

Conflict, displacement, and economic revival: The case of the internally displaced minority entrepreneurs in Pakistan

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Abstract

This article examines enterprise activities developed by internally displaced religious minorities (IDRM) and the role that social capital plays in supporting such activities. In particular, the article examines how social capital is linked to microenterprise development and the economic survival/revival of internally displaced religious minorities in Pakistan and why the link between entrepreneurship and social capital is critical for contexts with absent or poorly designed enterprise development policies. A three-staged, sequential research design was adopted, which comprised the analysis of secondary data on IDRM, a face-to-face survey of entrepreneurs and interviews in two selected study sites. The evidence shows how the role of social capital in supporting entrepreneurial activities is determined by socioeconomic inequalities as well as the characteristics of the formal enterprise support infrastructure, that is, where formal institutions are weak, social capital is the main source of entrepreneurial support, with different types of social capital networks delivering different outcomes.

JEL CLASSIFICATION

A13, D74, L26, Z12, Z13.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The microeconomics of conflict is a new subfield of development economics (Brück et al., 2017; Vervimp et al., 2019), with recent research focusing on various aspects of life in the postconflict recovery of individuals, enterprises, households, and communities (Justino, 2014; Brück et al., 2017; Bozzoli et al., 2016). Linked to this concern of microeconomics of conflict with postconflict revival of micro enterprise, is the literature on entrepreneurship in the context of forced migration and the role of social capital within it (Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018; Williams & Effendic, 2019). Surprisingly, this growing body of literature has not focused on the study of entrepreneurial activities of internally displaced persons and, more specifically, that carried out by marginalized religious minority entrepreneurs. Moreover, in their focus on

entrepreneurship and social capital (SC hereafter), these studies often overlook the policy context and the role of SC in supporting the entrepreneurial activities of conflict-affected migrants. This neglect is particularly true regarding the development of micro-enterprises within conflict-affected contexts.

For conflict-affected internally displaced persons (IDPs hereafter), for whom there are very few employment opportunities in the formal economy and no land available for farming, self-employment and informal micro-enterprises may provide the only immediate means of generating an income (Blattmann et al., 2015). There is growing evidence of how conflict affects the livelihood and the welfare of displaced people living in camps. However, welfare provision for, and the livelihood activities of the displaced people outside camps are under-researched (Zetter et al., 2014, p. 201). Even more critical is the absence of understanding of conflict's impact on the livelihood and

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welfare of marginalized religious communities, and how they are or are not cared for in the postconflict settings.

From the article's perspective, the interrelationship between entrepreneurship and religion is an important one, as religious groups and faith communities can provide resources for the generation of entrepreneurial (business-related) social capital (Dodd & Gotsis, 2007, pp. 93–94). Nevertheless, these interrelations are also under-researched.

This article aims to address these knowledge gaps by examining the role of the individual entrepreneurial activities of IDPs with a focus on SC in the economic revival of conflict-affected, internally displaced religious communities in Pakistan. It does so by exploring SC's links to the economic revival and enterprise development of newly arrived internally displaced IDPs. It is also argued that entrepreneurship among IDPs takes place within specific policy contexts which therefore cannot be overlooked (Vervimp et al., 2019). Therefore we ask, how social capital is linked to microenterprise development which is crucial to the survival and economic revival of internally displaced religious minority entrepreneurs in Pakistan? We also ask why focusing on the link between entrepreneurship and SC is critical for contexts with poorly designed enterprise development policies for postconflict rehabilitation of permanently displaced households.

We recognize that the literature on refugee entrepreneurs displaced by conflict has made some contributions to the above debate (Bizri, 2017) for example, by explaining how SC can influence the survival and success of refugee businesses or how SC shapes entrepreneurial ventures of conflict-affected, forced migrants (Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). We go beyond this literature by focusing on the entrepreneurial activities of IDPs (Kwong et al., 2019), and go a step further by focusing on the IDPs of marginalized religious communities that are in minority. Unlike most of the micro- and mesolevel analysis of the interrelationship between conflict, entrepreneurship and SC (Tobias & Boudreaux, 2011; Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018), we also take formal support infrastructure (i.e., entrepreneurial support offered by government and non-governmental organizations) as an important factor in analyzing the role of SC in supporting entrepreneurship and survival of IDPs.

The study focuses on internally displaced Hindu, Sikh, and Christian communities in Pakistan's erstwhile federally administered tribal areas (FATA hereafter) and Swat. It does so in two ways. First, the study offers empirical evidence on the difficult-to-access conflict-affected business owners and their economic activities (Muhammad & Warren, 2016; Kwong et al., 2019). Second, it analyses the role of different types of SC networks in the start-up and survival of entrepreneurial activities of conflict-affected IDPs. The data presented in this article was generated through an exploratory study of Sikh, Hindu, and Christian communities living in Peshawar and Nankana Sahib, which comprised a survey and in-depth/semi-structured interviews with members of such minority marginalized communities.

The erstwhile FATA and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) in the northwest of Pakistan are recently merged into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP hereafter) province of Pakistan. Millions of people had been displaced due to military operations against the

Taliban in the erstwhile FATA and PATA and hosted temporarily in IDP camps across the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (ICG, 2013; Khan, 2012). Most of the minority IDPs were displaced from Khyber, Kuram, and Mohmand District in erstwhile FATA (FATA hereafter for analytical purposes) and Swat district in PATA (Swat hereafter). Peshawar, the Provincial capital of KP is central as most of the permanently displaced people from FATA and many from Swat arrived first in Peshawar. Whereas, Nankana Sahib is located in the Punjab province of Pakistan, closer to the Indian border. Nonetheless, it occupies a central position in the Sikh religion and hosts one of the largest Sikh populations in Pakistan. In addition to this **religious connection**, many Sikh IDPs from FATA had pre-existing family ties in Nankana Sahib, therefore many of them decided to settle permanently in Nankanasahib.

The article is structured into five sections: Following this introduction (Section 1), major gaps in the existing literature are identified to build a theoretical framework (in Section 2). Section 3 explains the research context and methods of data generation and analysis. Findings are in turn presented and critically examined in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the theoretical implications of the study and concludes with some evidence-based policy recommendations.

2 | ENTREPRENEURSHIP, CONFLICT, AND ECONOMIC REVIVAL OF IDPS

The term entrepreneurship is employed here to mean the act of establishing, running, and growing a business (Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). Micro enterprises are defined here as solo traders or up to five employees, informally organized, nonagricultural “entrepreneurial” businesses (Ciarli et al., 2010), which emerge in a conflict-affected area. Displaced people in turn comprise some of the most marginalized, socially and economically isolated groups often living in extreme poverty (William & Efendic, 2019). Conflict situations add further difficulties to the economic activities of these displaced people (Kwong et al., 2019). We focus on these entrepreneurs as most of the conflict-affected individuals are generally driven by their survival needs and so do their businesses (Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019). Here, we heed seriously Banerjee and Duflo's (2007) advice against romanticizing these “penniless entrepreneurs.”

