

**Terrorism and Contagion theory:
Examining the influence of ISIS on Boko Haram
(2012-2016)**

BY

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Declaration of Originality

I declare that this research is entirely my work and that all additional and identifiable sources of information have been duly acknowledged.

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Abstract

Terrorism is not novel and has become ubiquitous in the present global era. It has also become communicable and contagious in recent years. To assess the contagiousness of this phenomenon, two very active terrorist groups operating in different geographical locations, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, will be studied. This is done to identify the influence and communicable effects of terrorism from the latter on the former. The existence of BH has primarily been identified as a result of economic hardships, mass unemployment, religious ideology and marginalisation (relative deprivation). However, the continued existence of the group has been limited to other factors. This study aims to examine the similarities that exist between BH and ISIS with a bid to understand if the insurgency of BH in Nigeria is a result of just these socio-economic and political factors prevalent in the country or as a result of imitation of other terrorist groups (contagion/copycat terrorism). Qualitative analysis of transcripts from these terrorist groups' public statements and online magazines was undertaken using Nvivo computer-assisted software. A careful comparison of both terrorist groups shows similar aims and objectives, including establishing an Islamic Caliphate run by Islamic laws. However, BH began as a non-violent group in 2002, owing to Nigeria's poor socio-political and economic conditions (internal factors). The group began to morph and imitate the activities, actions and rhetoric of ISIS, even becoming the deadliest terrorist group in 2014 and developing more prowess in using social media to its advantage.

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Abbreviations

AFP - Agence France-Presse

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

BH - Boko Haram

CAQDAS - Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software

CR - Critical Realism

EFP - Explosive Formed Projectile

EIA - Energy Information Administration

ICU - Islamic Courts Union

IDP - Internally Displaced People

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IEP - Institute for Economics and Peace

IG - Inspector General

IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies

IS - Islamic State

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISN - International Relations and Security Network

ISWAP - Islamic State West African Province

JTF - Joint Task Force

NEP - Northern Elders Forum

NI - Northern Ireland

QDA - Qualitative Data Analysis

SSS - State Security Service

TFG - Transitional Federal Government

US - The United States

VBIED - Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter offers an overview of the thesis and summarises the rest of the current chapter in brief details. The first section provides the rationale for undertaking the study, followed by the background of the study. The third section itemises the research aims, objectives and questions, followed by the scope and methodology of the research, while the final sections highlight the research contributions and organisation/structure of this thesis.

1.1 Rationale/Motivation for the Study

The primary rationale and motivation for this research is the need to provide an in-depth exploration of the emergence and sustenance of the terrorist group Boko Haram (BH) in Nigeria through the lens of ISIS by way of contagion. Boko Haram (BH), formerly known as ‘Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihadi,’ meaning ‘people dedicated to the propagation of the teachings of the Prophet (Muhammad) and Jihad’ (BBC, 2016a; Chothia, 2012; Walker, 2012), is a terrorist group which came into the spotlight in 2002. Originating from Borno state in North-Eastern Nigeria (Mantzikos, 2014), the group, whose name loosely translated from the local Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden,” was taciturn until after its violent clash with the Nigerian security forces in 2009. This led to the capture of a number of its members and the eventual death in police custody of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Walker, 2012).

Following the death of Yusuf, BH went underground and later resurfaced in the same year to become more disruptive, attacking individuals and infrastructures (Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012), terrorising the country and its neighbours such as Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin (Mamone & Moki, 2015). As a result of these events, several solutions have been proffered to ameliorate the situation (Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012). Despite best efforts, BH has continued to grow in size, structure, and weaponry, even bombing the UN building in Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal capital, in 2011 (Leigh, 2011; The Guardian,

2011). Within this time frame, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) following its clash with Assad supporters in Syria under its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2010 (BBC, 2015b). Looking at both groups, Gourley (2012) noted that attempts have been made to identify the similarities and connections between BH and ISIS and other terrorist groups while also understanding how these groups interact with each other. The current research seeks to identify how BH and ISIS relate and what influence the latter has on the former in the rise of terrorism in Nigeria.

It is seemingly difficult to ascertain the linkages and connections between BH and other terrorist groups, especially ISIS. It is, therefore, necessary to employ the group's messaging, tactics, messages and content to understand the group's intention, ideology, focus and the influence of ISIS on the group as it developed.

Secondly, there is the need to apply the benefits of content (thematic) analysis to ascertain the changes in the rhetoric of BH as a result of external factors such as other terrorist groups not within the confines of the Nigerian state by applying contagion theory. Johnson (2015) captures the need for contagion studies noting that patterns of violence spread through society may provide clues as to how we can halt them. Hence, understanding the underlying causes and sustenance of a particular problem can help proffer solutions and recommendations to such issues.

In 2013, Eveslage conducted a content analysis of BH's 2012 public messages and pointed out that the group was largely reliant on domestic politics with a reduced quest for internationalisation (expanding mainly beyond the borders of the country or Africa). That notwithstanding, recent studies have since shown an increased international agenda tending towards the emulation of ISIS (Mahmood, 2017; Pham, 2016). Hence, the current research shows the need to investigate the factors from other groups (external factors) which provide incentives for terrorism in the country (Nigeria). This somewhat explains the selection of ISIS and BH, two terrorist groups existing in separate geographical areas. Also, BH pledged its allegiance to the latter in a video in March 2015 (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015), with the latter purportedly accepting the allegiance (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015). Scott (2015)

describes the move as one made, based on fear and powerlessness, as it had become necessary for BH to motivate its comrades and stimulate its members' drive through such extreme resolves.

Moreover, Osita Chidoka, an ally of former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, warned the country about BH, suggesting that the group would likely imitate groups like ISIS and al-Shabaab (Sengupta & Pells, 2015). The group's timeline between 2012 and 2016 and the point at which this influence is likely visible is another rationale and motivation for the present research, as this will help curtail this trend.

In August 2014, BH declared Gwoza, Maiduguri as its caliphate, replicating the July 2014 declaration of swathes of land in Iraq as ISIS' caliphate (Grant, 2014). Following this, BH began referring to itself as the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), a West African extension of the Islamic State (Bugnacki, 2015; Withnall, 2015; Varin, 2016). As detailed by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) and corroborated by Gray and Kehl (2010), analysing the common features of terrorists is essential to understand their strengths as well as where lies their "Achilles' heel" (areas of weakness). Hence, studying similarities between terrorist groups and understanding what distinguishes successful attacks from failed terrorist actions is pivotal for security planning (Gray & Kehl, 2010). Therefore, the current research is pivotal in understanding how BH functions and what likely move is expected of the group soon.

Based on the preceding, understanding what strategies a terrorist organisation employs will inform the group and other groups more likely to undertake or perpetuate such strategies (Mumford, 2015). Additionally, Jackson and Frelinger (2009) announced that it is pertinent to understand what determines failed and successful terrorist attacks to encourage adequate security preparations against such eventualities. The current study is essential in informing the government of such a country of what security measures and tactics to take to forestall these (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009). Gray and Kehl (2010) suggest that identifying similarities between terrorist organisations' strategies is pivotal in the fight against terrorism. Similarly, scholars assert that looking into the similarities between

terrorist groups' strategies is essential to proffer counter-terrorism measures to quell the activities of such groups adequately.

Furthermore, Gray and Kehl (2010) believe that terrorist groups have specific strategies in common, such as using force to oust the government of the day or enforcing a radical change to policy perceived as unlawful. They do this by provoking the government into actions against them while targeting urban areas known as 'urban warfare strategy' – targeting urban areas to cause the government to alter specific policies (Gray and Kehl, 2010: 103). Another key motivation for the current research is the need to show how these patterns of similarities and contagion exist and to identify how the spread of terrorism by BH and other similar terrorist groups can be subdued or disrupted in the future.

1.2 Background to the Research

Terrorism as a violent tactic against individuals and property has come under various hypothetical explanations from the psychological to the societal perspectives, with various means of understanding its sustenance (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). Relative deprivation, which is mainly used to explain terrorism in Nigeria, argues that aggressive and radical behaviour, consequently, terrorist behaviours are usually a result of frustration due to a denial of the attainment of particular goals (Borum, 2004). The theory has easily been cited when viewing the internal structures of states as the main reason for the increase in terrorist attacks (Agbibo, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013; Pichette, 2015). The theory assumes that individuals (or groups) are more likely to resort to violence as a means of expressing their grievances when their needs are not being met or fulfilled in the manner they would have otherwise preferred. Also, Katja and Brynjar (2004) see this problem as a result of the ever-widening gap that exists between expectations and fulfilment, while Galtung (1964) argued that a state of disequilibrium from several social and political aspects of life which are from unmet expectations could induce aggressive behaviours from individuals.

Gurr (2005) also recognised that structural inequities in several countries result in breeding grounds for radical movements, violence and terrorism, for which Birrell (1972: 317) aptly captures as the

tension that occurs and develops when there exists a difference between what “ought” and what “is” of common value fulfilment. Likewise, Eveslage (2013) puts forward the theory of relative deprivation to explain the establishment and rise of BH, which he posits as the result of the lack of well-founded political, economic and social construction of the Nigerian State following the end of the colonial era. However, the number of people or groups that do not employ violence to address their grievances is not taken into account by this theory. This renders it to an extent not germane for the study of all groups not comfortable with the political, socio-economic conditions within their country (Adegbulu, 2013).

On the other hand, it is somewhat good practice to look into the internal conditions and structures of states, which give rise to fragments of civil war grievances which necessitate groups to resort to violence as a means of voicing their grievances rather than through dialogue (Patrick, 2006; Zumve *et al.*, 2013). It has also become increasingly necessary to explore the idea and theory that opines that supposedly successful terrorist activities in one country can lead to the orchestration of similar terrorist activities in another country – Contagion. *Contagion* involves “the exploration of media coverage of terrorist incidents, methods, and most importantly, ideologies as a vector of terrorist infection” (Nacos, 2009:4), which has given rise to the explanation of specific acts of terrorism (Midlarsky *et al.*, 1980). The media here refers to “the main means of mass communication, such as television, radio, [internet, social media] and newspapers” (Mass media, 2000).

Contagion theory suggests that the coverage of terrorist activities is a source for the replication of violence for groups prone to violence (Bjørge 1997; Midlarsky *et al.* 1980; Weimann & Brosius 1988). As such, Nacos (2009) asserts that terrorist groups in different countries can perpetrate acts of terror merely by paying attention to their counterparts through the media and, in turn, seek to acquire media airtime to encourage others to do the same. Similarly, Grant (2014) adds that terrorist groups take cues from each other in more ways than one, thereby suggesting some form of learning or imitation

between and among terrorist groups. For example, Grant asserts that Boko Haram seeks to imitate the Islamic State in attacks and establish its version of a caliphate – An African version (Grant, 2014).

However, while credit has been given to media-induced violence, scholars such as Gunter (2008) still hold some reservations about the belief presented by contagion theory. According to Gunter (2008), while some empirical studies exist on the issue of imitation and effects of media on violence (not merely related to terrorism), he argues that there should be some form of restraint in ascribing all violence to media inducement. He suggests that a more specific approach should be employed to recognise certain groups are more inclined to media effects than others, causing a difference in levels of violence eventually perpetrated by these individuals or groups.

Against the backdrop of the theory of contagion, the overarching resolve of this research is to draw a comparison between the prevalent terrorist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram (hereafter BH) and the popular terrorist group operating in Iraq and Syria, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereafter ISIS but also known as ISIL/IS/Daesh). The present research will examine the extent of probable similarities between the two terrorist groups while determining whether contagion is at work in the terrorism situation in Nigeria. The analysis process will be done by examining and identifying how the terrorist activities of ISIS influence the actions of BH in its terror campaign against the Nigerian state.

Within the African continent, Nigeria is not a stranger to the concept of terrorism or extremist movements, following the likes of the Izala Movement (Abubakar, 2017), the Maitatsine uprising (Abubakar, 2017; Oyovbaire, 1980), the Shi'ite sect of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and BH (Abubakar, 2017). The Maitatsine movement was previously the fastest-growing Islamic fundamentalist ideology in Nigeria and is believed to have been operated by a Cameroonian named Mohammed Marwa and nicknamed 'Maitatsine' (Marc-Antoine, 2014). The movement has somewhat influenced the birth of BH - the most significant security threat to the Nigerian state in the 21st century with greater sophistication in weapons and technological know-how (Ahokegh, 2012; Weate, 2014).

In 2015, following the continued existence of the group, BH dubbed itself 'the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) after the annexation of its supposed Caliphate in Gwoza, Borno State in Northern Nigeria, which the group claimed to be a "Caliphate" in August 2014 (Grant, 2014). A similar move was undertaken by ISIS earlier in the year, in June 2014, over swathes of land spanning Iraq and Syria (Grant, 2014). Tran and Weaver (2014) argue that similarities exist between both groups suggesting that the imitation of techniques and strategies of any one group are made popular by mainstream (social) media.

Regarding the connection between BH and ISIS, St-Pierre (2015) suggests some form of connection between both groups. However, he clarifies that he is not sure of the extent of the collaboration between them (Crompton, 2015). Celso (2015), in his journal paper titled, "The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups," pointed out that both terrorist groups have some forms of similarities in terms of tactics, ideology, and modus operandi. He opined that BH and ISIS belong to Jeffrey Kaplan's Khmer Rouge fifth wave prototype, a concept re-evaluated from David Rapoport's four-wave theory of modern terrorism. According to Rapoport, the 'wave' in the 'four-wave of modern terrorism' refers to diverse forms of terrorism observed in erstwhile periods. He defines it as "a cycle of activity in a given period - a cycle characterised by expansion and contraction phases" (Rapoport, 2004: 48). He employed this system to clarify the variations in the occurrence of modern terrorism. Rapoport (2004) explained the 'Four Wave of modern Terrorism' with the first being the Anarchist wave (1878 –1919); here, the source of collective injustice and hostility is the state that requires the government's elimination officials. The second is the Anti-Colonial wave (the 1920s – early 1960s) involving nationalistic attitude and independence struggles against the western imperialists; the third is the Left-wing revolutions (the mid-1960s – 1990s) in which individuals were bent on the destabilisation of capitalism and the ushering in of the redistribution of wealth. Popular tactics then were hijacking, hostage-taking and kidnapping, among others. Then came the fourth wave, the Religious terrorists (1979 till date), essentially made up of Islamic terrorists seeking to disrupt the Western world's influence in defence of their faith using tactics such as suicide bombing and arbitrary

and selective targeting. The fourth wave of terrorism is what Kaplan (2016) attempts to attribute to existing terrorist groups due to their common features of tactics, ideology, and modus operandi.

However, in their article, 'The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: it's not Waves, it's Strains,' Parker and Sitter (2015) argue that rather than 'wave' which identify the different epochs and development of terrorism as distinct from one another; they should be addressed as 'strains.' Strain refers to a situation whereby terrorist groups imitate and learn from each other emphasising 'contagion,' a situation where terrorist groups develop strategies, techniques and aims based on the activities of other groups throughout history. They also identify four separate strains: the Socialist, the Nationalist, the Religious, and the Exclusionist for which they assert that a "patient zero," that is, the origin of violence and terrorist activities, can be traced to a time in the 1850s (Parker & Sitter, 2015). Nonetheless, identifying patient zero is not the aim of this research but embracing the idea that the strain (as suggested by Parker and Sitter (2015) holds contagion tendencies. Therefore, as Rapoport further suggested that religion is a requisite element of terrorist violence in the 1990s to this present day (Kaplan, 2016), Celso (2015) sees this feature apparent in ideologies and activities of BH and ISIS. This was also evident in the tendencies of fifth-wave jihadist terrorist groups to uphold 'takfiri jihadism' based on Kaplan's fifth-wave evolution (Celso, 2015). Takfir is an 'Arabic word' used to describe a non-believer or 'infidel' (Takar & Zahid, 2016). Takfiri refers to the Sunni Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy or conversion to another religion (Takar, & Zahid, 2016) and uphold the holy war (jihad) against them (Engelkes, 2016). Kaplan suggests that the fifth wave terrorist groups have distinctive features, unlike other groups from erstwhile waves such as the 'radical quest for purity' among others (Kaplan, 2008). Kaplan's list of attributes of the fifth wave jihadist groups forms the basis for which Celso (2015) pulls his arguments to cite the precursors of this ideology, such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) before BH and ISIS taking a more extreme stance.

Table 1. 1 Key Component of Fifth Jihadist Wave Groups

Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order	Muslim society is in a state of Jahiliyyah or ignorance of divine truth that is promoted by apostate regimes. This requires separation from society and rebellion against it.
Idealization of a Mythic Past	Reconstituting Muhammad’s Medina Community and the caliphate developed by his four righteous successors are the desired end-states.
The Quest for Millenarian Justice	The destruction of apostasy and the return to the purity of Muhammad’s Medina experience will generate universal happiness as a caliphate develops.
Youth Culture	Males between 18 and 39 form the bulk of jihadi groups.
Brutalization of Women and Children	Islamist misogyny and forced veiling of women. Attacks on unveiled women, limitations on female education and employment. Forced marriages with jihadi fighters. Coerced recruitment of boys into jihadist organizations.
Kidnapping	Women and children frequently kidnapped and sold into slavery
Ethnic and Sectarian Cleansing	Campaign of targeted killing of religious minorities (Shi’ites, Alawites, Sufis) and Christians. Destruction of Mosques, Shrines, Burial Sites and Churches associated with religious minorities or deemed polytheistic. Broad use of takfir (e.g., ex-communication) of Muslim opponents [opposing] their killing.
Unrestrained Violence	Relentless military campaign of suicide bombings, IED and car bombs aimed at soldiers, police, and civilians. Takfir facilitates [the] killing of opponents including fellow Sunnis.
Charismatic Leadership	Islamist fifth wave groups typically led by powerful dynamic emir who combines religious and military authority
Development of a New Society	Violent destruction of decadent apostate order and creation of modern version of Muhammad’s Medina community and caliphate of his immediate successors

(Excerpt from Jeffrey Kaplan’s work)

Source: Celso (2015: 257)

Table 1.1, developed by Celso from Kaplan's work, reveals critical components of the fifth wave Jihadist groups, such as the rejection of the existing socio-political order for which BH and ISIS are believed to fall into this category (Celso, 2015). This serves as a point of departure for investigating similarities between both groups and the extent of ISIS's influence. However, discussing the similarities between Africa and the Middle East, especially between Nigeria, Syria, and Iraq based on relative deprivation, will be necessary for future research. At present, studying the similarities between BH and IS and how terrorism from a particular group in a specific country gives room for terrorism by another group in another country, using group levels (not individuals) will be the focus of this research. The following section will look into the theoretical framework used within this work.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework provides a collection of interrelated concepts that "guides your research, determining what things you will measure, and what statistical relationships you will look for" within any research study (Borgatti, 1996). It is utilised to give meaning, consistency and understanding to any research work by applying the postulations and principles of a theory (Asher, 1984; Gray, 2014). Therefore, theories are expressed to clarify, forecast, and appreciate phenomena (Abend, 2008), as they help to contest and lengthen current knowledge contained by the boundaries of inevitable critical norms. The theoretical framework represents the arrangement that holds or sustains the theory within any given research. It presents and defines the theory that elucidates the rationale for the problem under investigation (Abend, 2008; Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016; Swanson, 2013). Several theories have been espoused to explain the phenomenon of BH in Nigeria, such as the relative deprivation theory (frustration-aggression). Other theories include class theory based on Marxism and the politicisation of religion, leading to individuals playing on and using religion to seek political power, among others (Forest, 2012; Idahosa, 2015). However, for the current research, it is paramount to stipulate the theory essentially applied in the present research – contagion theory. While using the class theory, Ayodeji (2013) claimed that BH relies on Karl Marx's historical materialism resulting in a struggle for power as a result of the widening gap between the haves (the rich) and the haves not (the

poor) in the capitalist economy of Nigeria. The primary point has addressed the perceived marginalisation against the impoverished through violence leading to terrorism as a form of redress (Agbiboa, 2013). Also, the idea of seeking redress boils down to the frustration-aggression – relative deprivation theory (explained in the next section) as well as the politicisation of religion (Ajayi, 2012) which are components of understanding BH based on the internal dynamics and structure (internal factors) of the Nigerian state. However, understanding the external factors, such as the influence of other terrorist groups, in this case, ISIS on BH in the rise of terrorism in Nigeria, is essential for applying contagion theory. Nevertheless, both relative deprivation (RD) and contagion theories will be explained in detail in the next section. The RD theory aptly captures the internal factors giving rise to BH's terrorist activities on the grounds of those mentioned above; the latter theory will encapsulate the external factors of terrorism in Nigeria.

1.3.1 Relative Deprivation

In the psycho-sociological parlance, a critical theory for understanding terrorism is relative deprivation (Katja and Brynjar, 2000). Relative Deprivation (RD) or frustration-aggression theory refers to the idea that internal factors such as the sociological, political and economic context within a particular country are perceived as the reasons for the emergence of terrorist groups (Borum, 2004, Brown, 2004, Katja and Brynjar, 2000). Galtung (1964) argued that a state of disequilibrium from several socio-political aspects of life could engender aggressive behaviours from individuals. The dissatisfaction usually from unmet expectations is what Gurr (1970) terms as 'relative deprivation.' Seul (1999) advocates that though the most unifying and mobilising identity of specific internal struggles might be religion, they are not necessarily caused by religion. Hence, the need to understand terrorist activities orchestrated by most terrorist groups such as BH within the context of internal structures of the state, rather than specifically religion. Buttressing this point, Gurr (1970) in his book, 'Why Men Rebel' revealed that most individuals feel deprived and unsatisfied when they receive less than what they perceive they are owed by the government or from life; when their priorities and needs are not adequately met. He

further contended that fundamental deficiencies and disproportions within certain countries serve as a hotbed for violent radical movements leading to terrorism (Gurr, 2005).

Similarly, Idahosa (2015) argues that the rise of BH, and its extremist perpetuation, gives credence to the poor social and economic conditions of North-eastern Nigeria, which is further exacerbated by the inability of the government to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the region. More so, he agrees with subjecting the reasons for insurgency by juxtaposing 'internalised radical Islamic beliefs' with 'externalised socio-economic conditions' of the country (Idahosa, 2015: 26). Przeworski supports this claim asserting that "as long as masses of people experience material deprivation, any notion of the end of conflicts is illusory" (Przeworski, 1995: ix).

Socioeconomic conditions, poverty and corruption of the North-eastern states of Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013, Ibenwa, 2016; Pitchette, 2015; Zumve *et al.*, 2013) are of paramount importance in the understanding of the insurgence of BH. For instance, Eveslage (2013) observed, through his content analysis study of BH's 2012 public statement, that the group made no mention of poverty or the lack of education in the region as the cause of its activities. He also understands that these internal factors could have necessitated its recruitment and membership growth. He argues that they may not have been the leading cause of terrorism in Nigeria (Eveslage, 2013). This brings us to the theory of contagion - which looks at how external factors affect the activities of terrorist groups. Here, external factors influencing terrorist groups is more appropriate within the Nigerian context. However, relative deprivation as a cause of terrorism in Nigeria has continued to be discussed (see Agbiboa, 2013b; Idahosa, 2015) and may have been the reasons for the group's insurgency until its change in ideology and tactics since 2012.

1.3.2 Contagion Theory

Essentially, the theory applied and tested in this thesis, contagion theory, is pivotal in the psycho-social thought on terrorism (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). While looking at it from a terrorist group perspective, contagion theory suggests that the use of terrorist tactics in one country leads to and

inspires the use of terrorism in a similar or different country (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). The theory suggests that terrorist groups tend to imitate the activities of one another (or other more successful terrorist groups). Therefore, terrorism is perceived as a behaviour that can transcend across borders to influence the violence-prone individual to pick up arms and fight for the cause of other similar or dissimilar groups, whose points of view are being aired across the world on various media platforms (Weimann & Brosius 1988; Redlick 1979; Midlarsky *et al.* 1980). This is accentuated by globalisation which is the procedure and practice by which the world is becoming interconnected owing to improved trade and cultural interchange and transfer (BBC n.d). It is believed to have ushered in its wake new technologies which have been employed by terrorist groups in the achievements of their aims and objectives (Cooper, 2001).

The mass media also plays a pivotal role in intensifying globalisation and enhancing the cultural transfer of images and information, among others (Matos, 2012). Mass media is how people are sensitised and furnished with information about happenings through mediums, such as the internet, radio, newspapers and smartphones (Mass media, 2000). Martin (2013: 370) suggests that Mass media is 'a weapon of war' in the hands of terrorists as they use this tool in a lucrative manner as an addition to their weaponry. He argues that images and symbols are manipulated to influence governments and societies. Furthermore, Hoffman (1998) adds that innovative communication technologies through which news dissemination is made easier in line with the constant rivalry among news outlets that terrorist groups have capitalised on to their advantage as they seek media airtime to promote their cause. For example, BH has used different means to convey its message to the public such as being involved in "directly speaking to the press or [having] pre-recorded videos [which have been handed over by the group to reporters] have been the most common messaging types" (Mahmood, 2017: 4). Also, various newspapers have covered the group's messages to different levels; even the groups had frequent discussions with reporters from certain newspaper outlets such as The Daily Trust (Mahmood, 2017).

Crenshaw (1990) further added that as more and more people get used to the effect of terrorism, there is always a need to go over and beyond on the part of terrorist groups to shock their already increasing audience to seek more international credit or be regarded as 'the best in the game', resulting in more deadliest attacks and mass casualty. Case in point, in the year 2014, BH surpassed ISIS as the most deadly terrorist group globally, responsible for 6,644 deaths compared to ISIS, which is believed to have killed 6,073 people in the same time frame (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). Similarly, researchers such as Ajayi (2012) and Akinwalere (2013) agree that the media has a key role in sensitising their audiences on the ills of terrorism to society rather than gratifying or abruptly dismissing the actions of any select group of people while still understanding that there are various limitations to the efforts of the media outlets in the achievement of this feat. Also, Kennedy Moorhead captured the effects of communication between terrorist groups when he enunciated that certain groups, "find ways to communicate and bond ... to the extent that there is little hope for [any] amelioration of [the] situation, [hence] terrorism on a wider scale becomes increasingly possible in the next century" (Kennedy, 1998: 190). Crenshaw (1983) said that ideas that encourage terrorism are transmitted beyond the borders of countries via telecommunication technologies.

Correspondingly, choosing to understand BH through the lens of contagion theory is to explain the group's change in ideology and tactics is pivotal as the theory helps to understand how terrorist groups evolve and interact with other terrorist groups. According to Mumford (2015), this is essential as understanding the dynamics of terrorist groups and how they evolve while interacting with other groups helps provide recommendations as to how such interactions and activities can be halted in the future. Although there are limited records of demonstrating certain identifiable characteristics between terrorist groups, there is a substantial amount of coherent theory of associations (contagion) between the groups over a given period (Crenshaw, 2010). Mumford further argues that observing terrorism within 'macro-level' settings such as 'poverty' within a country has the danger of missing the importance of the strength of these sub-state performers (Mumford, 2015). Also, terrorist groups, like other sub-state actors in general operating in socio-economic systems, tend not to operate in

isolation. When they interact, they engage in the learning process, thereby learning from each other (Gourley, 2012).

Addressing terrorist groups alone as a single entity takes away from the importance of understanding the correlation and *interdependence* between terrorist groups; hence, “The central problem is to explain the development of terrorist organizations as they interact with each other, with other political actors, and with the government” (Crenshaw, 2010: 2). Following this, correlation and similarities between different terrorist groups are adequate in a bid to understand the groups properly as entities developing within a particular system with interactions and not as closed entities without interactions. Moreover, some research has considered instances of contagion in history, as referred to in the following section.

1.3.2.1 Contagion in History

Weimann and Brosius (1988), having observed the constant rise in terrorist attacks and mass casualty rate between 1968 and 1986, suggested that there appeared to be some form of a continuous cycle in terrorist attacks within the chosen time frame suggesting contagion. The theory has been applied to a wide range of political violence, such as waves of crimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which saw the rise of plane hijacking following the Palestinians’ staged hijacking receiving intensified media coverage (Martin, 2013). There was also the era of homemade bombs following April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, U.S, which left more than 160 people dead (Nacos, 2009) and the embassy seizures in the same period (Jenkins, 1985).

Furthermore, and related to international terrorism, Weimann and Brosius (1988) asserted that there exists a compounding observable indication pointing to terrorism ‘*contagiousness*’. Similarly, several other empirical research conducted on terrorist attacks in different times have alluded to the conception that terrorism is ‘contagious’ as usually terrorist activities are not undertaken by chance, but rather there is an apparent cycle in the episodes and ‘waves’ of terrorist attacks (Weimann &

Brosius 1988; Redlick 1979; Midlarsky *et al.* 1980). Hence, the decision by terrorist groups to launch attacks in any particular area is somewhat influenced by similar attacks in a close or distant area with analogous socio-economic or political structures (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). Therefore, an increase in terrorist activities within a particular period is supposedly shadowed by increased attacks in succeeding months bringing to mind the idea that the resolution by terrorist groups to initiate an attack is usually prejudiced by analogous attacks taking place somewhere else (Katja and Brynjar, 2004), with the media providing a platform for the dissemination of these terrorist activities (Schmid and Graaf, 1982; Weimann, and Winn, 1994).

Moreover, contagion theory proposes the idea of the media as being used as a representative communication agent to engender terrorist ideas and tactics as the mass media is pivotal in the comprehension of terrorism and terrorist tactics contagiousness (Crenshaw 1990; Wilkinson 1987). Hence, the researcher needs to employ mass media resources such as YouTube channels, journals, social media tools, newspapers and magazines used by these terrorist groups to propagate their cause and apply analysis by scholars on these terrorist groups. Wide-ranging collective measures, individual associations between terrorist groups and transnational systems are also thought to retain significant dynamics in the further explication of terrorism '*contagiousness*' (Crenshaw, 1983). Lastly, research on contagion involves the probing and examination of media reportage of terrorist incidents and methods in an attempt to understand their ideologies as a path to the comprehension of the '*contagiousness*' of terrorism and terrorist activities (Howie, 2006; Nacos, 2009), which justifies attempting a similar study.

1.4 Research Aims

As earlier stated, the resolve of this research is to draw a comparison between the prevalent terrorist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram (BH) and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS/IS) that operates within Iraq and Syria. This will be done by identifying probable similarities between the two groups and examining

the influence that ISIS has on BH and how this affects the terror campaign in the Nigerian State and its neighbours.

1.5 Research Objectives

Following the above, the following research objectives have been developed:

- To Identify the similarities/differences that exist between BH and ISIS.
- To examine the influence ISIS has on BH in its terrorist propaganda.
- To understand how ISIS's influence on BH affects the terrorist campaign in Nigeria.

1.6 Research Questions

In line with the objectives above, the following research questions have been posed,

- What similarities/differences exist between BH and ISIS?
- What influence does ISIS have on BH's terrorist propaganda?
- How has ISIS shaped BH's terrorist campaign in Nigeria?

The following section looks at how this research will be undertaken, and questions answered, elucidated in Chapter four.

1.7 Scope and Methodology

According to Brown (2006), methodology refers to how research is undertaken and how knowledge is acquired. The current study is based on primary and secondary research methods, which adopt a case-study approach using qualitative (thematic) analysis. Primary research, in this instance, involves the utilisation of media sources to assess terrorist groups' public statements on different social media platforms and analyses conducted by scholars in journals, books and articles (Lamont, 2015). A case study research design has been chosen as it is helpful for the testing and applying theories in reality

as it provides an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon (Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008).

Content analysis involves studying a wide variety of 'texts' from transcripts of videos, interviews, written works and discussions (Neuendorf, 2002). Neuendorf (2002: 9) identifies content analysis as "the primary message-centred methodology" as it can be used to explain hidden content within messages and communications, which makes it worthwhile to understand the content of generated communications from and between terrorist groups. Among the two types of content analysis, the manifest analysis, also known as quantitative content analysis, offers data as frequency count, the use of numbers or percentages ascribed to certain presumed categories (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002). This discusses the question of "how many" times a category was mentioned but does so without giving the full facts of a message (Bengtssen, 2016: 10). Hence, it is regarded as a manifest analysis as it seeks to address what can be superficially observed (Bengtssen, 2016). However, the primary focus technique for the current study is the qualitative content analysis which looks at the latent meanings.

Content analysis is applied in this research as it mutually infuses the advantages of quantitative (Krippendorff, 2004) and qualitative approaches (Berg, 2001; Downe-Wambolt, 1992), which can both be in a deductive or inductive manner respectively when analysing data (Bengtssen, 2016; Downe-Wambolt, 1992). Inductive reasoning is usually employed in qualitative approaches and the process by which data informs research through real-world settings by taking a holistic view of the phenomenon under study. This happens as the researcher is engrossed in the data, which is usually descriptive using document and observation records (Bengtssen, 2016; Mohajan, 2018). Deductive reasoning, on the other hand, is the process of engaging with data by categorising predetermined contexts and knowledge or theme (in this instance as provided by Celso (2015) in the characteristics of Jihadist fifth wave group) while applying or testing the postulations of the theory (Berg, 2001; Lamont, 2015).

Qualitative (thematic) content analysis is used as the focus of the current study as it uses data, especially textual data in the way of transcripts. Qualitative analysis also understands the hidden (latent) meanings of communication not easily observed in the quantitative (manifest) analysis. While “Quantitative research tells us *how* often or how many behave in a certain way” or the number of times a word occurs, qualitative research does more to show *how* things can be understood and how they exist the way they do in the ‘social world’ (Zamawe, 2015: 13; Hancock *et al.*, 2007). As such, the influence of ISIS on BH can best be perceived, understood and identified through media communications, most especially textual data in the way of transcripts while employing qualitative content analysis (Zamawe, 2015), hence, its application in the present research

Likewise, qualitative (thematic) content analysis breaks down words and phrases into themes, enabling the researcher to interpret results and find essential comparisons and denotations within any given text (Berg, 2001; Catanzaro, 1988; Downe-Wambolt, 1992). The latent analysis from QCA allows the researcher to submerge themselves to categorise concealed connotations within any data text. These themes (categories) can be summed up and presented in tabular or pictorial forms with themes and textual data to exemplify coding instead of the quantitative counting categories (Bengtsson, 2016). Therefore, data analysis will take the form of latent content analysis to understand more than what appears to be superficial within words and text (Berg, 2001; Downe-Wambolt, 1992). Moreover, qualitative research, which has its origin in social research, helps to contribute to the understanding of human situations within various perspectives and conditions for which the motivations for certain behaviours and actions (by terrorist groups) can be sought through qualitative analysis of (terrorist) communication (Bengtsson, 2016). The researcher also considered his perception of the groups under study before embarking on the planning. According to Elo *et al.* (2014) and Long & Johnson (2002), it is necessary to avoid prejudice during the study planning and analyses. Accordingly, the researcher’s perception was that both BH and ISIS had some form of collaboration. BH was replicating the activities, trajectory, ideology and tactics of ISIS and the similarities between

both groups. Nevertheless, to avoid any bias in the research, cases of non-similarities and divergence of opinion and ideologies, tactics, and trajectory were expected and taken into account. Both groups exist in divergent geopolitical areas. For BH, this is Nigeria, within the African continent, while ISIS takes refuge in Iraq and Syria in the Middle East. Likewise, as rightly pointed out by Bengtsson (2016), for any good qualitative study whereby self-reflection plays a pivotal role in the choice of qualitative research technique (Burnard, 1995), limitations of the study must be identified before the actual study commences to ensure improved quality (Bengtsson, 2016). Therefore, the limitations envisaged in this research include but are not limited to the amount of online data available for the analysis. This comes from the fact that most propaganda videos and documents by terrorist groups are being deleted from the internet and media outlets for security reasons, mainly to prevent more terrorist propaganda (Burke, 2016).

Though the current research aims to ascertain similarities between ISIS and BH and whether terrorism in Nigeria is a product of contagion, the structure and boundaries of the research are also important (Downe-Wambolt, 1992). Hence, the scope and boundary of the research are between the years 2012 to 2016, as data which includes online public messages transmitted during the years 2012 to 2016 will be collated through 'Convenience Sampling.' Sampling refers to the process of choosing a valid representative from a population being investigated (McLeod, 2008). Here, the population refers to public statements by terrorist groups for which most of them are either incomplete or have been removed by the hosts. As such, the convenience sample uses a select population that is accessible and available (Herek, 1997; McLeod, 2008). Public statements and magazines by BH and ISIS that are available will be employed except for public comments, which, in many cases, only showcase killing and hold no relevance to the discussion of terrorist group ideology and tactics or imitation.

The analysis process will take the form of assessing general communications from terrorist group propaganda videos with various social and mass media generated contents, as well as magazines and articles on and by the groups, including scholarly articles and discussions on the groups. This will follow

the identification of themes that will be useful to determine dominant features between the two groups asserting the similarities between them. Contagion will be tested through this process and selected by identifying if BH discusses ISIS and reiterates ISIS' rhetoric as specified in the fifth wave jihadist group by Celso (2015). Likewise, the dominant themes within BH communications tend to eulogise the activities of ISIS and vice versa, as this serves as an indication of imitation. By and large, the essence of the thematic analysis in the current research will be to show if the themes surrounding BH tactics and ideology are similar to and influenced by ISIS tactics and doctrine.

Therefore, to answer the research questions and be critical, attention is kept on the units of analysis while acknowledging other hindrances from reality which either assert or influence perceived thinking, such as prejudices (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 9; Willig, 1999). Moreover, reflecting on apparent reality (manifest content), it will serve well and provide a better understanding to disentangle the not-so-apparent reality (latent content), which is usually done appropriately through thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

1.7.1 Dabiq and BH Statements as units of Content/Thematic Analysis.

As many terrorist group propaganda materials and videos are being deleted across the internet (Burke, 2016), it is, therefore, the researcher's aim to make use of videos and transcripts available on social media platforms before they are deleted. However, many videos and transcripts between the years 2012 and 2016 remain available from several websites such as Voice of America (VOA), Sahara Reporters and Daily Trust, and scholars, among others.

The magazine 'Dabiq' represents an essential aspect of this research. It is essentially symbolic to ISIS, representing the group's online English-language propaganda magazine, among others that came into existence in 2014. The name represents a Syrian town 10 kilometres from the Turkish border (BBC, 2016b; Gambhir, 2014 and cited by the group as the place for the prophetic showdown between ISIS and their enemies, the Romans, whom they intend to destroy (Gambhir, 2014). ISIS hangs onto the

idea that Prophet Muhammad had during his lifetime declared that Muslims would destroy their enemies at Dabiq in an attempt to annex Constantinople (Istanbul of today) (Gambhir, 2014).

As an online/digital propaganda magazine, Dabiq contains ISIS's grand plan (religious, military and political programs) and how it seeks to achieve this (Gambhir, 2014). According to Gambhir (2014: 1), "The magazine aims to communicate both to enemies and to [sic] potential ISIS supporters [like BH and other terrorist groups or Muslims in support of the group's ideals] in the Western world." The magazine has become a point of departure for the distinct intentions of ISIS' clear apocalyptic messages to reach a wider audience. It has also cited BH on several occasions: Dabiq made mention of the kidnapping by BH of the Chibok girls as synonymous with its (ISIS) exploitation and sexual assault of Iraqi Yazidi women. It also spoke about the BH's allegiance. It stated that most Christians in the area or the group's sphere of influence were being subjected and subjugated to the terrorist group's rule (The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d).

Additionally, as used in several video evidence, Dabiq is referenced as a town and has raised its significance. For example, Mohammed Emwazi, popularly called 'Jihadi John,' a British-born ISIS militant had a scene with the Dabiq town as the background in one of his videos where he decapitated Abdul-Rahman Kassig, an American aid worker (BBC, 2016b). Hence, the reverence for Dabiq as a town and title of ISIS' online magazine has continued to grow through its use and mentions in the media. Other videos include an ISIS fighter walking past a terrain brandishing the ISIS flag with an imposed audio clip from the founder of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, where '*Dabiq*' is mentioned (BBC, 2016b).

In summary, for the type of data being analysed, the level of analysis used as explained above is the thematic content analysis which is a qualitative analytic technique involving the search for themes or patterns that exist within several entities, such as in this case, texts and transcripts of terrorist communications (Bengtsson, 2016; Braun and Clarke, 2006). Likewise, thematic content analysis is mainly synonymous with latent analysis as it provides an understanding of deep structures (what was

intended to be said in units of analysis) and underlying meanings of texts, using inductive and deductive reasoning (Bengtsson, 2016) within the related timeframe.

1.7.2 Chosen Timeframe (2012-2016)

The chosen time frame, which is from 2012 to 2016, is of the essence as it represents milestones in the development of both terrorist groups. Both BH and ISIS have proven to be violently more active between 2012 and 2016 than their counterparts, al Qaeda and al Shabaab, among others (IEP, 2015; Mahmood, 2017). This culminated in newsworthiness and the eventual rise of BH to the status of the most deadly terrorist group in 2014 with approximately 6,644 deaths and ISIS following with about 6,073 deaths while other terrorist groups followed behind (IEP, 2016). BH and ISIS accounted for 51% of terrorism-related deaths in that year globally (IEP, 2016; Pisa & Hume, 2015). Also, ISIS established a caliphate in June 2014 in a large area spanning Iraq and Syria, while BH followed the same pattern in August of the same year in Gwoza, North-Eastern Nigeria (Celso, 2015; Tran and Weaver, 2014).

BH has evolved over the years with what Pham (2016) classified as 'Versions 1.0 to 4.0'. Version 1.0 relates to the group's origin from 2002-2007 and the group's total rejection of the quasi-Sharia laws being practised in 12 of the 19 Northern states of Nigeria. The group was determined to undertake relatively small attacks against people deemed to be involved in 'haram' activities such as alcoholic drinking, among others and with a distaste for Western-style education. BH 2.0 came due to the death of the group's Mohammed Yusuf and the group's transformation as it became violent. However, on 16th June 2011, BH orchestrated its first Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) suicide attacks on the Nigerian Police Force and the eventual bombing of the UN building in Abuja on August 26, 2011 - showing its formidability (Celso, 2015).

Nonetheless, the versions more appropriate for the current research are Versions 3.0 and 4.0, with Version 3.0 having to do with the "ideological and operational shift" in the BH's camp (Pham, 2016: 5). Likewise, Varin (2016) also posits that both BH and ISIS relinquished their former tactics of drive-by shooting and hit-and-run attacks to the acquisition of territories. During this period, BH began

kidnapping for ransom, staging jailbreaks and became mostly resilient to counterinsurgency strategies from the Nigerian military. This eventually led to the capture of Gwoza and the declaration of a Caliphate in Northern Nigeria on 26th August 2014 (Al Jazeera, 2014) and the raising of the similar ISIS black jihadist flag (Boghani, 2016). In 2014, the Dabiq made mention of BH's kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls. Similarly, Mahmood (2017) mentioned a Qaqa/Shekau dominance period (2010 – 2012), Shekau's dominance (2012 – 2015) and IS dominance (2015 – 2016) in the group's activities.

Similarly, the instances of high-quality video produced by BH provided a brief visualisation of how the group slowly warmed up to the ideals of ISIS while the world was watching (Campbell, 2014b). In his article, "Nigeria: Five Reasons why Boko Haram's video Matters," Campbell (2014b) insists that the videos produced by BH were of a higher quality, which suggests a collaboration with ISIS. However, what is pertinent here is that he also suggests that Shekau, the head of the group, used the terminology "Islamic State" to refer to the group's captured territories ('Caliphate'), referring to ISIS. In 2015, BH eventually pledged its allegiance to ISIS in a video recording which ISIS accepted (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasry, 2015; Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015). Other eventualities took place within the group's communication to cause a shift in the allegiance of BH to a global jihadist group, ISIS, which could only have started at some point between the years 2012 and 2016. The questions put forward are whether communications were missed as to how these groups were linked to each other? At what point did they become connected, and what are the conditions that led to this? These questions can be answered only by looking at timelines, tactics and communications as indicated in the present research. Therefore, the researcher aims to answer a few of these burning questions by looking into external contacts and communications between and from both groups to ascertain their links and likely imitations.

1.7.3 Assessing Similarity and Contagion

Qualitative data analysis will be undertaken to answer the research questions posed with NVivo (Computer-aided qualitative data analysis software) as transcripts of BH and ISIS communications

collated will be imputed into the software. At the same time, codes and themes can then follow a cataloguing process (Bengtsson, 2016). Qualitative data analysis has been used in terrorism studies such as Drake (1998). He applied qualitative data analysis to understand terrorist groups who sometimes did not explain their ideologies or intentions. Drake further asserted that terrorist groups' attacks are undertaken for specific reasons and not without planning or prior knowledge of the consequences of their attacks, illuminating ideologies and reasons for attacking targets (Drake, 1998). Additionally, Eveslage (2013) positively advocated using qualitative content analysis to fully understand terrorist groups' statements, while Altier *et al.* (2012) proposed that examining terrorist statements using qualitative content analysis compares rhetoric, ideology attacks. Also, Peterson and Chrisman (1977 in Eveslage, 2013) applied qualitative content analysis to determine the level of threat portrayed by terrorist groups. These have informed my choice of applying thematic content analysis while using Nvivo CAQDAS to answer the following research questions.

1.7.3.1 Research question 1 (RQ1):

- **WHAT SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN BH AND ISIS?**

For the contagion and replication of violence by BH taking into cognisance the activities of ISIS, the first task will be to explore the similarities between BH and ISIS. This will take the form of identifying related as well as like concepts, rhetoric, attacks and techniques that exist in the activities of both BH and ISIS based on but not exclusive to analysed transcripts and online magazine between the years 2012 to 2016. These will take the form of themes and codes extrapolated from these units of analysis which include public statements, videos and publications, which represent the means of communication through which prospective members and the rest of the world are sensitised on the activities and ideologies of terrorist groups (Eveslage, 2013).

1.7.3.2 Research Questions 2 and 3 (RQ 2 & 3):

- **WHAT INFLUENCE DOES ISIS HAVE ON BH'S TERRORIST PROPAGANDA?**

- **HOW HAS ISIS SHAPED BH'S TERROR CAMPAIGN IN NIGERIA?**

In answering RQs 2 and 3 and as earlier captured, contagion is the replication of violence in which certain groups embark on violent activities by imitating the activities of other violent groups made popular by mainstream media (Weimann and Brosius 1988; Midlarsky *et al.*, 1980; Nacos, 2009). In this instance, the current research looks at how BH imitates the tactics, rhetoric and ideology of ISIS from 2012 to 2016. This can only be ascertained by verifying how ISIS is referenced by BH and vice versa in their speeches and statements, for which video transcripts and communication from BH and ISIS will be analysed from 2012 to 2016. ISIS's online publication Dabiq will also be analysed from the year 2014 to 2016. Though BH had no known online periodicals based on initial research, the group's video transcript will suffice for analysis using the NVivo software.

1.8 Research Contribution

Based on careful consideration of the research questions, aims and objectives, the current study aims to contribute to knowledge and literature in the following ways. First, it seeks to add to the body of terrorism literature in developing countries in general and Nigeria in particular. Nigeria is a West African country that has been rife with religious disturbances with a geographical dispersion of various ethnic and religious groups in the country (Ikenah-Metuh, 1994). Despite these religious disturbances, BH as a terrorist group remains the most pressing security threat currently faced by the Nigerian state (Ahokegh, 2012). Hence this work will serve as an addition to an understanding of terrorism in the country.

Secondly, the work will give a deeper understanding of the underlying external causes of terrorism prevalent in the Nigerian context by applying contagion theory. This theory advocates that the likelihood of terrorism occurring in a particular area is mainly dependent upon the perceived success of terrorist activities in a different geographical area or location. By considering the external influences and causes of terrorism in Nigeria, the current research aims to better understand external conditions and influences of terrorism. This follows the unstable political, economic and religious situations or

internal structures of the state as opined by the relative deprivation theory (Agbibo, 2013) and state failure (Malasowe, 2016; Widigdo, 2014). As such, the Nigerian perspective can be carefully applied to other African countries in a generalised manner.

Thirdly, this research will contribute to the literature on investigating similarities and differences between terrorist groups in different geographical areas, which will help forestall similar terrorist groups in the future by understanding how they connect and how they relate to disrupting them. Finally, it will also encourage using computer-aided qualitative analysis software to analyse documents and transcripts to understand these similarities, a feat not usually undertaken in politics and international relations. The following section discusses the structure of this thesis.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

This section addresses the structure of this thesis and the content intended for each of the seven research chapters. The structure of this thesis is as follows:

Chapter one is an introductory chapter that provides a general background of the research while discussing contagion theory and the reasons for selecting the theory in light of others for this study. This is succeeded by the researcher's motives and rationale for undertaking this research. The chapter further itemises the central aims, objectives, and questions surrounding the research, shadowed by the scope and methodology used in the investigative process of this research. Likewise, how the research questions will be answered in addition to the research contributions are highlighted.

Chapter two provides a background of Nigeria, the country where Boko Haram operates, Islam as a religion in the country, and Sharia law. An understanding of the concept of terrorism is reviewed while the philosophy behind religious terrorism and violence – Political Islam - is revisited with religion as a factor in new terrorism.

Chapter three is a literature review explaining the terrorist groups in question, BH and ISIS, and their political and socio-economic implications for the countries' influence or where they operate. Terrorist

groups such as BH are perceived as learning organisations involved in learning from the actions and activities of other terrorist groups. This is investigated in line with the similarities and potential differences between both groups. External influences of terrorist groups, such as the activities of other terrorist groups outside their sphere of influence, are considered alongside previous studies of contagion. This is concluded with explanations and postulations of the rise and emergence of BH in Nigeria.

Chapter four addresses the research methodology and design used in answering the research questions offered in chapter one. This chapter identifies the primary and secondary research methods through qualitative research methods while applying the analytical approach - thematic content analysis. Steps are taken to ascertain aspects of documents referred to as units of analysis (transcripts and online magazine) examined for cues and the establishment of coding schemes. This chapter also delves into reliability and validity checks within the study as well.

Chapter five examines the results relating to the application of the contagion theory. It involves data analysis and presentation through NVivo, a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). The results are analysed and discussed against the backdrop of BH and ISIS, their similarities and contagion theory.

Chapter six summarises the discussions and empirical findings in the preceding Chapter five while discussing the significance of the research results and findings. It analyses the data and provides the similarities between BH and ISIS and the latter's influence on the former.

Chapter seven is an explication of social media communication with regards to the terrorist group, BH. Changes in BH's communication, attacks, trajectories, strategies and use of social media are explained here. Furthermore, the relationship between BH, ISWAP and ISIS was also discussed.

Chapter eight summarises preceding chapters, followed by a summary of findings, the political significance of the current research, the contributions to existing knowledge, political significance and

methodology. Additionally, it itemises the limitations of the research and research significance and future research opportunities.

1.10 Summary

Terrorism, a violent tactic against individuals and property, has come under various hypothetical explanations from the psychological to the societal perspectives (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). In a similar vein, there has been no generally agreed definition of the concept (Laqueur, 2000; Martin, 2013; Baker, 2003; Townshend, 2011). Terrorism has come to be part of human existence and come under diverging explanations. Rapoport (2004) sought to describe terrorism through the concept of 'waves' - the Anarchist wave, the Anti-Colonial wave, the Left-wing revolutions and the Religious terrorist since 1979, which is still prevalent. Parker and Sitter (2015) also explained the concept in waves from the Socialist, the Nationalist, the Religious, and the Exclusionist. Several theories have also been put forward to explain this phenomenon. One that stands out for this research, among others, relative deprivation, is contagion theory. It has been explored in the theoretical framework to explain the actions of BH with the activities of ISIS.

Contagion theory suggests that terrorism transcends national boundaries and can influence terrorists vis-à-vis activities in other countries. Hence, the objective of this chapter has been to provide a rationale for this study. As the background to the research suggests, contagion can be applied as a source of replication of violence for groups prone to violence which has been tailored to ascertain how this concept influences BH in Nigeria using ISIS as the influencer.

The method of gathering data involved primary and secondary sources and follow-up analysis, which takes the form of 'thematic content analysis,' involving the qualitative analysis of text employing Dabiq (online magazine) and other ISIS and BH transcripts between 2012 and 2016. These have been used as units of content analysis to unearth relevant and recurring phrases and themes that can best answer the posed research questions (Downe-Wambolt, 1992).

In general, this research buttresses and sheds new light on the terrorism literature, is also a motivation for this research. There is a need to bring in a different dimension to the understanding of terrorism in Nigeria by delving into the background of Nigeria, Islam and terrorism especially looking at BH as a terrorist group in the country.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND ON NIGERIA, ISLAM AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a brief political and socio-economic background of Nigeria, where the terrorist group BH operates. The chapter further serves as an antecedent for how religious extremism and terrorism came about in Nigeria while focusing on the Islamic sect (BH) and the country's practice of Sharia law. Moreover, terrorism is conceptualised in line with new terrorism that BH and its counterpart, ISIS, supposedly practise.

2.1 Historical Background of Nigeria

The terrorist group Boko Haram exists in vast lands spanning across the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, most notably in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State and affects neighbouring countries, Chad, Cameroon and Niger (Idahoso, 2015; Maheshwari & Kumar, 2016; Ndege, 2013). Nigeria, a former British Colony and a West African country with approximately 80,000 active military personnel and 82,000 paramilitaries (IISS, 2014 in AFP, 2014). The West African country, bordered by Cameroon to the East and Chad to the North East, Benin to the West and Niger to the North, is arguably Africa's most populous country with a population of approximately 186 million people as of 2016 and still growing (United Nations, 2016).

The origin of Nigeria largely dates back to 1914, following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates under the 60-year British colonial rule. The rule officially started in the year 1900 when the British took control of the administration of the 'Royal Niger Company,' what is now known as Nigeria (The National Archives, n.d). Before this period, the revenue generated from crude oil exploration in the Southern part of Nigeria was developed in Northern Nigeria (Vanguard, 2014). This was the principal economic factor in the British authority's call for the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to rid itself of the financial burdens of the North (Vanguard,

2014). Nevertheless, other critics claim otherwise, such as Ango Abdullahi, a leader of the Northern Elders Forum (NEF), who argued that the reverse was the case as “oil exploration [in the South] was conducted using money from [the] groundnut pyramid, cotton, hide and skin among other cash crops [received] from Northern Nigeria” (Abdullahi, 2017 in Ndujihe, 2017). However, Social Rights and Niger Delta Activist, Mrs Ann-Kio Briggs opposed this idea claiming that oil exploration had started in Nigeria in the 1900s (though unsuccessful) but before the eventful amalgamation which was solely for economic reason, owing to the deficit which the North was running on as its revenue was less than its expenditure (Ndujihe, 2017).

Etymologically, Nigeria has been described as the third-largest economy in Africa (IMF, n.d in Eveslage, 2013) with a monolithic economy, and currently the largest oil producer in Africa (EIA, 2016). The bulk of the country’s revenue is from oil production as the oil boom of 1971 to 1977 shadowed the mid-1950s discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the country (Online Nigeria, 2003). This resulted in oil exploration overtaking the country’s reliance on agriculture which revolved around the exportation of cash crops as the country’s source of revenue (Omorogiuwa, Zikovic & Ademoh, 2014). The agricultural exports had reduced drastically by 15% between 1971 and 1977 (Online Nigeria, 2003). The economy became largely reliant on oil production and exportation, amounting to 90% of the country’s foreign earnings and developing into several structural issues for the country’s economy (Online Nigeria, 2003). Despite the oil boom, the country lacked the facilities and infrastructure to implement a more structured and vibrant private sector. Furthermore, according to Online Nigeria (2003), this gave rise to corruption in the country, as issues varying from treasury looting, embezzlement, and the rich oppressing the poor, resulting in clashes between the different classes of society – the ‘*haves*’ and the ‘*haves-not*’. This era exacerbated the importation of raw materials and machinery, which supposedly did not help grow the country’s economy (Online Nigeria, 2003).

Following the country gaining its independence in 1960 from the British Government and the previous oil boom era of 1970-1977, Nigeria has continued to face regional hostilities, corruption, and religious

intolerance (Bamber, 2001; Online Nigeria, 2003). These tensions have been perceived as a result of the disproportionate settlement of population in the country, with most Muslims living in the Northern part of Nigeria (Bamber, 2001). As of 2011, about 72% of the population survived on not more than \$1.25 each day (Eveslage, 2013), with Christians dominating the Southern part of the country (Campbell, n.d; Idahosa, 2015). Also, these tensions escalated and resulted in the first coup d'état in the country on January 15, 1966, which was perceived as an anti-Northern movement as the rebellion was organised by officers from the country's Eastern region, primarily identified as Southern Ibos (Idahosa, 2015). The coup resulted in the assassination of the then federal prime minister, Tafawa Balewa and the premiers of the Northern and Western regions who were of Northern origin (Idahosa, 2015). As a retaliation, a counter-coup on July 29, 1966, saw the killing of Southerns and top Ibo leaders (Bamber, 2001).

Later on, Gen. Yakubu Gowon emerged as the country's leader and Military Head of State. He divided the three former regions and the Midwestern region created in the year 1963 into twelve states (Bamber, 2001; Siollun, 2009). This further angered the predominantly Christian Ibos of the Eastern region who opted for an independent nation (called the Republic of Biafra), with the help of the then highest-ranking Ibo officer, Odumegwu Ojukwu, in May 1967 (Bamber, 2001). This resulted in the 1967-1970 (30-month) civil war in which the Ibos clamoured for self-governance – a secession to cater to their needs and use their oil resources to better their indigenes. Painfully, this led to the loss of lives estimated at more than one million Nigerians owing partly to malnutrition and the destruction of property (Madiebo, 1980; Shillington, 2004). However, the rebellion was suppressed by Gowon, with the then Ibo Biafran leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu, fleeing the country. Nigeria was reinstated as 'one,' and by January 1970, Biafra (the Ibo secession state) was entirely disintegrated (Bamber, 2001). The country continued to face several coups up until the democratic election of Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state in 1998 and the handover of power from the then Military President Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar in 1999 following the death of Gen Sani Abacha on June 8, 1998 (Widigdo, 2014).

Additionally, religious tensions and extremism rose in Nigeria with the likes of the Maitatsine movement (discussed later in this section) as a result of the never-ending regional and ethnic differences (Adesoji, 2011; Danjibo, 2009). This is despite several efforts to alleviate the problem facing the country. It is, therefore, against this background that the history and background of BH will be discussed in the succeeding sections.

2.2 Background of Boko Haram

BH is the media devised nomenclature for the terrorist group, known as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunni Lidda' Awati Wal Jihadi,' meaning 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad' (Ajayi, 2012, BBC, 2016a; Campbell, 2014a; Chothia, 2012; Pham, 2016). It is an Islamic militant terrorist group originating from Nigeria and has orchestrated several attacks against the Nigerian state and its neighbours Chad, Niger and Cameroon while fighting to create an Islamic state 'umma', a caliphate (BBC, 2016a; Pham, 2016). The group garners followers from the unemployed and 'Almajiris' with the notion that western education, politics and social adventures are '*haram*' - forbidden and need to be cleansed from society (BBC, 2016a). As such, the group seeks to overthrow the government of the day to ensure that its laws, dictates, and edicts are followed (ISN, 2009).

Etymologically, Boko Haram (BH) in Hausa language (Nigeria) is interpreted as 'Boko' referring to Book' meaning 'education' or 'western culture' and '*Haram*' is 'forbidden' or 'ungodly', meaning "the rejection of western culture or education" (Abubakar, 2016; Adesoji, 2010: 100; Agbiboa, 2013; Danjibo, 2009: 7; Malasowe, 2016; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). The group majorly operates in the predominantly Muslim North-eastern part of Nigeria and neighbouring countries Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin (Mantzikos, 2014; Mamone & Moki, 2015), engaging in several battles with the Nigerian Army and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) within the region (Adibe, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2015; Maiangwa, 2014). A look at the history of the group, BH, will be undertaken at this juncture.

2.2.1 History of Boko Haram

Historically, the group BH began as Islamic fanatics known as “Nigerian Taliban” that moved to Kanama in Yobe state from the Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri while having issues with the local community due to their interpretation of Islam (Abubakar 2017: 18 in Varin and Abubakar, 2017). However, Islamist ecclesiastic Mohammed Yusuf (leader of the Yusufiyya youth wing), former leader of BH, was not present during the Kanama uprising (2003 – 2004) or the group’s initial attacks against police stations in Damaturu in Yobe states at its beginning stages led by Mohammed Ali against security officers in Kanama and other neighbouring communities (Abubakar 2017).

The group was formally established in 2002 by Islamist ecclesiastic Mohammed Yusuf (Chothia, 2012; Mauro, 2015; Walker, 2012). Other claims exist that the group had been in existence since 1995, after having transformed from a Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation (Ajayi, 2012; Danjibo, 2009) in the University of Maiduguri, Borno state with Abubakar Lawan as its leader (Shola, 2015). The group, however, remained taciturn and passive until 1999, when it is believed that Yusuf took over the reins of power as Lawan left for Saudi Arabia to pursue the prospects of higher education (Shola, 2015). Hence, it was during this period that the group became radicalised (Ajayi, 2012). In July 2009, BH engaged militarily with the Nigerian army and police after the group had attacked a Police Headquarters (HQ) in Potiskum, Yobe state, which led to the death of a few members and the extra-judicial killing of its founder and then-leader, Yusuf (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Ajayi, 2012).

Under the leadership of Yusuf, the group built a school and a Mosque where it recruited unemployed youths and ‘*Almajiris*’ to its members’ cadre (BBC, 2016a) while threatening the police and public officials ultimately perceived as ‘corrupt’ (Shola, 2015; Walker, 2012). Following Yusuf’s death, the group went underground, only to resurface to become deadlier, orchestrating attacks against the Nigerian populace with Abubakar Shekau as its new leader (Ajayi, 2012; Campbell, 2014a; Chothia, 2012; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). Due to the attacks within localities and against Nigerian government parastatals, the group has been perceived as ‘a local insurgency group’ rather than a

global Jihad group (Varin, 2016). However, the group became more radicalised with global jihadist rhetoric: the rejection of the tenets of democracy, a distaste for western education vis a vis western culture and government institutions perceived as corrupt (Ajayi, 2012; Celso, 2015; Murtada, 2013). The group further relives the idea that western culture is '*haram*' and amoral leading to the corruption of society for which the only way out of this quagmire is an outright revolution of the present-day society and the instilment of Islamic laws, tenets and code of conduct (Celso, 2015). This was also buttressed by Mohammed Yusuf's interview with the BBC in 2009 when he mentioned that Western education had been intertwined with matters against the tenets of the Islamic faith (Boyle, 2009).

