".

Finch implicitly suggests a need for a detailed if not intimate knowledge of the subjects in an unstructured interview. Zweig (1948) also indicates that this style of interview cannot be started without detailed knowledge and preparation. He recommends that it is essential to observe people before a detailed conversation can occur. He suggests that detailed knowledge is essential before questions can be formed and before individuals are prepared to give detailed information on their way of life. Zweig (1952) suggests that a social scientist collecting his own material must perform two contradictory mental acts.

On the one hand he has to identify himself with the people who he interviews and describes and to think on their lines. On the other hand he suggests that another important quality is the ability to detach himself from his subject.

The researcher chose a non-participatory observational study as the means of obtaining a detached but detailed understanding of the subjects and the unstructured interview as a way of establishing empathy with the subjects.

The researcher did foresee at least one possible problem which may have been lessened by observation. Many occupations have their own "native" language and whilst the researcher sought not to interrogate the respondent he was aware of the need to clarify any utterances in the respondents "native" language (Spradley 1979). Some incidence of this should have become apparent during the non-participatory observation and questions designed to clear up any ambiguities or lack of understanding on the part of the researcher could thus be formulated. By restricting questions to the minimum and allowing the respondent to speak freely the researcher hoped to avoid the pitfalls of asking questions which failed to use terms and phrases that were not commonly used in the respondents cultural scene. A Sanyo TRC 500A Microcassette recorder was to be used to tape conversations with the subjects approval, where this was not forthcoming notes would be made and a record of the conversation made as soon as possible afterwards. Although this approach could claim no statistical accuracy it was hoped that any results obtained would in the tradition of Mayhew, Zweig and Finch, provide a rich portrait of what is occurring now, in a small section of a dynamic industry.

Non-participatory observation of corporate owners was not practicable and as time was expected to be of great importance to corporate owners of shopping centres, interviews were considered a less than ideal instrument. If interview had been selected as a tool in this instance the researcher would not have expected to have any choice of whom

he interviewed as this would most likely have been determined by the company. The researcher would have had to allow for any status imbalance resulting from such selection and this could have been yet another source of unmeasurable bias (Burgess 1984). For these reasons the researcher opted for the use of the self administered attitude statement instrument as the most appropriate tool for use with corporate owners, albeit the scope for bias remained. The researcher hoped to obtain information about attitudes from as many people as possible in the groups of consumers comprising business operators and members of the public. Time and financial constraints argued against the use of interviews with these groups. Because an evaluative judgement was required from these consumers, attitude scales were deemed the most appropriate instrument. The specific questions of typical attitude scales may call for an individual to give his/her "opinion" about some aspect of the given subject, in this case security operatives, these opinions are then used collectively to obtain some general attitude level for the anonymous individual represented by each questionnaire.

Some more recent studies of attitudes have stressed the relationship between attitudes and behaviour, that is cognitive consistency (Hollander 1981). Others have concentrated on the reconciliation of the generality of measures of attitudes and the specificity of measures of behaviour, particularly consumer attitude-behaviour correspondence (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). This research however, confines itself to the direction of attitudes on the continuum negative to positive as in the Likert scale (Likert 1932) or the Thurstone scale devised by Thurstone and Chave (1929) (Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey 1962). The Thurstone scale was rejected by the researcher because it is time consuming and unwieldy, requiring a weighting procedure which attempts to take account of item differences. It would have been necessary to have people judge items with regard to the position the statements represented on a scale of negative positive.

The Likert scale or "summated scale" was used because of its simplicity and ease of construction. The items on the scale are simply summed to get a total score and give a general overall positive or negative aspect to attitudes towards a given topic in this case private security in shopping centres.

The Likert scale was constructed by selecting a large number of statements that related to private security and particularly those aspects under observation.

Obviously if the summation of the scale was to have any meaning, then statements should be clearly anti or pro the object. Since respondents are required to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each item on the scale the items were required to meet two conditions.

- a) They tend to be responded to in the same way
- b) They elicit the same response on a number of occasions (Arnold and Robertson 1991)

In order to meet these conditions it was necessary to pilot the scales. Ideally items should elicit an extreme or consistent response as in a five point scale such as that used in this research, similar scores could be achieved by respondents having strong positive views and strong negative views for equal numbers of items or a respondent having no extreme views either way. A smaller number of items than is normal was used on this occasion to allow not only for an overall positive negative indication but also to allow the researcher to analyse the differences in responses from each consumer group. The items comprising the scale used in this research are shown at Appendix C. Of the thirteen statements nine were positive and four were negative, this meant that scoring of responses for positive and negative statements was inverted. That is if the positive statement "I believe that security officers working in shopping centres are well supervised" elicited a response, "strongly agree", it was awarded a score of one if it elicited a response of "strongly disagree", it was awarded a score of 5. Similarly if the negative statement "I do not believe that security officers should have a code of conduct similar to the Police

Discipline Regulations" elicited a response of "strongly agree" it was awarded a score of one and "Strongly disagree" was awarded a score of five. Two of the positive statements were directly opposite to previous statements and were inserted as controls to ensure that respondents were reading and understanding the statements, these were not scored. The remaining responses to the attitude statements were scored separately for corporate owners, business operators in each shopping centre and members of the public in each shopping centre. The scores were then adjusted to give a percentage score.

The eleven statements that were scored were then grouped into those categories to which they related, that is:

- a) Vetting
- b) Supervision
- c) Pay
- d) Parity with Police Pay
- e) Regulation
- f) Private Justice
- g) Crime Prevention
- h) Social Control
- i) Co-operation with Police
- j) Training

and percentage scores derived for consumer attitude to these areas.

5. Formulating the Question

Having decided on a battery of instruments it was then necessary to formulate the statements and questions to be used in those instruments. The researcher proposed asking question of any question intended for inclusion in the research instruments in an attempt to identify the underlying principles and theories that gave rise to the questions. For instance the question,

"Does your company believe that there is sufficient interaction between private security employed to patrol your premises and the local police?"

has relevance to the Junior Partner Theory, Economic Theory,

Radical Theory and the Consumer Hypothesis. It was the researcher's aim to ensure that questions or statements were not loaded in favour of one theory at the expense of others. Where this was not possible, questions or statements that were loaded in favour of one theory would be balanced by statements or questions loaded in favour of the others.

The researcher was aware that no assumption could be made that statements or questions can be formed in terms that are widely understood in the same way such that their meaning will be understood by anyone. Some survey researchers believe that it is possible to construct a standardised question that will be understood by almost all English speakers in a population. Others argue that although it may be possible to measure some types of rather superficial attitudes through standardised questions, richness and depth of meaning are sacrificed in exchange for the standardisation. For this reason the researcher proposed to adopt an unstructured interview style for use with security officers purposely aiming for richness and depth of information. It was hoped that as well as providing information on the specified objectives of the research such an approach might indicate whether the proposition by Freedman and Stenning (1977) that the personnel of both public and private police organisations are probably not substantially dissimilar in social perceptions is more or less accurate in England than in North America. Loy (1969) suggested that there are substantial differences between officers in the public police particularly in the degree of conforming and non-conforming they exhibit. If there are such substantial differences between public police officers, then it is probable that there will be such differences between private police officers and public police officers.

Loy's research suggested to the researcher that attitude scales would not be the best instrument for use with security officers because the conformist personality type who tends to see everything in black and white terms would be likely to

opt for extremes whereas the non-conformist personality may not. These considerations together with the fact, that an assessment of whether the subjects interpretation of questions matched that of the researcher was needed, convinced the researcher that the informal style of Zweig was to be preferred with this particular group. This of course meant that the researcher would not be in a position to prepare questions in advance but would be guided by the subjects conversation, only asking questions to clarify points and clear up ambiguities. It was hoped that by using an informal style without prepared questions that security officers might give some indication of their self-concept. Turner (1982) sees self-concept as being conceptualised as a cognitive structure which functions to regulate behaviour under certain conditions, he sees it as comprising two major subsystems.

- a) Personal identity referring to self descriptions in terms of personal or idiosyncratic attributes such as personality, physical and intellectual trends.
- b) Social identity referring to self definitions in terms of social category membership such as race, class, nationality, sex, a security company, the police, etc..

A person's total social identity is comprised of specific social identities and different situations make salient different self conceptions.(Brown and Turner 1985) Because the researcher could not hope to identify these specific social identities and their relationship to the saliency of different self conceptions, the unstructured interview was seen as a means of achieving at least an idea of the self concept of security officers in shopping centres.

In constructing attitude statements for questionnaires the researcher sought to arrive at statements that would help in the investigation of the objectives raised by the literature review. To this end they were pretested:

- 1) To ensure that respondents understood the same concepts within the statement as that understood by the researcher.
- 2) That in as far as possible the statements were so framed as to elicit extreme responses.

Samples of pilot and final attitude scales at Appendix C.

NOTES

- (1) Hypothesis B "Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over the service provider increases". Ratings were rejected as an instrument because they are usually made on the basis of overall performance of service provider. It was implicit in both hypotheses A and B that the assessment of overall performance would differ according to the degree of consumer involvement with, expectations of, and control over the service provider, such that ratings could be heavily biased. (page 84) It became apparent to the researcher as the study progressed that there may be an alternative hypotheses, e.g. The researcher discovered that the hypothesis needed refinement to include the effects of knowledge or lack of knowledge about private security and the service offered. (page 161)
The possibility that the hypotheses stated were not the only hypotheses possible is considered further justification for rejecting ratings as an instrument.
- (2) It was intended to poll members of the public as they went about their shopping within centres. Initially the researcher approached male and females of various ages alternately but it was found that as many people were reluctant to stop and speak to the researcher or where people would stop they declined to complete questionnaires on the basis of lack of knowledge. The researcher eventually settled for anyone who would stop to complete a questionnaire trying to balance up the number of female and male respondents by the end of the day. Fortunately those who did agree to complete questionnaires were of varying age groups. (page 89)
- (3) Due to temporal and financial restraints the questionnaires were piloted in a group of twenty subjects consisting of friends and relatives. The group of subjects included males and females of varying ages (30-70 years of age). Most of the subjects had visited some of the sites studied. The researcher felt that responses gained in this manner would not be too far removed from those of the intended subjects. (page 96)

(4)

In the field study the researcher found out that his observational categories were not mutually exclusive e.g. Categories 2 and 6 overlapped. Indeed it became almost impossible to determine the difference between Categories 6 and 7 as the main purpose of private security seemed to be relentless patrolling. During observations the researcher noted neither crime nor loss. If patrolling was successful was it successful as a crime prevention measure, a loss prevention measure or both?

(page 98)

The time interval chart (Appendix D) had to be supplemented by copious note taking as a result of the overlap of categories.

CHAPTER 4

IMPLEMENTING THE RESEARCH

The researcher had planned, developed and produced his research instruments in the knowledge that he was likely to encounter unforeseen variables that would affect the validity of the research. He had not, however, expected to experience lack of co-operation to the degree that it was experienced. Providers of private security chose to ignore any communication from the researcher making interviews with private security operatives impossible. Many business operators refused to co-operate on the grounds that discussion of security matters was contrary to company policy or simply that they were too busy. Members of the public were also extremely uncooperative which meant that the researcher was left with much smaller numbers of subjects than planned to work with.(1)

Since the research was descriptive rather than explanatory the smaller number of respondents was not the disaster it might have been and the indifference the researcher experienced to the topic of private policing is itself evidence of the lack of concern which allows government to persist with its policy of self regulation.

The research implemented was less ambitious than had been planned and consisted of:

- a) A non-participational observational study
- b) A list of attitude statements
- c) Anecdotal evidence.

1. Non-Participatory Observational Study

A non-participatory observational study was conducted at the following shopping centres:

- a) The Manchester Arndale Centre owned and managed by P & O Shopping Centres.

- b) Merseyway Shopping Centre, Stockport, owned by Hammersons and managed by Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors.
- c) Houndshell Shopping Centre, Blackpool, owned by Pearl Assurance and managed by Hillier Parker.
- d) The Lanes Shopping Centre, Carlisle, owned by the City Council and managed by Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors.
- e) St. John's Shopping Centre, Workington, owned by the City Council.
- f) St. John's Arcade abutting the St. John's Centre owned by Ravenscroft Properties Ltd and managed by Land Securities Properties Ltd.

It was felt by the researcher that such a study would provide hard visual evidence of whether or not private police are doing on private land what public police are doing on public land and whether or not they defer to the public police as they carry out their tasks. The researcher hoped to obtain first hand evidence of the state of the private police/public police relationship and the level of co-operation that exists at these sites, here and now in England.

Freedman and Stenning (1977) suggested that the personnel of public and private police organisations are not substantially dissimilar, it was hoped that the observational study would provide evidence to support or refute this suggestion. Loy (1969) on the other hand suggested that there are substantial differences between officers in the public police, particularly in the degree of conforming and non-conforming behaviour which they exhibit. The researcher intended to look for such differences in security personnel, particularly, as much of the literature on the subject treats the manned guarding section of the industry as one indiscriminate mass.

Simply by observing (2) security officers as they went about their business the researcher believed that he might detect behaviour that would support or refute the allegations that security officers are exercising powers over and above those

available to the ordinary citizen and are therefore in urgent need of licencing and regulation.

The observational study involved the use of fifteen minute time intervals and seven classes of action as outlined in Chapter 3. These classes of action were:

a) Visits by Supervisors:

Any contact between private security patrols and supervisors would be recorded. This of course would only be possible where the supervisor was readily identifiable by differences in uniform or badges of rank.

b) Interaction with Public Police; this was divided into:

(i) Conversation:

in which the researcher intended to note any verbal communication between private security and the local police force. The researcher was not particularly interested in the precise reason for communication, this would be impossible to determine by observation alone. Observations were conducted with a view to determining whether or not communication occurred with any degree of regularity with a view to forming an impression of the level of co-operation between these agencies.

(ii) Physical Assistance:

the researcher hoped to observe any instance of active assistance that private security gave to the local police force such as assistance in making arrests of offenders.

c) Interaction with shoppers; this was sub-divided into:

(i) Positive Outcome:

the researcher intended to note any interaction with members of the public where the outcome appeared positive. It was accepted that subjective judgements were involved with a positive outcome

being judged mainly on facial expressions, gestures and words where these were heard.

(ii) Negative Outcome:

again any judgements were purely subjective and were based on facial expressions, gestures and words.

d) Interaction with Traders; this was sub-divided into:

(i) Positive Outcome:

as with interaction with shoppers any judgements were purely subjective and in the case of traders where observations were often through a shop window the judgements were almost always based on gestures and facial expressions.

(ii) Negative Outcome:

again judgements were purely subjective and based on facial expressions and gestures.

e) Abuse of Authority; this was sub-divided into:

(i) Violence:

here the researcher was looking for occasions where private security might use force, and in particular force that was more than reasonable to achieve the objective. Since this is a matter for the courts to decide again any judgement would be subjective.

(ii) Verbal Abuse:

the researcher made an arbitrary decision that any words or language which might elicit a complaint against a police officer would fall into this category, and in particular any racist words or remarks. It was accepted that any judgement would be subjective.

(iii) Other:

the researcher was aware of the limitations of the categories he had selected and that abuse of authority could cover a whole host of behaviours other than those cited above.

f) Crime Prevention:

this category was concerned not only with before the fact measures such as foot patrols but also with after the fact measures such as pursuit and arrest of offenders whether by private security alone or in support of local police.

g) Loss Prevention:

it was apparent to the researcher that it was impossible to distinguish between Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention activities merely by observation. The very act of patrolling has been found to have a preventative effect on crime (Bright 1969). However, this effectiveness is limited because of the non-crime prevention service function of patrolling. (Elliot 1973)

The categories selected were drawn up into a chart (Appendix D) covering seven time intervals of fifteen minutes each. Notes were made on the chart when any of the listed activities occurred. It very quickly became obvious that the selected categories could be no more than a rough guide as many of them such as crime and loss prevention were not mutually exclusive. It became essential to supplement the observation chart with a note pad if the wealth of observed evidence was to be recorded.

In order to obtain as rich a picture as possible whilst giving maximum cover to the shopping centres the researcher decided to alternate periods of static observation with periods of mobile observation. During period one the researcher remained static, normally sitting on a bench observing any activity in or near his location. During period two the researcher walked about the shopping centre actively looking for any incidents that may have been occurring.

The first observational study took place at the Arndale Centre, Manchester. This is a massive complex consisting of two levels served by lifts, escalators and stairways and

comprising in excess of two hundred businesses ranging from shops, cafes and restaurants to pubs.

There is also an indoor market which is the responsibility of the City Council occupying space on both levels.

The security company employed by the owners and management of the Arndale Centre is Secureurop. Patrol officers wear blue shirts and dark blue/black trousers with white police style caps. The Secureurop uniform does not closely resemble police uniform. Supervisors were noted to wear white shirts and dark blue/black trousers with a white police style cap which again does not closely resemble police uniform.

A.M. Day 1

During the first fifteen minute period the researcher observed two white male security officers patrolling and one black female officer who was static at the head of an escalator. One white male officer of the Greater Manchester Police was observed to pass the two patrolling and the static security officers with no interaction of any kind taking place. A female member of the public approached the static female security officer and from the kinetics noted appeared to be asking for directions. The smiles and head nods of both participants indicated a positive outcome of this interaction. The researcher was mobile for this first observation period.

The researcher was static during the second observation period when he noted one white male security officer static at the head of an escalator who was visited by two white male supervisors. For the third observation period the researcher was again mobile observing one white male security officer in a static position and a little later a black male security officer in a different location but also static.

During the fourth period the researcher was static and noted the same black female officer static at the head of a different escalator.

She was visited by a white male supervisor and a little later they were joined by a white male security officer who had been patrolling. The researcher was passed by a white male supervisor who was patrolling.

Resuming mobile observations for the fifth period the researcher noted one white male supervisor patrolling, the same black female officer patrolling and later another white male officer patrolling. During the sixth observation period the researcher was static and noted nothing of interest.

During the final observation period of the morning the researcher was again mobile and noted what he at first took to be two white male officers of Greater Manchester Police standing at the head of an escalator. Drawing closer to the officers it was noted that their chequered cap bands were green and white and that they were wearing shoulder badges identifying them as Market Police.

P.M. Day 1

During the first period of the afternoon's observations the researcher was static and noted one black male security officer patrolling. The second observation period was conducted whilst the researcher was mobile during which he noted one static white male security officer who was joined by a patrolling white male security officer. The researcher was static for the third observation period when he noted two white male officers patrolling. A further two white male officers were noted patrolling during the fourth observation period whilst the researcher was mobile. A white male security officer not employed by Secureurop was noted inside Burtons the Tailors. During the fifth observation period the researcher was static and nothing was observed. The researcher was mobile for the sixth period and noted two white male officers patrolling and one black male officer, possibly the same black male officer observed in the morning. Nothing of interest was noted during the seventh and final period.

Due to the size of the Arndale Centre it was decided that it warranted more than one day of observational study.

A.M. Day 2

The first fifteen minute period was spent conducting static observations during which two white male officers were observed conversing at the top of an escalator. During the second period the researcher was mobile when he noted one black male security officer patrolling, he also noted a white male security officer not employed by Secureurop patrolling in a ladies clothing shop. Whilst static for the third observation period the researcher saw the same black female officer noted on the previous day, she was static at the head of an escalator. The researcher was mobile for the fourth observational period and noted nothing of interest. During the fifth observational period in which the researcher was static he was passed first by a white male officer and then ten minutes later by a black male officer patrolling. The sixth period of observation was conducted whilst the researcher was mobile during which time he noted a black female officer patrolling. During the seventh observational period in which the researcher was static nothing was noted.

P.M. Day 2

During the first period of the afternoon the researcher was static and nothing was observed. The researcher was mobile for the second period when he noticed one white male supervisor and two white male officers static at the head of an escalator and a further white male officer was noted patrolling. Nothing was noted during the third period in which the researcher was static. For the fourth period the researcher was mobile when he noted a white male security officer not employed by Secureurop in an electrical goods shop. One white male security officer employed by Secureurop was noted patrolling during the fifth period in which the researcher was static.

The researcher was mobile during the sixth period when he noted one black female security officer patrolling. A white male security officer was noted in a static position during the seventh observational period.

A.M. Day 3

A final seven period observation was conducted during the first session of which, a black male security officer was observed patrolling. Whilst static for the second period a black female officer was noted in a static position. During the third observational period, whilst mobile, the researcher noted one male and one female officer, both white, of the Greater Manchester Police, patrolling through the centre. No interaction with security officers either Secureurop or in-house security was noted. Two white male security officers were noted static at the head of an escalator during the fourth observation period. During the fifth period whilst the researcher was mobile a white male Secureurop officer was noted patrolling. During the sixth period whilst the researcher was static he noted one white male officer of Greater Manchester Police in a static position. During the period of observation no interaction with security staff took place. Whilst mobile for the seventh period nothing of interest was noted.

The observational study in the Arndale Centre was conducted over a period of two and a half days and the following conclusions were drawn:

- a) The policing of the centre is complex appearing to be a mix of Greater Manchester Police, Secureurop, Manchester Market Police and an indeterminate number of security officers employed by specific businesses. Just as Lidstone (1980) and Johnston (1992) draw distinctions between the forty three Home Department Police forces in England and Wales, other police forces and regulatory bodies, it was apparent from the study of the Manchester

Arndale Centre that such distinctions could equally apply to the various agencies that collectively make up the "Security Industry".

