

**BETWEEN NATION AND STATE**  
Nation, Nationalism, State, and National Identity in Cyprus

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Nicos Peristianis  
Ph.D. thesis  
Middlesex University

2008

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**BETWEEN NATION AND STATE**  
**Nation, Nationalism, State, and National Identity in Cyprus**

**Nicos Peristianis**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the Requirements of Middlesex University  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**June 2008**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis is a study of the emergence and diachronic development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and its relation to nation, state, and national identities. The broad perspective of historical sociology is used, and the more specific neo-Weberian analytic framework of cultural transformation and social closure, as developed by A. Wimmer, to demonstrate how nationalism, as the 'axial principle' along which modern societies structure inclusion and exclusion, did not lead to the development of a Cypriot nation-state, but to a bi-ethnic national state instead; this was mainly because closure took place along ethnic and not national lines, for socio-historical reasons which the study examines.

The study first explores the hotly debated issue 'when is the nation', of whether there was a Greek nation in antiquity, of which Greek-Cypriots were a part, or whether the nation's roots are traceable in Medieval times. Next, the development of national consciousness and nationalism is considered, under three different types of regime: During Ottoman rule, a religious community was gradually transformed into an ethnic community; toward the end of this period, Ottoman reforms did not manage to forge a common new (*Ottomanist*) identity, for social closure had already progressed along ethnic lines. In early British colonial years, ethnicity was politicized and ethnic consciousness gradually turned into a nationalist mass movement for *enosis*; despite the overall unity of the movement, two variants of nationalism developed, a more traditional ethnic version, characterizing the Right, and another version, imbued with territorial/civic elements (derived from the internationalist outlook of the communist party), characterizing the Left. The anti-colonial struggle for *enosis* was led by the Right, and excluded the Left and the Turkish-Cypriots.

The fragile consociational regime established at independence collapsed after a brief period of cohabitation between the Greeks and Turks of the island in the bi-ethnic / bi-communal Republic of Cyprus – the study analyses the causes leading to the breakdown. Between 1964 and 67, the Greek-Cypriots turned to *enosis* again, but after realizing the difficulties and dangers involved in its pursuance, Makarios sought to strengthen independence instead, while limiting the powers of Turkish-Cypriots – in effect, aiming for a majoritarian regime with minority rights for the latter. The clash between pro-independence and pro-*enosis* versions of nationalism was to characterize this period, leading to the coup and invasion of 1974.

With the death of *enosis* in 1974, *Hellenocentric* nationalism would give more emphasis to Greek culture and identity, whereas *Cyprocentric* nationalism would stress the priority of Cyprus, the state, and of rapprochement with the Turkish-Cypriots. The study utilizes data from two surveys coordinated by the author, to analyze in more depth the attitudes and discourses of Greek-Cypriots as regards their relations to the Greek nation and the Cypriot state. The gradual strengthening of Cypriot identity is seen to be connected with a new social compromise, which seems to have prevailed within the Greek-Cypriot community, stressing the importance of the Greek-Cypriot state, and which seems to be the primary explanation of why the Greek-Cypriots rejected the federal solution suggested by the UN sponsored Annan Plan, in 2004. In the same year, Cyprus became a member of the European Union, and the study considers some of the implications of this development for the future of nationalism in Cyprus.

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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

### **Objectives, issues, methods, overview**

This thesis is an analysis of the genesis and growth of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and its relation to nation, state and national identities.<sup>1</sup> The informed reader will immediately recognize how difficult and complex this aim is, considering that each of these terms is variedly interpreted by a voluminous and contradictory literature. The term nationalism, for instance, has been used to refer to ideas, discourses, ideologies and ideological movements, collective sentiments, and forms of behaviour or action. Obviously, each emphasis would lead to different implications for the study of nationalism – for instance, a stress on ideas, discourses and narratives would lead to a focus on nationalist texts, whereas a stress on movement would focus on analysis of political action, power and conflict. Similar problems arise with the rest of the terms and phenomena the study intends to examine.<sup>2</sup> Following Wimmer, the present analysis views nationalism as the central “cultural compromise” of modern society, and national states as forms of “social closure” resulting from this compromise.<sup>3</sup> Closure along ethnic (rather than national) lines results in tensions or even the complete breakdown of national states, which is what has happened in Cyprus. These concepts will be explained more fully further below, in the section on approaches and theories.

Greek-Cypriot nationalism presents an interesting case which considerably contrasts with other, well researched types of nationalism, especially as regards its peculiar relation to nation and state. Most types of nationalism can be classified as either state-led (the state fostering the creation of nation) or state-seeking (the nation aiming to form its own state). To these, Oommen<sup>4</sup> adds “state-renouncing” nationalisms, to refer to nations which ended up existing within the confines of a larger national entity (Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom, Catalonia and the Basque country within Spain, Quebec within Canada). The end result is a complex field comprised of: Nation-states or state-nations (Germany, Italy, Greece, as regards the former case, France, the United States, as regards the second); nations without states (Scotland, Catalonia); pluri-national states (the UK, Spain, Belgium); uni-national states (Japan); shared-nation states (South and North Korea); nations sharing states (Swedes in Sweden and Finland, Kurds in Turkey and Iran); and states without nations (Singapore, Taiwan).<sup>5</sup>

In Cyprus, an earlier irredentist form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism (*enosis*) aimed to unite Cyprus with a 'motherland' state (Greece), while the possibility of the creation of a Cypriot state was hardly considered. The stimulation of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism which opposed *enosis*, advocating partition or double union (to Greece and Turkey respectively), and British colonialism's use of the ensuing antagonism, led to the formation of a "Reluctant Republic"<sup>6</sup> – a bi-communal, bi-national Cypriot state. After a brief period of co-habitation, the consociational Cyprus Republic collapsed, Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from government into homogeneous enclaves, and Greek-Cypriots swiftly returned to the *enosis* ideal. Soon realizing that the latter was almost impossible to achieve, the majority half-heartedly embraced the idea of a unitary state where the Turkish-Cypriots would enjoy a protected minority status; a smaller fraction clung obstinately to the *enosis* dream, turning violent in its pursued ends and, with help from the "national centre" (more specifically, the Greek military junta in power at the time), undermined the Cypriot state with a coup; this was promptly followed by Turkey's invasion and the partition of the island in 1974. After this stage two new variants of nationalism emerged, each characterized by a different attitude towards nation and state. Even though after '74 the Greek-Cypriots kept pressing for the creation of a federation, which would have re-unified the country, in 2004, the vast majority voted against a UN sponsored plan aiming at a federal solution. Meanwhile Cyprus has entered the European Union, which seems to be offering new challenges and opportunities to the Greek-Cypriot controlled national state.

The study of nationalism in Cyprus has been, until recently, the almost exclusive preserve of historians and political scientists. But most mainstream historians have analyzed Cypriot nationalism by using its own categories – that is, by viewing it as a phenomenon associated with the nation, which itself is seen to be traceable three thousand years back, at the time of the coming of Greek settlers on the island. Henceforth Cyprus is seen as having been a part of the Greek nation, and various events (such as King Evagoras' conflict with the Persians in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C.) as manifestations of local nationalist feeling. Yet most contemporary social science approaches consider nations as modern phenomena (Gellner), or at most concede a persisting 'cultural core' (Smith) in pre-modern times. Whichever approach is used the questions remain as to what were the governing principles of pre-modern societies, and what were the specific ways in which the pre-modern or pre-nation characteristics of a society were transformed, in order to constitute the modern imagined community of the nation; what, furthermore, were the social forces within pre-nation society that

gave birth to the new ideology of nationalism.<sup>7</sup> None of these questions have been addressed by nationalist historians, and it is only recently that new approaches have emerged which attempt to schematically (Kitromilides), or partially – for a specific historic period – (Katsiaounis) do so. What is still lacking is a diachronic analysis of nation and nationalism which would build on these recent approaches but extend them to a more full-fledged socio-historical interpretation of the genesis and development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism.

Political scientists or international relations scholars have been the second conspicuous group which have touched on aspects of Cypriot nationalism, mostly in the context of an analysis of how 'external' factors (that is, the interests and power politics of other states) have impinged on 'internal' factors to create and perpetuate the 'Cyprus Problem' – that is, the conflict between the Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot communities. This perspective has certainly produced interesting insights, but its mostly 'external' focus has added little to the fuller understanding of nationalism as a social phenomenon. The present study will reverse the emphasis and 'bracket away' such external considerations, and refer to them only to the extent that they illuminate a particular aspect of the topics of investigation.

Few sociologists have studied Cypriot nationalism extensively. One of the major works which does so, by Attalides, is an exemplary piece bridging the domains of sociology and international relations, yet its coverage of pre-modern times and of the origins of Greek-Cypriot nationalism is brief and sketchy. Markides similarly pays little attention to the "historical antecedents" of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and seems to assume that the cultural core (Greek language and the Orthodox religion) quite naturally, and in an unproblematic way, gave rise to nationalist consciousness, the main carrier of which was the Orthodox Church (an assumption shared by the nationalists but contested by recent historical research). Such approaches under-emphasize the ideological labour required in constructing the new imagined community of the nation, and the role of the modern state and its ideological apparatuses (mainly mass education and communication) in cultivating nationalist ideas and feelings.

Early works by social anthropologists (mainly Loizos, and to a lesser extent Sant Cassia and Argyrou), made small, though significant contributions, shifting the emphasis of their analysis to the relationship between social change and nationalism. More recent studies have made aspects or periods of nationalism their specific subject of

investigation: Papadakis has focused on the construction of nationalist identities, narratives and commemorations, whereas Bryant's work in historical anthropology has examined the impact of British colonialism and modernity on the local cultures of nationalism.

Since the main objective of this thesis is to study the genesis and development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and its relation with nation and state, the bulk of the analysis is based on historical sociology; once the analysis arrives at the current historical juncture, then additional methods are used, such as surveys and discourse analysis, to supplement and extend the historical approach.

In recent decades, developments within the disciplines of sociology and history have brought the two much nearer than before. Modern sociology was born in nineteenth century Europe as an attempt to understand and explain the great historical social transformations of the times – the transition from traditional to modern societies, with the accompanying processes of industrialization, urbanization, ascendancy of new social classes, emergence of new states and nations, as well as the accompanying social problems. Yet the founding fathers of sociology (including Comte, Spencer, Tonnies) resorted to uses of history which were far from exemplary, since often universal 'laws of history' were stipulated a priori and historical evidence hand-picked so as to fit their proposed grand schemes. There were of course exceptions, as those of Marx and especially Weber, who produced landmark contributions in historical sociology (such as Weber's analysis of the rise of capitalism in the West). American sociology, which was to dominate the field since the turn of the century, showed no great interest in historical sociology and concentrated instead on concrete, empirical social phenomena and problems, running the risk of becoming 'ultra-empirical' or, as Mannheim pointed out, of being "split into a series of discrete technical problems of social readjustment".<sup>8</sup> Nationalism was too abstract and complex to attract attention – and besides, it was considered a phenomenon doomed to fade away with modernization. Structural functionalism, which was the dominant paradigm between 1940-1970, had an "ahistorical bias". As Sztompka puts it, if the field's heritage of the early European origins was "a sociology above history", the heritage of the second American origins was a "sociology without history".<sup>9</sup>

Yet again, the historical perspective did not disappear altogether, as witnessed by major works like Eisenstadt's on the political system of Empires (1963), and Lipset's

genealogy of "the first new nation" – America (1967); but its "full renaissance" was to come after the 1970s, with the rise of 'new historicism' or 'historical sociology' as a distinct theoretical and methodological perspective on the social world. Norbert Elias was one of the first historical sociologists to mount a sustained attack on "the retreat of sociologists into the present", and on the uncritical fact-finding of much empirical research. Elias stressed that to understand a society is to understand its history since "every present society has grown out of earlier societies and points beyond itself to a diversity of possible futures".<sup>10</sup> More recently, Philip Abrams has argued for a complete integration of sociology and history since "in terms of their fundamental preoccupation history and sociology are the same thing. Both seek to understand the puzzle of human agency and both seek to do so in terms of the process of social structuring".<sup>11</sup> Abrams underlines that "society must be understood as a process constructed historically by individuals who are constructed historically by society";<sup>12</sup> the central concern of social analysis is this "continuous process of construction" of individuals and society. Charles Tilly, another prominent historical sociologist, or social historian, similarly argues that sociology should become "historically grounded", so as to study societies "comparatively over substantial blocks of space and time, in order to see whence we have come, where we are going, and what real alternatives to our present condition exist".<sup>13</sup>

The move of sociology towards history has been reciprocated by a corresponding move of history towards sociology. History is no longer a chronological record of the achievements of kings and other rulers: Its domain has expanded with new perspectives such as social history, history from below, and subaltern history. In this convergence the two disciplines seem to have followed Carr's admonition: "The more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both. Let the frontier between them be kept wide open for two-way traffic".<sup>14</sup>

The perspective of historical sociology has been fruitfully applied to the study of nations and nationalism, especially since the mid-sixties, with the works of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John Armstrong, Walker Connor, Anthony Smith, John Breuilly, Andreas Wimmer and others. Despite the wide divergences between these scholars, there is also an emerging area of convergence, the basis of which is an effort to "situate the complex phenomena within the overall context of social change in keeping with the tradition of the [sociological] discipline".<sup>15</sup> As Aloysius puts it: "This

internal approach to the study of nationalism as a specific form of social change is the most important contribution of the new sociological approach".<sup>16</sup>

It is precisely this "internal" approach, focusing on nationalism and social dynamics over time, with a view of considering the impact of significant social changes (such as those relating to the political regime and economic mode of production, the ascendancy of new classes, and so on), and which sees present day Cypriot society as borne of earlier forms of society, which differentiates this thesis from previous works on Greek-Cypriot nationalism.

This first part of the thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources which have been interpreted or re-interpreted, respectively, using a constructivist framework (presented further on), which allows a new reading of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and national identity. *Secondary sources* include historical studies and records on Cypriot society, economy and culture, memoirs of individuals (such as political leaders, nationalist activists, but also ordinary citizens), and travelers' accounts. *Primary sources* include newspapers, which were especially useful in cases where other materials were scant or seemed to give insufficient or biased coverage of a subject (such as the early rise and ideology of the communist party in Cyprus, and the formative period of 'Cyprocentrism' just after the 1974 events), censuses, official reports (of the government, political parties and of other organizations), and statistical data on various socio-economic trends.

The final part of the thesis, which deals with the contemporary period, is based on primary sources and incorporates the findings of additional data drawn from two large-scale surveys coordinated by the author, in 2000 and 2006. The first survey covered a representative, stratified sample of 1,073 individuals and used a closed questionnaire delivered to all participants, as well as an open questionnaire completed by a sub-sample of 150 individuals; the second survey covered 900 individuals, stratified according to the same characteristics, and the questionnaire contained some new but also some of the same questions as the 2000 survey, so as to facilitate diachronic comparisons. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods afforded an opportunity to enrich our analysis with data generated specifically for the needs of the thesis – relating to Greek-Cypriot national identifications, attitudes towards significant national others, loyalty to state or nation, and so on. More details on the surveys are provided in Appendix 1.

The next section deals with the various approaches and theories of nations and nationalism, providing the opportunity to highlight the main controversies in the field, and to present the theoretical perspective guiding the thesis.

Chapter two addresses the question "when is the nation?", which has been a subject of lively recent debate in the social sciences; it goes back to the pre-modern history of Cyprus, starting with antiquity and the question of whether Cyprus constituted a part of the Greek nation – a central doctrine of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. After reviewing the growth of the Orthodox Church, as the most central Cypriot institution, from Byzantine to European feudal rule, it considers the extent to which there was a first appearance of Greek nationalism in Medieval times (many theories locate the roots of this to a number of nationalisms in these times).

Chapter three traces the changes introduced by Ottoman rule and especially the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church and the consolidation of religious identities under the *millet* system. It then considers the rise of new social classes, which were to become the carriers of early ethnic consciousness and ideas; the latter were to acquire increasing prominence towards late Ottoman rule with the empire's decline and the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms.

Chapter four studies British rule and the impact of modern principles and institutions on the communally based local society. After looking at how national awareness turned into a full-blown nationalist movement, it focuses on the counter-hegemonial project of the working class movement, and its own transition from internationalism to an alternative variant of nationalism. The intra-ethnic contest between Left and Right and the inter-ethnic conflict between the two communities are then considered in relation to the anti-colonial struggle.

Chapter five covers the 1960-1974 period of Independence – the formation and character of the consociational bi-communal state and the reasons for its collapse in 1963; the acquirement of the Cyprus Republic by the Greek-Cypriots and the resurgence of *enosis*; Makarios' turn to the policy of the feasible and the ensuing conflict between a militant ethnic nationalism and an incipient state nationalism; and the crisis of identity and loyalties leading to the 1974 debacle.



Chapter six covers the post-1974 period, in which there was an initial rise of *Cyprocentrism* (a new wave of state patriotism) followed by the return of Hellenocentrism, reinvigorated by neo-nationalism. After considering the ensuing collective identities (political and ethno-national), the chapter examines the convergence to a Greek-Cypriot version of nationalism, and the associated identification with the Greek-Cypriot state, which is seen to be the main reason explaining the rejection of the UN sponsored Annan Plan for a new federal regime in 2004.

Chapter seven, the conclusion, attempts to bring together the main threads of the argument and to make some overall evaluations on Greek-Cypriot nationalism and national identity.

In order to proceed to a full-fledged analysis of our topic, it is necessary to outline the main theoretical issues involved, as well as the major approaches to the field, and situate the present study's own proposed perspective and course of analysis. We may take as a point of departure Ozkirimli's observation<sup>17</sup> that the main issues around which contemporary theoretical debate revolves, cluster around three basic questions: a) what is the nation and nationalism; b) what are the origins of nations and nationalism (are they ancient or modern phenomena); c) what are the different varieties and types of nationalism. Each of these questions is answered differently by the three main approaches and relevant theories which have crystallized out of the fierce contemporary debates on these matters. We will now turn to consider these three paradigms, concentrating on those aspects which will be most useful in subsequently examining the case of Cyprus. It should be noted that with the continuous proliferation of related studies, what we will be considering is not so much three discrete perspectives with associated theories, but a range or continuum of relevant positions.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Approaches and theories***

#### ***Primordialism and Perennialism***

Primordialism is the earliest approach to nations and nationalism, and may be traced back to political romanticism – which, as we will see further on, constituted an important influence on Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Its central tenet is that

the world consists of "natural" nations in the twin sense of organic and immemorial; nations are seen to be the main actors on the stage of world history, each differentiated by a unique culture and spirit. As collective actors, nations have their own unique consciousness or identity, which may be lost or deformed in periods of serfdom or fall, so it becomes the duty of nationalists to seek to liberate, restore or to reawaken the nation, into freedom and new glories.<sup>19</sup> This perspective is still upheld by nationalist historians and nationalists at large, but is also a predominant feature of contemporary 'common sense' views of history and nations.

In its more contemporary phase, the primordialist approach has been of two types: Firstly, a *socio-biological* version which advocates that "nations, ethnic groups and races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drive of individuals".<sup>20</sup> In the social sciences this approach is exemplified in the work of Pierre van den Berghe;<sup>21</sup> his basic thesis is that "ethnic and racial sentiments are [an] extension of kinship sentiments. Ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism – the propensity to favour kin over non-kin".<sup>22</sup> This propensity he attributes to a "general behavioural predisposition", among humans and other species, "to react favourably toward other organisms to the extent that these organisms are biologically related to the actor. The closer the relationship is, the stronger the preferential behaviour".<sup>23</sup> For van den Berghe ethnic groups were in-breeding superfamilies for most of history; nations are similarly real or imputed descent groups. States were, throughout history, primarily organized around a single *ethny*; the main difference is that, in the past, states were either larger (as in empires) or smaller (as in city states) than modern national states. Since a nation is no more than a politicized *ethny*, states which are based on more than one *ethny* are bound to fail, for the simple reason that when ethnic demands and tension escalate, the state will have only two choices: either to repress such demands by force (thereby sacrificing its democratic principles or façade), or to yield to the demands (thereby risking further escalation or "another step toward the dissolution of the multinational state").<sup>24</sup> Indeed, on the face of it, such an account offers a simple and seemingly powerful explanation of why ethnic co-habitation in the bi-communal Cyprus Republic of 1960-63 did not work – that is, it failed precisely because the state was based on more than one *ethny*. But such simplicity may be deceptive, for, as we will see further on, it was not the mere co-habitation of the two ethnies which caused the 1963 collapse, but a host of other socio-historical factors.

The second primordialist variant proposes that ethnic groups and nations are formed on the basis of *cultural givens* which lie behind the diversity of social existence. The origins of this approach and related debates have been traced back to Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Towards the end of the 1950's, while addressing the issue of how modern societies are integrated or maintain solidarity, Shils suggested that in these societies two forms of ties co-exist: One relates to more abstract civil norms, and the other to "personal attachments, moral obligations [and] primordial affinities"<sup>25</sup> – mostly relating to kin and other primary or small groups, which act as the real glue of modern societies.

In the early 1970's, Geertz was tackling a similar question on what integrates new states (such as Cyprus) in the post-colonial era. He observed that in these states, people's primary attachments were to those they viewed to be of the same religion, race, culture or other primary affiliation: "Multi-ethnic [...] populations of the new states tend to regard the immediate, concrete and to them inherently meaningful sorting implicit in such 'natural' diversity as the substantial content of their individuality".<sup>26</sup> Primordial attachments often came in conflict with civil sentiments, necessary for nation-building in new states. But what exactly were these primary affiliations, and where did their strength derive from? In a much quoted passage, Geertz responded as follows:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' – or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and following particular practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves [...] by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.<sup>27</sup>

Other attachments, such as to class or political party, could lead to loyalties in competition with civil loyalties, but this was not such a problem since the former were not "candidates for nationhood" and did not threaten to undermine the nation itself. But primordial attachments and loyalties were of the "same general order" and could serve as alternative bases of nation formation and, thus, lead to a new state's collapse: "Economic or class or intellectual disaffection threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new definition of its domain".<sup>28</sup> Indeed, as

we will see in chapter four, the class/ideological struggle between the Left and Right in Cyprus was initially more intense than the conflict between the two ethnic communities – but it was the latter which was to prove more devastating and long-lasting, shaking the very foundations of the Cypriot state.

Based on a mis-reading of Shils and Geertz, their accounts have acquired the status of straw men standing for “fixity, essentialism and naturalism”.<sup>29</sup> Thus Geertz, for instance, is criticized for supporting the view that the various social “congruities” impact on human behaviour in themselves – whereas his stress was obviously on people’s *perceptions* about social reality. Furthermore, Geertz clearly emphasized that it was not the mere existence of primordial ties which was the problem in new state formation, but the *politicization* of these differences: The very creation of new states introduced a “valuable new prize” over which people could fight (as well as a “frightening new force” which could be used in ensuing conflicts), and this roused or heightened primordial feelings. That is why Geertz underlined that if new states were to maintain their cohesion, and not split apart along ethnic lines, an “integrative revolution” was necessary for the “containment of diverse primordial communities under a single sovereignty” – or, put differently, for the “political normalization of primordial discontent”. Those conclusions are in line with the analysis of the present thesis, which will argue that such an integrative revolution was absent in the case of Cyprus – although, as we hope to demonstrate, it is not the primordial attachments of the two communities that created the tensions in co-habitation, but the earlier politicization of such attachments, and the ‘social closure’ of the two communities along ethno-national lines, which made integration difficult.

Smith makes a useful differentiation between primordialism and *perennialism*. The latter views the nations as perennial or immemorial, but at the same time as social and/or historical constructs rather than as organic or natural; furthermore unlike primordialism, perennialism does accept that nationalism, or some versions of it, is a modern phenomenon. Perennialism was the dominant paradigm as to how nations should be viewed, from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries; this predominance related to a number of factors: For instance, the wide acceptance of ideas of social Darwinism, stressing the gradual ascent of collective entities, leading to cultural cumulation and progress (a focus which linked perennialists to organic primordialists). Another important factor had to do with the great advances made in national folklore studies, archaeology and historiography, which provided ‘objective’,

'material' and 'tangible' data on past cultures, seen to constitute proofs of ancient links; such data were important tools in nationalist claims, but the scientists involved in these disciplines often tacitly shared similar basic assumptions.<sup>30</sup>

After World War II finally discredited racist ideology and social evolutionism, perennialism's premises were severely undermined. Similarly, anti-colonial nationalism in the developing world, and the active pursuit of nation-building by each country's national elite, provided solid proof that many nations were, after all, brand new human constructions associated with socio-historical change and the spread of modernity. Such developments were, thereby, responsible for the demise of perennialism and the rise of the modernist paradigm, which we will consider below.

The various versions of primordialism and perennialism, and their claims, are a matter of considerable debate among academics. What is certain is that many of the associated ideas are still widespread among nationalist scholars and the general public – and this applies in the case of Cyprus. As we will see in the last part of our study, many of our respondents in the relevant surveys narrated views stressing the ancient roots of the Greek nation in Cyprus, the golden age of Greek civilization on the island (at a time when the West was still in a "condition of savagery"), and the difficult long centuries of serfdom and Cyprus' long march to freedom, culminating in the glorious anti-colonial struggle in 1955. The narratives stress the 3,000 years of unbroken continuity of Greek presence on the island and the close links with the Greek motherland or nation. A few individuals made reference to a "continuity of genes" with their Cypriot ancestors, or cited "scientific evidence" to argue for or against a relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots on the island.<sup>31</sup> Of course, as we will see, such accounts of ethnic descent do often contain "a kernel of factual truth", but, as Smith points out, "they typically elaborate, exaggerate and idealise that kernel in a one-sided fashion".<sup>32</sup>

Primordialism and perennialism have been heavily criticized from various quarters. Eller and Coughan propose that primordialism rests on three main ideas: a) that primordial attachments are 'given' a priori, underived and prior to all experience; b) that they are ineffable (incapable of being expressed in words), overpowering and coercive; and c) that they primarily relate to emotion and affect.<sup>33</sup> These features place primordial attachments and sentiments outside the realm of the social and mystify them, rendering them unexplainable – or, at best, explained by reference to "a

biological imperative", which is what socio-biological accounts resort to.<sup>34</sup> As a result, Eller and Coughan set out to "demystify" primordialist concepts by demonstrating through empirical findings of studies on ethnicity, the variable and constructed nature of ethnic bonds.

Another type of criticism comes from instrumentalists, such as Brass, who propose that it is not primordial attachments as such which explain the strength of ethnic or national feelings, but the mediation of elites, who select from a range of symbols of ethnic groups those that best serve their interests in uniting their communities and mobilizing them for various political ends. It is the competition between elites which leads to politicization of a culture and to changes in the self-perception of an ethnic group turning into a nation.<sup>35</sup>

Important as these critical correctives are, they lose their usefulness when taken to the extreme. For it is true that extreme primordialism may lead to cultural determinism, which sees ethnicity and nationalism as based on unchanging or given essences. But extreme instrumentalism may end up at the opposite pole, of viewing these phenomena as infinitely malleable or as readily available resources for the elites to use in any way they choose in furthering their own private ends.<sup>36</sup>

One may adopt a more balanced view which recognizes primordialism's contribution in "[drawing] our attention to the powerful perceptions, beliefs and emotions that can inspire and excite human beings, and rouse them to collective action and self-sacrifice"<sup>37</sup> – what Smith calls "participants primordialism". Furthermore, as Brass concedes, the primordialist perspective is especially "relevant to our understanding of ethnic groups with long and rich cultural heritages"<sup>38</sup> – such as those found in Cyprus. But, if taken "too seriously, the concept of primordialism precludes the need for a historical sociology of ethnicity or nationalism".<sup>39</sup>

### ***Modernism***

Modernism views nations and national identities as recent phenomena of the last two centuries, the basic thrust being given by the French Revolution and the birth of France as a nation. A new era was inaugurated when the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* underlined that "the source of all sovereignty resides essentially in

the Nation”, and equated the nation with the people.<sup>40</sup> Smith proposes that the modernist paradigm in its classical form can be regarded as the “polar opposite” of primordialist or perennialist assumptions, so that “ideal-type dichotomies” lead to two completely different pictures of the nation:<sup>41</sup> On the one hand, perennialism views the nation as an ethno-cultural community which is immemorial, ‘rooted’ in place and time (in a historic homeland), popular (as the community of the people), an integrated whole, and based on the principles of ancestral ties and authentic culture. On the other, modernism sees the nation as a political (territorial or civic) community of equal citizens, modern (in the sense of both recent and novel), a human creation of the specific socio-historical conditions of modernity (such as industry, bureaucracy, urbanization and secularism), primarily a construction of elites, divided into sub-wholes (for example, by class, gender, religion) but, yet, integrated via citizenship and social communication.<sup>42</sup> This classification is obviously a simplified scheme which magnifies similarities within each paradigm and differences across them, so as to highlight their underlying assumptions. In practice, many theories combine elements from both paradigms. Modernist theories in particular, are quite numerous, each stressing different factors – yet every approach or theory gives more emphasis or weight to some factors and less to others (which legitimizes the various studies’ attempts at classification). For our purposes, I wish to briefly consider the main elements of two theoretical approaches within the modernist paradigm, highlighting what seems of relevance to the case of Cyprus. After introducing the ethno-symbolism approach, further below, I will end by presenting a third modernist approach, which overcomes many of the limitations of other modernist theories, and which may be modified so as to incorporate insights from the ethno-symbolic approach.

### *Industrialization and modernity*

Ernest Gellner’s theory was perhaps the earliest and most original attempt to comprehend nations and nationalism from a modernist perspective. For Gellner, modernization and more specifically industrialization, with its various concomitants, was responsible for the radical transformation of human societies. In ‘agro-literate’ societies people were bound together by the structure of ascribed roles and traditional social institutions (primarily kinship). Literacy was confined to the ruling class, which used culture to differentiate itself from the mass of agricultural producers; whereas communication in the small local communities was ‘contextual’, the literate groups

benefited from 'context free' communication – whereby a gulf was created between a low and high culture and an "incongruity" between power and culture. Cultural heterogeneity constituted the main obstacle to the formation of nations.

On the contrary, industrial societies require high social mobility, roles are no longer ascribed and the system relies on meritocracy and equalitarianism. With an increasingly complex division of labour the occupational structure requires context-free communication and a high level of cultural standardization. Culture thus replaces structure. Indeed "the culture in which one has been taught to communicate becomes the core of one's identity".<sup>43</sup> Education becomes crucial not only for purposes of employability, but also for underpinning the dignity, security and self-respect of individuals. The need for mass education and a uniform communications system makes the state imperative, linking power and culture in unprecedented ways.

Nations thus emerge "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities".<sup>44</sup> Similarly, "nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the [...] population. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind."<sup>45</sup> Linking the two phenomena together, Gellner concludes that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round."<sup>46</sup> Therefore, "nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant, force though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state".<sup>47</sup>

In the case of Cyprus, Gellner's main thesis doesn't seem to hold. As Loizos puts it, his "theory looks more convincing when tackling the nationalism of modern industrial societies" – but not the nationalism of countries at a pre-industrial stage of development.<sup>48</sup> As we will see further on, national consciousness in Cyprus first appeared in the last years of Ottoman rule (late nineteenth century), and the early stirrings of nationalism in the first decades of British colonialism, when industrialization was in its complete infancy.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, the theory cannot explain the second wave of reactionary ethno-nationalism (1968-74), neither the more cultural, neo-nationalist third variant (1988 onwards). Mass education did certainly develop hand-in-hand with



the spread of national ideas in Cyprus and the subsequent growth of the nationalist movement: But the line of causality seems to have been the reverse to that proposed by Gellner – that is, mass education seems to have been the product, not the cause of nationalist awareness (although mass education contributed thereafter to the spread of national ideas and the strengthening of the nationalist movement). Furthermore, and relatedly, education in Cyprus seems to have had little to do with industry and its needs: Interestingly, in both Greece and Cyprus, education was seen mostly as a mechanism for *avoiding* joining the proletariat;<sup>50</sup> instead, it was perceived as a means of “becoming a person”, which entailed mastering “a body of knowledge that had come to represent the traditions of the community” (it was “in this way that the ‘high culture’ of schooling could be converted into nationalism”); in any case, education was certainly not intended for mastering techniques appropriate to industry.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, one may observe that Gellner’s linking of nationalism to industrialism limits from start the explanatory power of the proposed theory. At most, it can explain why nationalism “in general” can have a certain affinity with modern industrialism, or modernity more widely. But it certainly cannot explain different forms or variants of nationalism appearing diachronically or synchronically in the same country – as in the case of Cyprus.

#### *Social construction: the nation as imagination and discourse*

Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983) was a milestone in the development of modernist theories. Anderson set out to investigate why post-World War II national forms of thought and discourse have become so dominant and taken for granted, but also why they arouse such deep sentiments in people. Proposing that nations do not so much belong to the category of ideological constructs but are rather similar to kinship or religion, he defined the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. *Imagined* in the sense that members of nations do not and will not know most fellow-nationals, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”. The nation is a *community* because, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”; it is this solidarity which explains why so many are willing to lay down their lives for their nation. Nations are imagined as *limited* because

they have boundaries which separate them from other nations. Lastly, they are imagined as *sovereign* because they are the children of the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, when divinely ordained dynastic realms gave way to self-governed regimes.

What are the conditions which gave rise to nations and nationalism? The demise of the "large cultural systems" that preceded them, such as the "great religiously imagined communities" and the "dynastic realms," "out of which – as well against which" they "came into being". Thus, with the waning of religion, which provided a hope against the arbitrariness of fatality through the promise of continuity of life after death, nationalism provided a secular alternative through its vision of the nation as descending from the immemorial past and into the limitless future.<sup>52</sup> Parallel to the demise of sacred religious and dynastic communities, was the more fundamental transformation in the modes of apprehending the world. The earlier Christian conception of time, based on the idea of simultaneity (events in the present, past and future merging as in divine cosmology), gave way to a new view which saw time as linear and homogeneous. Events could now be measured by clock and calendar, and new forms of imagining made possible the novel and the newspaper. One can envision members of the nation going through the daily ritual of reading their newspaper in privacy, yet each knowing that the ceremony performed "is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion" – in this way, creating an anonymous bond, "which is the hallmark of modern nations".<sup>53</sup>

The development of print-capitalism greatly facilitated these new trends. Book-publishing, which initially served a small elite who read Latin, expanded to cater for the new market of pre-Christian works of antiquity (Greek and Roman), fostered by the Humanists; it also served Protestant believers who were eager to have personal access to the Bible and other religious texts. Cheap editions in the vernacular languages contributed towards the embedding of national consciousness through creating "unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars".<sup>54</sup> These developments fostered the rise of linguistic nationalism in Europe. From the late eighteenth century, the comparative study of language led to the production of dictionaries and grammar books, which set the older sacred languages on an equal footing with the now revived vernaculars (bilingual dictionaries being perhaps the best such example). The general growth in industry, commerce and

communications, along with the gradual increase in literacy rates, led to further linguistic homogenization, and the parallel strengthening of nationalism and nations which, in becoming entrenched, provided ideal models to be imitated by elites or intelligentsias in other parts of the world, after adjustments to local realities as necessary (and as if they were “modular”).<sup>55</sup> To recapitulate, the new “imagined communities” were the products of “a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human diversity”.<sup>56</sup>

Anderson introduces a number of ideas which will be useful to our study. The central idea of nation as an imagined community captures very closely the Greek-Cypriots’ understanding of themselves as a part of the Hellenic nation, leading to their drive for union (*enosis*) with Greece, as the national centre of Hellenism. We will also see how the reconstructed conception of Greeks as a nation was greatly aided by print capitalism and the “lexicographic revolution” in Europe. Yet some other elements of his theory do not “fit the facts”. As Kellas points out,<sup>57</sup> nationalism did not always replace religion, and in Cyprus the two mostly reinforced each other, as was the case in Ireland, Poland, Armenia, Israel, Iran and others. In Cyprus, despite an initial contest between the more traditional ecumenic view of the world and the new nationalist one, the latter was soon to prevail and, henceforth, religion was to become a part of the national identity.