Despite these constraints, some studies demonstrate that entrepreneurship can create a positive economic and social impact on those affected by conflict (Bullough et al., 2014). Entrepreneurial motivations are either necessity-based or opportunity-driven. Forced migrants often start a business out of necessity as they lack human capital, and suffer the loss of economic and social resources due to conflict and displacement (Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). Nonetheless, displacement creates a unique context as well as significant barriers for those affected (Cheung & Kwong, 2017), which are not well understood (Betts et al., 2014). Displacement takes many forms (Kwong et al., 2019). We specifically focus on IDPs as defined in the UN guiding principles on internal displacement (1998), that is, persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee their

homes or leave their places of habitual residence as a result of or to avoid armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural disasters. This definition applies to displaced people who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Asplet, 2013, p. 19).

IDPs mainly comprise two types: returnees, who voluntarily return to their place of origin either spontaneously or in an organized fashion (UNHCR, 2017); and those who are permanently displaced, either due to protracted conflict or because they do not wish to return even after the situation in their place of origin “returns to normality” (Mosel & Jackson, 2013). Each of these types can be further divided into registered and undocumented (UNHCR, 2017). IDPs Vulnerability Assessment and Profiling (IVAP) found that more than four out of five (86%) of the IDPs in Pakistan did not live in camps and were therefore much harder to identify and assist (International Displacement Monitor, 2018). This article focuses specifically on permanently displaced, noncamp, nonreturnees IDPs, both registered and undocumented, because they are “invisible” for, and often overlooked by, policymakers.

A key limitation of displacement and entrepreneurship in the literature is the inadequacy of data (Loschmann & Marchand, 2020), for example, due to difficult-to-count IDPs and the informality of their economic activities (Kwong et al., 2019; Williams & Efendic, 2019). Invisibility is one of the greatest data constraints (Zetter et al., 2014) which have prevented research on these vulnerable groups from being conducted (Branzei & Abdelnour, 2010).

This constraint limits understanding of the extent to which individuals and communities are directly or indirectly affected by conflict (Justino, 2009). Direct impacts of conflict include the destruction of household assets, both human and material, due to violence and forced displacement. Destruction of assets and forced displacement has a strong and negative impact on an individual's ability not only to survive but to start a business in the first place, even when such activities are the only available income-generating coping strategy (Ciarli et al., 2010). Indirect impacts of conflict on entrepreneurship include the destruction of shops and markets (Mosel & Jackson, 2013), and the destruction of social networks that could be a critical resource for entrepreneurship (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2007; Williams & Efendic, 2019).

2.1 | Entrepreneurship, internal displacement, and social capital

A central concept to understanding how (displaced) entrepreneurs make sense of the business opportunities is SC (Barrios & Blocker, 2015, p. 273). SC, defined as networks of relations (structural dimension) and norms of cooperation (cognitive dimension) (Christoforou & Davis, 2014) is often viewed by the displacement and entrepreneurship literature as a resource, enabling migrant entrepreneurs to access resources (e.g., finance) through co-ethnic networks (Vershina et al., 2011). The focus is always on SC as a determinant of entrepreneurial activities among migrants (Williams & Krasniqi, 2018).

The mainstream literature makes a distinction between bonding and bridging dimensions of SC, or strong and weak ties (Granovetter (1985), and so does the migration and entrepreneurship literature engaging with this concept. Bonding SC refers to dense ties of homogeneous networks with people having similar socioeconomic status. By contrast, bridging SC refers to diverse networks that bridge groups (Christoforou & Davis, 2014). Both migration and displacement literature agree that bonding SC with coethnics from the place of origin is a helpful resource in finding employment, creating start-ups, and securing economic survival in the host destination (Kwong et al., 2019; Bizri, 2017). Co-ethnic networks may help access resources and information in helping their members set up their businesses, using previous experience acquired by the more established immigrant community (Levie, 2007; Jones et al., 2010). Some find however that connections to one's ethnic network do not affect entrepreneurial activities (Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). This stream of literature argues that bridging networks with residents of the host destination, rather than the bonding networks, is more useful because of the more valued resources they could provide, for example, relevant contacts (Kanas et al., 2009, p. 302).

The literature at large adopts various and sometimes conflicting measures of SC and its influence on the entrepreneurial activities of the displaced, obscuring the relationship between SC and entrepreneurship. For instance, Kiboro (2017) uses membership of associations as a measure, whereas most of the literature draws on informal networks (Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). Due to the multidimensional (Efendic et al., 2015) and context-embedded (Quetulio-Navarra et al., 2013) nature of SC, we argue that both formal and informal networks are helpful for entrepreneurial activities and both can be either bonding or bridging forms of SC.

Confusion over the role of different types of networks is largely due to conflicting perspectives in the mainstream SC literature regarding what constitutes SC. Particularly important here are the debates concerning the relationships between individual and collective SC (Krishna, 2002; Levien, 2015), and between membership-based associations and informal networks (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p. 12; Norris & Inglehart, 2003, p. 3; Granovetter, 1985). While Putnam's view of SC emphasizes collective SC, Bourdieu's conception places greater emphasis on both individual SC and group membership (Smith & Kulynych, 2002; Tzanakis, 2013). Despite these conflicting views, scholars broadly agree that SC constitutes networks of relations and norms of cooperation such as trust and reciprocity (Christoforou & Davis, 2014, p. 3). Sensitive to varying outcomes of SC for economic activities, we argue that multiple network types exist simultaneously in a single context. The outcome of these multiple networks for small businesses and their interaction with formal institutions are valuable for different purposes across varying contexts (Khan, 2019).

Like the displacement literature on SC (Quetulio-Navarra et al., 2013), entrepreneurship literature in the context of displacement also overlooks the determinants of the role of SC (Bizri, 2017; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018). If the context of SC for entrepreneurship is important (Barrios & Blocker, 2015), the literature reviewed so far

overlooks these determinants of SC and the context they provide for the role of SC in helping entrepreneurial activities. This *neglect of SC's determinants* is one of the classic problems in the bottom-up, resource view of SC that treats good governance and economic development as outcomes of social capital "in action" (Putnam et al., 1993). Conversely, it has been argued that the role of SC depends on the level of economic inequality and the type of employment activities in question, for example, formal employment or informal self-employment activities (Loschmann & Marchand, 2020). It is within this context that SC can facilitate the establishment, survival, and success of the entrepreneurial activities of conflict-affected IDPs. However, given the confusion surrounding the role of bonding and bridging, formal and informal SC, we ask how social capital is linked to microenterprise development, which is crucial to the survival and economic revival of internally displaced religious minorities entrepreneurs in Pakistan.