- b) Secureurop officers gave the impression of omnipresence and although it was impossible to determine how many officers were on duty it is suspected that skilful use was made of stairs and escalators to create the impression that a large number of staff was on duty.
- c) The researcher was sure that during the period of the observation only one black female officer was on duty and it is suspected that only two black male officers were observed. All supervisors observed were white and male. From these observation it is concluded that ethnic minorities and females were under represented in the security staff patrolling the Arndale Centre, certainly under represented in the supervisory grades.
- d) The supervision of Secureurop staff observed showed regular contact being maintained by personal visits, radio and public address systems.
- e) No interaction of any kind was observed with local police even where police and security officers were in close proximity.
- f) The interaction with traders or shoppers observed was extremely limited but appeared to have a positive outcome on all occasions. The relentless patrolling of security officers is likely to have created an impression of safety for shoppers.

- g) No abuse of authority of any description was observed in fact no overt use of authority was observed.
- h) The main function of all security officers, Secureurop and in-house security appeared to be the maintenance of an obvious presence by constant patrolling.

Having conducted observations in the Manchester Arndale Centre the researcher visited the Merseyway Shopping Centre in Stockport which is also in the Greater Manchester Police area. This shopping centre is patrolled by in-house security employed by the property managers Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors. The uniform worn by the security officers at this site consisted of a dark blue suit and cap which bares little resemblance to police uniform. The Merseyway Shopping Centre was on a much smaller scale than the Arndale Centre, consisting of a covered arcade of perhaps twenty shops which leads on to an open plaza where a number of large stores such as Woolworths, C & A and Marks and Spencers abut the development but are not part of it. Facing these stores on the opposite side of the plaza are shops on two levels which also form part of the development. Because of the configuration of the development it was difficult to determine just how many businesses comprise the Merseyway centre proper, but it is probably no more than fifty.

P.M. Day 1

As with the Arndale Centre observations were split into fifteen minute intervals alternating between static and mobile. The first observation was conducted from a static position and one white male security officer was observed patrolling. The second observation period was conducted whilst the researcher was mobile and he observed a white female officer of the Greater Manchester Police at the far end of the open Plaza, she appeared to be recording details of an illegally parked vehicle.

The third observation period was recorded whilst the researcher was static and the same white male security officer noted earlier was seen patrolling. During the fourth observation period the researcher was mobile and observed two white male officers of the Greater Manchester Police, patrolling in the open plaza. No interaction with the security officer was observed.

The researcher was static for the fifth period when he observed the same white male security officer, who appeared to be the only one on duty, speaking to a female member of the public. From the body language observed it appeared that directions were being asked and given and that the outcome of the interaction was satisfactory. The researcher followed the security officer to the top level of the development during the sixth period and observed him speaking to a group of youths close to the top of a staircase. The body language of the youths once the security officer had moved on indicated a positive outcome. During the final period whilst the researcher was static the same white male security officer was observed patrolling.

Due to the size of the development and the fact that the researcher could see the only security officer patrolling it appeared that he was alone. However, he was observed to use his radio on two occasions, whilst he could have been speaking to his control room it is possible that he may have been speaking to other officers not readily observable. The overall impression was that security presence was very low key. Probably due to the much less obvious demarcation between the "private" Merseyway development and the public shopping area and the much smaller size of the site, the public police presence was much more obvious to the researcher.

A.M. Day 2

The Merseyway Centre was visited again some days later. During the first observational period whilst the researcher

was static he noted three white male security officers on duty. One in a static position and two patrolling. Whilst mobile for the second period the researcher noted one of the officers in a shop speaking with the staff, the outcome appeared positive. During the third period whilst the researcher was static he noted two white male officers of Greater Manchester Police patrolling through the plaza. No interaction with security officers was observed. Whilst mobile for the fourth period one security officer was noted climbing the stairway to the upper level of the development whilst another was observed patrolling the lower level. During the fifth period nothing was observed. During the sixth period a white male officer of the Greater Manchester Police was noted speaking to members of an army recruiting team who were mounting a display at the front of the shopping centre. During the seventh period nothing of interest was noted.

The following conclusions were drawn from observations at the Merseyway Shopping Centre:

- a) The policing of the centre is a mix of Greater Manchester Police and Donaldsons in-house security.
- b) The security presence is quite low key whilst the local police presence is more obvious.
- c) Ethnic minorities and females were not represented in the security presence on either day of observation.
- d) There was no obvious supervision of the officers on duty. On the second day of observation there appeared to be no distinction in uniform marking one security officer out as senior to the other two.
- e) No interaction of any kind was observed with local police even where police and security officers were in close proximity.

- f) Interaction with traders and shoppers was observed to be limited but that which occurred appeared to have a positive outcome.
- g) No abuse of authority of any description was observed.
- h) The main purpose of the security officers appeared to be the maintenance of a presence by patrolling.

The third observational study took place in the Houndshell Shopping Centre in Blackpool which lies in the Lancashire Constabulary area. The precinct which is fairly small comprises of a lower level with probably not more than fifty shops and an upper level consisting of only a large restaurant. It is now policed by security officers in the employ of Rentokil Sterling but these officers had originally policed the site as in-house security. The security officers wore white shirts with dark epaulettes, dark trousers and no caps. They were equipped with personal radios.

A.M. Day 1

During the first period the researcher was static and observed a maintenance worker equipped with a personal radio. The researcher was mobile for the second period when he again observed the maintenance worker. Whilst static for the third period the researcher noticed a white male security officer patrolling when he stopped to speak to a group of people, kissing one of the females in the group. Whilst this was not the type of interaction the researcher had anticipated the outcome appeared to be positive for all concerned. The researcher was mobile for the fourth period but nothing was noted. Whilst static for the fifth period nothing was noted except the maintenance worker. The researcher was mobile for the sixth period when one white male officer was noted speaking to the staff in one of the shops, the outcome appeared to be positive.

During the final observation period one white male security officer was observed patrolling, the maintenance worker was again observed. The conclusions drawn from observations at the Houndshill Centre were:

- a) The policing of the centre appeared to be carried out by two white male security officers employed by Rentokil Sterling.
- b) The security presence was very low key.
- c) Ethnic minorities and females were not represented at all on the security strength.
- d) There was no obvious supervision of the officers on duty.
- e) No police presence was noted during the observation so no police/security interaction could take place.
- f) Interaction with traders and shoppers was observed to be limited but what little interaction was observed appeared to have a positive outcome.
- g) No abuse of authority of any description was observed.
- h) The main purpose of the security officers appeared to be the maintenance of a presence by patrolling but in such a small site even when looking for them they were not always easy to find. The radio equipped maintenance worker maintained a more obvious presence.(3)

The fourth observational study was carried out in the Lanes Shopping Centre, Carlisle, in the Cumbria Constabulary area. This is a covered development and as the name suggests it is laid out in a number of lanes which have open access to the public thoroughfare. As well as some forty or fifty shops it also houses the public library. Once again seven fifteen minute observational periods alternating between static and mobile were conducted by the researcher. No security or police presence was noted. The researcher did see a member of the maintenance staff and by engaging her in conversation was able to determine that no private security was employed at the Lanes development. It was established that Cumbria Constabulary occasionally patrol through the area. Maintenance staff are employed at the centre twenty four hours a day and would contact Cumbria Constabulary if any problems arose. Throughout the observation periods no in-house security officers were noted in any of the shops.

The fifth observational study was carried out at the St. John's Shopping Centre, Workington in the Cumbria Constabulary area. Seven fifteen minute observation periods were conducted. All that the researcher observed was a white male officer of Cumbria Constabulary in a sports shop speaking to a member of staff. He also noted a white male security officer patrolling Tesco stores. In the final observation period the researcher spoke with one of the business operators in St. John's Arcade which abuts the precinct and was informed that no security officers patrolled and that occasionally officers of Cumbria Constabulary passed through the Arcade and the shopping centre. At night there was no access through the Arcade and most of the shops had alarms and security grills.

Having visited five different shopping centres the researcher had observed five very different approaches to policing these shopping areas and found himself questioning the current validity of previous research in respect of the policing of shopping centres in England today. The observational study resulted in the researcher drawing the following conclusions:

- a) Private police do some but not all of the things that public police do. Private police were not seen to do anything that required powers other than those available to the ordinary citizen and were therefore not in need of immediate government regulation.
- b) There was no evidence to suggest that a close working relationship existed between private and public police. The most striking feature of the observational study was that at all sites visited, even in close proximity private and public police tended to ignore each other.
- c) The fact that no overt co-operation was observed would tend to suggest that irrespective of what Freedman and Stenning (1977) suggest, officers of private and public police organisations perceived themselves as being substantially dissimilar.
- d) Substantial differences in the behaviour of security officers at the various sites was observed suggesting that Loy's (1969) research may have as much if not more relevance to private police as it did to public police.
- e) The comments of Mr P W Rabbitts of IPSA with reference to the low salaries paid by many companies in large cities and the employment of many people from ethnic minorities, were not borne out by the observed evidence of this study.

2. Attitude Statements

The Rand Report 1971 is quoted as having created impressions and characterisations of the average security guard. The researcher therefore, felt it necessary to compare his impressions of private security derived from the observational study with the impressions of corporate owners of shopping centres, business operators with premises in the shopping centres and the general public.

As already stated there is a close link between attitudes and verbal statements concerning beliefs and behaviour, for this reason attitude statements based on the Likert Scale were considered an ideal media for polling the aforementioned users of private security.

A pilot list of seventeen attitude statements was prepared. The statements were all based on material from various publications which had commented on private security and represented the views of such diverse personages as Bruce George MP, Roy Hattersley MP, Mr R Bacon a director of Securicor, Mr P W Rabbitts of the International Professional Security Association, various Chief Officer of Police and various other commentators. The attitude statements were selected to be representative of the following perspectives.

- a) Junior Partner
- b) Economic
- d) Radical
- e) Consumer Hypothesis

The attitude statements represented views rather than verbatim quotes and were so constructed as to be positive statements about private security except for two statements which were not only negative but addressed the same issue as previous positive statements. The negative statements were included as a control by the researcher who had made an arbitrary decision that where 80 (per cent) of respondents made directly opposite responses to these statements it could

be reasonably assumed that respondents were reading and understanding the statements, e.g.

"I believe that security officers in shopping centres are well trained for what they do."

"I believe that security officers in shopping centres are not well trained for the job that they do."

The negative statements were purely a control and were not summed when the completed attitude statements were scored.

A pilot list of seventeen statements was administered to twenty subjects. Each item on the scale was required to meet two conditions.

- a) It tended to be responded to in the same way
- b) It elicited the same response in at least 60 (per cent) of responses (Arnold and Robertson 1991).

Four statements failed to meet these conditions and were rejected. A revised list of thirteen statements, two of which were controls was piloted in the field using a further twenty subjects. All the statements in the revised list were found to elicit a similar response of between 60-70 (per cent).

The final list of thirteen attitude statements contained two control statements and were despatched to:

- a) Assistant General Manger, P & O Shopping Centres Ltd
- b) Manchester City Council, Security Section
- c) Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors
- d) Centre Manager, Hounds Hill Shopping Centre, Blackpool
- e) Ravenscroft Properties Ltd
- f) Land Securities Properties Ltd

of these only three were returned by:

- a) Assistant General Manger, P & O Shopping Centres Ltd who is responsible for the Manchester Arndale Centre.
- b) Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors who are responsible for the Merseyway Shopping Centre and the Lanes Carlisle. The researcher was requested by Donaldsons not to contact the Corporate owners

as they would merely forward any correspondence to Donaldsons.

- c) The Centre Manager, Houndshell Shopping Centre, Blackpool.

The researcher also requested permission from the management of the five sites visited to approach business operators and members of the public with the list of attitude statements. Permission was granted to carry out research at:

- a) The Manchester Arndale Centre
- b) The Merseyway Shopping Centre
- c) The Lanes Shopping Centre, Carlisle

Of the six corporate owners approached by the researcher only three completed their Likert Scale attitude instruments. The eleven attitude statements were scored and the results are presented below.

CORPORATE OWNERS

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | | 6 | | | |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | | | |
| 3 | | 4 | | 4 | |
| 4 | | | 3 | 8 | |
| 5 | | | | | 15 |
| 6 | | | | | 15 |
| 7 | 2 | 2 | | | |
| 8 | 1 | 4 | | | |
| 9 | | | | 4 | 10 |
| 10 | 2 | 2 | | | |
| 11 | 1 | 4 | | | |
| | 8 | 24 | 3 | 16 | 40 |

The more positive an attitude response was the lower the score it rated such that the response "strongly agree" scored 1 and "strongly disagree" scored 5.

The formula:

$$\frac{\text{Total No of attitude statements x subject} \times 100}{\text{Total Column Rating}} \times \text{Attitude Rating}$$

was devised to give a percentage score.

The scores for each rating as applicable to each of the eleven attitude statements was calculated (see over). The percentage positive, negative and Don't Know responses are presented in the table below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE

CORPORATE OWNERS

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | 100 | | |
| SUPERVISION | 100 | | |
| PAY | 66 | | 33 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | | 33 | 66 |
| REGULATION | | | 100 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 100 | | |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 100 | | |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 100 | | |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 100 | | |
| TRAINING | 100 | | |
| | | | |

The researcher approached business operators and members of the public in all three establishments. Within the Arndale Centre forty business operators of various type and size were approached, this being approximately 20 (per cent) of the total number of businesses within the centre. Of the forty businesses approached twenty one agreed to complete the list of attitude statements. Reasons for not wishing to assist in the research included, it being contrary to company policy to discuss security arrangements, this despite the fact that the research instrument had nothing whatsoever to do with the security arrangements of either the individual business or the shopping centre itself.

CORPORATE OWNERS

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{11 \times 3}{8} \times 1 = \frac{100}{33} \times \frac{8}{1} = \underline{24.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{11 \times 3}{24} \times 2 = \frac{100}{33} \times \frac{24}{2} = \underline{36.4\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{11 \times 3}{3} \times 3 = \frac{100}{33} \times \frac{3}{3} = \underline{3\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{11 \times 3}{16} \times 4 = \frac{100}{33} \times \frac{16}{4} = \underline{12.1\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{11 \times 3}{40} \times 5 = \frac{100}{33} \times \frac{40}{5} = \underline{24.2\%}$$

Other business operators flatly refused to have anything to do with the research giving no reason for their refusal and some became quite hostile when the researcher tried to more fully explain the purpose of the research.

The twenty one attitude statements completed by the business operators in the Arndale centre were scored and the results presented below.

THE MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE: (BUSINESS OPERATORS)

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | 1 | 4 | 36 | 12 | 15 |
| 2 | 1 | 16 | 18 | 24 | |
| 3 | | 4 | 24 | 20 | 20 |
| 4 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 44 | 25 |
| 5 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 36 | 30 |
| 6 | | | 3 | 60 | 25 |
| 7 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 48 | 15 |
| 8 | 11 | 20 | | | |
| 9 | | 2 | 3 | 56 | 25 |
| 10 | 2 | 18 | 27 | 4 | |
| 11 | 1 | 4 | 33 | 28 | |
| | 19 | 80 | 168 | 340 | 155 |

These scores were calculated as percentages of predominant attitude response and the results are presented overleaf.

MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE
BUSINESS OPERATORS

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 21}}{19} \times 1 = \frac{100}{231} \times \frac{19}{1} = \underline{8.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 21}}{80} \times 2 = \frac{100}{231} \times \frac{80}{2} = \underline{17.3\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 21}}{168} \times 3 = \frac{100}{231} \times \frac{168}{3} = \underline{24.2\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 21}}{340} \times 4 = \frac{100}{231} \times \frac{340}{4} = \underline{36.7\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 21}}{155} \times 5 = \frac{100}{231} \times \frac{155}{5} = \underline{13.4\%}$$

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
THE MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE

BUSINESS OPERATORS

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
| VETTING | 14 | 57 | 29 |
| SUPERVISION. | 43 | 29 | 29 |
| PAY | 10 | 38 | 52 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | 10 | 14 | 76 |
| REGULATION | 7 | 10 | 83 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 10 | 5 | 85 |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 100 | | |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 5 | 5 | 90 |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 52 | 43 | 5 |
| TRAINING | 15 | 52 | 33 |
| | | | |

Only twenty members of the public agreed to complete the research instrument although perhaps close to a hundred people were approached. There appeared to be three distinct reactions to the research and the researcher when an approach was made. The predominant response was either to totally ignore the researcher or to make a curt refusal and hurry away. Some members of the public did at least listen to the researcher but once they were aware of the topic of the research said that they did not know enough about security to comment. Of the twenty who actually completed the instrument, they did take some time and appeared to think about what they were reading, quite often apologising to the researcher when they marked an attitude statement with "Don't Know", as if they felt that perhaps they should know. The twenty attitude statements completed by members of the public in the Arndale centre were scored and the results are presented in the table overleaf.

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | | 2 | 45 | 12 | 5 |
| 2 | | 8 | 36 | 16 | |
| 3 | | 8 | 30 | 20 | 10 |
| 4 | | 6 | 18 | 40 | 5 |
| 5 | | 4 | 12 | 40 | 20 |
| 6 | | 2 | 24 | 44 | |
| 7 | 1 | 18 | 21 | 12 | |
| 8 | 3 | 18 | 18 | 8 | |
| 9 | | 6 | 39 | 4 | |
| 10 | | 4 | 48 | 8 | |
| 11 | 1 | 22 | 21 | 4 | |
| | 5 | 98 | 312 | 208 | 40 |

The above scores were then calculated as percentages of predominant attitude response and the results are presented below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE

MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | 5 | 75 | 20 |
| SUPERVISION | 20 | 60 | 20 |
| PAY | 20 | 50 | 30 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | 15 | 30 | 55 |
| REGULATION | 8 | 30 | 62 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 50 | 35 | 15 |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 60 | 30 | 10 |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 15 | 65 | 5 |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 10 | 80 | 10 |
| TRAINING | 60 | 35 | 5 |

Similar reactions by both business operators and members of the public were experienced in the Merseyway Shopping Centre.

MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{11 \times 20}{5} \times 1 = \frac{100}{220} \times \frac{5}{1} = \underline{2.3\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{11 \times 20}{98} \times 2 = \frac{100}{220} \times \frac{98}{2} = \underline{22.3\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{11 \times 20}{312} \times 3 = \frac{100}{220} \times \frac{312}{3} = \underline{47.3\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{11 \times 20}{208} \times 4 = \frac{100}{220} \times \frac{208}{4} = \underline{23.6\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{11 \times 20}{40} \times 5 = \frac{100}{220} \times \frac{40}{5} = \underline{3.6\%}$$

The researcher approached fifteen businesses in the Merseyway Shopping Centre this being approximately 20-25 (per cent) of the businesses forming the shopping centre proper. Reasons for refusing to complete the instrument were either that it was contrary to company policy or that the business operators were too busy.

The seven attitude statement instruments completed by the business operators in the Merseyway shopping centre were scored and the results are presented below.

STOCKPORT MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE (BUSINESS OPERATORS)

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | | | 18 | 4 | |
| 2 | | 6 | 6 | 8 | |
| 3 | | 2 | 12 | 4 | 5 |
| 4 | | | 3 | 16 | 10 |
| 5 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 5 |
| 6 | | | | 24 | 5 |
| 7 | | | 6 | 12 | 10 |
| 8 | 3 | 8 | | | |
| 9 | | | | 20 | 10 |
| 10 | | 8 | 9 | | |
| 11 | | | 12 | 8 | |
| | 4 | 26 | 72 | 104 | 45 |

The above scores were then calculated as a percentage of predominant attitude response and the results are tabulated overleaf.

MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE
STOCKPORT
BUSINESS OPERATORS

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 7} \times 1 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{4}{1} = \underline{5.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 7} \times 2 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{26}{2} = \underline{16.9\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 7} \times 3 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{72}{3} = \underline{31.2\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 7} \times 4 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{104}{4} = \underline{33.7\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 7} \times 5 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{40}{5} = \underline{10.4\%}$$

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
STOCKPORT MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE

BUSINESS OPERATORS

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | | 86 | 14 |
| SUPERVISION | 42 | 29 | 29 |
| PAY | 29 | 57 | 14 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | | 14 | 85 |
| REGULATION | 14 | 14 | 71 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 71 | 28 | |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 100 | | |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 100 | | |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 57 | 42 | |
| TRAINING | | 57 | 28 |
| | | | |

Of approximately fifty members of the public approached only fourteen agreed to complete the research instrument. The reactions to the researcher were very similar to those experienced in the Arndale Centre.

The fourteen attitude statements completed by members of the public were scored and the results presented in the table below.

STOCKPORT MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE (MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC)

| <u>ATTITUDE RATING</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| <u>ATTITUDE STATEMENT No.</u> | <u>STRONGLY AGREE</u> | <u>AGREE</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>DISAGREE</u> | <u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u> |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 4 | |
| 2 | 1 | 4 | 27 | 8 | |
| 3 | | 0 | 12 | 24 | 5 |
| 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 32 | 5 |
| 5 | | 4 | 12 | 32 | |
| 6 | | 2 | 10 | 24 | |
| 7 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 12 | 10 |
| 8 | | 10 | 27 | | |
| 9 | | 12 | 10 | 4 | 5 |
| 10 | | 6 | 27 | 8 | |
| 11 | 1 | 4 | 24 | 0 | 5 |
| | 5 | 60 | 216 | 156 | 30 |

MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE
STOCKPORT
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 14} \times 1 = \frac{100}{154} \times \frac{5}{1} = \underline{3.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 14} \times 2 = \frac{100}{154} \times \frac{60}{2} = \underline{19.4\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 14} \times 3 = \frac{100}{154} \times \frac{216}{3} = \underline{46.7\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 14} \times 4 = \frac{100}{154} \times \frac{156}{4} = \underline{25.3\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$
$$= \frac{100}{11 \times 14} \times 5 = \frac{100}{154} \times \frac{13}{5} = \underline{6\%}$$

The above scores were then calculated as percentages of the predominant attitude response and the results are tabulated below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
STOCKPORT MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE

MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | 14 | 71 | 7 |
| SUPERVISION | 21 | 64 | 14 |
| PAY | 28 | 28 | 43 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | 21 | 14 | 64 |
| REGULATION | 11 | 36 | 51 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 21 | 35 | 44 |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 35 | 65 | |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 42 | 42 | 14 |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 21 | 65 | 14 |
| TRAINING | 14 | 65 | 14 |
| | | | |

In the Lanes Shopping Centre, there was the obvious variable of no private policing service being available but the researcher also became aware of a number of unforeseen variables. Ten business operators were approached of whom seven agreed to complete the research instrument.