Another important criticism comes from Chatterjee, and regards Anderson’s thesis that nationalism was born in Europe and the Americas – which renders the rest of the world as simply importers of the “modular” forms already made available to them by the West. So “what do [the rest] have left to imagine?” asks Chatterjee:

History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized.<sup>58</sup>

Chatterjee proposes instead that “nationalist imaginations in the Third World” are posited not on an identity but rather on a *difference* with the modular forms of the national society propagated by the modern West”.<sup>59</sup> To withstand western dominance, anti-colonial nationalism divided the world into two domains – one material (the economy, science and technology), where the West’s superiority was acknowledged,

and the other spiritual (the nation's elements of cultural identity), which nationalism declared its own "sovereign territory", refusing to allow the colonial power to intervene in that domain.<sup>60</sup> Up to this point, the analysis fits the Cyprus case fairly well. But whereas in the "East" (Asia and Africa) nationalism's creative contribution was "to fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless not Western",<sup>61</sup> in Cyprus nationalism assumed from the beginning that the island was part of the West, through being part of wider Hellenism, the culture of which constituted the very foundation of European and Western civilization.

### ***Ethno-symbolism***

The third paradigm, historical ethno-symbolism,<sup>62</sup> takes a middle ground position between perennialism and modernism: Whereas the former views both nations and nationalism as immemorial, and the latter as both modern, ethno-symbolism concedes that nationalism is modern but advances the precept that nations have much older roots, traceable to ethnic communities in medieval times, and sometimes in antiquity.<sup>63</sup> Anthony Smith, the most well-known exponent of this approach, underlines the importance of studying social and cultural patterns in the long-run (*la longue durée*), so that "the analysis of the rise of nations and nationalism is placed within a framework of earlier collective cultural identities, and especially of ethnic communities" (for the latter he prefers the French term *ethnies*). Nations and *ethnies* "belong to the same family of phenomena (collective cultural identities)",<sup>64</sup> so the differences between them are a matter of degree rather than kind, as can be gauged from the following table (Table 1.1) comparing the attributes of the two:

<u><i>Ethnie</i></u>	<u><i>Nation</i></u>
Proper name	Proper name
Common myths of ancestry, etc	Common myths
Shared memories	Shared memories and history (a codified, standardized, national history)
Cultural differentia(e)	Common (mass) public culture
Association with a homeland	Occupation of a homeland
Some (elite) solidarity	Common (legal) rights and duties
	Single economy
	Over-arching common identity
	Single political entity or aspiration to (a degree of) self-determination/autonomy

Table 1.1: Attributes of *ethnies* and nations

The combined items in each case provide a "working definition" of *ethnie* and nation respectively.<sup>65</sup> A number of attributes are common to both – namely, a collective name, common myths and shared memories; what differs is that, in the ideal types, unlike nations, *ethnies* do not have a public culture (that is, shared mass communication and education) but only some common cultural elements (such as "language, religion, customs or shared institutions"); they also do not have a "codified, standard national history", like nations do.<sup>66</sup>

Although *ethnies* are precursors of nations, they are not primordial: It is not "objective" physical kinship bonds that define the structure of ethnic communities, but "the sense of cultural affinities" embodied in myths (including a myth of descent), shared historical memories, values, traditions and ethnic symbols.<sup>67</sup> As most of the attributes of *ethnies* are subjective, they may weaken under certain historical circumstances, negatively affecting the consciousness and cohesion of the community – yet again disconfirming primordialism.<sup>68</sup> Once formed, *ethnies* tend to be very durable, although their strength may be affected by several radical changes (negatively, by factors such as wars, conquest, enslavement, and religious conversion; positively, by military mobilization, state-making, and organized religion).<sup>69</sup>

This distinction between *ethnies* and nations allows Smith to differentiate himself from primordialists and nationalists, who believe that nations and nationalism were there since antiquity, and that history is nothing but a record of their march towards triumph in modern times, with the formation of nation-states. For Smith: "It is *ethnie* rather than nations, ethnicity rather than nationality, and ethnicism rather than nationalism, that pervades the social and cultural life of antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe and the Middle East".<sup>70</sup> Nationalism is mostly a modern phenomenon of late Medieval times: Nationalists used the cultural materials provided by the various *ethnies*, to build or construct nations; hence, most nations may be modern, but they do have deep ancient roots (or 'navels', as Gellner playfully interjects).

How do nations emerge out of *ethnies*? Smith proposes two main routes to nation-formation, corresponding to two types of ethnic community – the 'lateral' (aristocratic) and the 'vertical' (demotic).<sup>71</sup> The case of lateral *ethnies* relates mostly to Western Europe, where nations were formed through "bureaucratic incorporation": The dominant aristocratic *ethnie* was able to incorporate the middle strata and peripheral

regions into the dominant ethnic culture, primarily through the agency of the bureaucratic state.<sup>72</sup> Assimilation and cultural fusion laid the basis for relatively homogeneous nations. State activities, such as "taxation, conscription and administration", fostered the nations by creating a sense of "corporate identity and civic loyalty" among the population. Parallel "external" processes, which Smith calls the "Western revolutions", such as the economic revolution of "movement to a market economy", and the "cultural and educational" revolutions, added extra force in the same direction, leading to the gradual consolidation of "secular", "mass", "strong" nations.<sup>73</sup>

The second case of vertical (demotic) *ethnies* relates to Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle and Far East, and parts of Africa – and is thus more pertinent to Greece and Cyprus. Because vertical *ethnies* were usually subject communities (Cyprus almost always was), the most important influence was not the bureaucratic state but organized religion – in the case of Greece and Cyprus, the Orthodox Church. The influence and prestige of the clergy, the myths of chosen people, the liturgy and rituals, as well as the sacred texts and scripts, ensured the survival of communal traditions.<sup>74</sup> Through time, religious culture and loyalty was identified with ethnic culture. In the age of nationalism, these communities began seeing themselves as already constituted nations but without a political roof. Since there was "no internal coercive agency, no bureaucratic state, to shatter the mould", it was up to the secular intelligentsia to find ways of differentiating the "community of the faithful" from the "community of historic culture"<sup>75</sup>. Smith identifies three alternative orientations adopted by the intellectuals and their followers in this pursuit: A modernizing return to tradition ("traditionalism"), a messianic desire to assimilate to Western modernity ("modernism" or "assimilation"), and a more defensive attempt, utilized in Cyprus, to synthesize elements of tradition with aspects of Western modernity – "hence to revive a pristine community modelled on a former golden age" ("reformist revivalism"). The different orientations reflect "fundamentally different directions in the transformation of demotic *ethnies* into political nations".<sup>76</sup> In all cases "lies the imperative of a moral and political revolution", which requires the people to be purified from the accretions of centuries "which led to the embedding of ethnic communities so that they can be emancipated into a political community of equal citizens" or re-educated into "national values, memories and myths".<sup>77</sup>

To achieve the above, a "twofold strategy" was required, first of "furnishing 'maps' of the community, its history, its destiny and its place among the nations", and second of "providing 'moralities' for the regenerated community" as a source of inspiration for present generations. In turn, maps and moralities could be constructed either through an emphasis on a "return to 'nature' and its 'poetic spaces' (that is, the historic homeland, so that natural features would be related to national symbols) or "the use of history and especially the cult of golden ages": As we will see further on, in Cyprus, the second focus was chosen, emphasizing Cyprus' link with the ancient Greek world.

On the basis of the above analysis, Smith proposes that the fundamental, defining features of *national identity* relate to those of nation, that is, a "historic territory or homeland, common myths and historical memories, a common public culture, common legal rights and duties for all members, and a common economy with territorial mobility for members";<sup>78</sup> furthermore, he defines *nationalism* as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.<sup>79</sup> In the case of Cyprus, for instance, Greek-Cypriots *imagined* themselves to be part of the Hellenic nation, so an ideological movement was formed for shedding foreign rule and uniting with 'motherland' Greece (this was the irredentist *enosis* movement which we will consider in chapter four).

Finally, Smith differentiates between two types of nationalism. Basing his analysis on "Kohn's philosophical distinction between a more rational and a more organic version of nationalist ideology", he offers a "provisional typology" of "territorial" and "ethnic" nationalisms,<sup>80</sup> which I present here as a summary table (Table 1.2):

	Territorial nationalisms	Ethnic nationalisms
Pre-Independence	Anti-colonial nationalism (Aims to eject colonial rule and create new state-nation)	Secession nationalism (Aims to secede from a political unit and create a new ethno-nation)
Post Independence	Integration nationalism (Aims to join ethnically diverse populations to create new territorial state)	Irredentist nationalism (Aims to join ethnic kinsmen outside the present boundaries of the ethno-nation).

Table 1.2: Territorial and ethnic variants of nationalism

Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolist approach to nations and nationalism provides fruitful insights for the study of the Cyprus case. Its emphasis on the *longue durée* is certainly useful in accounting for a people who view themselves as having a history which goes back 3,000 years. The underscoring of the existence of *ethnies* in ancient times, and of the importance of cultural raw materials in the construction of ethnicity and, subsequently, of nationalism, has added valuable insights to the field. Yet, despite its apparent sophistication, ethno-symbolism has attracted considerable criticism, mainly from the various proponents of the dominant modernist paradigm. A major criticism concerns the relation between ethnic communities and nations: Smith appears to consider nations as *ethnies* writ large; critics point out that the differences between the two are not only quantitative but qualitative, so that the one is not simply an evolutionary outcome of the other.<sup>81</sup> For an ethnic group to become a nation, it must undergo significant transformations in both structure and outlook; and in undergoing this transformation process, 'alien' elements and influences from other cultures are absorbed, so that there is never a one-to-one correspondence, as in biological reproduction.

Furthermore, as Smith himself admits, *ethnies* simply provide the cultural materials (such as myths or symbols), which nationalists subsequently use in nation-building. But as Breuilly points out, what is important is not the raw materials as such, but the creative intervention of the nationalist agents – who select, mould and re-mould them, to serve their purposes. Thus, some myths may be chosen whereas others are not; a component of a myth may be adapted, a new part invented, or an altogether new emphasis given, to fit particular uses; and often there may be conflicting interpretations of myths, symbols or other cultural elements, serving antagonistic nationalist discourses.<sup>82</sup>

The last theory that we turn to consider tries to address the issue of the importance of human agency and of struggles arising from conflicting material or ideal interests in determining nationalist constructions.



### ***An attempt at synthesis: Social closure and cultural transformation***

Andreas Wimmer offers a synthetic explanatory account which creatively extends Weber's original formulations on ethnicity and social closure, and utilizes a number of the concepts we have reviewed from the modernist paradigm, to build a theory on nation formation and nationalism.<sup>83</sup> Below I briefly review the theory, which will subsequently be used as a framework of analysis for the Cyprus case.

Wimmer starts his analysis by defining culture "as an open and unstable process of the negotiation of meanings" [a] involving "cognitively competent individuals, of differing interests and aims", [b] in searches of "finding accepted compromises", [c] the end result leading to "social closure and corresponding cultural boundary-marking".<sup>84</sup>

More specifically, individual social actors are seen to live in unequally structured societies and to internalize their positions in their "life-worlds" through learning processes; following Bourdieu, actors are seen to gradually develop a *habitus* tailored to their position<sup>85</sup> – in other words, a system of "durable, transposable dispositions" that "determine action, perception and interpretation", made up of "a repertoire of strategies for action and cognitive patterns that have become routinised",<sup>86</sup> which lead to different classifications and world views.

In relating to each other, social actors enter into negotiations of meaning. Besides reaching agreements at an inter-personal level, "on the collective and symbolic level, notions about the set-up and workings of society, on what is just and unjust, sacred and profane, are negotiated" – and here compromise is achieved if all actors "can formulate aspects of their long-term interests in a shared symbolic language". Finally, certain cultural markers serve the purpose of distinguishing insiders from outsiders, "between those partaking in the basic compromise and those remaining on the margins".<sup>87</sup> A *cultural compromise* is a shared perspective of the world which "limits the horizon of possibilities within which individuals can argue in their search for power and recognition": But which elements of the cultural compromise actors will choose, and how these will be "reformulated and transformed",<sup>88</sup> depends on the position of actors in the social structure. When individuals change positions in the power or wealth hierarchies, they may develop new perceptions. Habitual schemes tend to change quite slowly, providing a certain stability and continuity; but if new variations generated differ substantially from established modes of thinking, then the existing

cultural compromise may "dissolve into a range of variations and counter-discourses. When a new balance of power has been achieved, new cultural compromises may eventually emerge".<sup>89</sup>

Building on the above "theory of cultural transformation", Wimmer proceeds to analyse "nationalism as the main cultural compromise of modern society, and the formation of nation states as a process of social closure resulting from, and interacting with, the consolidation and general acceptance of this compromise". Thus nationalism is more than an idea, an ideology, a sentiment, or a discourse – it is the *axial principle*<sup>90</sup> according to which modern societies structure inclusion and exclusion in all domains of social life. Wimmer adopts Anderson's concept of the nation as an "imagined community", as modernity's *primary form of cultural closure*. Accordingly, the "new principles of boundary making" have two corollaries: First, that the nation is regarded as "an all-encompassing social totality" (that is, as a simultaneously social, economic, political and cultural unit), not differentiated by any divisions of a fundamental nature; second, that this totality is imagined as a territorial unit with clearly defined borders, separating the homogeneous domestic realm from the heterogeneous external one. There are two types of nationalism – one based on common descent (the 'ethnic' variant), and one on political solidarity (the 'republican' or 'civic' variant). We will use the 'ethnic' variant (which more closely resembles the Greek-Cypriot type), to exemplify how the remaining forms of nationalist closure come about.

Ethnic nationalism considers the nation primarily as a *cultural phenomenon*. The national culture expresses the collective spirit (or "genius of a people"), which imbues the traditions and folklore of the peasants, seen to be the guardians of the nation's authentic heritage. "Three isomorphisms" (between society, polity and economy) act as the governing principles of nations: *Society* is comprised of the individuals belonging to the cultural nation, who are considered equal members of a single family, and as thereby related by ties of mutual obligation and solidarity. The *polity* relies on national self-determination to guarantee that "a community of [cultural] likes can be a community of [political] equals"; a nation must have its own state to guarantee its members from outside interference. The *economy* must be unified, without duties or tariffs creating artificial barriers; the country must be physically connected through a communication network.

The "three isomorphisms" give rise to the second characteristic of nationalist thinking, the *territorialisation* of its social imagination – unlike empires, where the polity was broader than society; for instance, in both the Byzantine and Ottoman empires the social world was made up of multiple semi-autonomous/corporate religious, ethnic and occupational communities, whereas the polity potentially included all Christian or Muslim believers, respectively. In nationalist thinking, the borders of the polity must clearly demarcate and differentiate between the national community and the outside world (the "aliens"). Within the national borders nationalist egalitarianism demands that there is horizontal unity, with no strong boundaries between the different groups constituting the nation; social borders can only be vertical, distinguishing between entities with similar internal structures (e.g. classes). This is unlike pre-modern empires where social groups were horizontally differentiated, separating the various castes or estates, the conquerors and conquered, and so on: "Nationalists thus make a fetish of national borders, in the same way that pre-modern empires made a cult of the cultural borders in separating the social estates".<sup>91</sup> That is why borders are carefully guarded and crossing a national border has acquired the significance of a *rite de passage*.

The nationalist self-image and the corresponding political institution of the nation-state are to be seen as the outcome of a successful cultural compromise, which manages to balance the interests between different social groups. This mainly involves "an exchange of the guarantee of political loyalty for the promise of participation and security". On the one hand, the elite can "enlarge their power domain in the name of the nation and the well-being of the citizen".<sup>92</sup> On the other, the population can appeal to the now common values of equality and solidarity and push their claims for political participation, free education and other welfare state benefits.

The fact that a vast number of different groups have to be satisfied by the overall cultural compromise, explains why "nationalism has to remain ideologically fuzzy and poorly defined". Rather than constituting a problem, this in fact is a strength of nationalism, for its "polysemic character" allows people to make sense of their situation from varied points of view. Thus, endless variation is possible and eternal ideological controversies over the proper interpretation of nationalist doctrines abound:

Bourgeois republicans, battling against royalists or left-wing internationalists, emphasize the political dimension of the national community. Conservative ideologists defend the cultural interests of the nation but minimize the

importance of national egalitarianism. Nationalist labour movements in turn highlight the egalitarian aspects of the national principle and therefore demand state intervention in their favour. Depending on the power structure and the historical conditions, different forms of closure come to re-organize all aspects of life along national principles, so that the nationalist representation of the world comes to acquire monolithic prominence, making the nation – a cultural creation – appear as nature.<sup>93</sup>

Wimmer next focuses on four additional types of closure. First, a *legal closure*: Whereas the legal systems of pre-modern empires codified the inequalities of the various constituent groups, thereby reinforcing horizontal divisions, modern states are based on the principle that all are equal before the law – despite social class, gender, religion or other characteristics. Whereas in earlier stages of nation formation political participation was restricted to the wealthy and educated upper classes, gradually, universal suffrage was established. As the new principle of equality before the law was consolidated, a parallel form of exclusion was introduced, separating national citizens from aliens. Although in the early nineteenth century, the concept of citizenship was based on territorial criteria (so that all inhabitants, irrespective of ethnic origin were considered subjects), this was later replaced by ethnic definitions, so that citizenship and nationality became synonymous.

Second, *political closure*: In empires, the ruler was God's appointee on earth, elevated over and above the people, whereas modern states are ruled through the "principle of national representativity", which entails that state power must be exercised by equals who are nationals. Once the idea of national-determination was introduced by Wilson, it spread around the world and has become the "ideological, juridical and political backbone of the world order of states". In fact, the very ideal of democracy was closely linked to that of national self-determination, until the middle of the twentieth century. Thereupon, because of the devastations caused by nationalist excesses, a distinction was attempted – initially in the form of separating a good Western nationalism, which was compatible with democracy, and a bad Eastern nationalism, which was authoritarian and violent. By contemporary times, the official disconnection between nationalism and democracy has been completed – only because modern democracy has been nationalized, and nationalism has imbued people's minds through its embeddedness in the surrounding social reality.<sup>94</sup>

Third, *military closure*: In pre-modern empires, the troops often included mercenaries from other countries and the army was a governing tool in the hands of the ruler –

“who could legitimately wield it both against the armies of other rulers and against rebellious subjects”.<sup>95</sup> In modern states, since the people are now equal and free, they are expected to defend “themselves” against outside intruders. Foreign rule is to be resisted at all costs since it violates the core principles of nation. Put differently, loyalty to country and sacrifice of life are expected as the natural trade-offs for all the benefits bestowed on citizens (freedom, equality and so on). Furthermore, mercenaries no longer have a place, since they do not share in nationality and can thus not be expected to have the required loyalty and readiness for sacrifice as co-nationals do.

Fourth, *welfare closure*: Modern states have increasingly accepted the idea of providing for their citizens, since this logically follows the principles of equality and, especially, solidarity. Although in earlier stages of industrialization, more *laissez-faire* principles were espoused, as regards the economy, which left the lower ranks exposed to the vagaries of the market (leading to intra-national conflicts stirred by the excluded), gradually, the state accepted responsibility for various welfare provisions (unemployment, illness, poverty, and old age benefits), thereby more fully incorporating the labour movement into the national order of things: “The welfare state transformed the nation into a real, not just an imagined, community of solidarity, a hyper-extended family where everyone cares for the well-being of everybody else”.<sup>96</sup>

Again, this new form of closure was paralleled by a new mode of exclusion, since the rules on who could enter and settle in a country (and thereby enjoy the respective welfare benefits), became much stricter, separating citizens as members of the community of solitariness, from immigrants, whose status thereby deteriorated: “The process of domestic social integration and closure therefore reaches its zenith with the emergence of welfare institutions and of state control over migration”.

Wimmer illustrates his model of closure and exclusion through figure 1.3:




Fig. 1.3: Five dimensions of closure

The above description refers to the general direction of developments under modernity. But Wimmer carries on to argue that this is not a teleological model, which advocates that all national states have to take the same route of development. Having presented the "structural perspective", he shifts his emphasis to "an analysis of process", to demonstrate that specific outcomes in each case depend on "the strategic interplay of groups of actors endowed with differing bargaining power". Social closure now has to be described as the result of a "specific constellation of actors and their perceived interests".<sup>97</sup> This provision of allowing for the indeterminacy of outcomes and the role of social action, helps the theory to avoid the determinism implied in functionalist explanations (such as Gellner's), which consider nationalism and the nation-state as effects, consequences or correlates of industrialization.

But how does social closure result from the overlap of interests between different actors? Through the process of cultural compromise, proposes Wimmer, which makes the formation of the national state an attractive option for all. For the elite, reaching

a national compromise makes sense, as it allows them to "expand further their realms of power". This is achieved as a consequence of the unparalleled legitimation the democratic process bestows to modern states (decisions are made to benefit the people), as compared to pre-modern governments acting according to "God's will". In return, democracy allows governments to increasingly influence all domains of life, in seeking to improve or control people's lives (deciding on who gets to pay which taxes, who goes to war, and so forth).<sup>98</sup> For the population, the national compromise process entails claiming for increased political participation, equality before the law, more jobs, and more welfare benefits. Pre-modern states cared for few such benefits for their citizens. Besides tangible benefits, modern states provide the people with valuable "symbolic capital", such as a sense of dignity and even prestige as citizens, which "commoners, peasants and artisans would not even dream of in hierarchically legitimized empires".<sup>99</sup>

Having presented the mechanisms of national closure, Wimmer proceeds to explain why the nation(al) state has become such a dominant political form in modern times. Briefly put, he distinguishes between two stages: First, the appearance of nation-states out of absolutism in Western Europe; and second, the globalisation of the model through the break-up of empires (for instance, the Habsburg and Ottoman multi-national empires) and the subsequent reordering of politics along national-state lines (through borrowing, the 'domino effects', and the influence of the international system itself, with its emphasis on the national determination principle).<sup>100</sup>

Having outlined Wimmer's "theory of cultural transformation", some critical comments are pertinent. Firstly, a terminological issue: Wimmer seems to often confuse or conflate nation, nation-state and national state; in fact, he uses the first two terms interchangeably, so, for instance, in figure 2, he uses the term nation (which I have maintained, to stress the point), whereas in his explanatory account, he switches from nation to nation-state – an obvious inconsistency. Neither of the two are appropriate terms, for what he is obviously referring to is the national-state, which is a more generic term than nation-state (the latter being a particular type or case of a national state, different from multi-national states – such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, and including the bi-national Cyprus Republic).

The second point concerns the standing of Wimmer's "theory of cultural transformation": As has been pointed out by several students of nationalism, it would be too

ambitious to claim that a single, grand theory can explain the many forms and faces of nationalism as a social phenomenon. As Calhoun rightly points out, issues such as why nationalism comes to dominate in the instances where it does, and not in others, why particular versions prevail, and why certain groups of people choose one or another variant, "are questions that by and large can be answered only within specific contexts, with knowledge of local history, or the nature of the state (and other elite) power, and of what other potential and actual movements competed for alliance".<sup>101</sup> It would thus seem preferable to view Wimmer's "theory" as an "approach" or "perspective" to analysing specific aspects of nations and nationalism. More specifically, Wimmer's analytical framework may be especially useful in explaining not nationalism in general, but national-state formation and consolidation: In fact, it is precisely for this reason that the insights from this approach can be especially useful in the case of Cyprus, providing the connecting thread to the diachronic processes of transformation leading to the contemporary national-state.

Thirdly, we could agree with Ozkirimli that nationalism is not a single, unitary phenomenon, but that "a number of, at times quite divergent, ideologies and movements compete to capture the allegiance of the 'nationals'." <sup>102</sup> What unites these diverse forms of nationalism is nationalist discourse, a common rhetoric or way of looking and talking about the world, which has three important features:<sup>103</sup> First, it advocates that the national interest(s) and values of the nation override all other interests and values; second, it regards the nation as the primary (if not the only) source of legitimacy; and thirdly, it operates through binary divisions, continuously dividing the world into 'us' and 'them', 'friends' and 'enemies', 'civilized' and 'barbarians', 'good' and 'bad'.

These observations should not lead us to the other extreme, of considering discourses as reified entities with all-pervasive powers, which appear in extra-social ways and take charge of social actors (as post-modernist approaches often seem to suggest). Within the context of the cultural transformation framework, individuals who are differentially situated in the hierarchies of wealth, power and knowledge, and are therefore imbued with differing habitualised dispositions, engage in discursive practices and in an ongoing, open and unstable process of negotiating meaning, through which they may reach accepted cultural compromises – which lead to social closure and corresponding "cultural boundary-making". Cultural compromises "limit the horizon of possibilities" of social actors, but are not monolithic or absolute, since individual or collective actors



may vary in their interpretation of particular elements of the cultural compromise, and sub-cultural groups can develop sub-cultural heterodoxy or counter discourses which may lead to adjustments or changes of the prevailing cultural compromise. Nationalism is thus a particular discourse (albeit the dominant one in modernity), which effects social closure, fostering (national) identity and difference, on the basis of the primacy of national interests and values. Building on such an approach to discourse, we could improve on Wimmer's conclusions by pointing out that there can be more than one variant of the nationalist discourse, each version supported by different social actors (individuals, groups or other collectivities): Rather than simply an 'ethnic' or 'civil' variant, characterizing different countries, we may thus have different variants of each type within particular countries – as we will see further on, in the case of Cyprus.

A final point relates to the unnecessarily restrictive use of the central concepts of the 'theory', such as 'social closure', to the modern period. Adopting a modernist position does not mean earlier periods should not, or could not, be properly studied through using a particular approach. Indeed, the power of any perspective could be judged by the criterion of how useful or fruitful it proves to be in explaining diverse cases. Interestingly, Jonathan Hall does attempt to account for the construction of ethnic identity in Greek antiquity through the very concept of 'social closure', which is the central pillar of Wimmer's approach – but which he does not even attempt to apply to pre-modern times.<sup>104</sup> It is precisely to the pre-modern era that we next turn, to consider whether, and the extent to which, Cyprus was a part of the Greek nation in antiquity and in medieval times.

## **Chapter 2 Early Bases of Ethnic Community and Identity**

A thesis on nation and nationalism adopting a modernist approach would select as a point of departure modern times, referring to approximately the last two hundred years – going back to the American and French revolutions, and the creation of modern nation-states. Adopting a long-term perspective, which goes back to ancient times, is associated with a nationalist or primordialist perspective or, at best, with historic ethno-symbolism. Yet to start with the modern world in the case of Cyprus is to completely ignore the self-understandings of Greek-Cypriots, who seem to take it for granted that Cyprus has been a part of the Greek nation since ancient times, and that they share a Greek identity, the roots of which go back 3,000 years, to the coming of the Greeks to Cyprus, and the so-called *Hellenization* of the island.<sup>1</sup>

Two separate assumptions are in fact conflated in the above view: First, that ever since the coming of the Greeks, Cyprus' culture has been Greek, or a part of Greek culture; second, that Cyprus ever since has become, and remains, a part of the Greek world and (what is considered to be similar) of the Greek nation. From these assumptions follows an interpretative grid which tries to explain every event or behaviour in the island's history ever since, as connected to the need of Cyprus to maintain its autonomy from the various conquerors, or other influences, so as to protect its Greek identity and its underlying unity with Greece. If we bring to mind Smith's definition of nationalism, as the ideological movement which aims at "attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation",<sup>2</sup> what we are considering here is a belief in a long-term nationalist movement, with roots traceable in antiquity, aiming at Cyprus' unity with Greece; this movement may have changed faces during Cyprus' various historical phases, but it is fostered by the same underlying spirit, which is itself an expression of a common underlying Greek essence. Put differently (to use Geller's terminology), assuming Cyprus "is Greek", there should be congruence between culture and politics so that Cyprus' movement through history must be viewed as the effort to bring the two together – of the difficulties involved, the frustrations, the betrayals, the set backs, and the lingering hopes. Such beliefs are not restricted to ordinary individuals, but have imbued the presuppositions of most mainstream historical narratives to the extent that, in most cases, it is difficult to disentangle "facts" from nationalist interpretations.

What I wish to propose is that the two assumptions need not be conflated, and that, though the first may be largely true, the second does not follow – more specifically, although Greek culture has of long been hegemonic on the island, Cyprus was not a part of the Greek nation in antiquity, for the simple reason that there was no Greek nation in pre-modern times (at least in the sense that we understand nation today). There were of course a number of Greek ethnic communities, or *ethnies* as Smith calls them, and Cyprus was closely connected with these. But the intensity of this connection varied with time and there was no certainty or inevitability that this link would have drawn these communities into ever closer union, if it had not been for various historical developments, which we will be considering further on.

Besides Greek culture, the second “ingredient” of Greek-Cypriot identity is seen to be the (Greek) Orthodox religion. It is again assumed that once Cyprus became a part of the Byzantine world, Greek culture combined with Christianity (Greek Orthodoxy) so that Cyprus was henceforth even more securely (ethnically) Greek – and this Greekness it managed to maintain under the various conquerors that followed (Franks, Venetians, Ottomans and British). In brief, the assumption is that the Greek national identity of Cyprus was maintained, despite centuries of enslavement, through Greek culture and Orthodoxy. How accurate these assumptions are we will be considering below.

### ***Cyprus in antiquity: a part of the Greek nation?***

The first traces of human life in Cyprus date as far back as the ninth millennium BC.<sup>3</sup> By the seventh millennium, there were well organized, small-scale communities engaged in hunting, farming and perhaps herding, thus with some degree of permanence of habitation.<sup>4</sup> With time, settlements became more stable, multiplying and growing in size, constituting an insular, self-contained indigenous civilization, largely independent and having little contact with the outside world.<sup>5</sup> The picture started changing in the third millennium, when Cypriots began utilizing copper, found locally in abundance, both for their own uses but also for trading it with neighbouring countries such as eastern Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt; settlements at this stage concentrated in the eastern part of the island, and there appeared the first shrines and fortification works. This was an era of substantial economic development, which brought the island wealth and fame. It was also a time when Cypriots broke out

of the isolation of neolithic times, opening out to outside influences and incorporating new knowledge and experiences into a robust culture, with a distinct Middle Eastern character.<sup>6</sup>

In the second millennium, Cyprus started having contacts with the Near East, Egypt and with the Aegean – the Greek world. In the latter case, links were mostly with Crete, whose civilization in this period was flourishing;<sup>7</sup> initial, sparse contacts were made by Minoan ships, coming to Cyprus to seek copper, or using the island as a transit stop to the bustling ports of Syria. The development of trade was rendering the art of writing increasingly necessary, and Cypriots adopted a linear script from the Cretans, adjusting it to their own realities – known as the Cypro-Minoan script, the use of which became widespread on the island.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, Cretan civilization was influencing mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, and the surrounding areas of the Mediterranean. The Mycenaeans, among the beneficiaries from contacts with Crete, eventually overwhelmed the latter, incorporating it within their own “political and cultural realm”.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, they took over the Cretans’ trade with the East, and consequently the links with Cyprus. After the destruction of the Mycenaean cities of Peloponnesus (by an earthquake and/or raiders),<sup>10</sup> at around 1200 BC, there was a massive exodus of refugees from these areas to countries considered friendly: Cyprus attracted continuous waves of these newcomers, in a complex process which took a century to complete.<sup>11</sup> What was significant is that, whereas earlier Greek settlers had arrived as individuals who gradually merged with the indigenous Cypriots, the new arrivals, fleeing *en masse*, proceeded to form colonies of their own in the host land, which were to “thrive for seven centuries and play a leading role in the political and cultural life of Cyprus”.<sup>12</sup> This massive influx of Greek settlers was to have a wide-ranging and lasting impact on the island. The Greek presence and influence was everywhere, affecting language, religion, politics, town-planning, architecture, art and all aspects of life – so much so that many historians see it as amounting to the complete “Hellenization” of Cyprus.<sup>13</sup>

As Karageorghis<sup>14</sup> points out, the fact that this acculturation was not the result of violent imposition but of a gradual, long-term and peaceful process, opening up new horizons for the locals, goes a long way to explain why it acquired deep roots. From a different point of view, the Mycenaean aristocracy seems to have managed to gain hegemony – to dominate the local population both politically and culturally, through

winning its consent. This does not mean the impact was only one way, for the new aristocracy was itself influenced by the local culture. There were also influences from other incomers – such as the Syro-Palestinians, with whom Cyprus came into contact through trade, but also through the arrival on the island of refugees, displaced from these lands by the 'Peoples of the Seas'.<sup>15</sup> In fact, this admixture of natives, 'western' Achaeans, and 'eastern' Syro-Palestinians seems to have led to a new vitality of cultural production – as reflected in the art of the times, and especially ceramics.<sup>16</sup>

In the ninth century BC, the Phoenicians, formidable merchants, sea farers, explorers and colonizers, succeeded the Mycenaean Greeks as the main trading power in the Mediterranean.<sup>17</sup> In commencing their westward expansion, they made Cyprus their first outpost. They engaged actively in business and commerce and, through achieving control of the island's mines, they managed to dominate the economy. Much like the Greeks, the Phoenicians established their own colonies through which they exercised significant political and cultural influence.

In 709 BC, Cyprus was conquered by the Assyrians, who allowed a certain autonomy to the Cypriot kings, so long as they paid the imposed tribute. After a brief period of submission to Egypt (560-545 BC), the local kings had to accept domination by Persia, the new great power in the East, whose rule lasted for two whole centuries. Foreign rule did not appear to block development, and it seems that in this "Archaic" era Cyprus "fully shared [in] the prosperity and culture of the Middle East".<sup>18</sup> The Cypriot city-kingdoms rose to prominence, becoming centres of politics and culture; they were ruled by local despotic dynasties, some of which enjoyed considerable religious status and power.<sup>19</sup> There were between seven to eleven such kingdoms, at different times, most of which were controlled by Greeks and the rest by the Phoenicians; even though under foreign domination, they seemed to enjoy considerable local autonomy. During this period, Phoenician economic and political influence seems to have increased, but in culture and religion, the "Hellenization process" reached a new peak.<sup>20</sup> Within the Persian Empire, Cyprus became an important trading centre and its economy was thriving. Apparently, Cyprus had increased contacts with the Greek cities of Ionia, on the east coast of Anatolia:<sup>21</sup> In approximately 500 BC, when the disgruntled Ionian city states rose up against the Persians, Onesilos, king of Salamis in Cyprus, rallied all Cypriot city kingdoms together (except for Amathus), to proclaim independence from Persian rule; although successful in the initial stages, the rebellion was crushed after a year from its inception.

In the subsequent years, the Greek city-states engaged in large-scale war against Persia. In 490 BC, the Greeks unexpectedly won an epic victory at the battle of Marathon. In 480 BC, they completely destroyed the Persian navy at the battle of Salamis: Interestingly, Cyprus, still under Persian rule, contributed 150 warships to the Persian fleet – but, according to Herodotus' reports, the Cypriots did not distinguish themselves in battle.<sup>22</sup> As has been often noted, those Greek victories were of trans-historical significance, as their consequences were important not only for Greece itself, but for the survival and later impact of classical Greek culture on western civilization. At that time, these unexpected successes emboldened the Greek cities to stage a counter-offensive against Persia, lasting approximately three decades. Since Cyprus was an important outpost for the control of Persian territories in the eastern Mediterranean (such as south-east Anatolia, Syria and Egypt), the island became the subject of continuous contests and kept changing hands between the two rival powers<sup>23</sup> (in 470 and 449, for instance, Athenian General Kimon captured the island from the Persians, but control quickly reverted back to the Persians). In 449 BC, an Athens exhausted by the long conflict with Sparta, was pushed to sign the Peace of Kallias, which left Cyprus under Persian rule.

The next move to question Persian supremacy was to come from within Cyprus. In 411 BC, Evagoras ousted the usurper Phoenician king of Salamis, restoring the throne to the Greek Teucid dynasty, of which he was a member. Once in power, he proved competent in his economic policies and managed to build city fortifications and a strong fleet. While himself a vassal of Persia, he managed to get the latter to collaborate with Athens in her struggle against Sparta, in the final phase of the Peloponnesian War. In recognition of his assistance, the victorious Athens bestowed great honours on Evagoras and relationships between Salamis and Athens drew ever closer. He subsequently managed to build a triple coalition between Cyprus, Athens and Egypt, with which he acquired more leverage in pushing most cities of the island to unite under his rule and, subsequently, to assert a growing independence from Persia. Evagoras' efforts were short-circuited when, in 386 BC, Athens and Sparta, exhausted by war, concluded the Peace of Antalkides with Persia, which again left Cyprus exposed. Even though Evagoras managed, using exceptional political and military skill, to resist the Persians for a few more years, he eventually had to accept honourable capitulation – to retain his throne at Salamis, provided he paid tribute to Persia. Evagoras was to stay in history as the king who attempted the unification of

the Cypriots, while also strengthening links with Athens:<sup>24</sup> He introduced the Greek alphabet locally, was the first Cypriot ruler to use Greek letters and symbols in new coinage he cut, and hosted renowned artists, musicians and literary figures from Athens in his court at Salamis.