BH has been involved in several attacks against the Nigerian populace, from motorbike shooting and attacks, storming police stations and freeing captured members, the kidnapping and killing of politicians and even Muslim clerics with opposing views to theirs (BBC, 2016a; Cook, 2011). The group has been involved in several of the tactics above in what Cook (2011) has described as two-part strategies/methods employed by BH. There were single-member attacks, drive-by shootings and assassinations, while the second method involved mass casualty bombing and destruction of property and kidnapping (Cook, 2011). The year 2011 saw the rise of suicide attacks by BH in Nigeria, culminating in the eventual bombing of the UN building in Abuja on 26 August 2011. Gourley (2012) perceived the act as signifying an international tactical and strategic trajectory and a global outlook instead of the erstwhile tactics of the destruction of local media houses and national infrastructures. By 2013 terrorist attacks by BH had escalated from the North-eastern part to other areas of the country and, neighbouring countries while the year 2014 saw the rise of the use of female suicide bombers (Cook, 2011), mainly from the 238 schoolgirls from Chibok captured in Borno state, Nigeria on 14 April 2014 (Amnesty International, 2015; The Guardian, 2011). Other figures put the total number as approximately 276 kidnapped Chibok girls (Abubakar, 2017). Also, the inadequate security measures across the Nigerian borders have resulted in the group's ability to transport small and light weapons while profiting from such exchange and business, among other sources of revenue such as kidnapping (Onuoha, 2013).

Within this time frame, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) following its clash with Assad supporters in Syria under its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2010 (BBC, 2015b). Scholars have attempted to identify similarities and collaboration between BH and other terrorist groups while understanding how they interact with each other (Gourley, 2012). Therefore, Crompton (2015) determined that though BH and ISIS possessed identical philosophical foundations, the ideas of similarities between both groups are encouraged by the media and, therefore, unrealistic. This is corroborated by St-Pierre (2015) when he suggested that the relationship between BH and any other terrorist group including ISIS even as of the year 2015, was made popular or unintentionally promoted by the media. That notwithstanding, Muzan (2017) asserted that BH was previously more concerned with the internal socio-economic realities within Nigeria than with the possibility of following ISIS. This concept is where this research comes in to identify how BH and ISIS relate in similarity levels and the influences of ISIS on BH. However, the background and rise of ISIS will be reserved for chapter three, while the rise of BH as a terrorist group in Nigeria will be elucidated in the next section.

2.2.2 The Rise of Boko Haram

Idahosa (2015) argues that the rise of Boko Haram, and its extremist perpetuation, is given credence by the poor social and economic conditions of North-Eastern Nigeria, which is further exacerbated by the inability of the government to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the region. However, he also agrees with subjecting the reasons for insurgency by juxtaposing already existent “internalised radical Islamic beliefs” with “externalised socio-economic conditions of the country” (Idahosa, 2015: 26). Here, Idahosa sees radical Islamic tenets as following poor socio-economic conditions, which lead to terrorism. Therefore, the scholar opines that the fractured internal structures of Nigeria are responsible for the rise of BH and the radical Islamic tenets propagated by the group. Similarly, and going by relative deprivation, the group’s resurgence has been attributed to the poor standard of living and poverty which has riddled the Northeastern part of the country, the politicisation of religion and political dissatisfaction, among others (Abubakar, 2017; Ajayi, 2012).

Marchal (2012), while suggesting that BH can be understood from different perspectives to proffer several solutions to the issue of terrorism in Nigeria, also argues that BH has its roots in the socio-economic deprivation of the Northern Nigerian populace. Applying the relative deprivation theory, Idahosa (2015) and Marchal (2012) believe that BH represents a tool in the hands of the Northerners (in positions of government), mainly the elites, to express their grievances against the Nigerian government for their misrepresentation and marginalisation. Marchal (2012) claims that BH was also angered by the financial obligation (amnesty) on the part of the government towards the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which belonged to the Southern part of Nigeria. This was also combined with the re-election of the then president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, from the Southern part of the country. These were seen as replicating the anti-Northern sentiment, which trailed the first coup of January 15, 1966 (Idahosa, 2015).

As earlier stated, Idahosa (2015) advocates that the ideology and philosophy of BH are essentially religious as it appeals to religious convictions in the sustenance of its struggle and recruitment. Muzan (2017), buttressing this point, accepted that previously, BH's terrorist activities were attributed to ethnocentric debates until recently when it took on an extremely religious undertone, following in the footsteps of ISIS with real consequences (Pham, 2016). However, BH is not the first movement or group to seek similar ideologies of establishing Islamic values in Nigeria. There were others, the likes of Izala, Ahmadiyya and most notably, the Maitatsine uprising from 1980 to 1985 in the Northern part of the country (Abubakar, 2017; Ajayi, 2012). Despite this, the notion that BH took a global jihad stance is worthy of note as opposed to previous movements with an internal view, looking to alleviate the problems in Nigeria (Abubakar, 2016). Besides, BH holds a Salafist Jihadist ideology which is an Islamic fundamentalist ideology the likes supported by al Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS, which reinforces the rejection of western ideals and the need to establish an 'umma' (a Caliphate) (Shola, 2015). The group also espouses the 'takfir' ideology supported by ISIS, which regards other religious denominations and even some Muslims such as Shiites with opposing views as

apostates whom war should be waged against as long as they are against their version of Islam (Abubakar, 2016; Baker, 2014; Celso, 2015).

Though other terrorist groups such as AQIM and al Shabaab have been mentioned in connection with BH, especially during the group's burgeoning years (Ajayi, 2012; Pham, 2016), yet it was only ISIS that the group had pledged its allegiance to in the year 2015 (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasry, 2015; Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Laccino, 2015; Osley, 2015). BH released a video in 2015 purportedly showing the group reiterating its allegiance to ISIS and its head, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group made sure to distance itself from increased news of successful anti-terrorism efforts and victories by the Nigerian government and the regional task force dedicated to limiting its activities (Laccino, 2015). According to Laccino (2015), the video was intended to boost its morale and furnish its followers and fighters with relevance and formidability. He suggested that the message could also be a means of vying for aid in finances and ammunition from other groups as the regional military offensive in Nigeria had put the group under extreme distress.

2.3 Explanations and Postulations for the Rise and Emergence of BH

Various postulations have been made regarding the rise of different terrorist groups; however, in this case, BH operates in Northern Nigeria. Some of these which will be examined below include:

2.3.1 Relative Deprivation/ Frustration Aggression Perspective

The concept of RD deals largely with the internal constructs of societies that seek to address the reasons for terrorism following the social, political and economic defects within a country. This was initially enunciated by Runciman (1966) in terms of economic, social and political inequalities within society based on a group's perception of another or referent group. Gurr (1970) distinguishes diverging aspects of RD that facilitate the atmosphere for social movement or violence as the case may be. However, he asserts that progressive deprivation, the most known pattern, occurs when projections increase, and the opportunities to fulfill these projections decrease, but the lack of opportunities deepens. Also linked with relative deprivation (RD) is frustration-Aggression theory

which suggests that aggression (radical behaviour, in this case, terrorist activities) is usually a result of frustration (denial from attaining a particular goal) (Borum, 2004; Gurr, 1970; Midlarsky *et al.*, 1980; Rosati *et al.*, 1990). This perspective is synonymous with the 'social conflict theory and socio-economic perspective' depicted by Malasowe (2016).

In trying to assert the place of RD in society, Runciman (1966) conducted a study between 1918 and 1962 on the historical divisions and status class and power tiers of RD in 21st century Britain and suggested that RD of status occurred or was perceived where the manual labourers acknowledged themselves as middle-class. Therefore, the manual labourers expected to receive similar benefits to their middle-class counterparts; however, there was a reduced aspect of RD of power for manual labourers as their power increased, leading to a reduction in the impulse for the middle-class. Geschwender and Geschwender (1973) also point to the supposed deprived group as rioting and engaging in protests to push for political demands to change their economic and social situations.

However, revolutions and protests can occur at any time, even during phases of economic growth (Cherkaoui, 2002). In essence, even where some form of development seems to exist, there is the likelihood of a sense of deprivation whereby the development engenders a form of expectation larger or higher than the actual or perceived development (Cherkaoui, 2002). The theory also cites social injustice and variances in income distribution as contributors to terrorism (Borum, 2004). However, these are mainly used to explain social revolutionary movements, violence or terrorism, seeking to address ills in the society rather than violence along ethnonational lines (which is the boundary where BH lies) (Borum, 2004). An example is where Birrell (1972) applied the theory of RD to the situation of Northern Ireland (NI), whereby the Catholics viewed their situation as a difficult one compared to the Protestants. He concluded that a causal factor for violence in NI was RD from the inequality perspective, which needed to be rectified.

Relative deprivation has also been linked to socio-political disturbances in Arab nations and used to explain extremist group rising and jihadism on some level (Korotayev & Shishkina, 2019). More so,

perceived group deprivation as a condition was used to describe the reinforcement of violence among Muslims in the Netherlands (Doosie et al., 2013). Correspondingly, RD is likely to engender violence in specific aspects of culture related to the concept of 'victimization-by-proxy' - sympathy to the plight of group members in remote areas (Obaidi et al., 2018). Muslims in particular regions can experience as within themselves (or personally), the deprivation of related/referent groups (other Muslims) in certain areas like Africa, resulting in similar violent activities. Power (2020) further mentioned that RD hinges mainly on the perception of how resources, power, and social status are equitably distributed within society.

Likewise, while the concept of RD can be used to explain certain violent behaviours, especially engagement in terrorism, it is somewhat not useful in all contexts. For example, Tedeschi and Felson (1994) opined that though the prevention of achieving one's goal encourages certain behaviours, it does not necessarily engender aggressive behaviours that lead to terrorism. Moreover, other scholars have objected to the idea of extremism/ terrorism as a result of limited socio-economic prospects (Atran, 2003; Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Accordingly, Obaidi et al. (2019) advised that RD is not the sole reason for extremism. The concept does not facilitate violence in every context, such as in the case of extremism for perceived deprivation by foreign-born as opposed to Western-born Muslims. They suggest that foreign-born Muslims compared to Western-born Muslims in this context, are less susceptible to violent acts by way of deprivation when juxtaposed with other groups.

The RD perspective has also been debunked as poverty in line with unemployment has been constructed as unviable to explain the causes of BH's violence in the northern region of Nigeria as the same issues are prevalent in other parts of the country (Bisalla, 2012). Similarly, with Sokoto state being the poorest state in Nigeria, some commentators such as Mathew Kukah, the Bishop of Sokoto Dioceses have explained the state should be the most violent state or one that harbours the most jihadi groups, same with Katsina state (Alozieuwa; 2015; Uche, 2015). To counter this, Zaidise et al. (2007) asserted that though socio-economic deprivation may not result in political activities yet, it

may enable the consequences of other experiences that engender violent acts. Akhtar (2018) advocated that by using the Kurds and Turkish State as an example, identity is pivotal when perceived deprivation and ideology propagation or violence and a facilitator for causing a group to become violent.

Looking at the case of Nigeria, BH as a terrorist group identifies with Muslims while perceiving itself as relatively deprived compared to its Christian counterpart in other parts of Nigeria. The group continues to claim some misrepresentation and maltreatment within their region and people in government. Within the framework of RD, it is likely to perceive BH as a result of the internal conditions of Nigeria. It is believed that the BH's insurgency came as a vanguard for the rejection of oppression and marginalisation. This was owing to the socio-economic issues and the corrupt nature of the democratic transition of the country. The emergence of the group is ascribed to the need for socio-economic building (Montclos, 2014). Idahosa (2015) also affirms that BH relies on the poor social and economic conditions of North-eastern Nigeria and the corruption of the government to garner support. Youth unemployment is exceptionally high in Northern Nigeria (Carson, 2012), with "literacy levels of 35% as opposed to 77% in the rest of the country" (Malasowe, 2016: 246).

Furthermore, in Borno state, "83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go to school" (Oxford Research Group, 2012: 3). There is a further increase in the unemployment rate and a large percentage of women with no formal education than a smaller percentage in other parts of the country. Moreover, the lowest poverty rate is recorded in the country's southern part, with the highest rate recorded in Northern Nigeria (NBS, 2010; UNDP, 2009). Therefore, this is attributed to the perceived socio-economic inequality as enunciated by Runciman (1966), which the Northerners experience concerning their referent group – the Southerners/ Christians as the case may be.

Another drawback of this theory is that it seeks to address terrorist activities by BH as not essentially a religious or Northern issue but an economically, socially and politically charged situation (Agbibo, 2013). For this, Seul (1999) argues that the identity of religious struggles may likewise be due to other

internal factors and not necessarily religion. Kunst and Obaidi (2020) further perceive that with increasing social inequalities in societies, RD is likely to become a pivotal contributor to violent extremism in years to come, if not in the 21st century. A pertinent question posed by the researcher is if BH is a construct of the consequence of the poor socio-economic situation in the Nigerian State, how do the establishment of the Caliphate and the running of an Islamic state solve this dilemma?

2.3.2 Politicisation of Religion – Political Islam

Another postulation for the rise of BH in Nigeria is the “politicisation of religion” (Ajayi, 2012: 104) which suggests that BH aims to restore the Sokoto Caliphate founded by Uthman Dan Fodio after a jihad (holy war) that was destabilised by the British in 1904 (Abubakar, 2016; Ajayi, 2012; Mauro, 2015). This concept ties in with Political Islam, a disputed concept that is related to global jihadism and terrorism, emphasising the need to institutionalise Sharia law in a certain nation via Muslim political movements (Esposito, 1997). The proponents of this idea – mostly Islamists - perceive democracy which globalisation attempts to expand and export, as deplorable western-focused efforts and secularisation (Hasan, 2011). Political Islam fits into BH’s goal of Islamising Northern Nigeria and other parts of the country, which also echoes the idea behind other Jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Alozieuwa, 2016). BH’s activities within this perspective is perceived as an eruption following alleged marginalisation by elites in the north.

Scholars have also used political Islam to explain the encroachment of religion in politics, notably Islam, the unexpected expansion of Islam tenets from private and individual perspectives to aspects of politics (Hirschkind, 2013). Leaning towards relative deprivation and socio-economic issues within society, political Islam in the current dispensation results from the lingering problems within society and the continuing interactions between Muslims and their surroundings - social, economic, and political perspectives. These are not necessarily the same perception of Islam passed down through history (Muazzam, 2011). Muazzam (2011) further suggests that certain developmental aspects of

society, such as gentrification and mobility of labour, far surpassed the society's ability to respond – revealing the issues facing society that led to Islamist movements. Such as the case of Nigeria and several other African countries, the situation and prevalence of the Islamic movement is attributed to the aftermath of colonialism (neo-colonial states) and consequences of globalisation – the displacement of the 'haves not' and the inability to foresee their place in the evolving worldwide system (Hoogvelt, 2001). Like the concept of RD and recognising identity, the Islamic movements are based on an identity that reacts to perceived marginalisation and the inability to close the gap.

However, Hirschkind (2013), taking a different perspective, recognises that perceived violence is not the only aspect of Islamic movements. He also states that the concept does not necessarily involve establishing the Islamic State but changing socio-political and economic situations with other undertakings such as campaigning, providing support, mosque establishment and community activities. In this regard, BH's non-violent bourgeoning years are somewhat attributed to Hirschkind's perspective. The group was involved in similar activities, especially establishing a mosque by its founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf. During this time, Yusuf was against Islamic religious leaders seen as not practising true Islam – BH's version of Islam (Ujah et al., 2015). Hoogvert's perspective further resonates with BH as the group uses jihad to constantly speak against colonialism and the activities of the West popularised via globalisation (Hirschkind 2013; Hoogvelt, 2001). BH has been referred to as the 'Nigerian Taliban' with training received from AQIM. Its leadership has received earlier training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the group flying the Taliban flag at some point (Lengmang, 2011; Varin, 2016). Yusuf is believed to have accepted technology while asserting the slow departure from Western education, which should be flushed out with Islamic studies. Accordingly, the use of violence was a scene that took place after the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf and a few other members of the BH group (Okereke, 2011; Sergi and Johnson, 2013). BH has been perceived as having trailed an increased form of radicalisation following the leadership of Shekau, especially the notions created with the UN House in Abuja bombings in August 2011 and supposed affiliations with AQIM and Al-Shabaab (Cook, 2011; Sergie and Johnson, 2013).

Historically, the northern part of Nigeria has been a volatile space for religious conflicts with jihad undertaken by Dan Fodio in the 18th century as an agitation towards the elites' refusal to detach religion from politics (Ajayi, 1990; Usman, 1979). The right to rule was usually derived from religion, and it was a critical factor in mass mobilisation from straying on the central issue of corruption and ineffective governance. This situation led to the rise of the Maitatsine movement, which rejected the Sultan of Sokoto's rule as un-Islamic (Oyovbaire, 1980; Isichei, 1987), a stance BH holds on to as well (Abubakar, 2016; Ajayi, 2012; Mauro, 2015; Ochonu, 2015). Marchal (2012: 2) perceives the rise of BH as "a current expression of a long-term dynamic[s] in the region." Here, Marchal sees the move by the group as a sign of restoration back to the way Islam was during the time of Uthman Dan Fodio and especially Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

Moreover, the Sharia law is practised in then twelve northern states of Nigeria was perceived as '*half-baked*' by the Maitatsines; hence the justification for the group's activities and riots in Kano, Yola and Maiduguri states among others (Ajayi, 2012; Danjibo, 2009; Sergie and Johnson, 2013). BH also perceives this law implementation as a lazy and watered-down version of Islam not worthy of the true umma, which engenders radicalisation and expression of violence. The group further requires the imposition of Sharia to disrupt Western values and tenets, which are not perceived as allowing for development in the country (Ajayi, 2012; Lengmang, 2011; Mauro, 2015). There is also the continuously perceived marginalisation felt by the North-Eastern region, which is attributed to the region's insecurity and loss of central power in 2010 to Goodluck Jonathan following the death of former President of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (Mohammed, 2012).

BH's former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, mentioned in one of his speeches how western education was creating evil in most of the society and warned that without its eradication, there could be no achievement of the 'umma.' Danjibo (2009) argued that BH imitates the actions of the Maitatsine in terms of inspiration and root causes but has tactics more like the Taliban. However, one pertinent question here is, if BH is a product of contagion from the Maitatsine group, which lasted for only five

years (1980-1985), then BH has surpassed its predecessor. Hence, how possible is it that its predecessor never sought to establish a Caliphate but BH has? (Ochonu, 2015).

BH clings onto the ideology of waging jihad to convert all territories under its version of Islamic rule while perceiving other traditional rulers as 'quasi-Islamic' owing to their cooperation with the Nigerian government (Mauro, 2015). The group insists on redressing grievances of colonialism and the seemingly unjust murder of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009 (Abubakar, 2016). Hence, the use of force by BH is seen as a resultant effect of force from the hands of law enforcement officials. However, the group's general Islamist programme has been called to question with the group's split into two - with each having its goals from reliving past grievances. These past grievances include the inability of a northerner to continue with the Presidency replaced by then President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan (a Southerner). There is also the need to impose Islamist statutes across swathes of world regions while pursuing coalition vis-à-vis cooperation with other external jihadi groups (Alozieuwa, 2016; Sergie and Johnson, 2013).

More so, as different societies and countries exist simultaneously, their socio-political and economic settings allow them to be abused by certain nefarious characters. This reveals how the settings are different in the oil-rich Eastern part of Nigeria, which sees certain characters form militias and engage in kidnapping and pipeline vandalism. As opposed to the predominantly Christian southern region of Nigeria where religion is not necessarily mixed with other aspects of life, the predominantly Muslim northern region and structure allows for the elites' exploitation of the region's institutions and Islamic traditions with other groups like BH blaming western tenets for the region's economic situations (Hoogvelt, 2001). Furthermore, the high unemployment rate and the inadequate education opportunities also allow for the exploitation of the masses, especially unemployed graduates, miscreants and 'almajiris' (street children) who form members of their cadre (Lengmang, 2011; Onyebuchi and Chigozie; 2013).

Some youths in the eastern part of the country also make up the political militia groups used to thwart election plans and cause mayhem during election periods to the favour of their sponsors (Alozieuwa, 2016). However, these groups are discarded by their sponsors, which has been prevalent dating back to pre-independent Nigeria with political militias used in the 1950s (Banow, 2003). However, unlike BH in the North, these groups developed based on unreligious perspectives, such as the Zikist Movement associated with the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Alozieuwa, 2014). In addition, BH claims the use of religious tenets in its construction, with members drawn from these defunct political groups in the North developed by political parties. The group itself, BH, is attributed to the former governor of Borno state, Ali Modu Sheriff, and politicians. The group was constructed based on the country's socio-economic issues, especially the region, and the need to impose Sharia law as an alternative to the secular Western practices blamed for the maladministration of the nation's resources. Moreover, different criminals tend to exploit the conditions they exist, such as the Islamic tenets affecting the relations between people mixed with socio-political and economic aspects (Hoogvelt, 2001).

As previously mentioned, with the displeasure of the mixture of sharia law and secular system in Nigeria, most Northerners are more willing to be radicalised. They frequently exhibit violent behaviours against the botched promises made by politicians. Added to this are those that interpret Western doctrines and especially education as despicable cause society's Jahiliyyah (ignorance of divine truth), requiring separation from these and the enforcement of Sharia (Lengmang, 2011).

2.3.3 Radicalism, Extremism and Religious Fundamentalism Perspective

Radicalism, extremism and religious-fundamentalism, have been used interchangeably to describe the emergence of BH (Malasowe, 2016). Radicalism refers to the attitude of accepting sentiments, views and philosophies that directly or indirectly promote or give way to violence (European Parliament briefing, 2015 in Malasowe, 2016). It is the process by which specific individuals are indoctrinated or

socialised into certain ideologies and belief systems that engender movements leading to extremist views (Jaffer, 2013).

As one of the most critical and persistent youth protection and safeguarding concerns of the era, radicalisation is significant within terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies (Kundnani, 2014, NSPCC, 2016). Radicalisation is the practice of engendering or influencing individuals to embrace extreme and lofty political, social and sometimes religious ambition and values. Violence is used and rationalised to realise these goals (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). There has been no unified definition with the ever-expanding plethora of definitions on radicalisation (Sedgwick, 2010). According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009), Radicalisation follows two perspectives – the violence aspect, which stresses the vigorous quest and or endorsement of violence to achieve specified goals. The extensive perspective of radicalisation also highlights the active pursuit or acceptance of extensive deviations from societal norms with inevitable consequences to democracy and the possibility of violence to achieve stated goals.

In distinguishing between the notions of radicalisation, the term is seen as how an individual adopts the use of unconstitutional or forceful means vis-à-vis terrorist activities to achieve political cum ideological goals (PET, 2009). On the other hand, passive radicalisation connotes a more comprehensive view whereby individuals can change or entice others. They do this to effect societal changes that are likely to disrupt already established democratic principles through illegitimate means to affect society's regular and effective running (AIVD, 2004). The definition by PET - Danish intelligence services looks at the tendency to engage in certain activities, including violence, to achieve specific goals in society. The latter definition is a generalist perspective whereby individuals are not opposed to achieving societal changes through different means – radical and otherwise but not entirely leading to violence.

In general, radicalisation accentuates the process by which individuals accept ideas, sentiments and interpretations likely to engender terrorism (EC, 2006). These definitions of radicalisation agree that

radicalisation involves several factors that see individuals become aggrieved at certain circumstances, leading to changes in behaviour and attitudes (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Radicalisation and terrorism are sometimes used interchangeably (Jaffer, 2013; Malasowe, 2016) as counter-terrorism efforts target radicalised individuals (Hall *et al.*, 2016). Radicalisation becomes the process by which people come to support terrorism and extremism and, in some cases, partake in terrorist activities.

Terrorism involves the use of intentional or unlawful acts against persons or property, government or organisations to threaten or pressure a government or organisation to act or desist from specific actions for the achievement of social, political and religious goals, which could also destabilise the basic structures of society or the organisation (EU, 2002; FBI, 2005). Terrorists are perceived as community members who zealously believe in violence to accomplish specific societal goals that some passively uphold (Pape, 2006). As such, terrorism can be seen as a 'political tool' which seeks to achieve administrative and communal transformation (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 6). Radicalisation, therefore, seeks to achieve these transformations without essentially employing violent tactics, while violent radicalisation involves engendering violence through belief systems for which its proponents are likely passive (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). While some radical proponents may desist from terrorist behaviours, terrorism is usually a preventable but usual end of radicalisation. Given this, while "every terrorist is a radical, not every radical is a terrorist." This suggests that the process of radicalisation engages in different dynamics together with non-violent activities. For example, a radicalised Muslim can have a resilient devotion to Islam or engage in passionate ministration or preaching that forbids the use of terrorist activities, which others accept. However, both are perceived as radicals (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

On the other hand, extremism involves "the adoption of a particular ideology to use violence to remove the state or ruling structure and its elites," challenging the existing order of society (Hall *et al.*, 2016; Malasowe, 2016). While radicalisation is the creation of specific changes, extremism seeks changes based on restricted political beliefs. Religious fundamentalism is seen as the building block of

radicalisation and is supported by several factors such as socio-political environment, psychological settings (a want for self-identity) and essentially religion (Abubakar, 2017; Pisiu, 2012).

Religious fundamentalism is the core of radicalisation and is grounded on the supposition that the religion being held is the true religion with truths that are dared by several forces and must be followed as was in the historical era (Malasowe, 2016). This is in line with the aims of BH, as it idealises a return to the mythic past (Celso, 2015). Religious fundamentalism seeks to return to a supposed former truth, single interpretation of truths and overruling any of other laws or rules by religious rules or already held truths (Malasowe, 2016).

Radicalisation is seen as a process that individuals venture into for the identity and sense of belonging that comes with being part of a group to achieve certain objectives. Following the failure of pursuing positive means to achieve certain objectives, the situation leaves only illegal or harmful means for accomplishing them (Maslow, 1943; Sageman 2008; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Related to radicalism and violent extremism is religious fundamentalism which involves the characteristic and defiant conviction of the definitive certainty of one's religion and religious beliefs (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004). Religious fundamentalism also affords individuals a feeling of respite from anguish and insecurity and a sense of belonging (Hood et al., 2005; Phillips and Ano, 2015).

Furthermore, concerning political grievance radicalisation often happens as an answer to economic, social or political inclinations (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). However, in some cases, individuals predisposed to violent extremism are not entirely religiously inclined and oblivious to the religious causes they allege to embody (Borum, 2012). The study of radicalisation by understanding the factors that engender terrorism in a manner that the engagement in extremist activities results from individuals being predisposed to extremist beliefs as flawed (Borum, 2011).

Given the volatile and poor socio-economic nature of the northern part of Nigeria, the RD theory (Gurr, 1970), vis-à-vis pitiable socio-economic situations (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006) are perceived as causes of radicalisation. Moreover, radicalisation disrupts cultural coexistence in society, which

further fuels the inclination of specific individuals to undertake violent activities against cultures (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Ashour (2019), while writing on “Online de-radicalisation? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy,” itemised that for radicalisation, certain groups use religion to give credence to their violent activities while utilising several religious imageries and certain narratives. These narratives include the political narrative, which utilises perceived marginalisation by the group with a particular referent object held in contempt. For Al-Qaeda, this is the West and other countries with a small Muslim population like India, while the historical narrative pits history against particular political perspectives. The socio-psychological description dwells on violent activities and aligns them with their culprits and grievances. The instrumental perspective propagates the attainment of social-political goals using the violent method. The theological perspective amplifies religiously legitimate reactions to perceived political and social marginalisation (Ashour, 2010). All these perspectives and narratives seem to flow with BH, given Nigeria’s checkered socio-political history coupled with the economic and religious grievances in the Northern part of the country. Similarly, Onyebuchi and Chigozie (2013) argue that, in Nigeria, violent extremism can be perceived as ‘a clash of civilisations’ with religion as a driving force for BH and doctrines of the West consistently seen as being at loggerheads with Islamic principles.

Therefore, BH is seen as a terrorist group that idolises the tenets of religious fundamentalism such as the belief in sacred texts perceived as holy and undefiled; rejection of other forms of religions, even the same religion with diverging ideas like Shi’ites and the intolerance to those perceived as outsiders. These are primarily synonymous with the tenets of Salafism and takfiris – ideologies to which BH wholeheartedly subscribes (Celso, 2015; Malasowe, 2016).

2.3.4 Externalist Linkage view

The externalist linkage suggests that BH is composed of several links from home (Nigeria) to external/foreign terrorist groups dating back to its emergence in 2002. With this, it is impossible to talk about contagion without mentioning BH’s links to foreign terrorist groups, especially AQIM and al-Shabaab,

specifically in its burgeoning and domicile days, following Mohammad Yusuf's death. BH has been connected to the groups mentioned above in different forms, from financial support to training camps and fighters. Its relationship with ISIS takes an extra dimension of communication and media reporting to imitation, analysed in the current research.

According to Ajayi (2012), BH established links with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2004 which resulted in the group members receiving training in weapons handlings and combat, for which they learnt amongst other activities the making of 'Improvised Explosive Devices' (IEDs) (Dearn, 2011). Here, Varin (2016) suggests that the 2003 war in Iraq ushered in an increased presence of Islamic terrorism. These claims were corroborated when the US designated BH as a foreign terrorist group in November 2013 (Mauro, 2013). Moreover, Osama Bin Laden also allegedly funnelled \$3 million to Muslims in Northern Nigeria to encourage the Salafist ideology (Mauro, 2015). The Salafist ideology has a more intolerant view on diversity and divergence of thoughts within Islam (Abou el Fadl, 2001) while pushing for an Islamic state's establishment by disrupting the secular Nigerian State and government (ISN, 2009; Malasowe, 2016; Walker, 2012). There is also the accusation that 40 million Naira was channelled to BH by an Algerian terrorist group. Links between these groups have been hard to verify, validate or disclose, for several unspecified reasons (Adepoju, 2012 in Ajayi, 2012).

Moreover, Cook (2011) argues that the attack by BH on the UN building in Abuja on 26 August 2011 signalled a tactical change and strategic course, which showed that the group was forming an international agenda of Salafi jihadism. Formerly, the group was considered a domestic guerrilla insurgency restricted to local issues, causes and change (Gourley, 2012; Varin, 2016). At this juncture, it will be helpful to identify the activities of BH with those of other foreign terrorist groups for which some form of collaboration has been claimed.

2.3.4.1 BH and AQIM

The north of Nigeria is seen as a hub for extremist groups such as BH. AQIM's influence provides a haven for these groups, especially given the practice of sharia law in 12 states of Nigeria (Glickman,

2003; Stith, 2010). BH as a terrorist group has been cited as collaborating with AQIM (Dearn, 2011; Ajayi, 2012). BH members are believed to have been trained by groups, the likes of Algeria's jihadist group, AQIM, with support fully shown and collaboration, if any, publicised by BH's leader, Shekau. Following the death of BH founder and former leader, Muhammadu Yusuf and some other members in 2009, BH went underground, for which, during this period of 'hibernation,' the group had some tie in with the terrorist group, AQIM which radicalised the group (Gray and Adeakin, 2015).

The only indication of the transformation of BH following the group going underground, which was previously overlooked as an erroneous claim, was an interview conversation with Al Jazeera. Here, the emir of AQIM, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, otherwise known as Abdelmalek Droukdel, promised to furnish the group, BH, with weapons, training, and strategic provision, expanding into other parts of Africa from Nigeria to disrupt secular governments (UPI, 2010; Pham 2016). The then former deputy head of BH, Abubakar Shekau, later undertook a characteristic al-Qaeda style where he appeared in a video, dismissing claims of his death with Yusuf, with an AK-47, Islamic books and donning a headscarf (Tattersall and Maclean, 2010). Here, he declared himself as the new head of BH, threatening to attack Nigeria and stations of 'Western culture.' Shekau further attempted to put BH's jihad within the ambits of global jihad by referencing ISI, which later became ISIS in a publicised manifesto (Tattersall and Maclean, 2010).

The group began with the orchestration of jailbreaks with federal prison Bauchi in September 2010 while distributing flyers to warn of future attacks (Mahmood, 2017). The group also claimed ties to jihadists in Somalia – al-Shabaab - for which it had received training on the art of warfare following attacks within the country itself (Agbibo, 2014). This followed the group's continued wanton attacks with IEDs in several states like Plateau and Bauchi. There was also the eventual launching of the VBIED on June 16, 2011, targeting the IG of the Nigerian Police, which is thought to be the group's first suicide attack showed a strategic shift in the group's tactics from hibernation and jailbreaks to deliberate suicide attacks (AFP, 2011). Following several low scale attacks, on August 26, 2011, the group

embarked on an attack against an international target, the Abuja UN offices using VBIED, which led to the death of 25 people with scores injured similarly to Al-Qaeda's attacks within Iraq, Afghanistan and across Europe (Agbiboa, 2014). Later, the group released a video showing the bomber and eulogising the late Osama bin Laden (al-Qaeda leader), increasing its international profile (BBC, 2011). BH continued with its destruction and attacks, including suicide attacks and violence carried out primarily after threats had been issued for the departure of Christians in communities in Damaturu and Madalla (Al Jazeera, 2011).

The year 2012 saw a significant landmark in BH's continued evolution. Foreign and external links proved to be a precarious aspect of the group's ideological standpoint and tactical shift from restricted violence to government parastatals, dignitaries and security agencies to a more lethal version (Agbiboa, 2014). In March 2012, a seemingly terrorist nation was created following the forceful annexation of northern Mali by Islamist militant groups linked to AQIM, starting a particular perspective for the group's emergence from the ashes hibernation (Varin, 2016). During the ten months reign of AQIM, the group was linked to terrorist groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine in northern Mali. BH also set up bases for the ongoing radicalisation of Almajiris and other group members, inculcating their extremist ideologies based on religious fundamentalism, weapons handling and tactical training (Lewis, 2013). This eventually led to an increased perspective of strategic superiority and tactical pace in the group's attack in Nigeria, taking BH to a developed uprising and insurgency. Moreover, with Libya in constant disintegration with tribal, factional and civil, the nation became porous for the continual training of jihadist fighters and members of BH by AQIM (Soudan, 2015). BH returned to northern Nigeria with some foreign nationals that had joined the group's cadre for training, tactical and warfare know-how with automobiles, light and heavy weaponry, following the oppressive attacks from French-led operations in Mali (Alli, 2013).

The group's return saw BH storming military barracks, chasing military officers and looting weapons; orchestrating prison breaks for its members and dismantling and attacking several schools, hospitals and government parastatals; staging attacks against the Nigerian military with its acquired warfare skills while controlling certain part of border towns (Alli, 2013). Albeit by mid-2013, BH was able to rid ten local government areas (LGA) in Nigeria of its government officials, around the borders of its neighbouring countries - Chad, Niger and Cameroon; creating a presence in the region by substituting the Nigerian flag with its banner and operating on a large scale within the area, organising and taxing residents of the area (Alli, 2013). The impact of external groups such as AQIM is witnessed in the activities of BH with its abductions, especially kidnapping for ransom in Nigeria, for which, for many years, AQIM had pride itself in the kidnapping and abduction. Another example is the kidnapping of the French family of seven, who were released after a ransom of \$3 million and the release of some BH members (BBC, 2013). BH further used tactics by AQIM linked group - *kata'ib* - which involved using previously stolen or purchased military uniforms to kill approximately 500 civilians in deliberate attacks in Gwoza, a town later ascertained as an Islamic caliphate by the group (Pham, 2016). BH has certain sources of funds, such as political sponsorship and crimes; kidnaping for ransom represents a crucial aspect of the group's funding process, which continued to affect families in Nigeria (BBC, 2013).

2.3.4.1 BH and Al-Shabaab

Similar to the linkages with AQIM, BH has been linked with the Somali-based group, Al-Shabaab. BH has engaged in the recruitment of members from Al-Shabaab and received training from the group with the claim that the bombing of the Abuja UN building was carried out by an individual who had recently arrived from Somalia (Minteh and Perry, 2013; Agbibo, 2014). BH perceived the UN as a global collaborator in the subjugation of Muslims while still claiming to be at war with the secular state of Nigeria for joining in such efforts (The Punch, 2011). Moreover, both BH and al-Shabaab ideologies bear resemblance with each other - fighting for the revival and preservation of ancient Islam and its

use in post-colonial sentiments; and the reinforcement of the idea of training and trade in resources to increase their capabilities within and across their sphere of influence - Africa and the Middle East.

Looking into the development of al-Shabaab, by 1991, the internal struggles within Somalia took a drastic turn with the fall of the military dictator Mohammed Siad Barre leading to a humanitarian crisis and a high number of Internally displaced people (IDP) with an increase in insecurity (Lorenzo et al., 2010; The Guardian, 2012). These internal struggles and issues in Somalia came with talks of no resolve, leading to the establishment of a militia group as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The militia group was created within Mogadishu with claims of establishing an Islamic state, which led the US-backed Ethiopian troop Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to disrupt the ICU (Wise, 2011). This action was perceived as a declaration of war by the US on Muslim countries leading to the creation of al-Shabaab in 2006, absorbing ICU adopting a guerrilla-style operational tactic with the need to control Mogadishu and repel the Ethiopian expansion (Lorenzo et al., 2010; Menkhaus and Boucek, 2010; Fergusson, 2013). With the TFG repelling of ICU and al-Shabaab, came the Islamic radicalism, which saw the reformation of al-Shabaab in 2006 with the acceptance of al-Qaeda jihadist stance (Wise, 2011). Moving forward, al-Shabaab reiterated an idea of the fusion of the jihad of the Horn of Africa with the global jihad in January 2010 with further suicide attacks in Ethiopia with the deaths of many (Ali Noor, 2008; BBC, 2012d).

However, the extensive use of communication technology saw the expansion of jihadist groups, such as al-Shabaab, training fighters in camps across Somalia and publicising propaganda to unassuming youths and individuals vulnerable to their messages (Saltman, 2008; Galvin, 2013). With this comes the linkage between al-Shabaab and BH, with the Commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Carter Ham, announcing a financial collaboration between both groups with an extreme Salafist ideology to overthrow governments deemed as secular, both near and far (IISS, 2011, Agbiboa, 2014). Al-Shabaab has also been linked with the BH splinter group, Ansaru, which engaged in suicide attacks, violence on soldiers, and the kidnapping of foreigners, warning African countries to desist

from assisting Western countries subjugating Muslims around the world (Roggio, 2013; Zenn, 2013). Therefore, al-Shabaab's quest for transnational terrorist attacks and movement was not limited to Somalia but came to include links with al-Qaeda affiliates and other jihadist groups like BH and Ansaru traced back to the al-Shabaab training camps and financial support.

The porous nature of African countries' borders combined with the lack of security provides opportunities for these Jihadist groups to exist, thrive and wreak havoc within the continent. With communication, training, and learning, they can transfer and disseminate their terrorist techniques and strategies to different parts of the region (U.S Department of State, 2012). According to Marchal (2009), the same means by which these jihadist groups disseminate their messages and radicalise individuals through ICT – same should be used by applying a more realist strategy to propagate the evils of terrorism and religious extremism. As such, the task is quite complex for anyone State to handle. Therefore, there is a need for combined effort along international lines to address the issues of terrorism, religious and violent extremism and the push factors for radicalisation. Push factors include localised problems within countries that exacerbate the phenomenon of jihadism, such as the poor politico-social and economic conditions in northern Nigeria (Agbibo, 2014).

It is imperative to note that there was some physical connection with some groups (AQIM and Al Shabaab) and BH, such as infiltration of BH cadre and weapons and tactics training (Campbell, 2014; Pham, 2016 and Varin, 2016). However, Shekau supposedly refused to publicly acknowledge BH's connections with these groups, making it difficult to ascertain. Notwithstanding, a distinction here is that there appears to be some form of imitation for so-called ISIS instead of physical connection and manual training. For the jihadist groups, AQIM and Al-Shabaab, there was more of an alliance and communal support and the direct exchange of ideas and information via various means (training). Training precedes learning (Schlenker, 2016) which appears to be different from the BH's connection to ISIS, which blinded-sided the community of jihadists and previous relationships and indirect learning (increase in knowledge, skills and abilities) – contagion – for the orchestration of attacks and

trajectory. The following sections delve into religious extremism and, subsequently, religious terrorism in Nigeria.

2.4 Conceptualising Religious Extremism

There have been strained relations between the two most popular religions in Nigeria: Christianity and Islam, which has resulted in frequent outbursts of violence (Isaacs, 2013; Falola, 2009). Religion (faith) mixed with violence is not novel to Nigerians as these ideas have become the crux of the nation's historical context (Cavanaugh, 2004; Falola, 2009). However, while seeking to understand the era of religious extremism/ terrorism vis-à-vis religious violence in Nigeria, it is necessary first to appreciate the concept of religious extremism. Religious extremism has been present since before the era of globalisation (Hashmi, 2009). Hence, being predisposed to violence, different religions such as Islam and Christianity have exhibited diverse levels of violence (Martin, 2011; Laqueur, 2000). Prus (2005) speculates that religious extremism reproduces the standards and usual undertakings of different religions, reinforced by members of that religion and endorsed by a supreme being. Every activity by members is within the stipulations of the grand norm of the religion.

Accordingly, Liebman (1983: 75) defines religious extremism as “the desire to expand the scope, details and strictness of religious law; social isolation and the rejection of the surrounding culture.” This Liebman perceives religious extremism as relating to radical religious acts, bypassing private life's confines to incorporate every aspect of public life. Religious extremists are involved in the restructuring of the political and social systems in such a way as to impose their ideas of a utopian society on the population. In buttressing Liebman's point, Falola (2009: 1), while referring to extremism in a political sense, puts it that “the agenda of the political class is to ask the people to transcend those routines and practices and become “nationalists,” or “federalists” or loyalists, that is, to move from an informal socio-political space to that of the public and formal.”

Furthermore, Rapoport (1984), while doing a comparative study of three religious groups: the thugs, Assassins and Zealots-Sicarii, referred to perpetrators of religious terrorism as ‘holy terrorists’. He

emphasised the growing phenomenon of 'holy terrorism .' He opines that technological advancement plays a significant role in the ease of procuring weapons for these terrorists combined with the easily exploited benefits of transportation and communication facilities. Extremists, especially religious extremists, endeavour to impose their laws and ways of life as moral within society. Any form of compromise in the interpretation of religion is haram (forbidden) (Rapoport, 1984). Liebman (1983: 79) enunciated the evils of religious extremism when he argued that "All historical religions recognise the destructive capacity of extremism and sought strategies to contain it." Additionally, Belt-Hallahmi (2001) sees the actions of secular government and other distinct religious identities as undermined by religious extremists using force or violence. There have been several cases of religious violence in Nigeria, as discussed in the next section.

2.4.1 Religious Extremism

As already captured, the concept of religious extremism involving terrorism and religion is not novel in Nigerian parlance (Agbibo, 2013) and is sometimes used interchangeably (Malasowe, 2016). Falola (2009) accepts that significant religious violence lies within the understanding of the history and politics of the country and marginalisation in the North. The era of religious extremism in Nigeria goes back to the tumultuous political situation in Northern Nigeria, where the jihad (holy war) took place in the early 18th century (1754-1817). The Jihad was led by Uthman Dan Fodio, which made it fertile for the manipulation and empowerment of radical Islam (Ajayi, 2012; Hickey, 1984). From then on, religious extremism and radical Islam have been existent in the country. Due to the politicisation of religion in the North (Ajayi, 2012), there were several other religious uprisings. These uprisings include the Maitatsine movement, the most prominent movement that rose to challenge the ruling elites in the North, mostly Muslims who exploited Islam for their selfish interest (Oyovbaire, 1980).

However, while the North has been rife with religious extremism, religion has been used mainly for political gains, the South also used Christianity. Usman aptly captured this when he noted that "the manipulation of religion in Nigeria today is essentially a means of creating the context for this fancy

dress ball, for this charade of disguises. This game of masks.” (Usman, 1979: 89). Moreover, Falola (2009: 1) believes that winning elections in Nigeria depends on the mobilisation of the people. Therefore, to win, one must go through religious and ethnic lines, which affect every aspect of private life, bringing these practices to the fore public and centre stage, hence the mixture of religion and politics and subsequently violence when these demands fail to be realised. Therefore, once a Muslim candidate appears, there is a tendency for politics and consequently crisis and violence to tow religious lines when the opposing candidate (and likely to win) identifies as Christian.

Before BH, the most prominent religious extremist movement in the North was the Maitatsine movement made up of religious fundamentalists under Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine (Abubakar, 2017; Ajayi, 2012). The group murdered and assaulted the ‘*haves*’ and ‘*haves-not*’ (rich and poor) alike, regardless of religious leanings. However, implementing the quasi-Sharia judicial process in a few Northern states was deemed a crucial cause for their actions with revolutions in Kano, Yola and Maiduguri between 1980 and 1983 (Danjibo, 2009; Walker, 2012). It is within the backdrop of this group that BH rose to power (Ajayi, 2012; Danjibo, 2009), justifying its actions and having ‘Taliban tactics’ in terms of modus operandi and objectives (Danjibo, 2009 in Ajayi, 2012; Walker, 2012; Varin, 2016). The Islamic extremist group, BH, evolved during this process without formal acknowledgement until 2002. The group subsisted until Mustapha Modu, also known as Mohammed Yusuf, formally took over reins of power and was eventually executed in police custody in 2009 (Sunday Tribune, 2012). Under Mohammed Yusuf’s tutelage, the group became radically minded, perceiving the western way of life, especially education, as inconsistent with Islamic religious doctrines while aligning with foreign fighters from Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for training (Ajayi, 2012). To this effect, a mosque was instituted in Maiduguri as a hub for spreading the “forbidden western education doctrine,” which was made up of mostly illiterate young men and the unemployed Almajiris (Dearn, 2011).

2.4.2 Reasons for Religious Extremism in Nigeria

There have been several postulations on the reasons for religious extremism in Nigeria (Ajayi, 2012). For “politicisation of religion” in Nigeria, Danjibo (2009) argues that religious extremism, especially the ideals of BH, stem primarily from the Maitatsine group’s uprising, which was involved in the assault and murder of individuals whom they deemed as apostates or unbelievers of the Islamic faith (kafir), irrespective of social status. This postulation cites religion as the sole reason for the rise of terrorism in Nigeria. Adesoji (2011), supporting this claim, suggests that the rise of BH can best be understood by identifying the religious conflicts in the country for which the Maitatsine movement was a big part.

2.4.2.1 *The Maitatsine Uprising*

The Maitatsine uprising orchestrated by Islamist fundamentalists and led by Cameroonian immigrant, late Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, nicknamed Maitatsine (Ajayi, 2012; Isichei, 1987; Ochonu, 2015), existed between 1980 and 1985 with a bid to suppress the prominent ruling elites in Northern Nigeria (Oyovbaire, 1980). The violence by the uprising ushered in an intense atmosphere of religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians alike (Adesoji, 2010; Isichei, 1987). The rebellion was made up of poor and employed youths made redundant due to the country’s reliance on the Southern oil during the boom as a means of the nation's sustenance. The religious fundamentalists accepted Maitatsine’s distaste for the government and acceptance of Maitatsine’s ways to alleviate the northern people from their undesirable state of affairs. Their main tactics of violence were killing, assault and assassination of individuals regardless of religious underpinning, even Muslims (Ajayi, 2012).

The name - ‘Maitatsine’ in the Hausa language means “He who damns,” and Marwa perceived himself as a prophet, like Uthman Dan Fodio (Adesoji, 2010; Isichei, 1987). Following the ideals of Marwa, the uprising was opposed to western ideals and influences (similar to the present day BH) and rejected the use of any other book except the Qur’an (Kumolu, 2011). Moreover, individuals sent to state schools were regarded as ‘Kafirs’ (infidels) (Adesoji, 2010; Isichei, 1987), an approach also espoused by BH (Celso, 2015). Though the country was acquainted with religious tension and disturbances, that

of Maitatsine was quite different. There was the May 1980 crisis in Zaria, for which most Christian dwellings were destroyed by Muslims, followed by unrestricted destruction of property (Adesoji, 2010; Isichei, 1987).

The major deadliest Maitatsine uprising took place on December 18, 1980, in Kano, resulting in the death of 4,177 people and property loss (Adesoji, 2010; Isichei, 1987; Kumolu, 2011), though Abubakar (2017) argues that 6,000 people were killed including Marwa. As such, Marwa (similar to the former BH leader, Mohammed Yusuf's death with the police) met his death at the hands of the military in December 1980, which resulted in the movement going underground for some time, only to come back stronger to last for a few years up until 1985. Marwa's movement was dissatisfied with the quasi-Sharia laws being practised in certain Northern states, such as Borno, Kano and Sokoto, which agitated the uprisings, twice in Kano in 1980 and later in Yola and Maiduguri in 1982 and 1983, respectively (Ajayi, 2012; Danjibo, 2009). BH began to rise almost three decades after, for which claims arose that BH trailed the path of the Maitatsine uprising (Ajayi, 2012; Kumolu, 2015). Still, regarding the politicisation of religion/political Islam, many Muslims believe that the Sharia law practised in the 12 Northern States of Nigeria was a caricature that only benefitted the rich to the detriment of the poor and should be adopted for the whole country (Ajayi, 2012). The same states practising Sharia law had poverty levels twice as high as the rest of the states in the country, combined with low literacy rates (Malasowe, 2016).

Advocating the same ideology may not necessarily mean evolving in the same way as Ochonu (2015) warns that BH is not Maitatsine; neither did the two groups operate under similar timelines. He argues that while the Maitatsine movement was a localised uprising with no foreign link, BH has had international inclinations and is incompatible with the Maitatsine ideology. Be that as it may, an understanding of the Maitatsine uprising is a sure way to understand the actions of BH in light of its terrorist attacks, which is, for now, not the focus of this research. This research focuses on what Ochonu (2015) argues that BH models itself against the backdrop of and receives inspiration from the

global jihadist group, ISIS. This is buttressed by the fact that the Maitatsine movement was principally an 'urban legacy' with recognisable bases that could be attacked at will, unlike BH, a rural movement with both urban and rural ties (Ojo, 1985; Isichei, 1987). Moreover, the sophisticated weapons available to BH are more significant than that of the current Nigerian security services and available to the Maitatsines at the time (Ochonu, 2015). Besides, while Maitatsines existed in certain urban areas in Northern Nigeria such as Gombe, Kano and Maiduguri, BH exists in large numbers in several other cities across the North and even spanning to neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Ochonu, 2015).

While the Maitatsine uprising lasted for five years, BH is still waxing strong and has existed violently for more than nine years and counting (Ochonu, 2015). Also, the Maitatsines had no intentions of establishing a Caliphate or administering a particular territory under Islamic law, which BH and ISIS find congenial to their existence, aims and objectives. Additionally, unlike BH, with several ties to Nigeria, the Maitatsine uprising was based in Nigeria, while its originator, Marwa, was a Cameroonian (Ochonu, 2015).

2.4.2.2 Competition for Resources

Another reason for religious extremism is the 'competition for resources.' Scholars such as Seul (1999) believe that religion may not be the leading cause of religious extremism in Nigeria. According to him, religious violence is not generally because of religion but resource competition and displacement, which arises from religious identities. Seul believes that religion by itself is not a cause of violence. Still, certain religious sects having better resources than others is a reason for violence to be used to voice their grievances, which is perceived within a religious framework (Seul, 1999 cited in Agbiboa, 2013). This is closely synonymous with the frustration-aggression theory (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate, 1990) and relative deprivation theory with Galtung (1964) arguing that a state of disequilibrium from several socio-political aspects of life and dissatisfaction from unmet expectations can engender aggressive behaviours from individuals. The internal structure of the state is viewed as that which

gives rise to religious violence. The failure to meet a need is followed by actions of frustrations that are primarily violent. This idea seeks to answer every problem of religious terrorism within the purview of economic resources (internal structures) before religion. By this (referring to the scarcity of resources), Idahosa juxtaposed 'internalised radical Islamic beliefs' with 'externalised socio-economic conditions (Idahosa, 2015: 26). Islam as a religion in Nigeria and Sharia law in the country is explained in the next section.

2.5 Islam and the Practice of Sharia Law in Nigeria

The practice of Islam in Nigeria dates back to the 11th and 12th centuries when the religion arrived through migration, trade and travel of mystic-wayfarer along the region of Kanem and Borno (Calder *et al.*, 2012; Isaacs, 2013). The religion first appeared in Borno state, which was in the country's North-eastern region, before spreading to the North-western regions such as Kano and Katsina. Islam became a religion of commerce for people and of the court in the region and beyond for some time, as it was spread peacefully by Muslim clerics and traders (Ascleiden, 2002).

With time, Islam became deeply rooted in West Africa with Islamic networks that stretched across North Africa and the Mediterranean to the Middle East and played a vital role in a trans-Saharan network that enabled Islam as the lingua franca of trade (Pew Research Centre, 2012). At the start of the 15th century, the Northern Nigerian Hausaland had become vast, as the Malian Songhai Empire had spread into it, thereby establishing a dynasty under the leadership of Askia Muhammad (till his death in 1538) (Adjaye and Ohaegbulam, 1992). This resulted in a rapid expansion of gold trade with Asia and Europe and the recognition of Islam as an integral part of the ethnic group and the Hausa language as a medium for Islamic literature (Meri and Bacharach, 2006). During the 18th century, Fulani cattle-rearers had settled and adopted Islam as their religion. Hence, this played a significant role in a Muslim revival in West Africa (Balogun, 1969), which made both the Hausa and Fulani, a well-connected intellectual tradition deeply rooted in the Islamic belief. By the 19th century, a Fulani scholar and founder of the Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903), Uthman Dan Fodio, launched a reformist

'Jihad' (holy war) in 1804 aimed at purifying Islam and eliminating religious syncretism and rituals, in addition to encouraging less devout Muslims to return to pure Islam (Raji, 1999). This move by Dan Fodio led to the expansion of Islam's influence in what would become Nigeria, as it gave rise to a political element that led to state conflict and the formation. The unification of the Northern (Hausa) states under Sharia law (Balogun, 1969). The year 1812 saw the merger of the Hausa dynasties with the Sokoto Caliphate. The latter dispersed due to the partition in 1903 when it (the Sokoto Caliphate) was incorporated into Nigeria by the British High Commissioner, who gained power from the Sultan (Murray, 1967).

Following the Independence of Nigeria in 1960, a new impetus to the spread of Islam was proffered by the newly elected Premier of the Northern region, Ahmadu Bello, with his Islamisation programme that led to over 100,000 people successfully converting to Islam in the Zaria and Niger Provinces (Umejesi, 1992). His programme ended abruptly following the first military coup on January 15, 1966, which claimed his life and those of other politicians in power. Yet, the following years leading to the 70s and 80s saw the dominance of Islam as the newly enforced government policies favoured Islam, especially during the military dictatorship of Ibrahim Babaginda from 1985 to 1993 (Raji, 1999). These newly Islam-inclined government policies further led to religious tensions from the evangelical Christians against the Islamic groups and government, especially with Sharia law in several Northern states (Christelow, 2002). This led to the burning of 14 churches by suspected Islamic fundamentalists recorded in Ilorin, the capital of Kwara state (Oduyoye, 2000). Further property destruction and violence were also recorded in 2000, following the growth and embrace of Sharia law in more than ten and later 12 Northern states (Idahosa, 2015) from Zamfara, Kano and Kaduna, to mention but a few. This further engendered the spread of violence and the death of over 10,000 people, both Christians and Muslims, in these respective states (Ado-Kurawa, 2002).

According to Isaacs (2013), Sharia law had been embedded in the legal system of Northern Nigeria, which had some element of Islamic civil law for more than a century. However, it was the sudden

enshrinement of stringent criminal measures and capital punishments. These punishments included but were not limited to the whipping of culprits for the possession of alcohol; amputation of appendages for crimes of pilfering; and the stoning to death of parties found guilty of adultery, that led to a different take on the matter. This led to a public outcry, and eventual distaste for the Sharia legal system being practised in the North believed to be watered down by Muslim fundamentalists (Isaacs, 2013). While Muslims had diverging opinions on the issue of Sharia, Christians perceived this move as a form of radical Islamisation of the region and prejudice to the belief of others. However, non-Muslims were not necessarily bound under Sharia laws in the region (Christelow, 2002). Furthermore, while most Muslims welcomed Sharia law, they became increasingly doubtful of the system. It was less advantageous to the ordinary Muslim and only beneficial to the wealthy political elites of the region who employed it (sharia law) to avoid prosecution (Christelow, 2002).

Moreover, as Idahosa (2015) mentioned, BH was not appeased by the re-institution of Sharia law in the Northern states of Nigeria. The group perceived Muslims involved in the administration of matters of the state as dishonest and having a foreign-colonial mindset. Hence, the need to dethrone the ruling elites to establish a purely Islamic state run by Sharia law. In any case, the economic gap in the country has provided a platform for continuous religious extremism, which takes several forms and shapes (Isaacs, 2013). The following section conceptualises terrorism while showing religion as a factor in new terrorism.

2.6 Conceptualising Terrorism

Terrorism is a global phenomenon that has affected many parts of the world through various forms, such as suicide bombings to the orchestration of strategic sequential bombing campaigns involving two or more targets within hours. It is therefore not a novel phenomenon as it has endured for a more significant part of human development and also assumed various definitions from equivalent and contradictory hypothetical viewpoints with no generally accepted definition and unison of what typically constitutes terrorism (Baker, 2003; Laqueur, 2000; Martin, 2013; Townshend, 2011).

2.6.1 Defining Terrorism

The struggle in reaching a generally accepted definition of terrorism is based on the premise that terrorism has been embarked upon for several reasons, such as political, ideological, nationalistic and most recently, religious reasons, among others (Barker, 2003; Lutz & Lutz, 2009). However, different definitions will be assessed to arrive at an appropriate or germane definition regarding this research. Ganor (2005: 17) describes terrorism as “a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians to achieve political goals.” His definition accentuates premeditated violence in the form of ‘deliberately used violence’ to achieve goals that may be nationalistic, ideological or socio-economic. He perceives terrorism as a system of fierce tussle in which violence is seen as the only way to communicate to the public. Hence, terrorism is deliberately employed against civilians to achieve certain objectives, highlighting specific characteristics of terrorism, including the threat and use of violence that Enders and Sandler (2012) underpin as fundamental characteristics of terrorism. However, Ganor’s (2005) definition sees terrorism as only symbolic when it affects civilians or unarmed individuals without accounting for structures and armed targets. The US State Department in 1983 perceived terrorism as the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience” (the USA, 1983 in Hough, 2013). Contentions arising from the above definition are the same as Ganor’s but also on the basis that some violence perpetrated against non-combatants by clandestine agents are a state organised and funded the likes of the assassination of members of the public in a bid to suppress terrorism (Martin, 2013).

Hence, Rapoport (1977) also enunciated terrorism as the use of violence to incite awareness, arouse particular emotional states of mind of compassion and revolt against the government of the day. Rapoport and Ganor’s definitions succinctly capture terrorism as using violence to achieve political objectives and muster support from the people by invoking sympathy. Rapoport’s definition calls to mind the dictum that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ (Cooper, 2001; Friedersdorf, 2012). This definition reveals that terrorists occasionally play on the empathic side of

their target audience when conveying their message. For instance, South African Late President Nelson Mandela was once labelled a terrorist by the U.S. authorities (Windrem, 2013). Such a notion renders futile the ability to proffer a generally accepted definition of terrorism, which has been seen as BH and ISIS use this medium to recruit members into their fold. They make use of extreme violence in an attempt to destroy the perceived old, decadent and secular socio-political order to build new “model” societies founded on Islamic tenets (religious objective) (Celso, 2015).

However, terrorism has evolved and has gone far beyond the arbitrary targeting of ordinary civilians for political objectives to include attacks against other segments of society like military targets and the achievement of political, nationalistic, ideological, socio-economic, and, more recently, religious goals. Hence, the definition proffered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is regarded as highly tenable (Martin, 2013). The FBI perceives terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social [and religious] objectives” (FBI, 2005). This definition largely encompasses all segments of society while suggesting that terrorism is undertaken to force the hands of any government in power to give in to the demands of terrorist groups.

Cooper (2001: 56) also posits that “Terrorism is the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings to secure or maintain control over other human beings.” Here, Cooper subjects his definition to the idea that every terrorist act is carried out to create fear in the populace's hearts to control their activities. Terrorism, therefore, involves the wilful action intended to create fear and cause people to act in specific ways already predicted by the terrorists in which the US State Department’s definition puts as ‘premeditated.’ Buttressing Cooper’s point, Nacos (2003) noted that opinion polls conducted following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the US showed an elevated American fear of further acts of terrorism and the possibility that either they or their family members could be victims at any time. In remarking on the same attack, the Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, observed that “There is America, full of fear from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that.”

(The Guardian, 2001). Despite this, certain kinds of activities tend not to fall within this category or the ambit of terrorism even when they involve the deaths of many people (mass casualty). For example, the bombing of a passenger aircraft by Jack Gilbert in November 1955 with 44 people dead is a criminal activity and not terrorism. It was not intended to create fear but to receive his mother's life insurance (Reeves, 1993).

Furthermore, going by the dictum of 'one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter,' - a terrorist viewed as a freedom fighter engages in terrorist activities to create awareness of the activities of their target, usually the government and control the behaviour of their allies or opponents (Coopers, 2001). Nonetheless, any complete definition of terrorism must encompass premeditated activities (USA 1983), planned violence and political objectives (FBI, 2005) for the propagation of fear (Coopers, 2001) and directed or perpetrated against several targets including civilians (FBI, 2005). However, given the above, terrorism has evolved since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) incident to usher in a new type/age of terrorism beseeched as 'New Terrorism' (Martin, 2013)

2.6.2 The New Age of Terrorism: New Terrorism

The new age of terrorism, also referred to as 'new terrorism' – modern terrorism was ushered in following the World Trade Center and the Pentagon attacks on 11th September 2001. According to Martin (2013), this involves using new technologies and the internet, which provides pathways for terrorist groups and other violence-prone groups to furnish individuals with their atrocities in the convenience of their homes. As seen to create fear (Coopers, 2001), violence has come to reach a broad audience and produces extended durations of relevance (Laqueur, 2000). This series of violence interrupted the traditional terrorist procedures. For instance, the erstwhile cycle of the car bombing in Iraq was quickly replaced with suicide bombing, which had more casualties and exacerbated between April and May 2005, resulting in significant death tolls (Williams, 2005 in Martin, 2013). According to Martin (2013: 21), the new era has been characterised by arbitrary targeting, use of conventional arms; 'surgical' selection of targets, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and

wide-reaching high casualty rates, which has led to a much larger framework for the understanding of terrorism. This new age of terrorism has also seen a more structured process and intensifying a method or technique of counter-terrorism: military action to quell terrorism. Though terrorism in the new era broadly encompasses the violent struggle against every facet of society and not just civilians (Martin, 2013). The period has also engendered some forms of religion-induced violence. Most violence in the old terrorism era was essentially a tool of radical violence for unexpressed grievances against prominent political leaders. These were undertaken by extremists and secular ideologists with ethnic-separatist strains which trickled down (Martin, 2004) - similar to the Maitatsine movement. For Kurtulus (2011), 'New terrorism,' unlike contemporary/traditional terrorism, has a more religious undertone which has seen terrorist groups undertaking terrorist activities under the guise of religion.