The seven attitude statements instruments completed by the business operators were scored and the results are presented overleaf.

THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE (BUSINESS OPERATORS)

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | | 2 | 12 | 4 | |
| 2 | | 4 | 12 | 4 | |
| 3 | | | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| 4 | | 2 | 3 | 16 | 5 |
| 5 | | | 3 | 20 | 5 |
| 6 | | | 3 | 16 | 10 |
| 7 | | 6 | | 16 | |
| 8 | 4 | 6 | | | |
| 9 | | 2 | | 20 | 5 |
| 10 | | 2 | 9 | 12 | |
| 11 | | 4 | 9 | 8 | |
| | 4 | 30 | 60 | 124 | 35 |

The scores were then calculated as percentages of the predominant attitude response and the results tabulated below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE

BUSINESS OPERATORS

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | 14 | 57 | 14 |
| SUPERVISION | 28 | 57 | 14 |
| PAY | | 42 | 57 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | 28 | 14 | 57 |
| REGULATION | | 14 | 85 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 42 | | 57 |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 100 | | |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 14 | | 85 |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 14 | 42 | 42 |
| TRAINING | 28 | 42 | 28 |

THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE
CARLISLE
BUSINESS OPERATORS

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 7}}{4} \times 1 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{4}{1} = \underline{5.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 7}}{30} \times 2 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{30}{2} = \underline{19.4\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 7}}{60} \times 3 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{60}{3} = \underline{26\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 7}}{124} \times 4 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{124}{4} = \underline{40.2\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\frac{100}{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{100}{11 \times 7}}{55} \times 5 = \frac{100}{77} \times \frac{55}{5} = \underline{14.3\%}$$

The researcher was eventually approached by the Centre Manager and asked to explain his presence in the Centre. In spite of the fact that Donaldsons had granted permission for the research to be conducted the Centre manager insisted that he did not wish his customers or the business operators to be pestered by people conducting surveys. He did, however, indicate that for the sum of forty pounds per day payable to him the annoyance to his customers might in some way be lessened. The researcher refused to pay and moved to the public library which is also situated in the centre. The object of the research was explained to the librarian and the researcher was allowed to approach members of the public using the library. The reaction to the researcher was similar to that experienced in the Arndale Centre and the Merseyway Shopping Centre except that many of the forty two people who agreed to complete the research instrument were only too willing to give their views on a list of topics which, while extremely interesting, were in no way related to this research.

The forty two attitude statement instruments completed by members of the public in the Lanes were scored and the results are presented below.

THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

| ATTITUDE RATING | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
| ATTITUDE STATEMENT No. | STRONGLY AGREE | AGREE | DONT KNOW | DISAGREE | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 1 | 2 | 22 | 66 | 24 | 5 |
| 2 | 2 | 4 | 78 | 44 | 10 |
| 3 | 4 | 28 | 78 | | |
| 4 | 2 | 40 | 24 | 48 | |
| 5 | | | 18 | 96 | 60 |
| 6 | | | 30 | 128 | |
| 7 | | 56 | 12 | 40 | |
| 8 | 2 | 16 | 18 | 104 | |
| 9 | 6 | 48 | 24 | 16 | |
| 10 | | 12 | 96 | 16 | |
| 11 | 8 | 16 | 60 | 24 | |
| | 24 | 242 | 504 | 540 | 75 |

THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE
CARLISLE
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

% Score for strongly agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating} = \frac{100}{24} \times 1 = \frac{100}{462} \times \frac{24}{1} = \underline{5.2\%}$$

% Score for agree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating} = \frac{100}{242} \times 2 = \frac{100}{462} \times \frac{242}{2} = \underline{26.1\%}$$

% Score for dont know

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of Attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating} = \frac{100}{504} \times 3 = \frac{100}{462} \times \frac{504}{3} = \underline{36.4\%}$$

% Score for disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating} = \frac{100}{540} \times 4 = \frac{100}{462} \times \frac{540}{4} = \underline{29.2\%}$$

% Score for strongly disagree

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of attitude statements x subjects}}{\text{Total column rating}} \times \text{Attitude rating} = \frac{100}{75} \times 5 = \frac{100}{462} \times \frac{75}{5} = \underline{3.2\%}$$

The above scores were then calculated as percentages of the predominant attitude response and are presented below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE
THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE

MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

| <u>PERCEPTION OF</u> | <u>POSITIVE PER CENT</u> | <u>DONT KNOW</u> | <u>NEGATIVE PER CENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| VETTING | 31 | 52 | 17 |
| SUPERVISION | 9 | 60 | 31 |
| PAY | 43 | 57 | |
| PARITY WITH POLICE PAY | 52 | 19 | 28 |
| REGULATION | | 19 | 82 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 66 | 9 | 24 |
| CRIME PREVENTION | 24 | 14 | 62 |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 71 | 19 | 10 |
| COOPERATION WITH POLICE | 14 | 76 | 10 |
| TRAINING | 38 | 48 | 14 |
| | | | |

The Chief Constables of Greater Manchester Police and Lancashire and Cumbria Constabulary were contacted and asked for permission to undertake the research in their force areas. As well as granting permission all these Chief Officers nominated a contact officer and offered any assistance that the researcher might require. Greater Manchester Police very kindly submitted the proposed research instrument to their Development and Inspectorate Department. A number of questions concerning the research instrument were raised by the department. The researcher felt that he had addressed these questions in designing the research but welcomed the opportunity to revisit them aided by another point of view.

The questions raised by the department included:

- a) "The questionnaire requires a lot of knowledge about security officers and their role which respondents may not have"

The Development and Inspectorate Department were evaluating the research instrument without

benefit of the foregoing three chapters in which the researcher hypothesised that the different categories of respondents

- (i) Corporate Owners
- (ii) Business Operators
- (iii) Members of the Public

were likely to have differing levels of knowledge and control in connection with private security.

- b) "The questionnaire does not appear to test the hypotheses stated as it does not ask about the satisfaction of customers towards "private policing" only about their attitudes. In addition there appear to be no questions inquiring if the respondent is a customer/user"

In earlier chapters the researcher had examined the connections between attitudes and customer satisfaction (Rosenberg and Hovland 1960) (Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and he intended to use the data concerning attitudes together with evidence from the observational study and any anecdotal evidence when arriving at conclusions. Since the instrument was administered by the researcher he was aware of the status of the respondent.

- c) "The layout of the instrument could be improved by more space between the statements."

The researcher accepts this as a valid comment.

- d) "As all the statements provide the same response (strongly agree, agree, etc) it would be better to alternate the response, for example the first five questions could start with Strongly Agree and the next five Strongly Disagree, etc. This will mean that respondents are required to think about their responses to each of the statements rather than circling the same response every time"

The responses to the statements were standard Likert type responses and the researcher chose to build in a slightly more subtle check of respondent understanding of the statements which is detailed below in response to other criticisms.

- e) "No instructions were given as to where and when to return the instrument, nor who the instrument is from."

The instrument was administered by the researcher and any information required was provided personally by him. This strategy was adopted as a means of maximising response.

- f) "No clarification is given as to whether the reference to shopping malls concerns all those in Britain or just, for example, the Manchester Arndale Centre."

Again this information was provided verbally by the researcher.

Further criticisms were raised in connection with specific statements.

Statement 1

"If respondents are not aware of pre-employment checks will they be able to comment on them being satisfactory?"

The previous chapters which the Development and Inspectorate Department had not seen indicated that the researcher expected different levels of awareness from the different categories of respondent "Shopping Malls" is a very American term it may be better rephrased as "shopping centres".

The researcher contends that this is matter of opinion. Mall is defined as:

"A public walk, originally a place where Pall-Mall was played." (The Concise English Dictionary 1968).

Since one of the most famous public walks in the world is called Pall-Mall and is situated in the centre of London the opinion stated above does not appear to rest on any linguistic, historical or geographical matter of fact.

Statement 2

"Will respondents be aware of how security officers are supervised?"

It was the researchers contention that levels of awareness would depend on the category of respondent.

Statement 3

"Do respondents know how much security officers are paid? If they are paid well who is this in comparison with - the person answering the question, a top business person, someone in part-time work, etc?"

Much of the literature on private security indicates that security officers are poorly paid and have to work long hours to achieve a living wage. It was the researchers contention that awareness or indeed concern with the literature would depend on respondent status.

Statement 4

"The comments to Statement 3 also apply. In addition will respondents be aware of the pay scale of police officers?"

As a result of the Police and Criminal Justice Act and the Sheehy Inquiry police pay and conditions were given substantial media coverage both in the press and on television to the extent that the least politically aware person in the country would have had some rough idea of what police officers earn.

Statement 5

"Respondents may be unaware as to why government may wish to licence firms of security officers."

The whole point of this statement is that government do not wish to licence firms of security officers, what the researcher was concerned with, was whether the electorate saw such a need.

Statement 6

"Will respondents be aware of Police Discipline regulations?"

The researcher would have been surprised if any of the respondents had a detailed knowledge of the Police Discipline Regulations but it is evident from the number of complaints against police in general that respondents would be aware that a regulatory mechanism exists in respect of the police.

Statement 7

"Compared to serving who? I presume this refers to serving members of the public or business?"

Statement 7 represent a radical perspective which sees the

police enforcing state law, and private security enforcing the rights associated with ownership of property. As a statement in a Likert scale it invites an instant response to the statement and therefore no comparison was intended or implied.

Statement 9

"This is a subjective statement as it depends on the respondents view of whether the government control the public or not. This also assumes that the government currently controls the public."

Precisely! The radical view sees the government as controlling the public by use of the police and private security. Responses to such statements were intended to give a rough guide as to the most prevalent concept of private security, i.e. junior partner, economic or radical. All the statements in the instrument were subjective being based on statements in the media credited to such diverse personages as Mr Bruce George MP, Mr Roy Hattersley MP, Mr R Bacon, a Director of Securicor Ltd, Mr Patrick Rabbitts of the International Professional Security Association and a number of Chief Officers of Police.

Statement 10

"Do security officers work with the police? If they do, will all respondents know if they work "well" together? Work well doing what?"

What the researcher hoped to establish was whether the respondents perceived any co-operation between police and private security. Such perception would have implications for customer satisfaction (Rosenberg and Hovland 1960) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) (Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993) and would indicate which of the five stages in the relationship between police and private security identified by Stenning (1989) was perceived by respondents as existing at present.

Statement 11

Statement 11 on the actual attitude scale inventory was "I believe security officers in shopping centres seldom work with the police". The development and inspectorate

department felt that like Statement 10 this statement should be subjected to the same question.

"Do security officers work with the police? If they do, will all respondents know if they work "well" together? Work well doing what?"

Statement 11 was not scored it was included purely as a control, being the opposite of statement 10. The sole purpose of this statement was to allow the researcher to determine whether respondents were reading and understanding the statements. It was arbitrarily decided by the researcher that if 80 (per cent) of respondents gave opposite responses to statements 10 and 11 then responses could be regarded as valid.

Statement 12

"What training are security officers given? If the respondent is not aware of the training they will not be able to comment on how good it is."

Again the researcher expected very different levels of knowledge for the various categories of respondents and therefore different responses.

Statement 13

"In addition statement 12 is a duplicate of 13, i.e. if a respondent agrees to question 12 then they disagree to question 13."

Exactly! and if 80 (per cent) of respondents show this trend then the instrument can be considered valid.

The researcher was aware from the outset that the research would never meet the stringent requirements of a laboratory experiment and expected to experience some difficulty in finding sufficient subjects to co-operate in the research. Due to the small numbers who were willing to complete the research instrument no attempt to extrapolate the findings of the research to the whole of the Security Industry would be possible. As stated earlier the object of the research was to provide a snapshot of one small sector of the Industry at a particular moment in time.

Although the researcher felt that he could defend his research instruments against the criticisms levelled by the Greater Manchester Police evaluation, he felt it necessary to acknowledge these concerns.

3. Problems Encountered

The researcher had hoped to conduct a number of informal, interviews as used by Zweig (1948 & 1952) with security officers themselves. None of the security companies operating within the shopping centres studied answered the approaches of the researcher, so that the conducting of Zweig type interviews was not possible. The researcher did, however manage to engage people in conversation in all of the centres visited and felt that their remarks were worth recording and considering with the data obtained by the non-participational observational study and the attitude statements instrument.

In the Arndale Centre the researcher managed to speak to a member of the Manchester Market Police with whom he was acquainted. It was ascertained that these officers are not attested constables but are Peace Officers deriving the power to enforce market bye-laws under the Manchester Markets Act 1879. The only power of arrest available to these officers is that of a citizen. Although the Markets police officers do not have full police powers they did appear to have more powers within their particular sphere of influence than the officers employed by Secureurop. What was particularly interesting was the fact that the City Council had been considering replacing the Market Police with contracted private security as a less expensive means of providing policing services within the city's Markets, however this had eventually been decided against. The officer spoken to was not in a position to enlighten the researcher as to what had informed the council's decision to retain its more expensive police force, but it would not be unreasonable to assume that, the increased powers available to its officers, and the

direct control enjoyed by the council had some effect on the decision.

The researcher managed to engage one of the security officers in the Merseyway Shopping Centre in conversation. As a result of this conversation it was established that Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors have their own security guards responsible for policing some of the properties they manage, this includes the Merseyway Shopping Centre. The officers in the shopping centre do not go into the stores that abut, but do not form part of the centre, unless they are asked to. The officer saw himself as a deterrent in the prevention of theft. He also said that it was part of his remit to prevent public order offences such as drunkenness and begging and also to prevent the riding of bicycles in the centre. He said that the local police were always passing through the centre and that a good relationship existed between police and security guards. It was obvious from the brief exchange with this officer that he saw his role as much crime preventative as loss preventative.

Donaldsons also managed the Lanes Shopping Centre in Carlisle but no security guards operate there. However, one business operator who completed the attitude statement instrument also provided the researcher with much useful anecdotal evidence. It would appear that there had been a number of disturbances in the shopping centre caused by youths engaging in general "hooliganism". These disturbances were short lived and the youths had disappeared by the time Cumbria Constabulary had arrived. Business operators worried about the effect of such incidents on their businesses had formed a committee to bring pressure to bear on the City Council and Donaldsons with a view to employing security guards. The lady providing this information had mixed feelings about such a move since as a result of the disturbances private security had been employed in her store. Three guards were employed on a shift basis and she only felt comfortable in her own store when one of these guards was on duty, the other two made her feel ill at ease.

Eventually money began to disappear from the bags of staff left in the rest room, this had not been a problem before and ceased as soon as the guards ceased to be employed in the store.

The data collected was analysed and the results obtained are discussed in the context of those areas identified as problematical by previous research.

4. Analysis of the Data

The results of the analysis of the data represents the perceptions of 3 corporate owners, 35 business operators and 76 shopping public.

As expected by the researcher the predominant attitude responses of these three groups of users varied considerably. The percentage responses for positive/negative attitudes and Don't Knows for each group are presented in table form below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE
COMPARISON OF CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS
PERCENTAGES

| | POSITIVE | | | DONT KNOW | | | NEGATIVE | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| | CORPORATE OWNERS | BUSINESS OPERATORS | SHOPPING PUBLIC | CORPORATE OWNERS | BUSINESS OPERATORS | SHOPPING PUBLIC | CORPORATE OWNERS | BUSINESS OPERATORS | SHOPPING PUBLIC |
| VETTING | 100 | 9 | 17 | | 67 | 66 | | 19 | 15 |
| SUPERVISE | 100 | 38 | 17 | | 38 | 61 | | 24 | 22 |
| PAY | 66 | 13 | 30 | | 46 | 45 | 33 | 41 | 35 |
| PARITY WITH POLICE | | 13 | 29 | 33 | 14 | 21 | 66 | 73 | 49 |
| REGULATE | | 7 | 6 | | 13 | 28 | 100 | 79 | 65 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 100 | 41 | 46 | | 11 | 26 | | 47 | 28 |
| CRIME PREVENT. | 100 | 100 | 40 | | | 36 | | | 24 |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 100 | 40 | 43 | | 2 | 42 | | 58 | 10 |
| COOPERATE WITH POLICE | 100 | 41 | 15 | | 42 | 74 | | 16 | 11 |
| TRAINING | 100 | 14 | 37 | | 50 | 49 | | 30 | 11 |

The researcher sought to make comparisons with the negative perceptions of private security identified by The Rand Report 1971.

The results are also used to test Consumer Hypotheses posited by the researcher.

a) Vetting

Only three corporate owners were polled but they were unanimous in believing that the vetting of security officers employed in their centres was satisfactory, although they stressed that they were not prepared to comment on the vetting of officers employed at other shopping centres. The majority response from business operators (60 per cent) was that they knew little about how security officers were vetted and of those that did express an opinion twice as many tended towards a negative perception than towards a positive perception. A similar percentage of the shopping public (66 per cent) claimed to know little about the way security officers were vetted and of those who expressed views, opinion was fairly even between negative and positive (15 percent and 17 per cent respectively). In the centres studied attitudes to vetting were much more complex than The Rand Report would have suggested. Corporate owners expressed a highly positive attitude in respect of those security officers over whom they exercised control. Business operators and the shopping public to a large degree confessed ignorance of vetting procedures and were unable to form any perceptions, of those who did have a view, negative and positive perceptions appeared to be roughly balanced.

The perceptions of corporate owners is born out to some extent by documentary evidence obtained by the researcher which suggests that many companies do carry out vetting to as high a standard as possible. Some companies require applicants to use the direct access to the Police National Computer allowed under The Data Protection Act with the company paying the necessary fee (see Appendix B). Vetting so far as the majority of business operators and shopping public were concerned in the centres studied is not problematical.

b) Supervision

Corporate owners expressed a unanimous positive attitude towards the supervision of security officers in their employ. Business operators were evenly divided (38 per cent) between a positive attitude towards supervision and lack of knowledge, there was a negative perception (24 per cent) but this was certainly not the predominant response. The predominant response of the shopping public was lack of knowledge (61 per cent). In the centres studied the perceptions of supervision were largely positive where perceptions had been formed but in the main lack of knowledge prevented the formation of perceptions.

c) Pay

Two of the three corporate owners polled believed that the security officers in their employ were well paid, whilst one thought that they were poorly paid. Business operators were almost evenly divided in believing that security officers were poorly paid and professing no knowledge of their levels of pay (41 per cent and 46 per cent respectively). The predominant response of the public was lack of knowledge with a roughly even distribution between positive and negative perceptions of levels of pay (30 per cent and 35 per cent respectively). Again the obvious factor here is lack of knowledge particularly in respect of the shopping public and business operators.

d) Parity with Police Pay

On the question of whether security officers should receive the same pay as police, two corporate owners responded negatively whilst one did not know. Business operators exhibited a strong negative response of parity of pay with police (73 per cent) whilst there was a roughly even distribution between lack of knowledge and a positive response (14 per cent and 13 per cent respectively). The overall public attitude towards parity of pay with police was negative (42 per cent) but less so than either corporate owners or business operators.

Almost one third (29 per cent) of the public polled believed that security officers should receive similar pay to police. The overall trend was towards a belief that security officers should not receive the same pay as police, the researcher concluded from this that the majority of those polled perceived police and private security as performing different functions. The lower percentage of shopping public in comparison to percentage of corporate owners or business owners believing that private security should receive less pay than police is consistent with the lack of knowledge about private security.

e) Regulation

Corporate owners were unanimous in agreeing the need for some form of government licencing or regulation. Business operators were also strongly in favour of regulation (79 per cent) with the shopping public also showing a strong positive response towards regulation (65 per cent).

Many areas of the private security industry in America were shown by The Rand Report 1971 as being problematical the only area that this study revealed as producing a strong negative perception of private security was in the area of licencing and regulation.

f) Private Justice

All the corporate owners believed that the private security officers operating in their centres were there not only to serve their interests, but to serve the interests of business operators and shoppers alike. A large proportion of business operators (58 per cent) disagreed believing that the security officers employed in the shopping centres were there to serve their paymasters. Evidence of the strength of this belief was seen in the number of in-house security officers employed in the Arndale and Merseyway Centres. The predominant public attitude (46 per cent) was that private security were not there simply to serve those who payed them. Those who believed that private security were not there to serve the public was fairly evenly balanced by those who did not know

(28 per cent and 26 per cent respectively). The perceptions of private security meeting the needs of special interest groups appeared more complex than suggested by The Rand Report but tended towards a positive rather than negative perception.

g) Crime Prevention

Corporate owners were unanimous in their belief that security officers in their centres were employed to prevent crime and assist the public. Business operators were also unanimous on this point. Surprisingly the shopping public who had shown the strongest trend towards a belief that private security should receive similar pay to the police were less sure about the crime preventative role of private security. The predominant response was lack of knowledge (42 per cent) with slightly fewer believing there was a crime preventative role (40 per cent). The observational study of all sites failed to reveal one instance of a law enforcement function. The most evident activity of private security was their relentless patrolling of the centres. Although research has shown that patrolling has a limited effect on levels of crime (Bright 1969) it was not established whether people perceived patrolling as a crime prevention activity although there is a body of opinion that holds that this is the case. The observational study tended to support the junior partner perspective in respect of the centres observed since at no time was anything that could be remotely described as a law enforcement function carried out.

h) Social Control

Corporate owners did not believe that security officers in their shopping centres were a means whereby government controlled the public. In the light of the response to previous attitude statements a radical theorist might reasonably suggest that corporate owners saw private security as a means whereby they controlled the public whilst in their shopping centres. Surprisingly the predominant response of business operators (58 per cent) was that private security was a means of social control.

