Brand repositioning of Egypt's Muslim brotherhood: do you see what I see, views from the female electorate?

Mark McPherson*

Department of Marketing, Branding and Tourism,
Middlesex University Business School,
The Boroughs, Hendon, NW4 4BT,
Middlesex, UK
Email: m.mcpherson@mdx.ac.uk
*Corresponding author

Monia Mohsen Ismail

Faculty of Mass Communications,
University of Modern Sciences and Arts (MSA),
26 July Mehwar Road Intersection with Wahat Road,
6th of October, Cairo, Egypt
Email: monia_mohsen@hotmail.com

Abstract: The paper explores brand-repositioning of the MB and FJP, as viewed by Egypt's female voters during 2010/2011 Presidential elections. Five areas of brand-repositioning were discussed. Multiple sources of evidence were used, namely commentary from 46 female respondents: 1) 22 face-to-face interviews; 2) four focus groups by age containing six respondents within each; 3) projective techniques – drawing and sentence completion. Judgemental/snowballing sampling were employed. Data was analysed via content analysis. Gaps exists between how the MB perceive their image and how respondents view such image. Respondents displayed concern about female expectations in the future; felt that pre-revolution the MB were, 'repressed', during were 'heroes'. Post, their image declined because they became authoritarian and curtailed women and minority rights. Insights are offered into the views and emotions held by Egypt's female voters towards both parties. Such insights expose a gap in the literature pertaining to Egypt's female electorate.

Keywords: brand repositioning; Muslim brotherhood; freedom and justice party; political marketing; Egypt's female voters; Egypt's 2010/2011 Presidential Elections.

branding, guerrilla marketing, and leadership and followership. He is actively involved in academic research where his specialisms are ethnic small businesses, marketing to ethnic minority groups, and Islamic marketing. He has presented at various marketing, small business and doctoral conferences at home and overseas. In addition to teaching and research, he consults for a number of clients from the ethnic small business community, who operate within UK and/or international markets.

Monia Mohsen Ismail is an Assistant Lecturer in Media and Communications. She has a passion for education which dates back to pre-professional days working within industry. She enjoys the learning process and tries to understand everything to which is exposed. She is currently an Assistant Lecturer at the MSA University in Cario, Egypt, notably the same university from where she graduated top of her class with a BA honours degree. This achievement won her a scholarship to pursue her postgraduate degree at the Middlesex University in London, England. She is working towards her PhD in Media and Anthropology at the Cairo University, Egypt.

---

1   Introduction

In June 2012, amid scenes of wild jubilation by tens of thousand of his supporters in Tahir Square Cairo, Egypt, Dr. Mohammed Morsi El-Ayat, head of the Muslim brotherhood's (MB) political wing – the freedom and justice party (FJP) – became Egypt's fifth President. The country's first freely democratically elected president, and its first leader from outside the military (Mohammed Morsi Biography, 2014; Spencer, 2012). The announcement of the official result revealed Dr. Morsi claimed victory over his rival, the former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq by 51% to 48% in the presidential runoff (Spencer, 2012). Although this win was significant for the party faithful and voters of Egypt (the implications thereof and the subsequent aftermath of events is well documented and will not be rehearsed here), what is of particular interest from a marketing perspective and the backdrop for this paper, are two major issues. First, that in 2011 the MB had developed a nominally independent political party branded as the FJP. Although the FJP had strong links to the MB, it attempted to appeal to the wider Egyptian electorate. This development raised the second issue, did this co-branding strategy resonate with a particular type of electorate, namely that of the female voter? To understand the rationale behind the focus of these two issues, it is important to step back a little to explore the link between the MB and FJP, before moving to the impact thereof on the 2011/12 presidential elections and the female voter.

The MB, established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, is the Arab worlds' oldest and dominant Islamic political organisation. Under the auspice of a Pan-Islamic, religious and social movement, along with its rejection of western imperialism (Aly, 2006; Leiken and Brooke, 2007), the MB reached a total of two million followers within a few years of inception. Ever since its foundation in Egypt (and unfolding into many neighbouring Muslim states), some elements of the MB felt the need to legitimise the 'use of force' to further their aims. As such, the MB is considered a terrorist organisation (The Guardian

Online, 2014); a philosophy that to this day still resonates with very many Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Conversely, other MB members reject this violent approach instead; focus upon spreading a non-violent message (Vidino, 2011). With regard to the FJP, the MB established this party and supplied many of its leaders and 40% of its members. The FJP obtained legal status on 6th June 2011 and, was headed by Dr. Mohamed Morsi (Shehata, 2011). The party called for the establishment of an Islamic economic system, with Islamic Sharia as the main source of legislation. In addition, the FJP represented the freedoms and (social) justice of all religious groups within Egypt, including gender equality, human rights and, those of women's rights (Shehata, 2011; Ziada, 2012).

When George W. Bush (former President of the USA) repeated his request for Egypt to be a democratic state, President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak appeared to respond. Mubarak's 30-year rule was approved through non-stop referenda (Brownlee, 2007). In February 2005, Mubarak reformed the constitution to approve multi-candidate presidential elections (Blaydes and El-Tarouty, 2009). However, for the next six years and despite broken promises, allegations of vote rigging, a crackdown and eventual arrest of opposition party activists (Brownlee, 2007) all resulted in the unthinkable. In 2010–2011, the world witness the end of President Mubarak's 30-year hold over Egypt, and as noted earlier the election of a new party into government, that of the FJP (intertwined very closely with its political master the MB), with it Dr. Morsi as the country's fifth President (Day, 2011; Trager, 2011). Within hours of taking office, Dr. Morsi swiftly resigned from the FJP. Interestingly, despite MBs chequered history, and being branded an illegal organisation with links to terrorism, the party gained widespread popularity throughout Egypt (Wade, 2013; Paison, 2012; Hrw.org., 2006; Campagna, 1996).

The speed with which Mubarak's regime fell surprised the world (Ibrahim, 2011). More inspiring however, were photographs of Egyptian women voters, campaigners and parliamentary candidates (Nytimes.com, 2012). As Khodair and Hassib (2015) noted, the Arab Spring of 2010 and the ensuing 25th January and 30th June 2011 revolutions in Egypt were pivotal in empowering women to take part in the political process, reviving women's aspirations, as well as, galvanising their determination for full and equal rights both socially and politically (Davie et al., 2013). Thus, Egyptian women had taken to the stage in extraordinary numbers. The revolution was not nationalistic, rather it was democratic, and since human rights was one of the reasons for the revolution, women had at last an opportunity to ask for their rights (Al-Bizri, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2012).

Given what has been discussed thus far, for the purpose of this paper the history and ongoing struggles of the MB, FJP or any political party or party member, or that of the political situation within Egypt, will not be rehearsed here as all are well documented, and very much beyond the scope and remit of this paper. To illustrate the point, since becoming Egypt's sixth de factor leader in 2013 (and then president in May 2014), President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, a former head of the military and defence minister, ousted Dr. Morsi from office following mass protest against [Dr. Morsi] his rule and, banned Egypt's MB and dissolved the FJP (BBC News Online, 2013, BBC News, 2016; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016; Sanyal, 2016; The Guardian Online, 2014). In essence, our interest in bringing the MB [and the FJP] to the fore is entirely from the perspectives of political marketing, rebranding of a 'political' party and 'consumer [voter]' behaviour. Therefore, the two stated aims of this paper are:

1   to explore the repositioning and branding of the MB [and FJP] as viewed by Egypt's female voters during the 2011 presidential elections only

2   whether such political party re-branding and repositioning resonated with the female voter.

This paper does not represent the political, religious, economic and/or social views of the authors. Nor does it support or condemn activities conducted by any one of Egypt's political parties or individual party member before/during/after the said 2011 presidential elections. The paper is structured as followed: literature review, methodology, findings and, conclusion.

2   Literature review

2.1   *Branding and positioning of a political party and its leader*

Pich et al. (2015) suggest that political brands are seen as a trinity of three elements namely, party leader, political party and party policy. To understand this notion consider, the following: US lawmakers and experts suggest they are troubled by the 45th president of the USA, Donald Trump (Republican Party). Why? Because he has an extraordinary focus on his own brand and popularity, so making his personality not only flawed, but dangerous. Paradoxically, US President Trump describes himself as having one of the best temperaments and overall demeanour "of anyone that's ever run for the office of the president – ever", (Milligan, 2017). In fact, President Trump believes he is the most 'presidential' president in US presidential history, second only to President Abraham Lincoln (Cillizza, 2017). Contrast that mind-set with this: President Trump has ushered in a new era of 'policy by clickbait' (his extensive use of twitter et cetera), whereby he uses social media to disrupt and bypass traditional lines of communications (as well as formulating policy) to the public (Gerzema, 2017). As Gerzema (2017) goes on to points out, the same way marketers optimise messages based on clicks and engagement, President Trump is able to engage in real-time diplomacy, policy and public sentiment through tweets and re-tweets. Consequently, he can test strategic direction by exploiting the grey area between his personal brand and that of official administration policy. What the Trump example highlights is that in stark contrast to the pre and post world war two era of mass 'propaganda' of political communications, described as one-directional communication – a process in which passive audiences found themselves subjected to the sometimes-manipulative appeals of political élites (Wring, 1997). The approach seen today, with regards to political marketing, appears to be in the main on three levels:

1   politics and the marketing concept

2   marketing the political campaign message

3   the marketing of personal and political trust, cynicism (ranging from disappoint to contempt), and efficacy (external: the degree to which citizens feel that the government is responsive to the will of the people; internal: the belief about one's own ability to influence the political process) (Peng and Hackley, 2007, 2009; Schiffman et al., 2010; Jevons and Caroll, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2015; Anderson, 2010).

Exploring these three areas in a little more detail. In relation to point (1) *politics and the marketing concept* (French and Smith, 2010; O'Shaughnessy, 2001; O'Cass, 1996), suggest brand image and (re)positioning, including the communications thereof are very much evident and not a new phenomenon. In fact, Baines et al. (2002) point back as far as the 1980's and 1990's where they note the major political parties within the developed world embraced the marketing concept and process. For instance, the authors cite examples such as the UK Conservative Party, as well as, Irish President, Mary Robinson whereby her particular campaign used the services of Saatchi and Saatchi in the 1980s, and 1990s respectively. The British Labour Party incorporated focus groups in its 1990's activities, as did the Conservative Party circ. 2010 onwards. Both the Green Party and SPD in Germany used marketing management techniques to defeat Helmut Kohl (Baines et al., 2002).