2.2 | Conflict, entrepreneurship, and rehabilitation policies

The specialized literature on conflict, displacement, and entrepreneurship attempts to understand the difficulties that income-generating activities encounter in both conflict zones and postconflict peace-building zones, and also the obstacles to economic development (Branzei & Abdelnour, 2010; Bizri, 2017; Justino, 2014). World Bank (2014) regards effective policies as a key to finding resilient and effective solutions to the increasing number of refugees in protracted displacement situations. Brück et al. (2011) note that the postconflict peace dividend, and the reconstruction of local markets and economies, critically depend on public policy support. Economic rehabilitation of permanently displaced communities is however hardly a concern in the policy debates or development practice. For conflict-affected regions of Pakistan, the facilitation of entrepreneurship is one of the key areas in short- and long-term development plans and interventions by donor agencies. That said, interventions are mainly focused on the returnees.

A reason for such a narrow policy focus is that policymakers are often poorly informed owing to the absence of data and evidence-based guidance (Justino, 2014). Muhammad and Warren (2016) observe that in the context of conflict and entrepreneurship in Pakistan, the lack of focus on a microlevel analysis and its links to the institutional environment is in effect one of the key impediments to understanding the impact of conflict on entrepreneurship. Besides data unavailability on entrepreneurial activities in the conflict contexts (Zetter et al., 2014), current policies often adopt an overly uniform and simplistic view of subsistence entrepreneurs in their needs, social positions, and motives (Barrios & Blocker, 2015).

The design of policies and the effectiveness of institutions in policy implementation provides a macrolevel context for the role of SC in venture creation and entrepreneurial growth aspirations (Effendic et al., 2015). This macrolevel is disconnected from the micro- and mesolevels, especially when it comes to variations within communities in terms of their majority or minority status (Efendic et al., 2015) and

their displacement and return patterns (Mosel & Jackson, 2013). Therefore, policymakers must take the community context into account because the entrepreneurs and their characteristics widely differ across community cultural contexts (Ribeiro & Galindo, 2012, p. 863). Higher reliance on SC in the countries where institutions are weak is already established in the mainstream SC literature (Nooteboom, 2007). How this reliance translates into business creation and survival strategies for the permanently displaced entrepreneurs is under-researched. Especially, when it comes to the substitutive role of different types of (community and interpersonal) SC for business creation and economic survival of IDPs. Therefore, we argue that focusing on the link between entrepreneurship and SC is critical for contexts with poorly designed enterprise development policies for the postconflict rehabilitation of permanently displaced households.

In summary, our theoretical framework encompasses four key elements of the microeconomics of conflict: entrepreneurship, displacement, SC, and informality/invisibility (Vervimp et al., 2019). Conflict causes displacement which affects individuals, businesses, households and communities, and SC is one of the few local resources which can play an important role in the survival, restoration and success of conflict-affected displaced entrepreneurs (Bisri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019). Formal support infrastructures are often overlooked although government and international agencies often use enterprise development as a means to support long-term rehabilitation of the conflict-affected households and communities; although they may produce exclusionary effects as a result of informality/invisibility.

3 | RESEARCH CONTEXT

The north-western parts of Pakistan, especially Swat and erstwhile FATA, have seen some of the largest waves of internal displacement in the aftermath of 9/11 and consequent military operations against the Pakistani Taliban in the northern parts of Pakistan neighboring Afghanistan. Due to various military operations since 9/11, it is estimated that between 4.6 and 6.2 million people suffered internal displacement (Saeed & Shah, 2017, pp. 5–6). The IDPs of Swat have largely returned, whereas a substantial number of FATA IDPs remain displaced (see the introduction for these geographic regions). The IDPs of FATA and Swat vary in terms of their displacement and return patterns, and the aid and media attention they received (Saeed & Shah, 2017, p. 7). Religious minority IDPs of FATA and Swat, the target group of this study, are not an exception to this *variation between FATA and Swat*.

Postcrisis assessments and long-term development plans aimed at sustainable peace-building are reticent on how religious minorities are included within such frameworks, for example, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA, 2010); the 10-year FATA governance reform plan 2016–2025 (FATA Secretariat, 2015); and FATA sustainable development plan 2006–2015.

These policy initiatives (except the 10-years FATA governance reform plan) have, however, identified the economic drivers of conflict

and have as a result emphasized the need for promoting micro-enterprise as a vehicle for stability and durable peace. The PCNA's long-term vision for peace-building proposed in effect supporting microenterprises through grants and support services to improve livelihood and employment generation (PCNA, 2010, p. 10). The PCNA adopted a "rights-based approach" to peace-building and stressed the need for building trust in government which had been destroyed by the conflict, but it is not clear how this approach operates in practice. Religious minorities, for example, are not prohibited from benefiting from the assistance provided under these frameworks which are underpinned by the rhetoric of inclusive development. However, it is unclear to what extent and how these initiatives benefit them in terms of their sustainable rehabilitation, and whether this rhetoric of inclusive development leads to effective peace building and social cohesion. What is clear is that long-term projects aimed at rehabilitation through business development (such as, business support by Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority [SMEDA], FATA Economic Revitalization funded by UNDP and implemented by local partners) fail to include IDPs of marginalized religious communities.

3.1 | Data generation and analysis

Social networks and actors constituting these networks also have a history, which accounts for the intricacies involved in the specific outcomes produced by SC (Devine & Roberts, 2003, pp. 94–95). SC is often embedded in power relations in which actors reflexively engage in multiple forms of networks (Portes, 1998). To understand this process and its outcomes for entrepreneurial activities, we adopt a qualitative interactive research frame underpinned by a dialogue between the theory and the empirics (Khan, 2019). The absence of data on the entrepreneurial activities of displaced minority communities who mainly operate in the informal economy, and their displacement patterns, necessitates a multistaged, exploratory research design. Hence, a three-stage, sequential data generation strategy was designed to address the problem of data unavailability.

3.1.1 | Stage 1

Existing (available) surveys were examined to find out data on religious minorities without much success (Appendix). The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was the only data source where data on registered IDPs could be found. However, since August 2019 when the data request was filed under the right to information act, the authority kept delaying data provision despite multiple efforts by the researcher up until October 2020.

The researcher then conducted seven key informant interviews (in person) with the elders and community leaders of Hindu, Sikh, and Christian communities in Swat ($n = 2$), Peshawar ($n = 3$), and Nankana Sahib ($n = 2$). These interviews revealed that permanently displaced IDPs had largely settled around their worship places because of religious solidarity. Worship places often keep track of their members in

the form of donors and recipients of charities. Community organizations were also contacted to find out about displacement and employment trends where religious worship places did not have relevant information or where a religious denomination of a specific religious community did not have their distinct worship place (such as Rajpoot Hindus of Peshawar).

Two main findings of the key informant interviews guided the rest of the research design. First, all the minority IDPs of Swat, except three families who have migrated to India, have returned to their place of origin. Second, Christian IDPs (now returnees), both in FATA as well in Swat, were predominantly employed in the "formal" sector, and therefore were not involved in micro-enterprises. Therefore, it was decided to primarily focus on the SC and entrepreneurial activities of Hindu and Sikh IDPs of FATA who have predominantly settled in Peshawar and Nankana Sahib.