Table 2. 1 Table Showing the activity Profile, Characteristics of and Differences between Old and New Terrorism

Activity Profile					
Terrorist Environment	Target Selection	Casualty Rates	Organisational Profile	Tactical/Weapons Selection	Typical Motives
The "old" terrorism	Surgical and symbolic	Low and selective	Hierarchical and identifiable	Conventional and low to medium yield	Leftist and ethnocentric
New Terrorism	Indiscriminate and symbolic	High and indiscriminate	Cellular	Unconventional and high yield	Sectarian

Source: Martin (2013: 507)

The above table reveals the characteristics of 'new terrorism,' which have seemingly displaced the old terrorism. The old terrorism, according to Martin (2013), involved classical structural formations with anticipated and balanced attacks, not identified on a mass casualty scale and extensive attacks. New terrorism, the likes perpetrated by ISIS and BH (IEP, 2015), are characterised by extensively large unstructured formation, unconventional methods, and mass casualty rate, which Quillen (2002) refers to as mass casualty rate and ideals against sectarian ideologies. BH and ISIS have orchestrated several terrorist attacks within and around their spheres of influence (countries of origin and operation). They

have thus been proscribed as terrorist organisations, with BH, by the US in July 2013 (Home Office, 2016) after the then president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, proscribed the group in June of the same year (BBC, 2016a), while the US also proscribed ISIS in June 2014 (Home Office, 2016). At this juncture, it is necessary to understand religion as a factor in the era of new terrorism.

2.6.2.1 Religion as a factor in New terrorism

Religion refers to established prearranged principles regarding the association between the familiar and mythical features of realism that promote proximity to mythological aspects of life and man's place in this association (Hayes, 2014, Moreira-Almeida, 2006). However, religion has since superseded principles and practices to be seen as the most significant engendering force behind international terrorism in the new (current) era (Aubrey, 2004; Quillen, 2002). Just like terrorism, as earlier mentioned, religious terrorism is not a recent phenomenon, as recognised by Rapoport (1984). In 1997, Bruce Hoffman (2001) of the RAND Corporation identified religiously motivated terrorism as harmoniously connected with mass casualty: the need to kill as many people as possible to gain attention and send a message simultaneously (Simon, 2003). Quillen (2002) concludes that the ability to kill many people referred to as 'mass casualty bombing' has been the backbone tying different forms of religious terrorism together.

Mass casualty involves killing more than 25 people or having up to more than 25 death tolls in a single or multiple attacks from the same terrorist group with a particular motive (Jenkins, 1985). For instance, according to Quillen (2002), BH and ISIS broadly fall within this category of mass casualty bombing. Hence, regarding the era of new terrorism, it is believed that BH and ISIS rely heavily on mass casualty bombing. Records show that in the year 2014, BH surpassed ISIS as the most deadly terrorist group globally and was responsible for 6,644 deaths compared to ISIS, with about 6,073 deaths within the same time frame (IEP, 2015). For example, looking at the 50 worst attacks of 2014, BH killed about 315 people in an attack on the 5th of May 2014 in Gamboru, Borno State, Nigeria, with ISIS killing about 670 people with explosives in the city of Badush, Iraq (IEP, 2015: 93).

The 'new era of terrorism' or 'new terrorism' was seen to have been ushered in following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Martin, 2013), which was previously witnessed in erstwhile attacks on the World Trade Centre in 1993 undertaken by Yousef Ramzi (Aubrey, 2004). New terrorism has seen the rise of religion as a motive for terrorist activities. Martin (2013) stressed that religion had been used in the swift recruitment of new members to undertake violence and perpetrate acts of terrorism that have continued to rise since the 1980s. Quillen (2002), in his article, "A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers," opined that diverse terrorism practices were identified for decades with the 1980s state-sponsored terrorists. The era saw sophisticated weaponry, with suicide terrorists, considered deadlier than religious terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Religious terrorism is deemed to be undertaken for the prevention of the desecration of 'true faith,' - a type of terrorism that involves violence for the preservation of the dignity and establishment of a faith incited by the utter belief that there is some conference of rights by an ethereal power (Martin, 2013: 40). For religious terrorism, the most violent group is the Sunni branch of Islam, which is more active and tolerant to violence vis-à-vis terrorism than its counterpart, the Shi'ah which is linked with terrorism and the Iranian government (Quillen, 2002). However, Christianity and Judaism adherents have also been attributed to terrorism in one way or another (Quillen, 2002); however, Islam has been the most prominent religion following the 9/11 incident (Aubrey, 2004). BH and ISIS are religious-violence inclined terrorist groups concerned with a mass casualty. Thus, Jenkins (1975) infers that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead," referring to traditional terrorist groups and contemporary groups as well. Juergensmeyer (2001) further ascribed radical religious activities inherent in traditions of violence to have three similarities. These include the denial of negotiations with liberal values and secularisation, uplifting religion above state limits, and upholding a more vibrant form of religion that neglects already watered-down versions of religion. To this end, scholars perceive BH to be a religious (Agbigboa, 2013a; Agbigboa, 2013b; Pichette, 2015; Walker, 2012) Salafi-jihadi group (Celso, 2015; Gourley 2012) angry at the already politicised religion and

watered-down Islamic interpretation and bent on the creation of an Islamic state led by a Caliph - 'a ruler of a Caliphate', an Islamic based community and kingdom - '*Umma*' (Celso, 2015). In the next chapter, we turn to structures and ideas designed to understand the phenomenon of terrorism orchestrated by BH to see whether the group imitates the activities of ISIS or not and if terrorism in Nigeria is a result of copycat terrorism.

2.7 Summary

Nigeria is a West African country that is not new to the concept of religious extremism or terrorism. The government has recently been riddled with several attacks from the terrorist group BH. However, this is not the first time the country has experienced such atrocities in the country's northeastern part. There was the Maitatsine uprising from 1980 to 1985, which gave rise and impetus to BH. The rebellion was an attempt to destabilise the Nigerian secular government and establish Sharia law in the country. Though Sharia law was being practised in 12 Northern states in Nigeria, many perceived this as a watered-down version favouring the rich. Hence, the violence in the North was orchestrated to bring about a more satisfying and balanced Islamic legal system. This ideology is also actively advocated by BH as the group seeks to destabilise the Nigerian government to enthrone its Islamic tenets, values and laws.

Terrorism, which most non-state actors employ or threaten to make the government of countries concede to their demands, has taken a different form (religious) known as 'new terrorism' since the attacks of 9/11, seeking mass-casualty with unstructured organisations leading these attacks. BH and ISIS come into play as they employ violence to achieve mainly political cum religious goals that involve disrupting supposed secular states to establish Islamic-run states. The next chapter deals more on BH and ISIS, terrorist groups' learning and contagion theory.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0 Introduction

The current chapter aims to provide a literature review on understanding both terrorist groups in question, BH and ISIS, the relationship, similarities and linkages, and the political and socio-economic implications for their countries of influence or existence. Contagion studies in different countries and contexts are also assessed in addition to terrorist groups as learning organisations and theories explaining the rise of BH.

3.1 Background on ISIS

The term ISIS is an acronym for the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' or Daesh (Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016), a terrorist group that has perpetrated acts of terrorism across the globe, the Middle East as well as Europe (Varin, 2016). The term '*Daesh*' is transcribed from the Arabic language to mean 'one who crushes something underfoot' or 'one who sows discord' and carries pejorative connotations (Irshaid, 2015; Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016).

ISIS is a Salafist jihadist group that garnered more recognition in 2014. It annexed swathes of land in Syria and Iraq and claimed some parts of these areas as its Caliphate while being involved in mass casualty bombings, killings and beheadings (BBC, 2015b). 'Caliphate' represents an Islamic or Sharia law governed territory headed by a Caliph (Islamic leader) such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for ISIS (BBC, 2015b). The group has an international outlook as it has requested other terrorist groups and Muslims to pledge allegiance to it and migrate to its controlled territories (Gambhir, 2014; BBC, 2015a; Varin, 2016). Furthermore, it seeks to bring about a showdown to defeat its enemies (the West) in the Syrian city of Dabiq (Gambhir, 2014, Woods, 2015).

3.1.1 History of ISIS

ISIS's history and origin are ascribed to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who pledged his allegiance to Osama Bin Laden following the Iraqi invasion by the US in 2003 (BBC, 2015b; Kemp, 2016; Laub and Masters, 2014). This led to the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), for which the Islamic State of Iraq was birthed in 2006 following Zarqawi's death with its leader as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who was later killed in 2010 (Kfir, 2015). Following this, a former US detainee, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took over the reins of power in the same year (Kfir, 2015). From 2011 through 2013, ISI became more militarily active in Iraq, forming the Jabhat al-Nusra Front with Abu Muhammad al Jawlani as its head (Abubakar, 2016). During this period, ISI gained ground in Syria and eventually joined in the uprising and rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad's regime (Abubakar, 2016; BBC, 2015b).

However, the al-Nusra Front and the ISI fell out due to leadership preferences and differences (Abubakar, 2016). Then, in 2013, Baghdadi created the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) through the unification of Iraqi and Syrian forces. Consequently, leaders committed to the causes of al-Qaeda and al-Nusra boycotted the plans, yet a good number of followers helped bring about a split from the al-Nusra front (Abubakar, 2016). ISIL/ISIS eventually focused its attention on Iraq, taking control of Fallujah - a central Iraqi city, for which the group's Caliphate was created. Following the group's annexation of the Northern city of Mosul and other towns and cities, a change of name was made to 'Islamic State' in June 2014 (BBC, 2015b, Fishman, 2014).

The group IS disapproved of the seemingly Shi'ite-led Iraqi government, which is perceived as western minded (Abubakar, 2016). ISIS/IS is also against the Iraqi and Syrian territorial boundaries, which it perceives as a ploy to push up the minority Alawites as a ruling class in Syria with a weakened Sunni presence (Burke, 2013; Kfir, 2015; Polk, 2013; Wood, 2015). Against this backdrop, other factors have given credence to the rise of ISIS as articulated by Hashim (2014), ranging from the administration of ISIS by Al-Baghdadi to the Syrian conflict and the eventual breakaway of al Qaeda. The group has continued to amass territories and wreak havoc across the globe while claiming responsibilities for

suicide bombings and attacks as they occur (Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015). The disregard for human rights, and the blatant execution of apostates and prisoners combined with a long history of perpetrated violence orchestrated by ISIS, has resulted in the group looking more dissimilar to erstwhile terrorist groups. Treading the same footsteps towed by BH, ISIS uses religion, violence and “territorial acquisition” as an avenue for political transformation, unlike other terrorist groups such as al Qaeda (Abubakar, 2016; Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015).

Territories under ISIS’ control have been faced with a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Women have to appear fully covered with executions taking a ubiquitous place in the territories’ lifestyle (BBC, 2015b). Non-Muslims are expected to pay special taxes, netting almost \$8 million monthly (Laub and Masters, 2014) or risk death (BBC, 2015b; Kemp, 2016; Wood, 2015). ISIS also trails the line of al-Zarqawi, who glorifies harsh and stringent Islamic laws and the recruitment of young fighters based on the idea of the liberation of Sunnis being persecuted in Syria and Iraq (Kemp, 2016; Kfir, 2015; Wood, 2015). Also, the terrorist group has continued to seek the outpouring of different cadre and professionals to its Caliphate and the pledging of allegiance from various other Islamic sects (BBC, 2016b; Gambhir, 2014; Pham, 2016; The Bay’ah from West Africa, n.d). It can be seen that from al-Zarqawi to al-Baghdadi, ISIS as a terrorist group evolved with a more brutal leadership from the Nusrah front while having a stance as a learning organisation. Hence, terrorist groups are seen as learning organisations, which will be explained in the next section.

3.2 Terrorist groups as Learning Organisations vs Contagion

As terrorists become famous or infamous, other terrorist groups see the need to replicate such attacks or tactics of success to achieve their level of relevance, usually made popular by social media networks and collaboration with the admired group. Within this realm, there exists contagion and influence that can be seemingly used interchangeably. Then there is the aspect of learning that represents the ability of terrorist groups to teach and use newfound skills in different contexts such as attacks. Moreover, new terrorism, which supports contagion theory, makes it possible for terrorist groups to engage in a

learning process from the lessons of their predecessors and other operatives' attacks around the world (Martin, 2018).

According to Mumford (2015), one way terrorist groups provide platforms of learning for each other is not remarkably divergent from how many different organisations learn from previous mistakes to avoid such occurrences to maximise efficiency and effectiveness when executing attacks. This is like any regime's department and domestic security agencies undertaking lesson-knowledge drills to adjust future operations. For example, Bill Keer in 2015 stressed that the internet was a vital tool through which terrorist groups could acquire knowledge on how to, for instance, build Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) believed to be parallel propelled domestic rockets (Keer, 2015 in Mumford, 2015: 24).

Learning is the process of actively imbibing information to increase skills, knowledge, and abilities to use such knowledge and further apply the skills gained in diverse contexts (Schlenker, 2016). Training precedes learning, for which training is the provision of information and knowledge through various means or methods for which learning takes place for the recipient (Schlenker, 2016). Here, terrorist groups can receive training and, in effect, learn for a prolonged period in diverse forms, either physically or online (via the internet).

As operational or recurrent training supports the learning process, terrorist groups can receive training and, in effect, learn for a prolonged period in diverse forms. For example, the supposed collaboration with AQIM is likely to have increased and affected BH's learning process, which showed itself in various ways, such as hit-and-run and motorcycle attacks. Therefore, it is plausible that the training (proximity) from AQIM affected BH's learning process to become violent from a previously taciturn group. It is also possible for individuals to learn without organised training involved as it can be undertaken at any stage of development or proximity for individuals or groups.

BH learned and, as such, was influenced and enticed by the activities of ISIS popularised by the media and publications made available by ISIS through technological means and teaching. Moreover,

providing training might not be the solution to specific problems ISIS has calculated to speed up the learning (long term) process to influence (through various channels), taking over (control of its media wing) and merging with BH to become ISWAP. This is within ISIS overall agenda of making administrative centres of different jihadist groups (Gambhir, 2014).

Moreover, the manipulation of media makes learning on an international scale efficient and quick, whereby direct contact (in the case BH and AQIM) may not be a prerequisite for influence - such as in the case of BH and ISIS - allowing for seamless control of BH's social media accounts for the furtherance of both parties' objectives) (Martin, 2018). It has also been claimed that BH affiliated with and received training vis-à-vis learning from other jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2004 (Ajayi, 2012; Dearn, 2011). Contagion takes the form of adopting specific skills and techniques, which can also be derived from training or close contact with the variable that the method or skill is being imitated from, in this case, a terrorist group. Here, the adopted skills could be infused, replicated and put into already acquired skills and techniques. The new skills might be utilised without proper understanding of how the application can be used and to what extent the skill can be appropriately identified as applicable except that it provides a new way of 'doing' or an improvement to older versions of activities or behaviour.

Terrorist groups have utilised Twitter and other social media platforms to showcase attacks and publicise their alleged successes. There is the ability to broadcast images, and messages live, sometimes asynchronous images with embedded music put on replay. Likewise, Al-Qaeda and ISIS have been portrayed as excellently skilful in this regard with different media contents published online, especially on jihadist websites and periodicals with several editions reporting events such as Inspire and Dabiq for Al-Qaeda and ISIS, respectively (Ingram, 2018). These have provided tactics and ways of assembling explosive devices and appropriate use of weapons. These publications provided training, ideas, tactics, ways of assembling explosive devices, and proper weapons use and communications. Other jihadist groups need to undertake similar tactics as ISIS (Martin, 2018).

Furthermore, terrorist groups learn from members who are usually the leaders, from within their or other groups, social settings, and previous terrorist groups with similar causes. From this, it is pertinent to understand that Mumford speaks about the learning done by terrorist groups, for which learning this research tries to seek out what is learnt by BH from ISIS (Mumford, 2015). Awan (2015) describes the process of terrorist groups learning from each other through the rise of the internet and the teaching of each other as “virtual mediation of terrorism” (Mumford, 2015). Here, the media provides a platform for terrorist groups to learn from the ideas and tactics of other terrorist groups published by the media and on other platforms. Additionally, Professor John Horgan, while looking at “Contemporary political violence and jihadist group learning,” identified how ISIS had transformed its recruitment patterns into the conscription of children into what he calls “*Caliphate cubs*,” where the children are indoctrinated into the ways of terrorism (Mumford 2015: 24; Whyte, 2015).

Similarly, Professor Mia Bloom stressed that other recruitments are for most individuals with high educational levels who can provide excellent skills for the eventual Caliphate (Mumford, 2015). This is seen when ISIS calls ‘a higher cadre of individuals’ to migrate to serve in its Caliphate as documented in Dabiq, the group’s online magazine regarded as containing ISIS grand plan (religious, military and political programs) and how it seeks to achieve this (Gambhir, 2014). However, Awan (2015) also opines that understanding the process of learning and adaptation within and between such terrorist groups provides an imperative matter to be addressed for counter-terrorism measures. Singh (2015) identifies how terrorist groups have leveraged the technology, which is predominantly easier to transmit than the political and moral discourse, which is difficult to break down.

Mumford (2015) stresses much on Al Qaeda as a learning (terrorist) group. It is still applicable here as it helps bolster the need to understand the learning process undertaken by terrorist groups. Scholars and counter-terrorism experts have predominantly understudied it. Mumford (2015) further argues the need to comprehend terrorist learning, which is crucial and essential. He uses the example of Al Qaeda’s command, which split into regional hubs, citing the role of the inner IRA bulletin, An t’Oglach

('The Volunteer'), which served as an early 'remote education path' for trainees at the time of the 'Irish Independence War'. He speaks on the availability of military training to those that need it (Mumford, 2015).

Moreover, according to Borum (2014), the theory of fundamental learning, known as 'social learning theory', suggests that reinforced behaviours are more likely to be continued due to readily favourable expected results. The theory relies on the idea that behaviours are acquired and nurtured by associations recognised between the behaviours and penalties (Borum, 2004). Therefore, an unfavourable consequence is more likely to elucidate less of such behaviours as learning is done through direct experience and reflects behavioural associations within one's environment. Also referred to as 'vicarious learning,' citing Oots and Wiegele, Borum (2004:13) perceives the learning that places aggression as a 'learned behaviour.' As such, hostile behaviours such as terrorism can also be learned, citing '*contagiousness*' as a cause of violence vis-à-vis terrorist behaviours.

It, therefore, follows a premise that colleagues and scholars have described BH as having received training, learning and collaboration with other jihadists (Glickman, 2003; Varin, 2016; Stith, 2020). There was no formal acknowledgement of assistance from ISIS to BH except for mentions of 'brothers' by the former (AFP, 2013; Iraqi Witness, n.d). The most identifiable perspective of contagion was BH's pledge of allegiance as there was no formal educational process but several hints of copycat tactics, the likes of ISIS flag in BH's videos, the image of Abu'bakr al Baghdadi during the run of its video, territory acquisition (which is also linked to other jihadist groups) and change in trajectory and tactics. With further ISIS claims of BH attacks and high-quality videos linked to ISIS, there was a reduced media presence of Shekau and other BH spokesperson as ISIS took over for some time. Similarly, there was a system of constant supervision by ISIS of BH's tactics, conversations, videos. This led to an eventual need to officially collaborate on a global scale and garner more members while looking more robust in the face of increased advancement from security forces.

Going back to the perspective of learning, AQIM showed itself from a taciturn group becoming more violent and involved in hit-and-runs, jailbreaks and motorcycle attacks with contagion and imitation pointing towards a change in already mentioned trajectory and tactics with territorial expansion and Caliphate establishment. The similarities vis-à-vis differences between both groups are identified to the degree that groups with similar structures are more likely to imitate each other or that a jihadist group that identifies itself with another is more likely to adopt and improve similar tactics to achieve similar goals (Celso, 2015).

In conclusion, learning involves active training to imbibe information to increase skills, knowledge, and abilities further to apply this knowledge and aptitudes in different situations. In this situation, the terrorist groups received learning from Al Shabaab and AQIM based on claims of training camps and learning to orchestrate several attacks. While contagion is the imitation of the activities of another group made possible by the medium of (social) media, which necessarily does not involve some form of proximity, but similar activities can be detected. This can be extrapolated to the actions of BH and ISIS. According to scholars, the similarities between the two terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, will be elucidated in the next section.

3.2.1 Linkages/Similarities between Terrorist Groups: BH and ISIS

Referring to the linkage and similarities between BH and ISIS, Adibe (2013) perceives no convergence but agrees on the groups' association with any international terrorist organisation. However, St-Pierre (2015) claims a collaboration between BH and ISIS. Adibe (2013) further believes that BH may savour some form of external influence from and interactions with other international groups. Though there is no scientific proof of such, there is still the acknowledgement of the sophistication of the group's machinery and tactics. Despite this, he also asserts that the Nigerian government will more likely than not expect people to believe such, as it may have vested interests in such propagated knowledge. First, such interests make it easier for the international community to sympathise with the government (Nigeria) to receive more assistance from Western countries in the process. Secondly, citing links between BH and other international terrorist organisations will make it easier for the

government to point to external assistance from other terrorist groups as to why it is unable to tackle the insurgency. Thirdly, linking BH with any other international group would help bring the group to the negotiating table when the forces of other countries have been invited. Jideofor (2013) also suggests that the bombing of the UN office in Nigeria on 26 August 2011 was a way to raise the group's name in the international arena. However, he concludes that not much is known about the group, but he does not proffer any means of identifying the group's (BH) affiliation with ISIS.

According to St-Pierre (2015), terrorist groups BH and ISIS are heterogenous organisations with centres gravitating towards their leaders and having diverse factions that perpetrate acts of terrorism. Hence, responsibility is given to different factions without the need for recourse to the central command. An example in October 2014 was where the BH sect was in correspondence with the Nigerian government regarding ceasefire agreements which were not in unison with the group's central command (BBC, 2014). He also talks about financial links as BH controls the North-Eastern and East-Western axes (zones) of Central Africa, with Nigeria deemed as a hub for different forms of trafficking. Therefore, there is a need for ISIS to be in talks with BH regarding trafficking prices and fees for material aid as trafficked goods pass through BH-controlled areas. Furthermore, both groups have an overall aim: establishing a Caliphate or '*Ummah*', with ISIS' Caliphate spanning across Spain and West Africa to China. BH is bent on the recreation of the defunct Kanem-Borno empire (which is traced to the origin of Islam in Nigeria) spanning North-Eastern Nigeria, Eastern Niger, South-Western Chad and North Western Cameroon (St-Pierre, 2015).

While tracing the origin of both groups with ISIS emerging from the crises in Iraq and Syria and BH, within Northern Nigeria with traces of the latter in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, St-Pierre (2015) suggested a connection but not a collaboration between both groups by identifying three points. First, in 2014, videos released by BH saw the group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, praising ISIS for its victories before creating its own 'Caliphate' without seeming to have any partnership with ISIS. However, in 2015, the group pledged its allegiance to ISIS in a video (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015), for which

ISIS accepted the allegiance (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasry, 2015). BH dubbed the name ISWAP - the 'Islamic State West African Province'. Secondly, the emphasis of BH's pledge in the November 2014 issue of ISIS magazine – Dabiq. The Dabiq provides pivotal channels for distributing strategic instructions, training and radical communications (Sheehan, 2015 in Mumford). And lastly, he looks into the BH's Twitter account while suggesting that the group's videos are of higher quality, tending towards a connection with ISIS endowed with excellent technical know-how in its open relations scheme (St-Pierre, 2015).

The last point is also buttressed by Campbell (2014b) in his article, "Nigeria: Five Reasons why Boko Haram's video Matters," where he claimed that the videos produced by BH were well-refined, which suggested a connection with its former splinter group, Ansaru, and other terrorist groups. BH also created a media channel called 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa' (The Indissoluble Link). This is in addition to other affiliated Twitter accounts, especially the one created on the 18th of January with contents having a close resemblance to that of ISIS, for example, putting up pictures of child soldiers (cubs) and conquered territories. (Jihadology, 2015). Campbell (2014b) further points out that one of the videos which featured the group's official spokesperson, Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi, was uploaded to the new media channel and circulated through all other ISIS networks. Moreover, the video had a more refined quality. Also, it had the ISIS infamous 'Ashid ummati qad lah al-fajr' (my ummah dawn has appeared) as it was recorded in the primary language of BH, Hausa with English and Arabic subtitles affirming an outsourced work as previous BH videos lacked such expertise (Jihadology, 2013).

3.2.1.1 BH, ISIS and Salafism

Still, regarding similarities between BH and ISIS, Cook (2011) supports the notion that the 26 August 2011 UN building bombing in Abuja by BH suggested a shift in the prowess and tactical route of the BH from a local or regional force focused on national interests to a much global looking Salafi-Jihadist group. Nevertheless, linkages between BH and other terrorist groups have been debunked on several

occasions, as even Gourley (2012) posits that BH is not essentially an appropriate match for an international jihadist group.

The Salafist ideology can be traced to 19th-century Muslim activists, Rashid Rida and Abduh al-Afghan, and 14th-century theologian and Muslim Juris consults such as Taqi al Ibn Taymiyyah (Cottee, 2010; Simon, 2003), which will be discussed in the next section. Salafism holds a more prejudiced view on diversity and divergence of thoughts on Islam (Abou el Fadl, 2001). Wahhabism is based on the fact that both ideologies hold on to the belief of an *'Umma'* in modern-day Islam. Salafi Jihadism exists as separate from the Salafi community, which is opposed to violence. It seeks to use violence to achieve an ideal state that Muslims can live in fulfilling Islamic law (Cottee, 2010 in Abubakar, 2016). The ideology pushes a totalitarian concept that proposes the use of Islam to dictate life with the rejection of human input deemed corrupt. Hence, the only way out of the current secular dispensation tainted with human inputs such as democracy is the vilification and total breakdown of existing practices for the establishment of an *'Umma'* – Muslim community, devoid of corruption - as was in the era of Prophet Mohammed (Cottee, 2010). However, critics of the ideology, such as Byman (2013), believe that they seek to ostracise other community members, especially Muslims who do not see the establishment of an *'Umma'* as the solution to their socio-economic problems like Shi'ites. Moreover, their ideology casts doubt on others as adherents of the ideology tend not to fully perceive the trust or loyalty of members since they require absolute commitment (Agbiboa, 2013).

3.2.1.2 BH, ISIS and Ibn Taymiyyah

Eveslage (2013) ascribed the establishment and rise of BH to Nigeria's poor political, economic and social construction following the colonial era and beyond. Also, Barkindo (2013) argues, and is supported by Simon (2003), that BH's ideology and other Islamic terrorist activities in Nigeria stem primarily from the writings of Taqi al Ibn Taymiyyah, who enunciated the superiority of Sharia law and political leadership of Islamic laws. The origin of the theological roots of al-Qaeda's leaders primarily associated with ISIS is based on a duo instruction: the advancement of jihad and the decriminalisation

of uprising against Muslim rulers, who do not enshrine sharia laws into the constitution. These have also influenced radical Islamic activities and movements (Simon, 2003). Ibn Taymiyya is believed to have taken jihad from a spiritual and personal walk to a physical struggle against people deemed as unbelievers (Kafir) and the acceptance of uprising against rulers reluctant to uphold the Islamic laws in their domain (Simon, 2003). His ideas were deepened in Egypt in the 1960s, which ushered in the 25 years of violence, culminating in the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Simon, 2003).

Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya's teachings also influenced the founding of Saudi Arabia in 1744 when Muhammed Ibn Abd al Wahhad fashioned a coalition with Ibn Saud (Simon, 2003). His teaching expanded on jihad as a need for all Muslims to stage an outward battle for Islam (far from the inner struggle). In Nigeria, the British colonialists usurped the Sokoto Caliphate by introducing the indirect rule in the North, which in 1804 was administered the Northern region of Nigeria and was regarded as the foremost legitimate Islamic leadership that lasted for over a century until 1903. This they did as they took control of the traditional northern leaders who retained their constituted authority, and a direct rule was implemented in the South (Idahosa, 2015). Based on this, Eveslage (2013) advocates that BH's ideology emanated from Ibn Taymiyya as the group criticises the secular nature of the Nigerian state while exalting Islamic rule under a Sharia-based government which is seen as an alternative to a corrupt and ineffective government which Nigeria is perceived as being.

From another viewpoint, the rise of Boko Haram is believed to be best understood by identifying the religious conflicts in the country. Hence, this ascribes the rise of the BH to religious grounds and its altercation with the nation's politics as Islamic movements such as the Maitatsine, which grew in the post-colonial Northern Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011). BH's ideology has been used to criticise the validity of a secular state, non-Muslim state representation and corrupt Islamic leaders while favouring Islamic authority in politics. In this context, a Sharia law-governed state has become an alternative to a secular Nigeria, which has created a basis for radical groups like BH to form and garner support, mainly from those who view the government as corrupt and ineffective (Idahosa, 2015). Idahosa argued that BH

believes Nigeria is dominated by western ideals and secularism as well as riddled with poverty for which the only way out of it is the reliance on 'True Islam' and the idea that true Muslims need be under one head, a Caliph ruling, the Caliphate (Idahosa, 2015: 25-26).

Regarding quelling the terrorist groups, Idahosa (2015) advocated conscious attempts to train the Nigerian military to tackle the insurgency with support and assistance such as sophisticated military hardware and logistics support from developed countries, such as Canada and the United States. These must be put in place within security reforms to investigate and prosecute mismanagement of procured assets and violation of human rights in areas affected by BH. More so, socio-economic reforms to address the plights of the Northerners in line with judicial reforms; cooperation between Nigeria and neighbouring countries in terms of logistics. The amendment of Article 10 of Nigerian's 1999 constitution will help provide for the multi-religious status of the country with freedom of religion and the prosecution of any breach of these provisions (Idahosa, 2015).

3.3 BH and ISIS: Contagion

Before the change of name from BH to ISWAP in 2015, there was some form of imitation and inspiration from the activities of ISIS instead of former local sentiments like the Maitatsine movement in Northern Nigeria. This is illustrated in the activities of both groups (linked to ISIS imitated by BH). As earlier noted, the idea of establishing a caliphate (which will be discussed in detail below) is one that was not immediately ratified or undertaken by the Maitatsine uprising (Ochonu, 2015). Following from Table 1.1 as developed by Celso (2015), some attributes of the fifth wave jihadist groups which BH seems to imitate from ISIS are explained here:

3.3.1 The Idealisation of a Mythic Past

Similar to the quest for millenarian Justice, the "Muslim society is in a state of Jahiliyyah or 'ignorance of divine truth' that is promoted by apostate regimes, and this requires separation from society and rebellion against it" (Celso, 2015: 257). For example, ISIS rejects the colonial boundaries existent around the caliphate with BH aiming to establish a modern-day replica of the Islamic rule in Northern

Nigeria (Abubakar, 2016), for which it also holds the assertion that most of the current governmental dispensation and structure resulted from colonialism (Abubakar, 2016). As the name suggests, BH is strongly opposed to what it sees as a 'Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities in northern Nigeria' (Abubakar, 2016; Walker, 2012).

This ideology was enunciated by BH's founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf. In a 2009 BBC interview, he mentioned that "Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam" (Boyle, 2009). He also confirmed the perception of the group when he said, "Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a '*kafir*' (infidel) land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs" (Daily Trust, 2009 in Agbiboa, 2013). BH and ISIS also apply to takfir (vilification) over other religions, including Muslims opposed to their version of Islam, even fellow Sunnis. BH is also opposed to groups that do not adhere to its strict appreciation of Islam, referring to them as *Kafirs* (unbelievers) as ISIS is opposed to Kurds, Shi'ites, Alawites and Yazidis, among other tribes and extremist groups (Abubakar, 2016; Celso, 2015; Kazimi, 2010)

According to Celso and in light of the ideology of Salafism, BH and ISIS are geared towards the creation of a Caliphate in a bid to revert to the previous era of Prophet Mohammed regarded as an '*Umma*' (Abou el Fadl, 2001; Byman, 2013; Celso, 2015; Cotte, 2013). Within the Islamic context, the '*Umma*' refers to "the world community of Muslims" (Mandaville, 2001: 8). However, there is some form of contagion and copycat terrorist tactic between ISIS and BH. In June 2014, after overrunning the central Iraqi city of Fallujah, the Islamic State (Caliphate) was created from the Northern city of Mosul. This move engendered the change of name from ISIS to IS to depict the 'Islamic State' - a name change in June 2014 (BBC, 2015b, Fishman, 2014). Meanwhile, in August 2014, BH followed this same step in the annexation of Gwoza, a town in Borno State, Northern Nigeria (Grant, 2014) and also changed its name to 'the Islamic State West Africa Province' (ISWAP) (Bugnacki, 2015; Laccino, 2015; Pham, 2016; Varin, 2016; Withnall, 2015).

3.3.2 Brutalisation of Women and Children

In another scenario, both terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, have used women as objects of targets, degradation, 'Mechanism of terror,' and revenue purposes (Abubakar, 2016: 14). BH kidnapped 238 schoolgirls on 14th April 2014, for which ISIS referenced the kidnapping to its maltreatment of captured Iraqi Yazidi women (Boghani, 2016; McLaughlin, 2014; Pham, 2016). Moreover, territories controlled by these groups have Islamist misogynist tendencies, which have involved but are not limited to the forced veiling of women (Celso, 2015). "Attacks on unveiled women, limitations on female education and employment, forced marriages with jihadi fighters, coerced recruitment of boys into jihadist organizations" (Celso, 2015: 257) are also activities undertaken by the groups. Furthermore, attacks by BH have involved the use of women or female suicide bombers, such as the November 2014 marketplace attack in Maiduguri where two female suicide bombers set off their bombs consecutively (Associated Press, 2014; Dixon & Abubakar, 2014). Also, in response to the supposed incarceration by the government of suspected BH members' wives in the year 2012 (VOA News, 2012), BH's leader, Shekau, once threatened to kidnap certain government officials' wives (Zenn and Pearson, 2014).

3.3.3 Sophistication of Social Media Usage

Another point of similarity and contagion between BH and ISIS is the appropriation of the media apparatuses, primarily social media, to propagate their messages and indoctrinate members and youths prone to violence. During the early years of the BH from 2002, the group relied on flyers mostly in Hausa and Arabic to communicate to communities threatening them with further attacks, vilify residents against collaborating with security forces while making their stance clear. This was a more local way of reaching the public until the full embrace of social media. Also, BH provided local media houses with information about their ideologies and 'modus operandi' most times in the form of long video messages (Windrem, 2014; Mahmood, 2017). The group essentially continued to furnish the public with information on its dealing through these processes and mediums until it deemed it fit to progress to more of social media.

The year 2015 saw a shift in the group's communication strategy as BH made use of media outlet 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa' (The Indissoluble Link), in addition to affiliated social media accounts such as Twitter with contents produced with close resemblance to that of ISIS (Jihadology, 2015; St-Pierre, 2015). Though the group began to experiment with social media sometime before, it relied on Shekau and other spokespersons to provide videos of interest posted on YouTube – mostly explaining the reasons for orchestrating certain attacks. This period followed the extensive promotion of BH's media content of attacks and offensives against security officials through different means from YouTube to Facebook, Twitter and Telegram. The media contents also involved detailing the group's strength and territorial acquisition while modulating the military offensive and pushing back against it (Laccino, 2015). Though these accounts were disabled at some point, leaving the group with recourse to other social media accounts, the media content had a specific likeness to those of ISIS (Burke, 2016).

With the use of social media accounts by BH, there was the preponderance of BH's high-quality videos on YouTube and messages on Twitter and Telegram with relatedness to those of ISIS (Campbell, 2014b; St-Pierre, 2015). The Tactics, which became more of suicide bombing attacks and running over territories, featured more online content. Moreover, there was the constant lauding of ISIS activities while incorporating the similar modus operandi (Akbar, 2015). Furthermore, BH's leader Shekau praised ISIS actions in his group's videos, indicating collaboration. In essence, there was a shift from flyers and meeting up with journalists to cooperation on social media platforms which saw a more detailed reference to ISIS with more publications in English to attract a seemingly more global audience as opposed to the previous Hausa speakers (Mahmood, 2017). Likewise, different issues of ISIS' Dabiq magazine alluded to the fact that both groups seem to be in the cohort, bearing in mind that BH pledged its allegiance to ISIS in 2015, for which a video was used. ISIS further accepted this pledge of allegiance with added mentions of BH in its Dabiq publications (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasry, 2015).

3.4 No Linkages between ISIS and BH

At any rate, though, cooperation between the two groups has been hinted upon due to the identical ideological foundations following ties between both groups and inference towards and by the media (Crompton, 2015). Yet, St-Pierre (2015) argued that this is far-fetched as there have been no relations between both groups as of 2015. For there to be, there had to be some accommodation for expansion, inner harmonisation, and communal objectives between them. Marchal (2012) argues that despite having an extended external holy war rhetoric, both groups portray the absence of a shared appreciation of Islam. Moreover, he sees both groups as belonging to separate geographical regions accounting for specific differences, with BH being rooted in the communal foundation of Northern Nigeria. ISIS is a result of the armed involvement of the US in Iraq buttressed by Zarqawi's (Al-Qaeda in Iraq originator and frontrunner) ideological stance. As already illustrated, there are instances of similarities that show BH giving credence to ISIS. These include the declaration of a caliphate in 2014; the idolisation and referencing in ISIS's Dabiq magazine of BH kidnappings; the pledge of allegiance, the change of name to ISWAP, and the embrace of ISIS symbols by BH (McLaughlin, 2014; Boghani, 2016; Pham, 2016).

3.5 Summary

ISIS developed quite differently in terms of historical trajectories from BH. It was formed from the breakdown of and disagreement between several terrorist groups from ISI to ISIL and then ISIS, after which it established its caliphate. Nonetheless, BH and ISIS bear resemblance on some levels as they adhere to Salafism and the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah. Moreover, terrorist groups are learning organisations that adapt their techniques as they see fit, which is BH. Both groups idealise the search for a mythic past, the brutalisation of women, and the sophisticated use of media channels. Several postulations have also been put forward to explain the emergence of BH, for which relative deprivation has been used more than others. Other postulations include the politicisation of religion, radicalism, extremism and externalist linkage view explained above.

The next chapter discusses the research methodology used in answering the posed research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

4.0 Introduction

Chapter four provides an overview of the research methodology, methods and design used in answering the research questions presented in Chapter One. The chapter is organised as follows: the immediate section is the methodology section followed by the research methods, namely primary research in the form of documentary research and secondary research methods with advantages and disadvantages of both methods. After this, the method of analysis, in this case - thematic analysis - which is usually considered synonymously with qualitative content analysis - is explained, and the rationale behind choosing the method of analysis and design in answering the research questions. The discussion then focuses on the use of Computer-Aided Qualitative Analysis Software (CAQDAS), the rationale for using the software, the limitations of using CAQDAS and the validity and reliability of the results.

4.1 Research Methodology (Primary Research)

Research methodology encompasses the technique through which a research study is undertaken and how knowledge is acquired (Brown, 2006), while research methods refer to the “techniques for collecting data” (Bryman, 2008: 31). The current study uses primary research, documentary research, and secondary research - in journals and analysis by scholars on the subject matter while utilising mainly a qualitative research strategy using the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software, Nvivo.

The case-study approach used in this research is helpful for testing and applying theories (Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008). It provides an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon instead of an extensive study by looking at BH and ISIS as terrorist groups. It is also employed for generalisation, which involves making wide-ranging statements as a result of conclusions made from observations with detailed research and enjoys the advantages of the application of the benefits of

thematic analysis (Copi and Cohen, 1990; Schwandt, 1997; Hurley, 2003; Bennett and Elman, 2007; Gerring *et al.*, 2008; White *et al.* 2002). To assist with thematic analysis, NVivo was used to collate and arrange data for easy access. BH published exceptionally long videos on YouTube between 2012 and 2014, with shorter videos in succeeding years till 2016 with statements on Twitter and Telegram between 2012 and 2016. Most of these were collated and organised as primary research sources with Nvivo for easy retrieval while being analysed. ISIS also published statements and Dabiq magazines collated and transcribed to answer the posed RQs within the research. Both groups' communications were compared and analysed for contagion by identifying itemising similarities and difficulties and recognising aspects where both groups referenced each other. This also involves juxtaposing themes in line with Celso's (2015) characteristics of fifth-wave Jihadist terrorist groups and other unearthed themes during the analysis.

Therefore, themes were identified using a cataloguing process advocated by Bengtsson (2016) for the coding utilised for qualitative data analysis. Qualitative data analysis is essential for terrorism studies, mainly where terrorist groups provide limited options for understanding their ideologies or intentions (Drake, 1998). The qualitative study was conducted for specific reasons with planning or prior knowledge of the consequences of their attacks, illuminating ideologies and reasons for attacking targets. Therefore, qualitative analysis of terrorist groups' communication helps the analysts and the populace to understand the groups' ideologies and intentions. Likewise, Eveslage (2013) advocates the use of qualitative content analysis to fully understand terrorist groups' statements, while Altier *et al.* (2012) proposed that examining terrorist statements by qualitative analysis provides an avenue for comparison between rhetoric ideology and attacks. Peterson and Chrisman (1977 in Eveslage, 2013) also applied content analysis to determine the level of threat perpetrated by terrorist groups. These instances have informed the researcher's choice of thematic content analysis while applying CAQDAS to answer the under-mentioned research questions.

Therefore, the epistemological framework for this research is '*Critical Realism*' (CR). Critical realism (CR) employs "flexible deductive [and inductive] process[es] of coding and data analysis" (Fletcher, 2017: 181), which aids in the understanding of social issues and events (Brown *et al.* 2014), as developed by Bhaskar and expounded upon by critical realists such as Archer (1995) and Collier (1994). Therefore, at this juncture, it is essential to elucidate the justification for the employment of critical realism (CR). Critical realism also benefits from the advantage of '*retroduction*.' This reasoning seeks to understand "why things happen," especially "why the data appear the way they do," which is of paramount importance to the researcher (Olsen, 2007: 1).

(i) Critical Realism as Epistemological Framework

Critical realism (hereafter CR) applies the ideals of constructivism and positivism while being a methodological substitute to both (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Positivism applies 'reality' to empirical findings (scientific or logical tests, discarding metaphysics), while for constructivism, 'reality' is perceived as totally constructed within human knowledge and dialogue (experience) (Bhaskar, 1998). Here, CR moves away from constructivism and positivism to avoid the presumption of ontology (what is existence) to mostly epistemology (our idea of existence). Even so, both the constructivist and positivist standpoints capture reality with human understanding. This is so as our idea and knowledge of a more meaningful existence or the world is expressly minute and misleading and not entirely representative of the real world (Brown *et al.* 2014; Novikov & Novikov, 2013).

Therefore, CR does not suggest that social science cannot appreciate the real world but perceives the world as not necessarily determined by theory rather understood using theories, and knowledge can be gained (Danermark *et al.* 2001; Fletcher, 2017). Furthermore, CR helps to gain a fuller picture of any phenomenon under study (Novikov & Novikov, 2013), providing a basis for understanding the activities of both terrorist groups within the framework of '*contagion theory*.' Theories help explain social happenings better, which makes CR invaluable in investigating social issues. Here, contagion theory helps investigate terrorist groups to find out how they relate to and with each other and

operate on a much larger scale. As such, this research tries to give a fuller picture of the activities of BH as a group and not simply lone-wolf terrorists acting outside the group and receiving credit for such activities. Following this, a more significant body of knowledge is understood by looking at BH through the lens of ISIS. Moreover, it is pertinent that BH is a terrorist group (human experience of the real world) and its actions are not oblivious to other groups' activities. One of the more advanced ones is ISIS (influence and interconnectedness in activities and character).

Additionally, the CR approach is adopted in the present research as it uses data that are objective and subjective (some ideas the researcher believes) (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to answer the outlined research questions using thematic content analysis. Critical realism denotes the belief that while realities, meaning and experiences are constructed by individuals based on their knowledge of the world, that worldviews and society also encroach on these meanings (Willig, 1999). This suggests that the units of analysis (documents) are analysed based on how the terrorist groups in question (BH and ISIS) perceive their world according to their knowledge which they express through their propaganda videos, online magazines and attacks. Likewise, the external world also encroaches on this knowledge and beliefs. Therefore, BH does not exist as a single entity constructed by its whims and caprices, but other influences such as ISIS and their world view impinge upon these beliefs.

Essentially, CR is used to avoid the presumption that the inner worlds of terrorist groups can only be perceived within the confines of a specific group. Knowledge can be gained within and outside the conception of the groups, which is what CR tries to advocate. For example, it is necessary to see BH as separate or related to other terrorist groups. While it is natural to see BH as existing as a single entity in its global jihad, CR suggests a look into the changing structure of the group and ideologies. Moreover, CR engenders "multi-level study" by applying different approaches at diverse levels to form relationships between concepts at diverging stages and methods of empirical study (Novikov & Novikov, 2013; Molina-Azorin, 2019), which in this case, is qualitative thematic content analysis. Therefore, CR helps to support the idea of influence, interconnectedness and relevance of different

terrorist groups, notably, BH and ISIS in the case of this research. Having looked at the epistemological framework that the present study adopts, an explanation of primary and secondary research methods is required.

4.1.1 Primary Research Method

In the context of the present study, primary research relates to documentary research, which involves using original data collated from transcripts of terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, propaganda videos, and online publications (Lamont, 2015; Maxine and Ruszkiewicz, 1996). The terrorist groups - BH and ISIS - produced transcripts used in this study during the timeframe of the current research, between the years 2012 and 2016. Analysis was done in conjunction with data from secondary sources of information (triangulation) such as media outlets, journals, periodicals, textbooks and publications on the analysis of the similarities and differences between BH and ISIS and the explanation of their driving forces and ideologies, which affect the activities of both groups. Nevertheless, it is problematic to ascertain primary or secondary data sources as a primary source in a specific instance can be a secondary source for another case (BGSU, 2019; Maxine and Ruszkiewicz, 1996). Though, primary sources refer to first-hand documents, such as interviews, transcripts, political speeches and diaries from which successive explanations or knowledge are made based on a topic. They represent collections of formerly described events as they initially happened by those supposedly present at the event. Pictorial contents such as photos also provide a source of primary research as they provide content as to how a group of people perceive the world around them. Moreover, while some primary data are produced simultaneously, others can be created much later, such as transcripts or accounts recorded later (Maxine and Ruszkiewicz, 1996). Against this background, the following section explains documentary research as a primary research method used in this study.

4.1.1.1 Document/ Documentary Research

The primary research method used in the current research study takes the form of documentary research, also referred to as document analysis which uses 'documents as a data source' (Austin & De

Jong, 2008; Bowen, 2009: 27). The current study includes BH and ISIS propaganda videos and online published magazines available from 2012 to 2016. Given the nature of the groups under study, document analysis is the most feasible research method in the current research context. It involves the use and process of evaluating and examining documents, whether electronic, internet-based or printed manuscripts. The data within the document can then be identified and interpreted to elucidate implications, aid comprehension and achieve empirical understanding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; McCulloch, 2004). In this regard, documents can be described as 'social facts' which describe one's experience and help provide understanding about how certain perspectives or points of view can be shaped, disseminated, and employed in a socially structured manner (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 47). Different documents exist, such as journals, transcripts, books, and letters (Bowen, 2009).

Furthermore, according to Labuschagne (2003), Documentary research/analysis provides data in quotations and excerpts, whereby codes and themes can be unearthed. This is chiefly where the methods of analysis – Thematic analysis – used in current research is beneficial as the analysis technique also involves using themes from data collated and synthesised from the chosen units of analysis (transcripts). Nevertheless, document-based research also represents a common strategy for research in International Relations (Lamont, 2015).

[4.1.1.1.1 The need for Document analysis](#)

Looking at the need for document analysis, it is evident that it provides an alternative means of analysis not easily attempted. More so, it is dangerous to attempt to receive or retrieve information or data from hostile entities. However, communications produced by terrorist groups hold within them, ways of understanding their agenda and ideology. Documentary research is predominantly used with other methods, which in the case of this research is secondary sources to aid triangulation as this aids "an effective strategy in assessing the validity" and provides credibility for the transcript data employed in this research (Lamont, 2015: 79; Denzin, 1970).

Likewise, triangulation helps as qualitative research is expected to draw convergence from a minimum of two sources of data and methods to increase validity and eliminate biases that can erode single-source research (Bowen, 2009). Essentially, document analysis is helpful for qualitative research and case studies as it provides a great deal of description (Angers and Machtmes, 2005; Yin, 1994) which have been applied in the case-study aspect of this research, looking at the influence of ISIS on BH. Documenting the research process is essential; hence, NVivo CAQDAS is necessary for the documentation of the research process, which includes the annotation function where thoughts and ideas during the research process are recorded and collated as a function of the software, among others.

4.1.1.1.2 Advantages of Documentary Research

Documentary research helps to offer the researcher an immense amount of historical aspects of some issues and issues and make provision to envisage factors that can affect the research underway. Here, previous research or information can be researched, studied and collated; where detailed research or information has not been provided in detail or at all, the researcher can understand this, increasing the chances of holistic research. In this instance, document research provides lists of categories, factors, or aspects that may likely affect or impact particular research (Bowen, 2009). More so, information within a document can provide particular directions for specific questions and aspects that need to be detected as components of any research.

Additionally, documentary research makes available complimentary research data which is an essential advantage to the knowledge base. Still, on triangulation, a case in point is the research undertaken by Goldstein and Reiboldt (2004). Their research showed that the analysis method (document/documentary analysis) could collaboratively balance other analysis methods. Another essential advantage is assessing change over time when conducting longitudinal research (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 1994), such as the current research. Documentary research also provides a basis for following transformation, growth and expansion over time, primarily as the development of BH is

specifically being investigated between the years 2012 and 2016. Similarly, the approach will be used to understand the change in BH's messages and terrorist activities within the same period. In most cases, documentary research serves as substantiation for results or discoveries from other data sources providing credibility, hence its necessity in this research (Bowen, 2009: 31; Yin, 1994).

Other advantages of documentary research include that it serves as a proficient method that is less laborious and cost-effective than other research methods. It involves data assortment rather than data gathering (Bowen, 2009; O'Leary, 2014). Moreover, most required documents are readily available due to the introduction of the internet (Bowen, 2009). The research method also projects non-conspicuousness or the need for some form of reflexivity affecting the documents required in other qualitative research methods (Bengtsson, 2016; Bowen, 2009; O'Leary, 2014). Documents can be subjected to recurrent analyses and examination (Bowen, 2009; Merriam, 1988). Additionally, there is the advantage of using precise designations, situations, and specifics of an event within the research, unlike other methods (Yin, 1994).

4.1.1.1.3 Limitations of Documentary Research

Although a ubiquitously used method of data collection, documentary research brings with it certain limitations. In most cases, the researcher cannot receive complete archives or transcripts from media sources or organisations. Even where this is available, they could also contain certain biases from the transcriber (Scott, 2006). Secondly, the document's veracity is questioned as certain news outlets may be propagating a narrative on a specific matter (Lamont, 2015). However, to solve these issues, a wide range of transcript sources were used in the current research to verify the transcripts collated for particular terrorist groups' videos and transcripts. Likewise, secondary sources of data such as scholarly analyses were also used to increase the integrity of the transcripts.

However, since some documents are produced for other reasons aside from the research at hand, they can sometimes be deficient in detail, making them inadequate to answer specific research questions. Also, access to documents can likely be blocked for specific reasons, as aptly captured by

Yin (1994). This research used convenience or opportunistic sampling to surmount this obstacle as some documents regarding terrorist groups' transcripts were being taken down by anti-terrorist organisations and governments.

Documentary research sometimes acts as a short form of selection and collection of data. Only available documents or units of analysis are usually used, leaving a whole range of other sources that could have been explored to answer research questions (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 1994). However, the benefits of documentary research far offset the method's limitations. It helps to understand a specific phenomenon from a historical perspective and allows for different elements of the research to be imputed where given research lacks in context (Bowen, 2009; Scott, 2006). Moreover, documentary research is especially beneficial when combined with other forms of data collection or method and analysis - triangulation - hence the use of the method in collaboration with secondary research method for triangulation which helps to provide credibility of choice of method.

Moving forward, there is a need to analyse past literature and works involving documentary analysis, which can then be infused into this research, where secondary research comes in to support or combine with previous data. This is necessary as the researcher performed analysis and interpretation in line with previously used methods of data analysis and not just 'raw data' as "a basis for analysis" (Bowen, 2009: 28).

(i) [Analysing Documents](#)

Documentary analysis entails the process of scanning (speed-reading), understanding (scrutinising) and providing analysis of documents (texts) by use of content analysis - the method of classifying information concerning research questions (Bowen, 2009). Though content analysis allows for quantitative analysis, the qualitative media thematic analysis similar to content analysis is used in this research. It ensures the use of significant and pertinent passages of text or data rather than just the quantitative frequency and word count (Bowen, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

Essentially, thematic analysis is used as an analysis method in this research. It allows for pattern appreciation, thorough scanning, understanding and analysis of documents (texts) while categorising the salient points into themes and codes (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Pre-defined codes were used - such as those offered by Celso (2015) in the form of the characteristics of the fifth wave Jihadist groups. These include the rejection of existing social-political order, idealisation of mythic past, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, among others, will be used and combined to data and codes unearthed from the documents that can be used and applied to other sources of data collection. Two motivations for using thematic analysis include providing objectivity (by which the researcher uses the document equitably) and, two, to provide understanding in the collection of data from the documents (Bowen, 2009).

According to Bowen (2009), when evaluating documents, it should not be considered that documents are excellent sources of information. They should be critically reviewed, with extreme caution employed when assessing the information they contain. This essentially means that documents should not be accepted in their entirety as exact, accurate or not without contention as complete details of events that happened. Essentially, meanings inferred from documents need to be assessed or evaluated, not just cited as captions or excerpts lifted from documents. Likewise, in the current study, the researcher used latent thematic content analysis, which looks beyond the superficial (manifest analysis) to issues of objectivity and understanding.

Several examples of documentary research and analysis include Turner's (1983) qualitative analysis using documentary sources such as newspaper and business journals, which informed his research on organisational behaviour. Also, documentary analysis allows for the harmonising function of triangulation as contents of transcripts pulled from primary sources of data are juxtaposed and equated with secondary sources of information (journals papers and analysis) (Bowen, 2009; Lamont, 2015). This essentially ensures that data analysis methods that may yield contrary and contradicting results can be identified, investigated and resolved (Lamont, 2015).

Hence, applying both primary and secondary sources helps solve the trustworthiness problem relating to bias held by the researcher and likely subjectivity of the research. Techniques of trustworthiness include an 'elaborate' depiction of occurrences and the ability to track reviews with a notebook or diary of the researcher's thoughts, decisions and divergence of thoughts (Bengtssen, 2016; (Bowen, 2009).). This is to ensure that the process of applying the theory of contagion and answering the research questions would prove to be both evident and verifiable.

4.1.1.2 Rationale for the Use and Analysis of Media Sources

Contagion theory proposes the media's ideals as a representative communication agent that aids the bolstering of terrorist ideas and tactics. The mass media is pivotal in the comprehension of terrorism and terrorist tactics' contagiousness (Crenshaw 1990; Wilkinson 1987). Hence, the researcher employed mass media resources such as YouTube channels, journals, newspapers and magazines used by terrorist groups to propagate their cause and ideologies and analysis on the terrorist groups propagated by scholars.

Moreover, wide-ranging collective measures, individual associations between terrorist groups and transnational systems retain significant dynamics for further explication of terrorism 'contagiousness' (Crenshaw, 1983). Therefore, the research on contagion involves the probing and examination of media reportage of terrorist incidents and techniques to understand the groups' ideologies as a path to the comprehension of the contagiousness of terrorism and terrorist activities (Howie, 2006; Nacos, 2009). This represents a justification for attempting to replicate such eventuality by undertaking a similar venture. The reliability and validity of the media used as primary sources will be discussed in the next section.

(i) Reliability/ Credibility and Validity of Media Sources

As explored in other aspects of this study, reliability and credibility of news and transcript sources are necessary to authenticate the veracity of this research (Leininger, 1994). The first point to investigate is the source of information, if it is based on judgement or opinions of the media ownership or editors,

as these are crucial factors in assessing the credibility of materials sources from the media (Krueger, 2016; LIBPWP, n.d). The information lies in transcripts transcribed from original videos of the terrorist groups BH and ISIS for the current research. Intrinsically, they are not treated as opinion-based but as messages received from the terrorist groups. The veracity was also checked by transcripts and sources employed by other authors and researchers (Krueger, 2016). For example, Eveslage (2013) used some transcripts in his study of BH, used some transcripts while conducting a qualitative content analysis of BH's 2012 public messages. He pointed out that the group was largely reliant on domestic politics with a reduced quest for internationalisation. Also, as identified by Drake (1998), the analysis of public communications of terrorist groups, which on certain occasions come in transcribed versions of video messages, is indispensable as it helps to highlight the groups' ideology, hidden messages and probable targets or objectives. Likewise, transcripts are cross-checked with other sources and transcripts available to eliminate discrepancies via triangulation (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 1994). Similar transcripts were sought from different sources, and the main source video for which the transcripts were extrapolated, recovered and assessed. Disparities were checked and gaps rectified where these were found, such as the use of the name 'God' transcribed and 'Allah' for which 'Allah' is also usually used to refer to 'God.'

In effect, validity refers to how relatable the information or data gathered is to the research objective, research questions vis-à-vis ideas and notions being investigated - the importance and suitability of data collected with the research at hand (Crossman, 2007). Regarding media sources, validity connotes trustworthiness and credibility of a discussion (LIBPWP, n.d) or, as aptly captured by Jary and Jary (1995: 714), "The extent to which a measure, indicator or method of data collection possesses the quality of being sound or true." Validity engages with the author's credentials for the information material and the source of information, including references to fact check the information contained in the source (Krueger, 2016; LIBPWP, n.d). In the same vein, validity investigates the level at which one can depend on the data and data source, which relies on closeness to the happenings and the author's neutrality, among others (Crossman, 2007). Therefore, accessing the reliability/validity of the

media source also involves investigating the envisioned audience of the author or purpose of writing (Krueger, 2016).

Moreover, specific sources may have certain biases, and they may also be more trustworthy than others (Krueger, 2016), such as newspapers that are seen as highly trustworthy than, for instance, magazines. In the same vein, newspapers are good sources of awareness for history learners but should not be employed as the sole information source (Baumgartner, 1981). Therefore, the transcripts sought by the researcher had to be cross-checked, as earlier stated with other newspapers, to prove the transcript was accurate in transcriptions and documentation of happenings. Additionally, the second research method, which aids in the triangulation of data sources, is the secondary research method, which is explained in the following section.

4.1.2 Secondary Research Method

As used in this research, the secondary research method offers the investigation, examination and exploration of previously existing data or reassessment of information from primary sources (Lamont, 2015; O'Leary, 2014). This is essential as secondary research sources provide a different narrative on particular perspectives, which include textbooks, journals, peer reviews and papers that interpret, analyse and review research work or reanalysis of data previously analysed or collected by others for various other purposes (BGSU, 2019; Johnston, 2014; Lamont, 2015; O'Leary, 2014). Essentially, like documentary analysis, as earlier stated, secondary data analysis is cost and time-effective in data collection. Also, it allows for the collation of data that would have otherwise been difficult to access (BGSU, 2019; Johnston, 2014; O'Leary, 2014).

Furthermore, secondary research takes an empirical process that infuses research principles with existing data while following clearly defined processes (Johnston, 2014; Lamont, 2015). In the current study, secondary research involves the utilisation of media articles, textbooks, journals and periodicals to assess the analysis of studies on BH and ISIS public statements by scholars. Such scholars involved in the analysis of BH and ISIS include Celso (2015), Gourley (2012), Akbar (2015), Alkhshali and Almasy

(2015), Elbagir *et al.* (2015) and Osley (2015), among others, and most of their works have been summarised in Chapters two and three. Likewise, the case study research design has been chosen for the current research because it is helpful for the testing and application of theories (Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008). It also allows for an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon within a given case and understanding the phenomenon across a wide range of variables or cases (Shuttleworth, 2008).

4.1.2.1 Advantages of Secondary Research

Secondary data provide an avenue for background knowledge and understanding of a topic or phenomenon when undertaking research (Lamont, 2015). The data also act as literature review sources, ensuring proper understanding of the problem under study through background research or literature review and offers a footing for assessment and evaluation of data the researcher may have collected (Lamont, 2015; MSG, 2019; Shuttleworth, 2008). Hence, to Cameron (2018), secondary research is usually less laborious, convenient, and inexpensive. Unlike primary research, it provides data and analysis from a different perspective, which is usually time-saving and less expensive (MSG, 2019).

Similarly, as earlier mentioned, data from secondary sources help to validate and make precise the data sourced from primary research – triangulation (Bowen, 2009; Lamont, 2015). This is because secondary data helps to reveal the gaps needed to fill in current research with supplementary data, usually from primary sources (MSG, 2019). Secondary data are readily available, for which doing online searches for sources becomes a lucrative venture which would have in most cases only been assessed by visiting libraries and asking for experts' assistance. Likewise, data from secondary sources are usually already analysed, evaluated, and structured, which can be used to understand a particular phenomenon, shedding light and expertise on concepts or aspects of any research (Cameron, 2018).

4.1.2.2 Disadvantages of Secondary Research

Notwithstanding the advantages of secondary research, several limitations to secondary research methods exist. If the data previously collected was initially for a different purpose and is unsuitable for the current research, that questions the validity of the material sources to the question under investigation. Also, there could be a dearth of requisite data or inaccuracy as sources may contain information not required by the researcher, which may become laborious to filter out the most salient information (BGSU, 2019; Lamont, 2015; O'Leary, 2014). There is also the information compatibility with the research at hand as data or information from secondary sources is usually from research conducted for several other purposes other than that of the current research. Therefore, this becomes tedious as the researcher has to sieve through a colossal amount of data to arrive at the salient points required for the research (Cameron, 2018; Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008).

Another issue with data received from secondary sources is the timely relevance of the data content. Suppose any aspect of the information is outdated. In that case, the use of such information by the researcher only causes the research to be fraught with inconsistencies and inaccurate results or become inconclusive as the information is outmoded or inaccurate (Cameron, 2018). In essence, secondary data is required and of great importance, especially for triangulation in the current study. Understanding how the analysis was arrived at from the previous research and comprehending the data collection process, the predisposition held by the previous researchers and the timely nature of data, the availability of the data, accuracy and relevance need also be considered (MSG, 2019).

Based on the preceding, this study attempts to take advantage of the benefits of the triangulation of primary research (documentary research) and secondary research using a case-study approach while applying thematic content analysis using the NVivo software (White *et al.* 2002; Gerring *et al.*, 2008; Bennett and Elman, 2007). This is highly essential to answer the following questions:

Research questions

- **What similarities/differences exist between BH and ISIS?**

- **What influence does ISIS have on BH's terrorist propaganda?**
- **How has ISIS shaped BH's terror campaign in Nigeria?**

Answering the posed research questions involves applying thematic content analysis to the collated data. The immediate section explains the qualitative research method applied.

4.2 Qualitative Research Method

As explained in Chapter one, qualitative research has been applied for several reasons, such as the fact that it allows for the production and analysis of data, most especially textual data in the way of transcripts. The research method is essential as it follows an empirical process that allows existing data to be used with clearly defined processes (Johnston, 2014). Quantitative research is mainly used “when ‘factual’ data are required to answer the research question; when general or probability information is sought on opinions, attitudes, views, beliefs or preferences” (Hammarburg, Kirkman & De Lacey, 2016: 499). This specifies the percentage or number of BH fighters influenced by ISIS or belonging to a high social class. Instead, qualitative research performs the functions of investigating individuals' experiences, attitudes, and beliefs for most participants that are generally not given in numerical values, which takes the form of interviews and analysis of documents and texts (Hammarburg, Kirkman & De Lacey, 2016).