It was left to Alexander to lead the Greeks, united under Macedonia by his father (Philip II), into defeating the Persians. When, on his way to capturing Egypt, he laid siege of Tyre, the Cypriot kings sent 120 ships to his assistance; the Cypriots supported Alexander's further campaigns in various ways, and many accompanied him in his conquest of India.<sup>25</sup> The victorious Alexander turned the island into a province of his empire, making it a part of the Hellenistic world, while allowing the cities to retain autonomy in running their affairs.

The Ptolemies, Alexander's successors (during the Hellenistic Period, 325-30 BC), were to put a permanent end to Cyprus' political organization into autonomous city-kingdoms: The island became part of the Hellenistic kingdom of Egypt and was centrally governed by an absolute monarchy, local power resting with a governor-general (*strategos*), into whose hands passed all military and political power. New institutions, characteristic of Ptolemaic rule, were introduced – such as a *vouli* (parliament), a *demos* and public schools (*gymnasiums*), although these did not amount to a more democratic regime.<sup>26</sup> What is certain is that relations with 'mainland' Greece became even closer, as evidenced by the fact that Cypriot athletes participated in the Olympic and Panathenian contests, and Cypriots were received as *proxenoi* at the Delphi.

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In the account above, an effort was made to go over the bare basics of Cyprus' early history. Most mainstream historical narratives<sup>27</sup> would go much further than this and present Cyprus, once Hellenized, as effectively a part of the wider Greek nation, and Cypriots as, henceforth, imbued with the respective national consciousness or Greek identity – what we may call the strong version of the "Hellenization" thesis. Following from this, Cyprus is seen as increasingly disengaging itself from any original links with the Orient and gradually consolidating its position as part of the Occident, via its link with Greece. Caught from early times in the ongoing conflict between East and West, Cyprus is seen as constantly seeking Greece's help in maintaining its freedom and

national sovereignty. Onesilos and Evagoras are treated as exemplary heroes in the service of the national cause; Phoenicians as ethnic others who were ready to collaborate with the enemy (Persians), precisely because they lacked in ethnic solidarity with the Greeks of Cyprus; Kimon, as the great liberator, implementor of the Greek resolve to keep Hellenic Cyprus free; and so on.

The problem with such accounts is that they impose modern concepts of nationhood and national identity upon the past. Before considering whether Cyprus was part of the Greek nation, we should determine whether there were nations in antiquity – and, if so, whether Greece was a nation. We have seen that scholars agree that most nations are products of modern times, some going back to the Middle Ages, and very few having their early start in antiquity. As regards ancient Greece, it certainly cannot be deemed a nation in the modern sense of the word.<sup>28</sup> It is well established that the dominant political organization in Greek antiquity was the city (*polis*), and this commanded the primary loyalty of people throughout the Archaic and Classical periods.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, there were broader, supra-regional loyalties (created as a result of increasing contacts between the various communities), related to ethno-linguistic groups such as the Ionians, Dorians, Aeolians, and Achaens, each of which was characterized by its own unique culture (style of art and architecture, customs, and religion), each had its own fictive lineage, and on the basis of these differential features, they cultivated separate networks of alliance.<sup>30</sup> So strong were these two types of sub- or intra-Hellenic identity that they led to constant antagonism and conflict between cities or between supra-regional alliances, at the detriment of a collective “Hellenic” identity. The long and devastating Peloponnesian War, for instance, was fought between the Ionian and Dorian camps, led by Athens and Sparta respectively. The opponents proved capable of using any tactic, including siding with enemies, in order to win over their rivals.<sup>31</sup>

Overall, the primacy of allegiance to particular city-states than to Hellas, was the main reason why Classical Greece never managed to unite politically and to build a Greek nation. Again, this must not be seen through the modern lenses of nationhood, as a sort of ‘failure’ of ancient Greeks, since they never conceived of an imagined community wider than the city-state, as either “possible or desirable”.<sup>32</sup> Of course, Alexander was to achieve unity, later on, but only through force, and only as a first step towards building a multinational empire – something altogether different to



building a Greek nation as the "sole source of political power" and as the "basis of world order".<sup>33</sup>

Given that Greece in antiquity was no nation, as it was not united into a single political entity and did not have an over-arching national identity, the question becomes – what was it then? For, although initially absent, some sort of a "Hellenic consciousness" did seem to develop over time. Jonathan Hall proposes that sub-hellenic unity provided the building blocks for such a wider Hellenic construction.<sup>34</sup> By the time of the Olympic Games in the 6<sup>th</sup> century, only "Hellenes" were allowed to participate.<sup>35</sup> And by the time of the Persian Wars in the 5<sup>th</sup> century, sufficient unity was achieved to resist the enemy.<sup>36</sup>

Here is where Anthony Smith's concept of 'ethnie' comes handy.<sup>37</sup> Greece at the time may not have been a nation, but it had enough unity to classify as an *ethnie*. The main features of this emerging sense of unity included: A common name (Hellas); attachment to a Greek homeland around the Aegean; myths of common origin of the Greeks and their main sub-groups; a common Olympian religion, with its pantheon of gods and goddesses; common sacred sites (especially at Delphi, Dodona and Didyma) and associated rites; a family of closely related dialects (for instance, Ionian, Dorian), each with its own myths of lineage and ancestral heroes (for instance, Heracles for the Dorians); historic memories fostered by a common literary heritage, such as the Homeric epics, "celebrating an earlier, Mycenaean civilization and its war against Troy"; various festivals and games (for instance, the Olympian and Pythian); and the various colonies created from the eighth century onwards, dotting the Mediterranean.<sup>38</sup>

These common features formed the shared heritage of the Greeks and served to bind them together, despite the centrifugal tendencies of the other two sets of identities already noted. The end result was an "uneven" Greek consciousness, "cross-cut" by city and supra-regional loyalties. Hence, city-states would often fail to unite despite external threats. Yet, when the threat was grave enough, as in the case of the Persian invasion, an alliance did become possible, even if temporarily and imperfectly so, so that a "latent Hellenic ethnocentrism" was converted into an "overt politico-cultural movement".<sup>39</sup> Unexpected victory against the Persians led to a new wave of "pan-Hellenic consciousness", which in turn led to rivalry between the main city-states for leadership of the united front against Persia – which, itself, further galvanized in-group

ethnic feelings towards superior, civilized, freedom-loving Hellenes, as against the inferior, barbarian, servitude-imposing, and illiterate Persians.<sup>40</sup>

Let us now return to the case of Cyprus. It must be obvious by now that if we cannot talk of a Greek nation in antiquity, there is no support for the strong version of the Hellenization thesis (more on this below). So let us consider the more attenuated version of the thesis to begin with. Undoubtedly, the Greek settlers introduced into Cyprus their language, institutions, cults, arts, and names of places and people; it also seems established that Greek culture quickly became hegemonic on the island. The innumerable ancient material artefacts (statues, pottery and so on) constitute visible documents of the strong cultural connections with Greece since early times. Furthermore, the idea of strong links between the Greeks and Cyprus is embedded in its foundation myths, which found expression in various early works of epic poetry and chronicles. Indeed, a number of Homeric Greek heroes of the Trojan War have been credited with the foundation of Greek cities on the island: Teucros<sup>41</sup> is said to be the founder of Salamis, Kepheus the founder of Kerynia,<sup>42</sup> Agapenor of New Paphos, Chalkanor of Idalion, Akamas of Soloi,<sup>43</sup> and so on. In actual fact, the cities these Greek heroes supposedly set up were already thriving for a long time since, but the foundation myths themselves underline the great impact left by the arrival of the Greek settlers on the island and its people.<sup>44</sup> These epic accounts seem to also reflect changes that were linked to Greek colonization, whereupon political life, till then apparently organized into a more unified monarchic regime,<sup>45</sup> was now reorganized into city-kingdoms – in most of which the Greek settlers dominated (either through their sheer numbers, or because Greek elites managed to secure hegemonic supremacy).

Epic poetry flourished more generally in Cyprus. Indeed, the island boasts its own epic poet in Stasinus, allegedly author of the *Cypria*,<sup>46</sup> which forms part of the Homeric Cycle of Epics along with the well known *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The *Cypria* is seen by many scholars as a long introduction to the *Iliad*, and served as a source for many tragedies, written by the great Greek dramatists, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. Some historians speculate that such epic and other poems were probably “recited by rhapsodes at the festivals in the temples of Aphrodite-Astarte at Kition, Salamis and Paphos” or “during festivals [in Cypriot and Greek] courts of the rulers”,<sup>47</sup> creating repertoires of common struggles, glories and heroes, thereby helping to hammer-out some sort of common consciousness and establishing an “underlying unity among the

Greeks":<sup>48</sup> As Smith points out, such epic productions were "more effective in shaping subsequent generations of ethnically conscious families than the events themselves, a more potent agent of solidarity than victories and defeats".<sup>49</sup>

Obviously, there are good grounds for accepting the weaker version of the Hellenization thesis. Yet close cultural affinity and underlying unity are not to be seen as indicators of nationhood and national identity – but only of a more rudimentary, ethnic awareness.<sup>50</sup> Yet, as already noted, Cyprus' historiography is replete with examples of imposition of modern notions of nation and nationality on the past – the stronger version of the Hellenization thesis. A good such example is provided by Franz Georg Maier, in his penetrating article *Factoids in Ancient History: the case of fifth-century Cyprus*.<sup>51</sup> For Maier, 'factoids' are mere hypotheses or conjectures which have been repeated so often that they attain the status of established 'hard facts'.<sup>52</sup> The particular case he examines relates to the fifth century conflict of king Evagoras with Persia,<sup>53</sup> and the assumptions of most authors covering the surrounding events, that the conflict was the result of national motivations. The Cypriot conflict is almost always treated as an instance of the more general clash between Greece and Persia (or, even more widely, of the clash between the West and the East); Evagoras is treated as inspired by the national ideals of uniting the Cypriots in pursuing independence from Persia and/or closer union with Greece; and the Phoenicians of Cyprus as the ethnic others who were "pro-Persian" and acted as "a fifth column at the expense of the Greek-Cypriot majority".<sup>54</sup>

After critically examining the available historical records, Maier concludes that there is no evidence of ethnic enmity between ancient Cypriots and Phoenicians: Rather the opposite, for there are indications of peaceful co-existence, mutual cultural exchange and even intermarriage between the two groups. Divisions were not vertical (ethnic/national) but horizontal (subjects against rulers). As regards Evagoras' motivations, these appear to relate more to power politics and dynastic ambitions (to expand his kingdom's power and gain hegemony over Cyprus), rather than to ethnic or national ideals.<sup>55</sup> Maier undertakes a more meticulous scrutiny of ancient sources and convincingly argues for a non-nationalist reading of the unfolding of events: Evagoras harboured no anti-Persian schemes or plans of liberating Cyprus during the first decades of his rule; his anti-Persian turn came after his assault on the other Cypriot cities, and Persia's decision to support the latter, at their request for help; during the process Evagoras indiscriminately attacked and annexed both Greek and Phoenician

kingdoms (if national values were his guidance, attacking co-nationals would have been out of the question).<sup>56</sup> Evagoras may have had "philhellenic leanings", attracting Greek artists and writers to Salamis, and this may have furthered the (cultural) Hellenization process – but this was probably not so much the expression of his "Greek national consciousness", as the vaunting of "pretensions similar to those of the Great [Persian] King and many of his vassal rulers", who similarly appreciated and imitated Greek culture and courted Greek artists, without demonstrating thereby an identification with Greece, or a desire for Persia to unite with Greece.<sup>57</sup>

Evagoras' case is thus a good example of *a posteriori* attributions of nationalist motivations to historical actors. One could add many more examples, to the ones used by Maier, to demonstrate the argument. Let us consider two such cases, through a re-reading of ancient sources. The first case relates to the Cypriots' participation in the naval battle of Salamis (480 BC): Mainstream historians almost always attribute the Cypriots' bad performance to national reasons; Kyrris, for instance, alleges that the Cypriots "willingly behaved unheroically";<sup>58</sup> Tim Boatswain similarly reasons that "[p]erhaps unsurprisingly the Cypriots, no doubt conscious of their Greek heritage, apparently did not fight well for their Persian masters"<sup>59</sup> – implying, obviously, that they allowed themselves to be butchered so as not to cause harm to Greece. But if we turn to Herodotus' original account, we simply learn that the performance of the Cypriots was poor – as was that of the Egyptian, Cilician, Pamphylian and other allies of Xerxes – causing Queen Artemisia's comment that they were "no good". There is nothing to justify the inference that the Cypriot's poor performance had to do with national sentiments. And if one was to assume the latter, then the question would remain as to why the Egyptians and other non-Cypriots did not fight well either, since they had no connection with the Hellenic cause.

Another example is how General Kimon's expeditions to Cyprus (470, 449 BC) are portrayed – namely, as Greek mainland efforts to free the island from foreign Persian domination. Yet, paradoxically, Kimon (much like Pausanias before him), freed Cyprus and then immediately left, so the Persians re-conquered the island soon after; one would have expected the Greeks to have left behind some forces to protect the island if indeed liberation was their main target. Another intriguing fact is that the Cypriots themselves seemed not to actively join these efforts towards their liberation (indeed, in some cases, the Cypriot kings resisted their liberator – why would that be so remains impossible to explain using the nationalist framework). A more convincing explanation

is in fact provided by an unlikely source, Plutarch, who, interestingly, gives three very instrumentalist reasons for Kimon's expeditions: First, Kimon wanted to keep the Athenians busy with external wars so they would not end up fighting other Greeks in civil wars; second, the Athenians needed to constantly train themselves in war against the barbarians (at that stage, the Persians); and third (and perhaps more importantly), if they were successful in battle they would have enriched themselves with the spoils of war. No reference whatsoever is made to nationalist values or motivations.<sup>60</sup> In fact, Plutarch's account immediately explains the paradox of the Greek's departure soon after winning over the Persians (they had their exercise and booty – so they carried on), as well as the Cypriots' passivity. Almost no historical work on Cyprus cites Plutarch and his interpretations of the Greek expeditions – so that the mainstream account of Kimon's resolve to liberate his Cypriot brothers prevails as the only "natural" explanation.<sup>61</sup>

Interestingly, Zannettos, the first author to attempt a complete modern history of Cyprus from a nationalist perspective, in the early twentieth century (1910), is one of the few who did note Plutarch's explanations. Zannettos wrote his history in the early Cypriot nationalist era, so he faced the great challenge of re-interpreting all historical stages by using the grand narrative of nation and the unfolding of the national spirit since ancient times. Unable to accept Plutarch's instrumentalist explanations, Zannettos found it necessary to add that "obviously [Kimon's] expedition served also the panhellenic idea"<sup>62</sup> – that is, of joining city-states together in the all-embracing union of the nation. For Zannettos, irrespective of other instrumentalist considerations, there must also have been, even if only implicitly so, the nationalist vision – lurking at the back, hidden from view, but surely there. Furthermore, to the extent that the national idea was not as developed as it should have been, Zannettos tried to place his argument within an evolutionary perspective, which would have allowed him to explain the more "selfish" behaviour of Greeks and Cypriots at that time (that is, their motivation by "individual interest",<sup>63</sup> as against the wider ideal of "national solidarity implied by the pan-hellenic idea").<sup>64</sup> He was thus able to conclude that the "fragmentation of Hellenism into numerous small cities was politically and nationally wrong" – and the only justification he could accept was that such an outcome simply constituted an earlier stage in the "ascent of [the Greeks'] national life to a higher stage of civilization",<sup>65</sup> which was to be reached a little later, when Alexander would unite the Greeks into a larger whole.

One may simply strip Zanettos' account of the teleology implicit in his evolutionist perspective, and stay with the more convincing conclusion that the imagined community which commanded the loyalties of the ancient Greeks and Cypriots was the city-state, and not any other wider entity. As there was only a rudimentary sense of Greece or Hellas, there was equally a very weak sense of "Cyprus". The salient identifications were not with Greece or Cyprus, but with Athens and Sparta, Salamis and Amathus. City-states were worlds unto their own: Salamis would develop close links with Athens, but other Cypriot cities could make entirely different choices, one aligning with Sparta (Athens' enemy), and another with Persia. So when Evagoras tried to dominate the other Cypriot cities, it is not surprising that Amathus, Soloi and Kiti sought Persia's help to protect them against their "co-national".<sup>66</sup> And when Kimon left Cyprus, after his victories over the Persians, he was primarily concerned about Athens' other interests and no so much with his status as a Greek liberator of an enslaved Greek island.<sup>67</sup>

Similar conclusions are reached by Michael Given in his study of ancient Cyprus between the seventh and third centuries BC.<sup>68</sup> After studying the ancient Cypriot cultural system, Given proposes that:

The most significant cultural unit was the city kingdom, each one central within the landscape it constructed and each with its own characteristic sanctuaries and cemeteries and local deities, providing a coherent and comprehensible entity [...] with which people could identify. This identification was made above all through the king, who was a unified and unambiguous symbol – indeed the only unified and unambiguous symbol – not only of the city-kingdom but of the meaningfully constructed world.<sup>69</sup>

Based on these conclusions, Given pronounces that ethnicity is an "irrelevant concept" as regards ancient Cyprus.<sup>70</sup> Yet he qualifies this by allowing that from approximately the fourth century onwards there are increasing signs of change and a gradual passage from the old to a new cultural system, based on ethnicity: This he attributes to a "revolution in thought" impacting on the prevailing "world view", so that by the end of the fourth century, the pre-ethnic cultural system was no longer in existence.<sup>71</sup> Given does not analyze in depth the causes of these changes, whose origin he links to "similar trends in the ancient world, especially Athens"<sup>72</sup>, from which they were imported to Cyprus. But they amounted to a growing emphasis on foundation myths linked to Greek heroes, and the adoption of divine figures from the "anthropocentric Greek pantheon" by the Cypriot kings and peoples.

Jonathan Hall argues that ethnic demarcations in ancient Greece started becoming particularly sharp "as a result of the processes of 'social closure' which forged a new definition of the community of *politai*, or 'citizens'."<sup>73</sup> Hall provides a link between Wimmer and Anthony Smith, between modernist and ethno-symbolic approaches, for the latter can be seen as attempts to delineate pre-modern processes of social closure, which culminated in rendering ethnicity as a central principle according to which pre-modern societies structured inclusion and exclusion in social life. Hall admits that it would be difficult to spell out the exact nature of the mechanisms determining inclusion or exclusion from the polis, but he suggests that "the recitation of ethnic myths, invoking claims and counterclaims to territory and ancestral rights, must have played some part in accession to, or exclusion from, citizen status". Henceforth, there would be fluctuations in the salience of ethnicity, cohesion increasing with the appearance of external enemies. But, as we have already seen, enhanced ethnic consciousness would certainly not lead to the close cohesion required of a modern nation. It is true that all this was to change after Alexander would forcibly unite the Greeks together, but the outcome was a multi-national empire, and certainly not a nation-state or a nation.<sup>74</sup>

### ***The Orthodox Church: From Byzantine to European feudal rule***

The Roman Period (30 BC-330 AD) was in many ways marked by continuity with the previous, Hellenistic era. As with most multi-ethnic empires, the new rulers showed "little interest in Romanising Cyprus".<sup>75</sup> Thus, Greek remained the official language and hellenic culture, along with the arts and the sciences, continued to thrive.<sup>76</sup> This, in fact, was a period in which the Hellenization process, which began long ago, was consolidated – "although as in other eastern provinces, the oriental tradition lay below the Hellenistic veneer".<sup>77</sup> More generally, Roman administration proved to be efficient and liberal: The peace and security enjoyed within a political system which united the Mediterranean world; the enhanced role of Cyprus as a link in the trade between east (India, Arabia) and west (especially Italy), and improvements in the roads and ports of the island, all contributed to a rise in the prosperity and well-being of the Cypriots.

But the most important development, which was to have a lasting impact on the island, was the introduction of Christianity. In 46 AD, St. Paul, together with the Cypriot St.

Barnabas, went around Cyprus preaching the new religion. Initially, Christianity did not seem to fall on fertile ground; in fact, in the first three centuries, the new religion made little progress, and paganism continued to be strong. This is not surprising, considering that in those years of Roman rule in Cyprus, the Christians were still persecuted – indeed, the only recorded Cypriot Christian martyrs met with death in this period.

It was during the long period of Byzantine rule (330-1191 AD) on the island that the new Christian religion and its Church were to grow deep roots. Constantine the Great, who established Constantinople (the 'New Rome') as the new capital of the Empire, on the site of the old Byzantium, was the initiator of this second phase of Roman rule. The establishment of the new capital heralds the separation of the Latin dominated West, from the Greek-speaking East part of the Roman empire (later to be known as the Byzantium), which was to evolve unique features of its own and to dominate the East Mediterranean for the next thousand years. Constantine allowed freedom of worship to the Christians and, most significantly, put the new religion under his personal patronage. Subsequent emperors,<sup>78</sup> after his death, continued his legacy, making Christianity the official religion of the Empire, while being hostile to idolatry and paganism: This explains the gradual phasing out of the latter in Cyprus, over the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries, and the "triumph" of the Christian religion.<sup>79</sup>

The Cypriot Church gained in prestige as a consequence of boasting a number of local saints,<sup>80</sup> but also from the alleged passing through Cyprus of St. Helena (Great Constantine's mother), after her visit to Jerusalem and her discovery of the site and relics of Christ's Passion: Presumably, St. Helena established churches and monasteries in Cyprus, and left some of the relics she had brought from the holy lands – thus Cyprus would henceforth add to its fame and establish itself as a centre of pilgrimage.<sup>81</sup> More importantly, the Church was expanding and consolidating its organizational structure, and spreading its network of bishops and priests throughout the island.<sup>82</sup> Through these, it managed to stay in close touch with the people and their problems, offering them protection against "overbearing officials".<sup>83</sup>

Within only a century of Byzantine rule, the local Church had grown powerful and confident enough of itself to resist subservience to the strong Patriarchate of Antioch,<sup>84</sup> which claimed the right to appoint the bishops of Cyprus. The conflict between the two churches lasted for almost a century. The matter was first raised in the 3<sup>rd</sup>



Ecumenic Synod of Ephesus (431 AD) which confirmed the "autocephalous" (independent) status of the Church of Cyprus. Some time, later (478 AD), the Patriarch of Antioch raised the issue again with emperor Zeno. This time, the Cypriot Archbishop, who claimed he had just discovered the tomb of St. Barnabas and the hand-written gospel of St. Matthew, presented the finding to the emperor, in Constantinople; the latter, not only re-confirmed the independence of the Cypriot Church, but gave a number of privileges to the Cypriot Archbishop.<sup>85</sup> The successful waging of the Church's struggle for independence was to form the basis for the prominence the Church was to enjoy henceforth, as a parallel power to the secular authorities, symbolizing Cyprus' autonomy.

Byzantine rule had on the whole beneficiary effects on the people. Some of the harsher Roman laws (such as the death penalty) were abolished; what was not ameliorated were the laws which tied tenant farmers to the land on which they were born, and town artisans to the work and guilds they were compulsorily organized into. Thus, in practice, a "small ruling class composed of land owners, senior officials and the clergy" enjoyed all economic and political power. But, overall, the economy was doing well, although it never reached the prosperity levels of late Roman rule – until further development was arrested by the Arab invasions, which started in the mid-7<sup>th</sup> century and lasted for over two centuries.

In 653/4 AD, after one of their many raids the Arabs decided to leave behind a garrison of 12,000 Muslims, while subsequently encouraging more Muslims to settle on the island: This was the first time that the new religion was to acquire an organized presence in Cyprus, although the numbers of those who stayed behind permanently must have been small,<sup>86</sup> until the period of Ottoman rule, during which the Muslim community was to become more numerous. Cyprus was important as a naval base for both Byzantines and Arabs alike, and proved to be a bone of contention for centuries. In 688 AD, the two powers agreed on neutralizing the island and on establishing a condominium-like regime: During the life of this arrangement, which lasted nearly three hundred years, there was relative peace and stability, and Christian and Muslim villages were reported to live "harmoniously" "side-by-side".<sup>87</sup> When the Muslim world began to fragment in the tenth century, the Byzantines reconquered part of their lost territories from the Arabs, and Cyprus was once again brought under the empire's control (965 AD).<sup>88</sup>

The next two centuries were marked by increasing prosperity and a 'cultural renaissance', in what became known as the 'second golden age' of the Byzantine empire.<sup>89</sup> Agriculture and trade revived, the island became an important centre of textile production, cities came to life, churches and monasteries were built, and great mountain fortresses erected. In this new era of Byzantine rule, imperial forces were stationed on the island and governors enjoyed more autonomy than previously in running island affairs. This provided more security, but it also created problems – for instance, taxes were now more efficiently collected, and some areas of autonomy were lost. Most importantly, the church leadership, which during the previous centuries had been rendered the only religious but also political leader of the local Christians, was now expected to share power with the Byzantine governors, and this led to tension between religious and secular powers. Furthermore, the governors of the island, who were now commanding their own military forces, were at times tempted to challenge their emperor, seeking increased power for themselves.

By the twelfth century, the Byzantine empire was once again thrown into problems and decline.<sup>90</sup> Internally, it was suffering from the consequences of the feudalization process, and the growing economic and political power of the military aristocracy and the church (which had by now become a large landowner), with the parallel disappearance of a free peasantry. The inability of the emperor and central administration to reverse developments led to the desolation of the countryside and a weakness in organizing resistance against the rising Ottoman threat. External challenges were also coming from a resurgent West: Tension with the West had been building up over the centuries, political reasons intermingling with religious ones (for instance, whereas the West was moving towards the development of independent states, in the East, the Byzantine empire was still struggling to maintain a more universal political culture); but the biggest cleavage was to come as a result of the religious *schism* of 1054. Without any help from the West, the Byzantines were yielding to the increasing attacks of the Ottomans – the destruction of the imperial army at the battle of Manzikert, in 1071 AD, being a date of symbolic significance, since it storm-opened Byzantium's gates to waves of Muslim bands in the Eastern borders of Anatolia.

The conflict with the West was to escalate in the years to come, at the time of the Crusades.<sup>91</sup> The First Crusade (1095-9) provided the cause for western European expansion to the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. After capturing the Holy Lands

and the adjacent areas of Syria, the Latins, as the occidentals were known at the time, consolidated their hold on the conquered lands with the stationing of troops but also with the arrival of settlers from Europe, leading to the creation of the eastern Latin states. As a consequence, trade in the area increased substantially, and Cyprus started benefiting from its location, linking the west to the east. Between 1174-1187, the Muslims re-captured most of the areas controlled by the west, which gave cause for the Third Crusade to be organized. It was in the context of this new crusade that Richard the Lionheart conquered Cyprus (1191), on his way to the Holy Lands. Even though the capture was almost accidental, Cyprus proved very useful in serving the needs of the crusading forces, by providing a base for their operations in the area for the next hundred years. In fact, the island was to remain under European rule for almost four centuries (1191-1571). It is important to underline that Cyprus was, at the time, a Byzantine province with a Christian population and, thus, its capture effectively marked a new phase in western expansionism – which was to be repeated in a few years' time with the capture of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade (1204).<sup>92</sup> After changing hands from Richard to the Templar Knights, and back to Richard, the latter finally sold Cyprus (1192) to Guy de Lusignan, ex-king of the Holy Lands/Jerusalem.

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Fearing that the more numerous locals could rebel, and perhaps cause the Byzantine Emperor to come to their support (whereas assistance from more distant France couldn't be relied on), Guy proceeded to create a local power-base of settlers with "a vested interest in preserving the new regime".<sup>93</sup> He thus invited "masses of 'unemployed' knights and other crusaders,<sup>94</sup> widows and orphans of men killed in battle, technicians, masons, clerks [who] flocked to the island", creating "strong Latin settlements".<sup>95</sup> The most distinguished settlers received fiefs and the rest were given assignments in public posts, or assistance in setting up businesses. Over the years, the numbers of settlers from Latin states in the area, but also from Western Europe, kept increasing,<sup>96</sup> constituting a new ruling class which controlled the economy and administration of the island. They shared the same Latin religion and culture, and tended to form a community apart from the subject population, which remained predominantly Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox by religious affiliation.<sup>97</sup>

Through time, the power of the Lusignan regime was consolidated into a hierarchical state, strong enough to last for nearly three centuries.<sup>98</sup> The new regime was a typical Western European feudal system.<sup>99</sup> All land was owned by the new rulers, who displaced the Greek landowning class (the *archontes*), and was divided as fiefs (which often comprised whole villages) between the king, the knights and the Latin church. The knights had to swear loyalty to the king, as his vassals, and to provide services to him, especially military ones, as necessary.

The entire local population was reduced to the state of tenant farmers or serfs. Peasant cultivators along with their families were bound to the fief-holders, who had the authority as to which land to allocate for cultivation, what products to produce, when and how. The natives were divided into three classes: The vast majority belonged to the lower class (the *paroikoi* or serfs), who had to provide their own means of production, pay one third of their produce to their landlord, plus a poll-tax, and also had to work for two days per week without pay on the landlord's lands. The laws allowed the feudal lords almost total power over their serfs and their families – they could buy or sell them along with the land, exchange them for other serfs or even for animals,<sup>100</sup> work them to exhaustion, dismiss or punish them. The only things they were not allowed to do were to wound them without reason, or kill them! "To all intents and purposes they were the property of the landlord".<sup>101</sup> The second class, the *perpyarioi*,<sup>102</sup> were free on the condition that they paid a special annual tax; they could not be sold or exchanged like the serfs – but were similarly obliged to pay a third of their produce, plus to work for two days per week on the landlord's estate. Finally, the freedmen (*lefteroi*) were emancipated locals, who usually received their freedom after paying a substantial fee to their lords. They could own land but had to pay tribute (from 1/5 to 1/10 of their produce) to their lord; they were no longer the property of their lord but of the king, to whom they had to pay taxes.

All the surplus labour expended by the locals was thus appropriated by the foreign ruling class – the king and his court, the nobles, the knights and the clergy. Another important section of the upper classes were the foreign merchants, mostly Venetians and Genoese.<sup>103</sup> Using Cyprus as a base, these merchants managed to control the Eastern trade, previously monopolized by the Byzantine Empire, which was now in decline. Up to those times, Syria used to be the main trading centre of the area, but with its fall to the Arabs, Cyprus took its place as the commercial link between East and West.<sup>104</sup> These developments brought immense riches to the foreign merchants

on the island, and had multiplying effects on the local economy, benefiting the whole upper class, which lived in luxury and splendour. Foreign travelers of the period were dazzled with what they saw. Ludolf von Sudheim, a priest from Westphalia, opined that: "The princes, the nobles and the knights of Cyprus, are the richest in Christendom".<sup>105</sup> Yet we should not forget that this was only a part of the picture, since "the brilliant surface presented by the Lusignan Court or the rich merchantry of Famagusta covered a core of poverty and oppression".<sup>106</sup> Not only that, but Cypriots were under strong pressures as regards their religious beliefs and practices.

Early on in their rule, the Lusignans had sought to establish a Latin church in Cyprus to serve their various needs.<sup>107</sup> The pope concurred to the idea of a local Latin church, perhaps hoping that, beside serving the settler community, the locals could also be won over to Catholicism. In those times, the Catholics considered the Orthodox as "faithful gone astray", who needed to be recalled to Roman obedience (the Cypriots especially, who were Chalcedonians, and not Monophysites, like other Christian churches in the East, were considered "nearer" the true faith). The Latin Church in Cyprus was accordingly established in 1196.

For the Orthodox Church, the new regime brought a great loss of power, wealth and status, challenging its previous prominence and, to a certain extent, its very survival. The Latin conquest had meant the flight of the Byzantine aristocrats who used to be its traditional source of patronage. It also lost a considerable part of its properties, which were taken over by the Lusignan crown and nobility for the creation of royal estates and noble fiefs; some land and monasteries were handed by the crown to the Latin Church.<sup>108</sup>

The latter aided the cohesion of the local Latin community, which had to face the resentment of the native Orthodox population and the encircling threat of Muslim forces contesting the Western crusader presence in the area. In the initial stages, there was a strong presence of catholic military orders (such as Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic knights), whose objective was precisely that of enhancing security against possible internal uprisings by disaffected Cypriots, as well as against Muslim or Byzantine attacks. To these were added several religious orders (such as Franciscans and Dominicans), who were noted for their higher education, and could better contribute to the proselytization mission. But the numbers of the Latin clergy were still relatively small, as most of them were recruited from France, and Italy. They tended

to concentrate in the towns, where most of the Latin community lived, thereby neglecting the countryside and the mass of Cypriot peasants. The natives, and especially the peasants, grew increasingly hostile towards the Latin Church because its rites and language were alien to them, its doctrines contradicted the received truth of their own church, its wealth and power reminded them of the poverty and powerlessness of their own church – and its priorities seemed to focus on the needs of the Latin urban population and aristocrats.

Matters became worse after the fall of Constantinople to the Latins (1204), which encouraged Pope Innocent III to seek the parallel imposition of the Latin creed on the defeated Orthodox. In 1213, he sent Cardinal Pelagius to secure the compliance of the Orthodox church in the Eastern lands; in Cyprus, the Pope's delegate convened two Ecclesiastical Councils (1220, 1222) which came up with a number of measures towards the subordination of the Orthodox Church.<sup>109</sup> The local Church's hierarchy sought counsel from the Patriarch of Constantinople: In the midst of the critical situation in Cyprus, and of the weakness of the Byzantines themselves, Patriarch Germanos initially advised moderation – to yield to the financial demands of the Latins, but to insist on the autonomy of the Church. A little later (1229), he sent a new letter to the Cypriots,<sup>110</sup> advocating a more assertive stand against the Latins: "The Roman Church was castigated, those who had fallen under its influence were condemned and the people were urged not to go to churches in which converts officiated but to worship in their own homes."<sup>111</sup>

Despite the Latins' resolve for ensuring the local Church's subservience,<sup>112</sup> the latter put up a strong resistance – the result of its long-standing autonomy and its lingering attachment to Byzantium (of which Cypriots were a part "within living memory").<sup>113</sup> The bishops exiled themselves from the island (1240), and ordered those who stayed behind not to submit to the Latins on threat of excommunication. Faced with such defiance, the new pope, Innocent IV, assumed a more moderate approach, whereupon the Orthodox prelates returned from exile and elected a new archbishop. But the next pope, Alexander IV, reverted to the older policies (now made even stricter)<sup>114</sup> codified in his *Bulla Cypria* (1260), which, among other measures, dictated that in future there would only be one archbishop on the island, the Latin one, to whom Orthodox clergy would swear obedience. The recently elected Germanos was to keep his position until his death, after which the post and title would be abolished.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, after

Germanos' death, the Orthodox church of Cyprus remained headless for 300 years, till the end of Latin rule.

In practice, it seems that the implementation of the *Bulla* "generated unexpected unrest and resistance" both by the clergy but mostly by the laity (who marginalized any clergy abiding by the new provisions).<sup>116</sup> This spirit of defiance was probably strengthened by news of the recapture of Constantinople from the Latins (1261), by the Nicaea Byzantines. Worried with the many enemies encircling the weakened Byzantium, the new emperor – Michael Paleologos – tried to mend relations with the West, so he conceded to a union of the Orthodox and Latin Churches (2<sup>nd</sup> Council of Lyons), under the supremacy of Rome. But Paleologos acted against the wishes of a vocal anti-unionist front, composed of a section of the clergy, plus the majority of the laymen, so the deal was never practically implemented; a few years later (1281), the Pope excommunicated Paleologos as a "promoter of schismatics" – after which, the rift between the two churches grew bigger: The Orthodox were henceforth considered not only as schismatics but also as heretics.

These developments naturally had negative repercussions in Cyprus, where animosities escalated. In 1359, the Pope sent a delegate<sup>117</sup> to the island to impose Rome's will. As the local chronicler, Leontios Machairas, put it, "he wanted to make the *Romioi* Latins, he wanted to confirm them [to Catholicism] and there was a great scandal between the *Romioi* and the Latins".<sup>118</sup> In one incident, the papal delegate arranged a confirmation of some priests in Santa Sophia, but when laymen received news of the matter they tried to break into the church and put fire to its doors, chanting "death to the Latins"; peace was only restored after the intervention of forces sent by the king. "And those whom he had confirmed, threw away the cotton and spat upon it" (denouncing their confirmation), Machairas underlines.<sup>119</sup>

Sheer force was not the only weapon of the Latins in accomplishing their purposes; they also utilized their resources to build Catholic cathedrals and schools, and to promote the general well-being of their community, which acted as attractions for voluntary conversion, particularly once the locals considered "the ease [...] with which a [converted] Catholic could become a freedman, a public employee, a merchant or secure some lucrative employment since he was now by religious profession a member of the ruling caste".<sup>120</sup>

Such efforts did not remain uncontested. The local Cypriot Orthodox elite, which was gradually recovering in strength, responded by building Orthodox Churches that tried to match in splendour the Latin ones.<sup>121</sup> The Cypriot elite maintained contact with influential Byzantine personalities and rallied their local church, helping it persevere in these harsh times. Furthermore, because local Orthodox schools were both few and of a low standard,<sup>122</sup> some sought a better education in Byzantine lands: A characteristic case was that of George the Cypriot, born in 1240, who after leaving a local Greek school because of its poor quality, went on to a Latin school where he had difficulty with the Latin language of instruction and was disappointed with the rudimentary Aristotelian logic taught – whereby he transferred to Nicaea, to complete his education, ending up as a Patriarch of Constantinople later on in his life.