A radical theorist looking at previous responses might suggest that as business operators appear to have little or no control over the officers employed to patrol the centres this may account for their perception that private security exercise a controlling function. They may go further to suggest that it is not the controlling function itself that is objected to, but the lack of power in exercising control which would then explain why some stores found it necessary to employ their own guards. The shopping public showed a fairly even distribution between those who did not see private security as a means of social control and those who did not know (43 per cent and 42 per cent respectively). Nothing was noted by the observer in any of the observational studies that would lead to the ordinary member of the public adopting a radical perspective in respect of private security operating in the centres.(5)

i) Co-operation with the Police

Corporate owners expressed a unanimous view that security officers co-operated with the police, however the observational study saw little evidence of this perceived co-operation. Certainly nothing approximating to the active partnership described by Stenning (1989) was evident. Business operators were evenly divided between those that did believe that there was co-operation between police and private security and those who did not know (41 per cent and 42 per cent respectively). The predominant response from the shopping public was lack of knowledge (74 per cent). This did not surprise the researcher whose observations had revealed nothing of any potential for interaction with sworn or public law enforcement agencies (The Rand Report 1971).

j) Training

Corporate owners expressed satisfaction with the training of officers in their centres. The majority of business operators knew little about training (50 per cent) whilst a high proportion (30 per cent) believed security officers to be poorly trained.

A similar proportion of the public (49 per cent) admitted a lack of knowledge about the training of security officers whilst a high proportion (37 per cent) believed that they were well trained. The only clear trend here is a lack of knowledge about training. The perceptions of security officers as being poorly trained disclosed by The Rand Report do not hold true for the shopping centres investigated by this research.

k) Comparison of Consumer Views

The perceptions of the three groups of consumers were different and particularly in respect of corporate owners who had a strongly positive attitude towards officers in their employ, although they did favour some form of licencing or regulation and did not believe that security officers should receive the same pay as police.

Business operators expressed negative perceptions in the areas of regulation, private justice and social control and appeared to have little knowledge of the supervision, training and pay of security officers and the amount of co-operation, if any, with the police. Since business operators pay for the security in the centres as a proportion of their rent, this lack of knowledge and indeed lack of power, may have some bearing on the negative perception.

The predominant response of the public in respect of vetting, supervision, pay, training and co-operation with the police was lack of knowledge. They expressed negative perceptions towards security officers in respect of parity of pay with the police and regulation but had some positive perceptions in that they did not believe private security to be involved in the provision of a private justice system yet they did believe that private security had a crime prevention role.

The overall attitude of members of the public surveyed requires some qualification as there was some considerable variation in responses in different shopping centres.

The percentage attitude response in respect of the three different centres is presented in table form below.

PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC (ALL THREE SHOPPING CENTRES)

| | POSITIVE | | | DONT KNOW | | | NEGATIVE | | |
|-----------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| | ARNDALE | MERSEYWAY | THE LANES | ARNDALE | MERSEYWAY | THE LANES | ARNDALE | MERSEYWAY | THE LANES |
| VETTING | 5 | 14 | 31 | 75 | 71 | 52 | 20 | 7 | 17 |
| SUPERVISE | 20 | 21 | 9 | 60 | 64 | 60 | 20 | 14 | 31 |
| PAY | 20 | 28 | 43 | 50 | 28 | 57 | 30 | 43 | |
| PARITY WITH POLICE | 15 | 21 | 52 | 30 | 14 | 19 | 55 | 64 | 28 |
| REGULATE | 8 | 11 | | 30 | 36 | 19 | 62 | 51 | 82 |
| PRIVATE JUSTICE | 50 | 21 | 66 | 35 | 35 | 9 | 15 | 44 | 24 |
| CRIME PREVENT. | 60 | 35 | 24 | 30 | 65 | 14 | 10 | | 62 |
| SOCIAL CONTROL | 15 | 42 | 71 | 65 | 42 | 19 | 5 | 14 | 10 |
| COOPERATE WITH POLICE | 10 | 21 | 14 | 80 | 65 | 76 | 10 | 14 | 10 |
| TRAINING | 60 | 14 | 38 | 35 | 65 | 48 | 5 | 14 | 14 |

Whilst the predominant response to the question of vetting in the Arndale and Merseyway centres was one of lack of knowledge (75 per cent and 71 per cent respectively), the predominant response though similar was not so marked in the Lanes shopping centre (52 per cent) even though no private security is employed. Although the predominant response to the question of pay was lack of knowledge the responses for individual centres was markedly different, Arndale (50 per cent) Merseyway (28 per cent) The Lanes (51 per cent).

Where perceptions were admitted these were totally opposing, in The Lanes a high proportion believed security officers were well paid (43 per cent) whilst in the Merseyway centre the same proportion (45 per cent) believed they were not well paid.

On the question of regulation the general trend in all three sites was towards a negative perception but of varying strengths, Arndale (62 per cent) Merseyway (51 per cent) and The Lanes (82 per cent). There was a general trend towards a positive response in respect of provision of a private justice system, Arndale (50 per cent) Merseyway (21 per cent) and The Lanes (66 per cent) but the responses were markedly different with those polled in the Merseyway centre showing a predominantly negative response (44 per cent). There was no uniformity at all in the responses to the question of social control. On the question of co-operation with the police there was a strong trend towards lack of knowledge, Arndale (80 per cent) Merseyway (65 per cent) and The Lanes (76 per cent). The question of training also drew responses at complete variance. It should be noted that the percentages quoted are based on small numbers of respondents.

The different results obtained at The Lanes shopping centre could be explained away by the fact that no private security are employed there, that the centre is in a different police area than the other two centres, that it falls within the sphere of responsibility of a County rather than a Metropolitan Police force. Most of the respondents polled in The Lanes were polled in the public library which may well have made them less representative of the shopping public than respondents in either of the other two centres.

It is more difficult however to account for the vast difference in responses between the Arndale and Merseyway centres. Whilst it is possible that the size and configuration of the developments and the different styles of policing may have had some effect on responses, the researcher felt that the only safe conclusion to draw from an analysis of the responses of the shopping public was that

there is overwhelming evidence of a general lack of knowledge about private security in shopping centres.

1) Proving the Hypotheses

The researcher proposed three hypotheses all of which were borne out to some extent by the research.

(i) Hypothesis A

"Consumer Attitude towards a service provider will show a positive increase as his/her satisfaction with the service provided increases"

The attitude of corporate owners tended to be highly positive towards those security officers employed solely for their purposes and a high degree of satisfaction was claimed in respect of security officers operating in individual shopping centres. Corporate owners did however make it plain that they were basing their judgements completely on the activities of security officers in their employ.

Business operators showed a less positive attitude towards private security than either corporate owners or members of the public and the lack of satisfaction is evidenced to some extent by the fact that many in-house security officers were employed by stores within the centres. The majority of business operators polled by the researcher did not employ in-house security.

It was difficult to detect any strong levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the part of the general public, the overwhelming impression obtained by the researcher was lack of knowledge coupled with lack of interest. It is held that hypothesis A was found to be true in respect of corporate owners and business operators, but the hypothesis needs refining to take account of the

effects of knowledge or lack of knowledge of both the service on offer and those who are providing it.

(ii) Hypothesis B

"Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over service provider increases"

Corporate owners appeared to exercise total control over the service provider and expressed a high degree of satisfaction with those over whom they had control, they refused to comment on other service providers over whom they did not exercise control.

The level of business operators satisfaction was perceptibly lower than that of the corporate owners, business operators exercised no power over the day to day functioning of security officers employed by the corporate owners, yet they were paying for the service by virtue of a proportion of site rent.

The shopping public had no control whatsoever over security officers yet their general level of satisfaction as expressed by lack of negative attitude (lack of knowledge prevented the expression of positive attitude) appeared to be greater than that of business operators.

Once again though the hypothesis in general terms was held to be true it needed refinement to include the effects of knowledge or lack of knowledge of service providers and service offered.

(iii) Hypothesis C

"Shopping centre owners, business operators and members of the public would exhibit different attitudes towards service providers operating in shopping centres"

This hypothesis appeared to hold true in respect of all categories of consumer, and whilst the researcher originally expected this to be so as a result of the degree of control exercised by each group of consumers, it has to be acknowledged that levels of knowledge of service and provider are as important if not more important than the degree of control.

In the shopping centres studied very different approaches to policing were observed and it is highly likely that if the number of shopping centres studied was increased, then an increasing number of different styles of policing would have become apparent. The issue that all groups of consumers polled in this research most strongly agreed upon, was the need for licencing and regulation.

Of all the issues highlighted by research such as The Hallcrest Report and The Rand Report, British politicians, police officers, academics and leading members of the security industry, all agree that licencing and regulation is a vital issue. In the next and final chapter a number of conclusions will be drawn based on the results of this research not least of which will be the need to provide a stronger base of knowledge about security across industries (and across consumers) and a need for a better and more consistent and co-ordinated research programme.

NOTES

(1) The observational study in the Manchester Arndale Centre was carried out midweek over a period of three days, July 1995

The observational study in the Merceyway Shopping Centre was carried out mid-week over a period of two days, July 1995

The observational study in Houndshill Shopping Centre was carried out on a Saturday, July 1995.

The observational study in the Lanes Shopping Centre was carried out on Saturday, August 1995.

The observational studies at the St. John's Shopping Centre and St. John's Arcade Workington were carried out on the same mid-week day during June 1995.

It was intended that the fifteen minute observations would be recorded on the time interval charts (Appendix D). It soon became apparent that the categories decided upon by the researcher tended to overlap and it was necessary to augment the records on the time interval charts with copious note taking.

The researcher was aware whilst conducting observations in the locality the real drama could be occurring in another areas of the Shopping Centre or indeed in areas to which the researcher did not have access. This is one of the reasons that the observations were divided up into time intervals of 15 minutes and alternated between static and mobile recording thereby providing a measure of control. The researcher made no attempt at concealment openly observing and recording what he saw.

Obviously access to closed circuit television recordings would have provided much more valuable and accurate observations but on the basis of the responses from security companies asked to complete questionnaires or allow interviews with staff the researcher was convinced that such access would not be granted. Whilst it is admitted that the observational technique adopted by the researcher is less than perfect it is easily replicated and the accuracy or otherwise of the observations easily tested.

(2) The researcher was aware that by observing subjects, meaning could be imputed to acts which may not have been intended by those observed. It was for this reason that the researcher had hoped to conduct ZWEIG type interviews (ZWEIG F 1948, 1952) as a means of recording meanings imputed and intentions of the subject. However, since the main thrust of the research was to explore the attitudes of "other observers" i.e. shoppers business owners and corporate owners it was felt that attitude statements would support the accuracy of observations. One result of this comparison of instruments was the recognition that the degree of control exercised over security companies would affect the imputation of meaning to actions of officers by the various categories of consumers.

(3) The conclusions drawn at all centres are purposely couched in cautious language. For instance where there appeared to be little supervision of officers they may have been supervised by means of closed circuit television, the cameras for which were not obvious to the researcher. The number of females or ethnic personnel employed could only be accurately determined by accessing personnel records. Since the researcher was not granted permission to interview staff it is highly unlikely that free access to personnel records would be granted. It is a natural function of the human animal to impute meaning to what it observes, the meanings imputed by the researcher have been recorded without access to confidential data held by the security companies studied. The only way to determine the accuracy of the conclusions drawn is replication of the observational study.

(4) There were eleven attitude statements which were scored and five attitude ratings recorded in columns from 1 for strongly agree to 5 for strongly disagree. Attitude statements 12 and 13 on the questionnaire were control and were not scored. The number of subjects of a particular group of users at a given location were polled and their responses to each attitude statement scored and entered in the table (page 126). Each column was summed to give a total score for each of the five attitude ratings. The eleven attitude statements covered those areas of concern shown in the table Predominant Attitude Response (p 127) which shows percentage scores. These scores were arrived at by use of the formula

$$\frac{\text{Total No. of Attitude Statements} \times \text{Subject} \times \text{Attitude Rating}}{\text{Total Column Rating}}$$

(5)

The researcher has already mentioned lack of access to tapes recorded by close circuit television. Since the researcher was concerned with the security operatives themselves no mention was made of closed circuit television to subjects. The researcher now accepts that had subjects been aware or been made aware that they were being observed by closed circuit television this could have affected attitudes towards security officers themselves. It has to be accepted that some members of the public may regard use of surveillance equipment as an unwarranted infringement of their civil liberties.

CONCLUSIONS

This research examined a very small section of the contract manned guarding sector of the private security industry in a limited geographical area. It examined private policing of shopping centres, seeking to determine the relevance of those issues which previous research, particularly in the United States, had identified as problematical. The one issue which united all groups of consumers of private security services covered in this research project was that of licensing and regulation. It is this issue above all others which also appears to unite police, politicians and members of the industry itself, yet on the basis of this research coupled with reports of what is happening now, throughout the industry it would appear to be extremely ill-advised to rush into any form of regulation.

1. The Inadvisability of Regulation

Regulation of the private security industry is an issue that crosses political boundaries, in the 1970's private members bills sponsored by Norman Fowler and Bruce George failed to gain parliamentary assent (Johnston 1992). Roy Hattersley has been one of the Labour party's more vociferous campaigners for the regulation of the industry. The Association of Chief Police Officers has for a considerable time argued for national legislation, backed by governmental support and authority, stating its case with increasing force. John Wheeler (1990) introduced The Security Industry Bill in which he argued for a regulatory mechanism sponsored by the industry itself. Bruce George (1990) introduced The Private Security (Registration) Bill which suggested a regulatory mechanism sponsored by the state, both bills were defeated. Politicians, police and academics such as Johnston (1992, 1994, 1996) South (1988), the International Professional Security Association and the British Security Industries Association all continue to argue for regulation.

The researcher found that corporate owners, business operators and members of the public in the shopping centres studied all agree that security officers should be regulated, yet the government persists in its policy of self-regulation.

Many commentators argue that self-regulation is an acceptable policy for professionals such as doctors, lawyers and social workers (Wilson 1968) but is less than an ideal policy for police since the lowest ranking member of the organisation is the one who is making life and death decisions or decisions affecting a citizens liberty on a regular basis. Wilson like many other commentators links regulation to accountability. In Britain it is argued that the police should not be allowed to regulate themselves and in some quarters the Police Complaints Authority is viewed with a great deal of scepticism. Even where government has introduced ostensibly regulatory machinery such as The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 this is seen by some commentators as an extension of the coercive powers of the police (Kinsey, Lea and Young 1968). It seems strange that concerns about regulation of the security industry which are widely held arouse none of the passionate debate that surrounds accountability of the police.

Hoddinott (1994) argues that it is the nature of the accountability that is one of the main differentiating factors between public and private policing. In the case of public policing and the police service accountability is subject to statutory regulation, to local democratic control and to a variety of formal and informal controls. In the case of the private sector, accountability is more restricted, confined to either contract or the board of a company. Hoddinott argues that the powers enjoyed by the public police demand the sort of accountability that only the public police are required to have. He argues that private policing can complement public policing (junior partner stance) in an appropriate fashion, and he sees this as policing private space or the supply of ancillary services to the public police.

The point here is that need for regulation is linked with the need for public accountability.

The link between regulation and accountability is an important one, Hoddinott maintains that the accountability of private policing is confined to either contract or the board of a company. It is not known for sure how many private security organisations are operating in Britain today (1), or how many contracts or boards of companies demand accountability of such organisations. What became very clear from the non-participational observational study undertaken by the researcher was that the expectations of boards of companies in respect to the private security companies they employ are very different. This being the case, the accountability and the regulation required to achieve it would be very different for various security companies.

Lidstone (1980) draws distinctions between Home Office and non-Home Office police forces, Johnston (1992) expands these distinctions to include all manner of regulatory bodies, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. The researcher argues that such distinctions could and should be applied to the private security industry. The accepted distinctions of intruder alarm sections, contract manned guarding, in house security and cash-in-transit do not begin to hint at the different activities embraced by the security industry, the styles of policing adopted and the type or types of regulation which may be necessary.

To date calls for regulation have largely fallen into two camps, either statutory licensing using existing British Security Industry Association Inspectorates, that is the present system of self-regulation backed up by statute, or statutory regulation backed up by an independent body. It is remarkable that prestigious academics, members of parliament and high ranking police officers can argue for the regulation of something which they all admittedly know so little about.

Even the International Professional Security Association and the British Security Industry Association admit that they do not know how many security companies operate in Britain today. Surely before any thought can be given to regulating the security industry, some attempt must be made to determine exactly what it is that requires regulating.

Various commentators have defined private security in terms of junior partners to the public police, as private providers of what were once publicly provided services, as similar to the police but enforcing an alternative justice system or simply as commercial competitors for the provision of policing services. If any or all of these definitions are accurate, then surely each definition would demand different types of accountability and regulation.

Security companies vary in size from two men and a dog to companies employing thousands, the tasks undertaken by different companies vary so substantially that an all embracing regulation would be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Purely on the basis of observations of the policing of a few shopping centres the researcher argues that security companies are vastly different, when these differences are magnified through the entire industry the problems of proposing and enforcing any constructive regulation are enormous. What is essential before regulation is even contemplated is a co-ordinated systematic investigation of the industry to determine exactly what it is that requires regulation.

In view of the many and varied clients of the security industry what is now essential in Britain is a review of the security industry along the lines of the Benchmark II Survey (1972). The Independent Committee looking into the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks have thankfully, included private security in the list of key questions they addressed by examining the role of other agencies, voluntary, private and statutory in delivering what might be termed policing services (Newburn and Morgan 1994).

It is essential that any major review of the industry does not study them in isolation but as a part of the wider order maintenance and crime prevention system within this country. Any review body appointed should include as a minimum, members of the Inspectorate of the Security Industry, members of the boards of management of various companies, representatives of security companies, representatives of the Home Office, local government and the police as well as leading academics in the field of policing and security. The sort of questions this team should be addressing would include:

- a) What exactly is the security industry?
- b) How many security companies operate in Britain today?
- c) What is the total number of security staff?
- d) What tasks are being performed by the industry as a whole?
- e) Are private security officers increasingly coming into contact with the public in public or quasi public places?
- f) If contact is increasing, is the contact of an informal or service nature or of a formal or coercive nature?
- g) What is the level of complaint, if any from the public?
- h) What machinery, if any, exists for the recording and investigating of any complaints that may be made?
- i) Are private security officers in Britain becoming significantly less like the ordinary citizen?
- j) How varied is the level and quality of service offered by the various security organisations and how does this relate to pay training and supervision?

To attempt licencing and regulation before these types of questions have been addressed would cause more problems than it would solve. The public police have been studied, reviewed and reported on since their inception and the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks would tend to suggest that government have still not got it right, or perhaps to be more

accurate that the government still believe the police have not got it right. In Britain apart from various unrelated research projects carried out by academics with an interest in private policing there has been little reviewing or studying of a form of policing that is generally accepted as existing before and continuing alongside the public police. The Home Office did set up a Home Office Working Group in 1988 to see whether there was scope for further improvement in self regulation (Johnston 1992). In effect this was not so much a study of private security but rather the ensuring that the results of decisions made in 1979 and identified as being deeply flawed, (South 1988) remained in place.

What became obvious to the researcher not only as a result of his own research but as a result of studying the research of others is that private security or sections of the industry cannot meaningfully be studied in isolation. The question must eventually be answered as to why government refuses to become directly involved in any realistic research into the industry, let alone regulation. The argument that involvement would be contrary to the government's stated policy of minimal state interference only holds true if deregulation and decentralisation are fact and not myth. It could be argued that what government are seeking to do in many instances, is to centralise control but to decentralise blame. Education and the police are but two examples of where the government have tightened their control but have readily identifiable scapegoats at whom to point when things go wrong. Any attempt to regulate the security industry in its present state would not necessarily increase government control to any great extent but would certainly identify a government department and a minister at whose feet any blame could be laid. From this perspective regulation would not only be against stated government policy but would also be against possible hidden agendas. Legislation is generally enacted to raise money or to deal with matters that have become problematical, particularly to the government. If lack of regulation of the security industry is not going to

cost votes at a general election or is unlikely to attract the attention of a powerful pressure group, then regulation is unlikely to happen.

Admittedly the police and the judiciary are a powerful group but if they alone are seen as the only or main advocates of regulation they stand to be accused of trying to displace their own perceived shortcomings on an unprotected rather than unregulated security industry.

There are many conflicting ideas about the security industry not least of these is what type of training is required but before that question has been answered, there is already considerable debate about quality of training.

2. Quality of Training

The researcher identified very different types of private policing in very different environments and concluded that whereas a similar basic level of training may have been appropriate to all sites visited each site clearly had its own specific training requirements.

As identified earlier the Security Training Organisation (SITO) is the independent training organisation recognised by the Department of Employment as the Training Organisation for the security industry. SITO is recognised by both the British Security Industry Association and the International Professional Security Association as having made considerable progress in developing training for the manned services industry (yet another category, which incorporates contract and in-house security).