Moreover, according to Hammarburg *et al.* (2016), qualitative research helps unearth and discover previously unknown ideas and facts. Hence, the qualitative research method is applied here as the analysis of BH and ISIS texts, documents and materials are used essentially to gain insights into the groups' beliefs, ideologies and knowledge, similarities as well as any means of reproduction and replication of violence by one group of the other's tactics. Through this, “content analysis” – Thematic content analysis is used to extrapolate essential information and communication within texts. The following section will elucidate the concept of content analysis.

4.2.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful mediums/forms) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2011: 18). The method is a pivotal research method in political communication compared with other methods used for data analysis (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Benoit, 2013). It is a “method that provides a systematic and objective means to make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data to describe and quantify specific phenomena” (Downe-Wambolt, 1992: 314). Downe-Wambolt goes further to justify the use of content analysis as a more rigorous process that supersedes the act of counting (Downe-Wambolt, 1992). The content analysis aims to juxtapose results within qualitative research based on their context explained as part of a document. Moreover, content analysis stipulates ways of assessing the extent of the contents of messages available in various forms, from text to video (for example, Berg & Lune, 2012; Benoit, 2013).

Furthermore, Benoit (2013) enunciates that content analysis involves the detailed description of ideas contained within messages. Hence, content analysis can be employed to describe a group of related messages to draw inferences about the sources of the messages or the reception of those messages by their audience (Benoit, 2013). For this research, inferences are drawn from BH and ISIS (as sources) and not about the audience reception of these messages (content consumers).

As an advantage, content analysis helps to ensure that researchers working at convergent times and circumstances have the same results when using comparable data and techniques (Krippendorff, 2011). Concerning validity, research can be publicly analysed, and the assertions made can be carefully measured against accessible proof for reliability (Krippendorff, 2011). As a widely used research method, qualitative content analysis was used by Evelsage (2013) to analyse BH’s public statements for the year 2012 against the group’s transnational intentions. He concluded that BH is a manifestation of domestic and international catalysts of activities by the government, which resulted from its military confrontation in the year 2009 where its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed. The

scholar also mentions several aspects of international incidents affecting the group's increase in threats and criticisms. For instance, the criticism received by the then President of the US, Barack Obama, from the group came as a result of the ascription by the US of three of BH members as terrorists (Eveslage, 2013). However, Eveslage concluded that though BH had some tendencies of 'internationalisation,' the group had no intentions of going international with its attacks (such as attacking the West like ISIS) except attacks against neighbouring countries like Chad (Eveslage, 2013).

4.2.1.1 Rationale for using Content Analysis

Content analysis is a common technique in International relations similar to discourse analysis used in examining political and social communication whether with text, videos, films or other forms of communication (Berg and Lune, 2012). As identified by Benoit (2013: 270), content analysis places emphasis on vocal features of messages conveyed in "arguments, claims [and], themes" (Benoit, 2013: 270). However, the three criteria for identifying categories and measuring contents of any message include thoroughness, common restrictiveness and significance of the content. For thoroughness, pivotal aspects of the content and message are expected not to be ignored. Common restrictiveness ensures that only one category can be used for any aspect of the text that is coded. Also, significance ensures the relevance of the categories to the research, both the question and hypotheses, if any. As a pivotal method of analysis in political communication, content analysis has been chosen in the present research to identify "patterns in communication" (Lamont, 2015: 91) between BH and ISIS. Moreover, it has the advantage of not being secluded to a single form when it comes to analysis (Lamont, 2015). Hence, it is essentially valuable for the current era of swift advancement in social media and internet communication technology as it provides opportunities for the researcher "to examine [a] large amount of data derived from social communication through categorization and coding" (Lamont, 2015: 169).

Content analysis is generally "a means of analyzing data" (Bos and Tarnai, 1999: 660). The central theme of content analysis is that several expressions can be made concerning texts based on social

reality as interpretations and results from the analysis depend on social reality (Bos and Tarnai, 1999) and focus on verbal elements of messages. Bos and Tarnai (1999: 661) identified a historical aspect of content - "Hermeneutic content analysis" which interprets and explains texts by using the central concept to make the study understandable for readers by way of a "modernization process." By modernization process, texts are understood based on a pre-arranged format, and the idea intended by the text's originator is usually extrapolated. Moreover, contents are best understood by looking at the whole, then the single meanings and vice versa (Heidegger, 1984). Due to the inability to receive the ideologies of the terrorist groups from the groups themselves, content analysis is feasible in the current study as it enables the researcher to unearth information from their communication (Drake, 1998). Also, as a way of measuring dimensions of content of any form of message (Benoit, 2013), content analysis enables the researcher to categorically specify the scope of the analysis where representatives of a larger sample can be chosen with the benefit of creating a favourable timeframe, (Lamont, 2015), in this case, 2012-2016.

Additionally, public statements, videos and publications represent the means of communication through which prospective members of the group and the rest of the world are sensitised to the activities and ideologies of terrorist groups (Eveslage, 2013). Content analysis of communication, especially terrorist statements, is worthwhile (Altier *et al.*, 2012) as it helps to illuminate a group's ideology, hidden messages and probable targets (Drake, 1998; Eveslage, 2013). Likewise, Eveslage, in 2013, conducted a content analysis of BH's 2012 public messages. Most research techniques used for understanding terrorist groups, such as interviews, provide infinitesimal information as groups tend not to reveal their agenda under normal circumstances, leaving very few sources such as video transcripts used for this purpose (Eveslage, 2013). More so, the focus of this research is the qualitative research method as it produces data, especially textual data in the form of transcripts (Zamawe, 2015). Qualitative content analysis permits the researcher to identify the fuller context of data, allowing for a much broader account and explanation. Altheide and Schneider (2013) positively perceive

qualitative content analysis as it offers the researcher the opportunity to use a continuous comparative practice concerned with recognising themes, meanings, and forms in texts instead of identifying occurrences and numerical arithmetic interpretations. Furthermore, as observed by Drake (1998), content analyses of statements help understand the ideology of a group or sect and plausible objects of attack. In the same vein, analysing statements and speeches and other contents, including symbols of terrorist groups, prove very beneficial and valuable in unearthing the correlation between terrorist attacks and the nature of the group rhetoric (Altieret *et al.*, 2012). The following section investigates the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative content analysis.

4.2.1.2 Qualitative Content Analysis Vs Quantitative Content Analysis

Philip Mayring, a German intellectual around the 1980s, developed the most well-known qualitative content analysis technique applied in the present research (Kohlbacher, 2006). There are two forms of content analysis, quantitative and qualitative thematic content analysis (Mayring, 2002). Qualitative content analysis involves using coding standards founded on the research questions identified in this research and the theoretical framework (identified as contagion theory), which is fundamentally developed through careful review of the material for inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning (Mayring, 2002). The codes are juxtaposed with erstwhile codes and methods (Mayring, 2002). Qualitative content analysis allows for the "empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models without rash quantification" (Mayring, 2002: 5). The current research employs inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning to bring about knowledge with the qualitative research framework.

Inductive reasoning entails "reasoning [or understanding] carried out from data to generality" (Olsen, 2007: 1). It deals with the themes that emerge from the research that helps to build the theory to be studied. Hence, the researcher's engagement with the research and findings informs the theory development and enquiry as a whole (Bryman, 2012). Induction ensures that data informs the research (theory) through real-world settings by taking a holistic view while the researcher becomes

immersed in the data (Bengtsson, 2016; Bryman, 2012; Mohajan, 2018). Deductive reasoning is how the researcher engages with the data by identifying predetermined contexts while testing postulations and hypotheses (Berg, 2001). It is also a form of “reasoning from generality to data via hypothesis testing” (Olsen, 2007: 1). Here, based on concepts that have already been identified from preliminary studies, the researcher makes a hypothesis that is examined during the ongoing research process. The concepts and theories are either validated or invalidated by the research findings (Bryman, 2012). Abductive reasoning represents interpretation and analysis by researchers using a predetermined and continuously redefined set of thoughts from engagement with the chosen theory and data in general (Danermark et al. 2001; Fletcher, 2017) or “reasoning from immersion in a scene to a verbal summary” (Olsen, 2007: 1). Here, data is interpreted, developed and redefined based on the researcher’s engagement with the research and data available – giving a form of a defined and redefining process as the research is underway. In essence, inductive reasoning is from observations and findings to theory; deductive reasoning involves data engagement from theory to observations and findings, while abductive reasoning is between both in terms of reasoning (Bryman, 2012).

Objectively, quantitative content analysis, also another variant of thematic content analysis, involves the objective portrayal of manifest messages (understanding the superficial messages in context) within any given text or communication. However, qualitative content analysis is suitable for the current study as it looks further to involve the subjective analysis and interpretation of latent messages in contexts and follows the recognition of themes/patterns to a logical conclusion (Bryman, 2012; Florian *et al.*, 2015; Kohlbacher, 2006; Shannon, 2005). Likewise, qualitative content analysis fits any research as the coding process is attuned to fit with the research questions and material at hand, making it possible to use only relevant data set when and where required from extensive data set or content (Mayring, 2002). It is methodical as it entails using salient material in analysis, following sets of procedures and allows the researcher to assess the level of reliability during this process (Schreier, 2012). As identified by Gläser and Laudel (1999), qualitative content analysis aims to apply theories in

the analysis of data while developing the “qualitative-interpretative” aspects of data analysis (Mayring, 2002: 2).

That notwithstanding, the process of reviewing documents, text or communication is usually qualitative even when they contain figures – a characteristic of quantitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2013). Similarly, just as advocated by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) and Mayring (2000) and also used in the current research, qualitative content analysis at times imbibes the advantages of quantitative content analysis in the form of frequency count or repetition. Though the content analysis process is advantageous, it bears some disadvantages and shortcomings, explained in the next section.

(i) Advantages and Limitations of Content Analysis

Regarding the advantages of content analysis, it is essentially conventional to employ transcripts as the units of analysis and samples for any study. These transcripts can be translated and widely used for analysis in different contexts and times (Abubakar, 2016; Eveslage, 2013; Mohmood, 2017). Moreover, qualitative content analysis allows for replication, thereby ensuring reliability, in addition to presenting unbiased interpretations of latent themes and events previously not apparent to manifest readers (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Kohlbacher, 2006). It is also an unintrusive and modest method that allows the researcher time and space to analyse data, free from intervening and intermingling with the subjects under study, which could influence the behaviour of any subject under investigation (Rose *et al.*, 2015; Vaismoradi, 2015).

That notwithstanding, some scholars such as Rose *et al.* (2015) and Vaismoradi (2015) feel that content analysis cannot be unbiased as researchers have to choose and catalogue data correctly and decide how to interpret certain types or particular forms of behaviour, attitudes and themes. Moreover, while quantifying the relationship between specific units of analysis, it is somewhat impossible to discuss the quality of relationships. However, this is what qualitative thematic content analysis tries to achieve. While quantitative content analysis describes the relationship, qualitative

thematic content analysis (qualitative analysis) explains how these relationships affect those involved (Rose *et al.*, 2015; Vaismoradi, 2015).

Therefore, thematic content analysis is used in this study (Bowen, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). It ensures the use of significant and pertinent passages of text or data to determine aspects of the study, such as the relationship between terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, rather than only the quantitative frequency and word count. Thematic content analysis as applied in this study is explained in the next section.

4.2.1.3 Thematic Content Analysis

The presence of themes is a requisite in any qualitative analysis as thematic analysis is a commonly used qualitative content analysis technique that is flexible. It involves the search for, analysis, and commentary on patterns within several contexts (such as texts) (Braun & Clarke, 2003). The method applies epistemological/theoretical (knowledge and belief) and ontological (categories, properties and relations) perspectives within the research (Roulston, 2001). Braun and Clarke (2006) also provided a straightforward step-by-step procedure or breakdown required in conducting thematic analysis (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

As advocated by Attride-Stirling (2001), thematic analysis provides a stance as to how the current research develops, mainly with the assumptions used in data analysis which can be used to assess the result appropriately. This also helps to juxtapose the current research with other studies or future research of a similar nature. However, it is worth mentioning that “there is no one ideal theoretical framework for conducting qualitative research, or indeed one ideal method” instead, the theoretical framework and approaches should align with the researcher’s idea of what constitutes knowledge. The current researcher tries to ensure this by choosing contagion theory, which can be assessed by examining texts. These are appropriately recognised and accepted (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 8).

Any theoretical framework should have certain assumptions regarding the nature of data, what they represent in terms of reality and the world, which thematic analysis tries to make apparent. Hence,

Critical realism (CR) is essential for the thematic analysis of the documents (units of analysis) used in this study as it describes experiences, meanings and realities (of these terrorists), as well as broader social contexts that impinge on those experiences (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This is because thematic analysis allows for an extensive array of pattern-related analysis of different units. Thematic analysis presents certain levels of flexibility with technique, for which the researcher has taken extreme care to elucidate what is being undertaken and what has been done. Also, the researcher has ensured that what is being done coincides with what he set out to do (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This is done by applying the postulation of the theory and the method (Reicher & Taylor, 2005).


4.2.1.3.1 Planning Thematic Content Analysis

Understanding what constitutes a theme is essential in planning thematic content analysis. As such, a theme is categorically a section of words or phrases of importance within the context of data regarding the research question and depicts an extent of “patterned response in addition to meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 10). Researchers can form themes from their judgement as no strict rules guide creating or developing themes. This is pivotal as themes and sub-themes are in the process of investigation and analysis. Therefore, a theme’s relevance is determined by its ability to capture the essence of the research question and not determined by quantifiable measures (Braun & Clarke, 2006) as the themes are extrapolated from the unit of analysis [online transcripts of the terrorist groups BH and ISIS].

In the same vein, the main steps that should be followed during the planning stages of any content analysis as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below include: “the aim, the sample and unit of analysis, the choice of data collection method, the choice of the analysis method and the practical implications.” More so, as previously mentioned, a research journal is kept to document the process of deciding which data is to be analysed, how the themes are arrived at, and measures of analysis, among others. Still, the technique of data collection and the consequences for the present research is based on inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning (Morse & Richards, 2002; Bengtsson, 2016) through the texts

analysed to test the contagion theory and principles. As earlier mentioned, inductive reasoning enables data to inform the theory and consequently the research as the researcher is immersed in the data (Bengtsson, 2016; Mohajan, 2018), and deductive reasoning is the process by which the researcher engages with the data by identifying predetermined contexts while testing the theory (Berg, 2001). As illustrated in Table 1.1, these predetermined themes represent the pivotal characteristics of Jihadist fifth Wave Groups as identified by Celso (2015). These characteristics include but are not limited to the rejection of the existing social-political order, the idealisation of a mythic past, kidnapping vis-à-vis brutalisation of women and children, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, unrestrained violence and charismatic leadership (Celso, 2015: 257). The abductive reasoning represents data interpretation based on a theory with a given set of ideas (theory) continuously developed as new ideas, themes and codes emerge during the research process (Danermark *et al.* 2001; Fletcher, 2017).

Figure 4. 1 Overview of Thematic Content Analysis from Planning to Final Presentation



(Source: Bengtsson, 2016: 11)

4.3 The Use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS):

Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) has become known following technical advancement from large to individual computers (Bos and Tarnai, 1999). It serves as an intermediary for data management. The files required as units of analysis such as transcripts can be imported to, retrieved from and saved on the computer (Bos and Tarnai, 1999). However, with CAQDAS, both "qualitative and quantitative content analysis" are somewhat impossible to segregate, and the software sometimes merges the benefits of both, making it costly and time-consuming to

have all figures and texts scanned to the computer (Bos and Tarnai, 1999: 668; Mergenthaler, 1996). That notwithstanding, the development of categories is the pivotal and focal point of content analysis that is quickly done and accessed via CAQDAS. Here, data can be investigated, organised and corrected while operationalising the hypothetically perceived classifications (Bos and Tarnai, 1999). Likewise, CAQDAS ensures that a plethora of procedures can be employed regarding the organisation, analysis and examination of documented data (Bos and Tarnai, 1999).

Moreover, CAQDAS helps to improve the reliability and validity of categories as it ensures the interrelatedness of categories and variables (Conway, 2006). The researcher utilised the advantages of the NVivo software to achieve the coding objectives. While the researcher coded, the software was used for collating the unit of analysis from the coding. Also, NVivo CAQDAS benefits time efficiency, as texts can be meaningfully analysed faster, collated and retrieved in real-time, unlike 'manual coding' or working without software.

For CAQDAS, the analysis will go through the process of inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning. As mentioned earlier, inductive reasoning informs the research by real-world settings and guides the research when recognising patterns and hypothetical elements in the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). On the other hand, deductive reasoning is how the researcher engages with the data by identifying predetermined contexts and knowledge while testing postulations and hypotheses (Berg, 2001; Lamont, 2015). After this, narratives and categories would be established while the coding of keywords and themes commenced (Lamont, 2015). Coding is "the process of coming up with words that represent a particular concept of [the] category [under study]" (Lamont, 2015: 90) that is aided essentially by qualitative data analysis software (NVivo). This allows for the ability to code a large number of terms not easily achievable when undertaken manually. Following the coding of texts into categories (themes), trends and patterns can be easily identified (Lamont, 2015). Moreover, the deductive approach is essential for this research for the inductive approach is usually criticised as

biased and invalid in a study as variables may be measured just after they have been identified rather than having coding rules set out before observation (Neuendorf, 2002; Macnamara, 2015).

Another process of reasoning that this research follows is the process of abductive reasoning - "theoretical redescription" (Fletcher, 2017: 188). Here, data is redefined based on theoretical perceptions. The phrase infers that thought operation takes the form of interpretation through a given set of thoughts and models. There is also a perfect understanding that a theory is not infallible, allowing for engagement with the chosen theory (Danermark *et al.*, 2001; Fletcher, 2017). Therefore, the abduction process comes from an incomplete observation of texts or themes to the best prediction of themes. As such, specific ideas and themes were observed during the current research, such as the mention of Ibn Taymiyyah by ISIS in its Dabiq publications and the preference of Ghanimah and Fay (spoils of and without war, respectively), and the need to erode existing socio-political structures existent in democracies (Celso, 2015). These contents play a crucial role in deciding whether themes can be created and further investigated to fit the theoretical disposition. The aforementioned attests to the theoretical redescription as themes that were unearthed during the coding process, serving as incomplete observations, came to either be used within the study or discarded for lack of support.

Some textual data had been selected for coding, while other themes emerged while engaging with and coding the transcript. The inductive codes or themes emerging from the data analysis include dishonesty from the government, the distaste for media houses by both terrorist groups, enmity with security services, unrestrained violence, and taking responsibility for attacks, among others.

Conversely, NVivo helps to categorise many codes and themes, providing annotations, links and opportunities for coding as much as is required, allowing for the itemisation of themes that carry a "particular message in sentence form" (Lamont, 2015: 91). Essentially, though, there are other data analysis software available such as ATLAS.ti, MAXqda among others (Lamont, 2015; Zamawe, 2015), Middlesex University provides access to different software, and NVivo is easily accessible and

comprehensible based on personal preferences and its qualitative analysis qualities. Moreover, NVivo CAQDAS aids the collation, storage and retrieval of analysed research materials and units of analysis.

4.3.1 Rationale for using CAQDAS: NVivo Software

The systematic use, collection and analysis of qualitative data is essentially labour and time intensive as already established. Hence, the need for CAQDAS is to correct these issues and make for compelling, accurate and speed coding, in-depth engagement with the data, and ease of data retrieval (Bezeley, 2007). NVivo is essentially used in this research. It supports several forms of data with excellent features, ranging from word frequency count, coding to multimedia usage, and extrapolation of analysis in charts, among others used to aid qualitative data management (Zamawe, 2015).

Additionally, the software works well with various qualitative research designs and data analysis methods such as content analysis and discourse analysis. As rightly captured by Zamawe (2015) in his paper, titled “The Implication of Using NVivo Software in Qualitative Data Analysis: Evidence-Based Reflections,” NVivo does not necessarily influence the research design for which it is applied. Still, it works well with grounded theory and thematic analysis approaches (the current research is thematic analysis based). NVivo also allows the researcher to link different ideas together from different sources or units of analysis (Zamawe, 2015). NVivo has been used as it aids the coding and restructuring of nodes (coded themes), which increases the precision, validity and reliability of qualitative studies as the process of arriving at the research findings and conclusions can be followed (Bezeley, 2007; Zamawe, 2015).

Although the advantages of NVivo are plenty, it still should not be exclusive when it comes to data analysis as NVivo does not replace the researcher/analyst (McClafferty and Farley 2006; Zamawe, 2015). Also, it is challenging to learn as the process is time-consuming but highly beneficial once it has been learned. Moreover, the main reason for NVivo and other CAQDAS is to assist in the data analysis process and data management. During the study process, new themes, analytical tractability and

transparency of the research process are the imperative reasons for employing the NVivo CAQDAS (Florian *et al.*, 2015).

Nvivo, as used in this research, aids analytical flexibility, trustworthiness and transparency of the research process; however, the software cannot analyse the data, which is the function of the researcher (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Mclafferty and Farley 2006). More so, the current research employs a Multi-level coding approach as proposed by Florian *et al.* (2015), which infuses the advantages of quantitative and qualitative qualities in analysis, giving the researcher more room to go ‘to and fro’ within the coding and investigative process. Qualitative thematic analysis was carried out on all transcripts from social media sources and 15 Dabiq online publications between 2012 and 2016, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.

(i) Advantages and Limitations of Using Software for Qualitative Content Analysis

Using software for qualitative content analysis ensures the proper organisation and management of extensive data in a single file which could have quickly gone missing if separated into different files (Bazeley, 2007, Marshall, 2002; Ryan, 2009). Also, CAQDAS aids in the graphical presentation of data and reports that enable graphs to properly understand the research results and findings (Schreier, 2012; Lewins & Silver, 2007). However, scholars like Macmillian (2005) argue that the use of CAQDAS sometimes results in inadequate transparency, methodical flexibility or lack of explanation or detailing of the use of the software during the analysis process, which is usually contained in the methodology sections of different researches (Johnston, 2006). The software is likely not efficiently and adequately used in answering the research questions (Bourdon, 2002). However, CAQDAS is an added advantage to any qualitative research for which the research methods guide the researcher, theoretical foundation, and the research questions and process explained (Macmillian, 2005).

Qualitative content analysis (QCA) further incorporates some aspects of quantitative research, unlike Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) which is explicitly aimed at the identification and explanation of texts (Florian *et al.*, 2015). In the same vein, as “... Content analysts have to be more explicit about the steps

they follow than qualitative scholars need to be" (Krippendorff, 2013: 89). As advocated by Florian *et al.* (2015), this research employed the 'multi-level coding process' (as previously explained). The steps and stages used during the research process are properly documented and followed in the preceding sections.

4.3.2 Steps used in Answering the Research Questions Using NVivo CAQDAS

The researcher used the NVivo 10 software throughout the current research and learned the data collection process of transcripts and the logic behind the workings of the software, data entry, and organisation. The researcher learnt the 'top-down and bottom-up coding' process in conjunction with the graphical representation of data showing results advocated by Jager and Maier (2009 in Florian *et al.*, 2015). Having looked at the different software that exists and considering the limitations fraught by software usage, it was discovered that CAQDAS like NVivo and MaxQDA only aid diverse researchers in data organisation and analysis and not in the actual analysis, which is the prerogative of the researcher (Lewins & Silver, 2007). The software could be easy to use and be checked by others as required; given the available alternatives, NVivo fit the requirements as established.

Other limitations exist, such as the financial implications and time constraints involved in learning the workings of the software (Bergin, 2011; Bos and Tarnai, 1999; Macmillan, 2005). There is also a limitation on the researcher's input in the research process resulting in an inadequate review of the documents (Bazeley, 2007). Understandably, it is the sole responsibility of the researcher to identify what documents constitute the units of analysis founded on the theoretical framework and research questions that should not limit the imaginative function of the researcher (Ryan, 2009). Middlesex University provides the license fee and on-site training for the NVivo software, which made it easier for the researcher to learn the intricacies of the software following one of the NVivo software training given by Dr. Lisa Clarke in 2018. This further required the learning of the pre-installed sample Project files for which the lack of understanding of the working of the NVivo software or any QDAS software for that matter could pose a severe threat in guiding the research (Bergin, 2011).

For RQ1, a priori design (code list) was created with themes and codes that appeared in the previously analysed transcripts and online magazine, based on what the researcher intended to investigate (Global Media Analysts, 2008). In this instance, preliminary analysis and previously collated transcripts produced specific codes and themes and those presented in Celso's features of a Jihadist fifth wave group. This understanding is done to understand more than what appeared to be on the superficial within words and text (manifest analysis) and is referred to as latent content analysis (Bengtsson, 2016; Berg, 2001; Downe-Wambolt, 1992; Morse, 1991). Moreover, qualitative research is "less likely to impose restrictive Priori classifications on the collection of data," for which the research is "less driven by particular hypotheses and categorical frameworks and more concerned with emergent themes and ideas (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992: 318).

Furthermore, the research is concerned with "idiographic descriptions" (Cassell and Symon, 1994:4) for better themes, descriptions and analysis. Transcripts from BH and ISIS videos and online magazines will be used as the unit of analysis and analysed using tools of the NVIVO software (Welsh, 2002; Zamawe, 2015). The units of analysis chosen as earlier stated are public statements, videos and publications, which represent the means of communication through which prospective members and the rest of the world are sensitised on the activities and ideologies of the terrorist groups (Eveslage, 2013)

The Coding and categorisation system advocates deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning (Bengtsson, 2016; Mayring, 2000; Ghajar-Khosravi, 2016). While not an exhaustive list, the themes in Table 4.1 are a starting point for understanding the similarities between BH and ISIS, based on transcripts, juxtaposed with activities undertaken by the groups within the time frame and beyond (2012-2016) of activities and scope.

Table 4. 1 Themes and Categories for Similarities between BH and ISIS

S/N	Themes	Keywords/phrases	# of keywords
1	Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order and development of a new society	Democracy, Caliphate, Khilafah, Islamic State, IS, ISIL, ISIS, constitution, western education	9
2	God	God, Allah, Jehovah, Alla	4
3	The idealisation of a Mythic Past and the quest for millennia justice	Dabiq, umma, Takfir, Salafi-Jihads, Jihad	5
4	The brutalisation of Women and Children	Women, girls, limitation on female education, forced marriages, recruitment of boys and other children.	5
5	Ethnic and Sectarian Cleansing	Rejection of Christianity/other religion, genocide,	2
6	Unrestrained Violence	Bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, IEDs, attacks	5
7	Charismatic Leadership	Emir with authority, caliph,	2
8	Distaste for Media Houses	Media houses, Newspaper, publications	3
9	Security services	SSS, Military, Police, Army	4

Developed from Celso (2015: 257) and Ghajar-Khosravi (2016: 88)

For RQs 2 & 3, going by Table 4.1, another priori design of codes (themes) is created as transcripts are analysed for which themes are identified in both BH and ISIS units of analysis while looking at the impact and relevance of ISIS speech and activities on BH. For example, a glorification of ISIS actions in BH's speeches could mean a form of acceptance of ISIS strategy and a need to follow the same route of the former. There is also the need to identify communication systems, how communication is disseminated, and whether subsequent actions, attacks and statements between the groups relate to the theme. For instance, of unrestrained violence or pledging of allegiance) already discussed during the time frame.

4.3.2.1 Using the NVivo Software: Sample Project

The process of using the NVivo 10 while strenuous is like using any qualitative data analysis software for qualitative data analysis (Digregorio, 2000; Florian *et al.*, 2015; Lavery, 2012). One essential gain for using NVivo software is storing a large amount of data in a sole document that can be manipulated as deemed fit by editing, escalating or dispersing to other users (Florian *et al.*, 2015).

Moreover, the software can be used with other programmes the likes used for referencing,, such as RefWorks, etc. It has its note-taking capability as annotation used as the researcher worked on the software (Florian *et al.*, 2015). The process of earning how to use the software involved using the already installed sample folders that held sample projects used as trials to find out how the software worked. After much sample testing, as Schreier (2012) identified, the pilot project was used to ascertain how the NVivo software package could be used for the research. This was created before the primary research data importation of word documents, pdf files, web links for analysis.

4.3.2.2 Basis of Analysis

The basis of analysis within the current study refers to aspects of documents to be examined and critical cues (Krippendorff, 2004). Since thematic content analysis is employed to measure the extent of the content of messages, sample texts should be studied. Among the varieties of samplings available (Benoit, 2013; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe *et al.*, 2005), this research makes use of

'Convenience Sampling' which uses a select population that is accessible and made available (Herek, 1997; McLeod, 2008) and '*Sampling*' is the process of choosing a valid representative from a population being investigated (McLeod, 2008). Other types of sampling include random sampling, which involves "the use of a number of texts for analysis which does not involve the analysis of every member of a population..." among others (Benoit, 2013: 271). The scope and boundary of the research is the time frame between 2012 and 2016, referring to data (transcripts) and online public messages transmitted during this period which will be itemised using convenience sampling. This is because most of the public statements and magazines by BH and ISIS available will be employed except for public statements that only showcase killing and hold no relevance to the discussion of terrorist group ideology and tactics or imitation.

The analysis process will take the form of assessing general communications - terrorist group propaganda videos and various mass media-generated contents. These include magazines and articles on and by the groups finding themes which will be helpful to determine dominant features between the two groups asserting the similarities between both groups and instances of imitation. Themes represent intrinsic aspects of documents (text) (Braun and Clarke, 2006) which in this case are transcribed texts from public messages and documents with regards to the research question, which signify aspects of specific answers or connotations within the document (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Contagion will be tested through this process and determined by identifying if BH discusses ISIS and reiterates the ISIS rhetoric as identified within the characteristics of the fifth wave jihadist groups as proposed by Celso (2015). Similarly, it will involve understanding whether the dominant themes within BH communication tend to eulogise the activities of ISIS and vice versa, which will serve as indications of imitation. Moreover, the transcripts used in this research identify with the research. Also, the ISIS Dabiq online publication produced during the years under study contains excerpts from the group's leaders, the group's grand plan (religious, military and political programs) and how it seeks to achieve this (Gambhir, 2014).

4.3.2.3 The Sample and Units of Analysis

While looking at the units of analysis, it was also essential to understand what kinds of files (which could be text or images) the software would accept for the study (Benoit, 2013). For this study, transcripts employed for BH and ISIS are text files that have been saved in word documents, and NVivo accepts this and the Dabiq pdf files (converted to word documents).

As there is no basis for data required except that it can satisfactorily proffer answers to the research questions (Krippendorff, 2004), the total amount of data is determined by the amount of available transcribed speeches and statements produced in the years of study. BH produced propaganda videos that have been provided in a transcribed format, and ISIS published statements and an online magazine for which Dabiq will be analysed for the years under study (2012-2016). Dabiq is an online propaganda magazine produced by ISIS in different languages, including English. It was used to push and engender Islam, the ISIS propaganda (Abdelaziz, 2014), and the recruitment of extremists with its foremost publication in July 2014 (Giles, 2014). It is based mainly on legitimising the activities of ISIS and its supposed caliphate while inspiring Muslims to migrate to its caliphate (Gambhir, 2014). Approximately five Dabiq magazines were produced between 2012 and 2016, as publication commenced in July 2014 and the last edition in July 2016. Table 4.2 shows the titles of all issues examined in this research and their dates of online publication.

Table 4. 2 ISIS Dabiq magazines and publication dates

#	Dabiq publication	Date of Publication
1	"The Return of Khilafah"	5 July 2014
2	"The Flood"	27 July 2014
3	"A Call to Hijrah"	10 Sept. 2014
4	"The Failed Crusade"	11 Oct. 2014
5	"Remaining and Expanding"	21 Nov. 2014

6	"Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within"	29 Dec. 2014
7	"From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone"	12 Feb. 2015
8	"Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa"	30 March 2015
9	"They Plot and Allah Plots"	21 May 2015
10	"The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men"	13 July 2015
11	"From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions"	9 Sept. 2015
12	"Just Terror"	18 Nov. 2015
13	"The Rafidah from Ibn Saba' to the Dajjal"	19 Jan. 2016
14	"The Murtadd Brotherhood"	13 April 2016
15	"Break the Cross"	31 July 2016

Source: Revolvly (n.d)


Essentially, regarding the unit of analysis, the sample retrieved by the researcher, which was, therefore, analysed "in its entirety or divided into smaller units" (Bengtsson, 2016:10). This asks whether the data collated from BH speeches and ISIS will be analysed as a whole or singly, within their right. In this case, both transcripts will be analysed and coded in the NVivo Software altogether, with each unit of analysis (transcripts and publications) discussed and juxtaposed to identify similarities or differences and imitation vis-a-vis inference between both terrorist groups. This is essentially done to achieve the most dominant themes when comparing similarities and making inferences. The pivotal distinction here is to itemise what is understood or interpreted from the research (Patton, 2002). Data collection techniques were based on the research as no distinct rules exist (Berg, 2001). Though content analysis can be used on various forms of textual materials regardless of the source, the depth of the analysis most definitely relies on the type of data collection method used (Bengtsson, 2016).

4.3.2.4 Data Organisation and Analysis

Learning the inner workings of the software was essential in the organisation of the data for analysis. Following the understanding of the NVivo software through the pre-installed files and priori design - the initial coding to test the coding system, the next stage was the actual importation of the data to be analysed over the given period (scope) of the study (2012-2014).

The database of the Jihadist repository (Jihadi Document Repository, 2014) – a repository of Jihadist material, especially online propaganda materials - was accessed for the ISIS Dabiq online journal collection after receiving personal login details from the University of Oslo in charge. Ethics form and sensitive materials, risk and safeguarding procedure form contained in the Appendix section (Appendix 1, 11 and 111) had to be filled before data collection. The documents and data collected were securely saved and locked out of the reach of non-users. Hard copies were locked away in passcode-required cabinets as requested by Middlesex University (in the filled forms). The Dabiq online publications were saved as pdf files for just the year 2014 and imported into the NVivo software using the source data import function of the software (NVivo), having been converted to word. Google and database searches followed this and Nigerian newspapers searchers such as the Vanguard for BH transcripts. A search was conducted for previous research and analysis within the time frame (2012 - 2016) to find transcripts for BH and online news outlets for transcripts for ISIS and analyses relating to the group. These documents were saved in Microsoft word, divided into years, such as all BH transcripts 2012 saved in a single word file, and the same process was applied to the rest of the documents (in the file). In general, all documents were given a quick review before being imported into the software as sources.


Figure 4. 2 Sample classification of the sources for BH and ISIS (Transcripts used as Units of Analysis)



Source: Research Study (2019)

Figure 4.2 above illustrates a sample classification for the first five Dabiq online publications, with the first publication represented as 01 Dabiq-no. 01-July-2014 and the same format applied to other publications used as units of analysis, while Figure 4.3 below shows the various queries run during the analysis. The Dabiq pdf files had to be converted into word document format to be imported into the NVivo software, after which classifications were created with various values, elements and qualities. The files were then divided and classified according to year, mentions of Nigeria, BH and ISIS. This was necessary to place specific evidence within given criteria which helped for easy access or to verify queries far ahead in the research, which can be influenced as deemed fit by the researcher (Digregorio, 2000). The following section refers to the coding, which is the multi-level coding as advocated by Florian *et al.* (2015), which involves inductive and deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning as employed in this research.

Figure 4. 3 Various Queries undertaken on the NVivo Software



Source: Research Study (2019)

4.3.2.5 Analysis and Coding Process: Multi-level Coding

Qualitative thematic content analysis enjoys the capability of establishing coding structures, initial coding plans, eventual improvement of the coding structure and double coding, which can be verified (Mayring, 2000). The NVivo software aids the easy retrieval of the coding created and used during the thematic analysis ensuring that codes are automatically recorded into the software’s database and interconnected to the source (section or component) of the files where they were coded. The abovementioned allows for seamless movement by the researcher within the source content and analysis. Even the number of themes can be readily accessed in the software (Kuckartz, 2014). Coding involves placing parts of messages or content into nodes (codes) that represent themes or sections of importance (Bazeley, 2007), which can have parent nodes and child nodes, as depicted in Figure 4.4. Here, for example, the parent node is ‘Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order’ while ‘External

Issues' and 'Internal Interests' represent coded child nodes, also representing the breaking down of significant themes/points into more minor themes (nodes) (Florian *et al.*, 2015).

Figure 4. 4 Nodes (themes) coded within the NVivo Software

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Ethnic Cleansing		2	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	18/02/2018 15:5	RE
Charismatic Leadership		4	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	17/08/2018 14:0	RE
Democracy		3	18/02/2018 16:1	RE	03/08/2018 18:0	RE
Development of a New Society		4	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	08/08/2018 18:3	RE
Distaste for media houses		6	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	17/08/2018 20:0	RE
Ibn Taymiyyah		1	17/08/2018 19:4	RE	17/08/2018 19:4	RE
Idealization of a Mythic Past		6	09/02/2018 14:0	RE	17/08/2018 21:0	RE
Kidnapping, Brutalization of Women and Children		5	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	17/08/2018 21:0	RE
Lies from the government		4	12/02/2018 23:2	RE	17/08/2018 21:1	RE
Pledging of Allegiance		2	08/08/2018 19:1	RE	17/08/2018 16:5	RE
Quest for Millenarian Justice		1	09/02/2018 14:0	RE	18/02/2018 16:2	RE
Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order		9	09/02/2018 14:0	RE	17/08/2018 19:5	RE
External issues (global jihad movement)		9	12/02/2018 22:5	RE	17/08/2018 20:5	RE
Internal interests		3	09/02/2018 19:2	RE	18/02/2018 15:5	RE
Religious tension and fundamentalism		2	09/02/2018 21:2	RE	18/02/2018 16:2	RE
Salafi-jihadism		3	09/02/2018 22:3	RE	18/02/2018 16:2	RE
Security services		2	09/02/2018 14:1	RE	18/02/2018 16:0	RE
slavery in Islam		3	18/02/2018 16:0	RE	17/08/2018 21:0	RE
Trouble to make peace		1	08/02/2018 22:2	RE	13/02/2018 21:2	RE

Source: Research Study (2019)

Based on the methodology, the coding started with pre-existing themes (concepts) following deductive reasoning in line with themes proposed by Celso (2015) - characteristics of fifth wave Jihadist groups and assessing how they are used in context. The next step involved inductive reasoning by way of extrapolating themes (concepts) from sources (transcripts) (Bazeley, 2007; Florian *et al.*, 2015) was used. As the research questions determined the whole analysis progression, the flexible system that supports inductive, deductive and abductive coding is referred to as '*Multi-level qualitative data analysis coding*' (multi-level research coding) as earlier indicated (Florian *et al.*, 2015). In line with the preceding, the following sections explain the use of 'multi-level coding' in NVivo 10 software following the qualitative thematic content analysis of transcripts of BH and ISIS propaganda speeches and online Dabiq publications, investigating similarities between both groups and imitation (contagion) within the years 2012 to 2016.


4.3.2.6 Units of Analysis (themes/ Codes/ Nodes)

All transcripts used as units of analysis in the Multi-level coding approach were necessary to link the sources to the research questions. A folder named 'Dabiq' contained all the Dabiq online publications used in the research, while the transcripts folder contained the transcripts for both groups. As advocated by Bazeley (2007 in Florian *et al.*, 2015), the 'query' function of the NVivo software was used to sort out some forms of understanding to check the researcher's previous impressions, such as the idea that BH and ISIS are collaborators and that some form of learning happens between both groups. This enabled the breaking down of the units of analysis which are pivotal to the research, for which the query results were saved so they could be retrieved at a later time or date, worked upon and understood within the 'context' of the text to aid understanding (Florian *et al.*, 2015), for example, the mention of Nigeria by ISIS. The researcher tried to understand the 'context' in which ISIS mentioned Nigeria by investigating the sentences and paragraphs.

The search results conducted were saved and the paragraph adjoining the texts within the content as usual for easy retrieval by the researcher. The next step was to review all transcripts and online

publication and the coding in pre-existing and new nodes. Some concepts such as the ‘distaste for media houses’ were unearthed through abductive reasoning and coded into new nodes. Similarly, surrounding sentences were coded to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the context of nodes (codes). The preceding action was beneficial as coding in ‘context’ gives meaning to the “proportion of the surrounding material that one needs to understand the meaning of a given unit of coding” (Rustemeyer, 1992: 133) to make sense of the whole transcript and message.

Figure 4. 5 Qualitative Data Analysis Software Assisted Multi-Level Coding Design



Source: Developed using Florian *et al.*'s (2015) depiction

Similarly, following from the queries used and run in the software, just like Florian *et al.* (2015), the illustration in Figure 4.5 shows the process of data analysis following from the research objectives using the multi-level coding approach to accommodate inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning. The researcher began with the inductive process (bottom-up coding), which looked to retrieve the nodes and assess the content, thereby coding and recoding the themes needed into other nodes or child nodes. There was also the deductive process (top-down coding) whereby salient aspects of the transcripts were reviewed and coded into nodes. New themes unearthed from the units during analysis were coded in parent nodes, while other nodes (codes) were merged where there was no need for more than one of the same nodes or if the nodes (codes) were identical.

4.3.2.7 Envisioning data and showing findings

Another benefit of the NVivo software is the presentation of findings and results using the tools provided, such as charts, word cloud, coding maps and comparison diagrams (Florian *et al.*, 2015). As Bazeley and Jackson (2013) pointed out that the use of tools aid in determining links between context or data (units of analysis), such as how much a theme is spoken about or the level of importance placed on specific themes (by BH and ISIS). This was also used to understand the relationship between secondary sources of data, codes and themes (nodes) such as analysis made by scholars. All visualisations of data are presented in Chapter Five, which encompasses the sections on data analysis presentation.

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Charts helped illustrate how specific themes developed across the years between both terrorist groups. Likewise, the tools provided easy data retrieval as data presented or visualised were constantly affiliated to the original data source, allowing seamless access to the leading paragraph or full transcript (Florian *et al.*, 2015). The following section itemises the validity and reliability that corroborates qualitative thematic content analysis.

4.3.3 Validity and Reliability associated with Results

The reliability and validity of findings and results are essential due to the hidden rigour of data collection, coding, and analysis, which usually go into qualitative research (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Krippendorff, 2013).

4.3.3.1 Reliability

Reliability is one of the basic concepts required in content analysis and how researchers authenticate the veracity of their research (Leininger, 1994). In qualitative research, reliability refers to “the extent to which two or more coders agree in their analysis of a common pool of texts: Is the variable (dimension of content) being measured” (Benoit, 2013: 273). As researchers create and use texts, disagreements about categories under specific codes or interpreted can arise. When two or more coders consistently disagree on what to categorise or code, it is difficult to decide which interpretation is correct to follow. However, it is much more appreciated when they agree to a certain degree than a person’s peculiarities and interpretations of texts to be followed. Nonetheless, reliability is evident when minor disagreement is envisaged. As such, ‘*intercoder reliability*’ is usually used to adjust low reliability, which is corrected by redrafting the codebook, keeping the same coders and documenting reliability (Benoit, 2013). Therefore, in this regard, lack of transparency in the data collection and analysis process breeds distrust in the results, and the different stages involved in the qualitative content analysis process should be detailed and how the results, as well as assumptions, inference and conclusion, reached defined (Kikooma, 2010; Richards, 2002). The NVivo software can be used in such a way that ramps up the reliability of the research process as the ability of ‘*inter-coder reliability*’ in this process. Nevertheless, the issue of non-transparency within the research can also be eliminated by ‘*inter-coder reliability*.’ This is because the codes and themes, and the process of the research, can be verified by anyone, including other researchers (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Krippendorff, 2013). For this study, the researcher’s Director of Studies and first Supervisor, Dr. Peter Hough, NVivo tutor, Lisa Clarke and Second supervisor, Tunc Aybak, inspected the codes, ensuring reliability and providing second opinions regarding the themes. All processes from methodology to analysis can quickly be

followed through, ensuring multiple researchers can access the codes, nodes and employ visualisation tools that link and lead back to the source transcript (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Johnston, 2006)

4.3.3.2 Validity

Validity is the degree to which the unit of analysis indeed investigates or examines what the researcher (or content analysis) intends to examine and meets the criteria identified while looking into the reliability, as it is done with correlation (Bazeley, 2007; Johnston, 2014; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe *et al.*, 2005). By this, when a pair of studies analyse a similar unit of analysis with dissimilar content analytic techniques, both data units can be correlated. A high relationship engenders support regarding the technique's validity (Benoit, 2013). For validity, predictive validity helps to ensure that the message being measured by content analysis compares to the effects intended to be identified by the researcher. This relationship is summed up as content analysis validity (Benoit, 2013). For example, while analysing the similarities between ISIS and BH, the relationship between both contents helps to corroborate the content analysis validity. In this regard, and as advised during the NVivo software training, a journal for reflections was kept during the research procedure to follow-up the problems of coding and how the issues and the choice of units of analysis relevant to answer the research questions (Bazeley, 2007; Johnston, 2006). In this case, transcripts from propaganda videos produced by BH and ISIS as well as online publications. Developing thoughts, notions and concepts were logged for reflection when required during the research process. This was essential during the abductive coding process of the transcripts, as emerging ideas and themes were recorded and later coded for relevance. As NVivo provided the annotation (journal-note taking) function, emerging ideas could be coded and linked to the source of information, keeping and storing information during the research process. The process of analysis and the recording of this on the NVivo software also had the advantage of being collaboratively shared with supervisors for relevance (Florian *et al.*, 2015).

As corroborated by Lamont (2015), triangulation was used to support or reject results or provide validity to findings and results as contents of transcripts pulled from primary sources of data were

juxtaposed and compared with secondary sources of information and analysis by scholars. There was also the need to understand irregularities and steps taken to correct these issues, such as identifying the reason for the predominance of themes in transcripts and not in the analysis previously offered by scholars and vice versa. While looking at the advantages of using the NVivo software, there are also certain disadvantages, including a well-grounded understanding of the software.

4.3.4 Transcending Limitations of Using CAQDAS

As earlier explained, just as there are several advantages relating to software for qualitative data analysis, such as NVivo used in this study, some disadvantages had to be surmounted to accomplish this study. One of these is that the software cannot analyse the data entirely up to the researcher while the software provides the tools to facilitate this process (Gibbs, 2002; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Scheier, 2012). Here, the researcher did not attempt to use the software to replace his function in the analysis process. Also, as observed by Florian *et al.* (2015) in their paper titled, 'A software-assisted Qualitative Content Analysis of News Articles: Examples and Reflections,' the researcher with a great deal of proximity to the data being analysed is better at understanding the data. However, for reliability and validity of the research process, suggestions and feedback on the coding process were sought by the researcher from NVivo software trainer, Dr. Lisa Clarke and supervisors, Dr. Peter Hough and Dr. Tunc Aybak, during the analysis of data.

Another disadvantage, as Bazeley (2007) claimed, is the shortage of detailed clarification and analysis of data by the researcher owing to the researcher's overreliance on the software, while the qualitative researcher could be super engrossed with the software and fail to observe the most general themes or points to consider. To avoid these, and as stipulated earlier, the '*Multi-level approach*' to qualitative data analysis helped escape the predicament. This is because the researcher has proximity to the data brought the requisite understanding of data, others involved, such as in the case of this study, the supervisors (while being aware of the coding process and data) aided in the introduction of certain constructs and generalisations needed for fusion in the analysis in the concluding phases. This was

necessary for this study to avoid 'surplus-coding,' as supervisors helped the researcher understand when to stop coding and proceed with other aspects of the study. Surplus-coding occurs when a researcher is too engrossed with the data and coding without a foreseeable end (Marshall, 2002). Still, instead, the researcher used properly structured research questions in the analysis process.

4.4 Summary

The current research takes the form of primary research (documentary research) and secondary research methods – mixed methods. Critical realism (CR) is employed as the epistemological framework for this research as it provides flexible steps of coding themes to help understand social issues in different contexts. Primary sources include the use of original data collated from transcripts of terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, propaganda videos, and primarily online publications (Dabiq) between 2012 and 2016. The primary research takes the form of documentary research usually applied in international relations. It is helpful for this research as it helped the researcher gain a great deal in historical aspects of data and was less laborious and inexpensive (Bowen, 2009). The researcher analysed documents via Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) NVivo for easy collation, retrieval, documentation and visualisation of analysis and results (Florian *et al.*, 2015). Also, secondary sources of data - analysis undertaken by other researchers for other purposes was used to aid triangulation. Among these is Celso's (2015) study on the characteristics of fifth-wave Jihadist groups such as 'the rejection of socio-political order,' to which BH and ISIS belong. Though both sources of data (primary and secondary sources) have several disadvantages, the combined advantages outweigh their disadvantages through triangulation, among others, providing time and labour effectiveness (Bowen, 2009). A form of content analysis - thematic analysis, a qualitative analysis technique that identifies themes and patterns in different forms of messages, is used to analyse the units of analysis (transcripts and online publications) (Braun & Clarke, 2006) through inductive, deductive abductive reasoning. The NVivo software was used to properly organize the data using a multi-level coding approach that infuses the advantages of quantitative and qualitative qualities in data analysis (Florian *et al.*, 2015). This was done to overcome the limitations of using

CAQDAS while ensuring the validity and reliability of the findings and documents (units of analysis).

The next chapter provides an understanding of the data analysis and presentation of data.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

“Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism, and everyone knows there are some things that God has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted even western education!”

Abubakar Shekau, 2012

The above quotation is an excerpt from a speech by the leader of BH, Abubakar Shekau (NaijaNedu, 2012), which has been transcribed and utilised by way of analysis through the NVivo software. Shekau is seen to outwardly reject democracy and its tenets such as the constitution, which is seen as ‘*haram*’- forbidden and unwanted, even western education. The phrase flows from the Salafist jihadist ideology, which the group has trailed in conjunction with ISIS (Abubakar, 2016; Cottee, 2010) and forms much of the group’s ideology.

5.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the results collated relating to the application of the theory of Contagion. It involves data analysis and presentation through NVivo, a CAQDAS. The transcripts are analysed, and results are discussed against the backdrop of BH and ISIS, the groups’ similarities and contagion theory. This section explains the thematic content analysis before analysis of the units (transcripts), then presenting data through the NVivo software tools.

5.1 Thematic Content Analysis

The presence of themes in the analysis is a prerequisite in any qualitative analysis; as such, thematic content analysis is essential in this study. Themes categorically represent a section of word or phrase of importance within the context of data regarding the research question, which depicts an extent of “patterned response in addition to meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 10). A researcher’s judgment can represent themes as no strict rules guide when creating or what makes up

themes. This is pivotal as themes and sub-themes can be formed in the process of investigation and analysis. Moreover, a theme's relevance is determined by its ability to capture the essence of the research question and not determined by quantifiable measures (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The themes are extrapolated from the units of analysis.

Therefore, thematic analysis is a commonly used qualitative content analysis technique that is flexible. It involves searching for, analysing, and commenting on patterns within several contexts (such as texts) (Braun & Clarke, 2003). It involves epistemological/theoretical (knowledge and belief) and ontological (categories, properties and relations) perspectives (Roulston, 2001). The current research borders on both views (Roulston, 2001). Braun and Clarke (2006) also provide clear step-by-step stages in the conduct of thematic analysis (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Thematic content analysis has been chosen to provide backing as to how this research will develop. This is done so other researchers can understand what assumptions were used in the analysis process, assess the result appropriately, and juxtapose this with other studies or future research of this nature (Attride-Stirling, 2001). One point to note is that "there is no one ideal theoretical framework for conducting qualitative research, or indeed one ideal method." Instead, the theoretical framework and approaches should align with the researcher's idea of what constitutes knowledge and that these are appropriately recognised and accepted (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 8).

Theoretical frameworks have certain assumptions regarding the nature of data, primarily what they represent in terms of reality and the world, which thematic analysis tries to make evident. In this regard, Critical realism is essential for the thematic analysis of the documents (units of the study) used in this research. It describes experiences, meanings and realities [of these terrorists] and how the broader social context impinges on these experiences (Braun & Clarke, 2006), as thematic analysis refers to an extensive array of pattern-related analysis of units of analysis. Though it presents some form of flexibility in terms of technique, extreme care has been taken by the researcher to elucidate what is being undertaken by applying the postulation of the theory and the method essentially (Braun

& Clarke, 2006; Reicher & Taylor, 2005). The next step follows the [resentation of data analysis using the NVivo software.

5.2 Preliminary Analysis

5.2.1 Units of Analysis

The units of analysis used as identified in Chapter one are video transcripts from both terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, and online publications as presented in Table 5.1. From the years under study, fourteen of BH’s videos were used, with five transcripts in 2012, six in 2013 and five in 2014, with no online publication from the group. There were several other BH Tweets, as represented in the table below. For ISIS, there were five transcripts available in the year 2014, six in 2015, with several of ISIS Dabiq online publications from the year 2014 to 2016 totalling thirteen analysed.

Table 5. 1 Unit of analysis for BH and ISIS from 2012-2016

Year	BH # of transcripts/ Tweets	BH Tweets	ISIS # of transcripts	ISIS Online Publication (Dabiq)
2012	5	30	-	-
2013	6	21	-	-
2014	5	15	5	6
2015	-	32	6	5
2016	-	18	-	4

Source: Research study (2018)


5.2.2 Coding of Transcripts

5.2.2.1 Coding of 2012 BH Transcript

Coding by nodes (coding of themes) for all BH video transcripts was conducted in different years. For the year 2012, as represented in Figure 5.1, BH transcripts mainly dwelled on the distaste for media houses as Nigerian outlets and new agencies were responded to, criticised and threatened with violence (Mahmood, 2017). In this instance, BH was on the verge of destroying or discrediting media houses as lying against the group in its activities and its treatment of Muslims which BH perceived as favourable and acceptable in Islam (Sunday, 2018; The Jurist Law, 2012).

Other themes prevalent in the 2012 transcripts were dishonesty (lies) from the government, religious tension, brutalisation of women and unrestrained violence in declaring war against the security services in Nigeria. This is bearing in mind that the group's former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was extra-judicially killed by security forces (police) in 2009 (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011).

Figure 5. 1 2012 BH Transcript - Coding by Node




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

5.2.2.2 Coding of 2013 BH Transcript

The following coding is that of the year 2013 BH transcripts which reveal, as illustrated in Figure 5.2, that BH, while still bent on internal issues such as criticising the Nigeria government and its actions, at

some point began to look externally beyond the borders of the country (Mahmood, 2017). From the analysis, BH claimed the Nigerian government was dishonest in its ways and actions towards the group, such as attacks attributed to the group. BH claimed they had not orchestrated such attacks (The Jurist Law, 2012, Sunday, 2018). Moreover, there was the rejection of the existing social-political order in Nigeria, such as democracy and adherence to the constitution. Several other aspects of the Nigerian state were heavily criticised by BH and the need to be replaced by an Islamic state run by Islamic laws (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015).

Figure 5. 2 2013 BH Transcript - Coding by Node




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

5.2.2.3 Coding of 2014 BH Transcript

In Figure 5.3, a large part of the BH transcript in 2014 focused mainly on the rejection of the existing social-political order with the second-highest mention involving external issues in the group's global jihad movement. At this stage, there is more discussion about the external environment of Nigeria, such as the neighbouring countries of Cameroon and Niger, among others. Moreover, unrestrained violence and taking responsibility for attacks began to be fully-fledged in this year as well. The Salafi-jihadist ideology was on the rise, and self-glorification and the idea of being ordained by God to undertake terrorist endeavours (Coding results, 2018). This is followed by the threats of kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children. Religious tensions and internal fundamentalism issues still related to Nigeria were also spoken about but concerning other countries. Other themes (areas of focus) that received some form of mention or attention include comments against democracy, the need to develop a new society, the preaching of charismatic leadership, and the urging of members to be involved in ethnic cleansing.

Figure 5. 3 2014 BH Transcript - Coding by Node




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

5.2.3 Coding of ISIS Transcripts

ISIS transcripts were of speeches attributed to its leader al Baghdadi (Iraqi Witness 2014; Jihadist News, 2014). As illustrated in Figure 5.4, terrorism was high with the rejection of existing social-political order unrestrained violence, followed by the idealisation of a mythic past, external issues - looking at global jihadist movement and glorification of appreciation of self. Also, the distaste for media houses was an issue spoken about alongside the disregard for Democracy in Syria, Iraq and the world.

Figure 5. 4 2014 ISIS Transcript - Coding by Node



Source: Nvivo Software Analysis (2018)

5.3 Analysis of Thematic Nodes Coding of Similarities between BH and ISIS

Based on the critical components of the jihadist fifth wave groups identified by Celso (2015) and itemised in Table 1.1, the themes and categories for classifying the similarities between BH and ISIS illustrated in Table 4.1 were coded using the NVivo software. The figures that follow represent nodes (themes), coded and extrapolated from the qualitative analysis software. The 'ball' (in the centre) represents the coded themes, while the page-like figures at the end of the arrows represent the transcripts with coded themes. The transcripts coded are as follows:


Boko Haram: 2012 to 2016 BH transcript (with Twitter transcripts analysed)

ISIS: 2014 ISIS transcript with transcripts in 2015 and 2016.

Dabiq transcripts: 01 Dabiq-no.01-July-2014 (Issue 1), 02 Dabiq-no.02-July-2014 (Issue 2), 03 Dabiq-no.03-Aug-2014 (Issue 3), 04 Dabiq-no.04-Oct-2014 (Issue 4), 05 Dabiq-no.05-Nov-2014 (Issue 5). Other Dabiq publications from Issue 6 to 15 were analysed as well.

Regarding coding, every transcript like BH in 2012, collated by the researcher, was collated in a single file and coded as one in the NVivo software. For example, all five transcripts in 2012 for BH were collated into one Microsoft word document and put through the software for coding, while the Dabiq online publications were analysed separately from other transcripts as they required a longer time to read, code and analyse. The following are the diagrammatic illustrations of the coding analysis for each theme and explanation.

Figure 5. 5 Coding Analysis for the Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)


The theme, the rejection of the existing social-political order, refers to the idea that Muslim communities lack morality and are in a state of ignorance (*Jahiliyyah*) and should become separate from the (immoral) society (Celso, 2015). As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the theme was coded along with all the transcripts from BH to ISIS and Dabiq online publications. It also exists as the most significant similarity between BH and ISIS as of 2014. Under this theme, Shekau in 2014 mentioned the need for the rejection of the existing socio-political system in Nigeria when he said:

“This is from Allah on the need for us to break down infidels, practitioners of democracy, and constitutionalism, voodoo and those that are doing Western education in which they are practising paganism.

“If you say, “I pledge to Nigeria my country,” it is wrong and act [sic] of paganism.” (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: Nigerian Bulletin, 2014).

Here, Shekau blatantly rejects the constitution for which a country (Nigeria) is founded upon, in this instance, the Nigerian law and constitution. He mocks Nigeria’s pledge, which reiterates the need to serve the country (fatherland), referring to the constitution, and its tenets as the source of all paganism vis-à-vis infidelity from western education.

Figure 5. 6 Coding Analysis for the Development of a New Society




Source: Nvivo Software Analysis (2018)

Figure 5.6 is the graphical representation of the theme: *'The development of a new society'* which involves the intense disruption of depraved apostate orders and the establishment of modern versions of the Muslim *'Umma'*. The Caliphate was evident across all BH transcripts and ISIS Dabiq publication. BH reiterated this idea when Shekau mentioned, “I swear, there will be nothing like democracy; there is nothing like the rule of man to people. There is only rule of Allah to the world. Government for people by the people is fake, there will only be law of Allah to people” (Abubakar Shekau, 2013: Nigerian Bulletin, 2013). ISIS sees this as a performance of emigration to their caliphate, swathes of

land across Syria and Iraq occupied by ISIS in 2014 when an article in one of their Dabiq publication stated that: “The State [Caliphate] is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.” (Dabiq all Issues, Gambhir, 2014).

Figure 5. 7 Coding Analysis for the Glorification and Appreciation of Self and ordained by God




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The ‘glorification and appreciation of Self and ordained by God’ to undertake terrorist attacks revealed in Figure. 5.7 was also a theme that cut across a range of transcripts between BH and ISIS. The theme is linked in conjunction with the predominant and large use of ‘Allah’, as illustrated in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. ‘Allah,’ which according to Islam is ‘God’ (Kuppusamy & Lumpur, 2010; Ismaeel and Blaim, 2012) is coded from 2012 to 2014 BH transcripts, 2014 ISIS transcript and Dabiq publications for July (both

publications in the month) and October (just one). ‘Allah’ is used as a way of giving credence to the power of the Islamist terrorist and used on several occasions to taunt security services that they (the terrorists) cannot die until their appointed time. A case in point is where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi makes use of ‘Allah’ while calling upon Muslims to fight against global subjugation and make Hijrah (emigration) to the newly-declared Caliphate in his 2014 speech. He claims that “We fight in God's path and for his satisfaction, and we do not fear the blame of blamers.” (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness (2014)

Figure 5. 8 Coding Analysis for the Idealisation of a Mythic Past



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)


The *'Idealisation of a Mythic past'* as depicted in Figure 5.8 above denotes the restoration of Muhammad’s Medina Community and the caliphate (Celso, 2015). It was essentially existent in BH

transcripts from 2012 and 2014, ISIS 2014 transcript and Dabiq online transcripts published in July, October and November 2014, and evident when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, while calling for Hijrah worldwide, posited that:

“The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims.

O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.” Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014 (Jihadist News, 2014). Here, he sees the swathes of land acquired by the group as a caliphate belonging to Muslims referred to as ‘Medina’ attributed to Prophet Muhammad in 622 (BBC, 2011b, PBS, 2002)

Figure 5. 9 Coding Analysis for Kidnapping and Brutalization of Women and Children




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children, as depicted in Figure 5.11, has been a recurring theme for BH and ISIS. The theme was coded in BH transcripts and two July and October editions of the 2014 Dabiq publications. BH has further claimed to be involved in selling girls and

women into slavery (BBC, 2014) with the recruitment of youths into their ranks. Even ISIS has referred to BH and, at some point, praised the latter group’s kidnapping and terrorist activities in Nigeria in particular, which will be elucidated further in Chapter six (Gambhir, 2014).

Figure 5. 10 Coding Analysis for Ethnic and Sectarian Cleansing (External issues and Global Jihad Movement)




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

As illustrated in Figure 5.10 above, another predominant theme in this research is ‘Ethnic and Sectarian Cleansing,’ which refers to external issues and a global jihad movement. External issues relate to the idea of not just looking at the country from which BH originates (Nigeria) but instead looking into the group’s idea of taking terrorism outwards into the international space with countries such as the U.S. For this, in 2014, the former president of the US, Barrack Obama, proscribed BH and ISIS (BBC, 2016a; Home Office, 2016), for which the groups, especially BH, showed some form of hostility towards the US. Hence, the codes identified the groups' animosity against countries other

than their country of origin. Like the *'Rejection of existing Social-Political Order,'* the theme was also coded for all the years under study.