### ***Greek 'nationalism' in Medieval times?***

From the eleventh century onwards, while Cyprus was under Latin rule, Byzantium was facing increasing attacks on almost all its borders and kept losing lands and shrinking in size. The last blow was the loss of its capital to the Latins in 1204. The remaining parts of the empire (Nicaea, Trebizond, the despotat of Morea, and the despotat of Epirus)<sup>123</sup> shared two characteristics: They were mostly Greek-speaking, since the lands lost contained most of the remaining ethno-cultural communities of the empire (such as the Serbs and the Bulgarians); and they now remained as smaller territorial political units looking for a future. Naturally, the main aim of all these units was how to regain Constantinople and reconstitute the empire. But another emerging vision was that of reconstituting themselves along the lines of ancient Greek city-states, with a Hellenic identity.

Up to that stage, the Byzantines had grown to see themselves as Roman citizens and Christians, members of the Eastern Roman Empire, which was God's earthly kingdom in the divine scheme of things. Their universalist perspective meant that they did not see themselves as part of any nation – in fact, the terms 'ethnos' and 'ethnikos' had the derogatory meaning of barbarians or heretics; neither did they consider themselves Hellenes since this term was associated with ancient Greece's polytheism or paganism; similarly, the philosophy and moral teachings of classical Greece were considered suspect. The highly educated Court and administration were versed in Latin through which links were maintained with the West, but Greek was permitted in the lower



bureaucracy. Gradually, relations with the West grew more distant and Greek became the language of the state and of the elite more generally.<sup>124</sup> A classical education and knowledge of ancient Greek became important for advancing to the higher offices of the empire. Yet the emphasis of such an education was on the form of language (the grammar, the structure, the syntax) and the rhetoric of the classics, and did not entail an identification with the ancient Greeks as the biological or cultural forefathers with whom there was any sort of continuity through time. It was only now, under the new circumstances, that the connection with ancient Greece was reconceptualized. As Campbell and Sherrard put it, the Byzantines were now threatened with a "double loss":<sup>125</sup> As regards the military domain, they had lost their superiority and their territories had been overtaken by all kinds of enemies, including the infidel Ottomans; and as regards the cultural domain they recognized the advances made by the Latin West, which was also successfully pressing the Orthodox to accept their supremacy in doctrinal matters. Laying claim to their hellinistic heritage was something that neither the Latins nor the Ottomans could emulate. The fact that most of the remaining free parts of the Byzantium were concentrated in territories earlier associated with ancient Greece, and were areas where Greek-speakers predominated, made the connection with Hellas more convincing. The contemporary inhabitants of mainland southern Greece were now seen to be the direct descendants of the ancient Greeks. Greek philosophers (and especially Plato, whose ideas were considered anathema by the Orthodox Church) were re-instated, to the extent that George Gemistos Pletho advocated a new polity based on Plato's ideal city, and which in many ways entailed features of modern nation-states.<sup>126</sup> The culture and ideas of the Hellenic Greek ancestors were becoming the basis for the regeneration of the Byzantines.

This turn to the classical past was best expressed by Pletho in a now famous memo to Emperor Manuel II, in which he reminds him that the people he rules over "are Hellenes by race, as both our language and ancestral education testify". The "proper" land for the Hellenes is that of "the Peloponnese, together with the neighbouring part of Europe and the islands that lie near to it". And why was that? Because "it appears that this land has always been inhabited by the same Hellenes, as far as the memory of man reaches back."<sup>127</sup> Nevertheless, as Runciman notes, the Byzantines did not feel comfortable using the term "Hellene" as a self-description before the mid-fourteenth century. When they started using the term, it initially had a "cultural" meaning, and sometimes a racial meaning, to refer to the Greek *genos*. Thus, Athanasios Lepenthrenus [Lependrinos], a Cypriot man of letters (*logios*), in a letter written in

1355, refers to the sad state of the "Hellenes living in Cyprus" ("Ellinon ton en Kypro"), under the Latins.<sup>128</sup> By the fifteenth century, it was quite common to identify the Byzantium with "Hellas", so that many would talk of the liberation of Hellas, and some would refer to the Byzantine king as the "king of Greece".<sup>129</sup> Yet some, and especially the prelates, were hesitant in completely identifying themselves as Hellenes; when George Scholarios, future Patriarch of Constantinople after its fall to the Ottomans, was asked to classify his racial origins, he replied that he was "Hellene as regards his language", but did not "hold the beliefs that the Hellenes once held"; as to how he identified himself, he clearly responded "Christian", showing that he still considered Hellene and Christian as antithetical.<sup>130</sup> Despite this, since it was the turn to ancient Greece which gave birth to this "last Byzantine renaissance", amidst the wars and the myriad problems facing the ailing empire, Runciman calls the phenomenon a "Hellenic renaissance".<sup>131</sup>

Would we be justified in considering this vision of a new polity and of a new self-identity as an early form of nationalism – as mainstream Greek historiographers have? Xydis investigates the issue by considering whether the various characteristics of nationalism seem to have existed at this later stage of Byzantium's history. His conclusion is negative and he proposes to rather view the phenomenon as a case of neo-Hellenic "proto-nationalism", which shares some features with modern nationalism, but differs with it in other important respects.<sup>132</sup> More specifically, he proposes that Greek-Byzantine proto-nationalism shares with nationalism its mostly secular character, and its sense of pride for ancestral roots (viz. the ideas of ancient Greece and of the Greek philosophers, as against the attachment to the Orthodox religion in those times). But there is a crucial difference: Greek-Byzantine proto-nationalism was mostly an elite phenomenon, whereas modern nationalism captures the imagination of the masses, leading to the identification of the nation with people, which is the main driving force for the emergence of modern national states.<sup>133</sup>

Hobsbawm develops further the concept of proto-nationalism, which he defines as referring to "certain variants of feelings of collective belonging" which evolved in the past under various conditions, and which may be available for national movements to mobilize in constructing modern nations.<sup>134</sup> Hobsbawm differentiates between two types of proto-national bonds: First, the political attachments and vocabularies of "select groups more directly linked to states and institutions" – such as the ones emphasized by Runciman and Xydis; and second, the "supra-local forms of popular

identification", which go beyond attachments to the immediate living spaces of ordinary people. Did the latter type of bond develop in late Byzantine times? In our brief historical review of the Byzantium, we have underlined the importance of religion, and Orthodoxy, did certainly serve as a supra-local identification establishing bonds between unrelated people. But Orthodoxy, at that stage, was underpinned by an ecumenic philosophy and not a national one, and it still united a diverse range of ethno-linguistic groups residing in Byzantine lands (even if, as we have seen, the contraction of the Byzantium reduced the number and importance of such groups, allowing the gradual dominance – over the next centuries – of the Greeks). Language is another candidate for serving as a proto-national bond: But the Greek of the elite was very different from the Greek of ordinary people, so again it could not have served as a basis of vertical unity, between elite and masses, or for horizontal unity between the various ethno-linguistic groups. We may then conclude that, at this late Byzantine period, the vision of a new polity may have served as a bond uniting segments of the elite, but it certainly did not provide a basis for their unity with the masses; moreover, any bonds linking the ordinary people with each other were quite weak, and could easily lead to tension and disunity rather than cohesion.

Let us now return to Cyprus, to review the application of these observations to the respective historical period. As we noted earlier on, the Cypriots did maintain contacts with the Byzantium, even after Latin rule was imposed on the island. Was proto-nationalism 'exported' to the Cypriots through these contacts? We saw how George the Cypriot left for Nicaea during this period of the Byzantium's Hellenic renaissance, to seek a better education which included the classics, ending up as Patriarch Gregorios (1283-1289). In a later autobiographical text, written after his ordination as Patriarch of Constantinople, he refers to the barbarian Latins who put the (Cypriot) Hellenes under their yoke, demonstrating a persisting concern over Cyprus and an awareness that Cypriots were not ruled by their "likes" – mostly seen in religious terms.<sup>135</sup>

In the previous section, we have seen how the conflict over religion had acquired primary significance as a central principle around which social inclusion and exclusion were structured. By the thirteenth century, there had developed a very high "degree of polarization", between the mass of the population and their rulers, along religio-ethnic, economic and social lines, "unequalled before or since".<sup>136</sup> Yet this did not apply to the higher classes, the members of which were in many ways co-opted by the Frankish rulers. Stavrianos notes that it was common policy of European feudal

powers to treat the local upper classes in the conquered lands generously, permitting them to retain their wealth and titles: "The latter responded by identifying themselves with their foreign masters rather than with their own countrymen".<sup>137</sup> In Cyprus, there was a gradual expansion of the Cypriot free men as a consequence of the liberation of the serfs (*perpyarioi*); this happened when, on a few occasions, such as Peter I's need to finance his overseas expeditions, these groups were given the opportunity to buy their freedom, after paying a specific amount to the state treasury. Those freed in this way, augmented the ranks of the Cypriots free by birth. A number of the free Cypriots were involved in trade and shipping, and others in various services related to the Lusignan regime. A good example of the latter group was Leontios Machairas (1360-1432), author of the *Chronicle of the Sweet Land of Cyprus*, who was a diplomat at the service of the Lusignans. On the one hand, Machairas betrays the identification of the Cypriot upper classes with the Frankish regime, when, in describing a local peasant uprising (driven by a famine), he writes with contempt about his compatriot rebels (those "wolves" the villagers) and their "wicked doings" and seems to be relieved at the defeat and cruel death of the insubordinate "cursed villagers"; at the same time, he expresses himself with sympathy towards the feudal regime and especially the King, and shows relief at the return of King Janus from captivity.<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, we have already noted Machairas' reporting of the strong religious feelings of the local Orthodox, resisting Catholic pressures for conversion (to "make the *Romioi* Latins"); he similarly demonstrates his concern for local culture, when he comments on the effect of Latin rule on the language of the natives. Since the conquest, he observes:

[The Cypriots] began to learn French, and their Greek became barbarous (*varvarisan ta romaika*), just as it is to-day, when we write both French and Greek in such a way that no one in the world knows what we are talking about (*is ton kosmon den ixevroun inda sintichanomen*).<sup>139</sup>

The above observations lead to the conclusion that the class position and loyalties of the Cypriots were stronger than feelings of common ethnicity; yet there was a strong attachment to the Orthodox religion and a concern with culture and language. But it does seem obvious that there was no sense of nation and no nationalist feelings at the time.

In 1441, the Latin King of Cyprus, John II, married the Greek Helena Paleologos, daughter of Theodore Paleologos, ruler of Morea, and grand-daughter of Manuel II, past emperor of the Byzantium (1391-1425).<sup>140</sup> Queen Helena was apparently very dynamic, next to a "passive and pleasure seeking" king, and was soon recognized by

the *Haute Cour* as a Regent of the Kingdom; using her influence, she appointed a number of Orthodox in the administration (she even tried to appoint an Orthodox as Latin Archbishop – but the Pope was not amused) and attempted to improve the fortunes of the local Orthodox people. After the fall of Constantinople, she gave refuge to a number of monks and learned Byzantines, which enhanced the strength of Greek culture on the island. It is apparently in this period that the Greek language (its local variant, the Cypriot dialect) became one of the official languages of the administration, along with French. Many Latins did not like Helena's initiatives and saw her as "adept in Greek treachery, hostile to the Latin religion and an enemy of the Roman church"<sup>141</sup> – obviously, Greekness was still associated with the Orthodox religion.

The paradox was that, despite efforts to turn the locals to Catholicism, it was the Latin regime which was gradually "Hellenized", to some extent, under the influence of Greek culture and the appointment of Orthodox Greek-speakers in the administrative machinery of the Latins. We have already noted Machairas' identification with the Frankish regime: Yet despite the fact that Machairas had studied in a French school, he chose to write his *Chronicle* in the local Greek Cypriot dialect.<sup>142</sup> Interestingly, though a high officer and a friend of the Latin regime, Machairas still felt somehow connected to the Byzantine Orthodox, for he still paid homage to the "King of Constantinople", and shared in the queen's dismay at the fall of Constantinople.<sup>143</sup> At the same time, the Orthodox religion seemed to be making inroads into the Catholic domain in various ways. Already from the 14<sup>th</sup> century the Pope was complaining that Catholic laymen were often attending Orthodox churches. The union of the churches after the Council of Florence made matters worse, leading to various forms of "religious hybridity" – so that, for instance, "the same priest [would] serve both the Latin and the Greek church", or some churches would have two aisles, the "one-domed Byzantine aisle was used by the Orthodox Greek branches and the Western one by the Latinizing or Catholic branches of mixed families"...<sup>144</sup> At the same time, inter-marriages between upper class families of Latin and Orthodox origin resulted in offspring who often had different attachments and loyalties than those of "pure" Latin descent – and many social and political distinctions were often made on that basis. As early as 1350, the Latin archbishop of Cyprus attempted to impose measures against mixed marriages, apparently to forestall further assimilation of the Latins. But, despite reactions, such phenomena continued right through to the end of Venetian rule.<sup>145</sup>

These then were some of the ways in which the locals resisted or influenced the dominant Latin regime.<sup>146</sup> Culture and religion were their main means – but not the only ones. On certain occasions, the Cypriots rose up to protest what they perceived as extreme impositions by the Latins on their Church and the clergy, or the local people at large. But such risings were certainly not guided by nationalist motives. It might be worth examining the case of James Diassorinos or Didascalos, considered by mainstream historians as an early nationally inspired rebel: Born in Rhodes, he went for higher studies in Europe and, in 1560, ended up in Nicosia where he founded a school; there he taught the Greek language but also “stirred the enthusiasm of the Cypriots [...] by recalling the glories of ancient Greece”.<sup>147</sup> He also seems to have stirred passions against the Venetians and the Catholic Church, and had secret contacts with the Ottomans, presumably seeking their intervention to liberate the island from the hated Venetians: The “conspiracy” was betrayed and Diassorinos was arrested, upon which 8,000 natives crowded the capital to demand his release – yet without success, and in August 1562 he was executed. Kyrris interprets the “violent demonstrations” as “evidence of the wide influence of the *national ideology* taught by the Didaskalos amongst the Greek community” (italics inserted).<sup>148</sup> But certainly this is far fetched and no shred of evidence seems to support it. It rather seems the case that Diassorinos picked his enthusiasm for ancient Greece during his studies in Europe (he was teaching the Greek language, and we have seen the use of the classics in language classes at the time). The dire economic conditions towards the end of Venetian rule, the neglect of the island, and the continuing subservience of the Orthodox Church and religion, seem to better explain the possible appeal of Diassorinos with the locals – but there are no indications for the existence of a “national ideology”; besides, Diassorinos was not advocating the rule of equals by their likes, nor was he calling on the locals to assert themselves against foreign rule: He (like many other Orthodox Cypriots) seemed to simply detest Latin rule, which was why he was ready to welcome Ottoman Muslim rule, as a lesser evil.

### **Chapter 3 Ottoman Rule and Plural Society**

The ethnic cleavage is the oldest and deepest division in Cyprus, its origins tracing back to the three hundred years of Ottoman rule of the island (1571-1878). Most mainstream accounts portray a picture of this period of Cyprus' history as entailing some or most of the following elements: That the uninvited barbarian Turks captured the island, after untold violence against its Christian defenders (the united forces of Venetians and Cypriots); that Ottoman rule plunged Cyprus into an era of Eastern backwardness and darkness, where oppression and exploitation prevailed, these being reflections of the very nature of the Turks and their regime; during their rule, the Ottomans put all kinds of pressure on the locals to abandon both their Christian faith and their Greek identity — so as to convert to Islam and be "Turkicized", but the Greek-Cypriots managed to preserve their identity thanks mostly to the national role of the Orthodox Church; behind the clash between rulers and ruled lurked a deep-seated, primordial enmity between Turks and Greeks, Muslims and Christians, East and West. Revisionist post-74 accounts often go to the other extreme of emphasizing traditional "peaceful co-existence" between the two religious communities, until the time nationalism was imported from Greece, and passed on to the largely unaware Cypriots, after which the two communities started drifting apart.

This chapter will attempt an alternative analysis of Ottoman rule of Cyprus, to demonstrate how ethnicity was not an important factor in determining the course of events and that national identities were fostered only towards the end of this period, out of pre-existing religious identities. Starting with a brief survey of the Ottoman regime, its principles of governance and how they were applied in Cyprus, and focusing especially on the importance of religion, as against ethnicity, we will turn to consider the impact of the Ottoman decline, of the rise of new social classes, and of the importation of nationalist ideas from the West – of which, however, Cypriots were already active parts.

Before proceeding, it would be pertinent to consider an important distinction historians make between two radically different periods in the development of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>1</sup> which will be useful in our analysis. The first period, the "Age of Ottoman Ascendancy", relates to the long march of nomadic Turkish tribes from the eighth century onwards, out of their early homelands in central Asia and into the Near- and Middle-East; by the early fifteenth century, the Ottomans had emerged as a significant force, overpowering the Islamic and Byzantine empires then dominant in that part of the world. The fifteenth century was a period of

further, rapid territorial expansion, including the capture of Constantinople (1453) and the remaining Byzantine lands, as well as most of the Balkans. The 100-year period between the mid-fifteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries is considered the "Golden Age" of the triumphant empire, *Pax Ottomanica*, which by now sprawled over three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), had a population of approximately 50 million (including 33 ethnicities, speaking 40 languages), a strong central government, and robust military, political, economic and religious institutions.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, historians seem to agree that "until the mid sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire was at least abreast of the Christian European countries in terms of economic conditions and relations".<sup>3</sup> As a consequence, the economic burdens imposed by the Ottomans on their conquered lands (mostly peasant societies), were lighter than those imposed by European feudal lords. Furthermore, the Ottoman mode of government allowed a considerable degree of autonomy and self-government to their subjects, enabling the peaceful cohabitation of diverse peoples in a vast multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious Empire. No wonder that, at the peak of its might and glory, the Ottoman Empire presented a ray of hope for the oppressed peoples in its areas of influence and expansion; its rule certainly seemed to be much lighter than the feudal rule of Europeans in their various conquered lands.

The second period, the "Age of Ottoman Decline" (late sixteenth to early nineteenth century), involved a long process of retrenchment, resulting from both external constraints (such as a number of important military defeats, and the growing economic and military power of a rejuvenated West), as well as internal problems (such as a static economy, the increased corruption of the administration, and the disintegration of the classical forms of military organization). After this period, there followed the era of nationalism and the staging of a number of successful national uprisings, which accentuated the pace of decline and led to abortive efforts at reform (1839-1852), and to the eventual collapse of the Empire.<sup>4</sup>

Interestingly, the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus came right at the juncture of the two periods. This seems to be an important factor explaining the discrepancy between the original high hopes of the common people from the new regime, and the stark realities they had to confront once the new regime was established. As Inalcik notes, the "conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 was the last substantial military success of the Ottomans";<sup>5</sup> only a few months after the difficult and costly capture of Cyprus, the Ottomans suffered a serious naval defeat at the battle of Lepanto, after which "they were not anymore in a position of maintaining their dominance in the Mediterranean".<sup>6</sup> New European naval powers were on



the rise<sup>7</sup>, which were to displace the Ottomans from the seas and from the associated lucrative sea trade. Meanwhile, their advancement in central Europe came to a halt so that gradually "the military balance shifted away from the Ottomans".<sup>8</sup> After the sixteenth century, a fundamental contradiction would face the Empire: "It was organized for conquest and expansion but it now entered a period of defeat and contraction. The result was internal tension and dislocation. This increased the disparity between the empire and the West which in turn led to more defeats [and] more contraction".<sup>9</sup>

To return to Cyprus, the increasing problems of the Empire as it started declining, should not obscure the radical changes Ottoman rule brought to the island: The end of feudal rule, the liberation of the serfs, and the restoration of the Orthodox Church. Another important change had to do with the creation of a Moslem community on the island, which was later to develop into the Turkish Cypriot community.

### ***Ottoman conquest and 'social revolution'***

Prior to the Ottoman conquest, the Cypriots, and especially those of the lower classes, had grown deeply resentful of European feudal rule: On the one hand, the conditions of serfdom and severe economic exploitation, and on the other, the suppression of the Orthodox Church, the most important of their communal institutions, were driving them to their limits. At the same time, the comparatively better fate of other Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman occupied lands of Asia Minor and the Balkans seem to have made the prospects of a change of rule appealing; it is thus not surprising that delegations from lower class Cypriots are recorded to have paid visits<sup>10</sup> to the Porte in Constantinople, to plead the case for the Ottoman takeover of the island.

The Ottomans obviously had many reasons of their own to wish to take control of Cyprus, primarily strategic. But once they decided on the venture they tried to differentiate between the Latin masters and their native subjects. In February 1570, just prior to the attack, the Sultan (Selim II) sent a *firman* to the officers of his troops, reminding them of the need to win the hearts of the masses"; he further stressed that once the island was captured, he wanted the locals to know of his promise not to molest them, nor harm their families and properties. Inalcik reminds us that these instructions were given in the spirit of *istimalet*, the Ottoman policy of showing goodwill to the native population so as to facilitate

conquest through consent, rather than violence. To what extent this approach did produce results is not easy to judge, but evidence indicates that the natives "were reluctant to fight on the side of their former masters against the Ottomans" and that they even "offered them provisions and gave the fullest information as to the position of affairs and the condition of the island".<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately for the Cypriots, the ensuing battles were followed by great destruction and manslaughter. After Nicosia fell (September 1570), three days of merciless pillage, plunder and killing ensued – on the first day alone, 20,000 dead were reported.<sup>12</sup> Violence and brutality also accompanied the siege and capture of Famagusta, after its heroic resistance lasting more than a year.<sup>13</sup> Without belittling the scale of violence and destruction, the point must be made that these extremities had little to do with the expression of primordial ethnic hatreds between Turks and Greeks, for such brutal practices were common in older times. To mention only two examples: Back in 1365, King Peter the First of Cyprus, had captured through a surprise attack, "lightly defended" Alexandria, after which three days of "looting, slaughtering and destruction went on with unrestrained animal ferocity";<sup>14</sup> and the Latin Crusaders' sack of Constantinople in 1204 was probably just as destructive, if not worse.<sup>15</sup> In the case of the Ottomans, restraint was usually shown when cities surrendered without putting up a fight (as actually was the case with the remaining towns of Cyprus), but the three-day plunder of Nicosia seems to have been "in accord with the precepts of Islam for a city that had resisted to the end".<sup>16</sup>

Less than a year after the conquest of Cyprus, the Sultan sent a new firman to the Ottoman high officials now in charge of the island, reminding them that as force had to be used for its capture, the condition of the reayas had "somewhat deteriorated" – thus urging their treatment with care and justice, according to the provisions of the holy law (the *Sharia*), avoiding violence and heavy taxation "so that the country may thus revert to its former prosperous state". Above all, the reaya was to be given due protection:

Thus I order that you must be careful in giving the reaya who are a trust from God to us, as much protection and mercy as you can, abstaining from such actions as may lead to their dispersion.<sup>17</sup>

As Halil Inalcik reminds us, the firman expressed "basic principles" of the Ottoman regime: Since the finances and well-being of the state depended on the prosperity of the country, the tax-paying population had to be protected and treated fairly so as to yield the expected surplus, which assured the system's longevity.<sup>18</sup> Ottoman officials carried out a census/survey of the population and sources of revenue (*tahrir*), in order to enumerate all

taxable resources.<sup>19</sup> According to Islamic precepts, all land belonged to Allah and his representative on earth, the Sultan. Within the Ottoman patrimonial system of power,<sup>20</sup> the position of the ruler was absolute but, at the same time, protective and caring towards his people: The Sultan was the shepherd and his subjects were the flock (*reaya*).<sup>21</sup> The relationship was not supposed to be one-sided, for a "circle of justice" was involved: The subjects were to submit to the master, and produce the goods and services required by him or the state; the ruler, in turn, was to provide the protection and justice necessary for the well-being of his subjects.<sup>22</sup>

The basic driving-force of the Ottoman system was imperial expansion, through military conquest. Ottoman cosmology saw the world as divided into two great spheres – the House of Islam, comprised of all Muslim believers, and the House of War, comprised of the rest of the world, of non-believers, who had to be conquered and brought to submit to the Prophet. In this scheme of things, ethnicity played no role, the only differences were those between believers and non-believers. Once unbelievers were conquered, plunder was legitimate, but subsequently, once they turned into subjects, they acquired a protected status as "dimmis" (or "zimmi").<sup>23</sup>

These principles had far-reaching implications: Since all landed property was a prerogative of the Sultan, there could be no hereditary land-owning class or nobility – as in feudal Europe. This "absence of private property in land"<sup>24</sup> was, as Marx was to note, the basic material difference between the two systems. In the early period of "Ottoman Ascendancy", land cultivation was organized under the timar-system of landholding.<sup>25</sup> This entailed the allocation, by the Sultan, of landed estates or timars to the mostly Muslim military stratum of cavalry warriors (*sipahis*).<sup>26</sup> The latter had to provide administrative and military services to the *Porte*, in return for exacting revenues in rent (in kind or money) from the peasants working on their land. The cavalymen were, at the time, the backbone of the Ottoman military forces; they were expected to fight during the war season and then return to administer their estates. The timars and timar-holders represented the "nearest analogy" to European feudal fiefs and feudal lords (or a knights' class), respectively.<sup>27</sup> But only an analogy, for "the timar estates were in no sense genuine fiefs" and the sipahis were no genuine knights, since "they exercised no feudal lordship or seigniorial jurisdiction over the peasants who worked on the timars".<sup>28</sup> In fact, the timariots were not at all involved in rural production – they were essentially external to the agrarian economy itself. Nor did they have hereditary security of tenure over their timars: To ensure that they would not become attached to their estates, they were systematically reshuffled to

different timars.<sup>29</sup> They had no right to eject peasants by force, nor to prevent them from shifting residence.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the whole system was organized in such a way as not to allow "the creation of a strong landed aristocracy which might have presented a challenge to the absolute authority of the Sultan."<sup>31</sup>

The corollary of the various limitations to the power and prerogatives of the timariots, were respective benefits to the cultivators. The peasants enjoyed hereditary tenure to the plots they tilled and this assured stability in production and in consequent yields for the *sipahi* and the Sultan. The feudal services which peasant cultivators would have to offer their masters under Western feudalism were, thereby, significantly reduced under the Ottoman system.<sup>32</sup>

The timar system of production exhibited significant regional variations. In Cyprus, all agricultural land which under European feudal rule was owned by the state and the nobility (rather than the peasant cultivators), passed now under state proprietorship, as public (*miri*) land; thereafter, *timars* were apportioned, mostly to Muslim cavalrymen – although some Christians did become *sipahis*, and some janissaries did receive *timars*. In practice, "a regime of perpetual lease, securing for the peasant the perpetual usufruct of the land" was established, allowing peasants to practically own the land they cultivated and to bequeath it to their male offspring "as a heritage without indemnity" – in exchange, obviously, for paying the state and the timariot the expected dues.<sup>33</sup>

A further *firman* (October 1572) eliminated forced labour. Noting that the lower classes (*paroikoi*) served their former feudal "lords and knights two days a week", the firman declared the decision of the Sultan to show "great mercy" to the reayas of Cyprus, reducing such servitude to one day per week, for tasks related to the Porte (for example, work in the government sugar mills): In practice, it seems that even this was never actually enforced,<sup>34</sup> so the peasants were effectively completely free. *Reayas* also enjoyed relative "freedom to move from place to place and from the countryside to the towns and live there."<sup>35</sup> Other important improvements related to taxes which became overall lighter than under European feudal rule.<sup>36</sup> In effect, as Braudel underlines, the Turkish conquest unleashed a "social revolution", since a huge 'slave' class, almost exclusively Greek Orthodox in faith, became free village landholders.<sup>37</sup>

Furthermore, peasant cultivators of timars came to enjoy a range of legal rights, so that they could complain in court about abuses by timar-holders (such as excessive charges and oppressive behaviour).<sup>38</sup> It is noteworthy that the lot of Christian and Muslim reayas was

not much different: Islamic law did not distinguish between ethnicities – "The law knows no Turk, Arab, or Kurd" – but only between believers (Muslims) and non-believers (zimmi).<sup>39</sup> Thus, in court, Ottoman kadis had to "apply the same standard of justice for both zimmi and Muslim". All were "entitled to protection of their lives and property and the right to practice their own religion."<sup>40</sup> Again, it must be stressed that religion and not ethnicity was the only criterion of differentiation: "In the court [of Nicosia] the name Greek Orthodox (Rum) was never used; that group were always called zimmi. Although other zimmi – the minorities – were often identified as Armenian (*Ermeni*), Maronite (*Suryani*), or Jew (*Yahudi*), those distinctions had no significance in regard to legal rights, only for administrative organization".<sup>41</sup>

It is worth remembering that under the European Frankish and Venetian regimes, very few Orthodox Christians enjoyed full legal rights. In Ottoman courts, the only handicap of non-Muslims was in testifying against Muslims: In such cases, the testimony of the latter was considered more valid, since the law presumed Muslims to be more honest and truthful than non-Muslims.<sup>42</sup> Other than that, Christians could lodge complaints in court against anyone, including Muslims (in which case they had to use the testimony of other Muslims) and government officials. They could similarly summon to court anyone they wished, including Muslims – and in such a case the latter were obliged to respond to the summons and the charges, as they would in the case of another Muslim.<sup>43</sup>

Historical data show that Christians and Muslims used the Sharia courts with almost equal frequency and for all kinds of purposes – whether business (such as setting up estates and transferring land or houses within a community or, more often, between communities) but also personal (such as marriage and divorce matters, intra-family feuds and quarrels, and so on), despite the fact that much of the latter could have been dealt with intra-communally. Jennings sums up the merits of early Ottoman rule, as compared to the previous Venetian regime, as follows:

The Ottoman system simply was not organized to permit such exploitation [as that of the Venetians]. Law and society were not elitist. Coercion of the poor and weak was despised. Legal rights and obligations applied to everyone. Ottoman law did not permit landowners to force villagers to cultivate what they wanted, when they wanted, or how they wanted. The taxes that spahis could collect were limited by law [...]. An exploitive class was eliminated, wealth was better distributed, and the villagers were liberated from onerous serfdom.<sup>44</sup>

Jennings' picture may sound quite idealistic and tends to downplay many of the problems of early Ottoman rule – as, for instance, the disorder accompanying the

great inflation of the 1580's, with the money shortages and delays in payment of the janissaries, leading to the latter's risings and the killings of two governors; the frequent use of violence by local officials; the many instances of theft – and so on. Yet we could accept that overall the new system did initially improve the lot of the peasants, as compared to the previous feudal regime. But even Jennings concedes that the system was later to become "corrupt, or ineffective, leaving the villagers vulnerable to a new exploitation".<sup>45</sup>

### ***Religious communities and the Orthodox Church as quasi-state***

After the Ottomans captured Constantinople, in 1453, the Sultan (Mohammed II, the conqueror) granted the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople an ordinance (*berat*) spelling out a new status for the Church, which in many ways rendered it more privileged than it had been under the Byzantium itself. The Patriarch in Constantinople was to be the all-powerful ecclesiastical head, irremovable from his post. Together with his synod, they were to be in full charge of all doctrinal matters, the discipline of all church members, and the management of church property. Not only was the church to be exempt from taxation, but it could levy its own dues on both clergy and laymen alike. The Patriarch was to be the head of the Orthodox community (*millet*),<sup>46</sup> as a whole, vested with considerable civil authority. Ecclesiastical tribunals were to have full jurisdiction on matters pertaining to family law (marriage, divorce and inheritance), and this gradually extended to all civil law. Finally, the Patriarch was to be a "recognized Ottoman official, holding the rank of vizir, and serving as intermediary between the Orthodox Christians and the imperial government".<sup>47</sup> As regards the Orthodox Christians more generally, the *berat* granted them freedom of religious faith and worship.

The reasons why Mohammed II proceeded to these arrangements must have related to both political strategy and religion. For one, he wanted to prevent a possible Orthodox-Latin reapproachment. The schism back in 1054 had created a rift within Christendom, and the fourth Crusade attacks on the Byzantium and the sack of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204 had driven the wedge further. The "superficial reunion" of the churches, under papal supremacy, promoted by Michael Paleologos, had deeply divided the Byzantines, the majority of whom adopted an anti-unionist stand, leading to the deal's collapse before it was hardly implemented. But mounting Ottoman pressure had forced the Byzantines to grudgingly concede to a union (1439)

– and yet the Latins did not provide the expected military assistance. All these bitter experiences had rendered the Catholics more hated than the Muslims. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, they sought to build on this rift and render it improbable for the Orthodox to seek collaboration with the Catholics in future – hence, the granting of extensive autonomy to the Orthodox Church; for the same reasons, the Sultan promoted to the Patriarchal seat Gennadios Scholarios, an eminent clergyman who was fiercely anti-Catholic and anti-Western.<sup>48</sup>

The religious basis of the Ottoman *millet* system was the Islamic principle, found in the Koran, recognizing monotheistic believers (Christians and Jews) as being, like the Muslims, "People of the Book", who should be tolerated and protected so long as they paid a special tax.<sup>49</sup> Since Islam was "both a religious and civil code", it operated on the assumption that other religious communities could similarly govern themselves, their religion providing the guiding principles for organizing their members' lives, under their ecclesiastical leaders. The organization of the Ottoman Empire, on the basis of autonomous, self-governing religious communities, developed into an elaborate system of indirect rule, whereby the Ottomans could control the diverse mixture of peoples living in their vast multicultural empire.

Subsequent to the Orthodox *millet*, the Ottomans established the Armenian *millet*, with its own patriarchate, and later on the Jewish *millet*.<sup>50</sup> The Orthodox Christians were the more privileged and most numerous group, combining people from different ethno-linguistic backgrounds – such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Vlachs, Syrians and others. They were collectively known as the 'Rum' (Roman) *millet*, since in Byzantine times they used to consider themselves, and to be considered by others in the East, as members of the Eastern Roman Empire (even though the Latins, refusing them the association with Rome, used the designation 'Graeci' instead, from which evolved the terms 'Greeks' and 'Greece', still used by the West as the names of contemporary 'Hellas' and the 'Hellenes').<sup>51</sup>

The important point to note is how ethno-cultural differences were not significant to the Ottomans, since their focus was on religion instead. Similarly, the Orthodox Patriarchs, in trying to foster unity among their diverse constituency during the long centuries of Ottoman rule, had to emphasize the universality of the Christian faith and to underplay any divisive elements. Thus, they saw it as their "duty to enforce uniformity of rituals, liturgy, organization, and language in the church".<sup>52</sup> The official language of the Church

and of the liturgy was Greek and this favoured Greek-speakers in rising to the high ranks of the Church's hierarchy. But this was inadvertently so, since the choice was made for religious and not for ethnic or national reasons: Greek was used to serve the unity of the faith and not of the nation.

Despite the above, ethnic differences did survive at another level – that of the local communities, in the villages and in town quarters.<sup>53</sup> At this local level, families and the community more generally, acquired primary importance in the transmission and reproduction of religious beliefs and practices, as well as of social customs and the use of the mother language or dialect. Local communities had their own local leaders, namely the *kocabasi* (village head) and *corbasi* (town head). Both the Ottoman government and the Patriarch relied on the local leaders who, along with the local clergy, could best communicate with people in their communities, since they better understood their ways of thinking and spoke their own language (both literally and metaphorically); furthermore, their high status elicited the respect and deference of the local people. So important did the community become under the millet system that Karpat goes as far as to propose that "the idea of community as a form of organization superseding the individual and as a source of identity, personality and behaviour was founded and implemented by the Ottomans".<sup>54</sup> It was precisely "this sense of community and profound solidarity and attachment to the group" which, Karpat feels, "laid the psychological foundations that [subsequently] nurtured the national consciousness of the Balkans and the Middle East and gave their nationalism a distinctive communal characteristic".<sup>55</sup> The end result was a unique combination of the particular with the universal, which made possible the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, while the basic millet was universal and national, the small community had distinctive local, ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. The millet system therefore produced simultaneously [a] religious universality and [b] local [ethno-cultural] parochialism.