Even today within an environment of digital/interactive technology, there is greater need for politicians to galvanise [positive] public opinion about themselves and their party. For example, continuous response measurement (CRM) and dual-screening during televised political debates, various online and social media platforms such as Twitter [a.k.a Twittersphere], 'blogsphere' and the like; help transform verbal gaffes, zingers, emotion, and non-verbal communications into real-time political commentary that shape or alter public perception and opinion (Mitchell, 2015; Munger, 2008; Freelon and Karpf, 2015; Jamieson, 2015). As Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan bears witness. Here, the President used social media with great effect to mobiles the Turkish populace against a military coup in 2016. Interestingly, despite him having 8 million Facebook followers, YouTube in Turkey remains partially blocked, and in 2014 he pledged to 'root out' social media and 'shut down' Twitter (Saiidi, 2016). Likewise, during the June 2017 UK general election Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, who at one point during his leadership faced a vote of no confidence by very many senior Labour Party members, as the party trailed 20 points behind the Conservative Party; successfully mobilised younger voters via a very slick and effective social media strategy, so outflanking the Conservative Party and putting labour within touching distance of winning the general election (Booth and Hern, 2017).

From a political marketing perspective, the above points to the notion that voter perception of political candidates [as well as their party] and voting objectives are more generally focused on personality image, rather than policy (Guzmán and Sierra, 2009; Peng and Hackley, 2009). Thus, as O'Shaughnessy (2001) suggests, political brands create image via three distinct elements:

- *The party as a brand:* here the party is able to strengthen its image because it offers the electorate consistency, understanding, certainty, and enhanced loyalty (Davies and Mian, 2010; Peng and Hackley, 2009; Singer, 2002).

- *The concrete characteristics of the politician:* any political party leader is considered core to the party s/he represents. As such, the leader may have a lasting positive or negative impact not only on the brand image, but interacting elements such as the electorate, media, rival parties, and the like (O'Shaughnessy, 2008; Scammell, 2007). Therefore, the leader's personality is simply identifiable and communed [Lock and Harris (1996) and Schneider (2004) cited in Smith and French (2009)].

- *The main services and policies offered:* the interrelationship between the party, its leader and key policies affects voting behaviour (Smith and French, 2009). Thus, any

positive or negative attitude displayed by voters toward such service and policies may ultimately, from a brand perspective, lead to acceptance or rejection of the party and/or its leader (Simonin and Ruth, 1998).

Developing these concepts further, as already known within marketing, brand image is the consumers association with the product. Such association involves knowledge, notions and perceptions of the practical, emotional, and symbolic benefits of the brand (Kaplan et al., 2010).

The second level, as noted by O'Cass (1996, 2001), O'Shaughnessy (2001) and Lees-Marshment (2001b) cited in Gurau and Ayadi (2011), focuses very much on the *marketing of the political message*. Here literature suggests political marketing combines a strategic approach that consists of campaigning, market intelligence, political communication, and 'product' design and promotion. Therefore, when packaged and delivered as an overall 'political communications campaign,' such a campaign must influence voter behaviour for two reasons, firstly, the initial expectations of democracy, thus citizens vote in order to get their opinions heard and respected (Edlin et al., 2007; Smith and French, 2009); secondly, the attractiveness of the political brand to voters (Calfano, 2010). Consequently, Bennett and Lagos (2007) point out, branded political messages reach consumers easily across all media categories with low awareness cost. Therefore, political parties apply a variety of marketing tools such as the campaign posters, word of mouth, viral marketing, social media and traditional media (Gurau and Ayadi, 2011). The likes of which are designed to produce the desired shift in behaviour and attain/maintain voter support and confidence (O'Cass, 1996).

With regard to the third level *personal and political trust*, *cynicism* and *efficacy*, here Schiffman et al. (2010), Jevons and Caroll (2015), Rosenblatt (2015) and Anderson (2010) note, literature questions the notion of truth and truth claims, and how much does the elector really trust the political messenger, the message and its motive. Thus, the form of government or regime-based-trust provides the strong basis for enhancement in the level of trust (Ahmed et al., 2011). As Anderson (2010) points out, "individuals are motivated and empowered when they believe that their involvement in politics will be consequential and that they can have confidence that the behaviour of others will be honourable." However, the reality as Boston (2016) suggests, is that today we live in a 'post-truth' political environment, whereby politicians and their followers spout lies brazenly and openly with little or no consequence. Bolton goes onto criticise the last couple of decades of post-truth America and the use of miss-information to galvanise or change voter attitudes and to direct their actions – and not always in a way that is peaceful. Certainly, looking at this argument within the context of various political arenas for example, 'half-truths and cynicism' in Pakistan, finds a more noticeable picture that emerges. As an extreme view for instance, Lieven (2012) highlights the fact that Pakistani politics in the main revolve around politicians' extraction of resources from the state via means of corruption; this is then distributed to their followers through patronage, so ensuring a 'loyal voter base' irrespective of 'policies' (Ahmed et al., 2011; Lieven, 2012). With regard to Egypt and the MB. Here, Bahri (2012) points to the fact that after the 2012 presidential elections, Egyptian voters began to see the true political intensions of the MB as a number of their pre-campaign promises and pledges were broken. So much so, the MB were accused of tainting their reputation with unfulfilled promises and 'robbing the revolution'. Closer to home, Nick Glegg, the then leader of the UK's Liberal Democrats circ. 2010 and Jeremy Corbyn 2017 (UK Labour Party) both fell foul of

broken electoral campaign pledges to student voters as an example. Thus, in order to win the student vote, the former promised not to increase student tuition fees, but did so once in office as deputy Prime Minister (Wintour and Mulholland, 2012). Whereas, the latter said during the UK's 2017 general election, that if he and his party were to take office, they would scrap student tuition fees. He did not win office, but readily denied having made such a statement, claiming it was more 'aspirational' than anything else (Elgot, 2017).

In essence, personal and political trust, cynicism and efficacy, as Ahmed et al. (2011) note, boils down to seven key reasons:

1   voter's discrimination

2   too high expectations, too low fulfilment's

3   weak mutual relationships

4   too less choices, too few differences

5   party domination

6   weak personality

7   the cynical voter.

Thus, as Ahmed et al. (2011) go on to espouse, it is vital that trust and trustworthiness, participation, honest and effective communications, shared issues of agreement and importance; inclusiveness, a sense of community, and managing expectations are all key factors to help bridge the gap between voters and political leaders (Anderson, 2010; Schiffman et al., 2010). And that political integrity and acknowledgement of the truth should be at the core of any relationship between the party leader, the party, the message and the voter (Peng and Hackley, 2007; Jevons and Carroll, 2005; Augoustinos et al., 2011).

2.2   Democracy in Muslim-majority countries

Cook and Stathis (2012), point to *Dustur Al-Madina*, or the charter (or constitution) of Medina established in 622 CE by the Prophet Muhammad. Here a pluralistic state was developed (the first modern state of its kind), accentuating the importance of consent and cooperation for governance, Muslims and non-Muslims were equal citizens with identical rights, duties and protections, including religious autonomy for minorities. Interestingly, Cook and Stathis note, if Islam has the foundational capacity to build democratic societies, what accounts for the dearth of democracies in the Muslim world today? The authors suggest, that the reasons Muslim countries lag so far behind in their democratic movements is due in large to the political, historical, economic and cultural factors, and not in fact religion. Therefore, the basic issue is not about Islam, but about Muslims, rather it is the authoritarian, dictatorships, political oppression, human rights violations, corruption, abuses of public offices, and patriarchal cultures in Muslim countries (Amineh, 2007). Likewise, Rowley and Smith (2009), refer to the notion of 'Islam's democracy deficit'. Here the authors offer an interesting paradox by suggesting that Muslim countries are less likely to be free or democratic. However, reported public opinion notes such countries (on average) tend to be pro-democratic, with attitudes

towards democracy (but not religious freedom) more favourable than some individuals in non-Muslim countries. Therefore, democracy is popular but rare (Rowley and Smith, 2009). What is note worthy about this particular paper is that the authors present a number of factors that lead to such a deficit. For example, regime dynamics, levels of economic growth, GDP per capital, women's rights, levels of educational attainment, religious tolerance, level of freedoms, differences between Arab core countries and Muslim countries and that, Muslim-majority electoral democracies are located on the geographical edges of the Islamic world (Rowley and Smith, 2009).

Running central to the above is whether Islamic law (shari'a) is a visible feature of the constitutional design of many Arab and Islamic countries. Thus, is shari'a 'a primary source' or 'the primary source' of legislation (Sultany, 2013)? Equally, Cook and Stathis (2012), pose the questions, "whose Islam and what Islam, and whose democracy and what democracy?" Exploring these in more detail. The success of the 2011 Egyptian revolution has changed the political landscape of the country for some time to come. Egypt has moved from a country governed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to one of an authentically democratic political system (Selim, 2015; Vidino, 2011). Therefore, Egypt is considered a republic, with a democratic political system wherein the roots of its constitution can be found in English common law and the Napoleonic code. Interestingly, as Vidino points out, Egypt looks towards Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) – with its highly centralised, parliamentary representative democratic form of government – as the model from which to learn (Noureddine, 2012; Kardas, 2008). Why is this important to understand? When the lens of political marketing is viewed across the Islamic world various political systems emerge, because no one system fits all. For instance, and to name but a few, Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia (although an absolute monarchy), Sudan and Yemen have political, social, legal institutions based upon Islamic shari'a laws and principles so governing every aspect of daily life (Abidi, 1979). Whereas, the political system within the United Arab Emirates is a framework of federal, presidential and absolute monarchy, and a judicial system derived from civil law and shari'a law. Tunisia has a representative democracy and a judicial system based on French civil law and Islamic law. It is clear that no one system is seen as better or worse than another, rather what is common across these and many other Muslim countries, is the balance between Islamic religious conservatism and a liberal democracy (with rights and freedoms for all), if not a move toward a nationalist form of government – as with the case of Indonesia (Parker, 2018; Al-Rikabi, 2012). As Charfi (2005) argues, connections between Islam and democracy, between Islam and terrorism and more generally, violence has been very much a topic of increasing debate. For instance, Pupcenoks (2012) notes that scholars, politicians, Muslims and non-Muslims agree on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, namely *Islamic democracy*. This interpretation is considered problematic, as no one knows really what it ought to look like. Nor are they able to provide satisfactory answers as to its implementation (Takeyh, 2011). Instead, there has been a rise in *democratic political Islam*, whereby the author goes on to compare and contrast the democratic Islamisation in Pakistan and Turkey, the former being *conflicted repressive Islamisation*, the latter *subtle Islamisation* (heralded as an inspiration for future reformers in the Muslim world) (Pupcenoks, 2012; Akan, 2011).