Figure 5. 11 Coding Analysis for Unrestrained Violence




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

Unrestrained violence was another theme depicted in Figure 5.11 that was paramount for the coding process. The need to threaten to use force is a tactic employed by terrorist groups (Martin, 2013). Unrestrained violence involved attacks against military formations and civilians alike, suicide bombing attacks against soldiers and civilians alike, other religions and fellow Muslims with divergent Islamic

views or ideologies and even fellow un-succumbing Sunnis (Celso, 2015). The theme was coded in four of the Dabiq publications in 2014 and other Dabiq publications, and the 2014 ISIS transcript. BH transcripts were also found to have the theme of unrestrained violence.

Figure 5. 12 Coding Analysis for Charismatic Leadership




Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

BH’s and ISIS leaders, Shekau and ISIS al-Baghdadi, respectively represent a sort of leadership that beckon upon the followership of their members, which they reiterated in their texts (transcripts) coded in the theme “Charismatic Leadership” found in the years BH transcripts in different ways with just a few codings from ISIS in its Dabiq publication. Charismatic leadership illustrated in Figure 5.12 represents self-acclaimed Caliphs, who combine and command religious and military authority (Celso, 2015). Their leadership is spoken of and used to push and encourage more people into their ranks or control order; otherwise, their followers risk the wrath of *‘Allah.’*

A case in point is when while referring to the problems supposedly caused by security services, Shekau complained that, “If people don't [sic] know us, God knows everyone. Everyone knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows what wickedness was meted out to our members and fellow Muslims in Nigeria from time to time” (Abubakar Shekau, 2013: Nigerian Bulletin, 2013). Shekau referred to the circumstances surrounding the death of the group's (BH) founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who commanded religious and military authority from different Muslims in diverse communities while making his power robust as the great crusader for his people. Likewise, Shekau tries to explain that Yusuf's death is seen as the catalyst of the rise of BH as well as several other atrocities caused by the Nigerian security officers in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013; Walker, 2012)


Figure 5. 13 Coding Analysis for the Distaste for Media Houses



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

Figure 5.13 represents an exciting theme, *'The Distaste for Media Houses,'* which was identified during the process of abductive reasoning and was previously non-existent from different works of literature relating to terrorist groups' objectives, including the characteristic of the fifth wave Islamic Jihadists as proposed by Celso (2015). The theme represents the utter dislike (distaste) for media houses due to perceived media misinterpretation of the terrorist groups; and lack of focus on the objective of their actions and activities, such as the government's irresponsible stance to their plight insensitivity of the media. This eventually culminated in the terrorist groups BH and ISIS attacking media houses in different forms. The theme was coded as early as 2012 BH transcripts and in most ISIS transcripts asides from its July 2014 Dabiq Issue 2 publication.

Figure 5. 14 Coding Analysis for Security Personnel



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme ‘Security personnel’ depicted in Figure 5.14 represent phrases [codes] where security service officers such as the military (army), police and State Security Service (SSS) were called out or insulted for their action against the groups which they saw as atrocities or activities against them. In 2009, Mohammed Yusuf was extra-judicially killed in Nigeria’s police custody. The animosity of BH towards the police and other security parastatals grew from non-violent to violent after going underground for a brief moment (Walker, 2012). As such, in a 2012 Speech by Shekau, he lamented that:

“We have said all that needs to be said and everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us... We hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians and those who have betrayed us. Everyone knows what happened to our leader.” (Abubakar Shekau, 2012: Sahara Reporters, 2012)


Shekau perceived the actions of the police in the killing of the group’s leader as an atrocity against the group and Islam; trying to ‘nip the rise of the Islamic State in the bud’ and suffocate any attempts to form another Islamic group following the fall of the Maitatsine uprising (Walker, 2012). Moreover, Yusuf was seen as a Martyr; hence, the claim by Shekau to continuously kill security personnel and Christians giving information to them (the authorities) and acting against the group. The death of Yusuf is also seen as a fundamental reason for increased violence and fighting against the security personnel beginning in the year 2009 (Chothia, 2012; Mauro, 2015; Walker, 2012).

5.4 Abductive Reasoning Theme (Nodes) Coding

During the coding process in the NVivo software, some new themes emerged due to abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning is when data is acted upon based on theoretically based findings (Danermark *et al.* 2001; Fletcher, 2017). Data is redefined based on '*theoretical perceptions.*' This infers that thought operation takes the form of interpretation through a given set of thoughts and models for which there is also a perfect understanding that a theory is not infallible, but the available data increases engagement with the chosen theory, hence, the knowledge of new themes (Danermark *et al.* 2001; Fletcher, 2017). Moreover, abductive reasoning here helps to allow previously unknown themes to be used during the research. Some themes, such as democracy, while not being part of the earlier discussed themes, became established as themes and coded. This was done to aid the proper engagement with the theory significantly as the newly established themes (nodes) will help answer the already stated research questions.

Themes (nodes) such as '*Youth Culture*' and '*Ethnic and Sectarian Violence*' were deemed insufficient to be coded. While these themes were earlier created as critical components of the jihadist fifth wave group by Celso (2015), no word/phrase (context) could be directly attributed to them. For instance, youth use or the grooming of youth for their attacks against individuals and property. Although it is a well-established fact that the use of youth to foster the agenda of terrorists has been a recurring decimal (Celso, 2015). The themes (nodes), as illustrated in the figures below, were unearthed during the process of coding and analysis.


Figure 5. 15 Coding Analysis for Democracy



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme of 'Democracy' represents a government focusing on its people while ruling according to the guidance of the populace. Abraham Lincoln (Abraham Lincoln Online, 1863) defined this as the "Government of the people, by the people, for the people." Shekau perceives otherwise when he stated in a 2013 BH transcript that "Government for people by the people is fake, there will only be law of Allah to people" (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013). For Shekau, democracy is forbidden, and only sharia law as stipulated by Allah should be practised in Nigeria to make it an Islamic State (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015; Cottee, 2010). Democracy illustrated in Figure 5.15 was coded in BH 2014 transcript, 2014 ISIS transcript and ISIS first Dabiq online July 2014 publication. As such, though an abductive reasoning theme, it was not fully established within the research and transcript to be developed into a dominant theme.


Figure 5. 16 Coding Analysis for Slavery in Islam



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme of 'Slavery in Islam' as illustrated in Figure 5.16 was coded in BH transcript and the second July 2014 and October 2014 ISIS Dabiq (Issues 2 and 3) publication. As explained in a later chapter, BH perceives slavery as synonymous with Islam. At the same time, ISIS mentions this as well, while speaking of BH's capture of the Chibok girls in April 2014 as a way of validating its violation of Yazidi women (McLaughlin, 2014; Boghani, 2016; Pham, 2016).


Figure 5. 17 Coding Analysis for Western Education is Infidel



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

Synonymous with the English version of Hausa nomenclature, 'Boko Haram' (BH), is the theme 'Western Education is infidel/forbidden' as pictured in Figure 5.17. The theme represents the use of the term by the terrorist groups in their transcript. It was coded in BH's transcript and ISIS Dabiq online publications.

Figure 5. 18 Coding Analysis for Lies 'Dishonesty' from the Government



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)


Another theme identified during the abductive reasoning is 'Lies (Dishonesty) from the government.' As pictorially depicted in Figure 5.18, BH and ISIS see different governments, such as the Nigerian government, lying against them while producing false figures of attacks, even about attacks claimed by the group. BH sees the Nigerian government as having lied about attacks against civilians and claiming the Nigerian security forces were more involved in the killing. Shekau, in a 2012 transcript, rebuffed the claims of the Goodluck Jonathan administration that the group was in talks with the

government and called the government, 'liars. BH subsequently has a distaste for the Nigerian government. The group believes the government has not been forthcoming with the facts, especially the extra-judicial killing of its founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf (Agbibo, 2013; Walker, 2012). Likewise, Shekau mentioned in a 2012 transcript that BH had no dealings with the government as suggested by the administration (VOA News, 2012).

“In another way they are spreading that we are dialoguing with them, it is a blatant lie. There is nobody that we are dialoguing with. It is a lie and mischief that they are talking with Boko Haram using fake names, and they are boasting that they have found solution [sic] It is a lie, you have not found the solution.

Rubbish and useless liars, there is no single person that you have sat with” (Shekau, 2012: VOA News, 2012). The theme was coded as early as in BH’s transcript and across 2013 to 2014 and ISIS October 2014 Dabiq online (Issue 4) publication.


Figure 5. 19 Coding Analysis for Responsibility for Attacks



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

Figure 5.19 represents the extent of responsibilities claimed by the terrorist groups, which saw a rise, especially BH, from 2012 to 2016. Terrorist attacks from BH in the year 2012 were not as much as other years, and the year 2014 saw BH become the most lethal terrorist group grossing 6,644 killings, while ISIS followed behind with 6,073 deaths (IEP, 2016). Globally in the same year, 2014, BH and ISIS accounted for 51% of terrorism-related deaths (IEP, 2016; Pisa & Hume, 2015). Also, the rate of claims of responsibility made by BH in 2014 and the following years was more prevalent than in previous years.

Figure 5. 20 Coding Analysis for Internal Issues and Interests



Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme of *'Internal issues'*, as identified in Figure 5.20, refers to internal 'fracas' happening within a country such as Nigeria, excluding the need for global jihad. Texts relating to internal events within a state (government) were coded within the theme. Global jihad here refers to the taste for a 'holy war' (Engelkes, 2016) that extends the confines of the terrorist group's country of origin to other countries, resulting in the craving for the establishment of an Islamic State which spans different countries. Shekau explains in a 2012 speech that:

"This short message is to [the] traditional rulers who have been conspiring against us, that they have no hidden places for conspiring against our commitment and worship to Allah. They have entered our way and have no hidden places anymore; this they should know." (Abubakar Shekau, 2012: Abubakar, 2012; VOA News, 2012)

Shekau was speaking about individuals his group perceived as helping security personnel and conducting themselves in an inimical manner to the group's existence. He specifically saw traditional leaders in the communities of Borno state as conspiring against the group in its goals to create an Islamic state and follow the dictates of 'God' for which they threatened attacks against them.

5.5 Summary

Transcripts for BH from 2012 to 2016, ISIS transcripts and ISIS Dabiq publication transcripts were used as units of analysis coded and analysed through the NVivo software, as are graphically represented in the figures in the current chapter. Other graphical illustrations and figures are of codes for which preliminary thematic analysis was made. Themes were sought and analysed within the units of analysis. Similarities coded between both groups include *'the rejection of social-political order'*, *'the development of new society'*, *'appreciation of self, idealisation of a mythic past'*, *'kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children'* and *'global jihad movement'* among other themes. Abductive reasoning also helped unearth previously unidentified themes such as *'lies (dishonesty) from the government'*, *'democracy'*, *'responsibility for attacks'*, and *'slavery in Islam'*.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results extrapolated from the data collated and analysed through the NVivo software. The Chapter presents a complete description and analysis of data. It summarises empirical findings presented in chapter five while venturing into the limitations of the research, research significance and further research opportunities.

6.1 Analysis of Transcripts

6.1.1 Analysis of 2012 BH Transcript

Following from BH transcript coding structure presented in Chapter five, Shekau mentioned the group's reasons for attacking media houses (Mahmood, 2017), that the media was pedalling rumours about them and indulging in actions contrary to the tenets of the group (Islam) (The Jurist Law, 2012). BH's 2012 transcripts and messages also dwelt on the group's distaste for media houses and the vilification of the Nigerian government. Shekau released a video in May 2012 to justify the 2012 bombing of Thisday newspaper and its warfare against other media outlets (The Jurist Law, 2012). According to Shekau, Thisday was targeted by BH for a supposed atrocity that the newspaper had committed as far back as November 2002 in the course of covering a beauty pageant in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria (The Jurist Law, 2012).

Moreover, constant justification and correspondence regarding the media put BH as a terrorist group looking to explain its actions to the media (Mahmood, 2017). Shekau felt the need to speak about the group's activities, who they are and what they care about while criticising supposed dishonesty (lies) by the government (Belo-Osagie, 2015: 10). This is followed by the rejection of the existing socio-political order. BH believes that the detachment from the society that has discarded the truth (*Jahiliyyah* - ignorance) is required by true Muslims (Abubakar, 2016; Celso, 2015). Likewise,

Democracy and its tenets, especially the constitution, which are fundamental constructs of the Nigerian society (Ajayi and Ojo, 2014), are deemed haram (evil and forbidden) and mainly western education (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015; Cottee, 2010). The English translation for Boko Haram (BH) is '*Western Education is Forbidden*' (Abubakar, 2016; Adesoji, 2010; Agbiboa, 2013; Danjibo, 2009; Malasowe, 2016; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012).

From the 2012 transcript, Shekau declared that:

"Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism, and everyone knows there are some things that God has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted even western education!" Shekau, 2012 BH Transcript (NaijaNedu, 2012).

Moreover, an analysis of 2012 transcripts revealed that BH dwelt mainly on internal issues within the Nigerian state and the idea that the government was peddling rumours against the group (Eveslage, 2013). The claim is a fascinating thought that requires exploration regarding the extent to which terrorist activities were not necessarily carried out but suggested to have been conducted by them (BH) following reports from the Nigerian government. Moreover, BH's arch-enemy is believed to be the Nigerian government, as the group pushed the claims of establishing an Islamic state with the abolition of 'man-made laws' (IEP, 2012: 19). Nevertheless, the group has been involved in attacks against religious institutions, government structures and security services to initiate a war by the government against Muslims (but in essence, it is against the terrorists themselves) (IEP, 2012). This results in an all-out war in which the sentiments of Muslims become used by terrorists against the government. This becomes a situation where retaliation by the government against terrorists is deemed as an attack against Muslims. This is intended by Shekau's claim that they did not kill civilians. In one of the transcripts, Shekau mentioned that they did not kill civilians or ordinary people; instead, they protected them, and their anger was only for security services and soldiers (NaijaNeduTV, 2012).

6.1.2 Analysis of 2013 BH Transcript

However, in 2013, there was a significant increase in terrorist deaths in Nigeria. The country became the fourth country with the highest increase in terrorist-related deaths, all attributed to BH, which increased both workforce and resources (IEP, 2014). Moreover, the year was four times more deadly than in 2009 when the group began its violent terrorist rampage. Like most large terrorist groups, the group started to show concern for depicting it in the media (IEP, 2014).

From the analysis, BH claimed the Nigerian government was mischievous in its ways and actions (23.7%). Regarding the dishonesty (lies) from the government, BH's leader, Shekau, was purported to have been killed by Nigerian forces in July 2009 (France 24, 2014). Then in August 2013, alongside the group's second in command, Bama, who may have been killed between 25 July and 3 August, following a shoot-out with the Joint Task Force (JTF) in Sambisa forest of Borno State, Nigeria (Al Jazeera, 2013; Maina, 2013; Whitnall, 2013). These claims have been proven to be untrue (Human Rights Watch, 2012) as Shekau released a video in August 2013 to refute the stories of his death (France, 24, 2014). He is quoted as saying,

"This is to the people, who call themselves Nigerians; it is Shekau that is speaking since you said he has died. Here is something new (Shouts). It is me that has come out to counter the lies and speculations" (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013).

Likewise, in another video transcript, Shekau declared that,

"Government for people by the people is fake, there will only be law of Allah to people" (Abraham Lincoln Online, 1863).

Here, Shekau suggests that democracy, as defined by Abraham Lincoln (Abraham Lincoln Online, 1863), is forbidden by Sharia law and only Sharia law as given by Allah should be practised in Nigeria (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015; Cottee, 2010). There was also a dramatic rise in BH terrorist attacks such as bombing, suicide attacks and kidnappings, notably of high ranking police and

government officers among others, with the group claiming responsibility for more than 88 percent of terrorist attacks in the country with 1,587 deaths (IEP, 2014: 25). In one of the transcripts, Shekau claimed responsibility for some attacks when he said:

“We are also responsible for Benisheik killings and carried [out] yesterday[‘s] killings. You that claimed you are SSS and man of knowledge. We slaughtered more than 200 people. Yes, these days in Monguno, after we killed stick boys (vigilantes) we seized several weapons from army and now under us.” (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013).

BH orchestrated the attack near Benisheik, Borno state, on September 17, 2013, where BH members supposedly wearing military uniforms staged fake checkpoints for travellers resulting in the burning of automobiles and the deaths of 143 people (CNN, 2013; IEP, 2014). This was regarded as one of the top 20 worst terrorist attacks of 2013 in Nigeria (IEP, 2014). Moreover, in August 2013, the group also killed 24 vigilantes in Borno State who were combing the Monguno forest in search of the group’s members (Associated Press, 2013). Salafi-jihadist rhetoric follows this and uphold the charismatic leadership of Shekau, who constantly praised himself and suggested that God sent him to destroy every form of western influence (Abubakar, 2016).

In his 2013 transcript, Shekau claimed:

“What we are saying is there in the Quran, and so do not bother or suffer yourselves. What I see in Quran, I will continue to do until the day I cannot breathe again” (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013).

However, at this juncture of the group’s growth, there was a slight turn towards external issues (Mahmood, 2017), which began to rise, as seen in Shekau’s statements. BH leader, Shekau once stated:

“It is just starting and a new beginning. I know Oladipo Diya will be sad, Jonathan too will not be happy but angry, Obama will be angry, Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel will be sad too. Francois Hollande will

be angry, Queen Elizabeth is angry. Margaret Thatcher same will be angry and all infidels throughout the world.” (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013)

Oladipo Diya, a retired Lt. General and former president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, were criticised (internal opposers). In contrast, external opposers such as former President of the US, Barack Obama was equally referred to alongside Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former President of France, Francois Hollande and the UK’s ceremonial Head and Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth. Shekau further referred to the fact that it was suggested that he was dead; however, a new beginning had arisen, for he is alive, and the world will hear of him as Allah gives him breath (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013). The criticism received by the then President of the US, Obama, from the group came as a result of the ascription by the US of three of BH members as terrorists (Eveslage, 2013). Shekau further mentions officials in Nigeria for which it can be said that he is looking internally for his fight – jihad (war). However, he still mentions international leaders whom he thinks will need to be aware that he is alive and commencing a new beginning, probably of more attacks as we begin to see in 2014 (Nigerian Bulletin, 2013).

6.1.3 Analysis of 2014 BH Transcript

In 2014, the global terrorism trend became very lethal as there was a massive increase in the mass casualty of several terrorist groups, with the five most deadly terrorist groups, including BH and ISIS, being responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths in the year (IEP, 2016). According to the Global Terrorism Index Report 2015, BH was the deadliest terrorist group of 2014 and responsible for 5,049 more killings than in 2013, totalling up to 6,644 deaths, with ISIL/ISIS falling behind with 4,672 more kills than the previous year and a total of 6,073 deaths in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41). Both groups engaged in combats with governments and other actors (IEP, 2015; Pham, 2016), accounting for about 51% of all terrorism-related deaths in 2014. Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria were most affected, as ISIS and BH accounted for most of the terrorism-related deaths in the same year (IEP, 2015).

The first propaganda video released in April 2014 by BH saw Shekau claim more responsibilities for attacks (Mahmood, 2017, IEP, 2015), as was illustrated in the transcript discussing the Nyanya (Abuja) bombing (Nigerian Bulletin, 2014). A Bomb-laden vehicle exploded in a crowded bus station in Nyanya, resulting in the death of 71 people on 14 April 2014 (Onuoha, 2014). Shekau addressed the world in his responsibility claim as he wanted the world to know BH was responsible for the attack. He said, "Let the world know that we were responsible for the bombing within Abuja in an area called Nyanya." (Nigerian Bulletin, 2014).

The group's transnational intentions started becoming very glaring for the world to see from 2014 onwards (Pham, 2016). The group began encroaching into neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger (IEP, 2015). Also, the groups and its need for media coverage rose highly, leading up to the kidnapping of more than 280 Chibok girls from the Government Secondary school in Borno State, Nigeria (IEP, 2014, 2015).

Looking into a clear case of the dishonesty and supposed lies told by the Nigerian government, Shekau is believed to have been killed by Nigerian forces previously in July 2009, June 2013 August 2013, (France 24, 2014) and again on 26 September 2014 (Cocks, 2014; France 24, 2014). The group took it upon itself to prove the Nigerian government as dishonest on various occasions, including the falsified claims of Abubakar Shekau's death in 2009, 2013 and 2014. In a precise instance of dishonesty, the Nigerian military issued an official report on Monday, 22 September 2014, that Abubakar Shekau had been killed again, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. The Nigerian army claimed the real Shekau was killed almost a year before that, with his assumed '*doppelganger*' killed afterwards by the military (Ibeh, 2014).

Figure 6. 1 Front cover of a Vanguard Newspaper reporting news of Shekau's death in September 2014



Source: Issuu (2014)

Nevertheless, the US expressed doubts over the Nigerian military's claim of having killed Shekau in clashes with the Nigerian and Cameroon troops, as previous claims turned out to be false (Ugwanyi, 2014). A senior State Department official from the US was stated as saying,

"The Nigerian government has announced several times that the head of Boko Haram was dead, and every single time, we find out that it is not true.

"What I read recently is that Shekau's lookalike or some Shekau impostor was killed and then I read later that maybe, Shekau himself was killed. I don't put a lot of weight on those stories until we see more evidence," (Ugwanyi, 2014b)

Figure 6. 2 Still-frame from News report of Abubakar Shekau supposedly being killed by the Nigerian military on 24


September 2014



Source: Wochit News 2014

The supposed killing of Abubakar Shekau in 2014 and his '*doppelganger*' as was claimed by the Nigerian military, was the first time the terrorist leader's death was officially confirmed after the military failed to validate the previous claims while distancing itself from stories of Shekau's death in 2009 and 2013 respectively. However, analysts further dismissed reports of Shekau's death as 'mere propaganda' by the Nigerian army intended to boost its image in the international arena. At the same time, BH continued carrying out its wanton killings of civilians (Ugwanyi, 2014a). The Nigerian army produced picture evidence (illustrated in Figure 6.3) to show that the Nigerian military had already killed the real Abubakar Shekau. They further claimed Shekau's '*look-alike*' and '*doppelgangers*' with aliases, Bashir Mohammad and Abdullahi Geidam, were parading themselves in videos as the dead leader (illustrated in Figure 6.2) (France 24, 2014; Zavadski, 2014). A close-up picture was released supposedly showing Shekau's lifeless body photoshopped alongside a still-frame from Shekau's video holding a rifle showing a bump on their forehead as depicted in Figure 6.3 (Ibeh, 2014).

Figure 6. 3 Image by the Nigerian Army claiming to show the dead Boko Haram Leader, Abubakar Shekau



Source: Ibeh, 2014

That notwithstanding, Shekau refuted claims of his death when he released a propaganda video in October 2014 (as depicted in Figure 6.4 below) in which he opined that:

"You (the Nigerian government) are not honest, you have nothing to say. Here I am, alive. I will only die the day Allah takes my breath," (Peace, 2014; Sotubo, 2014).

Here, Shekau refuted the Nigerian government's claims of his death and regarded it as dishonest and lies against him for which his death would only come from the one who tasked him on his quest: Allah. In these instances, Shekau has been proven to be alive, appearing in several videos taunting the federal government of Nigeria till date, for which he has also called himself 'invincible' in some cases (France 24, 2014; Cocks, 2014; Ugwuanyi, 2014; Zavadski, 2014; News24, 2016; 2018).

BH further released videos claiming to sell the girls to slavery or marry them off to jihadist fighters. These were intended to show the group's strength and persuade the public that the Nigerian government and its supporters were dishonest and untruthful in claiming the group had not captured any girls (Ameh, 2014). Therefore, there was a need for Shekau to publish videos showing proof of the abducted Chibok girls. In another case of dishonesty propaganda, on 11 September 2014, BH downed

a Nigerian air force jet while the Nigerian security forces claimed they were searching for it. BH released a statement claiming to behead the captured pilot provided video evidence of the wreckage of the downed jet plane and its seized pilot to persuade the audience that the Nigerian government and security forces were dishonest (Alli, 2014). It is believed that the Nigerian government did not attempt to rescue the captured pilot, Chimda Hedima. This was in contrast to the ISIS situation, where negotiations for the release of a Jordanian pilot, Lt. Moaz al-Kasasbeh, whose fighter jet was downed in December 2014, was made with IS. However, Moaz death at the hands of IS eventually led to the Jordanian government deploying troops to attack the jihadists in Syria (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018).

Also, Shekau began a barrage of insults on former and then President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan and former President of the US, Barack Obama, a trend which was started in 2013. He laments:

“(President) Jonathan you are a lame duck. Jonathan, you are now too small for us; we can only deal with your grand masters like Obama the president of America...even they cannot do anything to us... we are more than them...”

Shekau still claimed even Obama could not handle his group as it had surpassed the Nigerian borders and national interests.

Figure 6.4 Abubakar Shekau in a still frame from a propaganda video published in October 2014



Source: ORN, 2014

Moreover, the concluding parts of 2014 revealed the convergence of ideology between BH and ISIS (Pham, 2016). This culminated in the 2015 BH pledging of allegiance to ISIS. Both BH and ISIS possess the fifthwave Jihadist terrorist groups tendencies, which pit them against erstwhile Islamic groups and movements. They both trail a Sunni takfirist agenda that sees other Muslims against their violent propaganda as apostates and other religions (Celso, 2015). The following section analyses the ISIS transcripts of the year 2014.

6.1.4 Analysis of BH Twitter messages (2012 – 2016)

BH uses its media tactics to propagate its military agenda similar to other jihadist groups like ISIS, Al Shabaab and AQIM. The group used social media platforms to threaten military reprisals and expand BH's reach to a global audience. ISIS has also used this to its propaganda advantage with Twitter and its Dabiq English language publication while supporting BH in this regard (Berger, 2015; Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018).

In the group messaging and communications like that of BH and ISIS, “propaganda techniques” advocated by Ogden and Wilson (2015). This includes name-calling (labelling ideas to engender the public sympathy for the cause or its condemnation); alluring overview (to encourage the positive side of messages to make it acceptable to them); confirmation (providing certification for idea by individuals without providing proof), and convincing others with the opinion of the “we” and “us” to the detriment of “them.” For example, BH pushed the idea that the Nigerian government is deceitful and dishonest while BH is trustworthy (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). Social media messaging like those of Twitter have become a sort of platform for the dissemination of propaganda messages for which Lasswell (1927), perceives propaganda is concerned with communication and the regulation of views, attitudes, perceptions and opinions of others using images, symbols and various types of collective communication. Moreover, it also involves projecting a particular idea as lucrative and promoting actions to coerce others to buy into a specific cause to their advantage (Gambrill and Reiman, 2011).

Previously, BH produced crude and poorly constructed videos while ISIS made magazines and videos within their social media propaganda to engender extremism among Muslim youths across the globe (Campbell, 2014; Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). However, this seemed to change as the group’s imitation and influence of IS began to show up with high-quality videos while still showing off and propagating an idea of formidability from the Nigerian government and security forces (SaharaTV, 2013; Campbell, 2014b). Previously, the BH’s videos and messages were termed as not directed to recruit followers or push a particular ideology but against the tactics of the Nigerian armed forces and the government, citing them as corrupt and dishonesty while sometimes talking to leaders of other countries like Cameroon (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). They further assert that BH’s social media was to show itself as having the legitimate interpretation of Islam and showing the Nigerian government as unable to provide a secure State while pushing the propaganda of a sinister force that security forces cannot weaken. This is what IS referred to when they asserted that ‘Nigeria is not a police state,’

which in essence is a prerequisite for the existence of any extremist group within a country as emphasised by ISIS (Dabiq July 2014; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014).

6.1.4.1 Formidability of BH

Following the analysis of BH's twitter and video message between 2012 and 2016, there was a constant show of formidability whereby the group portrayed itself as having the capacity to establish its Caliphate in the face of military offensive from the Nigerian military and JTF. BH's, especially with the group's affiliation with ISIS, showed the group's military strength – weapons and automobiles, high-quality videos. There was also the matter of ISIS song used in BH video background showing the group's captured territories with the idea at this point to convince viewers of the group's collaboration with ISIS and the strength of BH against a weak Nigerian state (BBC, 2015c; Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). More so, the group claims to be against western values vis-à-vis technological advancement and education but still use social media platforms and technological communication devices, all products of education (Maiangwa, 2013).

By January 2014, BH had overrun several communities such as Gwoza, Limanti, and Wala in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, leaving hundreds displaced fleeing to neighbouring towns. This was followed by the annexation of territories in Nigeria, especially in January 2015, with BH attacking areas such as Baga, conquering and acquiring areas such as Abadam, Gambaru, Konduga more areas than that of ISIS (Connor, 2015). Also, BH continuously produced messages and media content, most of which its videos changed in length and quality. One of these videos had an ISIS song in the background showing the group's captured territories with the idea to convince viewers of the group's collaboration with ISIS and the strength of BH against a weak Nigerian state (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018).

In 2015, BH released a video on Youtube, which displayed Shekau brandishing several weapons and automobiles while bragging about the group's weapon arsenal, especially those retrieved from fleeing Nigerian military following its attack on Baga Borno state (BBC, 2015c). Shekau threatened neighbouring countries like Chad while burning the Nigerian flag, symbolic of the group's detachment

from Nigeria and the need to create an Islamic state. It could be seen that following from the definitions of propaganda, BH published videos and social media content to affect or change the attitudes, intentions and perception of the public in the group's favour against the government.

6.1.4.2 Dishonesty on the part of Government

With the analysis of 210 tweets between 2012 and 2016 by BH, there existed the use of Hausa and Arabics and more predominantly the use of English language for the radicalisation of many, especially Muslims outside the borders of northern Nigeria, to further African countries whose lingua franca is not Hausa (Chiluwa and Ajiboye, 2014; Mahmood, 2017; Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). There was the emphasis on the optimistic and progressive activities of the 'we' and 'us' (BH and its affiliates) while detailing the undesirable and unceremonious activities of the 'they' (government, security forces and other opposing groups). This follows Van Dijk (1998), the perspective of ideological discourse, as the group continued to laud its activities in the liberation of Muslims, especially in Northern Nigeria, while labelling the government and security officials as dishonest and corrupt (e.g. Tweet 27, 99, 15 where the 'they' are referred to as 'fools,' 'others' and 'gang'). BH also claims that the Nigerian armed forces engaged in the extra-judicially killing of civilians in a bid to fight them (deemed as terrorists) - claims supported by Amnesty International but refuted by the Nigerian military (Amnesty International, 2014; Clottey, 2015). However, while the claims seem probable, there exist a dearth of evidence to support the claim that the armed forces killed civilians while engaging in extremist battles, though some members of the JTF claimed to have destabilised the advances of the extremists in the north (Clottey, 2015).

Though the claims seem plausible, there is a shortage of evidence to support the claim that the armed forces killed civilians while engaging extremists in a battle. However, some members of the JTF claimed to have destabilised the advances of the extremists in the north. BH has also communicated themselves as 'freedom fighters' and propagators of 'Allah' while those who oppose their teaching are described as 'others' and 'infidels' (e.g. Tweet 95).

6.1.4.3 Ridiculing of the Government (Others)

Another dominant theme seen through the group's social media communication, video transcripts and Twitter communication is BH's constant ridiculing of the shortcomings of the Nigerian government and the Nigerian economy as the source of the problem to its citizens. Still, Nigeria experienced steady growth in GDP from 7% between 2000 and 2014, with a drop of 2.7% by 2015, with a further decrease of 1.6% in 2016. The growth rate further made a recovery of 0.8% as of 2017 (World Bank Group, 2019)

More so, BH emphasised the undesirable characteristics of other groups like MEND, accusing them of being more concerned with finances from the government, such as the government granting amnesty, while perceiving itself as more focused on ideals for its people – Muslims and those of northern Nigeria (Tweet 3). Moreover, BH sees others opposed to its teachings as drunkards and corrupt like government officials. The group further portrays itself as the only right structure with a constructive outlook on its activities while attracting the youths of Nigeria seeking their help in the fight against the Nigerian state.

In general, BH's use of social media propaganda involved the radicalisation and indoctrination of youths by validating their feelings that the government is the cause of their woes and that they, BH, the 'we' and 'us,' are the freedom fighters sent by God to establish an Islamic state. There is the need for the reinstatement of the previous form of morality, especially the rejection of Western perceptions of life, from alcohol, specific female dressing and certain types of music. However, some of these conventions and rules are pushed by Christians and other religions as well.

Moreover, western education is termed as the instrument for breeding incompetent human beings that are unlikely to withstand the government's advances as opposed to their (BH) teaching. For example, a tweet refers to the quitting of "those secular education, breeds jerkies and fools" (Tweet 5). Nevertheless, information and communication technology applications such as Twitter used by the group come from western education. The group continues to defend its use of such platforms while

speaking against its use by ordinary citizens, even the end product of higher education in Nigeria, NYSC – a compulsory one-year service to Nigeria following the conclusion of tertiary education at Universities.

However, as has been the case with ISIS, military defeats blunt the allure of terrorist propaganda as jihadists are more concerned with surviving and less of social media messaging at the point of military attacks. They demystify terrorists and their seeming ruthless efficiency and invisibility. Initially, Nigeria did not have a credible means to counter Boko Haram's social media messaging but militarily routing of Boko Haram has proven to be the most effective response to the group's reign of terror both on the battlefield and on social media. Extremist groups' social media messaging continues to provide a pivotal avenue for comprehending terrorist groups' ideology, perceptions, goals, and objectives. Following the recognition of the increased use of social media platforms by extremist groups, these platforms, such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, introduced a shared database to recognise terrorist propaganda and reduce the dissemination of extremist ideals and communication in June 2016 (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). The following section involves the analysis of the 2014 ISIS transcripts.

BH's communication has continually cited the government as corrupt and criminals while distancing itself from the activities of the government. BH has also spoken against the socio-economic issues in Nigeria, such as unemployment and a low standard of living. The menace of BH seen as 'freedom fighters' and other issues in Nigeria are attributed to political and socio-economic issues in Nigeria such as bad leadership referred to as 'terrorists.' Other communications from the group speaks about how the government siphons the resources of the country to the appreciation of a few. The following section will provide an analysis of the ISIS transcripts.

6.1.5 Analysis of 2014 ISIS Transcript

The transcripts by ISIS were of video (propaganda) speeches by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi speaking on emigration (Hijrah) on a large scale for supporters of Jihad and the Caliphate to the supposed Caliphate

bringing into a collective community their advantages for a stronger Caliphate (Iraqi Witness, n.d; Jihadist News, 2014)

In the ISIS transcripts of 2014, al-Baghdadi discusses how Jihadists (Mujahids) are mixed with Takfiris (unbelievers) (Gambhir, 2014). Primarily, God, who is also referred to as '*Allah*' for them, will bring about trials (fitnah) that will weed out the unbelievers. This is posited when al-Baghdadi claimed:

"... Don't be saddened by this fierce campaign against us, for God will help his soldier and will defend those who believe. God knows who's the Mujahid and who's the pretender, who's the liar and who's truthful, who's sincere and who's a hypocrite." (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness, 2014)

Furthermore, al-Baghdadi claimed the trials had befallen Syria and would be suitable for Islam when the world eventually ended. He also speaks to ISIS in Syria that the group did not create the terrorism war, but it was advantageous to Nusayris and Shias (Iraqi Witness, 2014). This was almost in line with BH when the group claimed that they were not the originators of terrorism in Nigeria but security service providers in the country (Walker, 2012).

Shekau blamed the Nigerian security services for having tried to destabilise BH by capturing and arresting the group's female members and relatives of some of their leaders in 2012. The group has repeatedly claimed that their former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was unjustly executed, leading to the group's retaliation in its attacks, especially the abduction of girls and women. This culminated in the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in April 2014 (Walker, 2012; BBC, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2016).

Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi continued in his 2014 speeches to display his '*distaste for media houses*' and tried to discredit the media, referring to them as peddling rumours that ISIS was long lost while they were still prevalent in their areas of influence. He also spoke about lies (dishonesty) of punishments brought upon the people of Syria and Iraq by attacks orchestrated by ISIS, including car bombs (Iraqi

Witness, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014). Baghdadi continues as he claims that God called ISIS to undertake the terrorism activities they had embarked upon (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness, 2014).

A prominent theme in the 2014 ISIS transcript and moving forward was the declaration of war; terrorism on unbelievers (takfiris) deemed as the enemies of *'Allah'*. There was the need to “seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the Dunya (worldly life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever.” (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014).

The rejection of socio-political order was upheld as Al Baghdadi claimed the *'Ummah'* of Islam watched the jihad happen in a selective type of terrorism in a new world. Selective terrorism involved the trampling of nationalism, the destruction of respect for one's nation, democracy and the nature of humans seen as deceitful. He also perceived the actions of ISIS as a liberation of like-minded Muslims suffering under unauthorised government authorities and Muslim rights trampled upon in different countries such as China, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Iran, parts of Africa and the West, among others (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014)

Under the theme of external global jihad, Baghdadi commands the Mujahideens to “take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight!” (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, 2014: Iraqi Witness, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014). This is symbolic of BH's command by Shekau in 2014 in which he spoke of how unbelievers will be killed as they accounted for infidels, which is captured when he said: “Even if you don't do anything to us we will kill you...We would do it even to avenge our brethren...” (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: NewsDiary, 2014).

Regarding the US, Al-Baghdadi mentioned that the war by proxy engaged in Syria by the US would not be successful like Iraq. He was referring to the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 in a quest to limit Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and disrupt the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein (The Guardian, 2010; Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). Baghdadi insinuated: “Know O protector of the crusade that this war by proxy in Syria won't help you like it didn't in Iraq. Soon we will be in a confrontation, and the sons of Islam have prepared for such a day. So watch for we are with you,

watching.” This is indicative of the idealisation of a mythic past and bolstered by the epilogue of the Dabiq online publication with the phrase, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify... until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq” (BBC, 2016b).

Baghdadi also advised ISIS in Iraq to go to war against the Shia while advancing towards Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, as the entire Sunnis are with them (Iraqi Witness, 2014). He further advocated for Muslims' emigration (Hijrah) from all walks of life to the umma (Caliphate). The advocacy of migration is reiterated when Baghdadi pleaded with Muslims: “O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing Hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so because Hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.” (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014; Iraqi Witness, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014).

6.1.6 Analysis of Dabiq Online Publications (2014 – 2016)

Investigating Dabiq online publications, between 2014 and 2016, there were six Dabiq publications in 2014, five in 2015 and four in the year 2016. Through the Al Hayat Media Center, ISIS earlier released the Islamic State News (ISN) and Islamic State Report (ISR) before Dabiq to continuously project its efforts of jihad, hijrah, tactics and project regular images of activities and articles into a regular publication (Ingram. 2018). These transcripts were catalogued and analysed - an analysis of the online publication present speeches from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other notable leaders and scholars such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, revered by ISIS.

Largely a strategic show of ISIS ‘politico-military’ might (Gambhir, 2014; Ingram, 2018: 12), the name of the magazine, ‘Dabiq’, is a Syrian town that is 10 kilometres away from the Turkish border (BBC, 2016b; Gambhir, 2014). There was the support of the assertion from the excerpt of late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi explained on page four of the Dabiq July 2014 publication. Dabiq is described as an area in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham where Muslims will wage the great battle. The great battle refers to the Jihadists’ main showdown with the crusaders, their enemies, the Romans - also viewed as the West whom they intend to destroy in the town (Celso, 2014; Gambhir, 2014; Kibble, 2015; The Carter Center, 2015; Ingram 2018) referred to as ‘*the Armageddon*’ (Dabiq July 2014).

All fifteen Dabiq magazine published between 2014 and 2016 had a similar undertone, as each opened with an excerpt of a speech by late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify - by Allah’s permission - until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” (Dabiq, July: 4, August, October and November 2014: Jihadology.net, 2015; BBC, 2016b; Gambhir, 2014; Ingram, 2016, 2018; Kibble, 2015). Every issue provided the idea of the apocalypse, which was ushered in by the Al-Zarqawi with quotes signalling the end times within the publication with constant use of hadith excerpts to show the present in tandem with history. Similarly, there were specific main themes held in the publications from the cover pages and several recurring themes throughout each publication, which will be discussed in succeeding sections of this research.

6.1.6.1 Dabiq 2014 First July Online Publication: ‘The Return of Khilafah’ (Issue 1)

The First publication in July 2014, titled ‘The Return of Kalifah’ dwelt largely on a mythic past, referring to the return of ISIS supposed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his Caliphate established in June 2014 in a large area spanning across Iraq and Syria (Celso, 2015; Tran and Weaver, 2014). The late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi accepted the steps of ISIS in its expansion in Iraq and Syria when the first ISIS publication explained on page five that “Shaykh Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi (rahimahullah) anticipated the expansion of the blessed jihad from Iraq into Sham and linked it...” (Dabiq July 2014: 4).

The publication continued on the Caliphate, about the coming together of people of different races and Muslims from different countries such as China, America, France and North African countries, among others and the showing of favour to themselves under the Caliphate (referred to as ‘*Ummah*’ or ‘*Khilafah*’) (Jihadology, 2013; Celso, 2014; St-Pierre, 2015). The emigration of Muslims is further explored in the publication as page 12 proclaims, “The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing Hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so because Hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory” (Dabiq July 2014: 10; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014).

The Dabiq publication goes further to display extravagant victories and ‘so-called’ liberations of suffering Muslims by ISIS from warring factions such as the Safawi forces as they laid down their weapons during the retreat after defeat from ISIS forces (Dabiq July 2014: 16; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014; Gambhir, 2014). Moreover, the publication spoke on the world as being divided between two camps: the camp of Islam and faith (Muslims) and the camp of hypocrisy and ‘kufr’ (disbelief), being led by jews, the crusaders, and other religions deemed as ‘kufr’ (disbelievers), most especially Russia and the US (Dabiq July 2014; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014; Gambhir, 2014).

However, an example of imitation and contagion in this publication was the mention of Nigeria (BH’s Country of origin) as “a place without a powerful police state” and that the terrorist group, BH should rise and seize control of the reins of power in the country; fuelling the group’s momentum and the need to prove itself worthy of ISIS’ favour and backing. The first July Dabiq publication in 2014 posits this while speaking on Hijrah as mandatory for jihad, “...Because there were almost no safe havens on the earth left for the mujahidin, the ideal land for Hijrah was a place where they could operate without the threat of a powerful police state... there are now numerous more lands with conditions that support jihad, such as ... Nigeria” (Dabiq July 2014: 36; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014). ISIS also promoted the use of ‘unrestrained violence’ to achieve this feat: “To achieve maximum chaos,... the most effective weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creating chaos - vehicle bombs, IEDs, and Istishhadiyyin (martyrdom referring to the use of suicide attacks)” (Dabiq July 2014: 36; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014). The Islamic group BH has used these tactics in its attacks against the notably North-eastern states such as Borno state in Nigeria (Adibe, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2015; Maiangwa, 2014; Pham, 2016).

6.1.6.2 Dabiq 2014 Second July Online Publication: ‘The Flood’ (Issue 2)

The July Dabiq online publication (Issue 2) of 2014 titled ‘the Flood’ looks into the theme of requesting bay’ah (pledges of allegiance) from several Muslim entities (Dabiq July 2014: 36; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014) as well as establishing its credibility on multiple levels using ‘the flood’ as a key

concept (Ingram, 2016, 2018). 'The Flood of the Mubalah' is deemed as a concept used to describe the 'mubalah', asking Allah for punishment or cursing upon a false sect. ISIS reiterated that al-Adnani called it upon ISIS and the Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) about the allegations levelled against the former by the latter in March 2014 (Ingram, 2018). The 'mubalah' was reiterated a month after which ISIS supposedly became successful in establishing a Khilafah (Caliphate) across Syria and Iraq. At the same time, JN was disrupted and faced hypocrisy. However, this is used as propaganda to suggest that ISIS is doing the will of Allah when they claim in the Dabiq publication (Dabiq July, Issue 2, 2014).

The second July Publication refers to the travails of Noah (Ingram, 2018) or Noah's ark as a '*Mutawatir*' - carried by a multitude of people that it is reprehensible for the story to be considered a lie (Dabiq July, Issue 2, 2014: 8). There is also the idea of free choice or free will in believing in God being unacceptable. The option of the Islamic State is much acceptable than the 'Flood' like in the days of Noah where people thought there was a freedom of choice which led to their death and destruction, which the people of the world still preach today and will not save them (Ingram, 2016).

Dabiq publication further reassured Muslims who could not perform hijrah to conduct public bay'ah, pledges of allegiance, which was to be recorded and then distributed through the internet and other types of media. The Dabiq publication also suggested the use of anonymity in a '*police state*' (Ingram, 2016; Dabiq Issue 2; Jihadi Document Repository, 2014). In the Dabiq Issue 1, Nigeria is seen as a not so 'powerful police state' that supports jihad and the rise of Islamic terrorist groups such as BH who can establish and rise freely.

Likewise, the themes of unrestrained violence and responsibility for attacks were pronounced in some pages of ISIS propaganda magazine with pictures of the destruction of tombs in Mosul. Throughout the pages, "Violence is thus framed as an act of redemption and empowerment" (Ingram, 2016: 16) as "Hijrah (emigration) will not cease as long as there is jihad" (Dabiq July, Issue 2, 2014: 18). The Dabiq publication is employed to radicalise and promote violence through various means, through the bombardment of Safawi military barracks in the city of Hadithah (Dabiq July 2014: 40) and capture of

military bases, while still appealing to the minds of the people by caring for orphans (The Charter Center, 2015; Ingram 2016).

Looking into contagion and imitation, on page 31, the US is regarded as the enemy in the July 2014 Dabiq publication. A picture of John McCain is displayed with the caption, 'In the words of the Enemy', and the description of how the invasion of Iraq by the U.S-led to the events happening in the present day while he (Barack Obama) still condemned their actions in the same country (Dabiq July 2014). Also, BH in 2014 spoke about the US as the enemy when its leader Abubakar Shekau revealed his status of being alive, refuting claims of his death by the Nigerian military, saying that: "The wish of Obama (United States President) will not kill me, the wish of Francois Hollande (of France) will not kill me, the wish of Benjamin Netanyahu (of Israel) will not kill me..." (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: Peace, 2014; Sotubo, 2014). Shekau mocked news of his death by the military as mere propaganda for which he would not die until his days were over as decreed by God (Peace, 2014; Sotubo, 2014).

6.1.6.3 Dabiq 2014 September Online Publication: A Call to Hijrah (emigration) (Issue 3)

The third publication in the Dabiq series published in September 2014, similar to the previous issue, was subsumed with the call for Muslim migration to the ISIS caliphate (Celso, 2015; The Carter Center, 2015). Essentially, the publication opens with a foreword of ISIS accusing the US of illegal and unsanctioned brutalisation of women and Islamic families in Iraq before its withdrawal (Dabiq August 2014). Though the US invaded Iraq in 2003 in search of weapons of mass destruction and remained there for a long time, no weapons were ever really found. The US military forces later retreated while allegations of unsanctioned activities by the US military have never really been proven (Borger, 2004; Singer, 2007; Draeazen, 2011). Here, Varin (2016) suggested that the 2003 war in Iraq had ushered in an increased presence of Islamic terrorism. Regarding the same situation as the 2003 invasion, ISIS said that Obama behaved like "the war president," George Bush, former president of the US and supported the Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, which almost extended the war in Iraq (Dabiq August 2014: 38).

Cited later in the publication, ISIS further argues for bringing high calibre Muslims to its Khilafah through the process of Hijrah. It is vital to the group given the number of students and young adults that fled the West to join the jihadists in Syria (BBC, 2015c; Perešin, 2015; Loken and Zelenz, 2018). ISIS also projects itself as militarily formidable with images citing the execution of Nusayri soldiers in Wilayat ar-Raqqah and the raising of its flag in captured territories (The Carter Center, 2015).

Figure 6. 5 Image showing ISIS flag hoisted over captured territories



Source: Dabiq September 2014: 15

Looking into the theme of ‘External issues: Global jihad movements,’ Dabiq criticised the exceptional and self-ascribed status of the US and the US military for undertaking any mission. It was deemed beneficial to the country’s national interest, such as interfering in Iraq by supporting Persmerga and other groups such as the new Sahwah councils with weapons and logistics mostly against the group (ISIS). ISIS further warned that the assistance provided by the US in the forms of arms and ammunition, as well as resources, would return to the group as ‘Ghanimah (war spoils) (Dabiq September 2014; Ingram, 2018).

Under the theme of “Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order” and contagion with BH, ISIS pushed the idea that working within a democratic state in the West was ‘modern-day slavery’. This was objectified where ISIS, in its Dabiq publication, explained that “The modern day slavery of

employment, work hours, wages, etc., is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation to a kāfir master. He does not live the might and honor that every Muslim should live and experience” (Dabiq September 2014: 29). This is further buttressed, since the best source of income for Muslims as advocated by ISIS is known as ‘*Ghanimah*,’ referred to as war booty, “What is the best and most lawful source of income?’ [...] .. It is the income of the ghānimīn (earners of ghanīmah),... no other income can stand up to it. And Allah knows best” (Dabiq August 2014: 29-30). The idea of Ghanimah as the most acceptable means of income was further elucidated in the Dabiq fourth issue published in October 2014.

Furthermore, James Foley, an American journalist killed by ISIS in August 2014, blamed the US. ISIS had earlier requested the release of Muslim prisoners, and their request was supposedly ignored (Carter, 2014; Beauchamp, 2015; Brennan, 2018). A US military hastened this failed rescue mission for Foley in Wilayat ar-Raqqah in Syria and aerial bombardments in Iraq (Dabiq August 2014: 37-38).

ISIS further claimed that other European states’ governments had made negotiations and paid ransoms for releasing their citizens in their custody after all ISIS demands were met (Callimachi, 2014; Keating, 2015; Wright, 2015). Similarly, BH identifies with the theme when the group through Shekau regularly called out the former President of the US, Barrack Obama, especially in 2012 when threatening to kill more security workers and capture hostages (Oboh, 2012).

ISIS projected a somewhat false perception of Jihad. According to Simon (2003), Jihad is a spiritual and personal walk for holiness. Islamic Clerics such as Taqi al Ibn Taymiyyah are referred to as a state of physical violence against unbelievers (Kafirs). Moreover, the belief of Muslims that travelling to Mecca to perform hajj, a sacred act for the forgiveness of sins committed annually by Muslims who make a pilgrimage to Mecca (Iqbal, n.d), is suggested by Ibn Taymiyya to have been discontinued.

6.1.6.4 Dabiq 2014 October Online Publication: The Failed Crusade (Issue 4)

The fourth issue of the Dabiq publication pushes the theme of ‘Kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children’ and ‘unrestrained violence.’ Coded on page 8, ISIS speaks about conquering the anti-

terrorism campaign embarked upon by the US by the strength of Allah, saying: “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women... If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market” (Dabiq October Issue 3, 2014: 8).

ISIS distinguishes ‘Ghanimah’ described in the previous issue and ‘Fay’, which is also a form of spoils of war but received from different outcomes. ‘Fay’ is defined as war booty ‘an enemy leaves behind’ for fear of their life before the fighting begins while Ghanimah is taken or carted away from the enemy through ‘fighting with the sword’ (Dabiq October 2014: 11).

On the theme of ‘slavery and kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children’, the Dabiq publication and a point of similarity and contagion between BH and ISIS is the capture of the Chibok girls by BH and Yazidi women by ISIS, respectively. The Yazidis tribe, according to ISIS, are pagans who existed before the Jahiliyyah stage. They became Islamised due to surrounding Muslim communities and now reside within the region of Iraq and Sham worshipping a fallen angel referred to as ‘Iblis’ for which even Christians believed them to be devil-worshippers (Celso, 2015; Dabiq October 2014: 15). Hence, ISIS perceives the enslavement of Yazidis women as mandatory as they never truly accepted Islam. Therefore, Yazidi women were divided among ISIS fighters on a large scale while comparing that to another small enslavement of Christian women and children. BH’s capture of Chibok girls was further used as a comparison (McLaughlin, 2014; Boghani, 2016; Pham, 2016; The Bay’ah from West Africa, n.d; Pham, 2016).

Moreover, an abductive reasoning theme here was the suggestion by ISIS that ‘Slavery is entrenched in Islam’, especially for those regarded as disbelievers (Kufurs). In Dabiq publication, ISIS claim that “Enslaving the families of the kuffār (disbelievers) and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shari’ah” (Dabiq October 2014: 17), which occurred during the start of the Islamic era for which the child of the slave girl had the status of her owner and master (Dabiq October

2014: 16). All these happened except if she was taken at a tender age, then she could be freed in the Islamic State and can take her mother as her slave without knowing this (Dabiq October 2014).

ISIS further claimed in the publication that both Foley and Sotloff deaths were a result of the arrogance of the US and ISIS demands not being met, unlike the European counterparts who paid to get their citizens freed (Gambhir, 2014). Images shown within the publication is further geared towards putting ISIS in a good light by caring for its members and defeating several enemies. The defeated enemies were the PKK, fighters supported by the US and Free Syrian Army (FSA), fighting for democracy, and Peshmerga with a small militia (Dabiq October 2014; Ingram, 2018). These entail the inclusion of hospital and carer treatment images, taking care of Muslim families liberated by the Khilafah, therefore enticing individuals from high levels of work to migrate to the Khilafah (Gambhir, 2014; Carter Center, 2015; Celso, 2015).

6.1.6.5 Dabiq 2014 November Online Publication: Remaining and Expanding (Issue 5)

Parallel to the previous Dabiq October 2014 issue number four, the Dabiq November 2014 Issue number five applied the rhetoric and propaganda of ISIS towards its self-acclaimed Caliphate in terms of military successes to entice Hijrah (emigration) from different Muslims across the world (Mumford, 2015). The group lauded its governance's efficacy in treating Muslims kindly under its rule, such as fending for those with diseases and catering to their needs (Celso, 2015; Ingram, 2018). Similarly, the November Dabiq issue contemplated the terrorist attacks in the West by lone-wolf terrorists (Dabiq November 2014; The Carter Center, 2015).

Additionally, ISIS maximises its expansion and supposed state status with the introduction of the currency of the Khilafah made up of gold, silver and copper, as illustrated in Figure 6.6. These symbols are attributed to Jihad's provision for Muslims and further enticing them to reject the West's currencies and embrace their (ISIS) currency (Dabiq November 2014; Ingram, 2014).

Figure 6. 6 Image showing ISIS Silver coins with several symbols



Source: Dabiq November 2014: 18

Moreover, ISIS represents itself as assisting Syrian people and liberating them from supposed Western incursion. This was subsumed within the Dabiq November 2014 issue with the interminable use of images of cigarettes and illegal drugs being burnt by the group, especially in Kobani, Aleppo in Northern Syria, a former ISIS area of influence to project its power in the area and in the lives of the people (Dabiq November 2014). An example of this is illustrated in Figure 6.7.

Figure 6. 7 Image showing ISIS burning cigarettes in a PKK Compound



Source: Dabiq November 2014: 17

The theme of 'Distaste for the Media Houses', similar to BH's activities, was identified as a similarity between ISIS and BH. In its Dabiq November 2014 issue, ISIS projected that the international media refused to cover the death of Sunnis while reporting on other aspects such as the negative review of their (ISIS) activities. In its publication, ISIS claim that "the international media lay squarely on 'Ayn al-Islām (Kobani), ignoring the massacres carried out by the Safawī army and militias and their American backers against the Sunni population in Iraq" (Dabiq November 2014: 10).

In addition, a case of contagion between ISIS and BH was the former's mention of Nigeria in the fifth Dabiq issue. While accepting the bay'ah from several mujahidins in Yemen, Egypt, and other areas, ISIS nullified the groups and instructed them to be turned to administrative centres or provinces with administrative heads. This is addressed by the Dabiq publication with ISIS, noting that; "Prior to the announcement of the new wilayat (province)... Nigeria ...had pledged their allegiance to the Khalifah" (Dabiq November 2014). In 2014, BH pledged its allegiance (bay'ah) to ISIS, for which the above clarified the acceptance of the former's pledge.

However, ISIS further mentioned that some groups are more significant than others, for a line of communication will be created, and the Khalifah will make new leaderships and appointments. ISIS enunciated this idea in the Dabiq publication by declaring: "We also announce the acceptance of bay'āt given by the groups and individuals in all of those mentioned wilāyāt and others. We ask every individual amongst them to join the closest wilāyah (province) to him, and to hear and obey the wālī (leader) appointed by us for it." (Dabiq November 2014: 25). It is plausible that this move gave rise to the split of BH into two factions: the Abubakar Shekau led BH faction comprising approximately 10,000 men and the al-Barnawi controlled Islamic State of the West African Province (ISWAP) headed by BH's former spokesperson Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi, including several thousand as having been noted by Zenn (2018a), in his article in 2018, titled, 'Is Boko Haram's notorious leader about to return from the dead again.'

6.1.6.6 Dabiq 2014 December Online Publication: Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within (Issue 6)

The first two Dabiq issues (1 and 2) were mainly dedicated to the group's politico-military agenda while providing the tactical, methodological and - and doctrinal stance to achieving this agenda (Ingram, 2018). Issues 3, 4, 5 and 6 focus on the call for 'true' Muslims to emigrate to their established Caliphate while showcasing military successes against their aggressors to make their point visible. However, these messages deviated from the core Al-Qaeda message, which encouraged lone-wolf attacks while disassociating themselves from the migration of fighters (Lorenz-Dus, et al., 2017). For issues 5 and 6 looked towards ISIS expansion in other countries which contained pledges from different jihadist groups across the Middle East and North Africa. Dabiq Issue 6, published in December 2014, which continues in Issue 7, follows through an intercontinental motivation by continually promoting the group's terrorist attacks being orchestrated in the West. This they did by discussing their progress, such as creating the wilayat in Libya, the Jordanian pilot's detention, and condemnation of Al-Qaeda in South Asia and Yemen.

6.1.6.7 Dabiq 2015 February Online Publication: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone (Issue 7)

The first issue in 2015, titled 'From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone', followed the burning of a captured Jordanian Pilot, which received wide media traction. Issue 7 provides the formal and organisational design for the remaining issues (Ingram, 2018). The issue presents itself as a departure from previous issues while presenting a precedent for the rest of the issues to follow as new sections were introduced. These include "From the Pages of History" which tries to provide a comparison between traditional Islamic lessons and current trials faced by their (ISIS) cause in the establishment of its Caliphate (Ingram, 2018; Dabiq February 2015: 20-33). Furthermore, in its previous Dabiq publications, ISIS barely spoke about females except when calling for the Muslim migration to the Caliphate (females are included). A new section - "To Our Sisters", was specifically written to appeal to Muslim women (Dabiq February 2015; Ingram, 2016; 2017). Fellow Jihadists were

not left out, as a section was dedicated to praising ISIS militants' efforts - "Among the Believers Are Men" (Dabiq February 2015: 46–49).

Furthermore, the article titled "The Extinction of the Grayzone" essentially was about the group's appeal to Western Muslims and their migration to Caliphate following its establishment. There was the argument that there was no justification for any ISIS-affiliated Muslims to dodge making the journey to the Caliphate, which is regarded as "just terror" (Dabiq February 2015: 54-56). The Dabiq publications and subsequent issues continued to use different articles to furnish its readers with the ISIS propaganda. They advertised other publications from ISIS-affiliated group media entities, making it impossible to move away from the grander ISIS propaganda scheme with "Selected 10" (Dabiq February 2015: 27, 33 and 78).

6.1.6.8 Dabiq 2015 March Online Publication: Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa (Issue 8)

Dabiq Issue 8 continues to push the idea of emigration to IS and requests Muslims to either move to the new territories or orchestrate attacks within their areas of influence or country of origin as lone-wolf terrorists. The issue made use of different messages and subjects to drive the point home. *Dabiq 2015 May Online Publication: They Plot and Allah Plots (Issue 9)* was more about the coming together of different kuffar – disbelievers of God and admonishing Muslims of following the supposed lies propagated by the western media. There was also the promotion of the group's efforts in securing ISIS.

Dabiq issues, especially from issue 9, were more dedicated to intercontinental aspects of the ISIS cause. These include condemning Western Muslims perceived to be colluding with leaders of the West to make a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad and perceived as a novel group of "crusaders" – a name used against the West and its allies to keep (Dabiq March 2015: 46-55; Dabiq Issue 9: pp. 50-59). There was also the prevalence of discussions of terrorist activities in the West as it was likely ISIS influence was necessarily being reduced at this point (Ingram, 2018). Previous articles were dedicated to Muslim youths especially making the journey to Syria or leaving their jobs. ISIS also called on

students to suspend their higher education, which was a waste of time and migrate to Syria to join the jihadists. These were not essentially covered mainly in the earlier versions of the Publication.

6.1.6.9 Dabiq 2015 July Online Publication: The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men (Issue 10)

Following the theme of Dabiq issue 8, Issue 10 focuses on encouraging Muslims to continue and engage in 'lone wolf attacks against the activities and infrastructures of the West. There is the continued show of ISIS's strength and the group's politico-military perspective against the West. In the same vein, Dabiq 2015 September Online Publication: From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions (Issue 11) looked to explore the excessive validation of the global caliphate, 'ummah.' The publication portrays IS as the present and "true" leaders of Islam against the conglomeration of the past and current opponents of Islam.

6.1.6.10 Dabiq 2015 November Online Publication: Just Terror (Issue 12)

Dabiq publication Issue 12 begins with lauding different attacks perpetrated within the West while minimalising the activities of al-Qaeda elements in Syria and Yemen. The publication continues to dominate pages with reports of IS' activities in different countries to boost its capability while looking down on other forces against it while further calling for unification from its troops to deal with offensive actions against it from the Western coalition in its stronghold. For Dabiq 2016 January Online Publication: The Rafidah from Ibn Saba' to the Dajjal (Issue 13), there was a shift in trajectory in ISIS messaging between 2014 and 2016. The years 2014 and 2015 saw a rise in ISIS activities, with a thematic increase in emphasis on their activities, statehood and the call for hijrah and foreign fighters and appealing to its more comprehensive Muslim readers on the need to join forces and move to Caliphate. With their dwindling resources and stance, the messaging from mid-2015 to 2016 was centred on the struggle to achieve the historical structures, undertaking jihad and 'just terror' in line with making sure that the jihadists are actual followers of their ideology.

Dabiq, Issue 13 delved into the propagation of IS activities and the concept of "just terror" synonymous with "just war" – jihad against the West. The publication articulates the San Bernadino

attacks, prompting its actions while further lauding the Paris attacks. There is also the emphasis on intensifying existing sectarian pressures. Similarly, *Dabiq 2016 April Online Publication: The Murtadd Brotherhood (Issue 14)* continued with the lauding of terrorist attacks in Brussels while demanding for Western Muslim clerics to be killed as they colluded with the enemy while showcasing the politico-military activities of ISIS (Ingram, 2018).