It must be noted that the Moslems themselves constituted a separate *millet*, no different to the Christian millets, under the head mufti (*seyhulislam*), the highest religious office-holder among the ulema, appointed by the Sultan.<sup>57</sup> The ruling elite within the Moslem millet was not comprised of a particular ethnic, linguistic or racial group, since conversion was open to all; in fact, both the administration and armed forces utilized solely converts, to the exclusion of free-born Muslims. Arnakis estimates that between 1453 to 1632, when the Ottoman Empire was at its prime, out of the forty-nine Grand Vezirs, only five were of Turkish origin, whereas eleven were



Albanians, another eleven Slavs, six were Greeks, and sixteen others were Christians of various persuasions.<sup>58</sup> That is why Gibb and Bowen exclaim that, as far as holding public office was concerned, it was actually an advantage not to be originally a Moslem! "In fact the non-ethnic character of the state became a mark of the state itself"<sup>59</sup> and this paradoxically was one of the factors which assured the survival of the various ethnic groups comprising the Empire, since the individual subject could have a double loyalty or identity – the one religious, attaching one to his sociocultural community and its leaders, and the other (much weaker) political, attaching him to the Ottoman government or the Sultan himself (experienced, at that stage, as a distant benevolent ruler).

Before turning to the case of Cyprus, to examine how Ottoman rule affected its communal structures and principles, it is necessary to introduce a recent debate on the nature and significance of the *millet*s. In this debate, "revisionist" approaches charge the more "traditional" views as over-stressing the corporate nature of the millets. The new approaches point out that the very term "millet", in reference to non-Muslim religious communities, was a product of the late Ottoman era, in the mid-nineteenth century of reforms – thus, its use for describing realities in earlier periods constitutes an undue projection.<sup>60</sup> Findley criticizes the traditional approaches as having "overestimated the elaboration of communal structures, the scope of communal privilege, and the formalization of relations that existed between non-Muslim religious leaders and Ottoman officials."<sup>61</sup> For the revisionists, it is wrong to view the millets as a "system" or even an "institution", but rather as a "set of arrangements, largely social, with considerable variation over time and place."<sup>62</sup>

We will take a middle ground, following Grillo, who proposes that one may distinguish between two levels of society and differential perceptions: At the top level, the Ottoman central bureaucracy did seem to view non-Muslim religious communities as real quite early on,<sup>63</sup> and since they treated ecclesiastical leaders accordingly, the latter also adopted this perspective – the "millet mentality",<sup>64</sup> as Itzkowitz calls it. At the level of the ordinary people, in the towns and villages, however, the "degree of institutionalization" and the perceived reality of the millets varied considerably, both through place and time. In Cyprus, as we will see, the millet mentality was prevalent from the early stages of Ottoman rule, but the strength of the communal institutions and especially of the Orthodox Church varied, increasing through time. Similarly, the differentiation of communal structures increased diachronically.

One of the most important consequences of Ottoman rule in Cyprus had to do with the

restoration of the power and privileges of the Orthodox Church. Let us remember that the Latins had abolished the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church, making it subordinate to the Catholic Church; they had interrupted the appointment of a Greek Archbishop and had reduced the number of bishops (whom they placed under the jurisdiction of Latin bishops); they had also confiscated most of the lands and property of the Orthodox Church while richly endowing the Catholic Church. In fact, since the 1260 *Bulla Cypria*, the Greek Orthodox of Cyprus were considered "Greek-rite Catholics", forming the majority of a "theoretically 'Roman Catholic' population".<sup>65</sup> Resenting this state of affairs, the Greek Orthodox clergy of Cyprus had tried to convince the Patriarchate of Constantinople that "their union with the Latin Church was the result of coercion and that they wanted to be in secret communion with the Orthodox while maintaining an outward show of obedience towards the Latin Church",<sup>66</sup> but an Orthodox Council in Constantinople (1412) had rejected this possibility.

Archimandrite Kyprianos, in his *History of Cyprus*, written two hundred years into Ottoman rule, stresses how the *Romaioi* (Romans, that is Eastern Orthodox Cypriots) preferred to be "under the Turks" than under the Catholic Latins, because the Patriarch of Constantinople and other Orthodox clergy in general, considered the "Cypriot Orthodox clergy and flock as Latins, and for this they would not accept them into the Church's union", as if they were "excommunicated Latins".<sup>67</sup> Hence, the common people ("*koinos laos Romaioi*") "cultivated a deep hatred in their souls against the Latins, and could not wait for the time they would be liberated from their rule".<sup>68</sup> Once the Ottomans conquered Cyprus, Kyprianos admits that "the Romans, who to a certain extent preferred to be subjects to the Ottoman rather than to the Latin power, were even glad in their wretchedness because, so far as concerned their rites and customs, they escaped the tyranny of the Latins".<sup>69</sup> Indeed, soon after the Ottoman conquest, the Patriarch of Constantinople summoned a Synod (1572) which restored ecclesiastical union between the Church of Cyprus and the Ecumenic Patriarchate, and consecrated the first Archbishop of Cyprus.

From early on (autumn 1571), the Ottomans granted a number of favourable concessions to the Orthodox Cypriots, whereby their community was to enjoy "preference and precedence" over all other Christian communities on the island: They would freely enjoy their religion; they would have the right to ransom ecclesiastical properties (whereas the Latins were explicitly prohibited from possessing churches or other property, and from enjoying any other privileges); and they would enjoy the right to buy and to transmit to their heirs any kind of property – including houses and estates.<sup>70</sup>

The reasons for the restoration of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus must have been similar to those we saw as applying in the case of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Presumably, the Sultan (Selim II) wished to win his subjects' loyalty so they would not seek aid from Western powers, for although the Ottomans had won the battles in Cyprus their dominance in the Mediterranean after the Lepanto defeat was precarious.<sup>71</sup> Internally, the Ottomans wished to ensure conformity and order, plus they needed an administrative mechanism which would help them in the collection of taxes throughout the island and, for both of these tasks, the church hierarchy and its access to the whole population were vital. Finally, the Orthodox prelates acted as a check against the possible abuses of the local Muslim administrators against the peasants: Since the latter were vital in surplus extraction, the Sultan had every reason to care for their well-being, so the fact that the Orthodox Church leaders had access to the central government and could report such cases, were a guarantee that the peasants, as vital wealth producing resources, were fairly treated and protected.<sup>72</sup>

Yet we must note that the privileges bestowed on the Church in the early days of Ottoman rule in Cyprus were mostly religious and only to a lesser degree economic and political. It was more gradually that political powers would be extended, in relation to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of grip of the central government on peripheral territories; the extension of the political powers of the prelates related to the need to keep local governors in check, so as to thereby protect the surplus yielding peasants in the periphery. That must have been one of the reasons why, in the early years, the Church prelates' attitude towards Ottoman rule was quite ambivalent. For, despite the advantages that the coming of the new rulers brought to the Church and to the Greek community, the Archbishop and other leaders came into contact with Western powers (such as the King of Spain and the Duke of Savoy) on a number of occasions, in order to explore possibilities for their intervention to liberate Cyprus from Ottoman rule. In the first such plea (1587), of Archbishop Timotheos to King Philip II of Spain, the Archbishop referred to substantial suppression of the Christians, and to abuses by the local government and military (such as stealing from houses, churches and monasteries, the imposition of heavy taxation collected through threats and torture, plus an enforced child levy) – which had caused strong reactions and a minor rebellion.<sup>73</sup> Mainstream historiography has interpreted these early appeals to Western powers for liberation from the Ottomans, as implying an underlying natural, pre-existing and perennial hatred towards the

'barbarian Turks', the religious-national Others, and a respective natural affinity for the West. But, as we have already noted, these and other problems with local Ottoman rule must have related to the fact that the golden years of ascent had come to an end, and the Empire was entering its long period of decline, which meant problems of central control, leading to local abuse and oppression. Another set of problems must have related to the limitations on the Church's, and especially the Archbishop's, real powers in these early years. Yet, gradually, things must have improved, for the last attempts to seek Western aid end in 1670, after which there seems to have been a tacit adaptation to Ottoman rule.<sup>74</sup>

Let us consider how the powers of the Church prelates were gradually extended. In the early years of Ottoman rule, the strength of the Orthodox Church was at the level of the local communities: The Orthodox priests came from the lower classes, lived amongst the ordinary people and laboured next to them in the fields; folk traditions and customs were tied closely to religious events and celebrations.<sup>75</sup> At the top Church hierarchy levels, however, things were not easy. The long centuries of absence of an Archbishop rendered it difficult to have a strong and coherent leadership at the top. The Cypriot Church was quite dependent on the help of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and, to some extent, had also to suffer from the latter's interference in local Church affairs. In 1600, for instance, the Cypriot Archbishop (who was "accused of illegalities") was deposed by the Ecumenic Patriarchate; interestingly, in seeking support, the archbishop turned to the local Ottoman authorities for assistance!<sup>76</sup>

The local bishops, who had lived for long without an archbishop, had grown used to their autonomy and were now resenting his priority in church affairs, disputing the boundaries of his authority. In 1651, the Archbishop appealed to the Constantinople Patriarchate for assistance, whereupon it was the turn of the local bishops to seek the support of the local Ottoman authorities in affirming their equal status to the archbishop. The matter was finally settled by a decision of a Synod, which confirmed the archbishop's prerogatives,<sup>77</sup> thereby reinforcing his authority and enhancing the centralization of Church powers.

Furthermore, from the early stages of Ottoman rule, up to the early nineteenth century, the Orthodox Church faced problems over its grip on some of its Christian members (even though decreasingly so). Thus, even if family law had officially been placed under the prelates' jurisdiction, a not insignificant number of individuals resorted to Muslim courts,

either in initiating a court action, or once they were dissatisfied with a decision taken by their own communal court;<sup>78</sup> the Church finally forbade this practice in 1832.

Finally, it must be noted that the only other officer among the Orthodox community with any real amount of authority was the Dragoman, who was the interpreter of the governor, and whose position bestowed him great political and economic power in the affairs of government. He played an important role in financial matters and in the assessment and collection of taxation from the locals.<sup>79</sup> The Dragomans were customarily chosen by the Orthodox notables and bishops, so their links with the prelates were close.

Overall, in the earlier stages of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the power of prelates did not match the much stronger power of the local Muslim governors and bureaucrats. Yet the influence and power of the Orthodox Church kept increasing steadily, especially after two critical stages. The first important upgrading took place in 1660, when the Porte extended the powers of the Church prelates, respectively decreasing those of the local (Muslim) governors, in an effort to curb their greed and their suppression of the reayas, so as to give the latter "some hope".<sup>80</sup> One of the main changes had to do with public taxation, with the church taking over major responsibilities from the governors. Until this time, the church was directly involved in gathering the dues owed to her, and as an intermediary in gathering the public taxes assigned by the governors to the Christian subjects – if need be with the help of janissaries.<sup>81</sup> From this point onwards, the Church seems to have undertaken the task of somehow guaranteeing the collection of the total public taxes allocated to Cyprus, of deciding on the allocation of the tax, and of arranging for the actual collection of the tax. The tax determination and collection process was quite complex, and involved the creation of a large network of secretarial and other administrative staff; it also involved the Church in subcontracting parts of the total tax collection to third parties. Associated with these new responsibilities was the right of Church prelates of direct access to the Porte, without having to notify either the local Muslim governors or the Constantinople Patriarch or Synod, as was required of them until that time.

The benefits deriving to the Church were obviously tremendous. Effectively the prelates became an integral part of the Ottoman local administration, with equal (if not more) rights to the governor, whom they could now by-pass to have direct access to the centre. Furthermore, these changes opened new opportunities for the enrichment of the Church. One of the methods utilized was described by a traveller (Don Domingo Badie Lebligh, or

'Ali Bey') in 1806: He observed that the prelates were assigned the task of collecting the annual taxes of the Christians, so as to pay the Ottoman government the agreed amount per person; but the Porte assumed the population to be less than a third of what it actually was – so the Church benefited from the excess amount collected, which was not passed on. When a commissioner was sent to verify the exact number of families "he was got at, loaded with gold" and sent away "his task unfulfilled".<sup>82</sup>

A second upgrading of the Church's position is traceable in a 1754 decision, which augmented its administrative and political powers. This time the Sultan recognized the Church's prelates as *'kocabasi'* of their people, with the responsibility of preparing reports on developments in Cyprus and the right of direct access to the Porte, so as to promptly advance any matters and problems of the reayas at any time necessary.<sup>83</sup> The main thrust of this new development was more political than economic – and was to have all around consequences. The prelates were henceforth not to be viewed as simple functionaries of the Ottoman bureaucracy, aiding in the collection of money, but as political representatives of their people.<sup>84</sup> Interestingly, when this development took place in mid-eighteenth century Cyprus, in many other Orthodox countries under Ottoman rule, this was a time of socio-economic change in which laymen *kocabasis* were the ones gaining prominence as the political representatives of their people, at the expense of prelates whose power was decreasing.<sup>85</sup> This is an indication that change in Cyprus was much slower than elsewhere; conversely, this re-enforcement of the Church's position would impede future modernization, since the Church's dominating presence was to impede the rise of other secular forces, which could have acted as catalysts of change.

Another source of wealth and power for the Orthodox Church was land holding. We already noted that the Ottoman authorities had early on allowed the Church to redeem its monasteries and other properties (previously held by the Latins and seized by the Ottomans during their expedition);<sup>86</sup> within the first few decades, the process was so successful that it promoted reactions among the Ottomans. A second way in which the Church accumulated land was through bequests, both for religious and practical reasons. In an age in which religious beliefs were deeply ingrained, it is no surprise that many pious people would donate land and other property to their church. Often, there was due encouragement on the part of the clergy; writing in 1815, an observer commented critically on how the priests would "strip the poor, ignorant, superstitious peasant of his last para,<sup>87</sup> and when he is on his deathbed, make him leave his all to their convent, promising that masses shall be said for his soul".<sup>88</sup> Practical considerations related to the inability of many families to pay land

taxes, or to the fear of usurpation of their properties by officials, both of which prompted the natives to 'donate' or 'lend' their land to the monasteries, which could more easily pay taxes and hold on to their lands.<sup>89</sup> Finally, the church accumulated more lands once the timar-system started breaking down, leading to increasing pressures on the peasants and their forceful eviction from their small family holdings, so as to facilitate the creation of larger estates (*chiftliks*), oriented towards market production.<sup>90</sup> Through all these processes and methods, the Church ended up amassing vast properties, so that, by 1844, its holdings amounted to more than 16% of the total agricultural land of the island.<sup>91</sup>

Besides taxation and landholding, the Church managed to accumulate wealth through its involvement in trade. In 1745, Drummond observed that the bishops "move from place to place as traders".<sup>92</sup> Kinneir in 1814 noted: "The Governor and Archbishop deal more largely in corn than all the other people on the island put together; they frequently seize upon the whole yearly produce, at their own valuation, and either export or retail it at an advanced price".<sup>93</sup>

The increasing wealth and power of the Church was certainly vital for it to better serve its followers – to assist the needy, to contribute to communal provision (such as the building of schools), and to act as a strong defender of the interests of Christian subjects as against abuses and encroachments by Ottoman officials. But although, to various degrees, the Church did contribute to all of these, it is also true that the Church developed interests of its own, which militated against the interests of those it supposedly served. Mariti, a careful observer of life in Cyprus, in which he resided for two decades, noted in 1769: "The poor subjects might very often be saved from oppression if their Archbishop were not from policy, and sometimes from personal interest, ready to lend himself to the exactions of the Muhassil [Governor], so that they are often abandoned by the very person who ought to take their part".<sup>94</sup> Other documents reveal that the monasteries routinely petitioned Constantinople to intervene in conflicts they developed with heirs of land donors (who would contest their parents' deeds), or with villages over grazing rights in contested lands, and so on.

No wonder many Christians developed negative attitudes towards the Church, which made historian Kyprianos, a clergyman himself, to complain that "the people had an evil habit of not ascribing their misfortunes to the proper source, nor the increase of their debts to the insatiate and heartless greed of the Governors, but thoughtlessly laid the blame on their spiritual fathers and chiefs".<sup>95</sup> But this was just one side of the coin, for overall the

Christians had no alternative but to be submissive and deferential towards their prelates, the only "rallying points" of a "community of slaves" – as another observer eloquently put it in 1806: "The Greeks are extremely submissive and respectful towards their bishops: in saluting them they bow low, take off their cap, and hold it before them upside down. They scarcely dare speak in their presence. It is true that for this community of slaves the bishops are rallying points. It is through them that it preserves some kind of existence...." The people were "deferential and respectful" towards their bishops. "These, on their part, parade in their houses and followers a princely luxury; they never go out without a crowd of attendants, and to ascend a flight of stairs they must needs be carried by their servants".<sup>96</sup>

Whereas resentment was balanced by submission and deference by the Christians, the same could not apply as regards the sentiments of the local governors towards the Church. During the early years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the governors and bureaucracy certainly did have the upper hand in their relations with the Orthodox Church.<sup>97</sup> With time, however, as the Empire declined and as the problems in Cyprus kept mounting – and thereby the revenues from the island kept decreasing – the Porte gave increasingly more power to the Church, thereby reducing the power of local governors. Effectively, a kind of "uneasy diarchy"<sup>98</sup> was created, between the governor and the archbishop (or more generally, between the governing bureaucracy and the Church hierarchy). By the early nineteenth century, visitors confirmed that the Archbishop "had annexed pretty well the whole administrative authority" and all the locals "Turks and Greeks alike, looked upon him as the real Governor", taking little notice of the *Muhassil*.<sup>99</sup> The Archbishop acquired a determining influence on the appointment and recall of the latter, as well as of other important officers on the island; he also assessed the amount of the annual contribution and sent the collected moneys to the Porte. Apparently, the Muslims grew resentful of his great powers and, in 1804, there was a rising against "the ecclesiastical authority, in whose hands all power rested", stirred by rumours of an insufficiency in foodstuffs: The insurrection was quenched by troops sent by the Porte, but this seems to have heightened resentment against the ecclesiastical authorities – which was probably the material cause behind the 1821 mass executions of the Christian prelates and primates.<sup>100</sup> But despite these developments and subsequent reforms intending to curb the power of the prelates, the latter managed to regain and consolidate their authority and influence. Writing at the close of the Ottoman period, Dixon described how the Church had acquired quasi-state powers, with the Archbishop as head. The latter's prominence was indisputable:



First, as head of the Church, he was the chief owner of land [...], and could therefore raise the rent on hundreds of farms at any moment and on any pretext. Second, as head of the Church, he was the biggest trader in the island, and could therefore raise the price of articles in the bazaars of every market-town. Third, as head of the Church, he was one of the chief exporters [...] and could therefore easily derange the shipping trade and annoy the ports. [Furthermore he enjoyed great spiritual powers:] He could stop the Sacraments and suspend the rites of marriage and sepulture. He could shut up church and cloister, put the altars under mourning and deny a suffering people all the solaces of religion, from the act of baptism to the final offices of grace.<sup>101</sup>

Overall, the concentration of political, administrative and economic powers in the hands of the prelates, rendered the Orthodox Church a quasi-state, substituting for the declining power of the Ottoman state, and pre-figuring modern states (which, besides amassing all the pre-mentioned forms of authority, and unlike pre-modern forms of government, have the added power of moulding their citizens' conscience).<sup>102</sup>

### ***The rise of new classes and the diaspora communities***

The period of Ottoman decline was also the era of the ascent of the Balkan Orthodox merchants<sup>103</sup> (the most dynamic group of which was the Greek merchants), who were to play a key role in the empire's downfall, by acting as catalysts in the fostering of new nation states in south-east Europe, starting with the Greek state in 1830. Greek Cypriot merchants were closely associated with their Greek counterparts through contacts in Cyprus but also in the many Greek diaspora communities (*paroikies*) in the West, which grew around merchant activities.

During the fifteenth and most of the sixteenth centuries, Venetian merchants were the protagonists in Eastern Mediterranean commerce. But in 1535, the Ottomans granted 'capitulatory privileges' to the French and (in 1569) obligated all foreign ships to trade under the protection of the French flag, thereby helping the French merchants to seize control of trade in the area. In 1580 and 1612, similar privileges were granted to the English and the Dutch respectively. At this stage, the Greeks had no state of their own to help them achieve similar privileges, but they benefited by acting as intermediaries

to Western European merchants.<sup>104</sup> Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Greeks did well at inland trade, once the wars with Russia shifted the centre of Ottoman commerce northern up, to Smyrna and Salonica, homes of large Greek populations.

An even more important boost was provided by the dramatic developments of the turn of the eighteenth century: The wars between the Ottomans and Venice, Austria and Russia, and the treaties signed at the termination of these wars, offered the Greek Orthodox merchants new opportunities for growth, with the backing of the Habsburgs and Russia. Thus, after the last Venetian-Ottoman war (1714-1718), the terms of the Austro-Ottoman treaty of Passarovits (1718) allowed the free movement of merchants and goods between the two powers, including the free use of the commercial ports of Salonica and Trieste. The victories of the Russians over the Ottomans led to the Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Jassy (1792) treaties, which gave legal protection to the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and enabled the Greek Orthodox merchants to fly the Russian flag. Soon the control of Black Sea commerce passed to the Greeks, whose fortunes improved dramatically, leading to the flourishing of Greek colonies in the area, such as Odessa.<sup>105</sup> More importantly, the French Revolution (1789), the wars between Napoleonic France and England, the latter's naval blockades of mainland Europe, and the American War of Independence – all between them dealt a severe blow to French commercial predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and provided the Greek merchants with a unique opportunity to step in and fill the gap. Overall, by the turn of the eighteenth century, Greek merchants had captured the greater part of the Empire's internal trade and were steadily extending their influence in the external trade.<sup>106</sup>

The rise of the Greek merchant was facilitated by the backing provided by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Phanariotes<sup>107</sup> – men of wealth who had accumulated their riches through trade, and had managed after the mid-seventeenth century to obtain virtual monopoly of influential posts in the Ottoman administration (such as those of dragoman of the Porte, dragoman of the Fleet, and undersecretary of the grand Vezir), becoming important technical and political advisors to the government. From 1716 onwards, and for a century after, they managed to acquire the right to appoint from their own ranks the governor (*hospodar*) of the Danubian principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), an office which controlled many lucrative monopolies, appointments, state contracts and carried other privileges.

All these favourable circumstances, plus the European eighteenth century demographic expansion, which led to an increase in the demand and prices of the agricultural products of the Balkans, brought unprecedented prosperity to the Greek merchants, who had for a while developed an expertise in exporting (legally or illegally) rural goods to the West.

The Greek Orthodox merchants were not confined to the Balkans: Their operations proliferated all over Europe and were instrumental in the creation and consolidation of Greek Orthodox diaspora communities in various European towns. The roots of Greek *paroikies* go back to the fifteenth century, with initial sporadic movements of Greeks under Venetian or Ottoman occupation to Italy, Sicily and the western coast of the Adriatic. Venice hosted the largest and most prominent Greek Orthodox community, comprised in the early stages of members of the Byzantine elite (men of letters, merchants, craftsmen, professionals, soldiers) who fled there mostly after Constantinople's fall, but also migrants from various Greek speaking lands, such as Cyprus. From the late seventeenth and mostly from the early eighteenth century, the focus shifted to major centres of land and sea commerce in the northern Balkans, Central and Western Europe, as well as in southern Russia,<sup>108</sup> mostly along the coasts of the Black Sea; Vienna became now the most prominent diaspora community. In this second wave, the Greeks were often attracted by incentives given by the host countries, aiming at skilled technicians and merchants, important to their own expanding economies. Much larger numbers were involved and this is the stage in which the *paroikies* were given real flesh. In Trieste, for instance, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the Greek Orthodox community numbered more than a thousand members, coming from various destinations – including Peloponesus, Epirus, the Ionian islands, Smyrna, Crete and Cyprus. A third wave was to follow in the early nineteenth century, with important communities set up at this stage, ranging from Alexandria to Marseilles. The former, still under Ottoman occupation, became part of the Greek commercial network of exchanges, linking Cyprus, the Aegean islands, Smyrne, Constantinople, and northern Greece, to Livorno, Trieste and Marseilles.

In all these Greek communities the merchants played a central role, along with Greek businessmen, clergymen, teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals. In order to maintain their separate identities and not to get assimilated by the host societies, diaspora communities tended to concentrate in a particular area of a city, creating neighbourhoods with a distinct cultural mark, whose life revolved around the church,

the coffeehouses or clubs (which acted as meeting places where merchants exchanged information), and the community's own school. They catered to the welfare needs of their members (often sponsoring hospitals, old people's homes, and orphanages) and the educational needs of the young (through provision for schools, teachers and books), making sure they were taught the basics of the Orthodox doctrine and the Greek language.

The success of Greek merchants related largely to the solidarity that governed their relationships. The central institution was the family and their businesses depended greatly on family involvement. Families provided information, counsel, capital and often manpower to young starters in business and commerce; thereafter, families supported such ventures and assisted in both the organisation and the staffing of the enterprises. In most companies, fathers and sons were the basis of partnerships (as reflected in the names of the companies), but often this expanded to include relatives created through marriage (for example, sons in law) or religious kinship (for example, godfathers and best men). The importance of the family grew with time as Greek merchants shifted from being mere brokers to establishing their own companies and networks of representatives.<sup>109</sup> Family involvement had obvious benefits, such as cutting down on labour costs through the utilization of unpaid or lowly paid family members (an older child or an aged grandparent), or through avoiding "expensive middlemen or brokers, to which European merchants had to resort."<sup>110</sup> When family members were unavailable, the next best solution was relatives, or persons from the same town or village or, lastly, other co-religionists.

Another institution of primary importance was the Greek fraternities (*adelphotites*). These were community organisations, often of a religious but at times of a secular-political nature. Together with the Orthodox Church they were the main institutions through which the Orthodox organized their collective life and represented themselves to the local authorities. The *adelphotites* assumed important social responsibilities – such as raising money from donations to assist their needy members (giving grants to the poor, dowry allowances to girls from less wealthy families, and scholarships to students to study in European universities), to build community schools, and so on. In Venice, for instance, the Greek Orthodox community was given official permission for the founding of an *adelphotita* as early as 1498; the Constitution of the *adelphotita* specified the proportionate participation of members in the executive organ, in relation to their geographical place of origin – which included Cyprus, Crete, the Ionian

Islands, Monemvasia and others. In 1517, a church was built which served the needs of Orthodox people from many lands and backgrounds.

The Greek Orthodox merchant class in Cyprus had developed at a slower pace relative to some of their most prominent Greek counterparts, such as the Ionians, Smyrna and Salonica. In the early years of Ottoman rule, a small colony of Venetian and Genoese merchants is reported to have existed in Larnaka back in 1596, and consulates of these countries seem to have been established in the early seventeenth century, followed in the next decades by British and French consulates.<sup>111</sup> By the eighteenth century, consulates of Austria, Holland, Denmark, Spain, Russia and others, were also present, and many more were added during the nineteenth century. The presence of all these consulates may seem paradoxical if we consider that, in most cases, there were none or very few residents from these countries on the island. Emilianides explains that most of these consulates were established at the prodding of Greek or Latin residents of Cyprus, as a way for them to enter commerce while securing, at the same time, through the consulates, the privileges afforded by the capitulations. Even larger powers, which did have local residents, often appointed Greek or Latin consuls, vice-consuls and other personnel in their consulates.<sup>112</sup> The benefits that attachment to European consulates bore, included exemption from taxes and the right to trial by the consul instead of the Ottoman courts. The effect of such an attachment amounted to "removing its recipient from the status of a *dimmi* to something approaching the status of a resident foreigner".<sup>113</sup>

Besides individuals linked to the European and other consulates, we have seen how the dragoman and Orthodox Church prelates were also involved in trade, taking advantage of their privileged position in the Ottoman regime. On the other hand, few *Muslims* seem to have similarly engaged in trade, not so much because Islam discourages involvement in trade, as is often assumed, but mostly because they primarily occupied administrative and military posts, or derived their incomes as landowners. Since, as a consequence of such priorities, trade came to be associated with infidels, the status of merchants was not attractive to ambitious Muslims.<sup>114</sup> Thus, in the late seventeenth century, it was reported that "there are rich and influential individuals among the Greek Cypriots, but not being allowed to carry weapons they devote themselves to trade. They carry oil, cheese, and other goods to Tripoli and other ports in Syria, but do not make long voyages".<sup>115</sup> By the late eighteenth century, a number of Greek Cypriots had managed to enter long distance trade, mostly involving south and central

European destinations. Like their Greek counterparts in the Balkans, they seemed to have learned to overcome the many restrictions imposed by the Ottoman regime, and to engage in the mostly illegal export of agricultural products to the West, catering to the needs of the expanding European population.<sup>116</sup> They were successful enough to outdo some of their more privileged competitors on the island: "By the beginning of the nineteenth century only one English merchant remained in Cyprus" and he, according to a contemporary observer, "had to contend with the united phalanx of Levantines, who had no inclination to admit a competitor in trade". Much of the trade in those times was illegal (particularly in corn): For this reason, it was "necessary to keep on good terms with the aga and officers employed at the custom-house by presents, the best and only means of ensuring favour in any competition with Levantines".<sup>117</sup>

The elimination of English merchants did not mean there was no other competition. Luke informs us that the most prominent merchants in those times were the "small but wealthy" Latin (Catholic) community of Larnaka, who were of "varied descent – French, Ionian, Venetian, Genoese, Maltese, Syrian", and had managed to take the lead over the local Orthodox Cypriot merchants, having "virtually monopolized the foreign trade on the island".<sup>118</sup> This was due to the fact that being foreigners they enjoyed more unhampered access to privileges linked to the capitulations. In contrast, the local Orthodox Greeks could enjoy the same privileges only if they were connected with the merchant consulates – and even in such a case, things were not always easy, for the Ottoman governors were often quite arbitrary in their dealings with the consulates.<sup>119</sup>

Another important group of merchants on the island were the Greeks from the wider Hellenic world (such as Constantinople, Smyrna and the Greek islands), who kept arriving in Cyprus ever since the close of the sixteenth century.<sup>120</sup> The most noteworthy sub-group was that of the Ionians, who came mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; throughout this period, the Ionian Islands were not a part of the Ottoman Empire, but changed hands from the Venetians to the French and then the British, until they finally united with Greece. This meant that the Ionians enjoyed the commercial and political benefits of the capitulations in Cyprus early on, like all other European nationals, which explains why most of them successfully engaged in commerce, and why most western consulates throughout this period recruited personnel for their higher offices from among the Ionian community.<sup>121</sup> Often the offspring of Greek (and more rarely of Latin) merchant families would marry with

children of Cypriot merchant families, thus strengthening the bonds between these communities and enhancing the networks of Orthodox merchants and their respective influence.

From the above, it transpires that the Cypriot Orthodox merchant class was dynamic but small in size. Increased opportunities for the local Orthodox to engage in commerce came after 1821 and the subsequent formation of the Greek state, when many Cypriots, "anxious to emancipate themselves from the status of *rayahs*, proceeded to Greece in order to acquire Hellenic citizenship".<sup>122</sup> Apparently, the numbers of those who embarked on this undertaking was so large that the Ottoman authorities (fearing that they would lose a lot of taxes, or that many would emigrate, or worse still that "the island would shortly become a Greek colony")<sup>123</sup> refused to accept the change of citizenship and threatened the punishment of all those seeking to avoid paying their taxes. Things were made worse by the fact that no capitulatory agreement was signed between the Porte and Greece; but even when this did happen, in 1855, the situation did not improve much. It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that the Cypriot merchant class would become a strong enough force to have a significant role in the public sphere of Cyprus.

If we return to the late eighteenth century, however, the picture emerging is of a small but growing merchant class, actively involved with the Greek *paroikies* all over Europe (from Venice to Trieste, Vienna, Marseilles and Alexandria). In the *paroikies*, Cypriots, having the same religion and language, as well as many of the folk traditions, as the other Orthodox Greeks, shared the same neighbourhoods, churches and coffeeshops – while their children shared the same schools.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, all shared the same religious and family values, and the merchants, additionally, shared the same business ethic. Money flew from the *paroikies* to the places of origin for building a local school or repairing a local church; people came from the Greek Orthodox lands to the *paroikies* to study in one of the high schools or universities in the host towns of the *paroikies*, or to find a job in a relative's or co-villager's growing business, or even to seek a spouse in these well-to-do European diaspora communities. Books were sent from the *paroikies* to the places of origin, where education was primitive and printing presses not yet available – and teachers, priests and icons flew back from the Greek lands to the communities and churches of the *paroikies*.<sup>125</sup> Information on the changing European world and the emerging new world-views would be exchanged with updates on the problems of a declining Ottoman Empire. In all these ways, the Greek

Orthodox lands and the Greek *paroikies* had gradually come to constitute an imaginary common space, linked together in multiple ways and at different levels, through a dense network of socio-economic institutions and through the movement of people, as well as of material and symbolic goods. This network connected individuals, families, churches, businesses and communities and bound them together through common material and symbolic interests, common institutions, as well as shared values and aspirations. At the same time, the network's existence recreated and reproduced multiple contacts, links, transactions, relations and exchanges between the different nodes of the network.

Up to this stage, the Orthodox religion was the primary basis of the identity of Greek and Cypriot Orthodox people. That is why securing special permission for free religious practice and an appropriate space for doing so was always the first priority of diaspora communities. Beside Orthodoxy constituting the faith of the people, attending church was a vital social practice which brought together diverse individuals from different geographical areas of origin, speaking different dialects and even languages,<sup>126</sup> and of different ethnic backgrounds; they all united in the face of their difference to the mostly Catholic host communities. The Orthodox religion remained the central integration element of the *paroikies*, even towards the end of the period under discussion, when the impact of the Enlightenment brought secularism and a degree of anti-clericalism along. What did change at that time was the new emphasis now put on different ethnicity, which acquired equal or higher importance than religious unity, leading to a split between the different Orthodox doctrines, especially the Greeks and the Serbs. But the Cypriots did not have a problem in choosing sides: Despite the fact that they belonged to an autocephalous church, the commonality of language and social institutions (such as the family and the *adelphotites*) identified them with the rest of the Greeks, who were being quickly transformed into Hellenes. Besides, unlike the other non-Greek Orthodox ethnic groups, the Cypriots, as we have seen, had a well developed merchant class which, although small, was the carrier of the same ethic and values as the other Greek merchants, spearheading developments.



### ***From religious to ethnic consciousness***

We have seen how after the Ottoman occupation, the Orthodox Christians came to constitute the religious community of the eastern 'Romans' (*millet-i Rum*). This united the different Orthodox ethno-cultural communities into an imagined community of common faith, transcending the constituent ethnic parts, under the Patriarch of Constantinople as the overall leader (*millet basi*). Through time, this new unity stimulated the growth of a supra-ethnic, ecumenic, religious consciousness, parallel to (and often overshadowing) the pre-existing ethno-cultural identities, which had started acquiring strength in the last era of the Byzantine Empire. This strengthened common bond differentiated the Orthodox from the Muslim conquerors, but also from the Catholic West. Among the Orthodox people themselves, language came to play a differentiating role, in a way which favoured the Greeks over the other ethnicities; this was because Greek was the language of the Orthodox liturgy and the administration of the church. The latter meant that knowledge of the Greek language became a very important qualification for rising to the top layers of the church hierarchy. In Cyprus, for instance, right after the Ottoman conquest, the Grand Vezir promoted a Serb monk to the post of first Archbishop of Cyprus, but because he was ignorant of Greek, the Cypriots quickly had him replaced with someone else, who had the backing of the Ecumenic Patriarchate.<sup>127</sup> The requirement of the Greek language must not be taken to imply a pre-eminence of Greek ethnicity: Indeed, if a person from any ethnic background did know the Greek language, he would face no discrimination, as demonstrated by the fact that many Bulgarians, Serbs, Syrians and others frequented the higher posts of the Church's administration. The Greek language was thus necessary in serving religious or church needs, and was not a tool of ethnic pre-eminence or domination.