The researcher found it difficult to obtain information about training of security officers in the sites studied and found it necessary to contact the British Security Industry Association, seeking information about their members who police shopping centres. Mr David Fletcher, Chief Executive of BSIA suggested contacting Pinkerton Security Services Ltd, Richmond Surrey, Security Express Guards, Edbaston Birmingham and Sterling Granada Security Services Ltd, London.

All of these companies confirmed that they followed BSIA requirements and regulations in respect of selection and training. All recruits undergo induction training and are required to take BSIA, SITO Examination papers A, B, C and D. Failure to successfully complete induction training results in termination of employment.

It would appear that there is some standardisation of training among some IPSA and BSIA members. By the simple expedient of contacting companies selected at random from the telephone book the researcher discovered that at least one member of IPSA, Bastille Investigation Services of Norwich, trains its guarding personnel in accordance with the particular assignment that the person has been recruited for, rather than in accordance with the general training recommended by its professional body. Securicor Security Services run three day induction training courses at one of their three training centres before guards start work on an assignment. On reporting to his/her first assignment the security officer receives assignment familiarisation training from the supervisor. Any specialist training such as First Aid is given as required and is usually off-the-job training. Primeguards of Braintree, Essex follow the BSIA standards in respect of vetting and selection and indicate that they look for education levels of G.C.E. "O" level C or above. Primeguards are not members of either IPSA or BSIA and run their own training courses which are a combination of classroom, introductory and assignment specific training. They see the lack of legislation and the illogical insistence on BS5750 by many clients as mitigating against the development of IPSA or BSIA as specifiers of standards within the industry.(2)

A minimum standard is available for security officers but there is no controlling body with sufficient power to make such training mandatory. The Home Office Police forces constantly review the functions and training of their officers and the current training enjoyed by statutory police

officers including those of forces such as the British Transport Police, the Royal Parks Police and Ministry of Defence Police is a direct result of The Working Party on Police Probationer Training in England and Wales (1986).

Training is experienced based, modular and requires close co-operation between forces and central trainers. This type of co-operation is virtually impossible in such a highly competitive and secretive industry as the private security industry.

Without a properly researched training needs analysis, it is impossible to produce a training programme to suit the needs of all security firms. In fact such an analysis may well prove that a universal training programme is not achievable. Unless and until it is determined just how many firms comprise the industry and what it is that they do, a training needs analysis is not possible.

Mollie Weatheritt (1985) writing of the police, suggested that:

"In common with most other institutions, the police service tends to think of its work as important and necessary and it is not given to spending too much time and effort questioning the purpose and the effectiveness of what it does. The police have been remarkably successful in creating an appearance of usefulness and competence, such that the value of much traditional activity - patrol for example, and crime prevention - is hardly questioned, either by the service itself or by the public. Failures of performance are admitted but tend to be laid at other doors in lack of manpower and of money, in inadequate powers, or in an intractable environment.... many aspects of policing have remained immune from critical scrutiny and the police service has been able to discourage and rebuff the attentions of research with relative ease."(p 11)

It could be argued in light of the White Paper preceding The Police and Magistrates Court Bill which says:

"The main job of the police is to catch criminals" that traditional activities such as crime prevention are now being questioned and the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks

may well see such tasks being hived off to private enterprise (Reiner 1994).

The researcher feels that Weatherit's comments are today, more applicable to private security and certainly in respect of the ability to rebuff the attentions of research with relative ease. Whilst the British industry has this ability it is highly unlikely that any serious training needs assessment such as advocated by Chuvala and Gilmore (1992) for the industry in the United States, is ever likely to occur.

Perhaps some indication of the government's stance in respect of training within the industry is the fact that Department F3 of the Home Office is keeping a watching brief, The Department of Employment recognises SITO as the training organisation for the industry whilst yet another government department the Ministry of Defence makes its own training arrangements. There was a time when the civilians who guarded MOD Establishments were not regarded highly but Allen (1995) argues this has changed with the inauguration of the MOD guard service (MGS) in 1992. Every guard has to pass a two week foundation course run by the MGS Training Wing at the Ministry of Defence Police Headquarters in Wethersfield, Essex. Recruits who fail have their service terminated and there is no second chance to attend the course. MGS Training is a multi service organisation headed by a MDP Inspector. Trainers are drawn from MDP, the Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Marines. Before MGS each service had its own guarding arrangements consisting of a mix of contract security, industrial patrolmen and watching grades. Training which was done at a local level was almost non-existent, all MGS members are encouraged to study for NVQ/SVQ qualifications. Once posted to station MGS who have their own administrative chain of command come under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence Police. For one small sector of the industry at least the government does regulate in respect of vetting, training, pay and conditions.


In this instance government has centralised control and localised blame, that is blame can be attached to the Head of the Guard Service and the Chief Constable MDP. Whilst no doubt both of these gentlemen prefer the present situation to that which allowed the IRA bombing of the Royal Marine School of Music at Deal in Kent, the very different attitudes towards private security adopted by three different ministers is confusing to say the least.

What is interesting in respect of MGS training is that although the Training Wing is situated at MDP Headquarters and headed by a police Inspector the training undertaken by MGS is not a "watered down" version of police training, but is more akin to the type of training undergone by security officers employed by private firms, albeit of a longer duration. In common with IPSA and BSIA the management of MGS incline towards vocational training. This is an important point because if MOD believe that security guards require such a different form of training from that enjoyed by a bone-fide police force, it tends to suggest that they do not perceive security guards as carrying out a policing function. This line of thought agrees with that espoused by Mr Rabbitts of IPSA (see Appendix A) who dislikes the term private police, insisting that his members carry out a security and not a policing function. It is possible then, that a proportion of the criticism of private security is as much due to inappropriate semantics as it is to inappropriate behaviour.

If it is accepted that in comparing the training of police and private security one is not comparing like with like then the results of any such comparison become meaningless. An example of the futility of such comparisons is an examination of the perfection versus cost dichotomy in respect of the training of police and private security. It is possible to achieve a moderate level of perfection at moderate cost but there comes a point where the achievement of total perfection, if at all possible is so prohibitive as to be impractical.

In the graph below perfection is measured as a percentage and costs of training in thousand of pounds. It can be seen that if, to achieve 65 per cent perfection it is necessary to spend £35,000, it may be possible to achieve 90 per cent perfection at a cost of a further £30,000. To increase perfection to 100 per cent may then cost a further £30,000 which makes poor economic sense.

Fig. 3



Any training organisation including the police have to determine the minimum acceptable level of perfection and the maximum cost they are prepared to pay to achieve it. Even if private security were attempting to carry out a similar function to the police the amount of time and money spent on training indicates that private security have settled for a far lower acceptable level of perfection. Even if private security begin to take over some of those tasks declared by government to be ancillary to the core policing function. Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks (Reiner 1994) it will not be necessary to adjust the accepted level of perfection upwards to anything like that required of the police. The research undertaken in a limited number of shopping centres would tend to suggest that at least one good reason for this is that although private security, may in a very general

sense, be involved in crime prevention, it is not involved in the specific sense in "catching criminals" (Reiner 1994).

3. Private Security - Crime Prevention or Crime Control

Whilst the researcher saw strong evidence of crime prevention measures such as heavy patrolling of shopping centres, he did not see any evidence whatsoever of private security catching criminals. Where the researcher managed to speak to security officers they spoke of preventing begging, stopping the riding of bicycles in pedestrian areas and preventing drunks loitering in the centres. When not engaged in crime prevention, private security in the centres visited, appeared to be engaged in order maintenance rather than the detection of crime. The adoption of an order maintenance role rather than a detection role including the arrest and processing of prisoners means that security officers can rely on citizens powers such as arrest for Breach of the Peace as a means of maintaining order rather than relying on the statutory powers available to constables.

Wilson (1968) identified several styles of policing in various cities through out the United States, these styles can, to a certain extent, be identified in the policing of British cities and to a limited extent in some private security forces. The patrolman style of policing was identified as being concerned with the maintenance of order and the researcher suggests that this style is applicable to both public and private police. Wilson saw this style being used in situations which did not involve serious crime. He also identified a legalistic style which acts on the whole as if there were a single standard of acceptable conduct prescribed by law, rather than different standards of conduct for different groups. As a result of their constabulary powers the public police are better placed to adopt a legalistic style when necessary and as a result of their training particularly in human awareness are more likely to know when and where to practice such a style.

Inherent in the office of constable is the ability to use individual discretion that is to individually match policing style to a given situation, success in this requires the levels of training undertaken by a police officer. This discretion is practised on a larger scale by the police administrator who is concerned with the managing of discretion force wide and the management of critical events whilst monitoring community reaction. Whilst individual officers are equipped to detect and arrest criminals it is the police organisation as a whole, Criminal Investigation Department, Custody Officers, Review Officers, Scenes of Crime Officers, Forensic Scientists, etc, who are involved in the process of bringing criminals before the court. Simply because private security companies do not have the necessary administrative and technical machinery it might be argued that they cannot be involved in the catching of criminals. However, simply because the public police do have the necessary machinery to catch and prosecute criminals it does not necessarily follow as the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks seems to suggest that this is the main task of the police (Reiner 1994).

Sheehy (1993) names the four main aims of policing (that is public policing) as:

- a) The prevention of crime
- b) Punishing and bringing to justice those who break the law
- c) Keeping the Queens Peace
- d) Protecting, helping and reassuring the community

Protecting, helping and reassuring the community involves another policing style identified by Wilson and that is, the service style, which involves frequent but informal interaction with the community. The researcher saw evidence of this style being adopted by security officers patrolling shopping centres.

To suggest that the public police should relinquish what have long been their principle aims and concentrate on the pursuit of criminals flies in the face of much informed and

distinguished opinion and criminological research. Reiner (1985) maintains that "crime fighting is not and could not be the prime activity of the police. To see it as such is part of a mythology of media images and cop culture which presents a stumbling block to sensible discussion or policy making. The core mandate of policing historically and in terms of concrete demands placed upon the police is the more diffuse one of order maintenance."

Reiner's contention reiterates the view of the Rt Hon Lord Justice Scarman (1986) who saw the primary duty of the police as co-operation with others in maintaining the normal state of society. Sir Robert Mark (1975) saw this ability of the police to offer not only a capacity to catch criminals but also to offer those services sold by private security and much more as the means of professionalising the police service, he maintained:

"The police are abandoning their artisan status and are achieving by our ever increasing variety of services, our integrity, our impartiality, our accountability and our dedication to the public good a status not less admirable than that of the most learned and distinguished professions." (p 42)

It would seem that government is now "hell-bent" on forcing the police to jettison those services which Sir Robert Mark saw as improving the status of the police. The discussion document published in August 1994 by the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of the Police (Independent Committee 1994) suggested that in respect of the modern police service the fundamental questions have not been asked. The Independent Committee recognised that the causes of crime are complex and deep rooted and that it is totally unrealistic to imagine its prevention might be tackled by the police alone (Newburn and Morgan 1994) thus acknowledging the crime prevention role of private security.

Private policing involves patrolling, maintaining order, crime prevention and a generalised service function, for the public police to relinquish these and other non-coercive

functions to private enterprise may have a cost saving effect in the short term but would be disastrous for the principle of policing by consent. The consent of citizens is more likely to be forthcoming if policing is perceived to be effective and if expectations are being met. Public participation is directly linked to effectiveness and the majority of crimes are solved as a result of information received from the public, not detective work (Burrows and Tarling 1982).

Public participation will increase the more they identify with the police and the extent to which they identify is dependent on the image of the police and impressions of remoteness or closeness. This image is strongly affected by the performance of the service role (Benyon 1982).

Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) tend to subscribe to this notion in acknowledging that there is some truth in the fact that the inadequate flow of information from public to police underpins and gives substance to police claims that they can do little about most burglaries and street crimes. They recognise the claims of the judiciary and the police that even in the most serious offences and in situations where one might reasonably expect people to exhibit the most concern and come forward to help the police with their enquiries, they often do not. They see The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the increased use of surveillance and criminal intelligence gathering as coercive measures contributing to police-public alienation. To cast the police in a wholly coercive role will deny them the very co-operation needed to perform their crime detection task. It is suggested that a system of proper accountability would increase public willingness to yield information necessary to the solution of crime. Hoddinott (1994) identifies accountability as one of the key differentiating factors between public and private police. If the police need to be more accountable to increase crime detection then irrespective of administrative or technical machinery unregulated and unaccountable private security cannot be in a position to undertake detection of crime.

It is argued by Kinsey, Lea and Young that the police be allowed to do the job that they are paid for "the full and proper investigation of crime." However, unlike the Home Secretary they do not see this as the absolute role of the police but argue it as the main thrust of minimal policing. Minimal policing rests on a series of interrelated propositions, namely maximum public initiation of police action and maximum access to the police and minimal police initiated action with minimum use of coercion. To jettison the service and order maintenance roles and concentrate on crime detection would deny the public maximum access to the police and would be most likely to result in increased police initiated action and increased coercion. Decreased contact with police on a daily non-coercive basis would lead to alienation of large sectors of the public and willing cooperation where it still existed, would become grudging compliance and eventually hostility provoking further coercive measures.

The non-participational observational study of private security tended to suggest that the security officers observed initiated little action and used no coercion, however it is likely that publicly initiated action was minimal and corporate owner initiated action maximum. Whilst the public appeared to have maximum access to individual security officers it is debatable just how much access they had to the private policing machinery. Although the security officers studied appeared to practice an outward show of minimal policing, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) also argue that effective policing necessitates public support, and it is only a police force which positively pursues civil liberties within the context of democratic accountability that will ever gain that confidence. Minimal policing argues for a restriction of the role of the police and whilst accepting that coercion is an inevitable feature of social order it should be kept to a minimum.

What the argument for police concentrating on crime control appears to miss is that disorder creates more disorder and leads to increased crime.

By relentless patrolling security officers are not more likely to detect crime but are likely to maintain order and in maintaining order to prevent crime, albeit only in the establishment they police. The fact that the crime may be displaced to areas policed by the public police is of no concern to the administrators of private security.

Lord Parker in the case of Rice versus Connelly (1966) describing the duties of the police said:

"It is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear to him to be necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the police but they are at least these and they would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring offenders to justice"
(Clayton and Tomlinson 1987 p 25.)

There is very strong evidence to suggest that private security is increasingly involved in order maintenance, crime prevention and property protection. Although this research study saw no evidence of a crime control role there is evidence to suggest that this is occurring. In the Arndale Centre in Manchester the researcher noticed Market Constables, wearing full police uniform, although not attested constables, and therefore not police in the strictest sense these officers would fall into the category Johnston (1993) describes as Municipal Police. These officers have powers under The Manchester Markets Act to enforce market bye-laws. Other pieces of legislation such as The Public Health (Amendment) Act 1907 and The Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967 empower local authorities to swear in employees as constables for the purpose of securing local bye-laws. As stated earlier The Harbours Piers and Docks Clauses Act 1847 has already allowed the swearing of private security officers as constables. The use of such legislation by various bodies and organisations has a large influence on the attitudes of various police

administrations and is one of the major factors in determining police co-operation and interaction with private security, thus co-operation albeit slowly and in a disjointed manner is now occurring.

4. Police, Private Security Co-operation

The junior partner perspective still has a strong tendency to colour the views of many commentators in respect of the relationship existing between police and private security.

A recent article about the private security industry in The Times maintained that:

"The pluralistic provisions of security services must not diminish the fundamental notion of law and order as a basic public good. Just as the idea of "no go" areas was unacceptable in the 1980's so the policy makers of the 1990's must prevent the emergence of a two-tier system in which the police protect only those who cannot afford a better service. In this distinctive area of state responsibility, private firms should complement rather than supplement the established role of the public sector." (The Times March 15, 1994)

This article addressed two key issues, that policing is a state responsibility and that private firms should complement the police. Senior police administrators would tend to see any active partnership such as described by Johnston (1994) being based on both these premises (Hoddinott 1994). The Review of the Core and Ancillary Tasks is an attempt by government to redefine policing in a manner that is most cost effective - at least in the short term - to government. This redefinition may weaken prescriptive arguments such as that put forward by The Times and certainly argues against the current approaches to policing. Clayton and Tomlinson (1987) identify a number of approaches to law and order:

- a) Conventional:- There is an unprecedented crime wave resulting from a breakdown of values in society. The police are a neutral social agency protecting the general interests of

society against actions of deviant elements, the solution is more effective policing.

- b) Radical:- The crime wave is exaggerated and not really a social problem at all. Crime derives from economic deprivation and the reaction of deprived groups to an unjust society. The police are seen as instruments of the "dominant class". Their role is not a technical one of solving crime but a directly political one of buttressing exploitation. The solution is not to improve policing but to bring the police under democratic control.
- c) Standard Police View:- Greater Police powers and resources are needed to combat the crime wave. The solution is substantial increase in police numbers and funding.
- d) Realistic:- Crime is an important social problem for working class and ethnic communities as well as the middle classes. Crime control is a serious duty with the emphasis on deterrence, the demarginalisation of criminals and minimal use of prison. The solution is for the police to provide a service to the community which is under clear democratic control and working with the close co-operation of the community.
- e) Current Government View:- The police are expected to take on tasks which are not strictly policing tasks. Solution shed "non-policing tasks" and concentrate on detection of crime.

The point here is that by overtly redefining the task of the public police the government have also covertly defined the tasks undertaken by private security as being non-policing

tasks, therefore no regulation or government interference is necessary.

How does the constant revision of what constitutes policing affect the police security relationship? As with all questions about the private security industry there is no clear answer. What became clear to the researcher is that there appear to be relationships at two levels, that between individual officers of police and private security organisations and that between organisations themselves. An examination of the possible reasons for this tends to suggest that private security is rapidly moving away from the junior partner role thereby forcing Chief Officers into relationships they would not otherwise have considered in order to protect the reputation of their own forces.

The non-participatory observational study revealed no interaction between police and private security even when officers were in close proximity to each other. The researcher formed a strong perception that the relationship between individual officers of the police and private security at the sites studied appeared to be at the stage of grudging recognition that is that private security are engaged in mere property protection rather than "real policing".

That such an attitude should prevail is not totally surprising if viewed from the perspective of organisational culture. Harrison (1972) classified organisational cultures or ideologies into four types:

- a) Club Culture:- The organisation is an extension of the personality of the head or founder, enjoys centralised power and short lines of communication and is best suited to small organisations (probably less than 20 people)
- b) Role Culture:- The underlying idea is that organisations are sets of roles joined

together in a logical and orderly fashion so that together they discharge the work of the organisation. Individuals are role occupants with job descriptions that effectively lay down the requirements of the role and its boundaries. Communications are formalised as are systems and procedures. Procedures contained in rules and handbooks abound throughout the organisation. There are standards, quality controls and evaluation procedures. Role culture organisations thrive when they are doing a routine, stable and unchanging task and find it hard to cope with change and individualisation. Administrative organisations have to be role cultures to be efficient. People are trained to fit the role.

- c) Task Culture:- Group or team talents and resources are applied to a project problem or task with each task receiving the treatment it requires, it does not have to be standardised across the organisation (or the industry), groups can be changed disbanded or increased as the task changes. A culture built around co-operative groups of colleagues without much overt hierarchy.
- d) Person Culture:- Puts the individual first and makes the organisation the resource for the individual's talents. This type of culture usually supports doctors, barristers, architects, etc.

The police by the very size of the organisation and by the force of increasing centralisation has to be oriented towards a role culture that often incorporates task cultures e.g. traffic, regional crime squads, drugs squads. The smaller private security firms are likely to be more oriented towards a club culture. Obviously no clear definition can be claimed

because the larger security firms by virtue of their size will increasingly become role cultures.

Handy (1984) suggests that most organisations are a mixture of all four cultures. The mix at any one time is influenced by the following factors:

- (i) Size:- Large size and role culture go together
- (ii) Work flow:- If the job is organised in separate units where a group or an individual can be responsible for the whole job, then club task or person cultures can exist. It is where work flow is sequential or interdependent, that more systems, rules and regulations are needed and the culture shifts towards a role culture.
- (iii) Environment:- If the environment does not give clear signals and the institution is a monopoly and can therefore set its own goals and standards then the organisation will tend to be a role culture.

The idea of cultures influenced by the factors identified by Handy is important because different companies within the security industry will exhibit different cultures, this coupled with the competitive need for secrecy between companies will mean that little co-operation exists between companies. Individual police officers will identify individual security officers as members of differing culture groups which will have an inhibiting effect on co-operation.

The attitude of the police organisation itself towards private security is also confused. The Association of Chief Police Officers has constantly called for regulation of the security industry and John Stevens, Chief Constable of Northumbria and chairman of the ACPO crime prevention sub-committee raised police concerns about the industry in 1994 demanding a central register for the 7,000 security companies believed to be operating in Britain and employing 162,000 people (Gibbons 1994).

The administration of the police organisation, appears to be at the level of competition and open hostility and demand for control. There is however, evidence to suggest that individual members of that administration are actually involving their forces in active partnership, particularly in that very grey area that divides or links police and private security, according to one's perspective.

Johnston (1993) maintains that day to day relations between municipal forces employed by London Boroughs to enforce bye-laws and the Metropolitan Police are fairly good but that the organisational response is somewhat inconsistent. In 1989 Hertsmeire Borough Council sought Home Office advice about the powers of parks constables under The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. At this time the view was expressed that parks constables enjoyed all the powers of Home Office constables, within the jurisdictional confines of the park. The Metropolitan Police sought counsels advice on the decision, the central proposition of such advice being that a distinction should be drawn between police officers and bodies of constables which are not police forces. This decision draws a distinction between those officers coming under the jurisdiction of The Police Act 1964 and constables sworn or unsworn who operate under the jurisdiction of other Acts. Further more it was said that a parks constable's authority does not extend to the enforcement of general law but simply to bye-laws.