2.3 *The dichotomy faced by the Egyptian female*

In her article titled 'The role of women in the Egyptian 25th January revolution', Al-Natour (2012) notes that the contribution of Egyptian women during the revolution of 2011 was very much downplayed in the literature. Here Al-Natour points to pieces of literature which appear to:

1 marginalise and underrepresent the contribution of Egyptian women – before/during/after the revolution

2 ignore the political implications of women's reactions

3 constrains females within the male monolithic experience.

She then argues counter to this by stating that:

> "Digital media, unlike fiction, was inclusive in its representation of women's roles in the revolution; it allowed for the emergence of new, uncommon sensibilities, shapes, and actualities that brought to life not only new patterns and types of order but also new realities." (Al-Natour, 2012)

As an example, Naib (2011) in her written news article for Aljazeera, titled 'Women of the revolution' reports on a number of young women who had become political activists. As such, they used social media to inform and document their "pro-revolutionary stories and contributions' very effectively. Their online posts, pictures, videos and tweets became instant social media hits, so going viral and becoming a rallying cry to inspire others to join the protests at Tahrir Square (Sohail and Chebib, 2011).

What the discussion has highlighted thus far is the dichotomy faced by Egyptian women. The Arab spring, and more so, the revolutions of January and June revived women's aspirations. Women became active actors that helped shape the future of Egypt, they felt at last they had a voice and their contributions recognised (Khodair and Hassib, 2015). To illustrate the point with a direct quote from Naib (2011), so as to get a real sense of how women felt about their participation within the revolution:

> "Egyptian women, just like men, took up the call to 'hope'. Here they describe the spirit of Tahrir – the camaraderie and equality they experienced – and their hope that the model of democracy established there will be carried forward as Egyptians shape a new political and social landscape." (Naib, 2011)

Ironically beyond this, such aspirations remained an idealist view with the reality proven to be much more complex, because women faced social and cultural obstacles; and still do even to this day (Botman, 1999; Odine, 2013; Bastawy, 2014, 2015; Frantzman, 2017). For Egyptians, as events started to unfold, it was not a conflict between the secularism of the west and Islam, but between what kind of Islam would be dominant in the country (Frantzman, 2017). In essence, political restrictions weaken the democratic participation and led to the marginalisation of women both inside and outside of the political arena (Ziada, 2012; Bastawy, 2015). For instance, FJP established itself under the belief of a modern democratic state, thus women's rights and national unity were their key pledges. Interestingly, their attitude towards women's rights remained quite controversial. According to Al-Ahram.org.eg. (2011), FJP did not permit females to contribute to internal voting, and although eligible, the FJP frown upon women running for presidency. Equally, as Shehata (2011) reported, despite FJP calling for gender equality, the party stated also that women must strike a balance between their family

duties and public life, so implying adherence to constraints on a woman's role in society in general and politics in particular. As Al-Bizri (2011) and Ziada (2012) note, the MB too have always been hostile toward the issue of females. Despite this, since the revolution of 2011 and 2012, the MB like the FJP had attempted to change its image to a more 'moderate' outlook. But due to cultural conservatism neither the incumbent government nor the Islamists welcome the presence of women in the political arena. Many argued that the Islamists were using the MB to push forward some form of political ideology hostile to women, so espousing a call for women to return to the home (Abu-Zayd, 2002; Ziada, 2012).

Sadly, as Ziada (2012) laments, despite the impressive role of women in the revolution, most Egyptians still believe that women are made for the kitchen and not the office. As Kropp (2015), notes, despite changes in religious views and the introduction of 'Arab feminism' leading to Egyptian women gaining an education, voting rights, and a higher social status, there still remains a long way to go before women gain the equality they deserve (Talhami, 1996). Even with the National Council for Women (NCW), as Khodair and Hassib (2015) stress, which was established in 2000 to advance gender equality, and to help empower women socially, economically and politically; adopted a neutral stance during the revolution and did not field any female political candidates. This failure by the NCW to 'seize the moment' during the revolution was due to three limiting factors: shortcomings within the NCW framework; shortcomings within Egyptian legal/constitutional framework; and shortcomings within the Egyptian societal and cultural heritage (Khodair and Hassib, 2015). In essence, despite the progressive tendencies of an entire class of women demanding a redress of discriminatory practices – both political and social, actively asserting their interests and shaping national institutions – religious law still favour men (Takeyh, 2001).

3   Methodology

As stated earlier, the aims of this paper is twofold:

1   to explore the repositioning and branding of the MB [and FJP] as viewed by Egypt's female voters during the 2011 presidential elections only

2   whether such re-branding and repositioning resonated with the female voter.

With this in mind, the paper notes that pre-2011 elections viewed the MB as a political organisation banned by the Egyptian state. Yet, for a political party with such a controversial image that stretched far beyond Egypt's borders, how did the MB (and FJP) win the majority of parliamentary seats, upper house 'Shurra Council', and the presidential election? Moreover, how did the MB (and FJP) manage to win such mass popular support amongst the people of Egypt? Specifically, given that Egyptian women were more than ever engaged with the political process, what were their (females of voting age) perspectives towards the MB (and FJP) as a brand? These are the fundamental questions this paper sets out to address. In order to do this, the paper used an exploratory research design with an aim of understanding the attitudes and beliefs of Egyptian females (of voting age) towards the repositioning and branding of the MB (and FJP) during the 2010/2011 parliamentary and presidential elections. Further, the design:

1   assisted with interpretation of data building

2   helped uncover issues held by participants

3   penetrated topics such as the views of the MB (and FJP) appertaining to religion, politics, women's rights – again topics that required a degree of sensitivity (Malhotra and Birks, 2003).

4   Research instruments

By way of data collection and working within a qualitative paradigm, the paper used multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994), namely face-to-face semi-structured interviews, focus groups and, projective techniques (Malhotra et al., 2010; Aaker et al., 2008; Baines and Chansarkar, 2002) – the advantages and disadvantage of these sources of evidence is well documented and will not be rehearsed here. Suffice-to-say, the rationale for this combination of techniques is found in the fact that the paper wished to explore the MB (and FJP) as a brand from a female perspective, as well as, to understand whether the party was able to change/develop its image within the political market-space, so appeal to the female electorate. In addition, the design was concerned with extracting detail appertaining to individual interpretations and richness of individual insight relevant to the MB (and FJB) brand (Hakim, 2000; Yin, 1994). Looking at each technique in brief:

4.1   Face-to-face semi-structured interviews

Twenty two in-depth face-to-face interviews (Patton, 1990; O'Donnell and Cummins, 1999; Malhotra, 2012) were conducted with professional Egyptian women [key informants (see Table 1)], across a range of industry sectors within the city of Cairo, Egypt. Respondents were drawn from occupations such as, academia, communications, TV broadcasting (TV anchor-women), financial services, women's rights organisations, journalism, and tourism. Of these 22 respondents, four were either MB party members or associated with the organisation via other means and, 18 were non-MB members. The majority were of the Muslim faith, whereas, a minority were Christian.

Respondents were selected because they were well informed about the issue pertaining to Egypt's political landscape, and expressive about the information given (Patton, 1990). With regard to negotiating access, contact was established with individual female respondents via the telephone to ascertain their willingness to participate in the face-to-face study. If individuals were agreeable, the necessary interview appointment was scheduled and conducted. This was made possible because the study had an Egyptian female researcher in situ. Given the political situation escalating throughout Egypt at the time, these 'cold calling' and 'referral follow-ups' were deemed the most appropriate. The rationale being it acted as an initial two-way screening process between researcher and respondent. Due to the sensitivity and nature of the topic, as expected some prospective interviewees refused access, whereas others agreed quite happily. The interview schedule, with associated questions (see Appendix 1), concentrated on five key areas:

1   the brand associated background and history

2   the attitude towards the current MB

3   attitude towards MB as a brand

4   the role of female's within our society

5   the future – female expectations.

Table 1   Interviewees by profession

MB party member
MB party member
MB party member
MB party member
FJP Christian member
Liberal party member
TV anchor
TV anchor
TV anchor
TV anchor
PhD mass comms
PhD mass comms
PhD mass comms
PhD mass comms
PhD women's rights
PhD marketing
Journalist
Egyptian women's right activist
Marketing executive
Admin manager
Tour guide
Bank employee

4.2   Focus groups

Threlfall (1999) and Morgan (1996) suggest focus groups are a valuable tool in qualitative consumer research when conducted from a truly qualitative perspective. Moreover, they work for topics concerned with:

1   convictions and beliefs of others

2   group interactions that may knock into the motivation and unconscious areas of the human essence

3   in the main, a triangulation approach to qualitative research (Threlfall, 1999).

To this end, four all female focus groups were conducted with each containing six respondents (Morgan, 1996; Threlfall, 1999; Hakim, 2000; Malhotra and Birks, 2003). Respondents were drawn from: socio-economic groups A and B, MB party and non-party members, a number of housewives, whereas others were employed within the professions, as noted in earlier in Table 1.

The age range was important given the history of the Egyptian 'female vote' throughout 1980s to-date [Article 61 of the 1956 Egyptian Constitution, and Article 1 of Law 73 of 1956]. Therefore, based on particular demographics, such as, education, socio-economic grouping, gender, religion, nationality and age, respondents were targeted and placed into one of the four focus groups: 20–29 years old, 30–39 years old, 40–49 years old, and 50–59 years old. The rationale for the separation of these four distinct age groups was based on 'opportunities to vote'. By this it is meant, as noted, 1956 saw Egypt pass a law that allowed women to vote [Article 61 of the 1956 Egyptian Constitution, and Article 1 of Law 73 of 1956] (Buchanan, 2015). However, it was not until July of 1957 when the first female vote was cast in the national elections, amid scenes of violence and rioting (Buchanan, 2015; Kropp, 2015). Since 1956 up to the present day Egyptian women have made strides politically, however, the country still remains deeply religious and rooted in conservative traditions (Frantzman, 2017). Therefore, as Threlfall (1999) notes, given the MB is a controversial topic in Egypt, the paper wished to explore the differing opinions of the various cohort of female respondents, and ascertain whether they were able to influence and change opinions of one another. In essence, as an unexplored topic, value from focus groups, allowed the researcher to reach valuable evidence on language or behaviour and capture real-life communication among the various focus group members (Threlfall, 1999). Finally, as indicated earlier, the focus groups were restricted to females' in order to ascertain their perspectives on the MB brand in Egypt. A combination of snowballing, judgmental and referrals were used to access suitable respondents.