These key informant interviews also revealed some interesting intra-community variations among religious minority IDPs. The Hindus of Peshawar are divided into three casts: Valmiki, Rajpoots, and Tirawal Hindus. Tirawal Hindus are the only ones that migrated from FATA. They form a community of 50 households, concentrated around Dargah rattan nat in the Union Council of Karimpura in Peshawar. Around half of the households of this community migrated before 9/11 to find better job opportunities and education for their children and the rest migrated to Peshawar due to conflict. The Sikh community has the largest number of permanent IDPs who settled permanently in Peshawar, Hasan Abdal, and Nankana Sahib. In the cases of Hindus and Sikhs, their residence is concentrated around their worship places, while their businesses are scattered throughout the city and beyond. These communities are generally difficult-to-access, hence a mix of snowballing and random walk methods were employed for subsequent sampling and recruiting (Lyon, 2000).

3.1.2 | Stage 2: Survey questionnaire

We conducted an exploratory survey with 105 participants. Questionnaires were administered face-to-face in Peshawar and Nankana Sahib. The target communities, selected after key-informant interviews, were divided into three residential clusters, two in Peshawar (Sikh and Tirawal Hindus respectively) and one in Nankana Sahib (Sikh community). We first mapped the total population (number of households in each cluster) and then applied our criteria of representativeness (total population) and response bias in each cluster. After determining the total population for each cluster and the potential response bias, the sample size was determined as 10% for each cluster. The response rate was 45%. The survey questionnaire, comprised of 82 mixed items, was divided into four sections or parent codes: (1) postdisplacement assessment of government, NGOs and informal support network; (2) microenterprise development and entrepreneurial activities; (3) business volunteering and community service; and (4) demographic profile. Since this article is more qualitative in nature, we only report characteristics of religious minority IDPs identified through this survey (Table 1).

TABLE 1 Respondents' profile

Respondent's characteristics/ possession of	Yes	No
Necessity-driven entrepreneurs	98%	2%
Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs	2%	98%
Registered as IDPs	98%	2%
Lived in IDP camps after displacement	3%	97%
Received immediate relief after displacement (ration or ration money)	98%	2%
Secured business support from any government institution	0%	100%
secured business support from nongovernmental organizations	0%	100%
After displacement, seeking shelter in a noncommunity member household	0%	100%
Owning a house before displacement	62%	38%
Living in rented house after displacement	80%	20%
Single earner household	68%	32%
Having own business before displacement	64%	36%
Business returns not restored to the predisplacement level	90%	50%
Noncommunity members main customers	99%	1%
Willing to return to place of origin	15%	75%
Security conditions shape decision not to return	13%	85%
Underdevelopment in the location of origin shapes the decision of not to return to one's location of origin	87%	13%

3.1.3 | Stage 3

Twenty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted in Peshawar and Nankana Sahib. The interviewees were purposively but equally selected from all the three clusters of two communities: Six Hindu traders, six Sikh traders in Peshawar, and six Sikh traders in Nankana Sahib. All the interviewees (in the entrepreneur category) were male–women entrepreneurs in Pakistan are generally denied access to conducting trade in the public sphere (Khan, 2020). Moreover, Women of Hindu and Sikh communities in Pakistan face stricter gender segregation in the already gendered-segregated patriarchal society of KP. In addition, voice-only interviews were considered to have the potential to speak to women. However, the absence of reliable networks (a prerequisite for successful access through phone in this context) of the researcher rendered this option impractical (Khan, 2022). In addition to entrepreneurs of minority communities, four interviews with officials from government departments and four with NGOs supporting micro-enterprises were conducted. Government agencies included SMEDA, FATA Development Authority (FDA), FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), and the development office of the Ministry of *auqaf, haj* and religious affairs in the KP. Two interviewees (a government official and an NGO official) were women, but we do

not disclose their gender in the presentation to avoid deductive disclosure (Khan, 2019, chapter 4). Sampling for interviews was purposive. The principle of respondent expertise (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p. 161) and maximum variation were employed to determine the sampling frame (Miles et al., 2014). The sample size for each category was in turn determined by the principle of information saturation (Saunders et al., 2018). The interviews were conducted in Pashto, Urdu, and Hindko, and lasted between 23 and 90 min. Interviews were translated from these languages into English and transcribed by the lead author. A flexible interview guide was prepared (Appendix) (Smith & Elger, 2014). All the data were appropriately anonymized and pseudonyms were employed to protect the identity of the interviewees. None of the public entities, government institutions and community organizations enjoys the right to anonymity (Israel, 2004). Our interviewees are either the members or beneficiaries of these organizations.

The interview data were analyzed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2016). Three-order coding cycle was developed for data analysis (Table 2). The first-order/organizing codes were developed into major themes which were then collapsed into aggregate dimensions. The first-order codes were reflexively expanded/reformulated. For instance, the network is a key theme in the SC literature, but our analyses revealed different functions of different types of networks (community, interpersonal, and associational) in the entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival. The interview data was then triangulated with the exploratory survey data and fieldwork notes. Various “if-then” tests were performed to determine the validity of the conclusions drawn (Miles et al., 2014).

4 | FINDINGS

Findings are presented in three sub-sections. Section 4.1 demonstrates inadequacy if not the absence of formal support mechanisms for permanently displaced IDPs and their entrepreneurial start-ups. Section 4.2 shows the significant role of social capital for entrepreneurial start-ups and business survival within a context of weak formal institutions. It also shows the different roles played by different types of networks in the business development of the IDP entrepreneurs. Section 4.3 presents our findings on the role of associational social capital concerning business start-ups and the survival of IDP entrepreneurs.

4.1 | Formal institutional support and the role of informal micro-enterprises

This study argues that while formal entrepreneurship support (from Government and NGOs) is important, in Pakistan it generates exclusionary effects which operate specially to the detriment of the most marginalized communities and so reinforce poverty. A field staff of FATA Economic revitalization program explains, “Our programs are open to all including religious minorities. If they [IDPs of religious

TABLE 2 Thematic analysis and coding cycles [Color Table can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