Because of their concerns the Metropolitan Police train both Wandsworth and Holland Park Police on the grounds that not to do so would be counter productive since the force receives prisoners from both forces on a regular basis and that any negative publicity arising from untrained parks constables exceeding their powers would reflect on the Metropolitan Police and on the service as a whole. To the average man in the street a police officer is a police officer and who pays his wages or who trains him, is of little importance.

In one location at least the police are co-operating with private security because they call themselves constables and wear police uniform. This would tend to suggest that the five stages of relationship identified by Stenning (1989) are not simply a time influenced phenomenon but also depend on the task that officers perform, how closely they resemble public police in dress and title and how public perceptions of those officers is likely to affect public perceptions of the police service as a whole. It should be noted that uniformed officers sworn for the enforcement of bye-laws are not simply confined to London. The researcher noted similar officers employed by Manchester City Council patrolling in the Arndale Centre and similar bodies of constables are employed by other major cities such as Birmingham.

Johnston (1993) suggests that historically there was never a clear divide between private and public policing and that from the inception of the public police the two have co-existed. It is becoming increasingly apparent that there is still no clear point at which a distinction can be drawn between the two forms of policing, and that policing could be viewed as a network of institutions within which the police are but one element. Johnston (1996) argues that this is not the case in Britain today and that lack of principled analysis of the police role vis a vis other policing agencies can be traced to governmental resistance to the genuine empowerment of local authorities in matters of community safety. Johnston sees the Posen deliberations as being based on the untested assertion that hiving off police tasks will be cheaper for the Exchequer. Rather than a network, policing in Britain is a patchwork made up of the most humble nightwatchmen, through the various private security firms, to the municipal constable, through statutory but non Home Office forces to the public police. When viewed from such a standpoint it makes the notion of standardised regulation training and pattern of relationships a nonsense.

5. Jurisdiction

It is not simply accountability that distinguishes police from private security, but also legally defined jurisdiction. Since in law security officers are considered to be no different than the ordinary citizen there is no need to legally define their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of officers of Home Department Police forces is determined by The Police Act 1964. The jurisdiction of statutory but non-Home Department Forces is determined by various other statutes which limit their powers when dealing with the public in public space. These restrictions mean that when travelling in public space between sites where they are allowed to exercise their powers officer of the Ministry of Defence Police, the British Transport Police and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary are only authorised to react to an incident requiring police intervention as citizens. The situation occurs where a fully trained uniformed police officer in a fully equipped and readily identifiable police vehicle may be first on the scene but has to deal with the incident as a private citizen. The problem of misidentification raised by the Metropolitan Police in respect of parks constables looms much larger and trained officers are aware of this and of the impact on the police service that any refusal to deal with an incident would bring about.

This problem has received political consideration and a group of MPs forming part of the Standing Committee in respect of the Police and Magistrates Courts Bill (Lords) tabled a series of amendments designed to resolve this problem and also seeking to place forces such as the Ministry of Defence Police, British Transport Police and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary on a firmer statutory basis. The amendments additionally, were designed to ensure a more certain definition of what constituted a police officer and a police force, partly in response to the trend among London Boroughs to establish their own parks "police". It was proposed that a schedule "other Police Forces" be annexed

to the Bill to distinguish constabularies from those police-type agencies which resemble them and to establish which forces were subject to the Police Complaints Authority. It was intended to more clearly define the jurisdiction of Constables of other police forces. It was proposed that the following subsection be inserted into Section 19 of The Police Act 1964:

- "(5) A duly attested constable serving in a police force listed in Part 1 of Schedule (Other Police Officers) to the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 shall have all the powers and privileges of a constable throughout England and Wales but only.
- (a) where no other constable is present and available to exercise his powers as a constable and he is satisfied that the circumstances require him to exercise those powers or privileges; or
 - (b) in pursuance of a request for assistance from another police constable."

These amendments were rejected on the grounds that local public accountability would be lacking (Defence Police Federation 1994).

There is obviously no universal definition held by parliamentarians as to what constitutes a police officer, a police force or what jurisdiction the various statutory but non-Home Department Forces should have.

There is confusion as to the powers and roles of the increasing number of municipal forces. Whilst these problems have a bearing on the activities and need for regulation of private police forces the attention that is now being directed towards regulation of the security industry as a whole would be more productively employed in resolving these issues.

6. Research into Private Security

The object of this research was to obtain a snapshot of a small section of the British Private Security Industry in a small geographical area with a view to determining if the

problems identified by earlier American research applied to that particular section of the industry.

- (i) Vetting:- It would appear that although there is no standard procedure throughout the industry some firms do as much as they can to check prospective employees. Based on the security firms observed the vetting procedures adopted by a large proportion of the industry are adequate for the tasks that were observed.

- (ii) Supervision:- There is no set standard throughout the industry and this was significantly evidenced by the observational study which revealed regular and heavy supervision at some sites and no evidence of any supervision at others.

- (iii) Pay:- This is a sensitive question which firms are reluctant to discuss however, there is no standardisation of pay. However, it is known from surveys conducted by Trade Unions and the Low Pay Unit that pay is very low.

- (iv) Regulation:- This research revealed that corporate owners, business operators and members of the public are generally in favour of regulation. However, the study led the researcher to question just what it is that requires regulation.

- (v) Provision of a private justice system:- Overall the perceptions of those polled suggest that this is not a problem, the observational study showed no evidence

of this. However by its very nature it would not be readily observable.

- (vi) Interaction and Co-operation between public and private police:- The observational study revealed no interaction at all between private security and police although corporate owners and the few security officers spoken to, saw co-operation as good. Documentary evidence tends to suggest that co-operation is confused and disjointed.
- (vii) Training:- There is a standardised training course available but not all companies use it. Training was not seen as a major problem by the participants in this survey.
- (viii) The precedence given to loss prevention:- Participants in the survey did not perceive private security as concentrating on loss prevention to the detriment of crime prevention.

The researcher concluded that the majority of participants in the research had insufficient knowledge about private security to allow any meaningful conclusions to be drawn about any of the issue raised except regulation. Regulation of the industry is the one issue which has received a great deal of publicity yet a number of arguments have been put forward as to why any rush to introduce regulation would be inadvisable.

This project like so much British research into the private security industry was guided by previous work carried out in the United States and Canada, as a result the formulation of the problem was guided by that research. Basically this project was seeking to identify if problems previously identified in the security industry of North America were relevant in Britain today.

The result of the research was that it was not possible to answer this question due to a universal lack of knowledge about the industry. The researcher learned from this that:

"The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old questions from new angles, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science" (Einstein 1938 p 92).

The problem is a lack of knowledge about the industry and many of the questions that need to be asked the industry is reluctant to answer. As a prelude to statutory regulation a thorough investigative research of the industry needs to be conducted and the researching body needs to have the full authority of government to demand answers to the relevant questions. The researcher has posed some of the questions that the industry needs to answer and sees the formulation of such questions as the most important feature of this research.

"The function of thinking is not just solving actual problems but discovering, envisaging, going into deeper questions. Often in great discoveries the most important thing is that a certain question is found. Envisaging, putting the productive question is often a more important, often a greater achievement than the solution of a set question" (Wertheimer 1945 p 123).

NOTES

- (1) At the time of the research The Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibility of the Police were conducting their research. The findings of that research had not been published at submission of this study. However, reference is made to the work being carried out by the Independent Committee, see page 53 (ref. Newburn and Morgan 1994), page 171 (ref. Reiner 1994) and page 181 (ref. Johnston 1996)

- (2) For a detailed account of BS5750 see page 22, this study.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW WITH P W RABBITS

APPENDIX A

AN INTERVIEW WITH MR. P W RABBITS (INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY) OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION

In this interview Q refers to words spoken by the Researcher and A to words spoken by the Respondent.

Q: Do you see a difference in the relationships between the general public and the public police and the general public and private police or private security?

A: Between the public and the private security industry and the public and the police, well obviously over the years the police have had a standing irrespective of what has been happening recently really of any member of the public having confidence in them, because they were a body which had power and could protect them and do things on their behalf. Now the private security industry is a new industry and there was very little before the last war and to a certain extent you do not have confidence between the public and the industry mainly due to bad publicity. Equally, having said that if you put a man in uniform and put him on duty somewhere, whatever colour the uniform the public look at the uniformed person as someone in authority or someone they can turn to. This is one of the dangers, that they are turning to the private security man and he cannot answer things for them because some of them are not trained and this is one of the difficulties.

Q: Is the industry addressing this problem?

A: It is and it isn't. We have the vocational qualification which at the lowest level is registered at level two because anyone in private security has a job of responsibility and having said that we waited for two and half years before it was registered.

It has been registered for over a year now, fifteen months. It is disappointing to see that it is not being taken up by the contract side of the industry. Obviously you know the background, you have the contract side that sells their services and you have the in-house. The in-house side are already interested in this because the in-house look for continuous training. They look for annual training for their staff. The contract side are already saying, we do not want to train to this level of the under pinning knowledge of the vocational qualification and this is absolutely crazy because they all sat round the table with us. The guarding side and the contract side sat there and agreed that was the lowest standard and now they go away because they are used to paying lip services to training. It specifies within the vocational qualification and the British Standard which is now in existence that there should be a form of induction training, two days minimum and to get them to do that two days minimum, they think that minimum is the maximum, so you still have a long way to go and I cannot see it coming without legislation, I just cannot see it.

Q: What do think is the root cause of that reluctance to train?

A: Yes it is profit of the company. Managing Directors of some of the largest companies have told me, yes if we have to do all this it comes off our profit and that really is the bottom line. I might say.

Q: There tends to be a body of opinion that only the police have a legitimate right to use force. Would the security industry hold that opinion particularly in the light of the increasing number of assaults on security officers?

A: The thing is what is-allowed, the private security man has no more powers than the ordinary civilian but in doing his job he can use reasonable force and he has to be so careful because the moment he touches somebody if it happens to be questionable whether he should have touched them he is sued for assault. Now you don't get this with the police. I know you get complaints you read of the police now almost daily which is terrible the number of complaints. The thing is, you see, this is what is difficult with a private security force, if he hasn't the powers to do it he is sticking his neck out. If he finds somebody on premises where he has broken into then that is straight forward and easy, he can hold them there until the police arrive. But then if it is something else, where he is questioning somebody and the person attempts to go away, run away for instance, now unless he is sure in his mind and he grabs him and pulls him down or something like this, so easily it leads to litigation.

Q: So the industry's view is that only the police have the right to use force?

A: Only really that power in any strength and this really is the crux of the whole thing. The police have powers the security industry have no powers.

Q: How many private security companies in the U.K. currently submit to any form of registration or control?

A: There are only two bodies that are really involved in this that is the BSIA, now here I think about 80 or 82 companies, and we have somewhere in the region of 340 odd (IPSA) at the last count. Now when you say that, if you say there are 500 that meet certain criteria you can say that there are at least another 1000 there, if not more, who do not meet any.

We do not know, there is no central statistical body, without legislation you don't know how many companies there are. In London, at the last count through the yellow pages there were something like 400 companies in London alone. Now if you take that around the country, think of Manchester, Birmingham and all the main areas you have to be heading to up to 1,500 to 2,000 but that is guessology pure guessology.

Q: So you could not put a percentage on it then?

A: No.

Q: A lot of these companies are not accountable to anybody.

A: No one at all and I must say some of them are very good companies. They don't want to be accountable to anybody.

Q: And again is that simply because of money or some other reason?

A: No, for example you have got some companies that are extremely good. If you are heading up security for a major company and you have been doing for a number of years, you are made redundant as is a colleague of yours and the two of you get together and employ a few more friends and what not and you are doing a super-duper Rolls Royce job. You think I don't want to join anything why should I. We know we are doing the best, we don't advertise, we work on recommendations, I can sympathise with them.

But equally you have got to say that there are a lot of companies and this is the weakness of the big company in the country. I mean they put out their glossy and sit in the big boardroom in London and say we will work to this standard but by the time it waters down to the branch standing in Penzance, or West Wales it is a

completely different picture and to a certain extent I feel sorry for the large companies because they are too large, large is not necessarily beautiful and you cannot control it, where if you take the company that employs a 100 men 50 to 25 and the Managing Director or the proprietor is the man that works amongst them, he knows exactly what is going on and at what level, he has that personal interest.

Q: This is probably something that happens in the police shifting of the management point of view, in that the management point of view is not necessarily identical to that of the man on the ground.

A: Absolutely right, it is emphasised more in the police force because once they get behind the desk in the police force they never move from it and what happens at the sharp end, they haven't got a clue, they just haven't got a clue.

Q: The bulk of research in the United States and Canada suggests that the background of the street operatives of the police and private security is very similar. Would you agree that people who join the police are very similar to people who join security?

A: That is a very difficult one because I think the majority of people that join the police force join it for a career. The majority of operatives at the lower end of the security industry and that is where the majority are employed are there,
a) because they cannot get a job doing anything else and
b) it is earning money, enough to exist on.
They have no interest in their career whatsoever. There is always the exception but back down at the basic level of a guard working for a guarding company he has very little interest in his job hence the turnover of a minimum of 80% a year in the big companies who are

delighted to say it is reduced to 80% a year turnover of staff.

Q: This conflicts with findings in America where someone might join a security company as a substitute for a police career or to mark time until he is accepted by a police force.

A: Here that is the minority, the absolute minority. I deal a lot with ex-servicemen who come out and go into the security industry and they all look to go in-house if they can because in-house you work 37 hours a week, you are well paid, but I always tell them we are a strange country where if you are already employed people would invite you for a second job, if you haven't got a job interviews seem to dry up and there is a large number of people who attend courses where I go every 6 weeks who have in fact gone to the contract side with a job as a guard. They are smart, they are enthusiastic, they want to push forward and I have seen within two months they are branch managers and within six months divisional managers but that is the exception. I don't know if you have done anything outside the U.K. have you? In Eire, I was over there for four days recently, they have a different approach there. People especially young people 19-25 go into the private security industry and get their professional qualifications waiting to go into the Garda because if they get the professional qualifications it puts them well on the top of the list of hundreds waiting to go in.

Q: Could this be because the police training in Eire follows the American lines with a strong emphasis on education?

A: I wouldn't comment on that because I think the general education of people in Eire is far higher than that of people in this country, far higher. They are hungry for education, they love to study.

Q: Because of the increasing incidence of assaults on security officers do security personnel ever use, if not violent, at least coercive measures to achieve an effect?

A: I suppose there is always an unscrupulous one who does, but not very many, not very many.

Q: Not as a matter of policy then?

A: No, definitely no.

Q: What do you think the general public expects from private security?

A: I think it has changed somewhat because they cannot get the service they want from the police force because they cannot see the policeman on the beat and to the average member of the public that is. " We don't see a policeman, we don't get patrols of our estate as we used to years ago" and they may well be right and therefore in lots of places you see private security have stepped into this role and I think where it has gone very successful they have made true comparisons on this. You see, I think it is very difficult with their expectations of a private security person because they don't understand the industry, this is the difficulty, they understand the police, they know that if there is a problem they dial 999 and the policeman will arrive at sometime or other and all being well will resolve the problem they have got, they don't know about the security industry and I have to go back and say that there are two things that let the industry down. When you read in the press, I won't say daily but you read far more incidents of security staff going wrong than you do with the policeman but secondly their image when they go to a big shopping mall or complex and security are on duty and some of them stand there like a sack of potatoes, almost in dirty uniform, all due respect to

policemen and I am one of the older ones that doesn't like to see a policeman with long hair but on the average a policeman gives a presence there and it is these sort of things that the company that employs these sort of men, it is this that lets them down, it does.

Q: So it is the company that sets the standards?

A: It is the company that sets the standards of presentation of the guard and it is the company that sets the standards of the training of the guard. But you see you are in a strange situation, you have people running companies who have never done the job, who have purely set up a company to make money.

Q: But does that argument not apply equally to some senior management of security companies who are ex-police officers or ex-military who although they may have done a similar job have not actually done that job.

A: I would say first of all when you look at certain companies and I am talking about the contract side I would say that the ex-service men and the ex-policemen, companies which are run by them. There are some companies who will only employ servicemen and excellent companies. I wouldn't say that about policemen at all, because a policeman hasn't got the experience ever of industrial security. You talk to them about industrial relations tribunals, Health and Safety at Work Act, you talk to them about fire prevention and fire control they have not got a clue. The serviceman has had to be diplomatic where ever he has been serving in the world. He is looked at in far different light. O.K. he hasn't had some of this expertise but when you put him on a job, the serviceman if you say to him walk from here to down there and keep doing it, a lot of them will do it for ever more until you stop them. A policeman the first thing he says is how can I short circuit this.

Because the first thing they say to me is that I know everything about security and I throw 2-3 questions at them and they say "no I mean security". Security is not pure security, security embraces all those subjects, it has got to. Because you are in a different environment you are away from policing you are into commercial industrial domestic situations.

Q: It sounds to me as if you are making a big distinction between security and policing.

A: Yes, absolutely, absolutely there is.

If we had for example like the Netherlands, I have just got back from Brussels only yesterday, but if we did have something well trained and well presented then you can safely say that the security industry would come up to here with regard to the police. But if you look at the industry as a whole the police are up here and the security industry is down there.

Q: Would you say then that the term private police in relation to the security industry is a misnomer?

A: I don't like the word, there is no such thing as private policing. They are not policing, not policing at all. I mean the private security person goes on an assignment with certain instructions if he is looking after a factory he has to patrol that factory and this is part of the big difference between in-house and contract. If you have got an in-house, your own staff and the accountants are the cause of this no doubt. Accountants are ruining the industry as they are ruining so much of the country. In-house security staff are trained initially, they go on courses all throughout the year, they know, you have a continuity there because they know the buildings, the staff, they know the lot and they are in a position where they do their shift they make a report.

Now O.K. it won't happen every time but out of 10 assignments there would be 7 or 8 reports of something which was amiss because they look at it more with the eyes of a policeman, they have to look at it in the light of the problems which could be caused. Somebody in an office has left a fire on, for example or something switched on and burning somewhere, they went by where acid was dripping out and they take the appropriate action and then you talk to the contract side. When I talk to the managers and what not, do you carry a police note book? No, well how do you make a report? Well at the end we just pick up the phone to the supervisor and tell them there was nothing there. Now what I don't understand if, I was running a contract company, I would expect my staff to have something to report because by Jove that would put my company I trust much higher in the eyes of the Managing Directors of the client when he gets a report to say, they may only be minor things, but you see we are back to what we said earlier they are not treating it as a career. One major company in the country said to me, not long ago, all that we want is to put bodies in uniforms and, that is just terrible.

Q: It is certainly not policing.

A: No. You see they will tell you that a security officer on duty in the contract side if anything goes wrong he picks up the phone or uses his radio, he has found an intruder. Now in our eyes and in this association's eyes everybody should be trained at a level where they are professional and I say, just a moment the telephones are out of order and you have dropped your radio and it is broken. What do you do? Well I don't know. And that's it in a nut shell, they don't know. They are not trained.

Q: Is the public attitude towards the security industry likely to be affected by social class because obviously company directors will have some notions about the security industry and people who live in better class apartments will probably have some form of security on the building, if they are having a constant contact with private security, will social class have any effect ?

A: Yes, I suppose you are right. If you live in a council block of flats somewhere and all you get is trouble all the time and the police rush in all the time every 24 hours or what not, you have no contact with private security really and because the only place it is really seen is in the work place you don't see here like you do for instance in Dublin or Belfast where every shop has a security person at the door you just don't see it here. You will see it in London with a number of shops but if you go into Torquay or even here, the number of security staff employed in departmental stores is next to nothing. So they don't have contact with it the public as a whole, don't. It is only perhaps the ones who meet it in their work place who have any idea. We get the questions, who are you? what do you do? people in security, who are people in the security industry?

Q: Do you think it is possible that the majority of people in Britain are just not aware of the security industry, it exists but they are just not aware of it?

A: I think that they are aware of it because of what they read in the press. That's all they are aware of. Look at all the publicity over Group 4 recently. I would imagine that every person in the country that looks at television would know that Group 4 are in security. It is only things like that unfortunately that you hear about. Then there is the security guard who was injured at Bishop's Gate. They will see that, but if you ask them if you say to them what do you think that fellow was doing in security in Bishop's Gate they don't know

anything about it. - He might have only been on the reception desk but I guess that he had bigger responsibilities than that and the other thing of course having seen all the side of the private security industry with the people in uniform then you have got the other side of the private security industry, the people who are not in uniform, investigators, people who deal with product contamination, counterfeiting all this sort of side. There is quite a small army of people out there just walking around like you and I.

Q: Do you think that in much the same way as the Metropolitan police have quite recently brought public relations people in to improve their image there is perhaps a need for the private security industry if not to improve their image at least to present the true image to the public?

A: Well I would like to know the answer. How can you produce the true image of what you are seeing. I know it is perhaps negative you are seeing the pitfalls of it but how do you go about showing them something for which there are no standards. As a service industry like ours I think it is very difficult to project the image. Individual companies may try to improve their image but we don't see much of that happening.

Q: I think this is the argument that many police officers are putting forward to the government saying how do you measure standards of service when it is an immeasurable quantity?

A: Exactly, you can't.

Q: My next question relates to the self image of private police officers, if they are not looking at the industry as a career, do they see themselves as a police officer or how do they see themselves?