4.3 *Projective research*

Finally, projective research techniques were considered an appropriate method to use (Aaker et al., 2008; Catterall and Ibbotson, 2000; Hofstede et al., 2007; Malhotra et al., 2010). As Boddy (2005) points out, projective techniques help uncover findings in areas where respondents are reluctant or unable to expose their thoughts and feelings via more straightforward questioning techniques. For the purpose of this study, application of such projective techniques had taken place during both the semi-structure interview stage and focus group phase. In essence, respondents were shown the logo of both MB and FJP parties to ascertain their understanding, and then respondents were asked to illustrate their views, with the use of a drawing, of Egypt before and after MB winning the elections. Finally, respondents were asked to personify the MB via sentence completion. In essence, the study wanted to ensure that any understanding generated from the projective techniques reflected the imagery, beliefs and associations of the participants and not the researcher, as this would have created a false reality (Pich and Dean, 2015).

5   The peripherals

All research instruments were tested throughout the pilot study phase – reflecting the main study above. The pilot study not only allowed for some adjustment; but gave pre-warning also about aspects within the study that could prove problematic or inappropriate (Teijlingen and Hudley, 2001). By way of data analysis, content analysis was used for all three-research instruments (Silverman, 2011). Equally, the study was able to triangulate data via all three, so increasing the validity of the findings/study. However, the likelihood of reliability and generalisability were compromised due to the very changing nature of Egypt's volatile political situation and, attitudes from city to city and from urban to rural (Threlfall, 1999; Malhotra et al., 2010). Given the environment and sensitivity of the study, judgmental and snowballing techniques were considered appropriate forms of sampling. With regards to ethical issues, before participating within the study all respondents were made aware of the nature, topics and purpose. Also, all respondents consented to have their names published. However, names will not appear within this paper (only as noted in Table 1).

Responding to cultural and religious sensitivity, all fieldwork was conducted by a trained female Egyptian researcher, in Cairo, Egypt and, within the natural and familiar setting of the respondents. The interviews focus groups and projective techniques were conducted in Arabic; thus, the issue of forward and back translation was addressed (Twinn, 2007). Essentially, two steps to translation were conducted. First, interviews/focus group's questions were written in and translated from English to Arabic. These were then dispatched to an experienced English/Arabic translator to approve the translation reliability. Second, on completion of the fieldwork, instruments were translated from Arabic back into English during the process of transcribing data (Al-Rajhi et al., 2013). The integrity of the respondents spoken word was maintained throughout. Finally, all semi-structured interviewers were voice recorded via an electronic devise, as well as, copious notes taken. Equally, all focus groups were video recorded so as to capture meaning, intonation, and the ebb and flow of discussion (Hartman, 2012).

6   Findings

There are five main areas that the study explored from a female perspective:

1   the brand associated background and history

2   the attitude towards the current MB

3   attitude towards the MB as a brand

4   the role of female's within society

5   female – future expectations (*see Appendix 1 – interview schedule*).

Where necessary data extrapolated via the various research tools will be used in conjunction with each other to help support discussion under the five areas noted above. Looking at each:

6.1 Brand associated background and history

This section focused upon three key questions that explored the respondents' knowledge pertaining to an understanding of the MB, the party's history and, perceived difference between the MB and FJP. During the face-face interview phase it transpired that despite public denials by the MB of being involved with past assassinations – six respondents supported this denial. All MB members agreed Hassan Al-Banna was the driving force behind the development of the MB, whereby his aim was to spread the moderate morals and principles of Islam. Ostensibly, these respondents believed that Islam is not only a practicing religion through praying and Qur'an but should be practiced throughout one's daily life. As respondent B noted:

> "It's a group [MB] that have morals principles and ideologies and had an objective; this objective is to return old Islam."

Respondent I suggested:

> "It [MB] started by an idea for a person, it's a moderate religion; people should be convinced by Islam, not forced."

Respondent A noted:

> "They are a party who uses the religion or operate under religion in order to reach certain political positions and authority."

Finally, respondent D stated:

> "They are group of people aims to spread Islam, the post regime since Gamal Abd El-Nasser used to repress and mistreat them, they were working underground."

When the six MB respondents discussed the history of MB, they highlighted all the positive aspects of the party. Respondents were proud of the MB as an organisation, and believed it was aiming for good. Conversely, these same respondents denied the assassinations and bombings associated with the MB. They went on to point out, the assassinations were arranged by other Islamic or Jihadist organisations, which as respondents felt, were completely separate from the MB. Pointing to one particular incident, respondents mentioned the assassination of Mahmoud Al-Nokrashi, stating it was the act of an individual without the agreement of the brotherhood.

As respondent G purported:

> "Its well-known history, I am so proud if being a member it's a very long history, everything said about 45 assassinations. Think about it, and tell me what will be our benefit, we were never violent and never wanted anything except God, and Islam doesn't call for violence."

This was supported by respondent B whom noted:

> "There was one [taking about the assassination] who used violence and then MB published that we cannot be generalized through this person and this person is not one of us, we are advocacy group we never used violence."

In contrast to the above, fifteen interviewees and almost all focus group respondents believed that the MB were involved and have links with extremist organisations (see Appendix 2: overview of all focus group responses). Consequently, a number of respondents confirmed there still remain a strong negative association with its history.

Interestingly, eleven respondents perceived the MB as an organisation that uses religion to achieve its political goals by any means. With regards to any noticeable difference between MB and FJP, a vast majority of respondents noted no difference between the two, stating FJP is the political arm of the MB. As respondent C comments:

> "There is no difference; the party is the political branch of the MB."

The very small variance that was noticeable centred on the ethos of both brands – political versus religious – more than anything else. For instance, as stated by respondent G:

> "The party [FJP] has the political role, when I participate in the party, I'm doing political activities, but in the MB, I am taught morals and principles, but actually they are not far from each other."

Equally, respondent F noted:

> "What I know about the MB that they do not hold swords against Egyptians, only against colonialists, and I read that Hassan Al-Banna was against violence."

6.2 Attitude towards the current MB

Within this section the paper wished to explore the attitude towards MB as it stands currently. Here questions focused upon seven areas (see Appendix 1) with a common theme of voting decisions. For instance, choice of party, influences on decision and choice, the resurgence in popularity of the MB brand, perceive contribution of the MB to the 'revolution and visa-versa'. The results of such questions produced findings that were noteworthy. For instance, despite what has been discussed in the section above, all interviewees did vote for the FJP or MB, but no such voting preferences were reflected within the focus groups. As respondent C pointed out:

> "I was elected I won in the parliament, of course I voted for FJP also I voted for Morsi in the 1st and 2nd round."

What became evident throughout the interviews was that respondents justified their vote for Dr. Morsi not only because 'he is a very good person', but also because of the party's collective decision-making. This approach made Dr. Morsi a creditable and electable candidate for the party. As respondent C went on to pointed out:

> "I was a campaigner for Morsi; I was convinced by the guy because I know him through FJP, I know that he is so organized and he is so loyal; also, he did not want to be a president it was offered for him, so I think this is God's choice."

Equally, respondent I offer justification by stating:

> "I'm a part of the party I have to vote for this party or else no reason to be a part, and till now I'm a part of both FJP and MB."

Other reasons put forward for voting FJP or MB were; convinced by the arguments offered by both organisations, the need for change, distrust of current government and army rule and, no real alternative. Many interviewees were still happy with their decisions and did not regret their choice. Many felt that the 'new government' was moving in the right direction, even if this move was not yet complete. Overall interviewees thought the early signs were very positive. As respondent B purports:

> "Who ever voted for anyone except the MB regretted it."

Not all were convinced by the growing success of the MB, citing religion and politics should not mix. Only a minority regretted their choice of vote. In general, a majority of focus group respondents (see Appendix 1) demonstrated a negative attitude towards the current MB. This became evident when discussing MB's contribution to the revolution. Half of all focus group respondents were convinced that the MB used religion and bribes as their main marketing strategy; as such many respondents voiced that the 'MB 'robbed' the revolution'. This notion was supported by the 40s focus group. Yet those pro MB and FJP focus group and interview respondents mentioned that food distribution acted as a charity tool and not as a basis of bribery. Again, this was supported by the 30s focus group. Equally, some of these respondents felt that the revolution helped re-establish the MB as they benefited the most from the collapsed regime.

However, not all agreed with the fact the MB had used the revolution help to re-establish itself or FJP as electable parties. On the contrary, many from both interviews and focus groups respondents agreed on one point, MB did not have to depart from their core message to re-establish themselves, rather is was the then sitting government under Mubarak that was seen for a long time as very repressive. On top of this, the MB had put the Egyptian citizen at the forefront of everything they did, and services offered. As respondent C pointed out:

> "We are always there, and all people know us, or if they do not know us they know our organizations, health education, but the thing is that we now have freedom, so all people realized and matched the connection between the MB and its services."

Respondent G supports this notion:

> "The MB did not leave to re-establish, they had faith in what they want, even when MB were jailed; they did not stop working and helping people."

In essence, without exception, all agreed that the revolution was the main reason in the collapse of Mubarak's regime, which many felt was repressing the MB. Again, as respondent B reports:

> "We started to breathe after long repression, the revolution helped in collapsing Mubarak's regime."

Finally, with regards to contributions made during the revolution, respondents mentioned that MB/FJP participated from the very first day of electioneering. Interviewees denied all allegations that had been published about the MB/FJP initial lack of participation. Instead respondents were confident in saying that the MB/FJP had an extraordinary role during the revolution, which, as respondents went on to point out "was witnessed by the revolutionist." As respondent B notes:

> "We participated in the revolution from the first day, and it's not true what people said that we weren't there; God knows that we were there. We are not saying that we are ones who have done the revolution, but we did participate from first day."

6.3   MB as a brand

The section addressed a number of issues pertaining to the MB brand per se'. Here questions teased out the perception of the brand and its image – before, during, post revolution and, whether the brand image appeared to have changed in any way; if the brand was able to communicate with voters and; perceived pros and cons of the brand (see Appendix 2). When respondents were asked about their perception of both MB and FJP brand logos, noticeably of the 22 (n = 100%) face-to-face interviewees, n = 4 pro MB and FJP respondents suggest both brands were superior. Two respondents described the brand as 'original, with no copies in the market'. Whereas, n = 7 respondents mentioned that the brand was organised well and able to establish a strong position within the market. Moreover, a minority of respondents (n = 6) expressed their love for both logos, and perceived the MB to be 'a force for good'; and that its history had been distorted and blamed for the violent acts of individuals, as well as, Islamic and Jihadist groups not associated with the MB. As respondent C pointed out, "a lot of people want to be in either FJP or MB; we have a good image we are loved by all citizens."