Yet, despite an ecumenic worldview de-emphasizing ethnicity, the prevalence of the Greek language in the life of the Church, was to inevitably favour the Greek culture and the Greeks themselves. On the one hand, it facilitated the reproduction of Greek cultural elements and, on the other, it hindered the respective process among other Orthodox ethnic communities. In the Balkans, for instance, "the replacement of Slavonic by Greek in the churches made the service incomprehensible to most faithful, excluded Slav-speakers from high church offices, and made resistance to the Ottomans more difficult".<sup>128</sup> Gradually, through a subtle process of *Hellenization*,<sup>129</sup> many among the non-Greek Orthodox (such as Albanians and Vlachs) adopted Greek as their main

or second language. A second factor which contributed to the Greek language acquiring such importance was the early development of Greek printing in Europe. The Greek language started gaining prominence with the rise in popularity of humanist studies in Europe, in the early sixteenth century; the first Greek books were published in Venice as early as the second decade of that century,<sup>130</sup> whereas printing in the Slavic languages, Albanian and even Turkish came as late as the nineteenth century.<sup>131</sup> Thus, Greek became the only language used in printing texts for Orthodox lands, for a long and crucial period.<sup>132</sup> Finally, the cultural dominance of the Greek language was accentuated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the rise to prominence of the Greek merchants established Greek as the "principal Balkan language of commerce and culture".<sup>133</sup> Since the high social status of the Greek merchants made them an object of admiration, many merchants and other men from the middle classes of non-Greek Orthodox groups adopted the 'Greek' label for themselves, so as to claim the superior status involved.<sup>134</sup> The groups most affected were the Orthodox Albanians, Vlachs and Bulgarians, firstly, because many of them lived as minorities dispersed among larger ethnic wholes, and secondly, because they lacked strong ethnic cultural traditions; the exception was the Serbs, whose long history of ecclesiastical autonomy had produced a more differentiated ethnic self-consciousness.<sup>135</sup>

Overall, the *Hellenization* process benefited the Greeks, yet as Stoianovich underlines, 'being Greek' at the time did not signify ethnicity in the narrow sense we use the word today; it rather signified high socio-economic status (as if someone was "a peddler or merchant", so that in this sense "even a Jew could be a Greek"); it also implied being of the Greek Orthodox religion (so that all Orthodox Albanians, Vlachs, Macedo-Slavs, Bulgarians, and to a lesser extent Serbs, were all considered 'Greeks').<sup>136</sup>

From the above, it transpires that both the Orthodox Church and the Greek merchant class wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the prevalence of Greek language and ethnicity. But the role of the two in fostering ethnic consciousness, leading to the subsequent ethnic rising in Greece, was not at all similar. The Orthodox Church found itself in a very ambivalent position: On the one hand, the many political and economic privileges it enjoyed depended on its loyalty and support to the Ottoman regime, of which it was effectively an integral part; on the other, the fact that the Ottomans were increasingly attached to Islam, an enemy religion, kept reminding the Church of its own captivity and maintained alive a vague hope for the eventual restoration of the

Byzantine world. But this was a purely religious vision, in which no special role was allocated to the Greeks qua ethnic group.

Although the precursors to the Greek merchant class, the Phanariotes, had managed to become "enlightened patrons of Greek culture",<sup>137</sup> they also "largely identified their interests with the preservation of the integrity of the Empire".<sup>138</sup> Their "fully developed Ottoman consciousness" did not allow them to view their Greek ethnicity as the primary determinant of their identity, since this would differentiate them from, and set them up against, their Ottoman masters.<sup>139</sup> Put differently, their complete devotion to the Ottoman regime meant that they "could not envision another political context nor an alternative arrangement for public life".<sup>140</sup> Still absent was a social collective actor detached enough from the ruling regime, yet at the same time strong and confident enough to articulate a new vision for an alternative future. This new social actor was to be the rising Greek merchant, whose main stages of progress we traced earlier on.

Greek merchants sponsored the studies of their own children, and sometimes of other young people from their places of origin, in high schools and universities in the West.<sup>141</sup> From the early years of Ottoman occupation and right through the turn of the eighteenth century, most of the few young Cypriots who studied abroad chose Italy for doing so, and primarily Rome and Venice where there existed lively Greek *paroikies*.<sup>142</sup> Usually they started their studies at the Greek Gymnasium of St. Athanasios in Rome and, if they carried on, they normally attended the University of Padua, the first choice of Greeks from all Greek lands, since it had a reputation as being the vanguard of the new ideas emanating from Italy's belated Renaissance and the rise of humanism, including an emphasis on the classics and neo-Aristotelian philosophy. Philippou reports that in Padoua was already operating, since 1563, the so-called "Cypriot Gymnasium" (*Gymnasion Kyprou*), founded by Pierre Garfranos [Petros Gafranou], with Alexandros Neroulos from Zakynthos as first director.<sup>143</sup>

The Renaissance call to return "back to the classics" found its early admirers among Greek figures<sup>144</sup> such as Nicolas Sofianos, who in the early sixteenth century hoped for the "renaissance of Greece" through the mimesis of Renaissance Europe; Sofianos believed that for the *genos* to raise its wings once again, young people had to educate themselves in the language and works of their "forefathers", the ancient Greeks, as well as in other European languages and in the natural sciences. But, at that stage, these were the thoughts of a few isolated individuals and did not articulate into an

integrated new discourse. Furthermore, Ottoman power was still at its prime and Greek lands still in disarray. It was in the late seventeenth century, when the process of Ottoman decline was well on its way, and the Greeks in a much improved position (as a consequence of improvements in the economy, demographic expansion, and the increasing prominence of the Patriarchate, the Phanariotes, and Greek merchants), both in Greece but especially abroad in the *diaspora*, that the ground was ready to receive the seeds of European Enlightenment.<sup>145</sup>

Neohellenic Enlightenment represented a diverse set of renewal trends in *diaspora* communities in the west, but also in the Ottoman occupied Balkans (what we nowadays call south-eastern Europe), and Minor Asia shores.<sup>146</sup> Reversing the emphasis of the Orthodox Church on the metaphysical and supra-national unity of the Orthodox people, the new approaches sought to use the human faculties in studying how the social characteristics of the various ethno-cultural groups were distributed, seeking to map their unique identities and differences. In the spirit of the lexicographic revolution, "grammars and dictionaries codifying the spoken vernaculars spoken by the various Balkan groups"<sup>147</sup> were put together. Language and cultural traits came to be seen as delineating one 'ethnos' from another. History was another domain which was explored, and so was geography, in an effort to discover the origins of the different ethno-cultural groups and how space influenced their formation and character. The Greeks felt especially proud of tracing their roots to the ancient Greeks (as against, say, the Slavs, who could only boast of a medieval past), whom Europeans themselves acknowledged as the pillars of Western civilization, and of the Enlightenment itself. The Greek vernacular was solid proof of the connection with the classical past, and its current dominance offered further evidence of its superiority to all other languages. Interestingly, ethnic identity at this stage was still in flux, its protagonists were not only 'Greeks' but also 'Hellenized' intellectuals.<sup>148</sup> The common denominator and the 'vehicle language' for all changes was the Greek language which, as we saw, was the lingua franca, and the language of education and commerce. It is in this changing context that the role of Greek *logioi* and merchants became crucial.

With time, the identity of the new merchant class acquired new meanings and came to differ from that of its Phanariote predecessor, in two important ways. First, it increasingly turned secular, with the consequence that 'being Greek' had less to do with Orthodox Christianity and more with being 'progressive' and imbued with a 'reforming spirit'. Thus, the cultural contrast with the Moslems ceased being a mere

matter of religious difference and came to be seen as a contest between 'modernity' and 'backwardness'. The merchant class became the carrier of European ideas, advocating the political modernization of the Balkans and, in defending these ideals, ended up questioning both the Church's and the Phanariotes' conservative ideologies. Second, the new vision now promoted linked together modernization with the creation of a new form of political community: This entailed not only liberation from Ottoman rule but the creation of a European form of polity, which would be the only guarantee for economic development and political liberation – this new model was the nation-state.

\* \* \*

Let us now try to trace these shifts in perceptions and identities in the case of Orthodox Cypriots. A convenient starting point could be that of archimandrite Kyprianos, author of the Chronological History of Cyprus (*Istoria Chronologiki tis Nisou Kyprou*). Interestingly, this was published in 1788 in Venice, where Kyprianos stayed for a few years; we have already noted the importance of Venice for the Cypriots, as the paramount *paroikia*, which linked them with the wider Greek networks and kept them in touch with developments in the West – of which the *paroikies* were, after all, a constituent part.

Kyprianos' *Istoria* was written at an important time juncture – a few years after the Russian-Ottoman wars (1768-1774), leading to the Kuchuk Kainarji treaty, and just one year before the French Revolution (1789) – and, as such, it is a reflection of those times of transition. Hence, the *Istoria* constitutes one of the first attempts by a representative of the emerging Neohellenic Enlightenment to study history through utilizing ideas and tools of analysis drawn from the European Enlightenment. Without abandoning the values and beliefs of Orthodoxy, Kyprianos shifts his emphasis away from the transcendental, teleological perspective of religion and metaphysics, to the social and political dynamics impacting on human reality; he tries to be critical in his approach and to distinguish well documented views from myth, fiction and bias;<sup>149</sup> and although he draws from the accounts of chroniclers who were often a part of the various rulers who held the island, he constantly seeks to balance their views through an emphasis on the plight of the ruled and the voices of the subaltern (unlike Machairas, for instance, who identified with the foreign ruling class with which he was associated).

Kyprianos aims to inform his compatriots of their country's glorious past – of its customs, religion and laws, of how its people cultivated the arts, the sciences and learning more generally, and of how they excelled in agricultural production, commerce, navigation, and war; the Cypriots developed as a people noted for their sociability, solidarity and well-governed nature. Cypriots had plenty of glorious ancestors – ancient kings, heroes, philosophers, poets and artists, but especially saints, apostles and other religious dignitaries associated with Orthodoxy, whose struggles and martyrdom constituted a cause of "pride for Country" (*kafxima tis Patridos*). Kyprianos hopes that knowledge of their past will help Cypriots thrive through "imitating the worthy achievements of the Glorious ones, who blossomed and laboured in this Country",<sup>150</sup> and especially of the saintly men who, through their teaching, introduced their ancestors to the "Holy Faith".

Obviously Kyprianos' worldview was still very much dominated by religion. Ethnicity was certainly not important in his thinking: He put a lot of emphasis on love of country, and of the *genos*, but the nation is not there yet in his history. His concept of space is pre-national: Cyprus for him is not part of the Greek world, but the "last [island] to Asia" (*teleutaia tis Asias*).<sup>151</sup> In an interesting section, where he tries to account for the "origin" (*tin arxin*) of the Cypriots, he traces the latter's early beginnings to the Flood and to "Noah's grandson", Hettim.<sup>152</sup> Yet, he does not seem to see his contemporary Cypriots as direct descendants of that early ancestor: Kyprianos adopts the view that by the time of St. Helen (mother of emperor Constantine), the island was completely depopulated and, thus, she arranged for its re-population by people from nearby lands (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Constantinople and others);<sup>153</sup> as the residents of these lands were of the "Roman" *genos*, their Cypriot descendants were also Romans.<sup>154</sup> Kyprianos thus upholds a discontinuous view of descent and does not seem to care for establishing a direct link between his contemporary Cypriots and the "original" inhabitants of the island. Furthermore, Kyprianos saw absolutely no blood or other connection between Cypriots and Greeks. The latter he associated only with the ancient Greeks, who were heathen (*ethnikoi*), and "appeared on earth" before Christians.<sup>155</sup> They did have a presence in ancient Cyprus but he considers them as merely one of many conquerors, quite distinct from the Cypriots.<sup>156</sup> The Greeks "called their heroes Gods", one of which was Aphrodite, which Kyprianos, as a clergyman, seems to particularly dislike, calling her a "false god" (*pseudonimos thea*)<sup>157</sup> or worse, a "noxious abomination" (*miasma vdelliron*)<sup>158</sup> in consequence of her indulgence in "licentious hedonism" (*aselgestaton idonon*).<sup>159</sup>

In sum, we have in Kyprianos the traits of a patriot, who wishes to foster love for country (*patrida*) and its people (*genos*); but we certainly do not yet have a nationalist tracing his descent to the Greek nation, being imbued with a Greek "national identity" or "national consciousness". Such ideas were to start gradually developing after Kyprianos' *history*, and were certainly not present in his own work. A little more than a century after the initial publication of the *History*, in 1902, when Ottoman rule was over and modernity was changing the face of Cyprus, there was a second reprint. In the introduction of the co-publishers, at least one of which (Nicolaos Katalanos) was a militant nationalist, they praise Kyprianos for writing his *History* in order to prepare the Cypriots for their "national restoration" – "blowing the trumpet" for their "awakening". But the text they cite as evidence says exactly the opposite: Kyprianos proposes that the example of "the Glorious ones" among their forefathers, will help his contemporaries "gladly bear" their current tribulations, under the Ottomans, especially once they considered the much "harsher slavery" of the peasants under the former Latin masters of the island, who happened to be Christian (reminding the readers that, in those times, "people were sold or traded as beasts").<sup>160</sup> As a good Orthodox and as part of a Church which was expected to support the Ottoman regime, Kyprianos is asking his readers to be submissive; the Ottomans may be suppressive, but their Christian predecessors were even worse. Patience, not revolution, is his call.

Only a few years later, the next person we turn to consider, was toying with revolutionary ideas. The young Cypriot *logios*, Ioannis Karajias (1767–1798), was closely associated with Rigas Pheraos Velestinlis, the most influential Greek speaking advocate of the new ideas stemming from the French Revolution, calling for a revolutionary overthrow of the Ottomans in the Balkans. Karajias, Pheraos, and another six of the latter's associates, were arrested by the Austrian secret service in the late 1790's in Trieste and, after interrogation, they were handed over to the Ottoman authorities who executed them in June 1798 (hardly ten years after Kyprianos' *History*). The interrogations had ascertained that Karajias had attempted reprinting Pheraos' "especially dangerous proclamations" and was "in touch with the traitors who wanted to spread the principles of French freedom and equality to the Greeks residing in Ottoman provinces".<sup>161</sup>

Born in Nicosia, Karajias had made a successful start with publishing and trading books in the Greek *paroikies* (mainly Vienna), primarily for use in Greek schools. Two of the more well known publications of Karajias related to ancient Greek philosophers and a

third one was a collection of romantic stories – a choice pattern reminiscent of the early publications of Phereos himself. The works of classical Greece were considered important tools for the education of the Greek people, which itself was a necessary precondition for a national revival and revolution; the romantic stories carried messages of the equality of people (the falling in love of individuals coming from different social classes) and were, thus, important tools for the emotional and social liberation of the readers.

But the later works of Phereos, which had got the collaborators into trouble, included the much more politicized *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, and the *New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Aegean and the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia*. Both texts were heavily influenced by the respective declaration and constitution of the French Revolution.<sup>162</sup> The *Constitution* was, in fact, a revolutionary manifesto, calling on the descendants of ancient Greeks in all Ottoman-ruled Greek lands to rise in revolution against the tyrannical Ottoman empire, that had reached the ultimate stage of decadence and decay. National liberation was a first necessary step to further social changes which would lead to a transformed "Hellenic Democracy" (*Elliniki Demokratia*). The latter was not to be a regime dominated politically by the Greeks, since the vision was for an equal union of all peoples living in the concerned lands, including the various Orthodox ethnicities (such as Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians and Vlachs) but also Armenians, Jews and even Turks. Rather, the new Balkan democratic republic would be *Hellenic* in the sense that the Greek language, education and culture would enjoy hegemony – since, after all, these were already widespread, serving the unity of the diverse ethnicities in the area.

Such ideas had alarmed the monarchical conservative European states, as well as the Ottoman authorities; that is why the Austrians handed Phereos and his accomplices to the Ottomans, and why the latter proceeded with the executions – to quench the revolutionary fire before it flared up. What is important for our purposes is the presence of Karajias next to Phereos, the harbinger of change, sharing in the new revolutionary democratic spirit, moving around the *paroikies* and publishing books promoting the new ideas to all Greek speakers, uniting the Greek lands with the *paroikies* in the new discourse of ethnicity, democracy and freedom.

Yet, in many ways, Phereos' vision was too radical or utopian for his times, even for the very audiences he was addressing, including the Greek merchants who were



naturally the most receptive to new ideas. Stoianovich points out that of the eighteen Greeks accused in the 1790's in Vienna of membership in Phereos' team of revolutionaries, "no more than a third were merchants", from which he concludes that "only a fraction of 1 per cent of the total number of Greek merchants in the Habsburg dominions entertained close links with the revolutionary conspiracy".<sup>163</sup> The situation was to change by the time of the *Philike Etairia*, in a short few decades thereafter.

The next important Cypriot figures to consider, as representative of those changing times, were the Theseas brothers, who were active members of the Society of Friends (*Philike Etairia*), a secret organization founded in 1814, in the diaspora community of Odessos, in southern Russia. From various studies of the membership of *Philike*, the largest numbers were merchants (54%), educated professionals (13%) and clerics (9.5%).<sup>164</sup> In the early years, the membership of the *Philike* remained small, but it expanded dramatically after 1818, at which time its headquarters shifted to Istanbul.<sup>165</sup> *Philike's* methods and organization were influenced by freemasonry,<sup>166</sup> and included initiation rituals to its four different grades of membership, as well as oaths of commitment and secrecy (betrayal was punishable by death). These features invested its activities and the duties of members with a sacred quality, "setting them apart and above" ordinary profane activities or obligations, as indeed was necessary in serving the purpose of preparing a revolution. Secrecy and detachment were vital in Ottoman lands, in societies which treasured close kin relations above all else, and where bribes for betrayal were part of a corrupt system; they were equally necessary in European monarchical regimes, which trembled in fear of the radical ideas of the Jacobines and the carbonaros. Hence, *Philike* initiates could move around unhampered, in both Ottoman occupied lands and the *paroikies*, under the pretexts of founding schools or churches, or of raising money for needy compatriots, while in fact spreading the seeds of revolution.<sup>167</sup>

The Theseas brothers were cousins of Kyprianos, who became Archbishop of Cyprus in 1810, after which the brothers gained in prominence, becoming the most influential Cypriots of the time.<sup>168</sup> After finishing school, Nicolaos Theseas went to Florence for a few years, where he published the *Iliad*; he then became a teacher in a Greek school in Trieste and "finally settled in Marseilles as an agent of his brother's firm 'Kyprianos Theseas and Co' of Larnaka".<sup>169</sup> Theophilos Theseas was ordained Archimandrite and joined his brother in Marseilles, where the two became members of the *Philike*.<sup>170</sup>

In 1821, some *Philike* leaflets, brought to Cyprus by Archimandrite Theophilos, fell into the hands of the Ottomans. This, plus other "incriminatory evidence", but especially the persistent requests of the local Ottoman governor (Kuchuk Mehmed) and other aghas, induced the Sultan to permit the mass execution of almost 500 Christians – exterminating literally the whole Christian elite, including Archbishop Kyprianos and other prelates. Interestingly, Archimandrite Theophilos escaped "by bribing his pursuers",<sup>171</sup> and ended up in Rome where, in December 1821, together with a few other Cypriot prelates and notables who fled the massacre, published the first declaration of Cypriots, calling for the liberation of their country from "tyrannical" Turkish rule.<sup>172</sup> Denouncing the massacres of the Christians and the destruction of their properties, the declaration stresses the resolve of the Cypriots to seek freedom, much as the rest of their "Greek brothers". The declaration made it known that Nicolaos Theseas was voted "Commissioner" of Cyprus, with authorization to do whatever was necessary towards this end (borrow money on behalf of the Cypriots, appeal to European Monarchs, raise a military force, or take any other action possible). But, since no help was forthcoming for Cyprus, the brothers joined the Revolution in Greece where they fought along hundreds of other Cypriots, and managed to distinguish themselves in many difficult battles.<sup>173</sup>

It must be pointed out that the Greek Revolution was initially intended to liberate the whole of the Balkans, much as Phereos had originally planned. Ethnic awareness, however, had started spreading to other peoples in the Balkans, besides the Greeks – starting from the Serbs, whose revolt at the turn of the nineteenth century (1804) had led to de facto autonomy by 1815. In the principalities, the Romanians were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Phanariotes' rule. Such developments meant that the Greek struggle could not inspire a Balkan-wide response, even though many individuals of other ethnicities (especially Vlachs and Albanians) did rally the cause of revolution.<sup>174</sup> As a consequence, insurrection failed to take root in the Principalities, where it started, and only managed to make progress in Peloponesos and Rumeli (present day south mainland Greece), where there were majority Greek populations. Naturally, the end result of the struggle was not a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural polity, as Phereos had imagined, but a largely homogeneous Greek state.

Furthermore, the revolution was not led by the educated, ethnically conscious middle classes, as Phereos (and primarily his subsequent theoretician of Greek liberation, Adamantios Koraes) had expected: It was mostly a peasant revolution<sup>175</sup> set in motion

in response to the economic hardship of the masses in Peloponesos, but which quickly gained widespread support for many other reasons – the arbitrariness and corruption of the ruling regime, the suppressed enmities of the subjugated, the spread of Enlightenment ideas, and so on. Yet, in widening its support, the revolution drew-in the “entrenched conservative forces” too, such as the big landowners and local notables, led by the Orthodox Church hierarchy; by the end of the independence struggle, which lasted for almost a decade, the traditional forces had managed to dominate the other social forces, and to impose their own ideological slant on the turn of events. Thus, the initially liberal revolution, which was infused with the humanist, cosmopolitan and republican spirit of the Enlightenment (reflected in the very progressive First Constitutional Charter, voted in Epidaurus, in 1822), ended up adopting an increasingly conservative ideology; by the 1832 Fifth National Assembly, a monarchical regime was confirmed as the outcome of the process. This turn of things was also favoured by the Great Powers, on which rebel Greeks came to depend, since developments in Europe had made the former sceptical of both national revolutions and Jacobin state regimes.<sup>176</sup>

Since, during the Revolution, Greek Orthodox Christians were effectively pitted against Ottoman/Turk Muslims, religious differences were gradually translated and consolidated into ethnic differences – the ethnic incorporating the religious element; the first “savage acts of massacre” committed during the Greek Revolution became thus the earlier forms of “ethnic cleansing” in modern history.<sup>177</sup>

### ***Late Ottoman rule and the consolidation of ethnic identities***

The fact that Archimandrite Theophilos became actively involved with the *Philike* did not mean many Cypriot prelates shared his views. It is debatable whether his own uncle, Archbishop Kyprianos, was very sympathetic to these new ideas<sup>178</sup> – his previous career and experiences did not militate for this. When young, Kyprianos had spent considerable time (1783-1803) in Wallachia, where the Phanariote *hospodar* Michail Soutsos put him under his patronage and helped him combine his post as a priest with free education in a local academy. The Phanariote rulers saw themselves as continuators of the Byzantine heritage – as protectors of the Orthodox faith and of the Roman *genos*. Though loyal to the Ottoman order of things, they fostered Greek culture and education and envisioned a future in which the Orthodox would sort of

capture the Empire from within, through dominating its administrative bureaucracy, and promoting an ecumenic Greek language and culture.<sup>179</sup> Exposed to such ideas, Kyprianos returned to Cyprus in 1802, where he quickly worked his way up to become Archbishop (1810), and to implement a similar vision. In 1812, he inaugurated the Greek School in Nicosia, in the founding document of which he notes how Cyprus was lacking in education and Greek learning, "the only means of ornamenting the human mind and of restoring man as worthy of being man";<sup>180</sup> he, furthermore, notes how schools existed in many other Greek lands but not in Cyprus, for which the Cypriots were "shamed". But Kyprianos' appreciation of ancient Greece and Greek education did not amount to a nationalist ideology. Indeed, only three years later, in 1815, in a circular to the faithful, Kyprianos warned them not to be affected by "anti-Christian circles", and threatened with excommunication anyone espousing radical ideas associated with freemasonry (associated with radical nationalism), which he considered as violating both the Orthodox religion but also the Sultan's own commands.<sup>181</sup>

When, subsequently (1818), he was visited by *Philike* delegates who sought his support, Kyprianos seems to have promised only financial support, and it is unclear as to whether he was fully aware of the revolutionary plans of the organization.<sup>182</sup> Whatever the case, what is certain is that, soon after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, he was executed along with hundreds of other Christian members of the elite. This, however, was not because the Cypriots were getting ready for a revolution, as the local Ottoman governor reported to the Porte: It was rather because, as we saw above, the Muslim elite resented the increasing wealth and strength of the Orthodox prelates and notables; it was also a pay back for grudges held since the 1804 events, during which the Christian dragoman and archbishop had solicited the Porte's help in crushing the uprising of (mostly) Muslim masses, protesting the shortage of food and increases in taxation.<sup>183</sup> But although the Christian masses were not yet imbued with nationalism, these tragic events were to mark their collective memory: "Even the most servile of *rayah*-like Christian subject of the Ottoman Empire must have been persuaded, by being treated as a revolutionary, that he had some connection with what was going on on the mainland".<sup>184</sup>

Suppression continued for some years after the July 1821 massacre and it is estimated that more than twenty thousand Christian Cypriots left the island in that period. In 1828, the new Archbishop, Panaretos, along with other prelates and notables, sent a letter to Capodistrias, the governor of Greece, the "common mother country",

reminding him of the Cypriots' plight and their longing to "drop anchor in the Greek harbour", asking him to become a "doctor to heal [the Cypriots'] wounds" in any way he saw politically fit.<sup>185</sup> Obviously, the position of the Christian elite was very precarious: Since help was not forthcoming from Greece, relations with the Ottomans had to be mended; in 1830, a delegation was sent to the Porte, pleading for "finding the means to heal long-time passions" and for preventing the further dissemination of the Cypriots.<sup>186</sup> Although the Porte did respond with some reforms, their impact was obviously not satisfactory for, in 1833, there were three popular uprisings on the island – one of which was led by Nicolaos Theseas.<sup>187</sup>

From 1839, we enter the period of the Tanzimat reforms, and even though the changes do not seem to have been as radical as the Porte intended them to be, they certainly must have made a difference to Cyprus, for henceforth there were no more risings, agricultural production and commerce improved, and the population started gradually increasing.<sup>188</sup> In their efforts to catch up with Europe, the Ottomans wanted to modernize their empire and to transform it into a centrally administered state of equal citizens, fostering an over-arching loyalty to the centre, than to their particular community of faith. The more famous Tanzimat reforms were those of 1839 and of 1856, which sought to establish equality among all Ottoman subjects, independent of religious or other group identity. The more significant changes related to the reorganization of the *millet*s along more "progressive" lines, to suit the more liberal spirit of the times. The main emphasis was on increased lay participation in the administration of the community and, especially, in the more 'secular' affairs of the church (such as the church's finances and its involvement with education), as well as in the election of its high officials. The idea behind the reforms was that minimizing clerical control of community life and church affairs would reduce the barriers separating the various religious groups of the Empire, and foster a sense of commonality – the ideology of "Ottomanism", of equality of all (male) Ottoman subjects; this became a new pillarstone policy until the end of the empire.<sup>189</sup> Other reforms aimed at modernizing the army and introducing universal conscription (which meant that Christians would now have to serve, and not only Muslims); changing the law so that discriminations against non-Muslims would be eliminated (for instance, in testifying against Muslims); and centrally administering the various territories through staff appointed by Istanbul (rather than the onerous tax farming method previously used). All the elements for a new "cultural compromise" were thus put in place: A vision for a re-imagined nation, congruent with a multi-cultural, centralized state

(rather than a 'mosaic' empire), and provisions for new forms of closure as regards politics, the military, law and national solidarity.

Yet Ottomanism and the reforms did not work. A main reason for failure had to do with the fact that, in practice, the reforms meant that the *millet* system was not abandoned but simply reorganized, so that the communities were given more responsibilities (at the expense of the central state); similarly, the fact that religious leaders were made accountable for implementing the changes meant that, in practice, the system was actually strengthened. Giving the *millets* more formal recognition effectively institutionalized the separation of the religious groups, only now the ethnic dimension was added, which was acquiring increasing significance with time. As a result, the *millets* came at this stage to resemble different partner 'nations' in a multi-national Empire, and the Archbishop of each ethno-religious group came to be seen as the leader of the nation (*ethnarch*) – rather than of the religious community as before. The Muslims resented the benefits given to the non-Muslims, and those in key positions of authority, who were expected to implement the reforms, often ignored or undermined them instead. Similarly, the non-Muslims proved unwilling to go along with many of the changes; for instance, in most cases, Cyprus included, the Christians did not wish to join the army. And the Church found new ways of maintaining, and even of increasing, its power, than sharing it with laymen. But before we consider how the latter happened in Cyprus, we must introduce another factor which militated for the failure of the reforms: The existence of competing nation-states, with their own agendas and claims, which came into conflict with the aims of the Ottomans. In the case of Cyprus, the creation and policies of the Greek Kingdom was to have a determining influence on developments in the island.

The Greek state was put in place a few years after the Revolution – in 1828. We have seen how the ideology of the young state turned from a more liberal or civic version to a more conservative, ethnic nationalism.<sup>190</sup> After a resurgence of religion and the establishment of a "national" church (1833), Orthodoxy became an important pillar of state ideology, and a useful mechanism in the drive for spiritual and national unity, vitally necessary to the state's survival. Furthermore, the initial Enlightenment-stimulated resort to the ancient Greeks, as a source of inspiration and emulation of liberal and republican values, had taken a new turn towards a "romantic historicism" and "a purely rhetorical celebration of ancient Greek greatness", which amounted to formalistic "ancestral worship", accompanied by "an intolerant sense of self-sufficiency and self-

confidence" based on the premise that modern Greeks were inheritors of the genius of classical Greece.<sup>191</sup> The two apparently incompatible perspectives (of secular republicanism and religion) were combined into the idea of "Greco-Christian" civilization, which was to be the basis of the Greek nation-state. But the new state contained only a fraction (less than a third) of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, and its territory was still very small when compared with the historic Greek territories of Hellas in ancient times, or Byzantine 'Greece'. In 1844, a rising politician, Ioannis Kolettis, addressing the National Assembly, which was drafting the constitution, was to propose a new, grandiose vision for the Greeks – in the form of the irredentist project of the "Great Idea" (*Megali Idea*):

The [present] Greek Kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but only a part, the smallest and poorest part. A native is not only someone who lives within this Kingdom, but also one who lives in Ioannina, in Thessaly, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race.<sup>192</sup>

In essence, the proposed vision entailed the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, through incorporating within the bounds of a nation-state all the areas where Greeks predominated, with Constantinople as the capital.<sup>193</sup> This was the way to bring about congruence between politics and culture, state and nation. The way this grandiose project was defined meant that the mechanisms for "closure" had to cater for both internal and external dimensions of nation building.<sup>194</sup> The former had to establish the homogeneity of the nation-state: For instance, education was to achieve linguistic and ideological homogenization; the legal system and judiciary were to ensure compliance to national norms and laws (for example, dealing with wide-spread banditry); the army was to galvanize the adherence of young males to the new values and to implement the mission of territorial expansion of the state; and through the national Orthodox Church, religion was to act as the necessary cement for the unity of the nation. The external dimension, meant that the 'national centre' (the Greek Kingdom) had to 'export' the national ideas to the unredeemed territories – the 'irredenta'. This was to be achieved mainly through the Greek consulates, the Greek schools and the cultural associations in these unredeemed lands. The overall purpose was the consolidation of Greek identities out of the traditional religious identities,<sup>195</sup> with the ultimate aim of eventually incorporating these remaining Greek lands into a new whole.

In the case of Cyprus, the process of identity transformation had already begun, via the agency of the Cypriot and Greek merchant class and men of letters (*logioi*) who

were in contact with developments in Europe, through the *paroikies* and the Greek Kingdom. But left on its own, the process of change was both slow and uncertain. In 1846, a Greek consulate was established in Cyprus, which was to provide an opportunity for the Cypriots to vent existing national feelings and to further consolidate them, channeling them in specific directions according to the policies of the Greek state. The latter was careful not to openly antagonize the Ottomans while Greece was not ready to openly confront them; its policies were more long-term and had to take into consideration a lot of issues – such as the relative power of Greece and the Ottomans, as well as the interests and outlooks of the European powers.<sup>196</sup> At the same time, the Greek consuls were very active in cultural affairs and especially in matters of education.

Schools had actually been very few and their activities uncoordinated until 1830 when, with the initiative of the Orthodox Church, a General Assembly plus Town and Village Committees were set up to oversee and foster their development.<sup>197</sup> The prelates largely dominated these bodies and controlled educational matters, since the Church was the greatest donor for the set up and sustenance of schools. The Tanzimat reforms required education to become a secular affair, managed by laymen; but the secularization of education was to be the duty of the Church leaders, as the heads of their *millet*. Most importantly, the “secular” education envisioned by the reforms was not a uniform education, for all the Ottoman people, but a separate education for each *millet*. Moreover, no financial or other assistance was given for furthering education – as indeed for most other developments stipulated by the reforms – since the Ottoman state was constantly in financial crisis.

According to Ottoman reform policies, the Cypriot system of education was linked to the *Roman/Orthodox millet*, under the Patriarch of Constantinople. But after 1850, when the latter reluctantly recognized the Church of Greece and relations with Athens became much closer, the policies of the much better resourced ‘national centre’ were to gradually prevail. The education of all Greeks, even those under Ottoman rule, became an important priority; through the influence of Athens, it started developing at a much faster pace than before,<sup>198</sup> and became much more uniform, contributing to the gradual homogenization of all Greeks. Since the content of education was determined in Greece (most books were written there, and many teachers studied or were recruited from there), the latter had acquired a powerful apparatus for forging the imagined community of nation.



The involvement of the Orthodox Church with education did not mean that the Church adopted national ideas early on. We have seen that the role of the Church – as part of the Ottoman establishment, in charge of ensuring the compliance of its members – put it in a very ambivalent position. Furthermore, its ecumenic perspective meant that it could not differentiate people on the basis of race, nationality, or other distinctions. In fact, Gregory V, the Patriarch of Constantinople, had condemned both Phereos' "radical republicanism" and the outbreak of the Greek Revolution.<sup>199</sup> We have also seen that, in Cyprus, Archbishop Kyprianos denounced masonic ideas and activities;<sup>200</sup> the 1815 encyclical charged freemasons that they "oppose[d] the decrees of the Sovereign and deserve[d] to be put to death" for what they preached; it further urged the Ottoman authorities to "crack down" on these heretical Cypriot Christians, "to arrest them in their meetings and councils and to punish them harshly".<sup>201</sup> Finally, it made a special plea to the Bishop of Kition (Larnaka), the centre of merchants, freemasonry and radical nationalism, "to be on the alert about this matter which is pit against not only our most sacred and pure faith but also against the wishes and commands of our King [the Sultan]".<sup>202</sup> Katsiaounis notes that: "The denunciation, which was in line with the stand of the Eastern Orthodox patriarchates towards French enlightenment and freemasonry, nipped in the bud the growth of radical nationalist ideas in Cyprus".<sup>203</sup> In the 1830s, Archbishop Panaretos expressed his contempt at the insurrection headed by Nicolaos Theseas, and charged that such men, who were initiated "into the sacraments of rebellion", were "abominable small men".<sup>204</sup>

But the most elaborate and clear condemnation of nationalist ideas by the Orthodox Church came after the proclamations of independence by the various national churches,<sup>205</sup> and especially that of Bulgaria (in 1865), which caused a great schism within the Orthodox Church. In 1872, a major Orthodox synod, attended by the Archbishop of Cyprus, issued a condemnation of "phyletism" (which essentially meant nationalism), arguing that the formation of national churches, "each accepting all the members of its particular race [*phyle*], excluding all aliens and governed exclusively by pastors of its own race" was totally against the spirit of the Church which aimed "to contain all nations in one brotherhood in Christ". The synod concluded with a strongly worded denouncement of phyletism:

We renounce, censure and condemn phyletism, that is racial discrimination, ethnic feuds, hatreds and dissensions within the Church of Christ, as contrary to the teaching of the Gospel and of the holy canons...<sup>206</sup>

Yet, by the turn of the twentieth century, nationalist ideas would make inroads even into the politics of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.<sup>207</sup> In Cyprus, a division into a pro-nationalist and a pro-ecumenic trend was to divide the Church, and the Greek Orthodox community more generally, reflecting a wider socio-political contest between traditional and modernizing forces. Since the Church was the paramount institution of Cypriot society, the battle revolved around which side would control the Church.