6.1.6.11 Dabiq 2016 July Online Publication: Break the Cross (Issue 15)

Dabiq Issue 15, the final issue of the Dabiq publication, is inundated with discussions calling for Muslims to emigrate to join IS as a sign of their commitment to Islam evident in previous Dabiq issues. The July 2016 issue admonishes Muslims to understand their Islamic faith properly, the West's supposedly deceitful ways, and the prerequisite to attack them by engaging in lone-wolf terrorist attacks (Dabiq July 2016: 11). There was the inclusion of the "Selected 10" adverts with the elevation of other contributions from associates such as the Al-Furqan's video - "the structure of the Khilafah" – demanding for more Muslims to make a change to migration to the West (Dabiq July 2016: 13). This was followed by articles of converts - such as "Words of sincere advice from an American convert in the Islamic State to the former Christian who accepted Islam" - making it seem rational for the need to make the conversion to Islam (Dabiq July 2016: 26-29, 64-69). However, unlike the previous issues, which looked to build the strength and the achievements of ISIS and the Caliphate, the final issue was more proactively and calculatedly published to taunt the West and its other coalition especially from the Forward and "Break the Cross" (Dabiq July 2016: 40-63). The issue relied more on the activities of its "soldiers of the caliphate" leading into the new English-speaking publications titled, 'Rumiyah' (Dabiq July 2016: 4-7; 46-63).

6.2 Similarities between BH and ISIS

Having posed the RQ1 in Chapter one regarding the similarities that exist between BH and ISIS, this section will be dedicated to analysing these seemingly identified features that exist between the two groups by looking at the themes already coded and developed from Celso's (2015) characteristics of

fifth wave Jihadist group. Celso (2015) opines that BH and ISIS possess these features, including but not limited to the employment of the ‘takfiri jihadism.’ This further involves the accusation of certain kinds of Muslims such as Shi’ites, Islamic converts and those regarded as unbelievers as apostates for which jihad had to be carried out against them (Engelkes, 2016; Takar & Zahid, 2016). Through inductive and deductive reasoning (Bengtsson, 2016; Mayring, 2000), themes were tabulated in Table 1.3 from Celso’s (2015) features of the fifth wave Jihadist group. The process of abductive reasoning (Danermark *et al.* 2001; Fletcher, 2017; Ghajar-Khosravi, 2016) was also employed as the researcher tried to uncover several other themes such as ‘lies (dishonesty) on the part of the government’ among others. The following themes represent characteristics and similarities between BH and ISIS that the researcher coded.

6.2.1 The Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order

The theme, ‘The rejection of existing social-political order’ as illustrated in Table 1.1, was coded along with all BH and ISIS transcripts and Dabiq online publications. As depicted in Figure 5.7, this theme is the most effective form of similarity between BH and ISIS as of 2014 and was coded from 2012 to 2014 in BH’s transcripts. Within this theme is the rejection of democracy and existing socio-economic and political systems harmonious in the world.

Also, the elections were conducted in Nigeria in 2011, which saw the continuation as President of southern Christians, Goodluck Jonathan, following the death of Northern Muslim former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. This further allowed BH to push the narrative of imposition of unwanted leaders and rejection of West influences – elections which are enshrined in the constitution (Pham, 2016).

In addition and as suggested by scholars such as Kfir and Agbiboa, according to BH and ISIS, the current state of affairs in Nigeria, Syria and Iraq with a global outlook of the western world needed to be eradicated with the introduction of Islam for the general population (Agbiboa, 2013; BBC, 2015b; Kfir, 2015; Abubakar, 2016). For BH, the introduction of quasi-Sharia law in the 12 Northern States of

Nigeria was of no effect. It was politicised to benefit the rich to the detriment of the poor and should be adopted for the whole country (Ajayi, 2012; Nigerian Bulletin, 2014).

Shekau blatantly rejects the tenets of democracy, such as patriotism and the country's constitution, for which the Nigerian constitution remains binding as the 'grand norm' of the country (Sahara Reporters, 2010). He mocks Nigeria's National pledge, which reiterates the need to serve the country (fatherland), referring to the constitution and its tenets as the source of all paganism vis-a-vis infidelity from western education. Similarly, ISIS, in its August 2014 Dabiq publication, titled 'A Call to Hijrah (emigration)' also called for the disruption of (western education) by Muslims.

6.2.2 The Idealisation of a Mythic Past

Amongst the three most coded themes, 'The Idealisation of a Mythic Past' as illustrated in Figure 5.10, denotes the restoration of Muhammad's Medina Community 'umma' and the Caliphate (Celso, 2015). The theme was primarily in BH and ISIS transcripts and Dabiq online transcripts. This is evident as when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi while calling on Muslims to push against oppression and a global '*Hijrah*' (emigration) to the established Caliphate in 2014 (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014 (Dabiq all Issues, Gambhir, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014; Iraqi Witness, n.d).

Here, Al Baghdadi sees the swathes of land acquired as a Caliphate belonging to Muslims referred to as 'Medina' attributed to Prophet Muhammad in 622 (BBC, 2011b, PBS, 2002). Similarly, Walker (2012) and Campbell (2014a) asserted that BH is bent on the Islamisation of Nigeria following the constant rejection of the current democratic system in Nigeria as contrary to Islamic beliefs (Agbibo, 2013). As earlier commented upon, Sharia law in the 12 Northern States of the current 36 states in Nigeria was perceived ineffective. It thus required a total Islamisation of the entire country (Ajayi, 2012). In a similar vein, in 2014, Shekau also called on the need to reject the existing socio-political system and call for the Islamisation of Nigeria (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: NewsDiary, 2014).

Moreover, in a BBC in 2009, former BH leader Mohammed Yusuf lamented that "Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to ... beliefs in Islam" (Boyle, 2009). Similarly, ISIS in

2014 bemoaned that: “The time has come for the Ummah of Muhammad (Sallallahu ‘Alayhi wa Sallam) to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonour, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honour has emerged anew” (Dabiq July Issue 1, 2014: 9). Additionally, ISIS claims that through the establishment of the Caliphate, “History repeats itself by Allah’s divine decree. This is the sunnah (established way) of Allah in His creation” (Dabiq October Issue 4, 2014: 32).

Furthermore, ISIS has continued to push the agenda that its Caliphate, established to resemble that of the Ummah-Medina attributed to Prophet Muhammad in the year 622 (BBC, 2011b, PBS, 2002). It is expected to be the home of Muslims that emigrate to ease the global pangs of suffering Muslims (Iraqi Witness, n.d; Jihadist News, 2014).

6.2.3 External Issues (Global Jihad)

The theme of ‘External issues (Global Jihad)’ illustrated in Figure 5.12 and coded in all transcripts and Dabiq publications used as units of analysis is also one of the first commonly coded themes. External issue – Global Jihad refers to jihad on a global level or the global jihad movement, synonymous with ‘Ethnic and sectarian cleansing.’ It itemises the urge for both BH and ISIS to be involved in the crusade of killing believers of other religions such as Christians and other minorities, such as the Alawites and Shi’ites in Syria, among others (Celso, 2015). Also, the theme of external issues investigates how these terrorist groups moved past their borders and boundaries of their places and countries of origin. There is also the destruction of social institutions against the tenets of Islam, including religious institutions such as Mosques and Churches believed to be used by disbelievers (Celso, 2015).

Both terrorist groups observed ‘Jihad’ as a twisted form of radical Islam and discontentment against groups of people perceived as lacking or differing from their takfiri ideology (Abubakar, 2016) as opposed to a spiritual walk and physical struggles in an attempt to abide by Islamic tenets (Simon, 2003). ISIS Dabiq publications also speak of the world as being divided into Islam (the faithful and Muslims) and the camp of hypocrisy and kufr (disbelief), for which all other religions such as Jews and

Christians and even Muslims such as Shi'ites belong. They are referred to as apostates and must perform bay'ah (pledge allegiance) to ISIS (Gambhir, 2014). For example, in 2012, Shekau accused former President of the US, Barrack Obama, of instigating war on Islam and former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, of being unable to stop the group's rise (Oboh, 2012).

Oboh (2012) claimed that the above speech hinted at the idea that BH played a pivotal part in the 'global jihad' in contradiction to western interests. Additionally, following the designations as terrorists of Abubakar Shekau and two other BH members in Nigerians by the US in 2012, which led to the eventual seizing of the designated individuals' assets, Shekau released a statement claiming he had no interest in America,

"You said I'm a global terrorist, and then you are a terrorist in the next world. I call on you ([former] Nigerian President Goodluck) Jonathan, you should abandon this ungodly power, you should repent and forsake Christianity, including Obama, who said I have business interests in the United States."

"I know the United States exists, but I don't know which part of the world it is located in, whether in the west or the north, the south or the east. I don't know where it is, not to talk of freezing my assets there" (BH 2012 Transcript - Abubakar, 2012).

In a divergence of opinions, though, Shekau had claimed in the early part of 2012 to resist former Presidents Obama and Goodluck Jonathan (March 2012; NaijaNeduTv, 2012; Oboh, 2012). He later claimed in the latter part of the year that he had no inkling where America is located on the world map (Abubakar, 2012). This somewhat disrupts the idea that BH is widely tipped towards a global Jihad. The group resorted to having no dealings with the US but rather seeking to establish Islamic laws only in Nigeria. However, the divergence in opinion was not followed through by BH in 2014. The group continued to taunt several countries' leaders, such as when Shekau claimed that former US President Obama and other dignitaries feared him (Nigerian Bulletin, 2014). This, Shekau mentioned when he claimed that,

“Yes I am the dreaded Shekau; the one even Obama fears; not even Obama, even if Pharaoh were alive today, he would reckon with me (laughing). To hell with the United Nations, to hell with Ban Ki-Moon; to hell with Obama.”

Moreover, following the VBIED explosion in Nyanya bus station in Abuja on 14 April 2014, which resulted in the death of 71 people, BH released a video claiming responsibility for the attack while asserting that Muslims around the world were being marginalised (Onuoha, 2014). BH makes claims that Muslims’ rights are being trampled upon around the world while making a comparison of these marginalised Muslim rights in Nigeria (Plateau State) to other countries, especially the group’s reference to ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) (Nigerian Bulletin, 2014). This essentially shows that BH accepted the statehood of ISIS in April 2014, just before the group (BH) established its caliphate in Gwoza in Borno State, Northern Nigeria, in August 2014, following in the footsteps of ISIS, which launched its Caliphate over swathes of land across Iraq and Syria in June 2014 (Grant, 2014).

Likewise, looking at the issue of Muslims rights being trampled upon in several parts of the world to incite Muslims to undertake the journey of emigrating to Syria (Gambhir, 2014), ISIS mentioned in one of al-Baghdadi’s speech while encouraging mass emigration to the ISIS Caliphate.

In the same manner, ISIS, before the establishment of its Caliphate as of January in 2014, mentioned that the US would not succeed in its proxy war like it undertook in Iraq in 2003 (BBC, 2015b; Laub and Masters, 2014; Kemp, 2016). Also, the idea of Dabiq by ISIS and animosity towards western values are further exhibited throughout the group’s transcript and publication. The global jihad is similarly linked to the rampant use of violence against other religions and Muslims opposed to their extremist interpretation of Islam, which explains the next theme of ‘unrestrained violence.’

6.2.4 Unrestrained Violence

Another key coded theme in the current research is ‘Unrestrained violence’ as depicted in Figure 5.13 which illustrates the persistent armed campaign against civilians, police and other security service agents through suicide bombs, IEDs and VBIED (Celso, 2015; Pham, 2016). Likewise, BH and ISIS pursue

the 'Takfir' ideology, which according to Celso (2015), is a feature of the fifth wave jihadist terrorist groups, facilitating the use of graphic violence. This violence is against everyone opposed to their line of thought, even with fellow Sunni Muslims following slightly opposing views (Takar, & Zahid, 2016). ISIS is opposed to Kurds, Shi'ites, Alawites and Yazidis, among other groups in Syria (Abubakar, 2016; Celso, 2015; Kazimi, 2010). Also, both terrorist groups justify upholding holy war (jihad) against several other elements of society, individuals, and property in the same manner (Abubakar, 2016; Engelkes, 2016).

Nonetheless, as of 2012, BH's leader, Shekau, while still employing violence against civilians and security agencies, attempted to explain the group's perspective that they were not intent on harming innocent civilians but security services they deemed were detrimental to their existence. The stand was referenced when in a 2012 speech, Shekau mentioned the group's tactics as: "Our objective is not to kill or humiliate or steal" (NaijaNeduTV, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2012). In January of the same year, while threatening the Nigerian security agents, Shekau also claimed that: "We never kill ordinary people, rather we protect them. It is the army that rushed to the press to say we are the ones killing civilians. We are not fighting civilians. We only kill soldiers, police and other security agencies" (Oboh, 2012). This is corroborated by Pham (2016) when he opined that the BH version 2.0 (the rise of BH by the year 2012) members were involved in pillaging military barracks to recover arms and stage jailbreaks to rescue (their) members while fighting the armed forces in open battles.

This theme seemed relevant to the change in BH tactic and imitation of ISIS as the year 2014 saw BH become the deadliest terrorist group killing 5,049 more people than in 2013, for a total of 6,644 deaths, with ISIL/ISIS falling behind with 4,672 more deaths than the previous year and having a total of 6,073 deaths in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41). There was unrestrained violence involving attacks against military formations, suicide bombing attacks against soldiers and civilians alike, even fellow Muslims having a different non-extremist approach or ideology (Celso, 2015). This theme was coded in four of the Dabiq publications in 2014: both publications in July, others in October and November, and the

2014 ISIS transcript. BH transcripts of 2012 were found to have the theme of unrestrained violence, but it was more pronounced in the year 2014. ISIS began a campaign to use destruction and unrestrained violence throughout 2014 as stipulated and advertised in its speeches in the year and its Dabiq publications (Gambhir, 2014). BH also proclaimed unrestrained violence against 'all and sundry' spanning the year 2013 and full-fledged in the year 2014, calling for the deaths of Muslim clerics as well (Pham, 2016; Walker, 2012). In the year 2014, Shekau, in a speech, is quoted as saying:

Essentially synonymous with unrestrained violence is the increased need to claim responsibility for attacks. In early 2012, BH denied attacks attributed by the government while claiming not to harm anyone except those against them (BBC, 2012b). A case in point in 2012 was a message from Shekau to former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, where he claimed that "We hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians and those who have betrayed us... Anything people want to say or do; we say enough is enough! We serve God, and we do not harm anybody, but anybody that looks for our trouble, we will face such person or persons!" (NaijaNedu, 2012; Sahara Reporters 2012). But by the year 2014, the group began being more agitated and further claiming responsibility for attacks which can be noticed when Shekau threatened to sell the Chibok girl abducted in April 2014 (CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014).

Similarly, while encouraging a global emigration of Muslims to the ISIS acclaimed caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi hinted at unhinged violence, including when he mentioned that by: "So by Allah, we will take revenge! By Allah, we will take revenge! Even if it takes a while, we will take revenge, and every amount of harm against the ummah (Caliphate) will be responded to with multitudes more against the perpetrator" (Iraqi Witness, n.d; Jihadist News, 2014). This is most prominent in the Dabiq publications, as Muslims in several European countries are encouraged to orchestrate attacks in their various communities even while still planning to make their way to the Islamic State (IS) (Gambhir, 2015). Nevertheless, for both terrorist groups, violence is more pronounced for women and children, as can be perceived from the next theme.

6.2.5 Kidnapping and Brutalisation of women and children

The 'kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children' as depicted in Figure. 5.11 is another theme that resonates with BH and ISIS. The theme was coded in BH transcripts, especially July and October 2014 editions and Dabiq publications which can be found in both groups' treatment of and reaction towards women. This is itemised by Celso (2015) as characteristic of both groups, which is related to misogynistic tendencies and the obligatory covering of women. There were other attacks against uncovered women, negative stance on female education and right to work (BBC, 2014), becoming the wives of jihadists, recruitment of youngsters into Jihadist ranks, and referring to them as 'cubs' (Vale 2018). This especially ISIS, which refers to child recruits as "ashbal al khilafa", the "*Lion cubs of the Caliphate*" (Witschge, 2017).

According to Vale (2018: 13), ISIS continued its recruitment by targeting the most helpless members of the society through the forceful conscription of children from camps and homes into their ranks with captured "girls sold or 'gifted' to fighters as sex slaves, and boys trained as frontline combatants or suicide operatives."

Figure 6. 8 Image brandishing ISIS cubs in a Dabiq publication



Source: Dabiq November 2014: 40

One intriguing aspect of the current research regarding Islamic misogyny, as elaborated by Celso (2015), points to the first five Dabiq publications examined. None of the issues contained a picture of a female as corroborated by Silverman and Stewart (n.d) in their paper titled, “Women in Islamist Extremist Magazines: Five Ways to please your Jihadi Husband.” Some other images perceived to contain females, such as Figure 6.9, were blurred, which portrayed a sign of blatant rejection of women to a position of authority but relinquished them to being slaves or wives of Jihadists instead (Celso, 2015; Boghani, 2016; McLaughlin, 2014). This section of the Dabiq publication encapsulated the evils of modern society, which referred to work and employment as modern slavery which should be rejected for Jihadism and spoils of war (*‘Fay’* and *‘Ghanimah’*), the most accepted form of earnings (Dabiq October Issue 4, 2014; Ingram, 2018).

Figure 6. 9 Image attempting to show Western society workers in a Dabiq publication



Source: Dabiq October 2014: 29

Additionally, BH has constantly subjugated women and children in several communities, especially the culmination and climax of the kidnapping in April 2014 and suspected selling of some of the Chibok girls, which had created an international sensation as a way of the group gaining newsworthiness (Grant, 2014; IEP, 2015; Pham, 2016). ISIS eventually lauded this feat in its October 2014 Dabiq publication when it compared its treatment of Yazidi people, especially women, to BH’s capture and treatment of the Chibok girls.

Moreover, BH continually threatened to attack women and children since the year 2012 till its eventual global trend with the kidnap of the Chibok girls (BBC, 2014). As of the year 2012, while accusing the government of holding BH women, Shekau promised to attack women and children (Zenn and Pearson, 2014) as he cried out that:

“Since you are now holding our women, (laugh) just wait and see what will happen to your own women. Just wait and see what will happen to your own wives according to Shariah law, (laugh) just wait and see if it is sweet and convenient for you.” (BH transcript, 2012: Abba, 2012; Abubakar, 2012; VOA News, 2012).

Furthermore, the ‘theme of slavery’ is primarily prominent here as women are treated as slaves and war booties by both and several other terrorist groups. (CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014)

Furthermore, Khalid (2018) suggested that women and children are used by terrorist groups such as ISIS. Children are perceived as easy to influence and deficient in independent critical thinking, making it easier to have extremist imprints on them. Additionally, BH fills its ranks with Almajiris (unemployed and orphaned youths) (BBC, 2012b), who have little to ponder. Similarly, ISIS garners teens and children who cannot consume substantial provisions, resulting in less financial burden and high tactical manoeuvres as they can learn light weapons usage quickly (Khalid, 2018). Women and young girls are marginalised and relegated to sex slaves; and used to produce more cubs for the terrorist groups fighting against the crusaders (Heather, 2015; Khalid, 2018). That notwithstanding, while still recruiting children and subjugating women to untold horrors, both groups continue to see themselves sent upon the earth to accomplish Allah’s demands and as descendants of Mohammed (Celso, 2015), as analysed in the next theme.

6.2.6 Glorification of Self and ordained by God

The ‘glorification of self and ordained by God’ as depicted in Figure 5.9, is a theme referred to as a feature of the fifth wave Jihadist groups attributed to both BH and ISIS, which relates to the combination of military and religious authority commanding respect from their followers (Celso,

2015). Coded throughout BH transcripts and Dabiq publications, the theme represents one of the second most coded themes in the research, as BH and ISIS leadership under the tutelage of Abubakar Shekau and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi respectively project a mythic presence with a large following (Celso, 2015). Shekau took over the reins of power for BH following the death of former leader Mohammed Yusuf, with a violent and takfiri agenda geared towards annihilating unsupportive Muslims and other religions regarded as apostates even Shi'ites (Walker, 2012; Zenn, 2015).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formerly served under Abu Umar al-Baghdadi before he took over power in 2010 following the death of ISI head. The group further transformed into an armed insurgency due to Bahir al-Assad's repressive policies (Celso, 2015). Moreover, Baghdadi commands religious authority since he possesses a doctorate in Islamic Studies, for which a cleric opined that the leader is a descendant of the Prophet (Ryan, 2014). According to Celso (2015) and Varin (2016), though both Shekau and Baghdadi shared the same zealous ideology with a varied interpretation of their Islamic faith, unlike the former, the latter lacked a strong media presence which could account for a shortage of Baghdadi's speeches throughout the timeline and scope of this research. Also, despite both leaders failing to play into the hands of erstwhile terrorist groups' concept or accepted tolerance of violence, Shekau and Baghdadi are bent on relieving the current (deviant) civilisation of its supposed 'Jahiliyyah' for the progress of Islamic rule. Furthermore, a point of similarity and in line with the 'theme of Charismatic leadership' for both leaders is the notion that both of them adopted or possessed their predecessor's name, the "name of the Prophet's first successor [Abu Bakr] who" succeeded in establishing an Islamic empire (Celso, 2015: 264). Both groups continue to project an Islamic ideology towards destroying infidels and confirming the 'Ummah' (Abubakar, 2016; Celso, 2015).

Following this, both groups in their propaganda videos and Dabiq publications pushed the idea that God ('Allah') declared the need for an Islamic state and rejected the existent civilisation. A case in point, while claiming that the BH serves the dictates of 'Allah' and was responsible for the Nyanya motor park, Abuja bombing (Nigerian Bulletin, 2014; Onuoha, 2014). Still, Shekau using his Islamic

prowess, further instructed Muslims to heed his warning while projecting himself as an indestructible one unless God willed it (CKN News, 2014; Peace, 2014).

In the same vein, ISIS also espoused the idea that Allah has anointed Baghdadi to conduct the Caliphate as he sees fit. Though Wood (2015) asserted that the real Caliphate is to rise from unanimous decisions between Mecca and Medina scholars, the ISIS caliphate was established without recourse to any authority. Besides, on occasion, an individual utters 'Allahu akbar' before undertaking any course of action such as suicide bombing or beheading. He is believed to be carrying out this action for 'Allah' (Wood, 2015). ISIS projects this idea that 'Allah' is the primary leadership from whom they received instructions and protection throughout their propaganda video showcasing their activities in accordance with God's will, making other Muslims not undertaking the same path to feel guilty for not joining their ranks or women serving as their wives (Iraqi Witness, n.d).

Moreover, according to Celso (2015), both groups, especially BH, indicated that the group's leader, Shekau had a strong media presence and preferred to work with some media houses disseminating information to the press in Nigeria, especially Daily Times. However, the media houses and new media whom both groups perceive are thwarting their agenda have also not been spared from the wrath of both groups.

6.2.7 Distaste for Media Houses

The distaste for media houses represents the third most coded theme identified in BH's 2012 transcript as well as ISIS 2014 transcripts along with Dabiq publications. This was illustrated in Figure 5.15 and, as aptly captured by Celso (2015), is the need to be globally relevant and understood, which was an idea that BH and ISIS dwelt on excessively. It represented a significant part for BH as this agenda eventually saw the group become the most lethal terrorist group in the world in 2014 with 6,644 deaths (IEP, 2015) following extensive media coverage of its atrocities against the Chibok girls in April 2014 (Grant, 2014; McLaughlin, 2014; Pham, 2014). It can, therefore, be extrapolated that the year

2014 was a media-high related year for BH with the group's heightened global relevance leading up to its pledging of allegiance to ISIS through a video in March 2015 (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015).

ISIS has also used the media to its advantage with regular media posts and documents published with its agenda and propaganda prowess (Wood, 2015). Nonetheless, the media has not always been tremendously friendly to the causes of both terrorist groups. The researcher structured the theme of 'distaste for media houses' through abductive reasoning. Both terrorist groups have issues with the media as the media sometimes portrays the groups in a negative light. An example is Boko Haram which is a media devised nomenclature for the Nigerian terrorist group's original name - 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunni Lidda' Awati Wal Jihadi', meaning 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad' (Ajayi, 2012, BBC, 2012b; Campbell, 2014a; Chothia, 2012; Pham, 2016). The group once published a video in which they renounced the name in 2012 by saying, "Nigerians, our name is not Boko Haram, we are Muslims, Ahlis sunnah" (BH transcript – The Jurist Law, 2012). Despite that, the name has stuck to the group. ISIS has also gone by several names in the media, especially 'Daesh,' which is a derogatory term transcribed from the Arabic language to mean '*one who crushes something underfoot*' or '*one who sows discord*,' a name the group, ISIS also has issues with as well (Irshaid, 2015; Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016).

Likewise, owing to the unpleasantness of the name change and other factors, both BH and ISIS have always vented their anger on media houses and platforms, culminating in BH's bombing of Thisday Newspaper in Nigeria way back as 2012 (The Jurist Law, 2012, Sunday, 2018). In an attempt to grace the world with the group's perspective on adverse media reports, BH explained their reasons for attacking Thisday newspaper and threatened to attack other news agencies, such as Sahara Reporters and Daily Trust (The Jurist, 2012; Sunday, 2018). Explaining further, the group claimed that this required a response of demolishing the federal government in response to the former president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan's declaration of defeating the terrorist group in three months (The Jurist Law, 2012, Sunday, 2018). BH also claimed that Thisday newspaper accused the group of being

responsible for the kidnap of expatriates in Sokoto state for which the “media houses reported that we were responsible for the incident, that was a lie against us” (The Jurist Law, 2012, Sunday, 2018). The group claimed responsibility for the suicide attack against the Thisday Nigerian newspaper in Abuja, which caused the death of four people and a car bomb attack on a complex that housed various news agencies on April 26, 2012 (Mantzikos, 2014).

The group went further to list the atrocities of the news agencies against BH. It categorised them based on the level of attacks orchestrated against them by BH, from Thisday to Sahara Reporters (The Jurist Law, 2012).

In the same vein, ISIS has also shown its distaste for the media, especially the western media, as the group warns Muslims not to pay attention to the media’s perceived adverse reports of their activities. In his 2014 Speech, while speaking to ISIS in Syria and claiming that they were fighting God’s fight, Baghdadi admonished Muslims saying, “Don't be deceived by the media for you will find us the kindest towards you and the harshest towards your enemies. God knows that we tried our best to defend Muslims. Then overnight we are accused of making Takfeer [Takfir] on the Syrian population” (Iraqi Witness, n.da). Likewise, the group believes it is on the warpath with the media when the ISIS July Dabiq publication read: “the Islamic State faces ... economic, military, political, and media war...” (Dabiq July Issue 2, 2014: 26). Also, while ISIS claimed the death of American Journalist James Foley, the group accused the Western media of subverting and diverting the minds of the US populace away from the real cause of his death - America’s inability to accept their terms and condition (Carter, 2014; Dabiq August, Issue 3, 2014; Beauchamp, 2015; Brennan, 2018).

In all, it is understood that ISIS is not as formidable as the western media make the group appear to be since it became popular in mid-2014 (Cottee, 2019). Nonetheless, ISIS distaste for media agencies received global attention when the group claimed responsibility for the Paris, Charlie Hebdo attack on 7 January 2015 undertaken by two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, in which 12 people were killed, and 11 others were injured (Taddonio, 2016; Marlowe, 2018). The reason was attributed to the fact

that in 2006, the magazine reprinted offensive cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed which had formerly appeared in Jyllands-Posten (a Danish newspaper) for which former and then French President, Jacques Chirac disapproved of the action and referred to it as "overt provocation." (CNN, 2018). Additionally, in 2011, following the publishing of another Prophet Mohammed's caricature, the magazine's agency was destroyed by a gasoline bomb (CNN, 2018). This shows that BH and ISIS work on a timescale of un-forgetfulness where grievances are addressed at later times/dates.

6.3 Influence and Contagion of ISIS on BH

Having answered RQ1 regarding the similarities between BH and ISIS, it is essential at this juncture to answer the RQ2 and RQ3, which relate to the influence of ISIS on BH's terrorist propaganda and what this effect looks like in BH's terror campaign in Nigeria through the lens of contagion theory. The influence of ISIS on BH can be attributed to factors inherent within both groups' ideology such as the need to establish a Caliphate as well as the gradual establishment of Islam as a dominant religion across the world seen to be eroded by western values leading to ignorance of truth (*Jahiliyyah*) (Walker, 2012; Celso, 2015; Pham, 2016). The influence of ISIS on BH also presupposes the need for BH to gain international recognition or audience, leading to the group becoming the most dominant/lethal terrorist group in the world in 2014 (IEP, 2015).

Contagion theory suggests that terrorist tactics in one country lead to and inspire similar terrorist tactics and techniques in other countries (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). It advocates the duplication and repetition of violence by certain groups due to the imitation or influence of other violent groups made prevalent by mainstream media (Weimann and Brosius 1988; Midlarsky *et al.*, 1980; Nacos, 2009). Such influences include but are not limited to the following further explained in detail; slavery in Islam, development of a new society, western education as '*haram*' (forbidden), lies (dishonesty) from the government, responsibility for attacks: change in attacks and trajectory: and unrestrained violence.

6.3.1 Slavery in Islam

Following Parker and Sitter's 'strain' concept, BH and ISIS represent a particular aspect of 'strain' representative of Rapoport's 'wave' where terrorist groups imitate and learn from each other pushing the narrative of contagion (Rapoport, 2004; Parker & Sitter, 2015). Slavery has been attributed to several religions, especially Islam, for which there is a divergence of opinion on the extent of this by scholars (Clarence-Smith, n.d; BBC, 2009). For this, Clarence-Smith (n.d) and Khaled (2001) claimed that a large part of Muslims recognised the abolition of slavery in Islam as necessary but finding out the era or period at which the abolition eventually came to be particularly difficult, with Levy (1957) indicating that the era was within the 1950s (Clarence-Smith, n.d).

Nonetheless, BH and ISIS make clear their diverging arguments on the matter of slavery. The activities of both groups involve the wilful subjection of women to harsh Islamic rules; situations where women and especially young girls are forced to become sex slaves of Jihadists and baby (cub) producing machines to populate the Jihadists in their quest for the global establishment of Islam (Heather, 2015; Khalid, 2018). A case in point is when Shekau claimed in a 7th May 2014 video while threatening to sell the April 2014 abducted Chibok girls that there is slavery in Islam and justified it by proving that Prophet Muhammad also had slaves in his time. Shekau also insisted that he cannot be killed by anyone while threatening former and then president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan and former UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-Moon, to infer that there was nothing like slavery in Islam. Speaking about the authenticity of slavery in Islam, Shekau questioned:

"What I will want you to know is, there is slavery in Islam, don't be deceive[d] about United Nations, it is useless thing and I call them United Nations of absurdity led by Ban Ki-moon. If not how can you say there is no slaves? Why are you slaughtering chicken? If someone say there is slave[ry], what is wrong? Are daughters of slaves not slaves?"(2014 BH transcript - CKN News; Peace, 2014).

The last question posed by Shekau in the above transcript is related to a statement made by ISIS in its October Dabiq publication (Issue 4) when the group following BH mentioned that boys born from

women regarded as slaves are their mothers' masters. However, with no mention of girls born of women referred to as slaves, it is expected that these young girls are regarded as slaves themselves, while if they are later set free, they take their mothers as their slaves without knowledge of this (Dabiq October Issue 4, 2014: 16). This statement is cited in the Dabiq publication when referring to the 'Revival of Slavery (which existed in the Islamic era and is to be re-established) before the hour' of crusaders' conquest (Dabiq October Issue 4, 2014: 14 - 16).

Furthermore, the groups' activities received wide criticism from several international bodies such as the UN. Former Secretary-General of UN, Ban Ki-moon in 2014 criticised BH's maltreatment of women following a rise in rape, forced marriages and sexual slavery by extremist groups, especially BH and ISIS (Lederer, 2015; CEP, 2017). Also, a report released by the UN in 2015 claimed that the most disturbing of the cases of sexual exploitation was the abduction of the Chibok girls, for which different figures have been given as Lederer (2015) asserted that 276 students were abducted from the school in Northern Nigeria. From mid-2014, the UN claimed a significant rise in the total number of documented cases of sexual violence orchestrated by extremist groups with particular reference to ISIS. Such actions were used to spread fear, terrorise the populace, oppress religious minorities such as the Yazidis in Iraq, and subdue societies that conflict with its philosophy (Lederer, 2015).

The Yazidis previously resided in Northern Iraq and practised Islam with other religions such as Mithraism (worship of the god of friendship). They have been accused of worshipping the devil by other Muslims, owing to the supposed comparisons between the devil referred to as 'Shaytan' and an angel of Yazidi origin, Tawusi Melek (CEP, 2017). Furthermore, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) (2017) reported that a UN report from June 2016 recorded that the Yazidi population has been the most maltreated community by ISIS, with approximately 400,000 Yazidis being subjected to various forms of degradation by ISIS since the year 2014. This was the same route the terrorist group BH took just around the same time as its documented kidnap of the Chibok girls with "forced marriages, enslavement and the 'sale' of kidnapped women and girls" playing a pivotal role in BH's philosophy

and way of life. In contrast, girls who refused to be indoctrinated into Islam or married to Jihadists were given death threats (Lederer, 2015).

Additionally, the issue of the internationally acclaimed April 2014 kidnap of the 238 Chibok girls by BH resulted in the mention of BH by ISIS and comparison of the former's Chibok activities as similar to those of its treatment of the hundreds of Yazidi women and girls (Grant, 2014).

Though ISIS compares BH's treatment of Chibok girls to its treatment of Yazidi women (Grant, 2014; Pham, 2016), the group still mentioned the latter's activities as more diminutive than its enslavement of these women since what it perceived as the rejection of Shariah law (*jahiliyyah*) (Celso, 2015). This the group does by proving and making itself (ISIS) to appear as a more formidable adversary to the crusaders (the west), coming second to no other terrorist group with BH coming behind with a smaller number of enslaved women. Moreover, the popularity/notoriety received by BH in its capture and enslavement of Chibok girls eventually culminated in the group's kidnap of approximately 110 girls during an attack on the Government Girls' Science and Technical College in Dapchi, Yobe State (also in Northern Nigeria), on 19 February 2018. However, most girls were later released except for a Christian girl, Leah Sharibu, who refused to renounce her Christian faith (Arobani, 2019). While the use of sexual slavery of women seeks to promote harsh Islamic ideals and fear in the populace's hearts, BH has also imitated ISIS to create its Caliphate and recreate the mythic past (Celso, 2015), as expanded upon in the next section.

6.3.2 Development of a New Society

The theme of the 'Development of a new society' as depicted in Figure 5.8 involves the vehement and forceful attempt by terrorist groups to obliterate the perceived depraved apostate state of order corrupted by western civilisation resulting in '*jahiliyyah*' (rejection of divine truth) and the need for the recreation of the current day archetype of Muhammad's Medina society (*ummah*) and establishment of *Khilafah* headed by his direct descendant (Gambhir, 2014; Celso, 2015). The theme represents a characteristic of Celso's (2015) fifth wave Jihadist group. It is synonymous with the theme

of the 'Rejection of social-political order,' and the quest for millenarian justice as depicted in Table 1.1, which entails the demolition of apostate structures and the reversal to the divine state and truth of Muhammad's umma buttressed by the bliss received from the creation of the Caliphate (Celso, 2015). The establishment of the Caliphate by both terrorist groups relates to Muhammad's Medina community (Celso, 2015), the Ummah-Medina in Saudi Arabia attributed to Prophet Muhammad. The Ummah-Medina was established following Prophet Muhammad's move from Mecca to Medina to evade discrimination in the year 622 and was seen as the home to Muslims all around the world and used to solve the problems of Muslims (BBC, 2011b, PBS, 2002). Both groups attempted to create this phenomenon of Muhammad's Medina community

In June 2014, following the split of ISIS from its al-Nusrah front (Abubakar, 2016), the group took control of the central Iraqi city of Fallujah to form the Islamic Caliphate. This was followed by the invasion of the Northern city of Mosul and other towns and cities, precipitating the group's name change to Islamic State (Tran and Weaver, 2014; Fishman, 2014; BBC, 2015b; Celso, 2015; Tran and Weaver, 2014). Contagion here relates to BH making no inclination to establish a Caliphate since its inception in 2002, till 2014 following that of ISIS (CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014). BH sought to establish an African Caliphate with Abubakar Shekau as the Caliph (ruler and leader) (Buchanan, 2015; IEP, 2015).

Conversely, Tran and Weaver (2014) perceived that the move by BH to establish its caliphate months after ISIS created the same as suggesting a form of similarity between both groups and imitation of technique and strategies by BH of ISIS made popular by mainstream media - symptoms of contagion. Additionally, the establishment of the ISIS caliphate in June 2014 was followed by the first publication of the Dabiq magazine titled 'The Return of Khilafah (Caliphate)' in July 2014 (Gambhir, 2014; Ingram, 2018).

Moreover, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself and was lauded as the Caliph (religious and political leader) of the ISIS newly established Caliphate (Iraqi Witness, n.db; Jihadist News, 2014), while Abubakar Shekau professed a Caliphate in Gwoza, Northeastern Nigeria (NewsDiary, 2014; Peace,

2014; Sotubo, 2014). Likewise, both Caliphs identify with the same successor name, 'Abu Bakr,' which is also a form of respect and reverence from their followers to believe they are divinely elected to undertake the path of recreating the Caliphate and cleansing the impure society (Celso, 2015).

Following the announcement of the Caliphate in Gwoza, Northeastern Nigeria, BH released a video in August 2014 which saw BH leader, Shekau asserts that he was grateful to 'Allah' for providing the group with victory over its newly established Islamic State (IS) (NewsDiary, 2014).

Moreover, Shekau referred to BH's version of a caliphate as 'Islamic State' in his speech, suggesting some form of affiliation to ISIS before the culmination of the group's final pledge of allegiance to the latter in March 2015 (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015). However, Scott (2015) claimed that the move was one of timidity and the need to affiliate with a much larger group to drive the group's goals and motivate BH members as the morale of the jihadists were dwindling at that moment following the group losing ground and its footing in Northeastern Nigeria. The above is followed by the group subsequently dubbing the name 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP), which will explain the relationship between ISIS, BH and ISWAP in succeeding sections (Grant, 2014).

There was also a different trajectory seen in the actions and tactics of BH, referred to as version 3.0 as of 2014 by Pham (2016), following foreign links with other groups, such as ISIS, which saw more lethal than version 1.0. The first version of BH was mostly about peaceful protests and riots and making the world understand their stand (Friedman, 2014). This is buttressed in BH's transcript as early as 2012 when Shekau tried to explain his group's stance while dictating that the group is solely against security service agents such as the police following the execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf (Abubakar Shekau, 2012; Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012; Mark, 2012; Oboh, 2012).

6.4 Summary

The examination of the units of the analysis revealed a sense of formidability of the terrorist groups and continuous government antagonism. Other religions and individuals against them or their Islamic dictates and tenets were regarded as apostates. Other similarities between BH and ISIS include but

are not limited to the rejection of existing social-political order, the idealisation of a mythic past, external issues (global Jihad), unrestrained Violence and kidnapping, glorification of self and claims to be ordained by God, and a distaste for media houses. However, one pertinent show of contagion between BH and ISIS is the changes in social media messaging and attack trajectory, discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SOCIAL MEDIA COMMUNICATION AND TRAJECTORY

7.0 Introduction

The current chapter explains BH's communication, mainly social media communication, which experienced some changes, especially regarding the medium and language. The chapter elaborates on this and delves into and trajectory and transformation of BH attacks and strategy while imitating ISIS. This is followed by discussing the relationship between BH, ISWAP and ISIS.

7.1 BH and Social Media Communication

Public messaging represents a pivotal part for any terrorist group, such as BH, for which attention is given to the group's contents rather than solely its attacks as this helps to provide access and insights into the group's modus operandi, outlook, strategy and trajectory (Mahmood, 2017; Zenn, 2017). BH has consistently disseminated information through different means such as social media and online platforms, the likes of YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram, which is somewhat problematic for a particularly surreptitious group. Through its conversations and dissemination process, BH has provided a distinct expansion of target groups from security officials to members of society, especially those assisting security personnel and areas, added to the constant explanation of its grievances.

The internet brought faster and instant messaging, social networking and improved innovative human interactions systems and methods. Most users can form communities and create platforms for exchanging information, organising certain activities and movements usually based on particular leanings, even political matters (Chiluwa 2011; Ifukor, 2011). According to World Internet Stats (2011), Nigeria ranks highest for the use of the internet in Africa with about 44 million users, mostly young people, with Facebook and Twitter being the most popular social media networks/platforms (World Internet Stats, 2011). Twitter was made popular in 2006 as a microblogging platform where users can send, post, share and re-share write-ups (tweets) of approximately 140 characters. Most times, the '@' symbol with a username can be used to start a thread – several messages – which can be formed

based on a previous tweet or message and push/refer messages to other users with retweeting (RT) facilities (Honeycutt & Herring, 2009). BH has maintained several Twitter accounts, including *@BokoHaram*, *@Boko_Haram*, *@_BokoHaram*, among others, with tweets in Hausa and English language with Islamic slogans. Most of these accounts have now been suspended. The analysis of these accounts reveals changes in communication primarily owing to BH's affiliation and imitation of ISIS by contagion. These changes affect BH's social media messaging, content propaganda and trajectory.

7.1.1 Changes in BH Communication and use of Social media

Between 2010 and 2012, BH provided local media with information on the group's intentions and activities. Abul Qaqa took over the capacity of spokesperson in September 2011 while being the second most quoted figure within the group at this time, behind Shekau. The end of 2012 saw the dominance of Shekau in the group's activities and leadership (Walker, 2012). The group also established certain relationships with different media houses, especially the 'Daily Trust' in which Ahmed journalist Salkida was favoured by the group (Mahmood, 2017).

Following Qaqa's death in September 2012, Shekau took over media and communication to disseminate lengthy video messages and furnish the internet with the group's methods and goals, lasting almost an hour, as opposed to previous short press interviews (Celso, 2015; Mahmood, 2017). Though the videos revealed development in the editing quality, the content and production seemed to change by the beginning of 2015 following the perceived influence of ISIS, leading to a change in message dynamics. BH frequently published messages with explanations for undertaking specific attacks while claiming them. These themes dominated the group's statements until 2015 when the group gradually lost its territorial claims and frequent security attacks and suppression.

From mid-2015 towards the end of 2016, following the group's pledge (bay'ah) of allegiance to ISIS, there was the preponderance of high-quality videos of BH's ongoing attacks and the showcasing of war spoils by the Media Office of the West Africa Province (MOWAP) (Campbell, 2014b). This period

saw a reduced media presence from Shekau, with messages having a more generalised rather than localised undertone and mention of grievances. The statements followed this pattern until BH split into two factions - BH and ISWAP - following the replacement of Shekau as leader of BH in August 2016. BH's messaging strategy involved pre-recorded videos and social media posts from several Twitter accounts - with various adjustments in terms of dissemination. The death of Qaqa reduced the group's communication abilities, leading to the use of YouTube by Shekau with restrictive efforts put in place by the Nigerian government.

The group used Twitter/Telegram, YouTube, Jihadist forums, websites, press interviews, videos, or other sources. Most of the group's messages were in video format between 2012 and 2016, with limited video statements between 2010 and 2011. By 2013, leading up to 2014, the Agence-France Presse (AFP) received some of BH's videos. At the same time, by 2015, the group relied majorly on social media's dissemination of messages and propaganda. The influence of ISIS on BH was visible in the group's messages on Twitter and Telegram instead of the long videos posted on Youtube with localised rhetoric and statements.

Previously, BH used flyers primarily in the Hausa language to explain their stance, issue threats, or justify their action. For example, flyers were left behind to clarify the January 2012 Kano attack (Mahmood, 2017). With more affiliations with ISIS came a shift from flyers that provided a localised means of messaging to the more generalised and cost-effective use of social media and information technology to reach a wider audience. This was visible in the group's Twitter, Telegram and YouTube accounts. The dabble into the diverse worlds of social media, especially Twitter and Telegram from 2015, revealed a sign of the influence of ISIS on BH in regards to its messaging tactics. Between January and March 2015, in the lead-up to the pledge to the Islamic State, four BH Twitter accounts, including 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa' (the Indissoluble Link), were suspended for violating user guidelines. The posts revealed the group activities and pictures of the group in battle with security agencies, among others.

Moreover, there was a continuous publication of links to video messages and tweets in English and Arabic instead of the previously preferred Hausa language (with the incorporation of Arabic), BH's primary language of communication. The last tweet from the account 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa,' was Shekau's pledge of allegiance to ISIS. It seems the social media accounts were orchestrated to accomplish BH's movement and show acceptance of ISIS. Likewise, the group made no further effort to re-join Twitter following the suspension of the 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa' account, nor does the media account exist anymore.

During the run of the 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa,' the messaging wing of BH, in 2015, the account produced materials in line with ISIS, sometimes in Arabic at a much higher quality, with Shekau missing from most of the contents (Jihadology, 2015). This showed an alteration in the group's messaging style and content and eventually affected the group's trajectory and strategy, leading to the eventual pledge of allegiance of Shekau to ISIS – bringing the group under the authority of an external jihadist group. Following this, the messaging took a felicitation stance for fellow jihadists worldwide, especially mentioning Western countries.

Beginning from July 2015, the attention BH received from ISIS led to an increase in attacks on security personnel as the group took control of most of the messaging for BH. ISIS began disseminating and publishing concise statements via different platforms and channels. During this period, ISIS claimed certain attacks undertaken by BH - ISWAP - Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah, replacing BH's previous means of claiming attacks (attacks with preference to attacks on government structures and those viewed as takfir). Moreover, ISIS promoted content and attacks relating to male rather than female suicide bombers and against security forces instead of soft targets. This ISIS preferred pattern was not in line with Shekau's tactics which involved more female suicide bombers and disparate attacks. There was the predominant use of graphical claimed attacks with dead bodies in a concise and undeviating manner, especially in high-quality videos. The videos had the religious music – nasheed, portraying the attacks positively and effectively with 'fay' and 'ghanimah' – spoils of battle. There was also the

denial of government and security forces' advancement and devastation against the group while illustrating the functional strength of the group.

Another aspect of the BH messaging tactics was the downplaying of the successes of the government and security forces while magnifying its strengths and capture of territories and showing off the lives of those living under its rule. This is a similar tactic used by ISIS and captured in its communication within its Dabiq publication. It details its plans and actions, calls for the 'hijrah' and showcases the recurring tactic by BH. ISIS continued to do this by showcasing BH as more prominent than it appeared while distancing itself from Shekau's over-explanation 'of the group's narratives in its public messages and eventually moving towards al-Barnawi's leadership.

Other forms of ISIS influence showed one of the group's members in an October 2015 video beckoning on members of al-Shabaab to collaborate with ISIS with previous analogous videos clamouring for the same. ISIS used different platforms, especially its Dabiq publication, to push its agenda and seek other Jihadist groups to join its ranks. At the same time, BH did the same, showing the external influence and some sort of coordination with ISIS. Similarly, the group continued to demonstrate some affiliations with ISIS by displaying members of its group in videos showing them executing punishments shown by other local administrations (Mahmood, 2017).

Due to the distance in the geographical regions in which they operate, unlike with the proximity with AQIM and al-Shabaab, BH needed to connect with ISIS through virtual space, social media and internet clear in messaging, video production and eulogy attribution with the provisional of moral and financial support. Following BH's affiliation with ISIS, the group began losing control of towns and areas previously under its authority as the Nigerian security forces started offensive attacks against the group (BBC, 2015d). BH's association with ISIS is specifically influential as it provided an external outreach of the menace and violence orchestrated by BH previously restricted to the geographical boundaries of Nigeria and its neighbours. It also allows for emigrating jihadists as requested by ISIS, with difficulty making the entire journey to abode in BH's wilayat. This is evident when ISIS spokesman

Abu Mohammad al-Adnani while speaking on the group's pledge of allegiance mentioned that, "a new door for you to migrate to the land of Islam and fight" was available in BH's wilayat in Africa (Abdelaty and Karouny, 2015).

7.2 Changes in BH attacks and trajectory

This section looks into the changes in attacks and trajectory of BH from a motorcycle, hit-and-run attacks and the use of poisoned arrows, to adopting Al-Qaeda's tactics of suicide attacks, kidnapping, vehicle bombing and assassinations and then to ISIS of increased violence and seeking to conquer and control territories in Nigeria under Sharia, which AQIM previously used in 2012. The pledge of allegiance by BH to ISIS has had dire consequences for the group, which will be highlighted, however, not before understanding the change in attacks and trajectory undertaken by BH.

BH has shown a particular preference for al-Qaeda and verbally attacked the US as far back as 2010 but claimed to be more focused on Nigeria as of then. Though looking at the influence of ISIS on BH, as of 2010, BH showered accolade on Jihadists in Somalia – Al-Shabaab, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen which was published in Arabic on a Jihadist forum and messaging wing of AQIM, showing a clear case of the ability to influence beyond the borders of Nigeria (Cook, 2011). The August 2011 attack of the UN office in Abuja revealed a shift in the group's activities and international outlook, which connected with external jihadists – AQIM and al-Shabaab (Eveslage, 2013). However, there was a lack of Western infrastructure attacks or actions of the exact likelihood (Mahmood, 2017). Though BH can be perceived as a largely local group with videos addressing local issues such as the advancement of security forces in northern Nigeria, the group has sometimes spoken about international relations actors such as video criticism of the French's war on Islam (Premium Times, 2013).

By the year 2012, through its communications, BH complained about the incarceration of its members, wives and children by the Nigerian government while following or giving credence to the group's involvement in attacks and jailbreaks to release some of its members (Celso, 2015). For example, BH warned Sokoto in January 2012 to free some of its members by following with attacks in July 2012.

The state failed to heed its warnings and release its incarcerated members (Zenn, 2012). This further led to the February 2013 kidnap of the French family in northern Cameroon in response to BH's detained members and families (BBC, 2013). It can be seen that the need to release the group's members (and their families) could be utilised by the government to their advantage by bringing the group to the negotiating table. The group has also continued this stance especially calling for the release of its members in exchange for its own kidnapped victim (Vanguard, 2013). Still, the BH was not intent on killing civilians in its escapades as the group somehow provided the direction it would take regarding its activities or perpetration of violence. For instance, BH's attacks on schools began with a public warning before they escalated into wanton violence. In February 2012, BH was quoted as admitting that, "We attacked the schools at night because we don't want to kill pupils" and warned that more violence and attacks would occur if their almajiri students were attacked once more (Vanguard, 2012).

The group remained absorbed with local issues while still acknowledging al-Qaeda in passing with specific videos in early 2012. Though BH showed some fondness to such as al Qaeda and AQIM, referring to them as 'brothers' in several cases in 2013 and further threatening some Western governments. For instance, in December 2013, Shekau claimed that the operations of BH are not confined to Nigeria, and America would see the group the next day (AFP, 2013).

BH's mix with AQIM and al-Shabaab followed extensive jailbreaking and kidnapping for ransom - a signature move for AQIM (Mantzikos, 2014). Towards the end of 2014, there was an increased confluence between BH and ISIS, which saw itself in symbolism, insurgency, support, communication and strategy of territorial acquisition. By August 6, 2014, BH had seized the town of Gwoza, along the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon. By August 25, 2014, the group attacked and demolished military barracks in the town of Ngala and overran the town of Gamboru, following the destruction of the bridge connecting the city of Maiduguri, the Borno state capital (Al Jazeera, 2014; Grant, 2014; Celso, 2015). These activities led to a rise in the group's local influence over many Nigerian citizens, further

culminating in the attack on Bama, a city southeast of Maiduguri with a population of approximately 300,000 people in September 2014 (Windrem, 2014). BH later began to distance itself from other groups and affiliate more with ISIS.

On August 24, 2014, BH leader, Abubakar Shekau, proclaimed the establishment of a 'Caliphate' in northern Nigeria with an hour-long video in which he mentioned, "Thanks be to Allah who gave victory to our brethren in Gwoza and made it part of the Islamic caliphate. We did not do it on our own. Allah used us to capture Gwoza; Allah is going to use Islam to rule Gwoza, Nigeria and the whole world" (Al Jazeera, 2014; Windrem, 2014). From the speech excerpt regarding Nigeria, Shekau refers to his group's (BH) ability to run Gwoza and subsequently the whole of Nigeria with Islamic law while looking to ISIS to rule the rest of the world from Iraq and Syria. It is evident that while AQIM had established a caliphate in 2012, BH had not expressed its intentions to do the same, even though the group had been close and in collaboration with and received training from AQIM. The feat achieved by AQIM was not essentially as crucial to BH then as of 2012, or the group had no resources to accomplish the same feat. The achievement of the same by ISIS, a group that BH had not been near but with symbolic affiliation and communication, felt natural and influenced the group through the aid of social media and spokesperson in the person of Al-barnawi to achieve the same (IEP, 2015).

While it was moderately challenging to ascertain the level of credence BH was giving to ISIS to establish its Caliphate, it was evident that BH had previously shown support to ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, with further inclination in its video (Al Jazeera, 2014). More so, ISIS, in its Dabiq – a road map to the administration of its caliphate and the Islamisation of the world – had called upon other terrorist groups to pledge their allegiance after overcoming the strengths of non-police states like Nigeria, which cited as an example (Woods, 2015). Similarly, any confusion about the Nigerian Caliphate not receiving any influence from ISIS was quelled when ISIS received the pledge from BH. ISIS further allowed Gwoza to be an administrative station (Province - Wilayat) for terrorist groups and a West African province with al-Barnawi as the leader (Dabiq November 2014; Abubakar & Lebur, 2019).

BH continued to orchestrate attacks from its claimed territories and bases to several Nigerian states and neighbouring countries, especially Niger. Even the Nigerien's President, Mahamadou Issoufou, had once sorrowfully declared that "the Islamic State is at our door" (Soudan, 2015).

Furthermore, there was a strategy with the allegiance pledged by BH as they suffered several attacks from the Nigerian military regardless of the purported victories gained by the group in early 2015 (Abdelaty and Karouny, 2015). In collaboration with other regional government securities, the Nigerian government began retaking territories already overrun by BH (Alozieuwa, 2015). Similarly, ISIS was claiming territories and wreaking havoc within Iraq and Syria, which somewhat gave the seemingly pronounced collaboration with BH the necessary publicity boost for both groups.

BH expressed a tactical shift from its earlier use of VBIED, suicide attacks, prison storming and jailbreaking, annexing territories, kidnapping for ransom, especially in exchange for captured BH members (Pham, 2016). The group became a formidable force against the Nigerian military following the group's connections with ISIS (See Pham, 2016 for BH versions 1.0 to 3.0). BH began conquering territories, especially Borno state and displaying the ISIS black banner over conquered infrastructures while threatening those opposed to its takfir and extremist ideology similar to ISIS in its captured territories in Syria and Iraq (Obisesan, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2015). This is followed by using the ISIS music/anthem, "*My Umma, Dawn has Arrived,*" in the group's recordings of high-quality videos (Mahmood, 2017). The group summarily executed those caught smoking within its operation territories and demolished approximately 178 churches by August 2014 (Doors, 2014; Taiwo, 2014).

Moreover, in a later video of superior quality than usual, in 2014, while extending pleasantries to the ISIS networks and the Caliphate already established in Iraq and Syria, Shekau declared his intentions to create the group's Caliphate in North-eastern Nigeria (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015). Also, the video featured the al-Baghdadi Mosul declaration of the ISIS caliphate in June of the same year (Mahmood, 2017). There was an increased frequency in BH levels of destruction, attacks, and violence as the group began attacking military bases and schools, churches, and other infrastructures and

institutions, including kidnapping several individuals (Mantzikos, 2014). This was also the group accepting responsibilities for attacks from 2014 and way into 2016, as was expressed in the group's videos and speeches. One of such situations was in a transcript which read:

"We have said all that needs to be said and everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are fighting with them."

"We hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians and those who have betrayed us." The quote was from a January 2012 Shekau video message while referring to and claiming the security services caused the death of former BH leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009 (NaijaNeduTV, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2012). He also claimed that the group was not involved in hurting or killing civilians except for security personnel that had affected them in more ways than one. However, as of 2014, this changed as the group deemed it fit to threaten every individual, including civilians in Nigeria. So, while threatening to sell the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped in April 2014, Shekau angrily declared:

"You are sitting down in the name of clerics with turbans; you are sitting with Christians, thinking it is mediation. Saying it is development and progress... We will die killing and slaughtering them if you meet infidels in battlefield brethren, just harvest their necks; Allah said it and not Shekau. Cut out their necks until the time that you will get majority over [sic] infidels of the world. And you will get it, Allah said it, time will come that you will form majority over infidels, face to face" (CKN News, 2014; Peace, 2014).

BH moved away from the tactics of just attacking Christians perceived as apostates and revenge on security service officers for supposedly attacking their (BH's) women and the death of their former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, to increased attacks on Christians, military personnel and even Muslims ("clerics with turbans") deemed as being against the group's ideology (CKN News, 2014; Mantzikos, 2014; Peace, 2014; Pham, 2016). In a similar Salafi-jihadist manner, ISIS called on jihadists to attack and kill perceived apostates (also regarded as unbelievers) without recourse to letting them live until they embraced Islam. To them, only two camps exist, that of the Islam - 'believers' which ISIS and

other jihadists belong to and the camp of hypocrisy - 'unbelievers' or peacemakers full of different religions and opposing Muslims (Dabiq Issue 2, July 2014; Gambhir, 2014). This is corroborated in a July 2014 speech where the ISIS leader, al-Baghdad encouraged emigration from Muslims and disruption of peace within other religions with unrestrained violence (Jihadist News, n.d).

Following this, the group changed its name from BH to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Bugnacki, 2015; Laccino, 2015; Varin, 2016). The move came with drastic changes in the group's organisation, leadership structure and attack trajectories which will be analysed in the relationship between BH, ISWAP and ISIS (Zenn, 2018a; Ibeh, 2019; Sakida; 2019).

7.2.1 Development of a New Society

The theme of the 'Development of a new society' as depicted in Figure 5.8 involves the vehement and forceful attempt by terrorist groups to obliterate the perceived depraved apostate state of order corrupted by western civilisation resulting in 'jahiliyyah' (rejection of divine truth) and the need for the recreation of the current day archetype of Muhammad's Medina society (ummah) and establishment of Khilafah headed by his direct descendant (Gambhir, 2014; Celso, 2015). The theme represents Celso fifth wave Jihadist groups (Celso, 2015). It is synonymous with the theme of the 'Rejection of social-political order' explained in Chapter 6.2.1 and the quest for millenarian justice as depicted in Table 1.1. The theme represents the demolition of apostate structures and the reversal to the divine state and truth of Muhammad's umma buttressed by the bliss received from the creation of the Caliphate (Celso, 2015). The establishment of the Caliphate by both terrorist groups relates to the recreation of Muhammad's Medina community - the Ummah-Medina in Saudi Arabia attributed to Prophet Muhammad, which he established and was home to Muslims all around the world to solve the problems of Muslims (BBC, 2011b, PBS, 2002). Both groups attempted to create this phenomenon of Muhammad's Medina community

In June 2014, following the split of ISIS from its al-Nusrah front (Abubakar, 2016), the group took control of the central Iraqi city of Fallujah to form the Islamic Caliphate. This was followed by the

invasion of the Northern city of Mosul and other towns and cities, precipitating the group's name change to Islamic State (Tran and Weaver, 2014; Fishman, 2014; BBC, 2015b; Celso, 2015; Tran and Weaver, 2014). Looking at the years under focus, 2012 to 2016, contagion comes as BH makes no indication of its inclination to establish a Caliphate since its inception in 2002, affiliations and training from other terrorist groups until its imitation of ISIS from 2014. The imitation saw the replication of the ISIS caliphate in the form of the African Caliphate by BH with Abubakar Shekau as the Caliph (ruler and leader) and eventually saw the group become the deadliest terrorist group of the same year, 2014 (Buchanan, 2015; IEP, 2015).

Conversely, Tran and Weaver (2014) perceived that the move by BH to establish its caliphate months after ISIS created the same as suggesting a form of similarity between both groups and imitation of technique and strategies by BH of ISIS made popular by mainstream media - symptoms of contagion. Additionally, the establishment of the ISIS caliphate in June 2014 was followed by the first publication of the Dabiq magazine titled 'The Return of Khilafah (Caliphate)' in July 2014 (Gambhir, 2014; Ingram, 2018), with the meaningful place of Dabiq to destroy the Western enemy (BBC, 2016b; Gambhir, 2014). Likewise, both Caliphs identify with the same successor name, 'Abu Bakr,' which is also a form of respect and reverence from their followers to believe they are divinely elected to undertake the path of recreating the Caliphate and cleansing the impure society (Celso, 2015).

Following the announcement of the Caliphate in Gwoza, Northeastern Nigeria, BH released a video in August 2014 which saw BH leader, Shekau declare that he was grateful to '*Allah*' for providing the group with victory over its newly established Islamic State (IS) (NewsDiary, 2014). This Shekau claimed, when he said that:

"We are grateful to Allah for the big victory he granted our members in Gwoza and made the town part of our Islamic Caliphate." Oh, you people, here I am Abubakar Shekau, still standing on my feet. I am still the leader of Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lid Da'awati wal Jihad, (BH) that country called Nigeria; a name we don't believe; but forced to address as such because [there is no] ... better name. For us

there is nothing like Nigeria but Islamic Caliphate; because God the creator of the world and the earth we are all standing is the sole owner of the earth and no one else” (NewsDiary, 2014).

Moreover, Shekau referred to BH’s version of a caliphate as ‘Islamic State’ in his speech, suggesting making the imitation of ISIS glaring before the group’s final pledge of allegiance in March 2015 (Elbagir *et al.*, 2015; Osley, 2015) after which ISIS accepted the group’s pledge (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015). Though, Scott (2015) claimed that the move by BH was one of timidity and the need to affiliate with a much larger group to drive the group’s goals and motivate BH members as the morale of the jihadists were dwindling at that moment following the group losing ground and its footing in Northeastern Nigeria.

7.2.1.1 Brandishing the ISIS Black Flag

In addition to mimicking and imitating the establishment of the ISIS caliphate by BH, the latter similarly took it upon itself to brandish ISIS’s flag (Celso, 2015; McLaughlin, 2015; Boghani, 2016; Gander, 2016). The ISIS flag is portrayed as a handwritten, irregular style of the ‘shahada’ with the upper line inscriptions as, “La ‘ilaha ‘illa-Allah,” translated as “There is no god but God” with “God Messenger Mohammed” on a white seal as illustrated in Figure 6.10. The inscription is not as elegant as other flags with identical messages, such as that of Al-Shabaab. The white seal is intended to look like the approved stamp of the Prophet Muhammad, which has been contended as per its original version in recent years (McLaughlin, 2014; Gander, 2016).

Figure 6. 10 The ISIS flag (banner)



Source: Gander (2016)

Consequently, the BH flag, as illustrated in Figure 6.11, featured the 'shahada' against a black Islamic inscribed flag embedded and rising above an open book with two guns crossed by the side (McLaughlin, 2014).