First order/organizing codes	Second-order codes	Aggregate dimension
Satisfactory role of government in the short-term rehabilitation of minority IDPs; The role of NGOs in the short-term rehabilitation of minority IDPs; insignificant role of government institutions in supporting entrepreneurial start-ups and survival of minority IDPs; no role of NGOs in supporting entrepreneurial start-up and survival of minority IDPs	Ineffective role of formal institutions in the entrepreneurial start-ups and survival of IDPs	
Minority IDPs acquiring government-sponsored enterprise developing loans; Minority IDPs acquiring NGO-supplied enterprise development loans; Minority IDPs acquiring informal loans for business start-up and survival	IDP's reliance on formal and informal support mechanisms for entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival	The role of formal and informal institutions in IDP entrepreneurial start-ups and survival
Individual self-help activities; collective self-help activities; community-based self-help organization; financial sources to support self-help activities; outcomes of self-help activities for IDPs	Individual and community self-help activities and their outcomes for IDPs	
The types of networks useful for entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival; the role of family ties in entrepreneurial start-ups; the role of community networks in supporting entrepreneurial start-ups; the role of business ties in entrepreneurial start-ups and survival; the role of networks in the business re-initiation of IDPs; the role of networks in the success of IDP's entrepreneurial ventures; microenterprises facilitating the role of networks in the rehabilitation of IDPs	Social capital, entrepreneurial start-ups, and survival	Social capital and entrepreneurial activities of IDPs
Variation in the type and size of economic activities of different religious communities; minority IDPs operating in the informal sector as forward-looking entrepreneurs; religious minority IDPs as survivalist entrepreneurs; patterns of economic activities within a community; preconflict and postconflict economic activities of minority IDP entrepreneurs	Entrepreneurial characteristics of the economic activities of minority IDPs	
Socioeconomic status of an individual as a determinant of decision to rely on either community or interpersonal networks; economic health of the community as a determinant of the role of community networks in the entrepreneurial start-up and survival; social capital as an important source of business support in the absence of effective policies and institutions	Economic capital and formal institutions as important determinants of the role of social capital in the minority IDP's entrepreneurial start-up and their survival	Context-dependent role of social capital in the entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival

Note: First order codes are represented in yellow, the second-order codes are represented in green, and the aggregate dimensions are represented in gray.

minorities] are not benefiting from those it is their choice" (Nauman interview, Spetember 12, 2019). Whereas, a Sikh community leader who has his shop in the same bazaar where FATA's revitalization program was actively implemented during our fieldwork, states: "I don't know anything about these [microenterprise support] activities. If you know about these, and if you can arrange our meeting with this organization so the Sikh traders can also benefit from this [enterprise development support of government]" (Sukhbeer, September 11, 2019).

This points to the fact that defective outreach methods and information asymmetry relating support provision operate, we argue, to the detriment of inclusive development through enterprise support policies. Akhuwat, the largest microfinance organization that offers interest-free loans across Pakistan is the most active organization in conflict-affected regions of erstwhile FATA. Akhuwat, along with Islamic Relief, is also implementing partners of the UNDP's FATA revitalization program. However, out of Akhuwat's over 5.8 million beneficiaries across Pakistan, in KP and FATA, only 863 were women, and only 87 (both male and female) were from religious minorities.¹ Similarly, in SMEDA's economic revitalization of KP and FATA none of

the beneficiaries belongs to religious minority communities. A senior official of SMEDA interviewed pointed out, "we have not seen any member of religious minorities visiting us in relation to these programs" (Naseem interview, September 17, 2019). Only 36 of our 105 survey respondents have indeed applied for grants under ERKF [Economic Revitalization of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA] and all of them are waiting for the outcome of their applications. A SMEDA official stated, "we know that some of these [applicants], we are assuming 40%, will not fit our criteria. Our (SMEDA) requirement is that they should be doing business before 2014, their business should have been affected, or if he [conflict-affected] comes within the rehab, he should have proper documentation that proves he was doing his own business before 2014." (Naseem, September 17, 2019). Akhuwat distributes its pamphlets in Mosques only, which automatically excludes religious minorities from other faiths than the Muslim majority.

Similarly, at the time of our fieldwork in 2019, the FATA revitalization program funded by UNDP has not reached some of the most remote areas of the Khyber and Oragzai districts and hence the population of those regions have not yet benefited from the long-term development programs. Finally, the criteria for ERKF implemented by

SMEDA suggest that the programs are aimed at the revitalization of conflict-affected regions and returnees, hence those who are permanently displaced and have their residential addresses elsewhere do not qualify for support. Overall, these findings clearly demonstrate that long-term policies aimed at rehabilitation through entrepreneurial activities are ineffective, and do not provide clear support to entrepreneurial activities of religious minorities or permanently displaced IDPs.

4.2 | Social capital: Entrepreneurial start-up and survival

It was found that where formal institutions of business support are weak or absent, social capital becomes the most important support source for IDP entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival. Four types of networks were identified relating to economic survival and rehabilitation of IDPs: Community (bonding), interpersonal (bonding), business (bridging), and associational (bonding) networks. The fourth type of network did not play any role in entrepreneurial start-up or survival, instead, its operations relied on the income generated by micro enterprises (more detail in Section 4.3). Before discussing separate roles of community, and interpersonal networks of family and business, we will demonstrate that the role of SC is in turn determined by economic capital.

4.3 | Economic capital as a determinant of the role of SC

The role of community and interpersonal ties in supporting entrepreneurial start-ups of the displaced entrepreneurs is well known (Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019). However, we found that economic capital is an important determinant of the modalities in which SC supports entrepreneurial ventures of IDPs. The overall economic health of the community determines whether or not community SC supports entrepreneurial ventures of IDPs. Furthermore, economic capital also shapes IDP's individual decisions to rely either on interpersonal or community networks.

For instance, as communities, Hindus and Sikhs are in effect quite different in terms of overall economic resources they possess. Out of 50 households in Tirawal Hindu community, states a community leader, "only four or five households can bear economic shocks, they cannot spare any money to help others start their business." (Rohait interview, August 20, 2019). Conversely, the Sikh community is much larger in size, and the number of households able to bear economic shocks is greater than those in need of permanent assistance. The varied economic outlook of these communities translates into varied outcomes of community SC for entrepreneurial support of the IDPs. Two contrasting cases of community support for IDP's start-up analyzed below will demonstrate this point.

Mayank, aged 19, is a Tirawal Hindu IDP and the only bread earner of his family with seven members. Mayank's father died in a

bomb blast in Torkham. His family survives with the help of community-provided food and his income of 15,000 (rupees) monthly wage labor. Mayank's current job was offered by a Sikh trader who is Mayank's relative. Mayank aspires to have his own business (in cosmetics), however, the Hindu community lacks the resources to provide Mayank with start-up capital or link him to suppliers to get goods on credit that will help him to start up his business.

On the other hand, Sukhvinder, age 40, is a Sikh IDP in Peshawar and the only bread-earner of an eight-members household. Sukhvinder was a street-vendor selling grocery items in Tira. After his displacement from Tira, Sukhvinder arrived in Peshawar without any capital. Sukhvinder's street business was destroyed as everything was left behind when he was forced to migrate. His immediate and long-term survival was assisted by community support. As Sukhvinder states, "When I arrived here, I lived in the Gurdwara, I was given ration by the Sangat [community organization], they [Sangat] also gave me 200,000 rupees with which I initiated my business in Bara" (Sukhvinder, September 7, 2019).

Community support is beneficial for the ultra-poor of the community, at a more general level. Individuals prefer to rely on their interpersonal networks than on charitable activities (e.g., money collection) generated by the community SC. In Pakistan, followers of both Sikh and Hindu communities pay Daswandh. Daswandh is a religious obligation that demands paying a tenth of one's earnings to help the poor members of his communities. Daswandh is collected by the community elders in the Gurdwara, who then spent these charities on the welfare needs of the poor community members. One of the most influential Sikh community leaders in Peshawar states, "Everyone does not come to collect Daswandh, most of them have family members having established businesses, they turned to them [family members] first and do not come to collect Daswandh" (Weer Singh, August 20, 2019).