Figure 1   Brand image of the MB (see online version for colours)

Source: Aswatmasriya.com

In contrast to the above, n = 11 respondents indicated that the MB was a poor brand with negative connotations, so likening it to 'spam' or a 'cheap Chinese product'. Essentially, a cause for concern raised by a number of respondents was the interpretation of both MB and FJP brand images and their associated slogans (see Figures 1 and 2 respectively). For instance, with regards to the MB brand, respondents interpreted the two swords as violent, even to the degree of killing anybody who stood against them [MB]. Interestingly, all four focus groups commented on how violent the MB brand logo appeared to look. For some the two swords were frightening. Whereas, the interviewees (n = 14) expressed their fear and annoyance that the swords were linked to the Qur'an is such a manner. This overall perception added to the notion that the MB's history was one of bloodshed. By this it was meant, the two swords represented Jihad, and that they [MB] were ready for war against the enemies of both the country and Islam – notably the Holy Qu'ran, signifying the constitution, is centre but yet above the swords. Only one person from the 24 focus group respondents thought the MB brand was for 'saving Islam'. Whereas, n = 4 interviewees suggested that people interpret the MB logo in the wrong way. They stated the swords mean they are saving the country [Egypt] against their enemies, not against their own citizens, and the placement of the

Holy Qu'ran is so that all decisions made by the MB are in respect to it. In terms of the FJP brand, respondents pointed out that the MB were more likely repositioning a new image (FJP) of an old logo (MB) in an attempt to hide or downplay the party's negative history. All respondents went on to add that the image of FJP although 'Islamic' in nature; 'representative of Egyptian society as a whole' and, reflective of the colours of the 'Egyptian national flag, green of good, scales for justice, blue sky with an Islamic star', it was considered overall 'incomprehensible', and was 'perceived to be cheating people'.

Figure 2 Brand image of the FJP (see online version for colours)

Source: Aswatmasriya.com

In essence, a vast majority of respondents both focus group and interviewees ($n = 13$) felt very negative towards both brands. Thus, respondents rejected the MB brand because it was perceived as too violent and, rejected FJP logo for being too deceptive. As respondent S pointed out, "FJP is too basic, its colors are targeting illiterate people with meanings such as scales for justice, green for development, sky blue for the future, it looks like a cartoon."

When both brand images were explored further during the face-to-face interview and, focus group phases, the study found that attitudes shifted across the period of Egypt's pre, during and post revolution stages. For instance, $n = 18$ interviewees felt there was a noticeable shift in the perceived image of the MB as it moved from stage to stage (see Table 2). Thus, as noted by these respondents there was a significant swing from the image being 'unclear' pre-revolution stage, to an image that was perceived by 55.5% ($n = 10$) to be 'well established' during the revolution stage. Finally, after the revolution, 22% ($n = 4$) and 50% ($n = 9$) thought the image to be 'blurred' or 'poor' respectively.

Table 2 Brand image

Brand image	Before the revolution	During the revolution	After the revolution
Repressed/unclear	100% ($n = 18$)	-	-
Well established	-	55.5% ($n = 10$)	27.7% ($n = 5$)
Blurred	-	38.8% ($n = 7$)	22 ($n = 4$)
Poor	-	5.5% ($n = 1$)	50% ($n = 9$)

Source: $n = 18$ face-to-face interview respondents

It was important to understand that whether the brand changed in the consumers mind, 16.66% ($n = 3$) agreed that the MB as a brand changed for the worse. Nevertheless, 61.11% ($n = 11$) supported that it did not change. 50% ($n = 9$) stated that they only changed the packaging, but the brand will never change, and 27.77 ($n = 5$) confirmed that the brand changed for the better. As respondent S noted: "no, I do not think that it changed; they do not change, the change occurred in the packaging only." Interestingly, this notion was support by smaller number of pro-MB respondents in that when questioned as to the point when the image of the MB changed? These respondents expressed the same view in that the brand did not or will not change. Therefore, respondent G suggested: "the MB will constantly remain the same but will always develop." As respondent B pointed out: "the MB never changes but they develop by time." Likewise, respondent C notes: "no it developed; the brand is original it never changes."

In terms of the focus groups, the 20s and 30s groups considered the MB brand image to be repressed at the pre-revolution stage. However, during the revolution this perception changed, and they viewed the image of the MB as 'heroes'. This contrasted with the 40s group wherein they suggested the pre-revolution brand image portrayed the MB as 'kind people', but not so for the 50s group who viewed the image with caution. Interesting, during the revolution stage both 40s and 50 thought the image became unclear. After the revolution, all four groups reached a similar conclusion in that the 20s group suggested the image of the MB had shifted to a position of 'power seekers', the 30s group appeared to propose that now the MB were in power, "we [Egypt] discovered the truth." This particular comment was in response to the resignation of President Morsi from the FJP. Finally, the 50s group stated that the brand image had become to signify the MB as 'hypocrites'. A common answer given by half of all respondents in each focus group showed that they interpreted Egypt as being in its 'poorest dress' since the MB were elected into power. As these respondents lamented, before the revolution Egypt was 'owned by Mubarak and his regime', however, after the revolution Egypt is 'under the rule of MB'.

Figure 3   20s group, pre-revolution – surprised/post-revolution – sadness (see online version for colours)

Source: 20s focus group

**Figure 4**   30s group, pre-revolution – anger/post-revolution – crying (see online version for colours)


Source: 30s focus group

Figure 5   40s group, pre-revolution – sunlight/post revolution – no light (see online version for colours)

Source: 40s focus group

Figure 6   50s group, Egypt is sloping up and down (see online version for colours)

Source: 50s focus group

Table 3   Projective techniques – drawings

Group	Before revolution	After revolution
	Age: 20s	
P1	Ruled by devil	Freedom
P2	Different objectives	Egypt is our objective
P3	Confused	Eye rolling
P4	Corruption	Justice
P5	Surprised	Sad
P6	Sad	Surprised
	Age: 30s	
P1	Closed door	Opened the door and discovered a new door
P2	Sad	Sad and crying
P3	Sad	Crying
P4	Crying	Confused
P5	Lightless	Lightless, cloudy and raining
P6	------	-------
	Age: 40s	
P1	Peacefulness	Crying
P2	Surprised	Question mark
P3	Sun	Nothing
P4	Dreadful future	Under test
P5	Nothing	Question mark
P6	Sad	Question mark
	Age: 50s	
P1	Slop: ups and downs	-------
P2	Surprised	Crying
P3	Bad	Worst
P4	Crying	Question mark and crying
P5	Depression	Unknown future
P6	No hope	Hope with depression

Source: *n* = 23 focus group respondents

When respondents were asked to depict how they felt towards the situation Egypt faced pre and post revolution (via projective drawing techniques), all four focus groups offered pictures of crying, sadness and the like. Table 3 provides an overview of such drawing, with Figures 3–6 illustrating their initial thoughts. Thus, the 20s group noted 'surprise' pre-revolution and sadness post-revolution; 30s group depicted pre-revolutionary – *anger and pulling-hair* and, post revolution – *anger, crying and pulling-hair*. The 40s group felt that sun had set once the MB had taken control, so plunging Egypt into darkness. Finally, the 50s group suggested given the turmoil Egypt had gone through and now the MB were in power, the country was moving toward an uncertain future. For this particular age

group, feelings of 'sadness and despair' resonated (see Figure 6 and Table 3 respectively).

In taking the notion of 'brand personification' a step further, through the use of projective techniques – sentence completion, respondents were asked "if the MB were a person, he would be…,". The study found terms such as 'loveable', 'robber', 'liar', 'smart', 'religious', 'anonymous' were used (see Table 4).

Table 4   Projective techniques – sentence completion

Personality type	MB/FJP members (n = 4)	Non-party members (n = 18)
Lovable	2	1
Organised	-	4
Smart	-	2
Moderate	1	-
Religious	1	-
Anonymous	-	3
Lack experience	-	2
Robber	-	1
Power seeker	-	3
Liar	-	2

Source: n = 22 face-to-face interview respondents

When respondents discussed the role of MB during the revolution issues of 'brides' and/or the use of 'religion to further party's own cause' and so forth were raised. A majority of pro MB/FJP interviewees were not happy about how these terms were interpreted and associated with the brand. Consequently, these respondents argued that the MB/FJP 'maintained a very good image' and suggested that such image had been tarnished via media attacks. To support their comments, pro-MB respondents highlighted strategies used long before the elections had taken place, but none-the-less, strategies that firstly aided the popularity of the party during the electoral campaign; secondly, attempted to "correct the negative image [of the MB] in the mind of the voter." For instance, the MB promoted themselves as a party that connected with the average person in the street. Here, respondents point to a long-established service, such as 'Lagnet Al-Ber' which targeted the poorer members of society. In addition, the MB set-up and ran a number of health units, various food and medicine campaigns, literacy programs, street children and widows' services, and other free social welfare programmes. All of which were promoted via TV advertisements, public relations and awareness seminars, activation booths, and one-to-one conversations.

When respondents (interviewees and focus group members) were asked to comment on the pros and cons on the MB brand, a number of respondents and pro-MB party members suggested the brand espoused a number of positive attributes (see Table 5). For instance, respondents mentioned that the party had over time "created a lovable atmosphere, a feeling that they [party members] were not alone in the world." Added to these sentiments also was the feeling, "that they [party members] are always there to help each other." Respondents went further to suggest that the main source of the party's advantage was its 'unity and organisation', coupled with its 'Islamic morals and

principles'. All of which, as respondents agreed wholeheartedly, would 'bring Egypt to the best place.'

Again, the human element was highlight as an advantage of the MB. Here for example respondent C commented that:

> "They [MB party members] are human like any other humans but advantages they have a lot. They are a group that loves each other, and they are very well organized, they have an objective to please God with no other thing."

Whereas, respondent B lamented:

> "We did not have an image, repressed image, during the revolution: we had a strong image, and great image of intelligence, it was the best image, now it is declining but we have a faith that the truth will soon appear."

These particular respondents summed up saying that they are sure that the image will change to the better when people observe the change in Egypt.