: I think you have got the dangerous element who think they are police and that is dangerous, very dangerous indeed. And they tend to be slightly fanatical people, just a sprinkling you get them throughout the industry. When they get into the private security industry they feel they are the cat's whiskers. Unfortunately, they are so often not trained to any level and they try to overcome it with this bold front. I think the side of the industry that causes problems as well is the bouncer or doorman which really is causing a similar thing. You have people who are put up and I have never seen anything more crazy in all my born days, you see it in a lot of places, they put them in a dinner jacket and stand them out like a penguin. Out on the front door and lads and what not who have had a few drinks think, lets knock the penguin down and that's not the whole idea of the job of security and the better places have staff wearing a blazer with a little badge saying "security" and they don't stand out on the doorway they mingle, they find out things. I talked to somebody in security to do with a club and said "are your security staff trained in fire precautions?" They replied "they are not trained in anything". There are certain things going on throughout the country, Westminster Council in London have a form of licensing for these people. There are people that ring me up almost everyday saying "I am a karate expert" and what not and I say "I wouldn't employ you because you have the wrong approach." Security is nothing like that. So you have got the element, currently there is a terrific following of young people wanting to become body guards. Now how it has come about I don't know, but we get contacted every day of the week. It is people who think the image of a body guard is wonderful, when you start saying training, what training have you had? "I am looking for a job, I have not had any training", this is the whole thing throughout the industry. "I have had no training but I want to do this" then you say, "predominantly these jobs

are given to ex-military people who have been doing all this in embassies all over the world".

Q: Are you referring to KMS and this type of organisation?

A: Yes and they say "well we see adverts for companies who offer this training and you go off and pay your £1,000", but there is no wage to earn at the end of it, no salary only a fee because it looks glamorous, it looks exciting. They say "I am 6ft tall, I am 15 stones", this sort of thing.

Q: But to come back to the use of force the body guard or the bouncer side of the industry surely the attraction is the possibility of using violence?

A: Yes! but they will tell you, "no, they are karate people, they don't like using violence". It is! They think it is something where they can use their muscles but they don't realise that muscle is not used. The muscle that has been used I think quite rightly in the police force which I regret now they can't use it, the police can't even shout at a person now. You can be reported for shouting at someone, we are living in a crazy world but the thing was if somebody was determined to go through somewhere you could put 3 policemen together and they just wouldn't go through. There is a deterrent if you put a 6ft 6" policeman out on the street and when you put a 5ft 8" policeman there is a big difference.

Q: Wouldn't you agree in the light of policing moving towards a service approach it is not height but the officer's approach that matters in the way he controls the situation?

A: Well true, but with any of us, if you go somewhere and you see someone there looking the part you tend to go to

him, than you would to, someone who doesn't look the part. You cannot generalise because you are talking about something special and it always amazes me when you see in London in the MET little dwarf men literally walking around when at one time they were all 6ft but they couldn't get that height so they brought the height down and down.

Q: If you take into consideration ethnic minorities where in some cases 5ft 8" is more than the average height and you want ethnic officers in police forces then surely there is no option but to reduce the height limit. On this particular aspect, is there, do you think a higher proportion of ethnic officers in the security industry?

A: I would say definitely yes! definitely yes. Especially in the London area where you have all types of ethnics right across the board, but a lot of them are there purely because they cannot get any other work.

Q: So not because of any leaning towards the law or because they want to be police officers?

A: No, no. When you consider if you are working for a large company in this country and this is the big thing, when you come to rates of pay. In London for instance you would be lucky if you were earning £3.00 an hour and some companies would pay £2.00 an hour but in the contract side you work a minimum of 60 hours a week but you could be doing 90 or 100 hours a week but you see a lot of these people especially those coming from overseas, if they can put a roof over their head and have enough to eat that's what they are looking for, and some of them possibly go off and work at another job when they have finished at this one, and this is the problem you have generally in this industry because of the low pay people go off and work somewhere else.

Q: What would you think is the attitude of the general public towards the lack of accountability of the security industry?

A: The majority of the public haven't got a clue. There is no legislation at all in this country for our industry we stick out like a sore thumb in the western world and in the EC there are only two other countries which have no legislation that's Greece and Eire, all the rest have some form of legislation.

Q: But surely there is an EC directive that the industry must be legislated for or there must be some provision for some form of self regulation?

A: There is no directive really as such because there is nothing within the EC and this is the amazing thing, we all talk about the EC and when we get there and find that there is no such thing because all the countries are doing their own thing. In security France has certain ideas Germany, Italy, Spain they are all doing it differently but they all get to the same goal in the end and that is having, I would say, reasonably well trained staff who meet the requirements and when you look at the Netherlands you have very well trained staff who meet the requirements

a) they are vetted before they can work in the industry and

b) they are trained,

and if you took those two things and I am a little bit old fashioned I would put training before vetting to a certain extent because if somebody went wrong 10 years ago or something like this and they have been good for 10 years I don't think you can hold it against them today. There is a problem when you look at levels of vetting because what do you say is above the line and what do you say is below the line it is very very difficult.

There is no directive as such because in 1990, I think may be in 1991, I went over personally to launch a charter for the private security industry in Brussels and that's grinding its way through and that's why I have been there this week.

Q: How do you think the service that the security industry renders affects public attitudes to policing in general?

A: I think we must forget this policing in general, it is two separate worlds. I think no matter what goes wrong or how you see the private security industry I don't think they compare with the police at all. I mean people see the private security industry or the service and they can only comment on it if they have had the service and of course a lot of people would have the electronic hardware, such as having an alarm fitted which is completely different, completely different to the guarding side. They would only measure the quality of the service if they had contact, but I don't think they would say "oh heavens it was a lousy security officer that's terrible the police are similar". I don't think that would ever happen.

Q: What I was trying to say with that question was, if you have a situation where a security officer arrested somebody for whatever reason and he is holding this person until the police arrive, at the end of the legal process the whole experience of that incident is going to affect that person's attitude towards the police. If the initial part of the experience was not handled as well as it might have been, irrespective of what the police officer has later done it's the whole experience that's imprinted in the person's mind.

A: If you have a well trained security officer, then he would have been trained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, so he would know and lets face it, you are talking the majority of those arrests as such are in the

retail side of the trade. He would know whether the person is allowed to sit down or whether he should make them a cup of coffee or whatever and to keep everything alright. Only you don't want a terrific uproar because they are going to be saying "I am not guilty it wasn't me, that wasn't in my bag", so it requires special training, extra training for those working in the retail trade and that is so important and the other thing there I think you will find there are more trained staff in the retail side because if you put a foot wrong you will be sued tomorrow.

Q: So in that particular case the cost of training is preferable to the cost of litigation?

A: Yes, yes the majority of store detectives are of course employed by that company. Very few of them are supplied from the contract side of the industry. The security man who stands in the store, if they have one, he is hardly ever likely to make an arrest, he is put there like a dummy just warning people that there is security.

Q: So we are talking about crime prevention.

A: Yes, yes

Q: Are there standardised policies for selecting recruits for the security industry?

A: There aren't really, I mean one would have to look for the normal thing of somebody with reasonable intelligence. The big thing is that he has to be able to read and write. Then again the Managing Director of one of the largest companies in the country said to me not so long ago, "I can't guarantee that all my staff can read and write".
If you are recruiting people you just can't say that. Now the other thing that I questioned and very few

companies do it I said "do you test them for colour blindness?", they say "why". You put them on duty you have taken a contract for a block of flats or a factory or whatever it may be it is not just security you could have a batch of coloured lights and if the heating goes to a lower level it affects these lights.

Q: So they are not medically testing them at all?

A: Exactly.

Q: So there is no standard intelligence test?

A: No.

Q: It is pretty much down to each company who they select.

A: Well it is and I have to come back again and say in your medium size company, if I owned a company and Fred Bloggs does something wrong is it going to affect me? People are going to point at me and you know whereas if I am just the manager of a company, it is different.

Q: In America there is quite a substantial interchange between the personnel of private security and police would you say that people join private security in Britain to mark time until they join the police?

A: I could say that you could almost measure it as nil.

Q: Would you say that what interchange there is tends to be at the higher level then?

A: No, not moving from the private security industry to the police, no! but retired police officers coming out is less and less because they don't seem to retire so early. They have in the past predominantly gone to in-house and that job so often has been got on the golf course prior to coming out because the ordinary police

constable doesn't tend to look for it at all. It is the senior ones and what I am saying to you is what they tell me and probably 50% of our individual members are retired police officers, ex-policemen. They say that they were shocked when they came out, they knew nothing, they thought they knew everything, but they knew nothing and this is where we do a lot of training for them so they can get their professional qualifications because of all these other subjects which they have got to understand. Whereas, to them in the past they could pass it on to somebody else, but now they are there they are going to be a quantity and this is where a lot of policemen when they are going into the industry within a month or six weeks they are thrown out. It doesn't matter what rank, they could have been commanders but they just don't realise you have to keep the wheels of industry turning. They have been thinking of feeling collars and when they take a look now the first thing is, "good afternoon", ring up and say "look I have taken this job with so and so, any tips" and the first thing I ask is "what is the company's policy on security" and they have no idea and I say be prepared because most companies say we don't prosecute for any theft under £100. They say "what?" and I say no, you are a manufacturing company, you can imagine you feel somebody's collar that means the shop steward comes along he says right we are stopping for half an hour, they don't measure that in a £100 or a £1,000 or £10,000 it may have cost the company a £100,000 that half hour, the people that run that business are on the ball, they can't stop the wheels because they know how much it is going to cost them. What they want you to do is to produce everything for evidence against him so you can take him up to Personnel and he is sacked. Plus for a policeman and this is where it comes into a new field for you in three months there is going to be a tribunal hearing and I say "you have to produce all your statements" and they say "that's alright" but I say "just a moment they are different forms of statements

because you can use hearsay evidence", and I say "you submit all your statements up to the Chairman of the company and he reads them through and says that there is no case to answer". I say "it will never go any further" I say "there is so much you have got to do in that respect and it is all to do with keeping the wheels turning".

Q: It sounds as if the main aim of the security industry is to minimise loss.

A: Yes absolutely.

Q: Does minimising loss take precedence over enforcing the law?

A: Yes, yes the policy of the company comes above the law of the land it does internally. It has got to, let's be realistic. It's no good taking somebody to Court for stealing a pencil out of the office and losing production. The other thing is, whoever he is, is he going to be sacked? Somebody in senior management will say to us, how long has he been with us, 35 years been a wonderful servant and he's going to turn round and say just a moment, is this the first time he has put a foot wrong as far as we know.

Q: So we are talking about anything less than a £100 because even the CPS take into consideration the value of stolen property.

A: Yes but if the company wants to it can pursue its own private prosecution, if necessary.

Q: Do you think that the police are specialised perhaps even over specialised whereas the security industry embraces a far wider range of functions?

A: You are right. We all say that policemen are very blinkered because their job is very blinkered. They don't take everything round them into consideration which you have got to, you just have got to. When you are working in an industrial or commercial environment even odd things about searching, you can't stop and search anybody. You can have it built into their contract of employment that they will be stopped and searched and most reasonable companies have done that and this was questioned some while ago when I was sitting on a committee for the health service and they said you can't stop the doctors and consultants coming out and open the boot of their cars. You ask the Managing Director of any company if his car is not stopped he wants to know why, immediately up go the shutters but people are reasonable enough if you approach them properly.

Q: A police constable has a certain amount of discretion but it seems to me that you are saying a security officer has even more discretion because as you said the policy of the company is above the law of the land and he is choosing, if not to ignore the offence at least not to process it through legal channels which at the end of the day a police officer can't do.

A: Yes. This is true because at the end of the day it is not the police officer's own property, is it? It is somebody else's, a third party's property but it is important. Yes you are right he has more choice the security man but remember a lot of other things would come under failing to meet company policy and therefore we go up to personnel and that would be dealt with later based on their history within the company.

Q: Considering the level of training and motivation of the basic grade officer is that not an awful lot of responsibility for that man to accept?

A: I would say with training and I have spent many years in the industry myself, everybody and in every department has a veneer put on their head of various things and one of them is training. There it is in the budget you have x amount of money for training your staff. Now you talk to the contract side of the industry and ask them what training do you do. Oh yes they all get trained, I have them in and talk to them, and ask what training you do annually. They reply "oh no we only do one lot of training even if they have been with us 10 years they only get one lot of training when they start". This other thing of course on the job training which is also a dangerous thing where they are taught by people who are doing the job and they learn all the bad habits. It is almost worlds apart and as I said earlier ex-policemen, soon realise it is two different worlds it is a vast job compared to what they were doing. In a way a much broader one.

Q: While we are talking about training and to go back to my earlier question on assaults on security officers, is any training given in response to the increasing number of attacks, particularly in the retail side of the industry for instance are they being given any self defence training?

A: I would say not normally self defence.

Q: What about social skills training?

A: No, I could quote you that the College in Dublin where they do a two year course, they are given self defence training there and that is of particular benefit to the quite large number of ladies they have going through that course.

Q: Yes!, I suppose when you think of people like store detectives who are more likely to arrest people this would be a benefit.

A: Yes I think you could find again a store detective, the in-house can almost choose what training they receive and on something like this most companies would back them but it is not part of the standard training of a security guard.

Q: Are there any plans to introduce it?

A: No I don't know of anything at all.

Q: But about social skills training, the way security guards approach people.

A: Yes this is where our courses differ a great deal you see some courses around are package courses where they are given a book and a tape and told to go away and then come back in a fortnight's time and will have a number of pieces of paper with tick boxes on, you know, what do you do first when you go on duty. Plug the kettle in, this sort of thing, absolute waste of time. We do a lot of role playing and that's vital when you are doing the training and if that is going on it has got to be a good branch, because this approach initially gives you the answer to many things.

Q: Is there an increasing trend towards the facilitative style of training?

A: At the moment no. No, there isn't because the training for the contract side it is at such a low level. They don't even talk in terms of training they may say it adds up to days but we would say that a minimum training should be a two day course.

Q: This highlights the difference between Britain and the United States because in the States they are looking at university degrees for the basic guard and masters degrees for the management side.

A: They might be, but we have to put the USA to one side because when anyone from here goes over there they greet them with open arms in the industry because for example that College in Dublin, a lot of Irish people, youngsters go off to America and time and time again they say and they have shown them the syllabus and the things they do well of course the people are streets behind over there, they just don't do it, they are great ones of having this where everyone finishes their education with a degree more or less, in America.

Q: Which begs questions about the quality of the degree.

A: Yes, yes.

Q: Now I believe that there is a joint initiative between your own organisation and the BSIA. Could you tell me a little about this. Is the Inspectorate a result of this joint initiative?

A: Yes. It was conceived last October very much under the guide lines of the Home Office who I would now say to you here made a terrific blunder by pushing it too fast. It is to be set up and going, it isn't going now this day. In fact I had a parcel right this morning, I hope it is the first application forms to apply to the ISI to have their inspections. The whole idea was that it would be an independent Inspectorate, that's fine, that's fine covering the whole of the industry. One of the first meetings I went to when this was first talked about, we are an association and I always say whenever I can, now look lets think about people who are not members of any association. The companies out there because that's the companies we want to bring up and bring into the fold and the Home Office agreed. Now it looks to me that the levels that have been set will not be achievable by the little companies outside and I will say this with guarded words it worries me if everything is going to be manoeuvred towards only large companies

being in the industry because this would be terrible. Good oak trees start from acorns, unless you have small operations an amount of small companies coming through, you are never going to help things at the other end. But what I don't like to see at the moment is what is happening out there. I sit on the management board but I do feel that some of these things will preclude the smaller companies from getting registered. What worries me as well is when they look at training they are not looking at the underpinning knowledge of the V.Q. They are looking only at training, it is the training the BSI used to do, well they call it training but it proves, that somebody can read and tick a box that's all it proves and that is no good. The whole idea is to lift everything up and I have never known such a strange industry and I have been in it a lot of years now. In most industries the large names are upfront like the ICI, Marks and Spencers who set the standard which everybody else tries to live up to, but the large companies in our industry don't. They do it in their glossies but the actual service they give is very often the poorest in the country and they don't want to lift it.

Q:: Because if they did it would eat money from the profits.

A: Well, that's it exactly and this is the frightening thing and I can't see any change until we get legislation. Yet if they had waited 6 months and given themselves time to prepare, it would have gone far better. There are going to be three levels of registered inspection, the enrolled level which will be for companies who set fairly high standards, it's the BS7499 with a few sections removed only a few, then at the end of that year they have got to apply for the inspected level and that is purely a 100% BS7499. Now 7499 is a British Standard but it is a British Standard

of practice which is a big difference to a British Standard but you have a lot of anomalies in it in the wording. There is nothing clear I mean if you have got a British Standard which it either shows black or white you know where you are but there are so many grey areas in there. In fact I am sitting on one of the sub-committees of ISI, I think we have got something between 20-30 anomalies in their one clarification from the British Standard. I have got to say to you, I don't think we should get it. Now what happens then, do ISI put their interpretation on it perhaps that's the wrong word I don't think British Standards would say you can interpret anything they print, I don't know the thing is you can't if you make such a general statement, it is no good, you can't inspect to that, you have got to inspect to something which is fairly tangible to the inspector.

Q: Something that can be evaluated.

A: Yes, all the way through and then you have got the top level which will be BS5750 incorporating 7499 now more and more people and I have thought it for a long while BS5750 isn't worth the paper it is written on. Everybody is screaming this is a wonderful standard when the country is going to thrive on it, it may be in the manufacturing side it may be in big business but in the service industry it is not because the little old company round the corner doing a shocking job, it can be producing cracked china dogs, but if you keep producing cracked china dogs you can still get your BS5750. It would be terrible for this industry. People are going for 5750 to satisfy clients and one major client said I don't care you get your 5750 if it is cheapest in the country this will satisfy us but we are saying it must be linked in with 7499. Now if you link the two together you have got something that really matters. I mean for example with 5750 if you have got a company with four branches, you only have to inspect one so you

only go through everything in one branch. With 7499 you have to do everyone, that is important.

Q: That one branch, if you were inspecting one branch, would that be chosen at random?

A: Yes.

Q: It wouldn't be for the company to say, this is the branch to have a look at?

A: Well you know, you are thinking the same as I think, so often these things do happen but officially it won't be that way. On that subject I feel very, very sorry for the large companies. If you have got 40 branches if you go for the whole of 5750 and that little branch up in Scotland lets you down you loose your 5750 for everything. Now some companies are going for zones or regions and they may have perhaps 7 or 8 branches per region and there you would only loose that region. Now there was a very good write up in "The Times" on it. Group 4 have gone for every branch to be individually assessed for 5750 which is a heck of a cost but it is an insurance policy. In fact if one branch lets them down only that branch fails.

Q: So is it the company that bears the cost of the inspection then?

A: Yes, yes on 5750 initially to set up 5750 is anything between, and this will be each segment in a company who is going for it like Group 4, anything between £5,000 and £20,000 to do each one. It is a very costly thing to do. Anyway back to ISI, and then there will be annual inspections. The thing is it has got to attract companies not sort of grab them round the throat. In other words, the client is not saying look you have got to be inspected by ISI or else. It has got to be so that people are wanting to come and be inspected.

Q: But will there still be an awful lot of companies out there carrying on as now, with no inspections and no accountability?

A: Exactly, and it is no good saying that the client governs it, he can do as much as he can but there is so much work out there where the client couldn't care less. He is just saying I want a security service and he picks up the yellow pages and picks a security service.

Q: Could the insurance companies not exert more influence on the security industry to become registered to be inspected?

A: No. They never have had any influence on the manned guarding side, no influence at all on the manned guarding. Now they do on the alarm installing side.

Q: This is what I am thinking, if they can do it on the alarm side why can't they do it on the manned guarding side?

A: Well you see, they don't get involved, for one thing you don't have a series of companies claiming from them. They are not particularly interested. They would be very loath at the moment because they are having terrible trouble with the alarm side because in fact the body there which looks after that side is NACOS and they have fallen foul of 5750 last year, when they gave all their members until the 1st of January. This year to become 5750, and only a handful have become 5750 and they are having to throw out all the others. I don't know what happens there because in fact NACOS is financed by the major insurance companies and I sat on a meeting called by the Office of Fair Trading, looking at this and we are waiting for the deliberation from that. Because I think there is going to be a major enquiry and you can't have the insurance company owning the inspectorate and then saying to people who are

installing alarms, saying to clients, you can only use these member companies. That's what they have been doing. It is interesting to see what is going to happen.,

Q: My next question is what new initiatives, if any, have been introduced into training. As a result of the joint initiative between yourselves and the BSIA. Are there likely to be any changes in training?

A: I would say no. When I say that, that's purely on the inspectorate. Their views on training and ours are poles apart, poles apart.

Q: Can you ever foresee a national standard of training?

A: I can when legislation comes, not before.

Q: Who will set the standards, the government or the industry?

A: Self regulation does not work. Look at the financial world and the city. You see what happens there it doesn't work. The BSIA and John Wheeler were against any form of legislation until two years ago and then he rang me up to say, well we are now backing you.

Q: Do you think that it will come?

A: The only chance I can see of it coming, it nearly came at the last election, is just according to how quickly our people in Brussels move. The Home Office knows what is happening over there and you know we could be talking another year or two years but I think if we can get something really coming out of Brussels to the government saying look this is what is happening in the other countries, what we are working towards is saying look this is the best format of it.

Q: Do you think that we will then follow the model in Northern Ireland?

A: No, no the legislation in Northern Ireland is nothing like that.

Q: Is that because it is mainly to eliminate terrorist groups from the security industry?