The power of the Cypriot Church had somewhat decreased after the 1821 events, and the Tanzimat reforms had a similar effect through empowering the laymen at its own expense. Thus, after a 1840 firman, inspired by the reforms, tax-farming was assigned to lay notables (mostly landowners), and a number of committees were set up to enhance the involvement of laymen in church affairs. The selection of the Archbishop and Bishops had, henceforth, to be through elections involving laymen, in addition to the Holy Synod (which up to that time had the main responsibility for the process). But, in reality, whatever power the Church lost through divesting some of its authorities to laymen, it regained in other ways, through its enhanced role as leader of the Cypriot *millet*. The Church dominated the new bodies assigned the task of implementing the various reforms (including the reform of the taxation system): The Archbishop was an *ex officio* member of the Central Council of Nicosia, and the Bishops, similarly, of the local District Councils.

The laymen who mostly benefited from the reforms were the traditional landowners, since they were the ones to fill the posts reserved for the lay notables in the new Councils. Some of these landowners did involve themselves with trade, but they did not shed their conservative attitudes and ideology. Even the most prominent among this traditional elite had but basic education, and continued to espouse the norms and values of a "corporate and essentially aristocratic society" – that is, "values based on honour" and sustained through traditional morality, the only basis for reliable dealings in a pre-capitalist world, characterized by unpredictability of life and insecurity of activity, including commerce. The material base of this secular elite, much like the Church before it, was the extraction of surplus from the labouring population, mostly the peasants, for the Sultan and for themselves. They were little involved with new productive enterprises, neither could they be the carriers of any new ideology, as that associated with the rising bourgeoisie in the West. It must be said that, overall, involvement in the various councils did not give any real power to the traditional Christian elite (prelates and prominent lay kocabasis); even though it did symbolically

decrease their social distance to their Moslem aristocratic counterpart, with whom they mixed socially (jointly attending public celebrations, and so on), below surface appearances, the Christian elite were still second best to the Moslems, and thus servility combined with resentment.<sup>208</sup>

The only group with somewhat different, non-traditional attitudes and ideology was the small "European oriented bourgeois", which developed around the merchant consulates in the two main port towns, Larnaka and Limassol<sup>209</sup> – as outlined earlier on. Enjoying the commercial and political benefits of the capitulations, this group's contact with the outside world made it a carrier of new ideas, especially radical nationalist ideas. The merchant class and most of the *logioi* favoured the option of union with the Greek state (*enosis*), and in this direction they received increasing support from the Greek consulate. The latter was situated in Larnaka, home of the strongest community of merchants on the island,<sup>210</sup> and kept close relations with this small bourgeoisie, supplying them with news and Greek newspapers, helping them in their educational and cultural activities.

The 1850's and 1860's marked a crisis revolving around the bishopric of Kition,<sup>211</sup> in Larnaka. As a consequence of bad financial management, the local bishop had to quit, and his replacement, after facing similar problems, allowed laymen to run the finances of the bishopric. Gradually, the bishop became dependent on the help and votes of the merchants and it seems that he came to adopt their nationalistic discourse, becoming a carrier of their ideas. Nicosia, on the other hand, without almost any presence of either merchants or Europeans, was dominated by landowners, whose traditionalistic discourse influenced the Archbishopric, situated in the capital. Over time, two loose coalitions came to be formed, both closely associated with the Church: The more modernizing nationalists, excluded from the power structures of their *millet*, rallied around the Bishop of Kition; and the other more traditional forces of the *ancient regime*, more "Ottomanist" in outlook, around the Archbishop. But the division was still at a very early stage of articulation – these were times of early consolidation of national identities, and not of conscious nationalist agitation.

A number of cultural associations or reading clubs [*anagnostiria*] in the main towns were gathering spots for reading newspapers from Greece, Constantinople and Smyrna, and for hosting lectures by learned Greeks from such areas, acting thus as small centers of intellectual and national revival.<sup>212</sup> But little was happening in the

countryside, the largest part of which was undeveloped and isolated, with almost no road connections to the rest of Cyprus and to the urban centers. In consequence, the peasants were more exposed to the clergy's influence and were thus more deferential and conservative, showing few signs of national awareness. Writing in the last years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, Theodoros Peristianis, vice-consul of Greece in Larnaka, wrote a report on the state of affairs in Cyprus. The vice-consul noted that whereas prior to the Greek Revolution not more than thirty town people could write proper Greek, at the time of writing (1872), one third of town residents could do so; this he attributed to the spread of education, which had also been beneficial to national identity, elements of which were becoming everywhere apparent, except in the countryside, where education was almost non-existent, and the many years of bondage had kept the peasants in dire ignorance: "Slavery has crushed the mind, the body and the hearts of the people."<sup>213</sup> At the same time, Peristianis judged that religion, and not ethnicity, was still the paramount factor separating the Greeks and Turks on the island. Most Greek-Cypriots could not yet distinguish between the two:

The Christian is not aware of his history, his nation. He considers all Orthodox to be co-nationals.<sup>214</sup>

Peristianis was convinced that, given the right circumstances, national feelings could be awakened. But he saw that time as far away:

Should a breeze of freedom blow for a while on the island and a national sense of direction be inspired in the spirit of the inhabitants, a teaching urging them along the road to nationhood, and these Christians will recover from the lethargy in which they have been cast by so many centuries of slavery. That day however will dawn very late.<sup>215</sup>

That day was in fact to arrive much earlier than Peristianis thought. And the spirit of nationalism was soon to change the face of Cyprus.

## **Chapter 4 British colonialism and irredentist nationalism**

Colonial European expansion started from the sixteenth century onwards, but in the last decades of the nineteenth century, European nation-states rushed into a new round of acquisition of overseas territories, particularly in Asia and Africa, "at a rate and with a purpose unprecedented in the history of European colonialism".<sup>1</sup> Some of these new territories belonged to the crumbling Ottoman Empire: Britain had, in 1840, initiated the London Convention, which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to forestall its dismemberment; four decades later, her re-defined interests led her to detach Cyprus to use as a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean, for protecting the vital routes to the Middle East and India. In exchange, the Cyprus Convention provided for Britain to protect the Porte against Russian advancement in Asiatic Ottoman territories. Between 1870 and the end of WWI, Britain's colonial empire would almost double in size.<sup>2</sup>

Britain's older colonies, mostly established before the mid-seventeenth century, were inhabited by settlers of British or European background and had been granted British laws and institutions. The new colonies, which were either conquered or ceded in the period under consideration, were inhabited by "savages" or other non-Europeans.<sup>3</sup> Much like the Ottomans, Britain managed these new vast territories through indirect rule, keeping control and interference to the minimum necessary, so as not to incur large governing costs. Yet, unlike the Ottomans, Britain did not confine her interests to surplus extraction or to strategic benefits, but considered herself as having a "civilizing mission" – of helping her colonies to transform themselves from their more traditional or backward stage of development, to a higher and more progressive stage of civilization.<sup>4</sup> In the case of Cyprus, this mission acquired a different twist, for the majority of the inhabitants claimed to be Europeans, but were economically and socially undeveloped; furthermore, along with the Christians on the island there co-habited a Muslim community. These were perhaps extra reasons why Cyprus was a most suitable case to acquire and to rule in an exemplary manner, so she could be a "model" for others to follow – among the others being the Ottomans, whom Britain was trying to teach lessons on how to treat subject peoples. The aim was for Cyprus to be administered without corruption and arbitrariness, with sound financial planning and principles of government, a just legal system, and an efficient state bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup>

But the British were to quickly forget their noble objectives. There were several reasons for this, ranging from Cyprus' changing strategic value, to financial constraints. But another set of reasons had to do with the plural nature of Cypriot society and the complications to representative democracy this presented; this also related to the ethno-cultural links of the two communities on the island with the Greek and Ottoman states, respectively, and the different cross-border identities and loyalties these entailed. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in late Ottoman years, the Greek Cypriots were gradually turning from a religious to an ethno-national community. Ottoman reform policies had not arrested this process and national closure was carrying on along communal lines. During British rule, the policies adopted by the colonial power would augment these processes of closure along the same lines and would foster an irredentist movement for union with Greece, which would peak into a violent anti-colonial struggle and lead to the end of colonial rule. Meanwhile, the two ethno-national communities would develop in very different ways and directions, with "walls of demarcation" growing between them, rendering them increasingly hostile to each other.

The inter-communal cleavage produced as a consequence of these processes, is certainly the most important division within Cypriot society, its roots going back to the island's pre-industrial past, and the process of nation-building, the next stages of which we will be examining further in this chapter. But, as Stein Rokkan has documented, modern states are also marked by a second division, associated with the industrial or market-economy stage of development.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, another important feature of British colonialism in Cyprus, relates to the introduction of capitalist social relations and the emergence of associated new social forces. This was to lead to an intra-communal power contest within Greek Cypriot society, between the traditional, hegemonic forces of the Right and the counter-hegemonic forces of the Left, which were to consolidate into two antagonistic camps, each having a different relation to the nation and upholding a different variant of nationalist ideology. Left-wing nationalism combined an internationalist perspective, with elements of a territorial-civic type of nationalism and thus appeared to offer new possibilities for the fostering of cross-communal loyalties and identities.

The cleavage between the two opposing camps was created, and gradually entrenched, through processes of exclusion and closure quite similar to those associated with the build-up of the inter-communal cleavage.<sup>7</sup> The multiple deep

divisions which ensued were to acquire explosive proportions, leading to the anti-colonial struggle, but also to conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the polarization of the division between the Right and Left within the Greek Cypriot community.

### ***Modernity and communalism***

When the first High Commissioner of Cyprus, Lt. General Sir Garnet Wolseley, arrived in Larnaka, and his proclamation was read to the gathered crowds, they were jubilant: The declaration conveyed the Queen's interest in the locals' prosperity and of her intention to adopt measures to promote the economy and "to afford to the people the blessings of freedom, justice and security". The island was to be "administered without favour to any race or creed" and, henceforth, all would "enjoy alike the equal and impartial protection of the law"; no measure would be spared "to advance the moral and material welfare of the people". Moreover, assurances were given that:

Regard shall be paid to the reasonable wishes of the inhabitants with respect to the maintenance of their ancient institutions, usages and customs – provided that they be consistent with just and good Government and [...] principles of civilization and liberty.<sup>8</sup>

As the proclamation was read, every statement was punctuated with enthusiastic cheers (*zitos*), confirming the crowd's seal of approval on all that was said. The Bishop of Larnaka gave an initial welcome, but the official Greek Cypriot response was given a few days later, by Archbishop Sofronios, in Nicosia.<sup>9</sup> The Archbishop stressed his community's<sup>10</sup> willingness to be loyal to the new government, "without renouncing its descent and aspirations".<sup>11</sup> The island had suffered much and for long, so that "intellectually and materially" it could not be proud of its achievements – but now was perhaps the chance for Cyprus to enjoy the fruits of the rule of law and "true civilization":

For truly, a great and noble nation, of great achievements, as the English one [with] an enlightened and humane and paternal government, is sure to rule the various peoples under her sovereign care with appropriate and liberal institutions, so that they can gradually improve in their progress and well being...<sup>12</sup>

The Archbishop went on to enumerate much the same values as Wolseley's message had referred to: The rule of law, equality of rights and duties, freedom, justice, and order, inviting the new authorities to seek the counsel of the "more able among the

elite" as regards the needs and realities of the country. On the face of it, there was complete agreement over values, objectives and expectations. But the assumptions of the two sides were radically different...

Let us first consider the Greek Cypriots. The Archbishop expressed the thoughts and feelings of all the groups in the Orthodox community, for all were glad to see the Ottomans go. The more traditional segment, of prelates and landlords, were enjoying prevalence within their own community, but although after the Tanzimat reforms they were formally participating in the various representative bodies, their overall position was still inferior when compared to the Muslim ruling class. The new merchant class and professionals were totally excluded from the political system; at the same time, they were the ones who kept closer contact with the outside world and, especially, with the Greek diaspora and the Greek Kingdom, so they had knowledge of the advances made in the West and shared in the ideas of nation and popular participation which were dominant in the West by that time. The peasants had somewhat improved their lot after the reforms, but they still suffered from heavy taxation, high debts, and the rapacity of Ottoman officials. Overall, everyone felt the island was neglected and underdeveloped, and power was in the hands of their enemies of the faith. Furthermore, increasing numbers, especially among the new elite, wished to see Cyprus become a part of the Greek Kingdom. For, if in the latter, the *Megali Idea* signified expansion and agrandisement, for the Greeks of the periphery, such as the Cypriots, aspiring to union with Greece signified liberation.<sup>13</sup> In this context, the take-over of the island by Britain, considered the most powerful and enlightened of the European powers, and which had furthermore given the Ionians their freedom only a few years back, was a form of liberation – and just a step away from the final stage of *enosis*. Besides, unlike other countries in Asia and Africa the Cypriots felt they were similar to the colonialists – they were no savages but true "Europeans who had fallen into difficult times".<sup>14</sup> Colonization was not seen as a new bondage, but as a temporary apprenticeship for acquiring the skills of democracy and modernity from those who had the appropriate experience.

If we now turn to the British, there were a number of factors which were to render them unwilling or unable to deliver on their promises to fulfill their civilizing mission and, thereby, transform Cyprus through good government and modernizing reforms. First, Cyprus' decreasing strategic value after Egypt's occupation in 1882. Second, under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, the British had accepted to pay an annual



tribute to the Porte – but because the Ottomans were indebted to British stockholders<sup>15</sup> and had defaulted on repayment, this sum was transferred to the latter despite the financial strains it imposed on the Cypriots. For fifty years, until it was abandoned, the tribute kept being a major source of complaint since a large percentage of government revenue (over 50% during the first decade of British rule) was siphoned off, stunting economic development in Cyprus and blocking expenses for implementing the promised and badly needed reforms (such as the construction of roads and dams). Even more problematic were the political reforms the Greek Cypriots were expecting: In the new colonies, political representation was not automatic for the non-British, but was given in proportion to the 'responsibility' and 'loyalty' the colonized demonstrated towards the colonial regime.<sup>16</sup> But here was a serious problem since the Greek Cypriots started pushing for *enosis* with another state right from day one. The British had a recent bitter experience with the Ionian islands, which they had to cede to Greece (1863) after unionist stirrings. One of the reasons they had chosen Cyprus was precisely because its population seemed to be peaceful and unlikely to similarly agitate for *enosis*.<sup>17</sup> What the British forgot was that the passivity of the Cypriots had been partly secured after the execution of its elite back in 1821: Now that they had a new, liberal master, they felt freer to advance their 'national vision'.

To make things worse, the small but significant Muslim community had different objectives and an altogether different culture, which further complicated the issue of political representation. The existence of two diverse ethno-cultural communities on the island, which many British viewed as two races, presented unique problems to the colonial regime. Demetriadou argues<sup>18</sup> that colonial worries with *enosis*, in conjunction with racist attitudes characterizing most British officers and officials, would make them antagonize the emerging ethnic sentiments among the Greek Cypriot elite, despite the fact that the demands of the latter were initially of a moderate and reformist nature. The outcome would be a self-fulfilling prophesy, since the ethnic awareness of the Greek Cypriots would be gradually galvanized into stronger ethno-national identification and a harder stand on *enosis*. Obviously, the two problems fed into each other, escalating the antagonism between colonizers and colonized even further.

Racist and orientalist discourses on the Cypriots became widespread with the British occupation of the island; the new colony became an object of interest and a number of popularizing accounts started appearing, aiming to provide details on the island's

history, geography, inhabitants and other curia. Paying little attention to the self-identifications of the locals (see next section), these accounts exhibited a fascination in speculating on the racial roots of the natives, and on the relative impact of the orient as against the occident on their character and culture. Influenced by the prevalent discourses of the times, as well as the worries of British at the prospect of unionist agitation, most such accounts tended to stress the impurity of the locals' origins and their hybrid nature. One of the earlier popularizing works on Britain's new acquisition, appropriately titled *British Cyprus* (1879), by Hepworth Dixon, provides an interesting example of the attitudes of the new British masters. Dixon devoted a chapter of his work wondering who "the Cypriotes" were. The author was certain that the natives "Except in name [...] are neither Turks nor Greeks" – not even an "amalgam of these two races", for in "neither face nor figure, in neither speech nor genius, has the Cypriote any resemblance to either Turk or Greek". Dixon did in fact clarify that his criteria related to "the race, and not the creed" and, by those criteria, he had found the natives to be on the lower steps of the evolutionary ladder. Hence, for Dixon, *Cypriotes* are:

An indolent, careless, and mimetic people, but without a spark of Turkish fire; without a touch of Grecian taste. With neither beauty of body nor sense of beauty in the mind – with neither personal restlessness nor pride of origin – with neither large aspirations nor practical dexterity of hand, they live on, in a limpid state like creatures of the lower types...<sup>19</sup>

Scott-Stevenson, a female author, married to a British officer, admonished her readers "not to confuse the Cypriotes with the true Hellenes, for in many characteristics the two people are essentially different, almost, indeed, forming a distinct race. The Cypriotes are dull and lazy, they have no ambition, nor the patriotic longings of the Greeks."<sup>20</sup> Similar attitudes and values towards the locals were shared by many British officials. The first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, shared such feelings, which he recorded in his private diary:

I don't like foreigners I am glad to say. I hate their ways and customs but I can forget those [:] Why I really dislike foreigners is on National grounds. If I had ten sons all should be brought up on this feeling [:] The more they hated foreigners, the more they would cling to England as their home.<sup>21</sup>

As regards Cyprus, more specifically, he carried on to complain that he felt powerless, since the terms of the Convention did not allow him to completely transform it into a part of glorious England:

All my visions of making this an entirely English province with English even for the language of the people are rudely dispelled that I can be little better than a Turkish Pasha without the arbitrary power the Turkish law gave him.<sup>22</sup>

From the early days of assuming his post, Wolseley kept worrying of the “danger of an Hellenic propaganda”.<sup>23</sup> He boasted that when the first deputation of Greek Cypriots visited him and requested “to make Greek the official language” he immediately rejected the suggestion.<sup>24</sup> As he confided to Salisbury, he went out of his way to “make much of the Moslems”, demonstrated an interest in the welfare of their mosques and churches, made sure that in all public occasions he gave place of honour to the Turkish Cadi – and, in general, tried to show “clearly to all concerned that Cyprus was not under English rule to become an Hellenic state”.<sup>25</sup> Not only that, but he (unsuccessfully) tried various schemes to promote immigration from Turkey, or from Catholic countries such as Malta, so as to equalize the numbers of Muslims to Christians, or to set the “Latins against the Greeks so as to keep the latter in order”.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, he tried to stop the influx of “Levantine, Ionian or mainland Greeks” into the island, so as not to strengthen Greek numbers.<sup>27</sup> Even where he appeared more ready to make openings to the Greek Cypriots, he made sure that they were still excluded. A good example was that of the police force, which under the Ottomans was the exclusive domain of Muslims: Wolseley opened recruitment to all, but insisted in maintaining the existing uniform, which included a white turban, a symbol of Ottoman rule that no Greek Cypriot wanted to wear, since it would “turn them into Turks”.<sup>28</sup>

Here, then, were the elements foreshadowing how the colonizers would use cultural differences to serve their political purposes: Cypriots were not seen as diverse ethno-cultural communities, comprising one people, but as fragmentary ethnic others, who needed to be manipulated and played against each other, so as not to create problems for their rulers. Not all British, of course, shared Wolseley’s views or attitudes. In fact, the more prominent British officers and politicians would increasingly come to share the locals’ views on their Greek ancestry and identity. Just two years into British rule (1880), William Gladstone, then leader of the Opposition and himself a student of Greek antiquity, concurred that “the bulk of the people of Cyprus are Greeks” and warned that with the “extending emancipation of the East of Europe, Greek sympathies will prevail in the island”, and that improving the locals’ lot would not win their loyalty to Britain but would instead expedite their desire “to be united with the free Greeks of the rest of the world”.<sup>29</sup> In 1907, Winston Churchill, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, affirmed that it was “only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of

Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished" – tempering this with a warning that the Muslim community should not be ignored.<sup>30</sup> Similar statements were made by many others on different occasions; Britain, in fact, offered the island to Greece in 1915, on the condition that she joined the Allies (which Greece was unable to do at the time so the offer was withdrawn), confirming the Greek Cypriots' view that the colonizers themselves recognized the island's "Greekness".<sup>31</sup> During World War II, the British government mobilized the Greek Cypriots with the recruiting slogan "fight for Greece and for your freedom",<sup>32</sup> implying that after the war the Greek Cypriots could expect their union with the "motherland". But these more positive views did not lead to a concrete outcome, managing only to stir Greek Cypriot expectations and subsequent frustration, as well as Turkish Cypriot anxieties, leading to their collusion with the colonizers in order to forestall Greek rule. Both denial and acknowledgement of ethno-cultural differences thus kept fostering ethnic identifications and divergences, widening the gulf separating the two communities. Instead of searching for ways to build an over-arching sense of unity, the British, who themselves had become a large part of the problem, attempted to contribute to its resolution through institutionalizing bi-communalism.

The need for the co-habitation of people with deep cultural differences did not only concern Cyprus, but many of the new British colonies which were considered to be 'plural' in nature. In his classic study of this phenomenon, Furnivall defined a "plural society" as comprising two or more elements or segments which "live side by side yet without mingling, in one political unit"[...] "a medley of peoples [...] for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals, they meet but only in the market-place, in buying and selling [...] living side by side but separately [...] in the society as a whole there is no common social will".<sup>33</sup> Faced with this kind of plurality, colonial theory attempted to solve the problem by combining political representation with the "balancing" role of the official British representatives, who were to have the "casting vote" so as to protect the weaker group(s) – assuming that, thereby, they would also be protecting the interests of the whole population, whose "divisions render[ed] it incapable of protecting its own interests".<sup>34</sup>

Cyprus was, in fact, the colony in which "communal representation [...] was first formalized":<sup>35</sup> Obviously, the British considered it a plural society par excellence. The

decision for communal representation was apparently taken after intense debate among senior officials of the Foreign and Colonial offices. In response to strong worries that the communal approach would divide the two ethnic groups the view prevailed that "history, custom and language" had already done that.<sup>36</sup> In another exchange, the Secretary for the Colonies, Earl of Kimberley, argued that even if the principle of fixing a certain proportion of Christians and Muslims in the representative body could have been accepted for ensuring an adequate representation of both "denominations" (as he assumed the two groups to be), voters should still have been free to vote for any candidate they wished, irrespective of community, subject to the ratio limitation stipulated; otherwise, he feared, there would have been a risk of creating "a wall of demarcation" between the two communities.<sup>37</sup> But, again, these worries were side-stepped.

The British were, thus, ready to grant a progressive measure of political representation to the Cypriots, but they were worried of *enosis* pressures, plus they had to deal with the plural nature of local society. These combined facts and constraints influenced the way they implemented representation. As a first step, the Cypriots were only given a fully appointed Legislative Council, consisting of 3 British official members, plus 3 unofficial members (a Muslim, a foreigner (Latin) and a "Christian"). Soon it became apparent that representation in the Council was "purely ceremonial", since the unofficial members could not propose legislation but simply comment on bills prepared by the government. The Greek Cypriots kept pressuring for change: For members not to be appointed but elected, for proportional instead of equal representation to be used, and for the decisions of the Council to be enforceable.<sup>38</sup> The Muslims objected from the start to the principle of proportional representation, arguing for the equal political representation of the two communities, just like in the last years of Ottoman rule. After several years of pressure, the Legislative Council was "remodelled" in 1882,<sup>39</sup> so that it had 6 official and 12 elected members, 6 of which were to be "non-Muslim" and 3 Muslim.<sup>40</sup> Each community would vote for its own representatives. Obviously, if the Muslims aligned their votes with the 6 official British members, and bearing in mind the chairman's double vote, they would always outbid the "non-Muslim" Greeks. In 1925, membership increased to 24, out of which 12 were Greeks, 3 Muslims and 9 official members, so the problem remained.<sup>41</sup>

Communal representation was, in many ways, a new version of the *millet* system. Did it contribute to the further division of the two communities? Would the liberal,

majoritarian system have been more democratic and/or more successful as many have proposed since?<sup>42</sup> Cross-comparative experience may shed some light on the issue: A British official commission, which studied the five decades experience of Ceylon with communal representation, did indeed conclude that the system was "a cancer on the body politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people, breeding self-interest, suspicion, and animosity, poisoning the new growth of political consciousness and effectively preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit".<sup>43</sup> Thus, communal representation changed in 1931 to majority government. Did this solve the problem? Reviewing developments since, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake concludes the opposite: Since ethno-racial thinking was already entrenched, "an ethnicity- and minority- blind system", with no concession to 'communal' interests, led simply to the dominance of the majority. Thus, in the pursuit of more democracy, an ethnically bi-polar imagination was consolidated which ultimately led post-colonial Sri-Lanka to conflict.<sup>44</sup>

It becomes apparent that once closure is already affected along ethnic lines neither communal representation nor the majoritarian system are trouble-free solutions for achieving peaceful co-habitation under a single political roof. In the case of Cyprus, separate representation in the Council may have been necessary for protecting the Muslim minority. But ignoring Kimberley's suggestion of not separating the voting constituencies certainly did not help, since division was accepted, built upon, and enhanced; a more integrated society would still have some chance, since nationalism at that stage had not yet reached the masses – as we will shortly confirm. A second consideration is how pluralism in the Council was handled: Was the real concern of the British how to protect the Muslim minority, or simply how to use it for its own purposes? If the former, then they could have usefully coached the two communities into learning to share power and to live together – in which case, the British would have been true enlightenment partners, guiding the newly-initiated into deeper democracy (as the locals had actually expected them to). Obviously, this was not the real intention of the colonizers; by the latter's own admission, half a century after the Legislative Council was set up:

The Government could only carry its measures through the Council by playing off the Greek-speaking against the Turkish-speaking elements [...] and from time to time, when a serious deadlock occurred, by resort to an Imperial Order-in-Council.<sup>45</sup>

In the early years of British rule, the representatives of the two communities did at times join forces to further their common interests, especially in connection with pressing economic problems which concerned both communities. Cooperation became increasingly difficult, however, and "broke down around the turn of the century when the Greek members of the Council began to use the body as a forum for enosis demands".<sup>46</sup> From that time onwards the Turkish Cypriots would join forces with the British – except on the Tribute issue.<sup>47</sup> As Governor Storrs, a supposed *Philhellene* was later to admit, this perennial collusion meant that the Greek Cypriots "confronted by the unanimous officials and the three almost mechanical Turkish voters, could not but feel with irritation that they were little better than a debating society". Storrs was one of the most 'enlightened' colonial officers; his view of the Greek Cypriots' identity has reminiscences of Max Weber's famous definition of ethnicity, emphasizing the importance of the subjective dimension: ..."the Greekness of Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentation or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French".<sup>48</sup> Storrs was among the British officials who were critical of communal representation<sup>49</sup> – yet he himself proved unable to treat the locals differently than others: When, in 1931, in the face of a great economic depression and the dire misery of the people, the British tried to impose new taxes, a new Turkish member of the Council sided with the Greek members; Storrs' narration of the event reveals the deeply ingrained attitudes of the colonizers in the face of opposition from their subjects: "the little Turk – 'the Thirteenth Greek' – in whose hands the Liberalism of the 'eighties had placed the casting vote of the Colony, voted with the traditional enemies of his race"; the bill was defeated and Storrs, in standard colonial practice, resorted to an Order-in-Council to enforce it against the wishes of the locals. This, in fact, was one of the main reasons which led to the uprising of 1931, and the end of the Legislative Council itself.

The preceding analysis is not for advancing a crude argument that the divide-and-rule policies of the British were solely to blame for inflaming ethnic passions and for the increasing distance between the two communities. For, as we have seen, the roots of communalism were already strong by the time the British arrived. Thus, allowing or encouraging the locals to take political decisions as individuals, and not as members of a cohesive community, would not, on its own, have produced very different results. A

good example was the Municipal Councils, which operated on different principles to the Legislative Council: Town councilors, who were elected separately through community-based proportional representation, voted thereafter jointly, to determine between themselves the mayor.<sup>50</sup> Unsurprisingly, the main towns, in all of which the Greek Cypriots were the majority (and thus had a majority of councilors), always selected a Greek Cypriot mayor throughout British rule, with only one exception – and that was not because, in that particular case, the councilors decided that a Turkish Cypriot happened to be better for the post, but because, at the time, the Greek Cypriots were so deeply divided between themselves (over the Archbishopric issue), that they failed to collude in order to determine one of their own community as mayor!<sup>51</sup> This, again, goes to demonstrate that once closure has proceeded along ethno-national lines, the liberal, majoritarian mode of politics (giving each individual one vote) cannot ensure that all will have equal chances of election, but instead normally leads to majority dominance. As with the case of the Legislative Council, the Muslims were unhappy with their minority status and kept pressing for a more equal arrangement. Thus, in 1907, they proposed a system whereby mayors would change by rotation, according to ethnicity.<sup>52</sup> In 1926, the Nicosia Muslim councilors requested for one of their own to be elected vice-mayor.<sup>53</sup> In neither case was change forthcoming. Yet it must be noted that, despite the prevalence of a communal *millet*-mentality, the overall collaboration between the two communities as regards municipal affairs was quite amicable: The Muslims to a large extent resigned themselves to the hegemony of the Christians. It was only towards the end of colonial rule, when the nationalism of the Turkish Cypriots had grown, and especially after the outbreak of the anti-colonial struggle in 1955 brought tensions to a climax, that they were to seek in more dynamic ways to restore their equality – through pushing for separation.<sup>54</sup>

Besides institutionalizing communal political representation, the British were quite ambivalent in the way they handled other *millet* institutions and practices, the end result leading to the further embedding of communalism. Perhaps the best example is how they dealt with the Orthodox Church. Expectedly, the secularly minded British imported to Cyprus the idea of separation of church and state. Early on, they tried to limit the power of the local Church by stripping it of many of its traditional rights and, thereby, eroding the bases of its authority; indeed, this “set the stage for the emergence of an intense anti-British campaign,” led by the Church.<sup>55</sup> Primarily, the British antagonized the Church through their unwillingness to recognize the Archbishop as *ethnarch*, that is, as leader and political representative of the Greek Orthodox.<sup>56</sup> As



we have seen, the British set up political bodies, such as the Legislative Council, to carry out the function of political representation. Yet the Church would not give up her prerogatives so easily and the Archbishop and Bishops clung on to membership of the Central and District Committees, respectively, even though many of the powers of these bodies shifted to the Legislative Council. Furthermore, since the law allowed the clergy eligibility to stand for election, a number of prominent prelates did successfully take the challenge and thereby managed to maintain an important political role "by becoming leading figures" of the Legislative Council.<sup>57</sup>

A second area of tension arose out of the British refusal to provide the Bishops with policemen to help them in the collection of their customary dues, which included canonical and liturgical fees – as was the practice under Ottoman times. The Church complained that, as a result, many individuals simply refused to pay, reducing her revenues to less than a third,<sup>58</sup> thereby hampering her educational and charitable work, for which it was blamed by the public. Thirdly, ecclesiastical land property, which was hitherto exempt from taxation, was now treated like any other private immovable property. Fourthly, the Church lost the assistance of the civil authorities in enforcing the sentences passed by the ecclesiastical courts on individuals violating canon laws (such as adultery, or the cohabitation of couples within the prohibited degrees of kinship).<sup>59</sup> The Church did, however, continue to have other means of controlling the faithful, such as withholding sacraments. Besides, the real issue was that personal law remained the domain of the communities which, in the case of the Greek Cypriots, meant it continued to be the responsibility of the Church, thereby maintaining the latter's hold on the people. Overall, it seems true that the coming of the British undermined the status and position of the prelates, since officially the Church lost some of the privileges it had enjoyed in the past, thereby losing in wealth and status. But the Church did maintain some privileges and it quickly found new roles and responsibilities which helped it survive and maintain its hegemonic position in colonial Cyprus: "...The ethnarchic tradition, the clergy's control of the education system and the strength of religious sentiment amongst the population made the Bishops natural rallying points against the abuses of colonial rule".<sup>60</sup>

The Church's control of education was especially important. We have seen that the Church established and maintained most schools in Ottoman years. The teachers in these early schools were mostly priests. During the British period, more and more schools were built and, gradually, laymen took over the teaching posts. But for nearly

fifty years into British rule, control of the schools remained in the hands of the District Committees, which were chaired by the Bishops, while the Church kept financing the schools to the extent possible. As we will see in the next section, the curriculum of the schools sought to inculcate national values and oriented the students towards *enosis*. The British government initially maintained a very liberal attitude, throughout the first fifty years, (wrongly) considering the Cypriot schools as similar to the denominational schools in England, but also because it did not wish to assume full financial responsibility for the educational system. Thus, it officially sanctioned the existence of two separate education boards and a "dual school system", so that each community catered for its own needs and had effective control of the community's education.<sup>61</sup> But the role of the schools in promoting nationalist ideas and the gradual escalation of nationalism caused it to change its mind, so, in 1929, it took control over the appointment and payment of teachers and, in 1933, it proceeded to take control of the curriculum as well. These changes belatedly introduced aimed to stop the two communities from looking towards their mother countries. A student of colonial education in Cyprus proposes that the British were aiming at the "integration" of the two communities and their "assimilation" into a new whole:

The new curriculum was intended to make all [Greek and Turkish Cypriot students] think of themselves as a separate nation, the Cypriot nation.<sup>62</sup>

This may be overstating the point, but the British did certainly aim at the creation of a new sense of Cypriotness. In elementary schools, for instance, radical changes were introduced affecting the content and teaching approach to most subjects, but especially History and Geography, the aim being for these subjects to focus on Cyprus and not the mother-countries, as before. Textbooks had to be written locally (and not imported from Greece or Turkey), so as to comply with the new emphasis. At the secondary level, the creation of English schools would be encouraged. And so on. But the obvious motive was not the good of the two communities and of the people of Cyprus – the development of a genuine sense of commonality between the two communities, aiming at peaceful co-existence and, ultimately, to a future bi-national, self-governing state. The new policy rather aimed at how to foster loyalty to colonialism, and get the locals to appreciate "the place of Cyprus as a part of the British Empire".<sup>63</sup> It was Anglicization under the guise of Cypriotization.