Not all were so complimentary about the MB. Here a number of respondents and pro-MB respondents highlighted some noticeable 'cons' associated with the brand (see Table 6). For example, one pro-MB respondents conceded that:

> "The party had made mistakes, as humans do, and sometimes individual wrong decisions are attached to the group which creates negative image to the entire group."

Interesting, it was the speed of the party's success that became its main weakness. As two pro-MB respondents noted:

> "Their [MB] sudden penetration in the market caused a shock for the group. They were used to working on small scales and under repression, so they are not well experienced for such a situation."

Whereas, respondent G pointed out:

> "We [MB] had a very bad image for 60 years, so from our disadvantages we could not change this image quickly in the mind of consumer. Also, that we did not thought about our unexpected spread in short period, so we are still acting in the same way as we are repressed, no one planned for this."

In essence, despite the rhetoric for and against the MB brand, a very many respondents praised the motivation and fortitude of the Egyptian electorate with the suggestion that:

> "Voters are smart; they knew who offered services long ago and will still offer, and who is just offering before the elections to win votes."

6.4   The role of women

The penultimate part of the questionnaire explored the perceived role of women within Egyptian society pre and post-election. In essence, respondents were asked to comment as to what might that role be under a MB government; and their reactions to rumours that the MB were planning to curtail the freedom of women? Here, a number of interesting observations were made. Thus, in terms of pre-election messages sent out by the MB/FJP, only 17% ($n = 3$) interview respondents thought that such messages made the role of women appear weaker. As respondent F pointed out, "she [Egyptian women] has a low share in the society." This was in stark contrast to the remaining 83% ($n = 15$) interview respondents whom perceived that the messages made the role of women appear much

stronger. Added was the suggestion their role exceeded that of men. Essentially, for many women there was a sense that they had been empowered and believed they had a part to play in shaping Egypt's future. As respondent Q noted:

> "She's [Egyptian women] everything, she's having important and sensitive role in the society, she's the mother and wife, and we are taking our rights."

The appointment of Pakinam El-Sharkawy by President Morsi, as one of his four main advisors was met with mixed reactions. For instance, 38.8% (*n* = 7) thought the appointment sent a clear message to women in that the President intended to fulfil his electoral promises. Yet, although 22.22% (*n* = 4%) acknowledge Pakiname as an educated woman, they believed the appointment had no real role [as an advisor] and was merely a marketing ploy. However, the post-election reality was much different. 55% (*n* = 10) respondents indicated that the role of women moving forward under MB rule would decline, so limiting female access within society, to employment and to key governmental positions as a whole. Conversely, 39% (*n* = 7) respondents stated that the role of women would remain constant if not increase. Finally, one respondent declined to predict the role of females under MB rule. Interesting views were mixed within the focus groups. All groups agreed the importance of a woman's role. However, post-election, the 20s group stated a decline/being curtailed over time; 30s group indicated nothing would happen, but likely to increase over time; the 40s group were adamant that there would be a decline; finally the 50s group indicated only the importance of the role of women under MB rule (see Appendix 1).

Table 5 Positive attributes of the MB brand

Pros	*Number of respondents (n = 18)*
Organised	15
Fast	3
Well established	10
Smart	17
Islam is their religion	3

Source: *n* = 18

Table 6 Negative attributes of the MB brand

Cons	*Number of respondents (n = 18)*
Power seeking	16
Religion users	16
Lack of experience	10
Reject criticism	2
Lacking responsibility	4

Source: *n* = 18

6.5 *Future expectations*

With regards to future expectations, namely, what are you looking for in the MB, and if there were new elections would you vote for them [MB]? Respondents offered a range of

comments, such as stability for Egypt, treating Christians well, the separation of politics and religion and so on (see Table 7). Essentially, comments noted by focus group centred upon the notion that respondents wanted the MB to make Egypt a better place, to love Egypt, to move the country to its peak, to ensure social welfare reform, guarantee the rights of its citizens and, to implement Islamic Shari.

Table 7   Future expectations

What are you looking for in the MB	Number of respondents
Egypt's stability	2
Treated by Islamic Sharia	3
Separation between politics and religion	4
Transparency/truth	5
Prove for their failure	1
Leave egypt	3
Treat Christians well	4
Nothing	2

Source: $n = 24$ focus group respondents

As two interviewees suggested, respondent G: "to love Egypt more and to do what is good for God." Whereas, respondent B noted: "for me the MB are the big hug MB, they are my mirror, I want us to continue our path to God." Interestingly only the 20s group wanted the MB to leave the country. Finally, in terms of voting intentions, the majority of interviewees stated that they would not vote/support the MB 61.11% ($n = 11$) again. However, 16.66% ($n = 3$) mentioned that they would definitely vote for the MB. The rest 22.22% ($n = 4$) indicated that the decision would depend upon the MB performance. A similar pattern was evident amongst the focus groups with the 20 and 40s indicating a resounding never vote MB again (see Appendixes 1 and 2 respectively).

7   Conclusions

This paper set out to provide an insight to a female perspective of the MB as a brand. To do this, the paper worked within its two stated aims, namely:

1   to explore the repositioning and branding of the MB [and FJP] as viewed by Egypt's female voters during the 2011 presidential elections only

2   whether such re-branding and repositioning resonated with the female voter.

Interestingly, despite the MB chequered history, and its pre/during/after 2011 revolution involvement, the MB continue to view themselves as an advocacy party which has at its core, an aim to spread Islam wherever and whenever it can. With this notion very much in mind, and responding to the two research questions, the paper found that although a minority of respondents held positive views about the MB. The majority of female voters however felt the MB had established a negative image within Egypt. Consequently, respondents were not satisfied with the MB as a brand. As stated, and demonstrated within the paper, a vast majority of respondents confirm the association of a negative brand history and the use of religion by the MB to reach political goals. This is evident in

terms of the interpretation of the brand, its persona and image, alleged assassination attempts, its role during a crucial time within Egypt's history, and the expectations of females. For instance, in terms of the interpretation of both MB and FJP logo's, respondents note that for the former, the two swords represented violence; even to a degree whereby the MB would kill anybody who stood against them, thereby adding further to their perceived history of bloodshed. Whereas, the latter logo drew scepticism from respondents as being 'a wolf on sheep's clothing' thus the MB used the FJP as a 'front face' to obtain power 'through the back door'. In essence, the personalisation of the MB brand centred on terms such as: power-seeker, lack of experience, violent, religious, moderate, loveable, organised, smart, religion users; Thus, respondents indicated that the were MB smart to use religion in order to paved their way to power. On the other hand, the FJP were described as too deceptive.

Despite the negative perception, some 30s focus group respondents did go onto mentioned that food distribution by the MB during the revolution were acts of charity and certainly not brides. Other respondents went a step further by stating the image of the MB was one of kindness and a force for good. Moreover, its image had been tarnished as a result of continued media attacks and pre-revolution oppression, government crackdown on party members and the like. What is noteworthy, the paper found that a minority of respondents had very high expectations of the elections in that the MB were expected to win a majority of the seats within the new parliamentary elections, and so usher in a new age for the future of Egypt. Interestingly, the majority of respondents did not share this view. Here many interview and focus group respondents alike agreed that before the revolution the image was 'repressed and unclear'. During the revolution the MB were seen as 'heroes/good people', and were considered 'effective'. So much so, people began to notice within their day-to-day lives the practicalities of MB that was not there before. Therefore, the MB began to create for themselves a very good image within the minds of the people. Yet after the revolution as the MB became the dominant power base, and political and national events took a different turn, the 'image moved into decline', so becoming 'scratched'. All of this was very much the underpinning as to whether overall women would fair better and not be curtailed under MB rule. Pre-revolution, MB and FJP made all the right noises to re-assure the freedoms of women, but as events started to unravel the reality was much more different, and actions and opinions of the ruling elite pointed to quite the opposite. Certainly, this lifecycle approach to the brand does suggest it is apparent that a gap clearly exists between how the MB perceives their image to be, and how the respondents view that image. Consequently, only time will tell if the two will ever meet or grow further apart.

Finally, a premise from which to identifying gaps within the literature and the need for further studies stems from the notion that suggest given the MB are a source of controversy in Egypt, our understanding of them has been informed to a larger extent from news articles and features, and bias (for or against the MB) reporting, rather than academic literature per se' wherein their presence is noted by the lack of investigated. The few empirical research papers that are available tend to have political and/or religious underpinning. Even starker is the lack of understanding pertaining to Egypt's female electorate, which again has not only received very little attention, but fielded in such a way as to limit her involvement equal to that of her male counterpart, or simply being one element of a larger sample of Middle Eastern women. Again, what is available provides a partial understanding of her views. Therefore, to minimise such gaps,

two areas for further research have been identified. Firstly, due to changes within Egypt's political environment since 2011, certainty from a political marketing/brand versus female perspective, there is a need for detailed reflective empirical study. Such a study should be countrywide and ascertain the full extent to which the aspirations espoused by the female voter within this paper, have in fact materialised or regressed further. Secondly, under the same theme of political change, it would be of interest to ascertain the views of Egypt's minority group's pre and post MB era, and the impact thereof on respondent aspirations.

References

Aaker, D.A., Kumar, V. and Day, G.S. (2008) *Marketing Research*, John Wiley and Sons, West Sussex, England.

Abidi, H.A. (1979) 'The Iranian revolution: its origins and dimensions', *International Studies*, Vol. 129, No. 18, pp.129–161.

Abu-Zayd, G. (2002) *In Search of Political Power – Women in Parliament in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon* [online] http://www.vintob.com/elections/docs_6_g_6_6a_3.pdf (accessed 13 September 2018).

Ahmed, M.A., Lodhi, S.A. and Shahzad, M.N. (2011) 'Political brand: trusting a candidate in the age of mistrust', *Journal of Business and Retail Management Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.131–141.

Akan, T. (2011) 'Institutional convergence of Turkish Islam and European social democracy on the political economy of social question', *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp.70–96.

Al-Ahram.org.eg. (2011) *Freedom and Justice Party – Political Parties – Elections 2011 – Ahram* [online] http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/24939.aspx (accessed 13 September 2012).

Al-Bizri, D. (2011) *Women, Revolution, Politics and Power*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Middle East Office.

Al-Natour, M. (2012) 'The role of women in the Egyptian 25th January revolution', *Journal of International Women's Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp.59–76.

Al-Rajhi, I., Bartlett, D. and Altman, Y. (2013) 'Research note: the development of an Arabic cross-cultural adjustment scale', *Cross Cultural Management; An International Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.449–463.

Al-Rikabi, J. (2012) 'Baqir al-Sadr and the Islamic state: a theory for Islamic democracy', *Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.249–275.