4.4 | Community ties and entrepreneurial activities

It was found that community networks generally serve as a social safety net as strong interpersonal ties help re-starting an entrepreneurial venture (see below). However, the IDPs who have the capital or have interpersonal ties to generate economic capital do not rely on the community as a social safety net. Madhwan was the only Hindu IDP from Waziristan. After the destruction of his business, he migrated to Peshawar and was able to re-establish a wholesale setup with the help of personal finances, remittances sent by his brother, and pre-existing supply networks. Explaining the role of community support in his postdisplacement rehabilitation, Madhwan states, "I never required support from Mandar or Gurdwara, however, if they come to ask for charity, and if others donate 500, I will give 5000." (Madhwan, September 17, 2019).

Contrary to migrant entrepreneurship and social capital literature (Williams and Krasniqi, 2018; Williams & Efendic, 2019), it was found that a customer base underpinned by community solidarity is insignificant for the survival and expansion of entrepreneurial ventures of the

religious minorities studied. This absence of need for community's solidarity to provide customer base is mainly due to the smaller size of religious minority communities and dispersed business locations of minority entrepreneurs. On average, all our survey respondents reported that around 95% of their customers are from other faith communities, mainly Muslims.

Community solidarity is an important source of wage employment for IDP entrepreneurs. The role of community solidarity in offering wage employment is especially important for aspiring entrepreneurs who lack financial capital and interpersonal family or business networks to support immediate start-ups after they arrive at the host destination. All those interviewees who lacked the financial capital or interpersonal family and business networks needed to immediately start up a business after displacement found wage employment with their community members having an established business in the host destination. Some of these wage employees have successfully started their businesses while others are looking forward to doing so. For these would-be entrepreneurs, wage employment is a transitional step toward having one's own business.

Herminder, working in his family's wholesale grocery business was twice abducted by militants and was released after paying the ransom. After their arrival to their current city of residence (undisclosed due to the interviewee's security), Herminder's family purchased a house and was left without any capital for setting up a business. Herminder, his father and a younger brother started working as wage laborers with other Sikh community members. Herminder started for 3000 rupees a month with a Sikh community member, and "gradually adjusted" to the surroundings by learning the Punjabi language which he could not speak at the time of his arrival at the host destination. While working with a Sikh community member in a herbal medicines business, in the first 2 years, he acquainted himself with herbal medicines and then started his shop in a nearby village. He continued working with the Sikh community member 3 days a week while running his own business for the rest of the week. After generating some capital, Herminder and his family planned a gradual transition from herbal medicines to the cosmetic business. The first set up a store for their brother in 2016, and then set up another for Herminder and his father in 2018. The establishment of their second cosmetic store completed their transition from one business to another. Their new business was established with the help of personal savings, informal loans from family members, and commercial credit from suppliers.

4.5 | Interpersonal family and business networks

Overall, interpersonal family and business networks are found to be critical for business start-up and survival. Family ties help find waged employment, offer loans for start-ups, and introduce the IDP entrepreneurs to suppliers for acquiring goods on commercial credit. For instance, Sathwand is a Sikh IDP in Nankana Sahib. After his arrival to Nankana Sahib, Sathwand worked as wage labor, a job that he quit after 2 years and remained unemployed for the following 4 years. Throughout these years, Sathwand relied on community support for

shelter, food and the school fee of his children, all provided by the Sikh fraternity. Sathwand's close relatives (brother-in-law and wife's nephew) helped him to set up his grocery business by providing the required seed capital. Together these two ties generated 300,000 PKR which Sathwand has not yet returned. As Sathwand explains, "that was not a loan, I have eaten a lot of that money and have not returned that amount ... They have told me, whenever your business gets better, return our money, until then, we will not demand a single rupee from you." (Sathwand interview, September 13, 2019). Radhay, a Hindu entrepreneur in Peshawar was forced to quit his medical school following his father's death, who was the only bread-earner of Radhay's family. They did not receive community support to re-initiate the business. He worked as a waged employee until his brother-in-law invited him to jointly run the business. Because of his 7 years' experience in sales, Radhay had the knowledge and skills of how businesses operate but was lacking the financial capital for setting up his start-up. Radhay's brother-in-law, who inherited his business from his maternal uncle did not have the know-how to operate a business.

Family ties are also helpful in brokering business connections which are critical to initiating and successfully operating an entrepreneurial venture in the host destination. The case of Ramesh, a Sikh IDP in Peshawar illustrates this point. Ramesh, a cosmetic retailer, was a grocery retailer before his first displacement from Tira Maidan. His house was captured by militants but he was able to re-initiate his business in Bara (erstwhile Khyber agency). However, after his second displacement from Bara to Peshawar, he left everything behind but some running cash and the record books of his business. One of Ramesh's relatives, who established his business in Peshawar years before the conflict, asked Ramesh to rent a shop and promised to help him to get the goods even though Ramesh did not have money to offer. Through this relative Ramesh was able to meet suppliers and get goods on credit from them which, in Ramesh's words, helped him "to get the circle of the business started." After 4 years (at the time of the interview), Ramesh has built enough market reputation and networks that he can now use to help others who are in a similar situation as he was 4 years ago.

Our evidence thus shows that interpersonal business networks (bridging ties) guarantee continuity of entrepreneurial venture, as they are the most reliable source for getting goods on credit, even if an entrepreneur lacks economic capital. Per Ramesh, the IDP Entrepreneur mentioned above, "Whatever you see in this shop, in all this [business], about 70 percent is arranged through the *ugraie* system (credit from the suppliers). After selling these goods, I return supplier's money and feed my family with the profit that I earn" (Ramesh interview, September 11, 2019). Feeding the family implies dealing with all the practical needs of the family including children's education. Consulted about their main source of business survival, 41% of the survey respondents reported suppliers, 32% reported family, 27% reported community but 21 selected suppliers belonging to the same community, and less than 1% (only one) regarded government and NGOs support as their main source of business survival.

Business ties are critical for the survival and continued operation of entrepreneurial ventures; however, they limit entrepreneurial

agency and business expansion. Sukhbeer Singh, A Sikh entrepreneur, deals with second-hand mobile phones in Peshawar. Explaining the lack of growth in his business size Sukhbeer stated, “I am doing business on other's money. If I have my resources, I can invest them in my business and progress further, but I cannot progress further on someone else's money. I will be continuing on this one level, I will eat and drink, but I will be unable to get to the next level” (Sukhbeer Singh, September 12, 2019). Explaining how credit relations limit entrepreneurial agency, Ramesh states, “every business owner is not giving me goods on credit. Those who give me credit, may not have those things that can have a greater profit margin. Again, if I am buying something on credit, I am buying it at the price that the supplier likes, that is not my choice” (Ramesh interview, September 11, 2019).