Figure 6. 11 The BH flag (banner)



Source: McLaughlin (2014)

BH's brand (logo) illustrated in Figure 6.11 appeared in most of the group's videos. Still, it was discontinued in 2014 as the group began flying the same ISIS flag just after establishing its Caliphate, as seen in the left-hand corner of Figure 6.4 (Celso, 2015; McLaughlin, 2015; Boghani, 2016; Gander, 2016). This followed BH's pledge of allegiance in line with ISIS's continued campaign for terrorist

groups and individuals living in different parts of the world, notably western countries, to migrate to the Islamic State (IS) or pledge their allegiance if their movement were restricted (Gambhir, 2014).

Nonetheless, BH's pledging of allegiance to ISIS brought undesired consequences for the latter as a whole, such as the split into two factions (Zenn, 2018a), as can be seen in the following section on the relationship between them ISIS, BH and ISWAP.

7.2.2 The Relationship between BH, ISWAP and ISIS

Consequent upon the acceptance of pledge of allegiance to ISIS by BH, the latter was shocked to find out that rather than being an extension in Northern Nigeria with its administration and Shekau as the leader (Caliph) of ISWAP, there was a division of BH into two factions: BH and ISWAP (Zenn, 2018a). Following the ISIS acceptance of BH's pledge and change of name, BH to ISWAP, the transition was undertaken by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, one of the sons of BH founder, late Mohammed Yusuf, which resulted in closer ties between Al-Barnawi and ISIS (Zenn, 2018a). Subsequently, in August 2016, ISIS relieved Shekau as head of the group and replaced him with Abu Musab al-Barnawi (The Economist, Zenn, 2018a). Shekau regarded some members of his group as unloyal, his version of Islam or ideology (infidels). Mamman Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and some Jihadists in his camp, referred to his ideas and actions as too extreme and an excessive form of takfir. This move did not sit well with Shekau as he had already elevated himself to Caliph without the help of ISIS and was not ready to step aside for anyone. Shekau disrespected ISIS order and continued to create a wedge resulting in the split of the group in mid-2016 into two factions – BH and ISWAP - with BH having more than 1,000 followers with a stronghold in the South and Eastern part of Maiduguri while ISWAP took over the reins of power in Northern Maiduguri (The Economist, 2018; Zenn, 2018a).

The relationship between BH and ISWAP has been tumultuous owing to ISIS's influence with BH primarily geared towards the looting of villages and carting away of medical supplies, food material as well as the killing of loggers and farmers perceived as passing information to Nigerian security forces against the group (Haruna, 2019; Ibeh, 2019; Maina, 2019; Punch, 2019a; Sakida, 2019). Moreover,

the foraging missions by BH have been perceived as efforts by the group to protect itself from relying on its depleting resources and against the harsh consequences of ISWAP disowning the group for its lack of establishment of its Caliphate and losing control of its former territories (Ibeh, 2019; Sakida, 2019). With this, most attacks against the military have been attributed to or claimed by the self-styled ISWAP, while BH remains active in the area and has barricaded roads, killed motorists and burned vehicles (Sakida, 2019; Vanguard, 2019). ISWAP relies on the ideological tenets of ISIS of not attacking Muslims in schools or marketplaces, except for those in the government's employ, which is seen as *'haram'* - forbidden as discussed in Chapter 6.2.5. ISIS frowned upon working for the government and other institutions, referring to it as *'evils of modern slavery'* in its Dabiq October 2014 publication (Issue 4), while claiming spoils of war (*'Fay'* and *'Ghanimah'*) as the only accepted form of earning (Dabiq October Issue 4, 2014; Ingram, 2018). Attacks against communities in Northeast Nigeria and military formations and bases also intensified during the period leading to the Presidential general election in Nigeria, which was postponed from Saturday 23 February to Saturday 9 March 2019. During this period, ongoing military offensive and defensive actions were taken against the group under the military counter-insurgency operation with the code name, 'Operation Lafiya Dole' headed by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt Gen, Buratai Yusuf (Haruna, 2019; Marina, 2019).

In ISWAP's connections with ISIS, the latter's

The ISIS social media news agency Amaq has also been involved in distributing In ISWAP's media and other content on the group (Reuters, 2019). For example, the news outlet claimed that ISWAP had killed 30 Nigerian soldiers in Logomani village on 26 January 2019. A report debunked by the Nigerian military asserted that only six soldiers suffered bomb fragments injuries (CAN, 2019; News Express, 2019). However, conditions for ISWAP leadership started looking gloomy in 2019 when reports spread that ISIS had usurped Al-Barnawi's leadership. On 5th March 2019, local news sources reported that ISWAP might have a new leader by the name of Abu Abdullah ibn Umar Al Barnawi, after dropping Abu Mus'ab Al-Barnawi, but the reasons for the ousting of the former leader were not immediately

provided (Punch, 2019b; Vanguard, 2019). Similarly, the fate of Al-Barnawi remained uncertain because following the same proceedings, former ISWAP second-in-command, Mamman Nur, was killed by more radical ISWAP commanders in August 2018 (Punch, 2019b; Vanguard, 2019).

The influence of ISIS on BH has continued to push the boundaries of terrorism in Nigeria, with ISIS gaining more ground on the activities and workings of BH as a learning organisation. Likewise, the effect of the influence of ISIS on BH continues to be seen through the pledge in allegiance, the use of similar flags, the use of extremist ideologies, changes in tactics and trajectory, the split of the group and change in leadership.

7.3 Summary

Regarding contagion and imitation between both terrorist groups, other grey areas exist, such as BH, which exists in Nigeria dwells mainly on the internal structures of the Nigerian state than on international affairs or matters undertaken by its ISIS affiliate. This is corroborated by Eveslage (2013) while putting forward the theory of relative deprivation to elucidate the establishment and rise of BH. After analysing the 2012 public messages of the group, he explained that though the BH made no mention of poverty nor education as the cause of its insurgency, and pointed out that the group was primarily reliant on domestic politics with a lack of skill for escalation of its attacks to the international levels.

Furthermore, both groups bear resemblance in their maltreatment of girls and women as slaves and producers of babies. These children are further conscripted into the Jihadist organisations as 'Cubs of the Caliphate' (Heather, 2015). The women receive limited education and are relegated to become wives of the Jihadists or, in some situations, slaves to their children, as described by ISIS.

Owing to changes in social media messaging and the trajectory of attacks and ideology of BH over time, it is expected that the group may remain unstable following in-group fighting, such as the rumoured change in ISWAP leadership, which also happened in the case of Shekau in BH. The demise of the groups (BH and ISWAP) may be slowly approaching following news of the successful disarming

of the last ISIS stronghold in Baghouz in Eastern Syria as of March 2019 announced by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (ANI, 2019; Tobin, 2019; Wedeman & Said-Morrhouse, 2019). There is also the issue of the death of ISIS's al-Baghdadi being killed by US forces with a new leader, Abu Ibrahim al Hashemi al Quraishi, believed to have been chosen as reported by the group's media arm, al Furqan Foundation (BBC, 2019; Callimachi & Schmitt, 2019; CBS, 2019; Ensor & Allen, 2019; Mortazavi, 2019; Skynews, 2019; Swann *et al.*, 2019).

The next chapter seeks to provide concluding remarks on the research, offering the political significance of the research and contributions of this study to knowledge.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSION

8.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide concluding remarks regarding this research in terms of its contributions to knowledge while offering the political significance of the research and other avenues, especially for further studies. The findings support the idea that BH was initially established by the group's founder, Muhammed Yusuf, in 2002 as a non-violent Islamic group. However, the group began trailing the activities of ISIS in 2014 and onwards with the declaration of the group's Caliphate in Gwoza, Northeast following ISIS Caliphate declaration in the areas of Syria and Iraq in June 2014 (Celso, 2015; Tran and Weaver, 2014). Though the group was connected to other terrorist groups like AQIM and al-Shabaab, the ISIS imitation seemed contagion apparent. This eventually culminated in BH pledging its allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, which ISIS accepted in the same year (Celso, 2015; Zenn, 2015). Moreover, the BH's caliphate declaration video propagated by the group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, describing Gwoza as the newly established Caliphate had some few minutes dedicated to al-Baghdadi's Mosul declaration of the ISIS Caliphate in June in a 'nod' to the acceptance of ISIS activities (Pham, 2016).

The current chapter provides a brief review and summary of chapters one to seven before explaining how this chapter was arrived at, followed by the sections on the outline of key findings, the political significance of the research, contributions to knowledge and conclusion.

8.1 Brief Review

To provide a cohesive conclusion, the substantial political significance of this study and contributions to knowledge, it is necessary at this juncture to surmise the previous chapters of this thesis which have led to what this particular section seeks to achieve, as earlier mentioned.

In chapter one, the background of the study was explained with contagion theory as the theoretical framework for this research. Contagion theory suggests that terrorism transcends national boundaries and can influence terrorism in other countries. Contagion in history saw the steady rise in terrorist attacks and mass casualty rates (attacks and bombing) between 1968 and 1986 with some form of a continuous cycle in terrorist attacks and a wide range of political violence and waves of crimes. Also, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a rise in plane hijacking following the Palestinian-staged hijackings, which received intensified media coverage (Martin, 2013). There was also the era of homemade bombs following the 19 April 1995 Timothy McVeigh bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which left more than 160 people dead and the embassy raids in the same period (Jenkins, 1985; Nacos, 2009). This is followed by the rationale and motivations for this research and the effects of ISIS on BH. The research aims/objectives and questions applied are explained and shadowed by the scope of the study, the methodology and follow-up analysis to answer the research questions, which takes the form of 'thematic content analysis' of qualitative data from media sources (primary sources – documentary research) and publications.

Chapter two provides a look into the background of BH in Nigeria, which is no stranger to the concept of terrorism vis-a-vis religious extremism. Previous violent groups include the Niger Delta militants and notably the Maitatsine uprising, a movement coordinated by Islamist fundamentalists and led by Cameroonian immigrant, late Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, between 1980 and 1985 with a bid to suppress the prominent ruling elites in Northern Nigeria. Similar to BH, the Maitatsines were opposed to western ideals and influences while rejecting the use of any other book or manuscript except the Qur'an (Kumolu, 2011). This will later reinforce the idea that BH tailored its activities after the Maitatsine (Ajayi, 2012). However, Ochonu (2015) enunciated that BH has surpassed the Maitatsines in Nigeria by modelling itself against the backdrop of and receiving inspiration from ISIS. Also, the advantages of the internet and the scale of the arsenal available to BH were not at the Maitatsines' disposal, and the latter exclusively existed in some urban regions (states) in Northern Nigeria, such as Gombe, Kano, and Maiduguri, unlike BH. The activities of BH span across Nigeria to

neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Ochonu, 2015). The practice of Islam as a religion in the Northern states of Nigeria was investigated. Another point of discussion was BH's perception of the Sharia law being practised in some northern states as only beneficial to the rich and the detriment to the poor (Ajayi, 2012).

Chapter three delves into the historical background of ISIS and how the group developed quite differently from BH from the breakdown of the agreement between terrorist groups, metamorphosing from ISI to ISIL and then to ISIS with the establishment of its Caliphate. BH and ISIS bear resemblance on some levels as they both adhere to the tenets of the doctrine of Salafism and the teachings of the late Islamic Cleric, Ibn Taymiyyah, among other characteristics (Abubakar, 2016). This is followed by understanding terrorist groups as learning organisations and the imitation-contagion between BH and ISIS.

Chapter four provides an overview of the research methodology and design used in answering the research questions (RQs) posed in Chapter one. Primary research (in the form of documentary research) and secondary research methods are explicitly the technique through which this research study gained knowledge and gathered data (Research Methodology). The epistemological framework for this research is Critical Realism (CR), which involves a malleable empirical process of data analysis, pattern recognition and coding, which help understand different social issues in contexts (Fletcher, 2017). Several documents were analysed by the researcher with the aid of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) NVivo for rapid collation, retrieval, documentation and visualisation of analysis and results. A mix of primary and secondary data was essential to receive the benefits of triangulation to validate the data from different sources to eliminate gaps in the research (Lamont, 2015). Thematic analysis was used in the qualitative analysis process to identify themes and patterns in the different statements (units of analysis) while applying inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Chapter five focuses on the data analysis and presentation of the different units used to examine the RQs posed in Chapter one. Qualitative research and thematic content analysis are elucidated as the 'main design of the research' with transcripts and online publications from 2012 to 2016 by BH and ISIS employed as units of analysis. The transcripts were coded using the NVivo CAQDAS, which offered visualisation and graphical representation of data. These illustrations include similarities coded between both groups with the fifth wave jihadist groups themes (Celso 2015), such as 'the rejection of social-political order' and 'the development of new society,' among others. 'Slavery in Islam' and 'Western education is forbidden (the English translation for Boko Haram) were coded in BH and ISIS transcripts. The research limitations, such as the difficulty in sourcing videos, transcripts and publications by the terrorist groups, were discussed.

Chapter six expounds on the critical findings and discussions from the analysis. The chapter discusses the graphical illustrations presented in the previous chapter. BH has existed since 2002, yet the group only became violent in 2009 in response to the death of its founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in police custody. The group followed through with a takfiri-ideology which eventually saw the group mimic the tactics of ISIS, leading to the establishment of its Caliphate and abduction of girls used as sex slaves. The ISIS supported the activities of BH while the group later changed its name to ISWAP after it pledged allegiance to ISIS, and this plan soon fell apart as BH split into two factions as a result of leadership change and in-group fighting in 2016. There have also been talks of another leadership change for ISWAP in 2019.

Chapter seven examines BH's social media communication and the group's propaganda dissemination changes, especially in medium and language. BH's transformation, changes in trajectory, attacks and strategy while imitating ISIS are also discussed. One influence of ISIS on BH is the creation of the ISWAP from BH. The relationship and dynamics between all three groups – BH, ISWAP and ISIS were discussed with BH brandishing the ISIS flag.

Chapter eight – the current chapter provides a review and summary of chapters one to seven, including a section on the outline of key findings, the political significance of the research, contributions of the study to knowledge, and a conclusion.

8.2 Summary of Findings

The following summarises the key findings of this research, which start with both groups' distaste for media houses.

8.2.1 Distaste for Media Houses

The distaste for media was identified as a similarity between BH and ISIS. The theme essentially formed the crux and trajectory of BH attacks as far back as 2012 until the group fully started its onslaught on individuals and military formations. During the time frame under focus, especially in the year 2012, BH attacked media outlets, notably the 'Thisday' newspaper, Nigeria headquarters in Abuja, leading to the death of four civilians as well as a car bomb attack on a complex which housed a various number of news agencies on April 26, 2012 (Mantzikos, 2014). BH disclosed that the attack on Thisday headquarters was solely for the news agency's adverse reports about prophet Mohammed during a beauty pageant in Kaduna in November 2002 (Mahmood, 2017; The Jurist, 2012). After explaining the group's reasons for attacking Thisday newspaper, Shekau threatened to attack other news outlets (The Jurist Law, 2012). Hence, the motive behind the attacks on the news agencies was revealed when Shekau explained that: "The reasons why we decided to attack some Media Houses, especially Thisday, is because the paper was used in dishonouring our prophet, Mohammad (SAW) during a beauty pageant in Kaduna in November 2002" (Abubakar Shekau, 2012 – The Jurist Law, 2012). Through this, it shows that the group never forgets its grievances but revisits them later, just like the death of its founder has continued to be spoken about by the group whenever the opportunity presents itself.

Additionally, the research findings support the view that BH prefers to correspond to the media on its terms and conditions, such as when they criticised the media as being dishonest with their reporting

and actions in collaboration with the Nigerian government (Belo-Osagie, 2015; Sunday, 2018). Shekau has, on several occasions, also warned media outlets on the need to behave and act right or risk being put out of existence (Belo-Osagie, 2015; Sunday, 2018). This was made evident following the Thisday media house attack when Shekau, in a related video released to that effect, claimed responsibility for the attack

Similarly, ISIS has declared its distaste for the media, notably the western media. The group occasionally warned the global Muslim population not to pay attention to the media's perceived adverse reports of their activities. A case in point was when ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, in a 2014 speech, admonished Muslims, saying: "Don't be deceived by the media for you will find us the kindest towards you and the harshest towards your enemies" (Iraqi Witness, n.d a). Likewise, the group claimed to be at war with the media when in its July 2014 Dabiq publication said: "In contrast, despite what the Islamic State faces of economic, military, political, and media war, and despite all the different parties unified against it" (Dabiq July Issue 2, 2014: 26). Moreover, just like BH, ISIS took its disdain for the media to a global scale with the 7th January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, in which 12 civilians were killed and 11 others were injured (Marlowe, 2018; Taddonio, 2016).

Furthermore, BH and ISIS have continued to blatantly lash out at media houses and journalists while accusing them of dishonesty. One of such occasions led to the capture and eventual death of American Journalist James Foley in August 2014. ISIS blamed the US for not heeding to their demands of releasing some Muslim prisoners like other European countries had done for the release of their previously captured European citizens (Beauchamp, 2015; Brennan, 2018; Callimachi, 2014; Carter, 2014; Keating, 2015; Wright, 2015). This was made evident in the Dabiq August 2014 publication Issue 3 when ISIS described how:

"The American government was dragging its feet, reluctant to take the necessary steps to save James's life, negotiations were made by the governments of a number of European prisoners, which resulted

in the release of a dozen of their prisoners after the demands of the Islamic State were met...” (Dabiq August Issue 3 2014: 37-38).

Therefore, the research findings corroborate the idea that both terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, always had an aversion to the media and were only positively responsive when the media portrayed them in a good light or published messages they had provided for dissemination by the press (Irshaid, 2015; Khan, 2016; Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017).

8.2.2 Slavery in Islam and the Marginalisation of Women

Having looked at the distaste for media houses, slavery, and the maltreatment of women by both groups is pivotal at this juncture. Substantially a symptom of contagion within both groups, both issues weigh heavily on the actions and interactions of the terrorist groups with the world. The question of slavery has been contentious for years as to how it has been attributed to religion, especially Islam (Clarence-Smith, n.d; BBC, 2009). It has also been ascribed that some Muslims during the 1950s abolished slavery, and it is difficult to identify the particular era of its abolition (Clarence-Smith, n.d; Khaled, 2001; Levy, 1957). However, in its Dabiq publication, ISIS makes a firm assertion that slavery is still relevant in Islam by way of Shariah law. The group claimed that: “Enslaving the families of the kuffār (disbeliever) and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shari’ah” (Dabiq Issue 4 October 2014: 17).

Additionally, BH and ISIS continue to use the weight of ‘slavery’ as a tool to their advantage to further their agenda. Therefore, the research findings suggest that ISIS employs the idea of slavery to turn the minds of Muslims against the political and economic system of the countries in which they reside. This they do by terming the seeking of employment in their respective countries as ‘modern-day slavery of employment,’ which subjugates Muslims to constant fear and domination to ‘unbelieving masters’ (Dabiq Issue 3, August 2014: 29). In one of the Dabiq online publications, ISIS praised different forms of looting, referring to them as war booties (elucidated as ‘Ghanimah’ and ‘Fay’) as an acceptable means of income. By this, the group lauded the practice of jihadism as lucrative than accepting well-

paid professional jobs in society. In explaining this, in the August 2014 Dabiq online publication Issue 3, ISIS questions:

“What is the best and most lawful source of income?’ [...] .. It is the income of the ghānimīn (earners of ghanīmah), which was made permissible for them upon the tongue of the Sharī’ah... It is the provision taken by might, honor, and subjugation of Allah’s enemies. It was made the most beloved thing to Allah, and so no other income can stand up to it. And Allah knows best” (Dabiq August Issue 3 2014: 29-30)

Moreover, the subjugation of women has also been hinted at by ISIS with the globally known and widely broadcast capture of the Chibok girls in April 2014 by BH in Borno State, Nigeria. ISIS compares the event to its subjugation and maltreatment of the Yazidi women in its Dabiq publications. According to ISIS, the Yazidi tribe are a part of an ignorant era that became Islamised due to surrounding Muslim communities but are not entirely Muslims and are somewhat worse than Christians (Celso, 2015; Dabiq October 2014: 15). As such, ISIS perceives the maltreatment of these sets of people as mandatory and required: “This large-scale enslavement of mushrik (those accepting other gods) families is probably the first since the abandonment of this Sharī’ah law. The only other known case – albeit much smaller – is that of the enslavement of Christian women and children in ... Nigeria by the mujāhidīn there” concerning BH (Dabiq October Issue 4 2014: 15). Here, ISIS refers to BH’s capture of Chibok girls as the largest yet more diminutive version of their capture and maltreatment of Yazidi women (Celso, 2015).

Likewise, women are treated as sex slaves, and war booties for the re-population of the supposed established Caliphates (Heather, 2015; Khalid, 2018) as Shekau, while speaking of selling the captured Chibok girls, claimed that:

"We will hold you as slaves, who told you there is no slave? They said human rights, silly liars, when did you know human rights? You just come and lying in the name of Allah, Allah who created human doesn’t know rights...?" (BH transcript, 2014: CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014).

In addition, the researcher's findings reveal that Shekau claimed slavery as being entrenched in Islam when in his 7th May 2014 video speech, while threatening to sell the abducted Chibok girls, mentioned this. He questioned, "What I will want you to know is, there is slavery in Islam, don't be deceive[d]... How can you say there is no slaves? If someone say[s] there is slave[ry in Islam], what is wrong? Are daughters of slaves not slaves?" (2014 BH transcript - CKN News; Peace, 2014). Also, ISIS and BH perceive themselves as established to perform Allah's duties as descendants of the Prophet Mohammed by recruiting children and subjugating women to untold horrors, especially the propagation of slaves (Celso, 2015). Another point of departure discussed in the next section is the change in BH's social media messaging.

8.2.3 Changes in Social Media Messaging

Violence escalated with social media tools such as Twitter and Telegram and high-quality videos following BH's affiliations with ISIS. Previously and primarily through Shekau and other spokespersons, the group usually described its actions and activities before undertaking them, such as the use of leaflets and flyers as a way to warn Muslims to abstain from association with mentioned targets and security officers or face the same fate. Similarly, the group also explained and claimed its actions against targets following its attacks – such as its 2012 attack on 'Thisday' newspaper and threat against other news agencies, which the group explained as a result of its grievances from 2002.

Nonetheless, with the group's threat, it is somewhat challenging to differentiate between genuine threats and discussions except when a grievance can be traced, such as the example mentioned above. Threats dominated BH's messages up until the period of 2015 where the group lost its territorial claims and engaged in frequent security offensives and suppression. Likewise, a messaging medium shift surfaced from largely Hausa and local languages to English and from flyers to social media platforms which provided a much less expensive and broader reach for the group's propaganda, having come under ISIS's tutelage.

BH's social media strategy saw the domination of Shekau and spokesperson, Qaqa between 2010 and 2012 followed by a Shekau dominance in late 2012 with a reduced presence following the group's affiliations with ISIS in early 2015. From early 2015 till 2016, the Islamic State's influence and dominance in the group's message were shown through Facebook, Twitter, Telegram and high-quality videos. Also, social media became the most revered source of dissemination instead of the previous provision of media content to most media houses and journalists. This allowed for triangulation of their efforts and propaganda to achieve their objectives.

However, further research is needed on BH's messaging, content and effect on the locale and linkages with its recruitment drive, which could help reduce the group's influence and diminish its growth and development in northern Nigeria. With the change in social media usage and communication came changes in trajectory and attacks explained in the next section.

8.2.4 Change in BH attacks and Trajectory

BH became militarily violent in 2009 following the death of its founder and former leader, Muhammed Yusuf, while continuing to voice its stance to the contrary. This stance was, in most cases, related to the group's non-intent of attacking civilians, except Christians and those that were perceived to be providing information to the authorities.

Nevertheless, as a terrorist group, BH has been involved in the orchestration and perpetration of attacks against individuals and property in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. During the current research, the researcher found out that BH needed to explain its actions to the people, such as not attacking every target claimed by the Nigerian government and security service officers (The Jurist, 2012; Mantzikos, 2014; Mahmood, 2017). BH was also involved in refuting claims of attacks attributed to it by the Nigerian government. For example, in January 2012, BH released a video claiming responsibility for the attacks on a security base in Kano for the supposed arrest and maltreatment of its group members' wives, children and members (Mark, 2012; Oboh, 2012).

More so, BH tries to coerce other Muslims to sympathise with them against the government of Nigeria by pushing the 'we' and 'us' versus the 'they' and 'them' narrative. BH further perpetuates and reinforces the portrayal of the police and public officials as corrupt and should not be trusted, thereby winning members' support and sympathy.

Likewise, there is also a case of contagion and imitation of the rhetoric of unrestrained violence voiced by ISIS, principally from 2014. BH's attacks, rhetoric, and trajectory took a different turn from hit-and-run attacks, motorcycle attacks and roadside bombs to capturing territories and attacking military bases and the group's unequivocal declaration of violence in a 'nod' to ISIS. BH birthed a 'Version 4.0' from 2014, which saw an increase in the convergence between BH and ISIS in symbolism, such as using the ISIS flag, imitation of philosophy and violence dogma (Pham, 2016). The group metamorphosed from what Pham (2016) refers to as version 1.0 (the emergence of the group) to version 2.0 (the death of BH founder Yusuf and the drastic change in the group's activity fostering jailbreak of their members) and version 3.0 (between mid-2014 which saw the group grow in foreign influence and elements) to version 4.0 (increased attacks).

By 2014, BH's trajectory moved from the anti-Christian rhetoric (which appeared in the group's messages and stopped in 2015) to the acquisition of territories, cross-border operations and the eventual joining of ISIS. The group also claimed its focus lay mainly in Islamising and executing Jihad in Nigeria, emphasising then President Goodluck Jonathan before using ISIS ideas and rhetoric majorly in 2015. The group further spoke against external actors, resulting in, for example, the kidnapping of some members of the Moulin-Fournier family in Cameroon regarding the arrest of its members.

It is only fitting to provide some political significance this study holds in Nigeria and the world at large, having itemised the critical findings of this research. These can be seen as the aftermath of contagion and strategies to forestall the contagion of terrorism.

8.3 Political Significance of the Research

Based on the research findings, the following political significances have been itemised to provide a clearer picture of the research and highlight the limitation of techniques used to disrupt the terrorist groups and contagion between the groups.

8.3.1 The Use of Force as a Last Resort

This section looks at the use of force by the Nigerian government as a counter-terrorism strategy against the terrorist group BH. The use of force by the Nigerian government led to the death of the group's founder, Yusuf and the group became more violent afterwards (Agbibo, 2013; Walker, 2012). Yusuf's death is the primary motive for the group's initial call to arms in the country (Walker, 2012). Therefore, the strategy should not be the only option to tackle BH or any terrorist group in Nigeria. Most times, using force as a reprisal to non-state violence increases violence (GPF, n.d; see Smith, 2012). While military power remains one of the methods of countering terrorism, it is not the only approach since no one method is used to fully alleviate the issue of terrorism (Hough, 2013; Martin, 2013). Kirby (2003) and Meikle (2011) suggest that different approaches such as negotiation, appeasement, legal measures and the likes can be employed together with military engagement as a matter of last option when all else fails.

An example of employing other means of countering terrorism is the Amnesty Program in 2009 offered to ex-militants of the Niger Delta province to lay down their weapons to receive a fixed remuneration, rehabilitation and official pardon for their acts of terrorism and crimes (Hinshaw, 2012 in Ejime 2017). Nonetheless, the success of this method requires the terrorists to reside within distinct boundaries of the state for which BH exists across the borders of Nigeria and other neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Moreover, the technique remains sketchy as ex-combatants can return to terrorism or acts of violence when the remuneration ceases, such as the rise of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in March 2016, subsequent upon the termination of the amnesty program in 2015 by President Muhammed Buhari (Ebiede & Lange, 2017).

However, the use of force by the government only gives the terrorists strong credence for the recruitment of more members and sympathy from the general populace (Ejime, 2017). Here, BH plays on the sentiments of the people by claiming the government acts in an immoral way by orchestrating violence against Islamic tenets and accusing the government of destroying its group members. Whether BH's assertions are correct or not, the fact remains that BH continues to play on the sentiments of the people who perceive them as righteous in their activities and reinforce the notion that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'

Intrinsically, the use of force should be a means of last resort, as earlier stated, because in most cases, it seems counter-productive and does more harm than good as it engenders more violence. For example, the previously explained Maitatsine movement had its leader, Maitatsine, a Cameroonian immigrant killed. Still, his campaign lasted for five years between 1980 and 1985 with a bid to suppress the prominent ruling elites in Northern Nigeria before it died down (Oyovbaire, 1980; Isichei, 1987; Ajayi, 2012; Ochonu, 2015). Furthermore, BH has been in existence since 2002. Still, with the death of its founder and leader, late Mohamed Yusuf, regarded as a martyr, BH became a lethal terrorist group, culminating in its rise to the deadliest terrorist group globally in 2014.

That notwithstanding, military action should primarily be used as a requisite for pre-emptive measures to debilitate the threat of terrorism before it happens, especially one that exists within the confines of a country (Stern & Wiener, 2006), unlike BH, which crosses borders. Similarly, military strategy as a counter-terrorism measure has recorded some positive results, such as the apprehension of a founding leader of Hamas, Mohammed Taha, in a military operation in Gaza (Ejime, 2017; Hough, 2013; Mackinnon, 2003), the taking out of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and his ISIS counterpart al-Baghdadi in 2011 and 2019 respectively, among others (Boone, 2011; Callimachi & Schmitt, 2019; ICRC, 2011; Miller, 2014; Mortazavi, 2019). The changing nature of terrorism has made it a grave if not the greatest threat to national peace and security. As such, there is a need for a re-calibration of counter-terrorism initiatives and much more broad collaborative efforts.

Nonetheless, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), formed by Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon against BH supported by the EU, has recorded some successful attacks against the group (Adibe, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2015; Maiangwa, 2014). Moreover, the U.S Obama administration denied support to Nigeria's Jonathan administration in the fight against BH, owing to alleged human rights concerns. Still, the Trump administration was more forthcoming in supporting President Buhari's government by pledging to sell 12 Super Tucano fighter jets to the Nigerian military (Premium Times, 2018; Reuters, 2017; ThisDay, 2018). Nonetheless, so much more is still required to put an end to BH.

Terrorism being a global problem requires multinational collaborative efforts and a multi-strategic approach to defeat it, including military action with negotiation/dialogue/persuasion and tackling the root causes of terrorism such as poverty, socio-economic deprivation, religious intolerance, political exclusion and general discontentment. The subsequent political significance of the research will be looking into the part of the government and its role in the rise of BH in Nigeria as terrorism in the country, primarily the actions of BH, have continued to grow despite the government's best efforts.

8.3.2 Transparency on the Part of the Government

'Honesty is the best legacy/policy,' they say. Still, it is tricky to deal with violent non-state actors as anything said or done could make or mar the situation, as is the case with the BH situation in Nigeria. The Nigerian government should initiate an active campaign to provide the truth on any security situation by revealing honest, less sensitive details of non-state actors' engagement and the adverse effects of engaging in terrorism. Like the use of force, the provision of quasi-truth or watered-down facts only plays to the terrorist narrative. An example is the implementation of Sharia law in the Northern states of Nigeria, which BH perceived as quasi-Shariah law, untrue and part of the reasons for their attacks against non-Muslim entities and western civilisation (Danjibo, 2009; Walker, 2012; Pham, 2016).

Additionally, it is unhelpful that the government of Nigeria has claimed to have killed the leader of BH, Shekau, approximately three times, in July 2009, August 2013, and 2014, while Shekau has continued

to supposedly resurrect on all occasions to refute the claims made by the Nigerian government (Al Jazeera, 2013; Maina, 2013; Zavadski, 2014). Shekau has, on each occasion, debunked these cases of his reported death in different videos (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Likewise, speculations were made by the Nigerian authorities that Shekau was killed and one of his 'doppelgangers' impersonating him was also killed (Ibeh, 2014), which have all been proven as untrue. Even the US expressed its displeasure with the constant news of the death of the constantly resurrecting BH leader, Shekau (Ugwanyi, 2014b). Consequently, if the US cannot trust the words of the Nigerian officials on a single case as this, how much more the citizens of Nigeria, as this makes it hard for them to believe the government over the words of the non-state actors (who may be perceived as freedom fighters)? Therefore, the Nigerian government should only provide or publish correctly verified information, especially on security or terrorism-related activities, to gain credibility with citizens.

Furthermore, the politicisation of religion and use of Political Islam would need to be curbed, as political elites looking to secure votes during elections along religious lines need to be sanctioned or penalised by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This would lead to the limitation of the flow of finances to terrorist groups. Likewise, Nigerian security officials need to be better disposed to information sharing with other security services in neighbouring and faraway countries to create an avenue for better tracking of movement of funds, especially to violent non-state actors within the country.

The following political significance looks at the Nigerian government's efforts regarding cooperation with authorities from service providers and other countries to create and or establish barriers to the dissemination of information (vis-à-vis terrorist propaganda).

8.3.3 Restriction of Terrorist Group Media Presence

Several stances can be taken looking at the political significance of this research to prevent contagion and the imitation of terrorism or violence by different terrorist groups. Contagion has been identified

as the replication of violence in which certain groups embark on violent activities by imitating the actions of other violent groups made popular by mainstream media (Weimann and Brosius 1988; Midlarsky *et al.*, 1980; Nacos, 2009). In recent times, the internet and other means of communication and information dissemination. Therefore, to curtail the effects of contagion of terrorism, the government of the day needs to limit the online activities of terrorist groups. In addition to other means of communications, it is necessary as it is only a matter of time before another group rises through the imitation of terrorist activities on the internet following the split of BH into two factions: BH and ISWAP.

Furthermore, internet providers and social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter and Telegram need to do more regarding online radicalisation and terrorism contents, such as placing restrictions, blocking and suspending confirmed terrorist social media accounts. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 2015 blamed social media providers for assisting terrorist groups while calling for collaboration with security agencies to tackle terrorism (Laing, 2015). In 2015, Twitter suspended a Twitter account under the name of '@Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa' suspected to be used by BH, which had previously been publishing images of child soldiers being trained by the group. The account had gained 4,000 followers before it was suspended by Twitter (Laing, 2015). ISIS has also been versatile in the use of social media, such as Youtube and Instagram, among others which caused speculations as to the group's collaboration with BH following a wave of high-quality video from the group as of 2014 instead of the former shaky and unsteady videos of Shekau speaking in Arabic formerly published by the group (Campbell, 2014b; Laing, 2015)

Similarly, activities of terrorist groups, especially propaganda videos and magazines, need to be monitored, studied and analysed carefully as a necessity as encapsulated in the 'rationale for the current study' section in Chapter one. The government becomes more informed on what security measures and tactics to take to forestall terrorist activities. Also, such monitoring helps security services and informs them of the activities of foreign terrorist organisations that are violence-prone

or other terrorist groups that may likely want to imitate others. Additionally, investigating and assessing terrorist groups' propaganda videos help the security service and governmental bodies to monitor the actions of the terrorist groups. The government of Nigeria also needs to appropriately alleviate the internal structural problems of the Northerners to prevent leverages the terrorist groups can use against the government, as explained in the next section.

8.3.4 Readjustment of resources in Northern Nigeria

BH's grievance can be traced to the colonialization of Nigeria and the perceived marginalisation of Muslims fuelled by the rise of Christians in positions of authority. Muslims perceive this as calculatedly orchestrated against them, with the further destruction of the Sokoto Caliphate. BH had always emphasised its point against Christians vis-à-vis Southerners, especially in 2012, when the group threatened the Christians (southerners) to leave the country's northern parts within three days. The threats led to attacks on churches in Nigeria which showed convergence in messages and activities (Mahmood, 2017).

Further exacerbating this is the issue of resource allocation in Nigeria, one phenomenon that has existed since the colonial days with the impoverished state of Northern Nigeria, which led to the amalgamation of the agricultural North and oil-rich South of the country in 1914 for the development of the former region (Ndujihe, 2017; The National Archives, n.d). That notwithstanding, the North has still not fared better since the colonial days leading to different violence-prone groups exploiting this cause to their advantage to undertake terrorist activities such as the Maitatsine movement and BH. Instinctively, according to RD theory, the inability of certain groups to attain their goals results in frustration and, consequently, aggressive behaviour (Agbiboa, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013; Pichette, 2015). In such a case, and as Eveslage (2013) pointed out, the lack of proper means within the country for the provision of particular needs led to the rise of BH. The same can be said for the Maitatsine uprising as they believed the ruling elites in the North were widening the gap between the 'haves' – the rich and the 'haves not' – the poor, for their selfish agenda (Oyovbaire, 1980).

Therefore, to alleviate the situation in the North, the problem of BH and reduce the group's claim of the abysmal internal structures, there has to be a reassessment of (the quasi-) Sharia law and the disruption of the politicisation of religion (Political Islam). This will lessen the impact of religious politics and religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians seeking political positions. Citizens will tend to gravitate towards candidates' charisma and manifesto, not necessarily choosing leaders based on religious beliefs.

Moreover, better security should be provided in the country while the economic problems in the North given attention. The resolving of the economic issues and increase in the standard of living in Northern Nigeria should be paramount in Nigeria's strategies as most cadres of terrorists are made up of easily coerced less privileged persons, the marginalised, the unemployed, and the poor (*Almajiris*) in the society (ISN, 2009; BBC, 2016a). Therefore, if the standard of living in the North is raised, it would become more difficult for terrorist groups to recruit economically highly engaged individuals in the country. With all identified, which is not in any way an exhaustive list, it is pivotal at this juncture to venture into the contributions of this research.

8.4 Contributions

The contributions from this research have been subdivided into three significant aspects - contributions to existing literature, political significance in Nigeria, and methodology.

8.4.1 Contributions to Existing Literature

This research has made contributions in the following ways to existing literature and knowledge as follows:

8.4.1.1 Understanding Terrorism in Nigeria

One of the contributions of this research is the understanding of terrorism in Nigeria, which has taken the form of 'new terrorism' as identified in Chapter two. 'New terrorism' refers to the employment of new technologies, the internet and social media facilities such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter by terrorist groups to furnish the populace of different countries with their orchestrated attacks and

comments within the convenience of their homes (Martin, 2013). The concept relies heavily on religious terrorism and political Islam, which is supposedly undertaken for the prevention of the desecration of what is considered 'true faith,' with the belief that there is some conference of rights or sanction by an '*ethereal*' power to engage in terrorism (Martin, 2013: 40). BH's tactics are mainly similar to ISIS going by the new age of terrorist groups (New Terrorism) using religion as a factor and basis for their attacks. Unlike old forms of terrorism, such tactics involve cellular groups with little or no known organisational structure using unconventional and wide-reaching tactics to inflict high casualty damage on indiscriminate targets or symbols to instil fear in the hearts of those remaining to watch the outcome (Martin, 2013; IEP, 2015).

Religious terrorism is not novel to the world nor religious extremism to Nigeria. The effects of globalisation have brought new terrorism to mainstream media and wide reaching, especially with the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Martin, 2013). As such, BH relies on the variables of the current era of religious terrorism and political Islam to perpetrate their acts of terror under the guise of religion with the ability to kill a large number of people. This is pivotal as understanding the group's existence, tactics, and sustenance is necessary to defeat the terrorist groups wholly. In this case, BH and ISIS, mainly under groups in the era of new terrorism, rely heavily on mass casualty bombings. This is so as records show that in 2014, BH surpassed ISIS as the most deadly terrorist group in the world and responsible for 6,644 deaths when compared to ISIS with about 6,073 deaths within the same time frame with the death toll caused by the group in a single attack reaching more than 50 deaths (IEP, 2015). For example, looking at the 50 worst attacks of 2014, BH killed about 315 people in a single attack in May 2014 in Gaboru, Borno State, Nigeria, with ISIS killing nearly 670 people with explosives in the city of Badush, Iraq, in the same year (IEP, 2015: 93).

Terrorism in Nigeria is in an era of new terrorism, which requires more than military might, such as soft approach tactics to tackle the menace in the country. Moreover, the group's attack trajectory and modus operandi have changed to imitate that of ISIS.

8.4.1.2 BH Trajectory and Contagion

Another significant contribution that forms the crux of this research follows the trajectory of BH's tactics, modus operandi and social media messaging. BH as a terrorist group developed due to relative deprivation, the inability of the group's needs to be met, the killing of the group's founder, Yusuf, and the poor internal structure of the Nigerian state. However, the sustenance of the group, unlike the five-year reign and demise of the group's predecessor, the Maitatsine movement, can be traced to the 'contagion effect' from ISIS, which became full-fledged in 2014. This led to the group becoming the most lethal terrorist group in the same year and division into BH and ISWAP, with the latter having more connections and ties to ISIS.


Nonetheless, the group's activities in its burgeoning years were shaped like that of the Maitatsine movement, which existed in Northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985, with the latter's distaste of the state of the quasi-Sharia law being practised in Northern Nigeria (Ajayi, 2012; Kumolu, 2015; Ochonu, 2015). However, owing to several factors such as globalisation and the rise of 'new terrorism,' BH has survived for ten years and counting. BH further appropriates the advantages of the internet, seeking to create a playing field where it becomes a renowned terrorist group with renewed external-international connections and artillery.

Regarding messaging, previously, BH used flyers, specific Facebook accounts and produced low-quality videos primarily with its logo/banner while explaining its stance on several issues. However, following the group's affiliations with ISIS, there was a convergence in messaging, and use of social media for recruitment and propaganda as BH began delving into high-resolution videos for a more general, if not global (English) audience. The video productions saw similar ISIS themes showcasing attacks and feelings of formidability in attack orchestration and territory acquisition. The connection between BH and ISIS has also been attributed to one of BH's founder sons in Abu Mus'ab Al-Barnawi (Zenn, 2017, 2018a). Al-Barnawi became the linkage with ISIS, which saw him rise to the position of leader of ISWAP to continue the BH – ISIS synergy. With the successful dismantling of ISIS's last stronghold in Baghouz,

Eastern Syria, in 2019, it only leaves the end of 2021 and years to come to reveal the fate of BH, ISWAP and ISIS. There is also the issue of the death of al-Baghdadi in the hands of the US forces and a new leader by the name of Abu Ibrahim al Hashemi al Quraishi being chosen as enunciated by the group's media arm, al Furqan Foundation (BBC, 2019; Callimachi & Schmitt, 2019).

Looking at the trajectory, in essence, and as represented in Figure 7.1 below, BH previously engaged in jailbreaks, orchestrating hit-and-runs and motorcycles attacks which fully developed into territorial acquisition and attack on military bases following imitation and contagion of ISIS activities. The contagion by BH was also perceived in the August 2014 establishment of the BH Caliphate in Gwoza, Maiduguri following the June 2014 ISIS Caliphate establishment in Iraq and Syria (Celso, 2015; Pham, 2016), as well as the parading of the ISIS black flag and logo; the use of a snippet of al-Baghdadi declaring the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in their video and the change in name from BH to ISWAP. All these confirm solidarity and empathy with ISIS from BH.

Figure 7. 1 Effects of Relative Deprivation and Contagion on BH Trajectory



Source: Research study (2019)

Itemising the reasons for contagion from ISIS perspective in a 'nod' to the acceptance of the activities of BH, the country Nigeria is mentioned in several instances in the ISIS Dabiq online publications in the publication in 2014, ISIS revealed:

1. Referred to countries such as Nigeria "without the threat of a powerful police state" support jihad, including BH, encouraging the group to continue in its actions,
2. The mal-treatment of Chibok's girls and compared it to its mal-treatment of Yazidi women, and
3. The acceptance of the BH's pledge of allegiance.

That notwithstanding, the supposed change in BH's leadership from Shekau to al-Barnawi by ISIS could be that al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, is threatened by BH's increase in relevance, following BH the title of the most lethal terrorist group in the world and second to none in 2014. This is in addition to Shekau's continued presence in the media, especially with the group's position in the affairs of the Nigerian state, clarifying responsibility for attacks or just refuting claims of Shekau's death as announced by Nigerian security officials. The distancing of Shekau from ISIS leadership's choice, al-Barnawi eventually resulted in the BH split. Also, the attacks on military bases have come to be attributed to the ISWAP faction. In contrast, the BH faction headed by Shekau has been involved in foraging missions, killing farmers and loggers while destroying farmlands and communities in the process (Zenn, 2018a; Ibeh, 2019; Sakida; 2019). The influence of ISIS on BH has continued to push the boundaries of terrorism in Nigeria, with ISIS gaining more grounds on the activities and workings of BH as a learning terrorist organisation. Summarily, contagion can be seen in the change in BH's tactics, trajectory, and leadership following the group's split.

Further research is required to understand the trajectory of BH resulting from the in-group fighting and split following the supposed shutting down of ISIS by foreign forces. The following section takes a look at ISIS's pronounced distaste for education. Nonetheless, BH's aversion to education is a given

going by its name, Boko Haram, which translates to *'Book/Western Education is forbidden.'* The group further engages in the victimisation of women and vilification of female education.

8.4.1.3 Distaste for Education and Maltreatment and Victimisation of Women

Another contribution of this research is the constant riddle of education by BH, similar to ISIS. The stance of BH on education is understood within its name, Boko Haram, while ISIS also has its aversion to education. The 'rejection of education' theme relates to *'western civilisation is forbidden'* which comes from Boko Haram (Book is infidel) according to the media given nomenclature for 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihadi' (Chothia, 2012; Walker, 2012; BBC, 2016a). This follows a disdain for female education and civilisation as it is. More so, the constant bombardment and destruction of schools and universities in conjunction with religious institutions further shows the groups' distaste for education, be it formal, informal or religious education. On numerous occasions, the group BH has called for the destruction and abandonment of schools which was intentionally evident in the kidnap of Chibok girls. Videos surfaced where the group claimed to be in the business of selling the girls into slavery while asserting that slavery is still very present in Islam.

Similarly, ISIS tackles the matter of education, especially in their Dabiq online publication when they commented to Muslims regarding the disruption of education. ISIS blatantly tries to convince students, especially those in colleges and higher education, to abandon their education and pursue Jihad in whatever way possible. This is evident in the number of students and young adults that have fled from the West, especially the UK, to join the jihadists in Syria (BBC, 2015; Perešin, 2015; Loken & Zelenz, 2018). Likewise, BH and ISIS claimed to be fighting against several authorities due to the maltreatment of the female members of their communities whom they have less value for except for child-rearing and taking care of the Jihadist communities.

ISIS has also accused the US of killing their women and children, especially in their online Dabiq publication. They mentioned this when they claimed that the US forces brutalised their women and Islamic families in Iraq before their withdrawal (Gambhir, 2015). In a follow-up, other publications saw

ISIS threatening to attack western women, “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted” (Dabiq Issue 4 October 2014: 8). In a parallel pattern, BH also accused the Nigerian government of attacking and molesting their women, especially the security services, while threatening a reprisal leading to the kidnap of the 238 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014. An example before that was in 2012 when BH accused the Nigerian government of holding their women. Shekau threatened to attack women and children in Nigeria and treat them according to Sharia law (Zenn and Pearson, 2014).

Also, in other situations, BH has claimed the government is corrupt and the cause of terrorism in Nigeria when they assert that the government keeps molesting their women. BH further perceives the government as the enemy. The government must take specific steps not to play into the hands of terrorists by not using force at every given opportunity. The above relates to the contribution to understanding the rise of terrorist groups, while the following section relates to the contributions to political significance in Nigeria.

8.4.2 Contribution(s) to Political significance

The current contribution refers to using force as an immediate reprisal to terrorists and the effects on state and non-state entities. In this case, Nigeria has employed force against violent groups on several occasions, which has led to the death of the founders and leaders of violent movements and terrorist groups, which becomes one of the driving motives for more violence from such movements and terrorist groups. Hence, the current research findings suggest that the killing of terrorist group leaders only makes such leaders appear as *‘martyrs,’* making the group have a reason for a comeback as a lethal terrorist group. The wanton destruction of lives and property could have easily been handled or avoided without the country’s recourse to military force as an initial step. Through the current research and looking at the background of BH and the Maitatsine uprising, the statement is probable. Similar to the rise of BH, Marwa Maitatsine, a Cameroonian and leader of the Maitatsine movement, was killed by the Nigerian military in December 1980, which resulted in the movement going

underground, after which they came back stronger and continued to exist for five years until 1985 (Kumolu, 2015).

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Marwa and his Maitatsine uprising movement like BH were discontented with the quasi-Sharia laws being practised in certain Northern states resulting in uprisings, leading several commentators to compare BH and Maitatsine in development. Similarly, like Marwa, the founder and leader of BH, Yusuf was also extra-judicially killed by the Nigerian security forces causing the group to go underground, regroup to become more deadly than previously estimated. Furthermore, while the Maitatsine uprising lasted for just five years between 1980 to 1985, BH is still waxing strong and has existed violently for more than ten years. The research posits that force by the government increased the rise of both movements, BH and Maitatsine. BH further turned down several attempts by the government to surrender while claiming the group whom the government was negotiating with was not of BH. It is expected that a multi-dimensional strategy of tackling terrorism should be used, such as negotiation, appeasement and legal measures, among others.

However, care should be taken as alternative strategies used for the Niger Delta militants (MEND) could backfire in other scenarios. For instance, Iro (2015) mentions that specific individuals might follow through the process to gain access to vulnerable individuals to radicalise and engage them in prison breaks after learning about the prison system. Still, with the dismantling and constant military attacks against BH, the group would likely receive retaliatory attacks from the disgruntled previously displaced communities if that occurs.

As a recommendation from a policy perspective, to save the country from similar crises or other violent and jihadist-based groups in the future, Nigerian leaders should devise clearly defined periodic power-sharing formulae that can enable parts of the country to have a voice. Moreover, the population census in the country, which provides the basis for resource/revenue allocation with the first documented census covering the Lagos area in 1866, is expected to be conducted every ten years

(Makinwa, 1985). Still, the last census conducted was in 2006 (Este, 2020). In previous years, the census process was marred by political intrusion and other problems, especially in 1962 and 1973. These problems include but are not limited to lack of qualified personnel to carry out the process, communication issues, mass illiteracy inflation and fraudulent increase in the number of regions to receive more revenue and resource allocation (Okolo, 1999). The subject of resource allocation for the development of each region and state to prevent further violence from marginalisation or perceived deprivation can be partly solved by a well-coordinated population census carried out in the country at an appropriate time, especially during the current president Buhari administration. Also, adequate deliberation should be given to the feasibility of enforcing Sharia law in certain regions, representing diverse and multifaceted political communities.

8.4.3 Contribution(s) to Methodology

Following the research's contributions to political significance, the following contributions relate to the use and application of NVivo in analysing terrorist propaganda videos and messages for a better understanding of themes in terrorist groups' statements. This serves as an optimal methodological strategy for the analysis of primary and secondary data. As illustrated in this research, the advantages of CAQDAS, especially NVivo, are innumerable as they provide ease in the use, collection and analysis of qualitative data, which is otherwise usually labour and time-intensive (Florian *et al.*, 2015; Lewins & Silver, 2007; Schreier, 2012). Qualitative Data Analysis Softwares such as NVivo, when aligned with content analysis - "a means of analyzing data" (Bos and Tarnai, 1999: 660) can help to identify themes correctly, concepts and issues to make for compelling, accurate and speed coding as well as ease of data retrieval (Bezeley, 2007). The NVivo software used in this research supports several forms of data with excellent features, ranging from word count to coding and multimedia capabilities, in addition to the extrapolation and presentation of analysis and findings in charts, among other functions required in qualitative data management.

As identified earlier, thematic analysis allows the researcher to identify the fuller context of data, giving a much broader account and explanation of the data set or message (in this case, terrorist propaganda). Moreover, this allows for continuous comparative practice concerned with recognising themes, meanings, and forms in texts instead of simply identifying occurrences and numerical arithmetic interpretations (Altheide & Schneider, 2013). Therefore, NVivo can be used to measure the dimensions of the content of any form of message, public statements, videos, and publications. These represent means of communication through which prospective members of terrorist groups, violence-prone individuals and the rest of the world are sensitised to the activities and ideologies of these terrorist groups (Eveslage, 2013). Content/thematic analysis of communication, especially with terrorist statements, is essential as it helps to highlight groups' ideology, hidden messages and probable targets or objectives (Drake, 1998; Altier, Horgan & Thoroughgood, 2012). The benefits of NVivo in the sphere of political and international relations are rarely known but, as applied in this research, help identify the similarities between terrorist groups and their imitation. NVivo software can also be used to understand terrorist groups' ideology to forestall further attacks by identifying similar words and themes used to describe attacks and ideology.

Likewise, a content analysis of BH's 2012 public messages carried out by Eveslage in 2013 (not with NVivo CAQDAS) revealed that the terrorist group was primarily reliant on domestic politics with the reduced quest for internationalisation. Furthermore, most methods and observations used to understand terrorist group ideologies, such as interviews with terrorist group members, are usually dangerous and highly unlikely. In most cases, these interviews or observations offer little in relevance and scope, which leaves minimal qualitative research sources for understanding terrorist groups, such as video transcripts for understanding different groups. Analysing statements, speeches and other contents, including symbols of terrorist groups, is beneficial in unearthing the correlation between terrorist attacks and rhetoric by using the benefits of the NVivo software. At this juncture, it is imperative to conclude this study by providing a comprehensive conclusion.

8.5 Conclusion

As presented at the beginning of this study, we have identified that terrorism is not a new concept and has come under several hypothetical explanations from the psychological to societal perspectives, to mean vying for political, social and cultural change through threats or acts of violence. In Nigeria, terrorism vis-à-vis religious extremism has taken several connotations and headed in diverse directions from the clamour for the expansion of Islamic influence in Northern Nigeria by the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903), Uthman Dan Fodio, to the elimination of religious fusion with politics - Political Islam. Several acts of violence have continued since then, especially with the Maitatsine movement of 1980 to 1985 agitating for the reduction of quasi-Sharia laws for a much better version of Sharia in Northern Nigeria. Against this background in 2002, the group Boko Haram (BH), known as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihadi,' meaning 'people dedicated to propagating the teachings of the Prophet and Jihad' was established by its late founder and leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Following the death of Yusuf, the group grew to become the most significant security threat faced by the Nigerian state in the 21st century with greater sophistication in weapons, technological know-how, and links with and influence from ISIS.

Relative deprivation (RD) refers to aggressive behaviours such as crimes and terrorism resulting from frustration due to a denial of attaining particular goals. It has come to be used to explain the rise of BH in Nigeria since 2002. The theory of RD enunciates the internal structures of nation-states as the pivotal driver for the increase in terrorist attacks such as Nigeria, for which Eveslage (2013) explains the rise of BH as a result of the unstructured political, economic and social construction of Nigeria following the end of the colonial era. Thus, this is immediately likened to the lack of a developed economy and politico-social structures with the extra-judicial killing of the group's former leader and founder, Yusuf and other members by the Nigerian security forces. As such, BH aims to redress the grievances of colonialism and the seemingly unjust murder of its former leader in 2009.

Hence, BH's unlawful use of force (terrorism) is seen as a resultant effect of the use of force by Nigerian security. This further culminated in the group becoming extraordinarily violent and, eventually, the deadliest terrorist group in the world as of 2014 (IEP, 2015). Other aspects of relative deprivation (RD) include the politicisation of religion. Here, religion is seen as the critical factor in mass mobilisation during political campaigns. Political leaders employ religious leanings to their advantage, especially during elections, while problems such as poor standard of living and poverty continue to riddle the northeastern part of the country. Besides, a constant widening gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' reveals an internal factor for the rise of BH, followed by the continuous traces of dishonesty from the Nigerian government.

With the years of focus in this research (2012-2016) and the analysed units of analysis, it is evident that BH and ISIS began having connections and relationships leading to contagion and imitation of the ISIS by BH, especially during the year 2014 through to 2016 and beyond. This is made clear with the changes in BH's trajectory and tactics and social media platforms, Twitter, Telegram and Facebook, for ideology propagation. Social media became a vital medium for BH in its quest for the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, criticising the Nigerian government and declaring its intentions with consistent publication and higher video quality. There was a shift in BH's tactical operations from hit-and-runs and motorcycles attacks to capturing territories and attacking military bases, followed by the change in the group's name from BH to the ISWAP. This is in addition to the group's division into factions and changes within the organisation, such as the group's leadership structure and attack trajectories.

BH and ISIS share certain similarities, such as but not limited to rejecting the existing social-political order - BH's rejects the Nigerian state, and ISIS rejects the Iraqi and Syrian border. They are also bent on idealising a mythic past to restore Muhammad's Medina Community 'Umma' – Caliphate (Celso, 2015). Both groups are geared towards ethnic and sectarian cleansing against Shi'ites, Alawites and other religions regarded as apostates; unrestrained violence (takfir ideology) against all and sundry;

the kidnapping and the brutalisation of women and children. They further engaged in the glorification of self. The leaders perceived themselves as ordained by God (Allah) to perpetrate acts of terrorism. They also attacked media houses due to their distaste for the media houses.

Theory of contagion examines media reporting of terrorist attacks, techniques and ideologies as a route for extremist and terrorist drive. BH has employed the theory (concept) to its advantage by mimicking the actions and techniques of ISIS. BH imitated ISIS in developing its tactics, from the hit-and-run attacks with motorcycles attacks to capturing territories and attacking military bases. BH subsequently established its caliphate in August 2014 with Shekau as its Caliph; a few months after, ISIS launched its Caliphate with al-Baghdadi as its Caliph in June 2014, one of Shekau's videos featured al-Baghdadi declaring the ISIS Caliphate (Osley, 2015). Likewise, in March 2015, BH declared its allegiance to ISIS, and the latter accepted the pledge leading to a change in the group's name from BH to ISWAP. The group also brandished the ISIS black flag as opposed to its former flag, which features a 'shahada' within a black Islamic flag rising above an open book (supposedly the Quran) with two guns (Ak-47s) crossed by the side (Celso, 2015).

Based on the preceding and the 'strain' concept by Parker and Sitter (2015), BH and ISIS represent a particular aspect of Rapoport's wave system where terrorist groups imitate and learn from each other pushing the narrative of contagion). In essence, though BH is a product of the turbulent internal structures of the Nigerian state by RD, the sustenance of the group has been its collaboration with ISIS utilising contagion, which took effect especially from 2014 through to 2016 and beyond. By 2014, BH's trajectory moved from the anti-Christian rhetoric (which appeared in the group's messages and stopped in 2015) to the acquisition of territories, cross-border operations and the eventual joining of ISIS. The group also claimed its focus lay mainly on the Islamisation and execution of Jihad in Nigeria before employing ISIS ideas and rhetoric in 2015 through social media platforms.

It is pertinent as, in 2010, a member of BH had made it clear that the group lacked social media expertise and skill in using such platforms. Following BH's connection with ISIS and split from ISWAP,

social media became more of a familiar place. Some BH members used these accounts to laud the activities of Shekau while criticising ISWAP supporters. Further to this were the high-quality videos and constant publishing of messages on the platform to show the group's teaching and formidability. The accounts were also used to interpret ISIS doctrinal arguments, laud its activities, taunt rival groups, and threaten communities, which once seemed far from the group's reach, as they previously complained of internet issues. Especially with ISWAP, videos came to be uploaded on other platforms such as Vimeo, Google Play, Amazon and Dropbox, as opposed to simply YouTube; however, these accounts were disabled or deleted at some point in their existence.

BH relied on the support from ISIS, using Al Barnawi as the link between both groups. He was made the leader of ISWAP, as a West African administrative unit of ISIS and supporting its propaganda. This was refused vehemently by Shekau, leading to a split of BH into two groups with the BH faction led by Shekau attacking community residents and ISWAP led by al-Barnawi mainly attacking military bases and formation leading up to the preparation of the Nigerian presidential and gubernatorial elections of 2019. There is also the distance between ISIS and BH existing in different regions and continents, limiting operational practicability between both groups. However, consistent recruitment of individuals was mostly from '*almajiris*,' to ranks in BH and ISWAP.

Given that it has been established that BH takes cues from ISIS, the group's future trajectory remains uncertain, which could go in different ways. There could be the merging of both BH and ISWAP to form a more formidable ISWAP with Shekau as the head; the destruction of the group following intra-conflict or internal conflicts or the unlikely disbandment of both groups following the supposed successful disarming of ISIS and removal of ISIS from its last stronghold in Baghouz, Eastern. The US forces also killed ISIS leader al-Baghdadi, with Abu Ibrahim al Hashemi al chosen as the new leader, reported by the group's media arm, al Furqan Foundation.

The tactical feasibility of a partnership between both groups eluded some analysts due to the vast space between Nigeria, Syria and Iraq. Still, a great deal of evidence linking both groups, which

continues to arise with the constant radicalisation of young adults in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa. With the imitation of terrorist groups, there is the need for a well-defined intelligence-sharing system and a community-backed counter-extremist programme to tackle the menace and collaboration between both groups.

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[leader-abubakar-shekau-fatally-wounded-in-nigerian-army-air-strike-a7204676.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-west-africa-province-iswap-as-militants-launch-new-10204918.html)> [Accessed on: 22 Feb. 2018].

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Excerpt of Filled Ethics Form



Middlesex University Research Ethics Review Form A

REC ref no: _____

Please read the MU Code of Practice for Research: Principles and Procedures¹. The purpose of this form is to help staff and students in their pursuit of ethical research methodologies and procedures. Students should complete this form in consultation with their supervisors. The supervisor is responsible for submission² of this form and required accompanying documents³. No fieldwork should begin until your Research Ethics Committee (REC) has given approval.