Aly, A. (2006) *Understanding the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, Brandeis University [online] http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB23.pdf (accessed 8 June 2018).

Amineh, M.N. (2007) 'The Iranian revolution: the multiple contexts of the Iranian revolution', *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 6, Nos. 1–3, pp.129–157, Computer Source, EBSCOhost.

Anderson, M.R. (2010) 'Community psychology, political efficacy, and trust', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp.59–84.

Augoustinos, M., Hastie, B. and Wright, M. (2011) 'Apologizing for the historical injustice: Emotion, truth and identity in political discourse', *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp.507–531.

Bahri, T. (2012) 'Egypt's MB: losing popular trust?', *RSIS Commentaries* [online] http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/8440 (assessed 13 September 2012).

Baines, P. and Chansarkar, B. (2002) *Introducing Market Research*, John Wiley and Sons Ltd., West Sussex, England.

Baines, P.R., Harris, P. and Lewis, B.R (2002) 'The political marketing planning process: improving image and message in strategic target areas', *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.6–14.

Bastawy, S. (2014) *Women's Rights in Post-Revolution Egypt*, Asfar, e-Journal Edition, December [online] http://www.asfar.org.uk/womens-rights-in-post-revolution-egypt/ (accessed 5 March 2017).

Bastawy, S. (2015) *Women's Rights in Post-Revolution Egypt, Part 2*, Asfar, e-Journal Edition, December [online] http://www.asfar.org.uk/womens-rights-post-revolution-egyptpart-ii-sawsan-bastawy/ (accessed 5 March 2017).

Bennett, L. and Lagos, T. (2007) 'Logo logic: the ups and downs of branded political communication', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 611, No. 1, pp.193–206.

Blaydes, L. and El Tarouty, S. (2009) 'Women's electoral participation in Egypt: the implications of gender for voter recruitment and mobilization', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp.364–380.

Boddy, C. (2005) 'Projective techniques in market research: valueless subjectivity or insightful reality?', *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp.239–254.

Booth, H. and Hern, A. (2017) *Labour Won the Social Media Election Digital Strategists Say* [online] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/digitalstrategists-give-victory-to-labour-in-social-media-election-facebook-twitter (accessed 16 December 2017).

Boston, R. (2016) 'Humanists and the rise of 'Post-Truth America'', *The Humanist*, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp.32–33.

Botman, S. (1999) *Engendering Citizenship in Egypt, Research*, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, West Sussex, England.

Brownlee, J. (2007) 'New generation of autocracy in Egypt', *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.73–85.

Buchanan, K. (2015) *Women in History: Voting Rights* [online] https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/03/women-in-history-voting-rights/ (accessed 5 August 2017).

Calfano, B. (2010) 'The power of brand: beyond interest group influence in U.S. state', *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.227–247.

Campagna, J. (1996) 'From accommodation to confrontation: the MB in the Mubarak years', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp.278–304, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost.

Catterall, M. and Ibbotson, P. (2000) 'Using projective techniques in education research', *British Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.245–256.

Charfi, A. (2005) 'Islam and democracy: are they compatible?', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture*, Vol. 12, Nos. 2/3, pp.67–72.

Chung, C.J. and Cho, S.H. (2013) 'News coverage analysis on SNS and the Arab spring: using mixed methods', *Global Media Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 23, pp.1–19, Hammond.

Cillizza, C. (2017) *Donald Trump Ranked Himself 2nd on the List of Most 'Presidential' Presidents* [online] http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/26/politics/donaldtrump-abe-lincoln/index.html (accessed 28 July 2017).

Cook, B.J. and Stathis, M. (2012) 'Democracy and Islam: promises and perils for the Arab spring protest', *Journal of Global Responsibility*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.175–186.

Davie, W.R., Dick, S.J., Bashri, M., Galander, M., Hamdy, N. and St. Pierre, J. (2013) 'The Arab spring and the U.S. response: American and Middle Eastern students speak out', *Global Media Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 22, pp.1–23, Hammond.

Davies, G. and Mian, T. (2010) 'The reputation of the party leader and of the party being led', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp.331–350.

Day, P. (2011) 'The return of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt', *Quadrant Magazine, Humanities International Complete*, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp.10–15, EBSCOhost.

Edlin, A., Gelman, A. and Kaplan, N. (2007) 'Improve the well-being of others', *Rationality and Society*, August, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp.293–314.

Elgot, J. (2017) 'Jeremy Corbyn denies promising to wipe graduates student debt', *The Guardian* [online] https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/jul/23/jeremy-corbyn-denies-promising-towipe-student-debts (accessed 12 April 2018).

Frantzman, S.J. (2017) *The Struggle for Women's Rights in Egypt* [online] http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/The-struggle-forwomens-rights-in-Egypt-483059 (accessed 5 August 2017).

Freelon, D. and Karpf, D. (2015) 'Of big birds and bayonets: hybrid Twitter interactivity in the 2012 Presidential debates', *Information, Communication & Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.390–406.

French, A. and Smith, G. (2010) 'Measuring political brand equity: a consumer oriented approach', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp.460–477.

Gerzema, J. (2017) *Donald Trump and the Clickbait Presidency* [online] https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-01-11/donald-trump-and-theclickbait-presidency (accessed 27 July 2017).

Gurau, C. and Ayadi, N. (2011) 'Political communication management: the strategy of the two main candidates during the 2007 French presidential elections', *Journal of Communication Management*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.5–22.

Guzmán, F. and Sierra, V. (2009) 'A political candidate's brand image scale: are political candidates' brands?', *Journal of Brand Management*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp.207–217, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost.

Hakim, C. (2000) *Research Design – Successful Designs for Social and Economic Research*, Routledge, London, England.

Hartman, M. (2012) 'Gender, genre, and the (missing) Gazelle: Arab women writers and the politics of translation', *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp.17–49.

Hofstede, A., Van Hoof, J., Walenberg, N. and Jong, M. (2007) 'Projective techniques for brand image research: two personification-based methods explored', *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.300–309.

Hrw.org (2006) *Human Rights Watch – Country Summary: Egypt*, January, New York, USA [online] https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k6/pdf/egypt.pdf (accessed 25 September 2012).

Ibrahim, S. (2011) 'A tale of two Egypt's: contrasting state-reported macro-trends with micro-voices of the poor', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 7, pp.1347–1368.

Jamieson, K.H. (2015) 'The discipline's debate contributions: then, now, and next', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp.85–97.

Jevons, C. and Carroll, J. (2005) 'Marketing, truth and political expediency', *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.20–32.

Kaplan, M., Yurt, O., Guneri, B. and Kurtulus, K. (2010) 'Branding places: applying brand personality concept to cities', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 44, No. 9, pp.1286–1304.

Kardas, Ş. (2008) 'Turkey under the justice and development party: between transformation of Islamism and democratic consolidation? Critique: critical Middle Eastern studies', Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.175–187, Humanities International Complete, EBSCOhost.

Khodair, A.A. and Hassib, B. (2015) 'Women's political participation in Egypt: the role of the National Council for Women', *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, Vol. 3, No. 7, pp.326–337.

Kirkpatrick, D. (2012) *In Egyptian Hard-Liner's Surge, New Worries for the Muslim Brotherhood* [online] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/world/middleeast/attacking-the-west-islamist-gainsin-egypt-presidential-bid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 16 January 2013).

Kropp, K. (2015) *Societal Expectations of Women: Feminism in Egypt* [online] https://history.libraries.wsu.edu/spring2015/2015/01/17/expectations-of-women-inislamic-societies/ (accessed 5 August 2017).

Law 73 for 1956 on Exercising of Political Rights.

Leiken, R. and Brooke, S. (2007) *The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood* [online] http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-s-leikenand-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood (accessed 10 June 2018).

Lieven, A. (2012) *Pakistan's Culture of Honourable Corruption* [online] https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2012/jan/19/pakistan-culture-honourablecorruption (accessed 23 March 2018).

Lock, A. and Harris, P. (1996) 'Political marketing', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 30, No. 10, pp.14–24.

Malhotra, N.K. (2012) *Marketing Research – an Applied Orientation*, 6th ed., Pearson Education, Harlow, England.

Malhotra, N.K. and Birks, D.F. (2003) *Marketing Research – an Applied Approach*, 3rd European Edition, Pearson Education, Harlow, England.

Malhotra, N.K., Birks, D.F. and Wills, P. (2010) *Marketing Research – an Applied Approach*, 4th ed., Pearson Education, Harlow, England.

Milligan, S. (2017) *Temperament Tantrum* [online] https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/ articles/2017-01-27/does-donald-trumpspersonality-make-him-dangerous (accessed 27 July 2017).

Mitchell, G.R. (2015) 'Public opinion, thinly sliced and served hot', *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 9, pp.21–45.

Morgan, D.L. (1996) 'Focus groups', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 22, pp.129–152.

Munger. M.C. (2008) 'Blogging and political information: truth or truthiness?', *Public Choice*, Vol. 134, pp.125–138.

Naib, F. (2011) *Women of the Revolution* [online] http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/ egypt.html (accessed 7 June 2018).

Noureddine, M. (2012) *Erdogan Adopts Islamic Fervor for Turkey's Future and His Own – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East* [online] http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/politics/ 2012/09/erdogan-leader-of-islamicworld.html#ixzz2891Rvkqf (accessed 2 October 2012).

Nytimes.com. (2012) 'Muslim brotherhood (Egypt)', *The New York Times* [online] http://topics. nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/muslim_brotherhoodegypt/index.html (accessed 16 September 2012).

O'Cass, A. (1996) 'Political marketing and the marketing concept', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 30, No. 10, pp.37–53.

O'Cass, A. (2001) 'Political marketing – an investigation of the political marketing concept and political market orientation in Australian politics', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 35, No. 9, pp.1003–1025.

O'Donnell, A. and Cummins, D. (1999) 'The use of qualitative methods to research networking in SMEs', *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.82–91.

O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2001) 'The marketing of political marketing', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 35, No. 9, pp.1047–1057.

O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2008) 'Bush, Blair and Hitler: a review of comparative self-presentation', *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp.293–302.

Odine, M. (2013) 'Role of social media in the empowerment of Arab women', *Global Media Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 22, pp.1–30.

Paison, M. (2012) *The History of the Muslim Brotherhood*, The Political, Social and Economic Transformation of the Arab Republic of Egypt [online] http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/ files/resources/nimep/v4/The%20History%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood.pdf (accessed 14 December 2012).