4.6 | Associational social capital, collective self-help, and entrepreneurial activities

We found that associational social capital hardly plays a role in entrepreneurial start-ups or business survival of the religious minority IDPs in Pakistan. Instead, associational activities rely on the capital generated by microenterprises to perform collective self-help community efforts for supporting IDP households in their postdisplacement survival. In so far as collective self-help activities are concerned, individuals in both the Hindu and Sikh communities in Peshawar, and the Sikh community in the *nankana sahib*, have established community self-help associations. These are often established by young, formally educated and politically active members of the community and often enjoy the support of all the community members linked to their gurdwara and mandir in the case of Sikhs and Hindus, respectively. These organizations provide food, education, and shelter to the poorest community members. Their major source of financial support is Daswandh (donations), collected from own-community traders. Table 3 provides more details about these community self-help organizations.

Self-help associations are common bonding types, consisting of own community members and like-minded people within the community. These associations acquire financial support from their own community members and provide for their welfare needs. Exclusive welfare service providers to own community members, in the words of a Hindu community leader, are due to “acute poverty” within minority communities. As he explains, “The sentiment of help is not limited to our community alone, but poverty in our community is so acute that we cannot think of the outside world” (Rohait interview, September 15, 2019).

Gurdwara or Mandir, as an expression of religious solidarity, and closed interpersonal networks of trust leading to the establishment of membership-based associations are found to be the two most important sources of collective self-help activities for the relief and rehabilitation of IDPs. Religious solidarity was the source of immediate relief in terms of finding food and shelter, whereas associations established by young educated community members provide basic welfare services such as education and monthly food ration for the ultra-poor of

the community. The example previously provided demonstrates the positive impact these associations have on the lives of the ultra-poor households of the minority communities. The very survival of these collective self-help activities depends upon the financial support generated through micro-enterprises. Be it collective self-help organizations, or places of worship offering food and shelter based on religious solidarity, all rely on donations from community traders who own micro-enterprises (Table 3). No evidence of the direct role of religious solidarity or community self-help organizations for business start-up or survival was however found.

5 | DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The findings presented above raise significant theoretical and practical issues concerning the microeconomics of conflict and development (Bizri, 2017; Kwong et al., 2019). The findings resonate with Evans (1997, p. 173) in that social capital can be generated even in the most adverse circumstances, which helped especially displaced entrepreneurs (Kwong et al., 2019). In the absence of effective formal support institutions contributing to individual and collective self-help, informal networks of social relations supported by entrepreneurial activities operating in the informal economy become crucial to entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival. This *important role of SC* is in turn critical to the long-term rehabilitation of permanently displaced populations. The article argues that the potential of such individual and collective self-help activities cannot be fully realized unless bespoke enterprise development policies are in place.

Besides, reiterating the role of SC for entrepreneurial start-up and survival in the postconflict context characterized by weak formal institutions, our findings have significant implications for (forced) migration, entrepreneurship and SC literature. Contrary to Williams and Krasniqi (2018), we found that co-ethnic networks play a significant role in entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival (Levie, 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Vershinina et al., 2011). This Role of coethnic networks in entrepreneurial start-ups is especially true in contexts where bonding shaped by religious solidarity imposes exclusionary feelings. Unlike both sides of the divide on the role of co-ethnic networks in the entrepreneurial activities of displaced entrepreneurs (Levie, 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Vershinina et al., 2011; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018), we demonstrated that different types of co-ethnic networks (community, interpersonal and associational) play particular roles in the entrepreneurial start-ups and their survival. Furthermore, unlike the resource perspective in the migration and entrepreneurship literature, which treats SC as an independent variable, we argue that formal institutions and economic capital are significant determinants of SC's role in entrepreneurial start-ups, survival, and success.

Our findings contribute to the literature on the microeconomics of conflict (Verwimp et al., 2019), with a focus on conflict, displacement, and entrepreneurship in Pakistan (Muhammad & Warren, 2016; Kwong et al., 2019). Our research goes beyond existing displacement

TABLE 3 Collective self-help organizations

Organizational profile/ minority group	Sikhs of Peshawar	Hindu community of karimpura (Peshawar)	Sikhs of nankana sahib
Organization's name	Peshawar singhsabha society	Om institute	Young Singh student society
Year of establishment	2016	2018	2016–2017
Main activity	Providing monthly food packages to the poor in the community (particularly displaced persons), education support.	Providing monthly food packages to the poor members of the community (particularly displaced), religious education	Providing educational support to young Sikh children
Number of beneficiaries (households)	37	6	9
Method of collecting donations and source	Monthly in the gurdwara; individual incomes generated through businesses	Monthly visits to own-community traders; generated through microenterprises	Need-based visits to the shops and homes of community members; generated through trading activities
Status	Active	Active	Inactive

Source: Interview data and field notes.

and entrepreneurship literature by providing evidence on multiple displacement locations and host destinations with different marginalized communities that are even harder to reach than ordinary noncamp IDPs operating in the informal sector (Kwong et al., 2019; Zetter et al., 2014; Bizri, 2017). Second, our study demonstrates that the role of SC in promoting entrepreneurial activities of the conflict-affected IDPs cannot be thoroughly assessed unless the postconflict development policies are assessed. This *contribution* is a clear advance over the existing literature which overlooks the policy context of the operation and outcome of entrepreneurship and SC in the aftermath of conflict (Kyboro, 2017; Williams & Krasniqi, 2018; Williams & Effendic, 2019).

We found that the ultimate goal of the IDPs was to establish their enterprise in the informal sector, which is perceived as a sort of guarantee of their long-term survival. However, the means of realizing this goal are social networks and not formal institutional support (Muhammad & Warren, 2016; Bizri, 2017). Distrust associated with the ability of formal institutions to provide support is the underlying cause of the IDP's reliance on informal support mechanisms such as SC (Khan, 2019). As socially embedded actors, individual entrepreneurs facing problems call upon habitual ways of doing things and previously successful routines to orient their entrepreneurial behaviors (Spedale & Watson, 2014). If entrepreneurial behavior, in terms of opportunity recognition, is shaped by external conditions underpinned by institutional context, complementarity between formal and informal institutions is a must. To this end, state institutions and donor organizations need to design inclusive micro-enterprise policies that can generate trust and hence the facilitation of entrepreneurial behavior (Blatmann et al., 2015) even among informal/nonregistered entrepreneurs.

Our findings also demonstrate that permanent IDPs unlike the returnee entrepreneurs of Swat (Muhammad & Warren, 2016) are faced with more adverse business environments (Kwong et al., 2019). The permanent IDPs lose their entire customer base and also their network of local suppliers (Kwong et al., 2019). Moreover, the survival

needs of the permanently displaced are hardly a policy consideration because the government's policies are primarily designed to promote a return to the place of origin (Mosel & Jackson, 2013). In such an adverse business environment, bonding SC of permanent IDPs is a major source of initiating ties with the suppliers (Bizri, 2017). Nevertheless, the role of SC in facilitating entrepreneurial activities has its limits that are underpinned by socioeconomic inequalities. Since these marginalized communities are often poor, socioeconomic inequalities inhibit entrepreneurial potentials, especially to the detriment of these more marginalized communities.