A: That was one, yes because I sat with Nicholas Scott who was the Minister for Law and Order at that time, we sat in London on this and well I will tell you the full story of it. He had the draft and eventually we tied up various bits. In that actual legislation it says a security guard, it doesn't say an employee of any company offering a security service but a security guard, and I said, you are going to have trouble with this. They looked at it and said, "no" that it will be fine and of course it went through and it has been going on for 2 1/2 years.

I was invited out to luncheon in July because we were the only organization in the country who would help them with this. The BSIA said no to government, we don't believe in any form of legislation we are not going to speak with you on this and I was quite surprised when we got down there with the chairman of our region in Northern Ireland, we went to luncheon and there were only 10 of us there, I think, and who should be sat there at the table but David Fletcher of BSIA and Mr Pike one of the Directors of Securicor Northern Ireland and it was launched and in the speech it was said, well they opened the speech by saying well, I know what we are doing today the launching day doesn't satisfy me or IPSA because you are looking for full legislation but this is for the purpose just as you say blah, blah, blah and explained that every company had to register by the 31st December or they would have to cease trading and there was no appeal.

I thought that was most interesting and that went through, and five companies didn't register and went out of business it was quite interesting. It went on to explain that all staff details had to be submitted to Stormont, date of birth, place of birth and all this and the list would be sent back to the company as to who could continue in employment and who had to be got rid of and now he said turning to me, now that's right for security guards and by the way he said if anybody wants to stop me anywhere in this please if you are not sure of anything, so Mr Pike put his hand up, he would like to ask a question he said "our cash in transit staff are not called security guards so I assume they are exempt from this". "No", he said "there is no one exempt from it". On we go again then he came to recruiting new staff. "You recruit" he said and "you have to allow 14 days before you can take them on and we have those 14 days to do the necessary checking".

What happens when very often on a Friday we get a new contract we recruit over the weekend and put them in a uniform on Monday morning. David Fletcher could have fallen through the floor because we know, we know it goes on. He said it makes no difference 14 days you cannot employ them beforehand but that was the system and that's what they did. The outcome of it all and I have been back over a couple of times because they had a review of it and it is very disappointing because you see when they check on Marcel Brain and they find, this is the RUC, are saying, oh dear they sent the form back saying he is clear, he is fine, he is not connected with any terrorism but he has got burglary, he has got this and he has got that and the employer doesn't know and there they are sort of laughing behind the scenes. You know sort of saying you are employing him? why?, and it is very difficult but whether you are in Northern Ireland or not and you are an employer and you don't know the facts and they are sat there with the facts knowing what the man has been up to, so it served the purpose for which they wanted it.

It has left a lot of things out, I understand now at the moment they are so slow in doing the checking it's unbelievable.

Q: What is the level of co-operation in mainland Britain between the police and the security industry, do they work together?

A: It's variable. There is not a standard at all of commitment, I mean we invite policemen, senior policemen, chief constables and what not to our events. If you can get them nail them down and talk to them show them what's going on. Most of them really don't want to know. All they know are the bad facts which they have had to deal with and they don't really know what's involved but I mean we have got a very good relationship overall with them. In fact we produced a brochure for re-training policemen who want to come into the industry and things like this but it is completely different when you go to somewhere like Southern Ireland, I mean when you are walking along the road with somebody and he says by the way come over here, hello this is our Minister of Justice come and have a word and you go into the nearest pub with the Minister of Justice and you talk over things. The Home Office there is a very good relationships there. F3 is the department that looks after our side of the industry but again of course they will be civil servants and I often wonder, I think they have their minds made up before you can talk to them.

Q: Thank you very much Mr Rabbits, that has been very helpful.

APPENDIX B

LETTERS FROM SECURITY COMPANIES

F/RJN

The British Security
Industry Association Ltd

Security House,
Barbourne Road,
Worcester WR1 1RS

Telephone 0905 21464
Fax 0905 613625

17th April 1993

Hannon, Esq.
10A Mitchell Circle
100 Wethersfield
WAINTREE, Essex
SS17 4AZ

Dear Mr. Hannon,

Thank you for your letter of 4th April, enquiring about information of your R.D studies. Answering your questions in the order you raise them, I have the following comments :-

1. Approximately fifty companies are currently subject to inspection by the Inspectorate of the Security Industry (ISI). These are all the large companies who are members of this Association. They employ approximately 55,000 guards.

The creation of ISI was supported by the Home Office.

Guarding companies are inspected against BS 7499 : Part 1. Companies are also encouraged to move from Inspected Companies status to BS 5750 Assessed status.

1. Different companies look for different qualities in their recruits, ranging from the 'cowboy' company who normally seeks a hot, warm body, to the quality companies who have very high standards. This of course is also reinforced in the rates of pay.

Securicor Guarding Limited have carried out some excellent work on psychometric testing of their guards with the result that they have substantially reduced labour turnover.

2. Many security companies recruit from the Services or from amongst retired Police.

4. I enclose a brochure relating to the creation of ISI. This is a direct successor to the Manned Services Inspectorate (MSI), established by BSIA in 1982, but became totally independent in 1992 when the International Professional Security Association (IPSA) became an additional shareholder.

Contd. ...



Certificate No. FS14657
To BS5750: Part 2 1987

- . Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) is the independent training organisation recognised by the Department of Employment as the Industry Training Organisation for the security industry. It has made considerable progress in developing training for the manned services industry, and in particular :-
 - * basic training for all new recruits supported by on-the-job training covering the first three months;
 - * Professional Guard 1 - a SITO/City and Guilds qualification that has now been achieved by 13,000 guards. This will shortly be followed by Professional Guard 2; and also
 - * the introduction of the first National Vocational Qualification last year. The NVQ Level 2 is likely to be adopted very rapidly throughout the industry during the coming years.


You also ask about private policing of shopping centres and I suggest you contact one or more of the following :

Inkerton Security Services Limited
Sinore Way, 205 Lower Richmond Road, Richmond, Surrey, TN9 4LN

Security Express Guards
Westbourne Manor, Westbourne Road, Edbaston, Birmingham, B15 3TR

Berling Granada Security Services Limited
15-307 Chiswick High Road, London, W4 4HH

Yours sincerely,



D.S. FLETCHER
Chief Executive

7 July 1993

V
S
Mr T Hannon
460A Mitchell Circle
MDP Wethersfield
Braintree
Essex
CM7 4AZ

Dear Thomas,

Many thanks for your letter dated 21 June 1993 concerning information required as part of your Ph.D.

I will try and offer what insight I can into the recruitment processes that Pinkerton Security Services apply in the selection, recruitment and training provided to applicants wishing to be employed as security officers. Whilst I do maintain the company policy and procedure relating to selection and recruitment I do not personally interview applicants. That responsibility is delegated to regional recruitment officers who are operational staff who have received recruitment training.

It is easy to over simplify the situation but in practice each customer who uses Pinkerton Security Services will have differing criteria concerning the individual characteristics they believe are important. Hence our personal profile will differ, even though the job specification and job description will be the same.

Our recruitment teams are provided with training to assist applicants with our tailor made application form. Screening commences with the initial interview and candidates are made aware of the company's process of checking information.

We adhere strictly to the guide-lines issued by the British Security Industry Association and candidates who are successful in completing the initial interview must then attend a two day (16 hour) training course and must also be fully screened to account for all periods of employment and unemployment in the past 5 years.


It is only after the company are satisfied that they have been trained and successfully tested, have a work history that has been verified and have provided documentary proof to indicate they are who they say they are, that employment can commence. During their probationary period of employment further training and assessment occurs. The process of checking and vetting information also continues and may cover up to a 20 year period if appropriate.

By now you will have gained an impression of a complicated process that has as many variations and combinations as you can possibly think of.

/cont.

It is not possible to go into any depth in this short explanation but I do hope it may have provided you with a brief overview of the process of recruitment amongst the professionally based security services organisations.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Richard Gray". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "R" and a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Richard Gray
General Manager Personnel Services



STERLING GRANADA

SECURITY SERVICES

Sterling Granada Security Services

12-14 Sterling Industrial Estate, Rainham Road South, Dagenham, Essex RM10 8TA

Telephone 081-984 8020 Facsimile 081-984 1618

r/tlk

1993

annon
itchell Circle
thersfield
REE

Z

r Hannon

you for your letter of 21 June 1993 which has been passed for action.

urprised that the BSIA has referred you to us, since all selection procedures are dictated by BSIA regulations, and uly follow their requirements, and those of British ord 7499. May I suggest you contact BSIA for copies of as they will give you the maximum information.


sincerely,

Taylor

A Taylor
INEL MANAGER



SECURITY EXPRESS GUARDS

A Security Service of Mayne Nickless (UK) Limited 

Westbourne Manor, 17 Westbourne Road,
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 3TR
Tel: 021-454 4342 Fax: 021-455 8862

our Ref: JOB/TJW

nd July, 1993.

Mr. T. Hannon,
60A Mitchell Circle,
IDP Wethersfield,
raintree,
sex.
M7 4AZ.

Dear Mr. Hannon,

Thank you for your letter of 21st June 1993, regarding assistance in your research.


Briefly, the selection, screening and training of applicants to this Company is at least to BS7499 and BSIA minimum standards and I am assuming that you are familiar with these.

This is developed in the enclosed photocopies of the relevant procedures which I would ask you to keep confidential.

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Yours sincerely,

O. Beck
ational Personnel & Training Manager



Bastille

PRIVATE INVESTIGATION SERVICES

111 MILLER PLACE, 44-48 MAGDALEN STREET, NORWICH NR3 1JU.
Phone: (0603) 630040 / 761415 Fax: (0603) 763530

14 September 1993 Your Ref:

Our Ref: SP/RW/GEN

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr T Hannon
10A Mitchell Circle
10P Wethersfield
10Aintree
10Essex
10S17 4AZ

Dear Mr Hannon

Further to our letter dated 6th July 1993 in answer to your enquiry dated 21st June 1993.

a) I can confirm that we employ nine personnel within our company.

b) An application form is filled in and employment history is required covering the previous seven years. References are taken up with all previous employers and two personnel referees are telephoned and written to. We also use a persons direct access to the PNC which they are allowed under the Data Protection Act, with ourselves paying the £10 search fee. However we require the original copy of their reply.

c) Training is given to guarding personnel in accordance with the particular assignment which that person has been recruited for.

d) Our Company is registered with IPSA and the Proprietor is a member of the Institute of Professional Investigators.

I hope that this information is sufficient, but if you have any further enquiries, perhaps you will telephone me.

Yours sincerely,

STEPHEN POINTER
Principal



Members of the
Institute of
Professional
Investigators

Securicor

I/KSA

Securicor Security Services Limited
Sutton Park House 15 Carshalton Road
Sutton Surrey SM1 4LD
Telephone 081 770 7000
Fax 081 643 1059

July 1993

Mr T. Hannon
10A Mitchell Circle
10P Wethersfield
Walthamstow
London
E17 4AZ

Dear Mr Hannon

In further to Mr Cowden's letter of 24 June 1993 I am writing to provide you with information regarding the selection, screening and training of security guards within Securicor, as requested in your letter of 21 June 1993.

RECRUITMENT & SELECTION

Since 1988 recruitment of operational staff has involved the use of psychometric questionnaires (referred to within the Company as Biodata questionnaires) which have been developed by occupational psychologists specifically for Securicor. The introduction of these questionnaires sought primarily to reduce the length of time it took to make a final selection decision. Prior to the introduction of the new procedure, it took an average of 43 days to process an application, from an individual's initial contact with the organisation to making an offer of employment. This was due to the BSIA's requirement to complete five years screening prior to making any offer of employment. The result was that Securicor was losing the higher quality candidates to employers who could make a selection decision within a shorter period of time. The use of the questionnaires enables offers of employment to be made prior to any references being taken up. Candidates cannot commence employment, however, until telephone references covering the last five years have been obtained.

the selection process

The Biodata questionnaires are only part, albeit a crucial part, of the selection process.

stage 1

The candidate is asked to complete an application form which is designed to identify applicants who do not meet basic, easily measurable criteria. Having completed this form, the candidate will be interviewed by a suitably trained administrator who will also provide information about the relevant position. The interview is straightforward, based on the information provided on the form. The administrator will make the decision to reject the candidate or put him/her forward to the next stage.

stage 2

The Biodata questionnaires, of which there are two, are administered by qualified recruitment Officers with portable computers. The candidate is presented with multiple-choice answers to a series of questions about job history, education, financial situation, spare-time interest, attitudes to work and everyday events etc. Each answer is given a numerical value and scores are grouped according to personal characteristics known to be important with respect to job success. The questionnaires are completed concurrently. The computer generates a personal profile which the recruitment Officer uses to conduct a structured interview, exploring in depth the candidate's profile - this involves some quite intense detailed questioning. A high proportion of applicants are rejected at this stage.

stage 3

If the candidate is successful at the previous stage he/she will be asked to complete one or more computerised ability tests, depending on the nature of the job. Three tests are in use: numerical, verbal and administrative; the latter is used most frequently. The results are given against Securicor norms.

stage 4

Before a final selection decision is made credit references are obtained.

stage 5

Employment can be offered at this stage. The candidate is asked to complete a second application form which provides all the necessary information for screening purposes.

SCREENING

Once an offer of employment has been made telephone references are obtained for the last five years*. The offer is then confirmed and employment can commence. This employment is probationary until such time as the full screening is completed.

Full screening involves obtaining written references from previous employers going back 10 years*.


The exceptions to this are security guards employed for high risk assignments. Telephone references must be obtained for a 10 year period and full screening involves going back 20 years. In addition, the employee is 'positively vetted' i.e. interviewed by Company security personnel.

TRAINING

All security guards attend a 3 day induction training course at one of 3 company training centres before they start work on an assignment. The content of the course includes basic security guard duties, such as patrolling, dealing with the emergency services, dealing with customers; use of radios and telephones; dealing with major incidents; civil and criminal law including recording evidence and powers of arrest; health and safety. There is also an introduction to the Company. On reporting to his/her first assignment a security guard receives assignment familiarisation training from the supervisor. Specialist training, such as First Aid, is given as required and usually off-the-job.

I hope this information is of value to you. If you wish to discuss anything in more detail or would like a demonstration of the computerised questionnaires please do not hesitate to contact me on 081 722 2275.

Yours sincerely



RITT MAZZON (MRS)
Personnel Manager

PRIME GUARDS

PRIMEGUARDS
SECURITY SERVICES
Security House
162 Coggeshall Road
Braintree
Essex CM7 6ER
Telephone: (0376) 550232
Facsimile: (0376) 344444

T Hannon
16A Mitchell Circle
Braintree
Essex
CM7 4AZ

2 August 1993

Dear Inspector Hannon

RESEARCH - THE BRITISH SECURITY INDUSTRY

Thank you for your letter requesting information on employment criteria for manned guarding which has now been brought to my attention.

In response to the specific queries, I regret that it would be misleading to make a statement on the number of employees but I would instead say that we are a small company having a permanent head base of under 35 full time staff. A more precise measure of company size is generally given in Contract Hours. This is a closely guarded secret with almost all security companies.

The selection and screening criteria follow the BSIA standard with respect of vetting previous history. Being in the position of receiving a great number of applicants then any queries concerning substantiated breaks in employment are generally grounds for rejection rather than further investigation which is time consuming and may prove inconclusive.

Selection of staff is based on two separate approaches. The first is personal recommendation by existing staff. The applicant is subjected to the full vetting procedure and a discussion of their merits takes place with the nominating employee before or after the formal interview. We have found this to be a highly satisfactory system - personal bonds leading to a greater level of team-work.

The second approach is the standard application form in response to enquiry and is subjected to the usual vetting procedure.

The criteria we specify are that the candidate must have a good command of the English language, be a good communicator, not have a conviction (exceptions are made in respect of driving offences unless driving is part of the duties), to have a mature and confident presence. A good standard of tidiness, personal hygiene and general grooming is likewise included.

Tattoos, pierced ears and hair length are covered under uniform regulations.

We prefer a reasonable standard of education - to 'O' level grade C equivalent or above. This is aimed at moving the image of security staff away from the educationally-challenged person of limited imagination towards the motivated professional with the ability to learn and to grow with the company. The nature of security today demands a much higher degree of technical understanding than ten years ago.

In work histories, we look for a serious career effort in a different industry, so that the guardbase has a diverse array of industry-specific knowledge.

References are requested that give the usual information and include the question of whether they would re-employ the candidate which has been identified as the most informative to ask. Personal references are expected to be well presented by literate people. They are to cover a minimum of two years acquaintance by someone other than a relative or co-habitant and are compared to the initial letter for similarities in paper, handwriting and phraseology.

Candidates are expected to be of a standard of health and fitness suited to the job. If the health declaration is not 'clean', then reference can be made initially to the company coordinator who is a former medical underwriter and finally to a medical examiner selected by the company who would complete and return the examination form with his opinion for evaluation.

Interviews for guarding duties are usually conducted by a single member of the management team with experience in interview technique. For higher positions, two or three interviewers may be present in order to cover all the ground and to gauge the candidates reaction to three personalities and question streams.

Unlike some companies, we do not offer introducing staff a bonus or payment for their work. This avoids the deluge of responses or nominations that have beset other companies following that approach.

Training of staff accepted for employment is carried out by a combination of classroom introductory and assignment specific training courses. The training team is composed of the nominated training officer and the mobile inspectorate, the latter training site. If it is felt at the end of the classroom module that the candidate has insufficient grasp of or interest in the training, then employment will be terminated.

We are currently in the process of revising our training manual to include developments since it was first published and the new format is loose-leaf so that the recipient can organise it in the order they want. New subjects are being issued currently at the rate of one per fortnight.

The training syllabus includes :-

- Law (relevant acts and how they are applied)
- Report writing
- Patrolling duties
- Overview of physical security (locks, fences etc)
- Uniform and equipment
- Searching
- Arrest
- Record Keeping
- Dealing with the public
- Accidents and emergencies (includes 1974 Act)
- Professional standards
- Company regulations
- Bomb threats
- Fire

There are additional specialized courses being prepared such as
R - Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance.

We are not members of the BSIA or IPSA. It is my personal view that although these bodies have great potential as SRO's for the industry, the lack of legislation combined with the illogical insistence on BS5750 certification on the part of many clients has stymied their development as specifiers of standards. The work they have done in developing standards, however, is widely used within the industry - including by us.

We are currently investigating BS5750. Also under
amination is BS7499. I am sure that this will be of great
erest to you.

In conclusion, I hope that the information is suited to your
eds. As this area of information is one which most companies
el falls into the realms of commercial confidentiality, perhaps
would be of greater benefit to visit us and discuss your needs
a personal level. In the meantime, on behalf of the directors,
would like to wish you success with your Ph.D and remain

urs sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Robert M. ...'.

) Sessions
-Ordinator
IMEGUARDS SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED

APPENDIX C

ATTITUDE STATEMENTS - LIKERT SCALE

QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTION SHEET

The attached questionnaire aim to examine the attitudes of the general public, business operators in shopping malls and employers of private security services.

The attitude statements included in this questionnaire are based on comments taken from the literature in private security.

1. Please read each statement and then circle the response which most closely matches your own attitude towards that statement.
2. Please circle only one response for each statement.

Thank you for your assistance in this research.

QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTION SHEET

The attached questionnaire aim to examine the attitudes of the general public, business operators in shopping malls and employers of private security services.

The attitude statements included in this questionnaire are based on comments taken from the literature in private security.

1. Please read each statement and then circle the response which most closely matches your own attitude towards that statement.
2. Please circle only one response for each statement.

Thank you for your assistance in this research.

PUBLIC AND BUSINESS OPERATORS ATTITUDES TOWARDS
SECURITY OFFICERS

ATTITUDE SCALE

1. I believe that the pre-employment checks carried out on security officers working in shopping malls are satisfactory.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
2. I believe that security officers working in shopping malls are well supervised.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
3. I believe that security officers working in shopping malls are well paid.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
4. Security officers working in shopping malls should receive the same pay as police officers.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
5. I do not believe that the government should licence firms providing security officers.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
6. I do not believe that security officers should have a code of conduct similar to the Police Discipline Regulations.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
7. I do not believe that security officers in shopping malls are only there to serve those who pay them.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

8. I believe security officers in shopping malls are there to prevent crime and assist the public.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

9. I do not believe security officers in shopping malls are just one more way that the government controls the public.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

10. I believe that security officers in shopping malls work well with the police.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

11. I believe security officers in shopping malls seldom work with the police.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

12. I believe that security officers in shopping malls are well trained for what they do.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

13. I believe that security officers in shopping malls are not well trained for the job that they do.

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX D

FIELD STUDY

TIME INTERVAL CHARTS

| CATEGORY | PERIOD 1 | PERIOD 2 | PERIOD 3 | PERIOD 4 | PERIOD 5 | PERIOD 6 | PERIOD 7 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | DATE | DATE | DATE | DATE | DATE | DATE | DATE |
| <u>INTERACTION WITH POLICE</u> CONVERSATION | | | | | | | |
| PHYSICAL ASSISTANCE | | | | | | | |
| <u>INTERACTION WITH SHOPPERS</u> POSITIVE OUTCOME | | | | | | | |
| NEGATIVE OUTCOME | | | | | | | |
| <u>INTERACTION WITH TRADERS</u> POSITIVE OUTCOME | | | | | | | |
| NEGATIVE OUTCOME | | | | | | | |
| <u>ABUSE OF AUTHORITY</u> VIOLENCE | | | | | | | |
| VERBAL ABUSE | | | | | | | |
| OTHER | | | | | | | |
| CRIME PREVENTION ARREST | | | | | | | |
| FURSUIT | | | | | | | |
| LOSS PREVENTION | | | | | | | |