Parker, E. (2018) *What Does Indonesia's New Political Landscape Mean for the Future of its Economy?* [online] https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/what-does-indonesiasnew-political-landscape-mean-for-the-future-of-its-economy/ (accessed 26 April 2018).

Patton, M.Q. (1990) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, 2nd ed., Sage, Newbury Park, CA, USA.

Peng, N. and Hackley, C. (2007) 'Political marketing communications planning in the UK and Taiwan', *Marketing Intelligence and Planning*, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp.483–498.

Peng, N. and Hackley, C. (2009) 'Are voters, consumers? A qualitative exploration of the voter consumer analogy in political marketing', *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.171–186.

Pich, C. and Dean, D. (2015) 'Qualitative projective techniques in political brand image research from the perspective of young adults', *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.115–144.

Pich, C., Armannsdottir, G. and Dean, D. (2015) 'The elicitation capabilities of qualitative projective techniques in political brand image research', *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp.357–394.

Pupcenoks, J. (2012) 'Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: lessons for the Post-Arab Spring Muslim World', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp.273–289.

Rosenblatt, A. (2015) *Social Advocacy and Politics: Can Social Media Increase Political Efficacy?* [online] https://www.socialmediatoday.com/specialcolumns/2015-05-05/social-advocacy-and-politics-can-social-media-increase-politicalefficacy (accessed 23 March 2018).

Rowley, C.K. and Smith, N. (2009) 'Islam's democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?', *Public Choice*, Vol. 139, No. 3, pp.273–299.

Saiidi, U. (2016) *For Some Who Doesn't Like Social Media, Erdogan Used it Effectively to Put Down Coup* [online] http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/18/for-someone-whodoesnt-like-social-media-erdogan-used-it-effectively-to-put-down-coup.html (accessed 28 July 2017).

Sanyal, P. (2016) 'Parliamentary elections in Egypt, 2015', *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.445–454.

Scammell, M. (2007) 'Political brands and consumer citizens: the rebranding of Tony Blair', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 611, pp.176–192.

Schiffman, L., Thelen, T. and Sherman, E. (2010) 'Interpersonal and political trust: modeling levels of citizens trust', *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 44, Nos. 3–4 pp.369–381.

Selim, G. (2015) 'Egypt under SCAF and the Muslim brotherhood: the triangle of counter revolution', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.177–199.

Shehata, S. (2011) 'Profile: Egypt's freedom and justice party', *BBC News*, 25 November, Middle East.

Silverman, D. (2011) *Interpreting Qualitative Data: A Guide to the Principles of Qualitative Research*, 4th ed., Sage Publications Ltd., London, England.

Simonin, B. and Ruth, J. (1998) 'United States: hard to get', *Women Voters*, Vol. 8603, No. 389, p.40 [online] http://search.proquest.com/docview/223980263?accountid=12441 (accessed 15 September 2012).

Simonin, B.L. and Ruth, J.A. (1998) 'Is a company known by the company it keeps? Assessing the spillover effects of brand alliances on consumer brand attitudes', *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. 35, pp.30–42.

Singer, C. (2002) 'Bringing brand Savvy to politics', *Brandweek*, Vol. 43, No. 34, p.19.

Smith, G. and French, A. (2009) 'The political brand: a consumer perspective', *Marketing Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.206–226

Sohail, R. and Chebib, N. (2011) 'The reasons social media contributed to the Egyptian revolution', *International Journal of Business Research and Management*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.139–162.

Spencer, R. (2012) 'Egypt election result: Muslim brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi wins', *The Telegraph*, 24 June [online] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaand indianocean/egypt/9352396/Egypt-election-result-Muslim-Brotherhoods-Mohammed-Morsi-wins.html (accessed 21 November 2012).

Sultany, N. (2013) 'Against conceptualism: Islamic law, democracy, and constitutionalism in the aftermath of the Arab spring', *Boston University International Law Journal*, Vol. 31, pp.435–463

Takeyh, R. (2001) 'The lineaments of Islamic democracy', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.59–67.

Takeyh, R. (2011) 'The lineaments of Islamic democracy', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.59–67.

Talhami, G. (1996) *The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt*, University Press of Florida, USA.

Teijlingen, E. and Hundley, V. (2001) 'The importance of pilot studies', *Social Research Update*, No. 35, Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, Guildford, England.

Threlfall, D. (1999) 'Using focus groups as a consumer research tool', *Journal of Marketing Practice: Applied Marketing Science*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp.102–105.

Trager, E. (2011) 'Unbreakable MB: grim prospects for a liberal Egypt', *Foreign Affairs 90, Law Journal Library* [online] http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora90 anddiv=93andg_sent=1andc ollection=journals (accessed 25 September 2012).

Twinn, S. (2007) 'Methodological issues in the evaluation of the quality of public health nursing: a case study of the maternal and child health centres in Hong Kong', *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp.753–759.

Vidino, L. (2011) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Hurdles on the Way to Power*, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.

Wade, N. (2013) 'Egypt: what poll results reveal about the brotherhood's popularity', *BBC News*, 30 August [online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-23846680 (accessed 5 March 2017).

Wintour, P. and Mulholland, H. (2012) 'Nick Clegg apologies for tuition fees pledge', *The Guardian* [online] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/sep/19/nickclegg-apologies-tuition-fees-pledge (accessed 12 April 2018).

Wring, D. (1997) 'Reconciling marketing with political science: theories of political marketing', *Journal of Marketing Management*, Vol. 13, No. 7, pp.651–663.

Yin, R. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 2nd ed., Sage Publishing Beverly Hills, CA, USA.

Ziada, D. (2012) 'Egypt's Islamists: much to prove on women's rights', *CNN*, p.3 [online] http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-8/opinion/opinion_egypt-womensrights_1_muslim-brotherhood-women-rights-respect-human-rights/3?s=PM:OPINION (accessed 25 September 2012).

Websites

BBC News (2016) 'What's become of Egypt's Mohammed Morsi?', 22 November [online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24772806Online (accessed 5 March 2017).

BBC News Online (2013) 'Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', 25 December [online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405 (accessed 5 March 2017).

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2016) 3 October [online] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdel-Fattah-al-Sisi (accessed 4 March 2017).

Mohammed Morsi Biography (2014) Published by A&E Television Networks, 2 April [online] http://www.biography.com/people/mohamed-morsi-20862695#synopsis (accessed 5 March 2017).

The Guardian Online (2014) 9 August [online] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/09/egyptian-court-muslim-brotherhood-freedomand-justice-party (accessed 4 March 2017).

Appendix 1

The interview schedule, with associated questions, concentrated upon five key areas.

Table A1   Interview schedule

1   The brand associated background and history

- What do you know about the MB?
- Tell me a little about their history?
- What is the difference between the MBs and freedom and justice party?

2   The attitude towards the current MB

- For whom did you vote (parliament, first round, and second round)?
- What influenced your voting decision?
- Are you still happy with your decision?
- What is the main reason do you think helped re-establishing the MB?
- How and in what way(s) do you feel the MB contributed to the revolution?
- How and in what way(s)s do you feel the revolution contributed to the MB?

3   Attitude towards MB as a brand

- In your view, what do you feel are the brands strengths and/or weaknesses?
- How and in what way(s) do you think the MB brand communicated with voters?
- What is the established MB brand image in the market - before, during, and after the revolution?
- Do you think the brand has changed, if so how? If not, why not?

4   The role of females within our society

- How do you view the role of women in our society?
- What do you think the role of women would be under MB rule?
- What is your opinion about rumours that MB will curtail the freedom of women?
- Why do you think President Morsi assigned Pakinam El-Sharkawy as one of his four main advisors?

5   The future – female expectations

- What are you looking for in the MB?
- If there were fresh elections tomorrow, would you vote for the MB?

Appendix 2

Table A2 Overview of responses by focus groups

Question	Age 50s (n = 6)	Age 40s (n = 6)	Age 30s (n = 6)	Age 20s (n = 6)
History associated with MB	Some assassinations	Assassinations and confirmation of assassination of Sadat	Some assassinations	Assassinations except one participant did not believe in any assassination
Difference MB and FJP	No difference FJP is the political arm	No difference FJP is the political arm	No difference FJP is the political arm	No difference FJP is the political arm
Logo and slogan	*FJP*: cheating on people / *MB*: frightening and totally against	*FJP*: incomprehensible / *MB*: violent, totally against	*FJP*: Islamic logo / *MB*: swords is violent	*FJP*: imitating Turkey not genuine, but one participant liked the logo / *MBH*: one person believed that swords are for saving Islam, but rest are against
Who did you vote for?	*Parliament*: non-voted MB / *First round*: non-voted for MB / *Second round*: 2 Morsi because they had no choice, the rest did not vote	*Parliament*: non-voted MB / *First round*: non-voted MB / *Second round*: non-voted MB	*Parliament*: non-voted MB / *First round*: non-voted MB / *Second round*: four voted for Morsi to save the revolution	*Parliament*: non-voted MB / *First round*: non-voted MB / *Second round*: four voted for Morsi mentioning that they wanted to be with the revolution
Reason of relaunching MB	They are always in the market, but the revolution helped	MB are always in the market, but the revolution helped as well	Weakness of other parties	The revolution. / *Parliament*: no one voted for MB but one did not vote but if she voted she will vote for MB
MB contributed to the revolution	Nothing they participated at the end	Nothing they robbed the revolution	They had normal role like other citizens	They attended but at the end, three believed that they have good role two did not know and one believed of no role
Revolution contributed for the MB	Gave power	Everything	Popularising the brand	One of them became a president of course they were benefited
MB marketing strategy	Distribution of money, food, and shelter	• They used their long staying in the market / • And their good for people	• Word of mouth / • Food distribution (in a good way)	• Advertising / • Word of mouth / • Religion
MB brand image	*Before*: no image (repressed) / *During*: heroes / *After*: power seeker	*Before*: no image (repressed) / *During*: good people / *After*: we discovered the truth	*Before*: kind people / *During*: no image (unclear) / *After*: spoiled	*Before*: unknown / *During*: unclear / *After*: hypocrite
Women in Egypt	Important role	Important role	Backbone of Egypt	Proper role
Women role during MB	Will decline, but curtailing after time	Nothing will happen the role will remain the same or increase	Will decline	We do not know, but we do not believe in curtailing women in MBH has important role
Assigning Pakinam El-Sharkawy	Clear message	Message	Message	Message, but two believed that she might be suitable
Looking for in MB	Want them to leave	To love Egypt	We want them reach move Egypt to its peak	Social welfare and right use Islamic sharia
Vote for MB again	Never	Never	No but if they change, we might think	Depending on their performance