6 | CONCLUSION

We started by asking how social capital is linked to microenterprise development, which is crucial to the survival and economic revival of internally displaced religious minority entrepreneurs in Pakistan. We also asked why focusing on the entrepreneurship–social capital link is critical for contexts with poorly designed or inexistent enterprise development policies for postconflict rehabilitation of permanently displaced households. In response to these questions, our findings first demonstrate that entrepreneurial activities of IDP religious minorities do play an important role in their long-term survival, especially where formal support infrastructure has exclusionary effects on marginalized communities. Second, our empirical evidence demonstrates that formal institutions and the economic health of the community determine the role that SC can play in supporting entrepreneurship among conflict-affected IDPs. Findings also show that community ties serve as a social safety net for the ultra-poor IDPs of the community, whereas interpersonal family and business networks are critical for entrepreneurial start-ups and their long-term survival. Formal associations of bonding type do not play any role in entrepreneurial support activities, instead, their welfare provision activities are dependent on economic capital generated by entrepreneurial activities of community members.

Some policy recommendations emerge from our study. First, on the pattern of quotas in the formal employment practiced in Pakistan, quotas in the enterprise development schemes for religious minority entrepreneurs could be introduced. This *policy measure* will do away with much of the unintended exclusionary effects of uninformed enterprise development policies of both government and donor agencies. This *policy design* will incentivize entrepreneurial support for marginalized religious communities in the context where poor data allow reticence regarding religious minorities in the post-conflict development policies. In line with Ram et al. (2017), addressing such policy gaps calls for rejecting the tendency to view business support activities for minority entrepreneurs as secondary to mainstream provision.

Moreover, enterprise support policies need not be aimed at forcing IDPs to return to their locations of origin. Policies should be formulated to support permanently displaced IDPs who may wish not to return to their places of origin. Formulating such policies will help religious minorities IDPs in the long run without estranging them. Third, most of our respondents do not wish to return due to the underdevelopment of their place of origin and the fact that they have better conditions in their host destinations. Making provision for the rehabilitation of permanently displaced IDPs will save the government from wasting its development efforts and resources. Forcing IDPs to return to their underdeveloped places of origin which do not have basic facilities is counterproductive. That the current policy thinking is insensitive to the varied impact of place is perhaps the best example of how one-size-fits-all postconflict development policies re-enforce marginalization, exclusion, and consequently distrust in government policy. Therefore, all the long-term post-conflict development policies require serious reconsideration of the varied impacts of place as well as community employment trends on the return and long-term rehabilitation of minority IDPs.

Two limitations of this study are important for future research. First, this study was exploratory in nature, and the long-term impacts of community social capital on providing social safety net and support to entrepreneurial micro-businesses requires longitudinal approaches, particularly to inform policy decision making concerning businesses' long-term sustainability. Second, the IDP participants of this study were all men, and hence a perspective on women-led entrepreneurial activities in postconflict rehabilitation is also required.

ENDNOTES

¹ These statistics were provided to the lead author in an in-person meeting in August 2019 by Akhvat's regional office in Peshawar.

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APPENDIX

ANALYZING RELEVANT SURVEYS/DATABASES FOR EXTRACTING MINORITY-RELATED DATA

Name of survey	Period of coverage	Geographic scope of survey	Is the data disaggregated by religion	Is there any mention of religious minorities in this survey?	Is there any mention of the religious minorities of KP in this survey?	If yes, what dimensions of this survey have gathered and analyzed data on minorities.	Produce an additional table on that data related to minorities in this survey	If data exists on minorities, are all minorities treated as homogeneous categories, or are different religious communities mentioned separately	What is the sample size and how is the data in this survey/database disaggregated?
Pakistan Living Standards measurement survey	2014–2015	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	78,635 households. Data disaggregated by province/district, by region (urban/rural) and by gender.
	2013–2014	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	17,989 households. Data disaggregated by province, region (urban/rural) and gender.
	2012–2013	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	75,516 households. Low, middle and high-income group, keeping in view the socio-economic status of the majority of households. Data disaggregated on the bases of region (urban/rural) and gender.
	2011–2012	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	15,807 households. Data disaggregated by region (urban/rural) and gender.
	2010–2011	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	
	2008–2009	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	75,188 households with village/neighborhood as enumeration bloc. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2007–2008	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	

(Continues)

Name of survey	Period of coverage	Geographic scope of survey	Is the data disaggregated by religion	Is there any mention of religious minorities in this survey?	Is there any mention of the religious minorities of KP in this survey?	If yes, what dimensions of this survey have gathered and analyzed data on minorities.	Produce an additional table on that data related to minorities in this survey	If data exists on minorities, are all minorities treated as homogeneous categories, or are different religious communities mentioned separately	What is the sample size and how is the data in this survey/database disaggregated?
	2006–2007	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	73,953 households. Data disaggregated by region and gender.
	2005–2006	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	15,453 households. Data disaggregated by region and gender.
	2004–2005	National/provincial/district	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	76,520 households.
Household Economic Survey (Pakistan)	2015–2016	National/provincial level with urban/rural breakdown	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	24,238 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2013–2014	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	17,989 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2011–2012	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	17,056 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2010–2011	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	16,341 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2007–2008	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	15,512 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2005–2006	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	Covering 15,453 households
	2004–2005	National/provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	Covering 14,708 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.

Name of survey	Period of coverage	Geographic scope of survey	Is the data disaggregated by region	Is there any mention of religious minorities in this survey?	Is there any mention of the religious minorities of KP in this survey?	If yes, what dimensions of this survey have gathered and analyzed data on minorities. Produce an additional table on that data related to minorities in this survey	If data exists on minorities, are all minorities treated as homogeneous categories, or are different religious communities mentioned separately	What is the sample size and how is the data in this survey/database disaggregated?
ILO labor force survey for Pakistan and then KP-relevant statistics	2014–2015	National/provincial level	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	42,292 households, data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
Labor force survey conducted by Pakistan bureau of statistics	2017–2018	National and provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	43,361 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2014–2015	National and provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	42,108 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
	2013–2014	National and provincial	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	40,747 households. Data disaggregated by region (rural/urban) and gender.
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority business development survey	N/A	N/A	N/A	SMEDA Publications access is denied	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)	2017–2018	All regions	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	
International displacement monitor data on IDPs	2017	KP FATA and Quetta	No	No	No	N/A	N/A	119,000 Total number of IDPs (December 2018).

Note: Military-restricted FATA and Protected Areas of KP are excluded from various rounds of PSLM and HIES (PSLM, 2014–2015:1; HIES, 2015–2016:4; PSLM, 2013–2014:2).