Section 1 – Applicant details

1.1 Details of Principal Investigator/Supervisor²		
1.1a Name: Peter Hough	1.1b Department/Position: Senior Lecturer in International Pol.	
1.1c Qualifications: BSc, MA, PhD	1.1d Email: P.Hough@mdx.ac.uk	1.1e Tel: +44 (0)20 8411 6034
1.2 Details of Student Researcher (if applicable)		
1.2a Name: Raphael Ejime	1.2b Programme of study/module:	
1.2c Qualifications: BSc, MA	1.2d Email: Re222@live.mdx.ac.uk	1.2e Tel: +44 (0)79 44 98 9632
1.3 Details of any co-investigators (if applicable)		
1.3a Name:	1.3b Organisation:	1.3c Email:
1.3d Name:	1.3e Organisation:	1.3f Email:
1.3g Name:	1.3h Organisation:	1.3i Email:
1.4 Details of External Funding		

Section 2 – Details of proposed study

2.1 Research project title	The Media, Contagion and Terrorism: Examining the Influence of ISIS on Boko Haram (2012-2014)		
2.2 Proposed start date	01/10/2015	2.3 Proposed end date	30/09/2019
2.4 Main aims of the study			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To understand the similarities of ideologies, tactics, and attacks that existed between ISIS and Boko Haram. To put to test the theory of contagion as a cause for the rise in terrorism and terror-related activities in Nigeria in particular while analysing it with terrorism in other regions of the world, ISIS in the Syria and Iraq. To proffer solution to the proper use of media to forestall or mitigate against the effects of contagion. 			
2.5 Details of study design, data collection methods (e.g., interviews, questionnaire, observation etc.) and/or secondary data sources (e.g., UK National Statistics) to be used in the research			
Secondary data sources – online media sources/statistics and databases			

Section 3 – Initial Checklist to be completed by ALL applicants

Indicate your response

3.1 The research ⁴ DOES NOT involve human participants ⁵ or animals (or animal by-products) ⁶ or any activity that might cause damage e.g., to the environment or precious artefacts i.e., the research involves analytical or simulation modelling, or is a literary, historical or theoretical project relying on sources available in the public domain ⁷ and does not make use of personal or personal sensitive data.	Agree	Disagree
3.2 The research involves secondary data analysis ⁸ where the researcher can provide evidence that they have the necessary approval to access ⁹ the data (<i>*please provide evidence of approval</i>) and DOES NOT involve access to records of personal or sensitive information concerning identifiable individuals, or research which may involve sharing of confidential information beyond the initial consent given. <i>If there is data linkage or it may be otherwise possible to identify participants, please complete all sections of this form and the Data Protection Act Checklist for Researchers.</i>	Agree	Disagree
3.3 The research already has ethical approval from another UK Ethics Committee* (e.g., a UK HEI or organisation e.g., NHS, IRAS ¹⁰) and the liability insurance is provided by the other body/institution ¹¹ . (<i>*Please provide evidence of ethics approval</i>)	Agree	Disagree
3.4 The outputs from research (e.g., products, guidelines, publications etc.) are not likely to cause harm to others, and are in-line with UK legislation ¹² .	Agree	Disagree

Middlesex University
Dept. of Criminology and Sociology and Dept. of Social Sciences Ethics Sub-Committee
INDEPENDENT FIELD/LOCATION WORK RISK ASSESSMENT FORM
UNDERGRADUATE AND POST-GRADUATE TAUGHT STUDENTS, CONTRACT RESEARCHERS

1 TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS	
<p>This proforma is applicable to, and must be completed in advance for, the following fieldwork situations:</p> <p>1. All fieldwork undertaken independently by individual students or small groups of students, either in the UK or overseas, including in connection with proposition module or dissertations. Supervisor to complete with student(s).</p> <p>2. All fieldwork undertaken by undergraduate and postgraduate students. Supervisors to complete with student(s).</p>	
APPLICANT DETAILS	
Student Number:	Raphael Ejime
Supervisor:	Peter Hough
<p>Is your research</p> <p>1) <input type="checkbox"/> PRIMARY (it involves engaging with participants)</p> <p>2) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECONDARY (it involves engaging with the literature and secondary data)</p> <p>If your research is 1) PRIMARY complete sections from 1 to 7 If your research is 2) SECONDARY go to section 7</p>	

1.1 PROJECT TITLE:
.....



<p>1.2 LOCALITY OF RESEARCH</p> <p>Locality of research (City, Area of city, Country and Region)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Travel Arrangements (e.g. How will you travel to the area where you are conducting your fieldwork? What is the setting?)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>What are the potential risks you may be exposed to? (Think carefully: Will you be conducting your fieldwork at night? Will the research be conducted in a high crime area? Will you be causing an offence?)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>NB: Comprehensive travel and health insurance must always be obtained for independent overseas fieldwork. Please note that the University of Middlesex does not cover any accidents during fieldwork.</p>



Security Sensitive Categories

Please complete this form and submit to your Research Ethics Committee together with your completed Research Ethics Form. **RESEARCH INVOLVING SECURITY SENSITIVE INFORMATION MUST BE STORED CENTRALLY – please email CHANGE MANAGER to organize this.**

1. Does your research fit into any of the following security-sensitive categories? If so, indicate which:				
a. Commissioned by the military:	Yes	No		
b. Commissioned under an EU security call:	Yes	No		
c. Involve the acquisition of security clearances:	Yes	No		
d. Concerns terrorist or extreme groups:	Yes	No		
If your answer to question 1d is yes , continue to the questions below:				
The Terrorism Act (2006) outlaws the dissemination of records, statements and other documents that can be interpreted as promoting or endorsing terrorist acts.				
1. Does your research involve the storage on a computer of any such records, statements or other documents?	Yes	No		
2. Might your research involve the electronic transmission (eg as an email attachment) of such records or statements?	Yes	No		
3. If you answered 'Yes' to questions 1 or 2, you are advised to store the relevant records or statements electronically on a secure university file store. The same applies to paper documents with the same sort of content. These should be scanned and uploaded. Access to this file store will be protected by a password unique to you.				
You agree to store all documents relevant to questions 1 and 2 on that file store:	Yes	No		
3a. You agree not to transmit electronically to any third party documents in the document store:	Yes	No		
4. Will your research involve visits to websites that might be associated with extreme, or terrorist, organisations?	Yes	No		
5. If you answer 'Yes' to question 4, you are advised that such sites may be subject to surveillance by the police. Accessing those sites from university IP addresses might lead to police enquiries.				
Please acknowledge that you understand this risk by circling the 'Yes' box.	Yes	No		
6. By submitting to the ethics process, you accept that the university ethics office will have access to a list of titles of documents (but not the contents of documents) in your document store. These titles will only be available to the ethics office.				
Please acknowledge that you accept this by circling the 'Yes' box.	Yes	No		

Declaration: I confirm that the above questions have been answered accurately to reflect the nature of my research and I acknowledge my responsibilities in conducting this research.

1. BH Transcript

11/01/2012

Source:

Video:

NaijaNeduTV. (2012) Boko Haram Leader "Imam Abubakar Shekau" message to President Jonathan. [Online] NaijaNeduTV (January 11, 2012). Available at: <<http://youtu.be/umkj50SUzck>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

Transcript:

Sahara Reporters (2012) VIDEO: Boko Haram leader "Imam Abubakar Shekau" Message to President Jonathan 1 [Online] Sahara Reporters. Jan 12, 2012 Available at: <<http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/12/video-boko-haram-leader-imam-abubakar-shekau-message-president-jonathan>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

Greetings to you and greetings to fellow muslims and thanks be to God. This is a message to Goodluck and to the CAN president. Alhamdulillah, we are known as Jamatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-jihad which some people derogatory term as Boko Haram. We have said all that needs to be said and everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are fighting with them.

We hardly touch anybody except security personnel and christians and those who have betrayed us. Everyone knows what christians did to muslims, not once or twice. Why i've come out to explain myself is because of the explanation jonathan and the CAN president gave on us, including the various versions people give about us that we are like cancer (a terrible ailment) in this country called Nigeria. No, we're not cancer, neither are we evil. If people don't know us, God knows everyone. Everyone knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows what wickedness was meted out to our members and fellow muslims in Nigeria from time to time in Zango kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna, villages, Langtang, Yelwa shendam. Different things were meted out to muslims in this country.

Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and everyone knows there are some things that God has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted even western education! We have stopped everything apart from saying we should stay on the path of truth and peace and live right in the sight of God. There, we will have peace and that is what we have been preaching and b'cos of that they said we should be killed and our mosques destroyed. We decided to defend ourselves and God

has said if u follow him, he will give you strength! That is why Jonathan, u should know that this is beyond your power. It is not our doing but that of God. It is beyond you.

Wallahi, what you are saying is like you have not started saying anything! Before God created the earth, he knew what was going to happen and he has promised in the holy book that he will help his religion. It is beyond your power. What you see has been happening, God allowed it because you have refused to follow him and you have betrayed his religion. That is why Jonathan, this is beyond your power-yes!! If a few in your government say nice things about us, it is not surprising-it has happened many times -our hands are open! Anybody that says he will not follow God, even if he loves us, God has not said we should love such a person. God has said we should show such person the right path and embrace such person! You christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of God.

This religion of Christianity you are practicing is not a religion of God-it is paganism. God frowns at it. What you are practicing is not religion. Aside that, you Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like cannibals! You did all you wanted to us. We are trying to coerce you to embrace Islam, because that is what God instructed us to do. Even at that, without provocation, you slaughtered us and took our wives and humiliated us! Now you CAN president, you come out to say your people should come out and do whatever they want to do! Any right thinking person knows what you mean, any right thinking person knows what you're saying. This is why as leader of this sect i tell you to repent and to you Christians, repent! This path we're taking is God's path. Fellow muslims, understand us! Our objective is not to kill or humiliate or steal.

This explanation has become necessary, even if I don't explain, I can decide to keep mute because the person I love to know me like this is God.

I have no objective than to help the religion of God, that is all I can explain. But if u want further explanation, we have tapes you can listen to and know our objectives. This is also my message to the President of Nigeria, Jonathan, who has come out to say negative things about us and also a lot of harm to us-God has given us victory and we have done what we want to do. This is almost 11 yrs. our members are being killed! Anything people want to say or do, we say enough is enough! We serve God and we do not harm anybody, but anybody that looks for our trouble, we will face such person or persons!

We follow the tenets of the Quran and anybody that thinks he can fight God shouldn't think his prayer or praying in the mosque can save him! Any muslim that cheats and hides under the cloak of religion, if we know such person, we won't hesitate to eliminate him. Yes, I am saying so because it doesn't

take 5 minutes to kill just as we're being killed. We follow the teachings of the Quran. This is what God has told me to explain. Allhamdulillah!"

2. 27/01/2012

Source:

Video:

NaijaNeduTV. (2012). New Video Boko Haram leader "Imam Abubakar Shekau" Message to President Jonathan 2. [Online] NaijaNeduTV (January 27, 2012). Available at: <<http://youtu.be/IUd0Vcs8Tm4>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

Transcript:

Mark, M. (2012) Boko Haram vows to Fight until Nigeria establishes Sharia law. The Guardian. [Online] NaijaNeduTV (January 27, 2012). Available at: <<http://gu.com/p/3>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

"If [security forces] are going to places of worship and destroying them, like mosques and Quranic schools, you have primary schools as well, you have secondary schools and universities, and we will start bombing them."

"We were responsible for the attack in Kano, I gave the order and I will do it again and again. Allah gives us victory,"

"We attacked the securities base because they were arresting our members and torturing our wives and children. They should know they have families too, we can abduct them. We have what it takes to do anything we want,"

However, responsibility for the killing of 150 people was denied as made up by the Nigerian

"We never kill ordinary people, rather we protect them. It is the army that rushed to the press to say we are the ones killing civilians. We are not fighting civilians. We only kill soldiers, police and other security agencies,"

"In America, from former President George Bush to Obama, the Americans have always been fighting and destroying Islam," he said. "They have tagged us terrorists and they are paying for it. It is the same in Nigeria, and we will resist."

3. 3/05/2012

Source:

The Jurist Law (2012) Updated with Full Transcript: Boko Haram Releases Video On ThisDay Bombing, Threatens To Attack VOA, Guardian, Daily Trust, SaharaReporters [Online] The Jurist, May 3 2012 Available at: <<http://thejuristlaws.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/updated-with-full-transcript-boko-haram.html>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

"This is a message from Jama' atul ahlis sunnah lil daawati wal jihad, and we wish to inform Nigerians our reasons for attacking some media houses,"

"This is a message from the public awareness department of the Jamatu Ahlis sunnah lil daawati wal jihad, a group engaged in jihad in Nigeria.

"We wish to explain about the attack we carried out on Thisday Newspapers. Some of the reasons why we decided to attack some Media Houses, especially Thisday, is because the paper was used in dishonouring our prophet, Mohammad (SAW) during a beauty pageant in Kaduna in November 2002.

"At that time, some people who called themselves leaders of Muslims came out to say they have forgiven those who committed the offence.

"But based on our knowledge, we know that no one has the power to forgive anyone for an offence that God himself has given judgement, especially on an offence that has to do with dishonouring Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

"No one has the power to forgive this type of offence, and the judgement is for such persons to be killed.

"This lady that committed this crime, the judgement on her is to be killed at any opportunity; and the media house is also supposed to be driven out of existence whenever there is a chance to do so.

"We are just getting the opportunity to attack the media house, and we are hoping to continue these attacks until we drive them out of existence.

"It is our hope that Allah (SWT) will help his religion.

"We know that any genuine Muslim must have been deeply touched by the Thisday incident.

"Thisday newspaper is also leading in helping the government in fighting us, alongside other media houses that we will mention soon.

"Some of the offences of Thisday and other media outlets include: firstly, during the botched attempt to rescue some kidnapped foreign nationals in Sokoto; these media houses asked us if we have

anything to do with the kidnap and we said we have nothing to do with it, yet these media houses reported that we were responsible for the incident, that was a lie against us.

"Secondly, when we sent a video of our leader, Abubakar Shekau, the media houses reported things that our leader did not say, such as that in response to the president's threat to finish us in three months, we have also threatened to finish the government in three months. But the truth is, nowhere in the video did our leader said what they attributed to him.

"Thirdly, on the purported arrest of Abu Qaqa by the SSS, we have come out to tell them that the person arrested was not Abu Qaqa, yet the media continue to portray us as liars, and even said that our leader had ordered for Abu Qaqa II to be executed, and we are now searching for Abu Qaqa III.

"Recently too, they came out with another lie that one Mohammed Awwal Kontagora was the Abu Qaqa II that was executed, and that even his parents confirmed it, that was just a big lie to convince the world.

"The media also said that we have killed the father of Abu Darda, so as to pass a message to him, because he had leaked our secrets after his arrest by security agencies, and they wanted him to know that he is one of our targets.

"These are all lies, and they are many.

"These media houses have committed a lot of offences that is detrimental to Islam, and we don't have the power to forgive them. We will take revenge on them by God's grace, some of these media houses have been categorized into three groups.

"The first group is the likes of Thisday whose offences are big.

"The second group we will also attack soon are Punch, Daily Sun, Vanguard, Guardian, Nation, Tribune, and National Accord, which are all newspaper houses.

"There is also VOA Hausa radio. All these media houses we will attack them including their staff and offices, by God's grace.

"VOA Hausa for instance have recently started campaigning for people to support the government against us by exposing us.

"The next group that are on the verge of joining this list who if they are not careful we will attack very soon include, Leadership, Daily Trust, Peoples Daily and RFI(Radio France international)

"There is an online medium known as Sahara reporters who have their office in New York, and who have made their site as a platform for attack against Islam. So we are warning them to stop making their site an avenue for attacking Islam, otherwise we will find a way of attacking them too.

"We resorted to using this medium to send our message instead of the normal tele-conference because of the fear by journalists; which made them refuse to conduct the conference.

"We are grateful to God for the success recorded on the attack on Thisday, and we hope to continue such attacks.

"Finally, the government has now resorted to arresting our wives and children and also demolishing our houses, like they did in Biu recently, that is why we have also resolved to start attacking government schools, especially, tertiary ones.

"We promise to demolish 500 buildings for any one of our houses that the government destroys.

"We have already started with Gombe and Kano."

4. 4/08/2012

Source:

Abubakar, A. (2012) . Nigeria Sect leader Slams Obama over 'Terrorist' Label. [Online] Agence France Presse. August 4, 2012. Available at: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQxDnREhiyVxek5wDnTSRvyduRJA?docId=CNG.1679719e9fc61e5e01920f55d25a45.561>> Accessed on: [23/09/2016]

"You said I'm a global terrorist, then you are a terrorist in the next world"."I call on you (Nigerian President Goodluck) Jonathan, you should abandon this ungodly power, you should repent and forsake Christianity, including Obama, who said I have business interests in the United States."

"I know the United States exists, but I don't know which part of the world it is located in, whether in the west or the north, the south or the east."I don't know where it is, not to talk of freezing my assets there."

5. 30/09/2012 September

Source:

Abba, I. (2012) Sako Zuwa Ga Duniya (A Message to the World) Translated by Jihadology [Online] The Jurist, September 30 2012 Available at: <<http://youtu.be/txUJCOKTluk>> in Eveslage (2013) Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016]

Statement was given by Abubakar Shekau via video, published on YouTube and translated into English and published partially by Agence France Presse and Voice of America (VOA).

Abubakar, A. (2012, October 1). Boko Haram chief issues video threat over Anti-Islam \$lm. Agence France Presse. Available at: <<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jVn1g7HL6acDyoubE7vcGhWJMAuA?docId=CNG.36246fde9530caaeaa21ef0c451062c6.651>> Accessed on: [27 Sept. 2016]

VOA News. (2012) Islamic sect says no peace talks with Nigerian government. [Online] Voice of America. October 1, 2012 . Available at: <<http://www.voanews.com/content/islamic-sect-says-no-peace-talks-with-nigerian-government/1518503.html>> Accessed: [27 Sept. 2016].

“This short message is to traditional rulers who have been conspiring against us, that they have no hidden places for conspiring against our commitment and worship to Allah. They have entered our way and have no hidden places any more, this they should know.

“The message is for three purposes, all plans against Prophet Mohammed and Muslims will not succeed and just wait and see what we will do. The second is, they were arresting and molesting our members who are just serving Allah. We did not even talk and now they have continued capturing our women, this week about seven women were captured and we don’t even know where they are, but they are being held by infidel enemies of Allah. In fact, they are even having sex with one of them. Allah, Allah, see us and what we are going through. It is in one place that they are holding seven women, in other places they are more than that. Only Allah knows the actual number of our women being held, women who are married in accordance with Islamic law.

“In another way they are spreading that we are dialoguing with them, it is a blatant lie. There is nobody that we are dialoguing with. It is a lie and mischief that they are talking with Boko Haram using fake names, and they are boasting that they have found solution It is a lie, you have not found the solution.

Rubbish and useless liars, there is no single person that you have sat with.

“You are killing our people and at the same time, they are saying they are dialoguing with us. Lies, they are only killing us, they are only killing us. See their lies, they went to the world that they are dialoguing with us, later on they come up and say they have killed and captured our leaders.

“Since you are now holding our women, (laugh) just wait and see what will happen to your own women. Just wait and see what will happen to your own wives according to Shariah law, (laugh) just wait and see if it is sweet and convenient for you.

“SSS rubbish, Shekau on your neck, SSS you will see it, you are fighting Shekau in their thinking but Allah is by the side watching, and I am alive, healthy and no one had killed me. Allah is with us. We are working for Allah, and not attacking Muslims but infidels, we are not against Ummah but those against work of Allah.”

2013

1. 27/09/2013

This is to the people, who call themselves Nigerians; it is Shekau that is speaking since you said he has died. Here is something new (Shouts)

It is me that has come out to counter the lies and speculations.

I believe you are watching and listening to me. Sagir Musa (spokesman of JTF) will be sad now and really angry. I pity Sagir Musa. This is just beginning of another war that will befall Nigeria.

It is just starting and new beginning. I know Oladipo Diya will be sad, Jonathan too will not be happy but angry, Obama will be angry, Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel will be sad too.

Francoi Hollande will be angry, Queen Elizabeth is angry. Magrate Thatcher same will be angry and all infidels throughout the world.

I am alive and a new beginning has just commenced.

The world should know am alive by the will of Allah, who will call me at the appointed time he desire and set for me.

If my end comes, no matter what, even if I am eating, I will go. What I am doing, is not my own but it is there in Quran, I challenged all clerics in the world to come out and lets debate. Even if its Tantawee or whoever, they should know that I am not just doing things, rather saying only what Prophet Mohammed SAW was sent to do by God.

What we are saying is there in the Quran, and so do not bother or suffer your selves. What I see in Quran, I will continue to do until the day I cannot breathe again.

Be vigilante and watchful, this is above you and your imagination. Am alive contrary to the lies, you are surprised that I am now your tormentor in the this cause.

Shekau is really nothing; you should rather fear Allah, the maker of everything you see. You are just communists and leaders of humor sexual. I swear, there will be nothing like democracy, there is nothing like rule of man to people. There is only rule of Allah to the world.

Government for people by the people is fake, there will only be law of Allah to people.

This is Shekau, I keep quite deliberately. Is this not me? I went underground and heard all the lies, is this my picture Turakin Adamawa?

Adamawa? Is this picture, Sagir Musa? Is this my picture Jonathan? I will show you soon.

This is Shekau, they said they killed our brothers. Let me explain what transpired. I gave permission for all these attacks since it is from God and the foot soldiers are only obeying God. If am not alive, it will continue. This is our conviction. Is Mohammed Yusuf not death? Are not seen how it is progressing? Are you not saying that Shekau is more radical than him? If death of leader is the end of faith, our faith will have died with the death of Prophet Mohammed...

Those sticks boys you are deceiving, we are the ones that killed them in Monguno, they came with sticks and Allah help us as we killed over 200 of them. You lied that they are about 20 and with over 30 missing. It is above that as we killed them and the whole place was blood bath and they were all smelling and we have to leave the area.

We are also responsible for Benisheik killings and carried yesterday killings. You that claimed you are SSS and man of knowledge. We slaughtered more than 200 people. Yes, these days in Monguno, after we killed stick boys we seized several weapons from army and now under us.

1. 21/04/2014

Nigerian Bulletin (2014) Abuja Bomb Blast: 'We are the Bombers of Nyanya' - Read Complete Speech by Boko Haram Leader. [Online] Nigerina Bulletin. Available at:

<https://www.nigerianbulletin.com/threads/abuja-bomb-blast-we-are-the-bombers-of-nyanya-read-complete-speech-by-boko-haram-leader.66677/#post-71931> [Accessed on: 23 Jan 2018].

"Let the world know that we were responsible for the bombing within Abuja in an area called Nyanya. (President) Jonathan you are a lame duck. Jonathan, you are now too small for us; we can only deal with your grand masters like Obama the president of America...even they cannot do anything to us... we are more than them," he said.

“Yes we did it; we carried out the attack because you kill Muslims in Plateau; you kill Muslims in every country of the world. Why don’t you global tyrants talk when Muslims are killed in Afghanistan? Why don’t you talk when Muslims were killed in Iraq? And they are still being killed. Why don’t you talk when Muslims are killed in the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria, and now Yemen, Mali, Azerbaijan, Shishan, Pakistan?” he asked.

“Why were you not complaining when our Muslim brethren were killed in Plateau, their wives were forcefully taken and raped, and if they give birth, their children were being killed? So because of that tiny incident that happened in Abuja, everybody is out there making an issue out of it across the globe”

“We want you, Jonathan, to know that we are worshipping only God that is why we are always victorious in all our attacks; stupid fellow like you; if you are that wise, why is it still very difficult for you to locate where we are up till date despite the fact that we are within Nigeria. Look at us we are right within your city; and you don’t even know how to find us. Let me tell you now; I am here very close to you; I dare you to get me, if you can.”

“You cannot do anything. Remember that this is the exactly the fifth year that you boasted that you were going to finish with us in just three months; so we are not bothered with any further boasting that you will make now because what you cannot accomplish in five years, is very difficult to achieve now, never!”

“We will not stop until our aim is achieved; so everyone that calls himself a muslim should stop obeying the constitution, should leave democracy, should stay away from western education.

“We are the bombers of Nyanya; yes we are the bombers; if you really want to know who did it, let me tell you now; it was Shekau that did it”.

“this is me, Abubakar Shekau whose turban you don’t like seeing; whose armoured shirt you so much hate; this is my usual gun with which I kill. Get more annoyed, because I am still here; yes, I am the Shekau that does not like Christians, and I don’t like Muslims that relate with Christians.

"We have been commanded by Allah not to associate with infidels because they cannot be trusted until they accept your religion. So you cannot say you are a believer and then you go and follow democracy; we cannot allow you to ridicule the religion of God; never!"

“I am not afraid of death; and I pray that God should let me be killed by an unbeliever so that I can gain His paradise. We don’t love this sinful world of yours; we want to die and go to the presence of Him who created everyone so that we can enjoy ourselves.

“Yes I am the dreaded Shekau; the one even Obama fears; not even Obama, even if Pharaoh were alive today he would reckon with me (laughing). To hell with the United Nations, to hell with Ban ki Moon; to hell with Obama. Yes we did the bombing in Nyanya; we did it”.

2014

1. 07/05/2014

Transcript source:

Full English Transcript of Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau’s Latest Video [Online] CKN Nigeria. Available at: <<http://www.cknnigeria.com/2014/05/full-english-transcript-of-boko-haram.html>> [Accessed on: 27 Jan. 2016]

"My brethren in Islam, I am greeting you in the name of Allah like he instructed we should among Muslims. Allah is great and has given us privilege and temerity above all people.

If we meet infidels, if we meet those that become infidels, according to Allah, there is no any talk except hitting of the neck. I hope you, chosen people of Allah, are hearing. This is an instruction from Allah. It is not a distorted interpretation, it is from Allah himself.

"This is from Allah on the need for us to break down infidels, practitioners of democracy, and constitutionalism, voodoo and those that are doing Western education in which they are practicing paganism.

"If you say, “I pledge to Nigeria my country,” it is wrong and act of paganism. For me, I pledge to Allah. my God, to be faithful to my Allah and you to your country. I to my Allah, I pledge to my Allah. To be faithful, loyal and honest to serve Allah. Are you saying what? To serve Nigeria? To Serve Allah? Loyal and honest to serve Allah? That is what I will say; this is what you are saying in your reading of Western education. With all your strength you said you will worship a land, this is what you people said.

"They are even saying that they would defend indivisibility of the country and its oneness. For me, I will defend only what Allah said and you are only defending country. This is our differences and that is where I detect that Western education is infidel. Allahuakubar. This is a message to Muslims to wage war against infidels who are not doing what Allah said. Those who are working that infidels and their act become our institutions in the world.

"Suddenly you will hear somebody coming and be saying that there are no religious differences, where did you have that talk that there are no differences? Where did you get this talk because of Allah?

Who told you there are no differences when Allah said there are differences in religion? What will you say about what Prophet said that the whites and the Jews will not trust you until you turn to their religion? This is what our leader said and you are telling us something useless.

"You are sitting down in the name of clerics with turbans; you are sitting with Christians thinking it is mediation. Saying it is development and progress, what progress after you have deviated from Allah? We will die killing and slaughtering them, if you meet infidels in battle field brethren, just harvest their necks; Allah said it and not Shekau. Harvest Jonathan's neck, harvest Kashim's neck, Allah said cut out Burabura's neck, even in Ka'aba if some is doing Salat for so long as he is deviating from what Allah said, he is infidel. Cut out their necks until the time that you will get majority over infidels of the world. And you will get it, Allah said it, time will come that you will form majority over infidels, face to face.

"We will hold you as slaves, who told you there is no slave? They said human rights, silly liars, when did you know human rights? You just come and lying in the name of Allah, Allah who created human doesn't know rights until you silly?

"I will marry out a female at 12; I will do same for a nine year old girl like it was done on my mother Aisha and wife of Prophet. You infidels of the world, you have met a trouble, we must follow Allah, and you should die with bitterness.

"Brethren cut out infidels from their necks, brothers you should capture slaves; just because I took girls in western school they are worried. I said they should even desert the school, they should go and marry. Nonsense, I am the one that captured your girls and I will sell them in the market. I have my own market of selling people; it is the owner that instructed me to sell. Yes, I will sell the girls people, I am selling the girls like Allah said until we soak the ground of Nigeria with infidels blood and so called Muslims contradicting Islam. After we have killed, killed, killed and get fatigue and wondering on what to do with smelling of their corpses, smelling of Obama, Bush, Putin and Jonathan worried us then we will open prison and be imprisoned the rest. Infidels have no value.

"It is Jonathan's daughter that I will imprison; nothing will stop this until you convert. If you turn to Islam then you will be saved. For me anyone that embraces Islam is my brother. silly Jonathan, no matter your infidel status you will be surprise. Until the land is soaked with blood, you have never fought me but I am angry with you, this is what I said. We will kill and imprison and never get tired or you bring your trillion, there is nothing we can do with your money, if you know us you will not think that of us.

"Allah said he just give us work because if he likes, he will finish infidels, but Allah made us to fight you so as to taste our faith. Some of us that said we are believers; it is to see if we are sincere or just playing to gallery. This is what Allah does to taste us with difficulties and see our faith. Those that died working for Allah, they will not lose their deeds, and they will see it in heaven.

"May Allah make us killed in working for him, oh Allah make us to work for you. Oh Allah helps us to work for you, this is what I will tell my brothers to stand and work for Allah and Islam.

"What I will want you to know is, there is slavery in Islam, don't be deceive about United Nations, it is useless thing and I call them United Nations of absurdity led by Ban Ki-moon. If not how can you say there is no slaves? Why are you slaughtering chicken? If someone say there is slave, what is wrong? Are daughters of slaves not slaves? It is Quran that said so, for example can you go into someone's house with his wife and children and say they should leave the house? Locals will even say you are an oppressor and so, where is Allah and you? Where is Allah and you Jonathan and Obama? Where is Allah and Ban Ki-moon? And you are saying you are advocates of human rights. Humour intimate people like you, promoters of same sex marriage, animals knows rights more than them, even sheep doesn't sleep sheep, but you keep a woman and a woman as husband and wife.

"See the time we are in and Obama will stand up and say it is their rights, see what we are facing. We said we will worship our Allah and stick to what he said, we left your sight and you are still fighting us. You think we will not worship Allah? Allah said his land is vast and only him will be worshipped. Go and form your own land, we are in Allah's land and don't know Nigeria. We don't know Cameroon or Chad, I don't know, I don't have a country. Islamiyya is what I have, wherever I am is mind. This is what we know.

"There are slaves in Islam, you should know this, Prophet Muhammed took slaves himself during Badr war. He killed many and because of this, I will also kill Obama, if I catch him. I will kill Jonathan, if I catch him. Just like you want to catch me and kill me. Do you think I will Allah's work? I am not mad; it is you that is mad. You are placing 50 million booty on the person that catch me, you don't know that there people that we are slaughtered in the cause of Islam, I am no one. I know my religion well and not illiterate. I am nothing if Civilian JTF kills me. Even a small person can kill me. I am working for God and will die in it, no one can stop me. You killed Mohammed Yusuf, are you not saying he is even better than Shekau? Even if you kill me, other fighters will rise better than me, I am nothing and worthless before God who I am working for. That is Islam you don't know.

"Like Prophet did, even if I catch slave, I will hold and say I am the owner. There is no President in Nigeria. No President in Nigeria, no President in the world only Islam. Why would you arrest people

and keep them in prison? What is the reason? You are doing yours, should we not do Allah's own? Any infidel is a sheep to be sold, Jonathan, if I catch you, I will sell you, Obama, Bush I will sell you for peanut. Infidels doesn't have value, I am the most expensive, don't be agree, I have no doubt it will have, the only way this stop is your conversation. I will cut and not eat your meat; neither will I drink your blood.

"Let me tell you prominent people who worked for Allah and authored several books were slaves, and you come here saying we are selling girls, are you their manufacturer? You are nothing, it is the owner that authorizes the sell, and you are suffering people you gave people holding arms without food. It is Bush and Obama that are talking about rights.

"It is a lie, in fact you suppose to wash and re-wash a plate Christian eats food before you eat as Muslims. You know all these things and you are contradicting Islam. And you come joining hands with Bush, and Obama. You are laughing, I am talking about King of Saudi Arabia, and they are his advisors. Our own people are those in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and Mali. Our own are those who will stand and say Quran to be followed. I will not fear anyone.

"You are seen me black, I am for Allah; you are deceiving people that they are Arabians. No matter what you think, I will not follow anyone except Allah; I will not model anyone except Prophet. Brethren stand up and never allowed yourself to be cheated. You came deceiving people with democracy and Abraham Lincoln, Aminu Kano, Tafawa Balewa are all infidels because it was constitution that they promoted. If you like you should understand or deliberately refused. May Allah help us to do what is in Quran.

"How can you call Allah when you have followed Obama, I am not Boko Haram, I am Jamaatu Allus sunna lil daawati wal Jihad. I don't care what you call me, you are in trouble. I am against government of the people by the people. I am for government of the people by Allah. I will not worship what you are worshipping, you are worshipping democracy and because of that you are tracing to kill us. What is even your religion, communists like you. Everything you say NATO, you thought we don't know, England, France, Germany, China, all communists.

"All those clerics are to be killed for following democracy, all of them are infidels. I will tell Muslims what Allah wants them to do. We are anti-Christians, and those that deviated from Islam, they are forming basis with prayers but infidels.

"All those with turbans looking for opportunities to smear us, they are all infidels. Betrayers and cheats like them. Like Israel people, Rome, England they are all Christians and humour intimate. People of Germany like Margret Thatcher. Ndume are all infidels.

"Saminu Turaki said he is representing mediation, enter our hand and see mediation. All of them are infidels. Here is what Bush once said and we will repeat it here. He said all the fights going on in Iraq and Afghanistan are Christian war, crusade, it is a known issue. And that they will crush Afghanistan, today I will say my own. To the people of the world, everybody should know his status, it is either you are with us Mujahedeen or you are with the Christians. The likes of Obama, Lincoln, Clinton, Jonathan, Aminu Kano. They are your fathers of democracy, the likes of Tafawa Balewa. It is Usman Dan Fodiyo that is our own.

"We know what is happening in this world, it is a Jihad war against Christians and Christianity. It is a war against western education, democracy and constitution. We have not started, next time we are going inside Abuja; we are going to refinery and town of Christians. Do you know me? I have no problem with Jonathan. This is what I know in Quran. This is a war against Christians and democracy and their constitution, Allah says we should finish them when we get them.

"It was in this land that they cleaned defect with Quran in Maiduguri, in university they did same. They are cheating Islam and deceiving. I support not Abraham Lincoln, Ban Ki-moon, and any unbeliever. This war is against Islam. God will not leave us. You are dying because of money and I will die believing in Allah."

2. 24/08/2014

NewsDiary (2014) Transcript of Shekau's Video Declaring New Caliphate in North –Eastern Nigeria.

NewsDiary [Online] Available at: <<https://newsdiaryonline.com/transcript-shekaus-video-declaring-new-caliphate-north-eastern-nigeria/>> [Accessed on: 23 Jan 2017]

"We are grateful to Allah for the big victory he granted our members in Gwoza and made the town part of our Islamic Caliphate." Oh you people, here I am Abubakar Shekau, still standing on my feet. I am still the he leader of Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lid Da'awati wal Jihad, that county called Nigeria; a name we don't believe; but forced to address as such because it has not better name. For us there is nothing like Nigeria but Islamic Caliphate; because God the creator of the world and the earth we are all standing is the sole owner of the earth and no one else. So we have no option but obey the owner of the sky that is above us, even as He is the owner of the earth. We Muslims obey our Creator." Oh people of the world, Allah has granted us victory in the town of Gwoza, not because of our might but because we are committed to do His work." Oh people, I chose to deliver this message in order to refute the lies being spread by the government, about the operations we had in recent times.

“We warn the Vigilante, called Civilian JTF to back should back out; if not there will be no place for them to hide. We have evidences of how you killed some of our brethren whom you would ask if they are Boko Haram before you killed them; we knew how you humiliated them by asking them if they had ever carried guns or killed someone...we knew everything about the evil you committed against our brethren.

“We still have the magnanimity of asking you to repent; because you will never succeed in this way by the grace of Allah; and I swear by Allah that we will never stop killing you, because Allah commanded us to kill people like you. If we pity you and spare you, one day you will become infidels; so to us having pity on you is an act of disbelief. You can continue to run or hide your identities in women’s attire, but we will get to you and remove the women clothing off you then while you are shouting for mercy we will strike, smash your heads and kill you all. Even if you don’t do anything to us we will kill you...We would do it even to avenge our brethren. You killed our brethren in large numbers.”We don’t joke with religion (quoting from the Koran). There is no hypocrisy in this religion. It is only the truth.”Therefore, woe on to you, vigilante. Woe on to you. It is Allah that torments you and even tomorrow Allah will torment you. By Allah you will never achieve your aim. I swear by Allah.

To the Americans...who is America in the sight of Allah? Who is America in the sight of Allah? Who is Israel in the sight of Allah? Who is France in the sight of Allah? It is only when we don’t have firm belief. We don’t fear you at all. “We were the ones who carried out all these attacks. Not just Gwoza, all the attacks you see in Borno (state) or any country we are the ones carrying them out.”This is the life for us; it is our world and we are living it out. How can one fear these American people? If one is indeed a believer, he needs not to. How can one fear these people (America) if one is indeed a believer.”This is the speech I have to make; which is a warning for worse things to come. Better submit to Allah before it becomes too late.

3. 03/10/2014

Transcript source:

Partial transcript below:

Sotubo, J. (2014) Watch, Read Transcript of Shekau’s New Video [Online] Pulse.ng Available at: <<http://www.pulse.ng/news/boko-haram-watch-read-transcript-of-shekau-s-new-video-id3173409.html>> [Accessed on: 22 Jan 2016].

“As long as I’m on this earth, every infidel is in trouble. Allahu Akbar” (sporadic shooting)

"You are not honest, you have nothing to say. Here I am, alive. I will only die the day Allah takes my breath,"

"The wish of Obama (United States President) will not kill me, the wish of Francois Hollande (of France) will not kill me, the wish of Benjamin Netanyahu (of Israel) will not kill me, the wish of Ban-ki Moon (of the United Nations) will not kill me, the wish of Queen Elizabeth will not kill me, the wish of the infidels of the world will not kill me, much less of President (Goodluck Jonathan) , much less of Kashim (Shettima of Borno State) , much less of Bra-Bra (Yobe State Governor Ibrahim Geidam).

"Nothing will kill me until my days are over. Do whatever you want to do. If you think what I'm doing is not the truth, even if you don't fight me I will crumble.

"Nothing will kill me until my days are over... I'm still alive. Some people asked if Shekau has two souls. No, I have one soul, by Allah. It is propaganda that is prevalent. I have one soul."

"We are running our caliphate, our Islamic caliphate. We follow the Koran... We now practice the injunctions of the Koran in the land of Allah,"

5. 01/11/2014

Video source:

Sahara Reporters (2014) Full Video and Transcript of Boko Haram leader Shekau's Latest Video on Chibok Girls and Ceasefire Talks [Online] Sahara Reporters. Available at: <<http://saharareporters.com/2014/11/01/full-video-and-transcript-boko-haram-leader-shekaus-latest-video-chibok-girls-and>> [Accessed on: 22 Jan 2016]

Transcript source:

Audu, O. (2014) Full transcript of Shekau's latest video on ceasefire deal, Chibok girls [Online] Premium Times. Available: <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/170441-full-transcript-of-shekaus-latest-video-on-ceasefire-deal-chibok-girls.html>> [Accessed on: 22 Jan 2016]

Sahara Reporters (2014) Full Video and Transcript of Boko Haram leader Shekau's Latest Video on Chibok Girls and Ceasefire Talks [Online] Sahara Reporters. Available at: <<http://saharareporters.com/2014/11/01/full-video-and-transcript-boko-haram-leader-shekaus-latest-video-chibok-girls-and>> [Accessed on: 22 Jan 2016]

"Without wasting time, we hereby send a message to the tyrants of Nigeria and other infidels as well as their world tyrants as a whole in Hausa language.

“You people should understand that we only obey Allah, we tread the path of the Prophet. We hope to die on this path and get eternal rest in our graves, rise up in bliss before our Lord and enter Paradise (quotes from the Koran). Our goal is the Garden of Eternal Bliss. May Allah protect us.

“Oh you followers of constitution, have you forgotten your laws? Since the time we were preaching in Maiduguri, in your constitution in Section 8, verse (paragraph) 2 to 3, in your accursed book called Constitution, which became law for those who are not fair to themselves on earth.

“You shamelessly declared in your radio and newspapers that you were fighting those determined to establish an Islamic state.

“Because of that constitution that barred us from preaching in Maiduguri, we moved out and migrated as Allah ordained (quoting from the Koran).

“Have you forgotten that? And it is you today claiming we made truce with you? In what way did we make truce? Which kind of negotiation, with whom? That your Danladi, the infidel like you, who we will not spare and will decapitate if he falls into our hands today?

“Where do we know him, not to talk of him representing us? Who is Danladi on this earth?

“Allah knows everything. Allah is witness (quoting from the Koran).

“Therefore I tell you (that) we have not made ceasefire with anyone. Only battle, hitting, striking and killing with gun which we long for like tasty meal. This what we believe in and fight for.

“Our goal is to see only Koran being followed on earth. This is our focus.

“It is said Chadian President, Nigerian ambassador, the people of Cameroon and us met and agreed on a truce. How? Don’t you know we are still holding your German hostage, always crying. If we wish we hack him or slaughter him or shoot him. We fear no one but Allah. This is our job.

“When did we release Chibok schoolgirls that we seized, those that Shekau who is now talking, seized, brought them and kept them in the place he chose for more than six months now.

“Allah has proved too difficult for the infidel, Allah has proved too difficult for the tyrant, Allah has proved too difficult for the United States, Allah has proved too difficult for a plane called drone, bastard. Allah has proved too difficult for everyone. Allah is mightier than everyone.

“Surprisingly, if the women of Chibok, I mean the mothers of the Chibok schoolgirls and their fathers, if you know the condition your daughters are in today it could lead some to convert to Islam and some to die from grief.

“Don’t you know the over 200 Chibok schoolgirls have converted to Islam? They have now memorised two chapters of the Koran. They have seen themselves in the Books of Luke and John that Christians have corrupted the Bible. Girls from Chibok confessing Islam is the true religion! A six-grader, liars.

“We married them off. They are in their marital homes. (Laughter)

“Fury upon fury. Shekau can infuriate. It is said Shekau is leadership position. Which leadership? Do you think we are practising traditional monarchy? (Laughter). It is the same Shekau whose father is Muhammadu, his son is Muhammadu, his name is Abubakar. It is the same Shekau, he is still the one. Shekau, eat the heart of infidels since infidels want to disobey Allah.

“We did not negotiate with anyone. We did not negotiate with anyone. We did not negotiate with Chad. We did not negotiate with Cameroon. We did not negotiate with Nigeria. We did not negotiate with the Chadian ambassador. We did not negotiate with Africa. We did not negotiate with Asia. We did not negotiate with Europe. We did not negotiate with America. We did not negotiate with the United Nations.

“What is negotiation? We did not negotiate with anyone. It is a lie. It is a lie. We will not negotiate. What is our business with negotiation? Allah said we should not (quoting from the Koran).

“We follow the Koran. We will not be teased by any infidel. Now you don’t know what to do, you want to convince your leaders that are tired of you, that have realised your lies, including your Solomon Dalung, your Abdullahi Wase, your Senator Ndume.

“They are tired of you, they have realised you are deceiving them, you are playing with their intelligence, you just want to protect your own interests. It is bad for you.

“I’m only making this speech for those people who want to convert to Islam. I don’t care whatever you say. What is my business with you? Allah is my focus. I left my parents’ home. I left my mother and my father, I left my relations and joined those who want to practise Islam (quoting from the Koran). And you are trying to deceive people with negotiation.

“I thank Allah. I started with knife and today I have seized more than 20 of our armoured vehicles, they are in my possession.

“It is said Shekau is a position. Bravo to you Orator. Well done to you who studied in Israel. Well done to you the expert in Psychology, well done you expert in Biology, well done you believer in ‘I pledge to Nigeria my country’. This is what you said.

“You pledge to Nigeria your country. Right? Me, me Shekau I pledge to Allah my God. If you don’t know, today you will know.

“I pledge to Allah my God, to be faithful. This is Shekau. Idiot like you!

“This is just my speech in brief.

“You should repent and turn to Allah and follow the Koran. You should follow the Koran. You should follow the Koran. You are so unfortunate as to be preventing those who follow the Koran obeying Allah. “It is a lie. It is a lie. Whoever refuses to listen will be dealt with by Allah.”

ISIS

1. 19/01/2014

Transcript source:

Iraqi Witness (n.d) English Transcript of Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Speech on 19th Jan 2014 [Online] Victory Party. Available at: <<http://thevictoriousparty.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/english-transcript-of-sheikh-abu-bakr.html>> [Accessed on: 12 Aug. 2017].

It's from God's tradition and wisdom that the rows of believers and Mujahids is mingled with hypocrites. God will not leave this row mixed with those hypocrites and pretenders and therefore creates Fitnah and trials for them. The row must be melted so that the maliciousness leaves, and be pressured so that the weak building blocks crumble and the lights must shine at it exposing the intricacies and inner personalities. Struggle between truth and falsehood will never end and with it fitnah and trials. Except that the believer will always win at the end This does not increase the fighter in God's path except in purity and fineness and determination and steadiness. So persevere O ISIS and have patient and don't be sad by letting down of the close ones or the collusion of the enemies. And don't be saddened by this fierce campaign against us for God will help his soldier and will defend those who believe. God knows who's the Mujahid and who's the pretender, who's the liar and who's truthful, who's sincere and who's a hypocrite. Know that this trial in Syria that has befallen upon you will be good for you and it will be a great bestowal.

To ISIS in Syria: God knows then you know that ISIS tried everything in its power to stop this war that was launched against us by some rebels. God knows then you know that we did not want this war, or prepared for it and those benefiting from it are the Nusayris and Shia. We were forced into this war and for days we tried to end it even though the betrayal was blatant. This continued until those deceived thought that ISIS was something of the past and that they could take us down. Because they were following lies of the media, so were forced to wage this war and Allah is Sufficient for us & Best

Disposer of affairs. If you know this O ISIS then have faith in God as victory is for you if you fear him and don't oppress and don't betray. We tell you to stop against those who stopped against you and pointed their weapons away from you regardless of their crimes against you And forgive and reconcile so you can fight a Licentious enemy that is watching the Sunnis. So if you tried your best to stop this war and fight only the Shia and Nusayris and you failed then put your faith in God. Then fight this war for you are capable and be certain that this is a good thing as this is God's plan. And don't oppress anyone, and if anyone oppressed someone then let him hasten to return the rights and repent. For we respond to every injustice that reaches us and we clear ourselves to God for every injustice perpetrated by one of ISIS. And we order our soldiers to return every injustice and may God not bless someone who heard of an injustice and did nothing. This is a message to every Mujahid in God's path, from all the groups in Sham, soldiers and leaders. This battle is a battle of the entire Muslim nation. And the ones targeted are all the Mujahideen. ISIS is a door from which they can reach you, if it's breached they will reach you so do not let a day come where you will regret it. Repent to God for you have stabbed us in the back while our soldiers were at the front. Today you have seen our punishment and strength (car bombs etc), and you have seen the difference between yesterday and today. Yesterday you were walking safe, sleeping assured. Today you are in constant fear and apprehension staying awake at night guarding yourselves So here is the state extending its hand to you, so you can stop fighting it and we will stop fighting you and we can fight the Shia. And if not then know we we have soldiers that do not sleep, known to the near and far.

As for the People in Syria: You have God, everyone trades with your blood, racing each other so that they can sit on your shoulders, or even on your corpses. The Nusayris kill you claiming to fight terrorists to protect you. The Crusaders and Jews are plotting against Islam and against the Mujahideen in your name and in your cause. Arab regimes are buying followers and and recruiting them under the name of relief. Thieves and thugs are stealing your money and possessions under the name of defending you and protecting you. You Have god and glad tidings if you are patient for God will take care of you. As for us we can't say nothing but your blood is our blood and your destruction is our destruction. We fight in God's path and for his satisfaction and we do not fear the blame of blamers. Don't be deceived by the media for you will find us the kindest towards you and the harshest towards your enemies. God knows that we tried our best to defend muslims and then overnight we are accused of making Takfeer on the Syrian population. God knows that we were the only ones that fought off criminals and overnight we turned into murderers and put our people in mass graves? God knows that thugs and thieves fled from every street/area we entered and overnight we are accused of terrifying the local population? God knows that we opened our arms towards every group and then we are accused of not recognizing any Mujahid but ourselves? God knows we left our families and our homes to establish

Shariah, and overnight we are accused of not turning towards Shariah? God knows that we are the harshest people towards the Shia, and even they know that. God knows that on the night of the treachery we had an army in Deir ez-Zour led by Omar al-Shishani to free the entire province. And that we know we had a force in Aleppo on the western frontlines to free the entire city. And that we had another force coming together to storm Kuwayris from the Eastern frontlines. And that we had another force ready to storm Hanano and sleeper cells ready to launch attacks at the same time in government areas. And that we had a prepared force in Idlib ready to raid 11 government checkpoints and thereby liberating Wadi Dayf. And another force getting ready in Hamah for a campaign against the Nusayris. The prophet said a time will come where the liar is believed, and the trustworthy deemed a liar.

As for our people in Iraq: Today you see the Shia for what they are. And you have finally picked up your arms. This is your chance and don't waste it. If you do you will not have a say again. Your war with the Shia is an ideological war, as admitted by Nouri Maliki when he described the battle as holy. So gather around your sons the Mujahids, for you have today become a fortress for the Sunnis, so make sure the Shia don't reach them.

As for ISIS in Iraq: Be in the frontlines against the Shia, and march towards Baghdad and the South, keep the Shia busy in their own areas. Know that the entire Sunni population and the brothers in Syria are watching you.

Our last message is to the Americans. Know O protector of the crusade that this war by proxy in Syria won't help you like it didn't in Iraq. Soon we will be in a direct confrontation and the sons of Islam have prepared for such a day. So watch for we are with you, watching.

2. 01/07/2014

Transcript source:

Iraqi Witness (n.db) English Transcript of Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Speech on 19th Jan 2014 [Online] Victory Party. Available at: <<http://thevictoriousparty.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/english-transcript-of-sheikh-abu-bakr.htm>> [Accessed on: 12 July 2017]

Jihadist News (2014) Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Encourages Emigration, Worldwide Action [Online] Site intelligence Group Personal Edition. July 1, 2014 Available at: <<https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/islamic-state-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-encourages-emigration-worldwide-action.htm>> [Accessed on: 23 Aug. 2017]

Truly all praise belongs to Allah. We praise Him, and seek His help and His forgiveness. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils of our souls and from the consequences of our deeds. Whomever Allah guides can never be led astray, and whomever Allah leads astray can never be guided.

I testify that there is no god except Allah – alone without any partners – and I testify that Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) is His slave and Messenger.

{O you who have believed, fear Allah as He should be feared and do not die except as Muslims} [Al-Imran: 102].

{O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah, through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer} [An-Nisa': 1].

{O you who have believed, fear Allah and speak words of appropriate justice. He will amend for you your deeds and forgive you your sins. And whoever obeys Allah and His messenger has certainly achieved a great triumph} [Al-Ahzab: 70-71].

As for what follows:

Allah (the Exalted) said, {O you who have believed, decreed upon you is fasting as it was decreed upon those before you that you may become righteous} [Al-Baqarah: 183].

{The month of Ramadan [is that] in which was revealed the Quran, a guidance for the people and clear proofs of guidance and criterion. So whoever sights [the new moon of] the month, let him fast it} [Al-Baqarah: 185].

We congratulate the ummah (people) of Islam, in the East and in the West, on the advent of the blessed month of Ramadan, and we praise Allah (the Exalted) for allowing us to reach this virtuous month.

Al-Bukhari and Muslim reported on the authority of Abu Hurayrah (may Allah be pleased with him) who narrated that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said, "Whoever fasts the month of Ramadan, having faith and anticipating a reward, will have his past sins forgiven." He also said, "Whoever stands in prayer in the month of Ramadan, having faith and anticipating a reward, will have his past sins forgiven."

So congratulations to you, O slaves of Allah, as Allah has allowed you to reach this noble month. Praise Allah and thank Him for having granted you long lives, thereby giving you a chance to correct your past deeds. Meet the month of Ramadan with sincere repentance and truthful resolve.

{O you who have believed, repent to Allah with sincere repentance. Perhaps your Lord will remove from you your misdeeds and admit you into gardens beneath which rivers flow [on] the Day when Allah will not disgrace the Prophet and those who believed with him} [At-Tahrīm: 8].

{And hasten to forgiveness from your Lord and a garden as wide as the heavens and earth, prepared for the righteous} [Al-‘Imran: 133].

And there is no deed in this virtuous month or in any other month better than jihad in the path of Allah, so take advantage of this opportunity and walk the path of your righteous predecessors. Support the religion of Allah through jihad in the path of Allah. Go forth, O mujahidin in the path of Allah. Terrify the enemies of Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the dunya (worldly life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever.

{So do not weaken and call for peace while you are superior; and Allah is with you and will never deprive you of [the reward of] your deeds. This worldly life is only amusement and diversion} [Muhammad: 35-36].

{And this worldly life is not but diversion and amusement. And indeed, the home of the Hereafter – that is the [eternal] life, if only they knew} [Al-‘Ankabut: 64].

{But the enduring good deeds are better to your Lord for reward and better for [one’s] hope} [Al-Kahf:46].

And blessed is the one who parts with his dunya in Ramadan and meets his Lord on a day from amongst the days of forgiveness.

O mujahidin in the path of Allah, be monks during the night and be knights during the day. Bring joy to the hearts of a believing people, and show the tawaghit (rulers who claim Allah’s rights) what they are wary of.

O mujahidin in the path of Allah, truly the matter is that of Allah’s religion and His commodity. You only have one soul, and an appointed time of death that will neither be hastened nor delayed. It is a matter of Paradise and Hellfire, happiness and misery. As for the religion of Allah, then it will be victorious. Allah has promised to bring victory to the religion. And as for Allah’s commodity, then it is precious and valuable. Indeed His commodity is costly. Indeed His commodity is Paradise. As for the soul, then what a lowly, miserable, wretched soul it is if it does not seek what is with Allah and does not support the religion of Allah.

By Allah, we will never be mujahidin as long as we are stingy with our lives and our wealth. By Allah, we will never be truthful as long as we do not sacrifice our lives and wealth in order to raise high the word of Allah and bring victory to the religion of Allah.

{Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Quran. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great triumph} [At-Tawbah: 111].

So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight!

Beware of becoming deluded and losing strength. Beware, for the dunyā has come to you reluctantly, so kick it down, trample it, and leave it behind you. Indeed, what is with Allah is better and more lasting.

Indeed, the ummah of Islam is watching your jihad with eyes of hope, and indeed you have brothers in many parts of the world being inflicted with the worst kinds of torture. Their honor is being violated. Their blood is being spilled. Prisoners are moaning and crying for help. Orphans and widows are complaining of their plight. Women who have lost their children are weeping. Masajid (plural of masjid) are desecrated and sanctities are violated. Muslims' rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, Sham (the Levant), Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ahvaz, Iran (by the rafidah (shia), Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, in the East and in the West.

So raise your ambitions, O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your brigades. It is enough for you to just look at the scenes that have reached you from Central Africa, and from Burma before that. What is hidden from us is far worse.

So by Allah, we will take revenge! By Allah, we will take revenge! Even if it takes a while, we will take revenge, and every amount of harm against the ummah will be responded to with multitudes more against the perpetrator.

{And those who, when tyranny strikes them, they defend themselves} [Ash-Shura: 39].

And the one who commences is the more oppressive.

Soon, by Allah's permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved. Anyone who dares to offend him will be disciplined, and any hand that reaches out to harm him will be cut off.

So let the world know that we are living today in a new era. Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken. Whoever was shocked and amazed must comprehend. The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature.

So listen, O ummah of Islam. Listen and comprehend. Stand up and rise. For the time has come for you to free yourself from the shackles of weakness, and stand in the face of tyranny, against the treacherous rulers – the agents of the crusaders and the atheists, and the guards of the jews.

O ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews.

Indeed the Muslims were defeated after the fall of their khilafah (caliphate). Then their state ceased to exist, so the disbelievers were able to weaken and humiliate the Muslims, dominate them in every region, plunder their wealth and resources, and rob them of their rights. They accomplished this by attacking and occupying their lands, placing their treacherous agents in power to rule the Muslims with an iron fist, and spreading dazzling and deceptive slogans such as: civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom, democracy, secularism, baathism, nationalism, and patriotism, among other false slogans.

Those rulers continue striving to enslave the Muslims, pulling them away from their religion with those slogans. So either the Muslim pulls away from his religion, disbelieves in Allah, and disgracefully submits to the manmade shirk (polytheistic) laws of the east and west, living despicably and disgracefully as a follower, by repeating those slogans without will and honor, or he lives persecuted, targeted, and expelled, to end up being killed, imprisoned, or terribly tortured, on the accusation of terrorism. Because terrorism is to disbelieve in those slogans and to believe in Allah. Terrorism is to refer to Allah's law for judgment. Terrorism is to worship Allah as He ordered you. Terrorism is to refuse humiliation, subjugation, and subordination (to the kuffar – infidels). Terrorism is for the

Muslim to live as a Muslim, honorably with might and freedom. Terrorism is to insist upon your rights and not give them up.

But terrorism does not include the killing of Muslims in Burma and the burning of their homes. Terrorism does not include the dismembering and disemboweling of the Muslims in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Kashmir. Terrorism does not include the killing of Muslims in the Caucasus and expelling them from their lands. Terrorism does not include making mass graves for the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the slaughtering of their children. Terrorism does not include the destruction of Muslims' homes in Palestine, the seizing of their lands, and the violation and desecration of their sanctuaries and families.

Terrorism does not include the burning of masajid in Egypt, the destruction of the Muslims' homes there, the rape of their chaste women, and the oppression of the mujahidin in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere.

Terrorism does not include the extreme torture and degradation of Muslims in East Turkistan and Iran (by the rafidah), as well as preventing them from receiving their most basic rights. Terrorism does not include the filling of prisons everywhere with Muslim captives. Terrorism does not include the waging of war against chastity and hijab (Muslim women's clothing) in France and Tunis. It does not include the propagation of betrayal, prostitution, and adultery.

Terrorism does not include the insulting of the Lord of Mightiness, the cursing of the religion, and the mockery of our Prophet (peace be upon him). Terrorism does not include the slaughtering of Muslims in Central Africa like sheep, while no one weeps for them and denounces their slaughter.

All this is not terrorism. Rather it is freedom, democracy, peace, security, and tolerance! Sufficient for us is Allah, and He is the best Disposer of affairs.

{And they resented them not except because they believed in Allah, the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy} [Al-Buruj: 8].

O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah's grace – you have a state and khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a khilāfah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers by His grace, loving each other for the sake of Allah, standing in a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing themselves for one another. Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal, in one

pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood. If kings were to taste this blessing, they would abandon their kingdoms and fight over this grace. So all praise and thanks are due to Allah.

Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah's. {Indeed, the earth belongs to Allah. He causes to inherit it whom He wills of His servants. And the [best] outcome is for the righteous} [Al-A'raf: 128]. The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims.

O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.

Allah (the Exalted) said, {Indeed, those whom the angels take [in death] while wronging themselves – [the angels] will say, "In what [condition] were you?" They will say, "We were oppressed in the land." The angels will say, "Was not the earth of Allah spacious [enough] for you to emigrate therein?" For those, their refuge is Hell – and evil it is as a destination} [An-Nisa': 97].

So rush, O Muslims, with your religion to Allah as muhajirin (emigrants). {And whoever emigrates for the cause of Allah will find on the earth many [alternative] locations and abundance. And whoever leaves his home as an emigrant to Allah and His Messenger and then death overtakes him – his reward has already become incumbent upon Allah. And Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful} [An-Nisa': 100].

We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha' (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their emigration is wajib 'ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the dire need of the Muslims for them. People are ignorant of their religion and they thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it. So fear Allah, O slaves of Allah.

O soldiers of the Islamic State, do not be awestruck by the great numbers of your enemy, for Allah is with you. I do not fear for you the numbers of your opponents, nor do I fear your neediness and poverty, for Allah (the Exalted) has promised your Prophet (peace be upon him) that you will not be wiped out by famine, and your enemy will not himself conquer you and violate your land. Allah placed your provision under the shades of your spears. Rather, I fear for you your own sins. Accept each other and do not dispute. Come together and do not argue. Fear Allah in private and public, openly and secretly. Stay away from sins. Expel from your ranks those who openly commit sin. Be wary of pride, haughtiness, and arrogance. Do not become proud on account of gaining some victories. Humble yourselves before Allah. Do not be arrogant towards Allah's slaves. Do not underestimate your enemy regardless of how much strength you gain and how much your numbers grow.

I also remind you to attend to the Muslims and the tribes of Ahlus-Sunnah (the Sunnis) with goodness. Stay awake guarding them so they can be safe and at rest. Be their support. Respond with kindness if they do you wrong. Be gentle with them, giving them as much pardon as you can. Persevere, endure, and remain stationed. Know that today you are the defenders of the religion and the guards of the land of Islam. You will face tribulation and malahim (fierce battles). Verily, the best place for your blood to be spilled is on the path to liberate the Muslim prisoners imprisoned behind the walls of the tawaghit. So prepare your arms, and supply yourselves with piety. Persevere in reciting the Quran with comprehension of its meanings and practice of its teachings.

This is my advice to you. If you hold to it, you will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills.

{Our Lord, we have believed in what You revealed and have followed the Messenger, so register us among the witnesses [to truth]} [Āl 'Imrān: 53].

{Our Lord, do not impose blame upon us if we have forgotten or erred. Our Lord, and lay not upon us a burden like that which You laid upon those before us. Our Lord, and burden us not with that which we have no ability to bear. And pardon us; and forgive us; and have mercy upon us. You are our protector, so give us victory over the disbelieving people} [Al-Baqarah: 286].

- @Boko_Haram. As you have seen, we have been causing havoc and bad infidel federal government stil clueless as ever. Long live Boko Haram
- @Boko_Haram I wonder how many years of bombing the infidels in Aso rock can survive? We plead with Nigerians to join us in our actions
- @Boko_Haram The truth is it's the army killing innocent people the army is a mad dog. We are for you.
- @Boko_Haram What matters is the size of the fight in the dog, not the dog size. a big buffoon like the Nigerian govt is a fool anytime.
- @Boko_Haram@daldino. Do you see the innocent people the infidel government is killing complain? No!
- @Boko_Haram. We love Nigerians; it's only the Nigerian polis, Nigerian army, drunkards, prostitutes, politicians, usurers, teachers, touts we can't stand.
- @Boko_Haram. Armypeople you are hungry, polis you are tired. Go home. We are your friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock #gaskiya.
- @Boko_Haram. Jonathan, abati, omokri are a threat to Nigeria not Boko Haram. We fight for your liberation even though you are not grateful #longterm
- @Boko_Haram. MEND is after money, we are after ideals. Ideas that come at the right time flourishes. #deadideals
- @Boko_Haram. Pls come to Maiduguri to see the good job we have done. quiet. no siren. No thieves only us, polis and army. #tourismhttp.
- @Boko_Haram. Wives and children now see their husbands in the night in Abuja and Maiduguri. Countless marriages have been saved #collateraleffect
- @Boko_Haram. Rate of alcoholism has reduced in Abuja and Maiduguri because of our good work #collateraleffect
- @Boko_Haram. Maiduguri looks better with our fireworks. Roads look more even and streets quieter #collateraleffect
- @Boko_Haram. Boko Haram thinking of replacing cigarettes with sheesha...healthier and with more vitamins #Progress
- @Boko_Haram. We are thinking of banning Jeans, Tshirt and Tmlewin shirts...Jelabia is more suitable to the Maiduguri sun and for banks #1STEPHEAD
- @Boko_Haram @Boko_Haram. Federal government wants to negotiate with Boko Haram ... more like bribe us #Foolsall
- @Boko_Haram. Boko haram would not sit by and allow a gang rape. The infidel government of Nigeria has done enug#ABSU#EVIL5
- .@Boko_Haram. Federal govt of Nig has killed more people thru incompetence this year than Boko Haram, armed robbers, kidnapaz and MEND. #GASKIYA
- @Boko_Haram. People you are hungry, polis you are tired. Go home. We are your friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock #Gaskiya
- @Boko_Haram. The government is the terrorist. When last did you have light for 24 hrs? Boko Haram are the freedom fighters.