The attempted changes were not confined to education: They were part of a wider policy aimed to curb the growing nationalist movement. Georgallides cites a minute of

1928 by Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Governor Storrs, suggesting the fostering of "Cypriot patriotism" as an alternative to *enosis*.<sup>64</sup> The Greek Cypriots were basing their irredentist demands on their Greek culture and identity; they used the mounting archaeological and folkloric evidence, documenting the island's Greek cultural roots as weapons in their political struggles;<sup>65</sup> British Philhellenes had repeatedly expressed sympathy with their cause. Therefore, colonial authorities could not easily resort to Orientalist arguments (linking the locals to the East, rather than to Greece or to the West) in justifying the perpetuation of their rule. Caught between the problematic Hellenic and Orientalist alternatives, the British had to invent a *suis generis* Cypriot identity as the way out. Current needs, at the time, were therefore to determine ancient realities: Storr's re-edited 'Handbook of Cyprus' de-emphasized the Hellenic aspects of Cyprus' history.<sup>66</sup> In the field of archaeology, the "Eteocypriots", supposedly the island's first inhabitants, before the coming of the Greeks, were soon to be invented.<sup>67</sup> In historiography, G. Hill would use a single line from Aeschylus' *Suppliants (Iketides)*, to argue against the "pure" Greekness of the Cypriots.<sup>68</sup> New stamps issued, combined symbols from the Christian, Muslim and Lusignan past.<sup>69</sup> Even the Governor's palace was decorated using mixed motifs from the island's history – not out of a desire of celebrating Cyprus' multi-cultural past, but with the intention of giving the locals from both communities pride in a past "wholly unconnected with present or future aspirations" – save, of course, the reality of colonial rule, which was the invisible promoter of this neutral Cypriot culture and identity.<sup>70</sup>

The policy failed dismally in all its objectives. The Cypriots understood it as a ploy of the British to serve their own political purposes. The Church campaigned against the proposed changes, arguing that they were an attempt to "de-Hellenize" the Greeks; this was actually one of the main rallying cries it used to arouse the Greek Cypriots to resist the government, and it was a precursor to the 1955 armed struggle. What is unfortunate is not that colonial plans were frustrated. It is rather that the potential of steering a new course, starting with education, which could have contributed towards the fostering of a new over-arching identity, was lost. And the idea would be further reinforced that feeling Cypriot was the opposite of feeling Greek – that the two could not co-exist, so that the construction of a unifying sense of Cypriotness amounted to de-Hellenization and treachery.<sup>71</sup>

### ***From national awareness to nationalist movement***

At the time the British came to Cyprus, there was no developed national movement, and we can only talk of the existence of an ethno-national awareness among the Greek Cypriot elite. It was only in the mid-1850s that the first scholarly work putting Cyprus in the context of its historical and cultural links with Greece appeared.<sup>72</sup> The author, Athanasios Sakkelarios, was a Greek mainland philologist, who spent time as the headmaster of a Greek high school in Larnaca, and collected materials on the geography, history, language and lore of the island; the massive outcome, *Cypriot Matters*, extended the tradition of nineteenth century Greek historiography and folklorism to Cyprus.<sup>73</sup> Gradually, other Greeks and Cypriots would build on Sakkelarios' work. Georgios Loukas, one of his pupils, was the first Cypriot folklore researcher. In the introduction of his *Philological Visits to the Monuments of the Ancients in the Life of the Modern Cypriots* (1874), Loukas presents his readers with a philological vision he had: Two of the "blessed Teachers of the modern Greeks", Koraes and Mavrophrydes, appeared before him dragging along the "German heretic", doubter of the Greeks' purity of origin, Fallmerayer. The "Teachers" asked the "heretic" to consider the life and culture of the Cypriots, the furthest outpost of the Greek world, and determine for himself that they still maintained the purest customs and most Hellenic life-style, much like their ancient forefathers. Fallmerayer was shamed once he attested to the truth of the matter; furthermore, the evidence did not only make the case for Cyprus' continuity with Greek antiquity but, much like the missing link, added strength to the argument of the continuity of Greece itself. "Yes! the Hellas of Perikles unaltered lives on!",<sup>74</sup> exclaimed Loukas – the proof had been conclusively given that the nation had survived through the ages, and only needed to be rediscovered.<sup>75</sup>

Two years after Loukas' publication, in July 1876, the national vision was still not shared by many, to the extent that H. Vassiliades, the vice-consul of Greece in Cyprus, lamented that:

The spirit of Hellenism in some places is asleep and in others is totally non-existent, owing perhaps to the continuous pressure exerted by the Ottomans.<sup>76</sup>

Indeed, the Ottoman regime must have been the paramount reason why national consciousness seemed asleep or totally lacking, for only three years later, and only one year into British rule (in February 1879), the same Greek vice-consul was to report a miraculous re-awakening:

The spirit of the Cypriots has risen to an unbelievable degree. Four years ago the inhabitants of the island, particularly in the hinterland, refrained from calling themselves Greek, fearing the wrath of the Asian despots. Today, however, they boldly declare themselves Greek and refer to Greece as their dearest motherland.<sup>77</sup>

The change-over described seems so swift that one may indeed liken it to a sudden awakening from age-long slumber. Would a modernist explanation still be possible, offering an alternative reading of this unexpected surge of national feeling? Kitromilides<sup>78</sup> answers in the affirmative, and proposes that such an alternative explanation would need to stress the interplay of two factors: First, the "Hellenic ethnological character" of Cypriot society, as reflected in its language, archaic culture, ancient myths, memories and traditions, which provided the "demographic and cultural substratum" for the implantation and subsequent growth of Greek nationalism. Second, the nineteenth century process of exporting nationalist ideas from the Greek national centre (the Greek Kingdom) to the "Eastern periphery of Hellenism", in the context of the propagation of the political programme of the *Megali Idea*. Building and elaborating upon Kitromilides' "model of the penetration and development of Greek nationalism"<sup>79</sup> in the "Greek East", we may stipulate that the appearance of an "awakening", hid from view a much more complicated process of nation construction, entailing a complex set of elements – which we turn to consider.

Firstly, we should recall that Greek Cypriots maintained close links with the wider Greek Orthodox world, and were active participants in the processes of change in the Greek *paroikies* and the newly created Greek Kingdom. It would, thus, be wrong to portray the penetration and development of nationalism as simply an "export" from the Greek nation-state to the periphery – since the Cypriots themselves (through a small section of their elite) were participants in the production of the national vision. Having underlined this point, we may concur that the newly created Greek state did play an important role in the promotion of nationalist ideas, both directly and indirectly, through the educational network, the consulates, the cultural associations, and the press. Greek education initially focused on the spread of the Greek language among the younger, a task which was aided by the fact that Greek was already taught as part of the more narrowly focused ecclesiastical education, traditionally offered by the Orthodox Church. A first emphasis was on the "linguistic homogenization of the Christian Orthodox populations of the East", in the face of the existing linguistic variations – which were considered "symptoms of cultural and ethnic degeneration".

Language would thus supplement religion and, eventually, even surpass it as the major bond of nationality. A separate element was the promotion of the ideology of national unity of all *Hellenes*, aiming at the legitimation of the role of the Greek state as coordinator of the liberation project of all unredeemed Greeks (the idea of the "national centre" of Hellenism). This vision was transmitted via Greek History classes and/or through the latent curriculum of national celebrations and other cultural activities.

The basic instrument for translating these policy objectives into educational outputs, material and human, was the Athens National University. The state university was founded in 1837 and an important part of its vision was the spread of Hellenism Eastwards; this it achieved through training young people from the *irredenta*, or through sending Greek mainland teachers and textbooks to wherever these were needed. Schools in the Greek East had to comply with the standards and specifications set by Athens, both in order to keep up with developments in the mainland, but also because school graduates could enter the National University only if the nationally agreed curriculum was taught. The work of the university was assisted by independent cultural and educational organizations, such as the Athens based 'Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters' and the 'Greek Literary Association of Constantinople'.<sup>80</sup> Local cultural associations were also vital in this project, usually set up by young teachers or other *logioi*.

The work of Athens was supplemented with inputs from the other centers of Hellenism and the *paroikies* – such as Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, Venice, Trieste – which, besides "commercial commodities exported cultural commodities", such as books and newspapers, thus "reinforcing the dialectic of nationalism".<sup>81</sup> In Cyprus, the project of educational convergence became easier after the improvement of socio-economic conditions and the setting up of regular postal and commercial connections with Athens, Smyrna, Constantinople and Alexandria, in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>82</sup>

A characteristic letter of thanks, sent by the Nicosia Town Committee, to the Ministry of Church Matters and Public Education of Greece (February 1862), sums up the national values and relationships built through education:

Greece being considered by us the cradle of enlightenment, from which the whole Greek race in Eastern lands awaits progress and advancement, it is fair to receive from us the due payment of gratitude. Because it does not only freely offer us teaching books but in its various educational institutions teachers are educated, competent to be used as instruments for the dissemination of Greek *paedeia* [education] and Christian training without which it would be impossible for the whole nation to advance itself.

It is important to note how quickly the number of schools kept increasing: While, in 1839, there were only 10 Greek schools, by the end of Ottoman rule, in 1878, the number had grown to 76; within a decade into British rule, the number more than tripled – and so did the number of students. Considering the crucial role of education in propagating the new ideas of nation, we may take the growth in literacy as an index of the spread of nationalism.<sup>83</sup> A comparison with the respective numbers of Muslim schools and students brings out the point more clearly.<sup>84</sup>

Year	Christian Schools		Muslim Schools	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
1878-9	76	-	64	-
1879-0	-	3100	-	-
1880-1	-	3145	-	1421
1882-3	162	-	76	-
1885-6	210	9480	77	2424
1890-1	241	10944	103	3594

Table 4.1: Growth in number of schools and students, in early colonial years

The Greek consuls were active catalysts in the development of local education and in linking together the various relevant actors: In Cyprus, the last consul under the Ottomans and first under the British (E. Vassiliades, 1876–1880), for instance, established three schools during his time of service, and elicited the help of the 'Society for the Advancement of Greek Letters', in sending teaching textbooks for the island's schools.<sup>85</sup>

The help of the *paroikies* was equally important. The Cypriot Fraternity of Egypt had been financially supporting four elementary schools, when, in 1889, it decided to help with the establishment of the first Greek secondary school (*Gymnasion*) in Nicosia. The request and pressures went to the Archbishop as the one in charge of educational matters. Once the relevant decision was taken at a special meeting of the Nicosia School Committee (1893), the Fraternity carried on with pressure to impose the

"classical" form of Gymnasium (which more clearly fostered national ideals, rather than alternative models) and, subsequently, requested its recognition by the Greek Government.<sup>86</sup> The Fraternity actively promoted national ideas in various ways. When the British first came to Cyprus, written requests were sent by the Fraternity to the Archbishop, urging him to do away with the "humble and servile spirit" which characterized his stance during Ottoman rule and to "recover the grandeur and eminence" fit for his position, now that the "more civilized" British were coming; it furthermore, advocated a welcoming stance, representing not just the Greek Cypriot community (*the Orthodox millet*) as in Ottoman times, but the "entire Island" or the "Fatherland" – in other words, the Archbishop was exhorted to act as a modern leader, representing the whole Cypriot people.<sup>87</sup> High Commissioner Wolseley had accused the Fraternity of aiming at "the spread of disaffection amongst the people of Cyprus and the general propagation of Hellenism throughout the Levant".<sup>88</sup>

The first printing press was imported to Cyprus in 1878, after the financial help of the Cypriot community in Egypt. The man who coordinated the effort and published the first newspaper in Cyprus (1878) was Theodoulos Constantinides, who had spent several years in Egypt, teaching in Greek schools.<sup>89</sup> Printing had a difficult start and, out of the 8 newspapers that circulated in the first decade, only 5 survived till the end of the 1880s, but in the last decade of the nineteenth century, another 8 newspapers appeared, bringing the total number to 13, and by 1914 there were 23 titles!<sup>90</sup> The circulation increased as the rate of literacy improved, and as the standard of living made newspapers accessible to a wider audience. Most newspapers maintained a critical attitude towards the colonial government and canvassed strongly for *enosis*.

As already mentioned, before the local press made its presence in Cyprus, newspapers were imported from other Greek centers, predominantly Athens. This continued to be the case even after local newspapers were available – in fact, the latter often drew news and others stories from Greek newspapers and, in this way, Greek Cypriots kept in touch with developments in the motherland, sharing in the joys of national victories and the sorrows of national defeats. Similarly, a number of Cypriots were subscribers to periodicals published in the Greek speaking lands, some sent literary contributions to such periodicals (mainly to Athens, but also to Alexandria, Constantinople and Smyrna), and others were themselves publishers of various literary publications in these lands.<sup>91</sup>



At the same time, many, mostly upper class, Cypriots kept visiting Greece, some for university studies, others for business, and yet others as pilgrims – to pay homage to the hellenic sacred land, so as to have first hand experience of free Greece, and to view with pride the ancient relics and the Parthenon (symbols of Greece's diachronic pre-eminence and universal recognition). Some Cypriots would even become permanent residents of Greece and, from there, represent and promote Cyprus' best interests with the Greek politicians and the wider public, making sure that their "private *patris*" (*idiaitera patrida*) was always "counted in" as an integral part of the imagined community of Hellenism and as a candidate for redemption, to be added to the expanding free Kingdom.<sup>92</sup>

Similarly, many Greeks would come to Cyprus as visitors or to stay. In fact, a number of the most prominent nationalists of early British rule were Greeks from the mainland: Mention has already been made of Sakkelarios, Zannetos and Katalanos: Sakkelarios was a prominent philologist who taught in Cyprus and wrote on Cyprus' Greek history and culture; Zannetos practiced medicine in Larnaca, wrote the first modern History of Cyprus using the perspective of diachronic national unity, and had a very active political career (serving as mayor, member of the Legislative Council, and head of a number of cultural associations); Katalanos worked as a teacher and journalist and became known as a stirrer of nationalist passions.

Greeks were especially dominant in the teaching profession. The case of the Pancyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia, the oldest and largest on the island, demonstrates the point well: Between the foundation year of the school and Independence (1893-1960), 14 principals were to serve, out of whom 12 came from Greece. During the same period, there was a total of 428 teachers, out of whom 151 (35,3%) were from Greece. Out of a total 133 Greek Language and Literature teachers (*Philologoi*), 87 (65,4%) came from Greece. Most of these Greeks came from the mainland, although some came from other areas with a large Greek presence – such as Constantinople.<sup>93</sup> It is significant that the University of Athens and various cultural associations, or sometimes the Greek Ministry of Education, would assist in the selection of the "appropriate" candidates, especially of the principals<sup>94</sup> – the main criteria (besides competency) being their dedication to national ideas.

Beside the direct influence of the *manifest* educational curriculum in fostering a sense of identification with *Hellenism* and the Greek state, of equal importance was the *latent*

curriculum: This included the various national celebrations, such as the "25<sup>th</sup> of March", symbolizing the launching of the victorious 1821 Greek Independence struggle; on these occasions the principal, and other teachers and honorary guests, would give commemorative speeches, while students would engage in a program comprising patriotic poems, and national hymns and dances; the climax of the celebrations were usually parades in the main streets of the town, in which the Greek flag would lead, the flag holders usually dressed in Greek national costumes.<sup>95</sup> Another component of the latent curriculum was the staging of ancient Greek dramas or more modern Greek productions with "patriotic messages". Other aspects included the drawing of heroes of the Greek Revolution in art classes and the pinning of such pictures on class walls, along with the pictures of the Greek King or of other members of the Greek royal family.<sup>96</sup> The neoclassic architecture of many schools, the names and emblems chosen (usually of ancient Greek gods or philosophers) for the schools, and other such features, all reinforced the perceived bonds with ancient Greece and the modern Greek state.

The occasions for strengthening the emergent national identities were not confined to education and the young. National celebrations, parades and other collective commemorations, involved the whole community. Theatre productions, which were gradually gaining in importance, were to become a main means of fostering national emotions and awareness. Katsouris<sup>97</sup> documents the impressive growth of theatre productions in Cyprus during British rule – before the introduction of the cinema (which brought a flood of Greek produced films) and television, towards the middle and end of this period, respectively, which were to gradually offer alternative modes of entertainment for the masses: What is striking is the extent of visits by Greek theatrical companies, but also the number of local productions involving patriotic themes or ancient Greek plays.

Similar occasions were afforded by the various athletic contests. A good illustration is provided by the Pancyprian athletic competitions at the turn of the century (1900), in Lamaca: The event started with the prelates' blessings with holy water (*ayiasmos*), and the athletes' kissing of the holy cross. The chairman of the hosting athletic club, who happened to be Ph. Zannettos from mainland Greece, gave the main address. Linking the occasion to the ancient Greeks' emphasis of training both body and mind, he stressed that the memory of those days of "national glory" constituted the basis for "today's national cohesion", which was vitally necessary for sparking current national

praxis; much like Hercules, contemporary Greeks were called on to overcome their many problems so as to achieve pan-hellenic unity and recommence the unfinished work of their glorious ancestors, for the benefit of mankind. The speech was followed by the national anthem sung, by the students, and by the salute to the slowly ascending Greek flag, while 21 mortar shots were fired, accompanied by the crowds' cheers for *enosis*. The local Bishop then declared the start of the contest "In the name of God and of Hellenism"! Next, the athletes paraded round the stadium, with the Greek flag leading the procession; the winners of the contents received the wreath, much like the ancient Greeks after their own contests.<sup>98</sup> The blending of national and religious symbolism obviously created a unique mystical atmosphere, which bonded closely all those present with those near and far, in Cyprus or in other Greek lands, those alive with the ancient Hellenes, the living faithful with Orthodox saints – surely a most potent mix.

Yet again, the involvement of the Orthodox Church with nationalism should not lead us to the assumption that the Church was always the carrier of this new ideology. We have seen how ambivalent its stand was under the Ottomans. During the first decades of British rule, the representatives of the Church did give vent to national ideas, but they were quite moderate initially – as most lay notables were too. It was with the passage of time and the escalating antagonism with the British and the unfolding of the nationalizing processes described, that the Church and a section of the Orthodox elite started hardening their positions. The initially milder nationalism of the Church may explain the more moderate stand of the masses of peasants, for their views were obviously not the outcome of the educational system, but of their close attachment to the churches and its rituals. It is no wonder that in the first rally of the 1890s, expressing the Greek Cypriots' disappointment with a statement in the British House of Commons (that in case Britain left Cyprus it would revert back to Turkey), the largest segment of those protesting were the young, those in their late teens, who had only recently completed elementary school. But as time went on, the impact of education was to become more visible.

Another group affected by education was the children of the upper classes, who could carry on beyond the primary schooling of the masses – to the secondary level, and sometimes to university. For the latter, they ended up mainly in Greece, swelling the ranks of the professionals – lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists – who returned to Cyprus imbued with the spirit of irredentist nationalism prevalent on the mainland.

An important factor in nation-building in the West, as many studies have shown, was war. The Cypriots, as an enslaved people as of long, did not have their own army. We have seen how, at the time of the Tanzimat reforms, they had refused to join the Ottoman army, since they did not feel a part of the Ottoman state. We have also seen that many Greek Cypriots fought in the Greek War of Independence. This readiness to contribute to the war efforts of the Greeks continued under the British. In 1880, when Greek army officers<sup>99</sup> came to buy Cypriot mules, to use in the prospective war with Turkey, there was a great rush of the locals to organize collections and many donated their own animals (the only means for their livelihood) for free.<sup>100</sup> In 1896, during the Cretan revolt against Ottoman rule, collections were again organized, housing was offered to refugees, and 75 young recruits set off for Crete to help the national cause.<sup>101</sup> Only a year afterwards, in 1897, the Greco-Turkish war raised a patriotic fever and approximately 1,000 volunteers enlisted – as testimony to the gathering momentum of the forces of nationalism.<sup>102</sup>

Inevitably, such occasions increased tensions between the two larger communities on the island, although no major incidents were noted. But this explains the concerns of the Muslim community who, in an 1882 memorandum to Kimberley, expressed their worries at the mounting agitation “by Greeks around the world” aiming to “restore Greece in its previous powers” or dimensions. They charged more specifically their “Greek co-citizens” as lacking in moderation, and stressed their objection to the introduction of the principle of proportional representation in the political sphere, as requested by the Greek Cypriots; for:

No community anywhere on earth can enjoy safety of life, property, or honour under the rule of the Greeks who are arrogant in relation to the glorious achievements of their ancestors, unless there is equal representation in the administrative affairs of the country; this would especially apply as regards the Muslims, who are naturally the object of the Greeks’ revenge.<sup>103</sup>

The last and, perhaps, most important factor in the hardening of the nationalist positions of the Greek Cypriots, was the intra-communal contest for hegemony. We have seen how when the British came to Cyprus the elite was broadly divided into a loosely defined traditional class, mostly comprised of conservative landowners, and the more modern and pro-nationalist merchant class. By the end of the nineteenth century, the latter were joined by an emerging manufacturing segment, plus the growing group of university educated professionals, who were becoming the most influential section on the basis of the cultural capital they acquired. When the

Archbishop died in 1900, the post was contested by the Bishops of Kition and of Kyrenia. The nationalists rallied mostly around the first, while the traditionalists rallied around the second, so that the Greek Orthodox community was divided between the two camps.<sup>104</sup> The ten-year long ferocious contest which followed, "inaugurated the era of mass politics" on the island.<sup>105</sup> Since elections for the Legislative Council were limited to the districts, and there were limitations as to eligibility (such as a certain level of wealth), the Archbishopric elections became the first island-wide political contest.<sup>106</sup> The outcome was the clear victory of the nationalists, who would henceforth gain hegemony over the Greek Orthodox community. But, from another point of view, as Sia Anagnostopoulou underlines, the real winner was the Church: First, through managing to give expression to both antagonistic camps, it prevented the formation of a sphere of politics autonomous from the Church; second, once the more modernizing nationalists won, the whole Church as an institution identified with their positions, thus re-establishing itself as the main exponent of the new hegemonic views – and leaving little role for the lay politicians: In effect, the Church had thereby managed to re-affirm its *ethnarchic* role.

### ***Changing economy and class formations***

When the British took over Cyprus from the Ottomans, the socio-economic transformations which the new regime set in motion started changing the configuration of local socio-political forces. In the early part of British rule, investment in new forms of economic production was very limited, due to a variety of reasons: The colonial rulers did not undertake substantial infrastructural investments, since they considered Cyprus a temporary acquisition; not only that, but a large amount of the limited public funds raised locally, had to go towards the Tribute. Furthermore, the surplus extracted from agriculture and trade, by moneylenders and merchants, was not invested in industry – but in land, urban property, trade, and usury, where it yielded higher returns (this led to the growth of merchant capital and the associated financial services, at the expense of industrial capital).<sup>107</sup>

Gradually, however, progress was achieved as a consequence of the very nature and the activities of the colonial state. For one, the colonial government sought firm, central political control over the whole territory, eliminating challenges to its power coming from areas distant from the centre – thereby, gradually consolidating a single

economic space.<sup>108</sup> Its concern with the enforcement of law and order fostered a more secure environment, within which relations of trust could develop: This applied to all aspects of life, from the elimination of banditry in the countryside, to the greater predictability in business dealings, enabling entrepreneurs to take risks and to expand their economic activities.<sup>109</sup> Internal local boundaries to economic activity were overcome through extensive road construction – by the early 1900s, all main towns were connected by roads.<sup>110</sup> Harbours were reconstructed so as to allow the expansion of trade and commerce with other countries.<sup>111</sup> Although manufacturing initially declined, due to foreign (mostly British) competition, it was subsequently given a boost, with the development of some light industries.<sup>112</sup> The educational system kept expanding continuously, leading to an enormous growth in adult literacy.<sup>113</sup> Significantly, whereas the population remained more or less the same (approx 180.000) throughout the 300-year Ottoman rule, within the first two decades of British rule, it rose by more than 25 percent (and within the first fifty years it nearly doubled)!<sup>114</sup> These changes were accompanied by alterations in the class structure, especially as regards the constitution of the middle classes, in which, as we have seen, came to predominate the trading and manufacturing bourgeoisie, augmented by the members of the new professions (doctors, lawyers, teachers). But how were the lower classes affected?

The British had found an economy which depended almost exclusively on agriculture. In contrast to Britain, which, after the enclosure movement, was virtually a country without a peasantry, Cyprus was a land of peasants, or more precisely, a "*sea of smallholders*", since there was an overwhelming prevalence of small family ownerships.<sup>115</sup> For most of the Ottoman period, peasants enjoyed rights of occupancy, but not ownership, of the land. The Tanzimat reforms "acknowledged and confirmed a process similar to that experienced in Western Europe two centuries earlier", through which land became private property.<sup>116</sup> Peasant ownership, and the consolidation of a small-holders class (along with the deeply rooted religious feelings), may in fact account for the shift from peasant radical protest, to the social conservatism that increasingly came to characterise Cyprus' countryside from this period onwards.<sup>117</sup> But although land ownership was a blessing for the peasants, it carried a potential curse, since the other side to ownership was the possibility of alienation and dispossession of their land. Indeed, the gradual shift from self-subsistence to a market economy, encouraged by the reforms, made it increasingly necessary for the rural population to seek cash money for their various needs. To secure this, most villagers resorted

regularly to richer co-villagers, or to town merchants, for loans, pledging their land in return. The latter often utilised the opportunity to extol high rates of return and cheat the peasants in as many ways as possible; in consequence, the peasants often ended up in debt, and sometimes in bankruptcy.

Yet despite perennial indebtedness and failure to serve their debts, there was, in practice, little dispossession at this stage. There were several reasons for this, mainly relating to the Ottoman state's lingering pre-capitalist rationale and mode of operation, but also with its "built-in" concern to protect the peasant small-holders, who constituted the backbone of the economy. Despite institutional reforms, conversion of state to privately owned land proved to be quite a slow process. For one, the state itself continued to assess property tax on whole villages, rather than on individual holders of plots, betraying its own unwillingness to accept the implications of the privatisation it had instituted.<sup>118</sup> Similar inconsistencies prevailed as regards taking debtors to court: Pre-existing social norms viewed the inability to repay a debt as a moral failing, and, thus, respective laws punished this "immorality" by imprisonment. Hence, the increasing resort to borrowing and the subsequent failure of repayment did not lead to increasing alienation of properties, but on increased numbers of imprisonments! This explains why when the British arrived to the island, they found the prisons full of indebted peasants, but only a very small extent of "absolute destitution".<sup>119</sup>

British rule was soon to change these realities, completing the process of land privatisation started by the Tanzimat reforms. One of their early fiscal reforms (in the mid-1880s) entailed the abolition of the communally assessed property tax, in favour of a new system of individual assessment. Furthermore, new laws regarding credit shifted emphasis from the imprisonment of faltering debtors, to confiscations of their movable and immovable property. These measures, along with British efficiency in collecting taxes and in executing justice, plus the peasants' ordinary practices (for example, borrowing in order to finance next year's production), and nature's extraordinary calamities (draughts, locusts, crop diseases) that befell the country in the first decades of British rule, led to massive forced sales of land and property, at very low prices, and thereby to the first waves of total destitution.<sup>120</sup> These developments were accompanied by a "profound crisis" of Cypriot society, marked by wide increases in inequality between rich and poor, widespread demoralisation, and the consequent effects of alcoholism, prostitution and mass pauperisation.<sup>121</sup>

Declining respect for the new regime, which instituted the changes, but could not control the consequences, of free market forces, led to widespread "disorderly conduct", deviance and crime.<sup>122</sup> In many ways, disrespect extended towards the local elite, since many of its members were often money-lenders, taking advantage of developments. Though part of the problem themselves, members of this elite, along with the Church, attempted to address the increasing poverty and accompanying lawlessness of the new poor, by setting up charitable brotherhoods which provided free medical and other welfare services to the needy.<sup>123</sup> Often, these voluntary organisations aimed at the "moral re-education" of the new poor, by offering free teaching in basic literacy skills but also in moral and ethical principles, aiming at taming their insubordinate passions and spirit, which constituted a threat to the prevailing social order.<sup>124</sup> What is important for our thesis is that, since the colonial state with its laissez faire policy was not ready to assist the needy, welfare provisions were taken care of on a communal basis – thus, further reinforcing trends for cohesion on a communal basis and the Church's role as the quasi-state of Greek Cypriots.

As the government proved unable or unwilling to deal with the problems of usury and heavy taxation, ill-feeling kept mounting among the peasants and the lower classes more generally. The bourgeoisie (and, more specifically, the rising merchant-professional class) tried to galvanise such feelings into more coherent anti-government attitudes through the nationalist ideology.<sup>125</sup> Since the traditional elite were more moderate in their attitude towards the British, their authority within the Christian community kept dwindling. The rift between the old and new wings of the elite climaxed with the battle over the election of the Archbishop, during which the mass of the people supported the hard nationalists.<sup>126</sup>

In the next decade or two, the original opposition between traditionalists and nationalists was recast as an ongoing opposition between two versions of nationalism. Broadly speaking, the soft-liners [*diallaktiko*] adhered to the view that, while supporting union with Greece, as the ultimate goal, Greek Cypriots should aim at achieving more constitutional and political freedoms, along with improvements in socio-economic conditions. The hard-liners [*adiallaktoi*, or *ethnikoi*] believed that *enosis* should be the only aim so as not to detract Cypriots from this paramount national duty. What united the nationalist elite was their common exploitation of the peasants.<sup>127</sup> Client-patron relationships, established between merchant-brokers and the peasants, were one more mechanism for the penetration of the nationalist ideology



from the cities to the countryside: "Generally people simply voted for whomever the broker they dealt with told them to vote for [...]. Through a series of individual vertical coalitions [...] the brokerage system provided the urban and rural merchant class with an extremely tight control over the peasant producer".<sup>128</sup>

Yet, by the early 1920s, nationalist politicians of all shades had reached an impasse, since their policies failed to win any significant concessions from the British – be it in matters of economic development, of more substantial political representation, or of acceptance of the idea of *enosis*. In 1921, Greek Cypriot politicians resigned from the Legislative Council and, in the next elections (1922), they supported abstention as a declaration of protest.<sup>129</sup> In the very same year (1922), Hellenism was to experience the unprecedented shock of the Minor-Asia debacle [*Mikrasiatiki Katastrophi*]. This dealt a death blow to the "Great Idea" [*Megali Idea*] of a 'Greater Greece, spanning two continents and five seas'; naturally, it also amounted to a severe blow to the nationalist aspirations of the Greek Cypriot elite.

This was the social, economic and political context within which the first socialist ideas were to emerge, with the dawn of the twentieth century. Before proceeding with the historical analysis, it is important to consider some of the implications of the structural context outlined, for Cypriot politics. A first issue to note, relates to the fluidity of the class boundaries between the different sections of the elite in this formative period, of early British rule. It should not be forgotten that Cyprus never had a native aristocratic class. Its elite was decimated in 1821 and the small traditional landowner class, plus the even smaller but more modern merchant class which emerged prior to British rule, were not well entrenched. Indeed the division between 'traditional' and 'new' wings among the elite under Colonial rule was not a hard and fast one: Landowners would enter trade and commerce (if they did not, their children would); merchants would invest in land; and all would engage in lending and usury. Realising the increasing value of cultural capital, they would all educate their children, most of which would enter the professions, or business – or both! This means that there were no solid, long-term interests or cleavages over which political formations could aggregate.<sup>130</sup> The fuzzy nature of class boundaries also accounts for why the main organised political conflict of this period was not over any major class issue, but over an institutional matter – the succession of Archbishop and influence or control over the Church.

A second issue relates to the early prevalence of nationalism among the bourgeoisie. Nationalist demands included a number of liberal items (ranging from a freer press, to a more representative form of political representation). This meant that liberalism did not have the space to grow as a separate, organised, political expression of the middle classes. As elsewhere (for instance, Ireland, Finland) the predominance of the national issue subordinated liberalism to nationalism.<sup>131</sup> To bring the various points together, fluid class boundaries and class formations, a weak bourgeoisie overshadowed by the Church, and the early predominance of nationalism, amounted to a weak liberal ideology. Finally, the early mass mobilisation over control of the Church, the paramount institution within the Greek Cypriot community, strengthened and consolidated identities based on religion and ethnicity, pre-empting subsequent mobilisations by other collective actors (such as the working class) along alternative political ideologies.<sup>132</sup>

### ***The communist party and its internationalism***

In the first decades of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of peasants whose land was expropriated, ended up as workers on the land of the more wealthy (mostly *chiftlik* owners), or moved to the growing urban centres, to set up as independent craftsmen, but mainly to join the small construction and manufacturing industry of the times. The post-WWI crisis in agriculture, created more landless peasants. Usury grew rampant in the 1920s so that, by the end of the decade, an official survey of rural life found that three out of four peasant owners of land were in debt. The various policies of the government to stem the problem (such as the creation of an agricultural bank), did not meet with success.<sup>133</sup> In the 1920s, more light industrial units, plus the nascent mining industry, rejuvenated through the investment of foreign capital, offered new outlets to the waves of the dispossessed.<sup>134</sup>

At the same time, increasing exploitation and inequality led to enhanced feelings of social injustice. The general radicalisation of working class politics, as a consequence of WWI, and the spread of communism in the world after the Russian Revolution of 1917, provided new hopes to the labouring poor, together with a new ideology and a living example of radical social change. European countries were already hosting working-class parties, mostly of socialist or social-democratic persuasion, associated with earlier stages of industrial growth (and manned by the more skilled sections of the working

class). Yet the choices of these parties in the Great War, abandoning their internationalist ideology (of the solidarity of all workers across national borders), so as to lend a hand to their national bourgeoisie, had split the unity of the world working-class movement. This led to the creation of the 'new type' left-wing parties, namely the Leninist communist parties (usually dominated by more radical, unskilled workers, agricultural labourers, and small peasants), which were to often enter into intense strife with the socialist parties.<sup>135</sup>

In Cyprus, the above developments allowed a space for the newly emerging socialist ideas to gain ground, towards the late 1910s and early 1920s – quite belatedly, if we are to compare with ideological developments in most other European countries. A main factor related to the delayed and slow industrialisation already noted. Furthermore, as Bartolini argues, such contexts do not favour socialism or social democracy (which were typical products of industrial society), but communism. Indeed, in Cyprus, there was a brief contest between the two left-wing ideologies, with communism the eventual winner. In 1922, the first Cypriot left-wing newspaper, 'Pyrsoi' (Torch), was published, giving voice to the newly-established 'Cyprus Workers' Party', comprised of a small group of intellectuals and workers. Confirming the choice of a communist over a socialist direction,<sup>136</sup> the nascent Party soon broke with the socialist elements<sup>137</sup> and with *Pyrsoi* newspaper, issuing (1 January 1925) its own newspaper titled *Neos Anthropos* [New Man], "organ of the worker-peasants and poor life-strugglers", under the "political control of the Communist Party of Cyprus" (KKK). Carrying the rallying slogan, next to its title, "workers, peasants of the world, unite", the first newspaper's main article was KKK's manifesto. In this, the main objective was defined to be "economic liberation", entailing the termination of "exploitation of men by [other] men". To achieve this, their internationalist perspective dictated:

Our first concern is to eradicate all racial hatred existing among the inhabitants of the island, to teach the masses that people cannot anymore be separated into Greeks and Turks in order for them to consume each other for their countries' self-aggrandisement – instead people [are divided] into poor and rich.

The communists were to be "heralds of love and union of all the poor for the collective pursuance of their interests".<sup>138</sup> The second, parallel objective was to be political liberation: Since "the happiness of a country comes with its real liberation", the communists declared that they would "work for the independence of Cyprus, under a Worker-Peasant Government, with full freedom rights to the people, far from any

influence or protection from the outside". Espousing the policies of the Third International, the Communist Party proposed that an independent Cyprus would then join the 'Socialist Soviet Federation of the Balkan Countries', a union which would consolidate co-operation and internationalist solidarity between these countries, being constantly torn asunder by all kinds of nationalist conflicts.<sup>139</sup>

The Communist Party thus took a stand against *enosis*, which it considered a goal promoted by bourgeois nationalist politicians, supported by the capitalist class of mainland Greece. Although the rationale for this negative attitude towards *enosis* was not explicitly spelled out in its manifesto, it became more apparent in subsequent editions of *Neos Anthropos*. The main objections were that, first, the *enosis* goal "divided the people" into Greeks and Turks, preventing the creation of a common front against British colonialism; and second, that for the "Cypriot people" union with Greece would have simply meant liberation from the "yoke of English imperialism, in order only to taste the worse Greek [yoke]", the "harsher slavery to the Greek megabeasts" – that is, Greek mainland big capital...<sup>140</sup>

Overall, *enosis* was seen by KKK as a populist objective, advocated by the "local bourgeoisie" (the "largest of the usurers and their faithful organs in the National Council"), as the "panacea for all evils" – whereas it was precisely the same people who grabbed the land, the houses and the means of production of the peasants, leading them to immiseration and desperation. The Church was considered equally responsible for the exploitation of the peasants and for appropriating the land they had put under its protection at earlier times, during Ottoman rule, in their effort to avoid excessively high taxation; in consequence, KKK advocated the distribution of church land to the landless peasants.<sup>141</sup>

Not unexpectedly, the radical platform of KKK – against nationalism, the bourgeoisie, the Church, and British imperialism, provoked strong reactions from all fronts. The bourgeoisie and the Church used the premier ideological apparatuses (the schools, the reading clubs, the press, and the pulpits), to fight back against these dangerous new ideas. The British exercised more naked forms of control, through censorship of the press, the courts and the police force.<sup>142</sup>

These were not the only hurdles making it difficult for the young party to gain supporters. Its recruitment capabilities among the masses, mostly peasant small-

holders, were hampered by the prevailing patriarchal family ideology, the deeply held religious commitments, the high degree of informal social control in a small, closed community, and the socio-political conservatism of the people. The working class was still in its infancy: Industry was completely undeveloped and the few available enterprises were of a very small scale, employing less than five workers, and mostly family-owned; workers were thus subject to the patronising influence of their employers.<sup>143</sup> Hence, industrial workers were almost non-existent and the KKK recruited mostly from small business, crafts and the construction industry. Even in subsequent years, when light industry was to grow somewhat, heavy industry was never to take root; as we will see later on, it was mostly in the mining industry, the public service, construction, and a few large enterprises (which brought large numbers of workers together under the same roof), from the late 1930s onwards, where the workers' movement would take stronger root. Finally, the lack of indigenous, radical traditions, led to an almost complete dependence on international communism for the importation of ready-made theories, which took little notice of local realities and had little to say about nationalism, the hegemonic ideology on the island. All the above, constituted serious limitations to the party's development and possible impact on Cypriot society.<sup>144</sup>

Despite these difficulties, members of KKK, though few in numbers, proved to be valiant in spirit, and determined to put up with tribulations, persecutions and social stigma, in order to uphold and further their radical cause. Focusing on building sound organisational structures, on being in constant contact with the working people and their problems, and especially in co-operating closely with the trade unions, they kept together a party which did not rely on clientelistic networks, but on horizontal relationships and a coherent political ideology – an altogether new phenomenon of the times.<sup>145</sup> Such features balanced out the very hostile social environment, as well as the party's own shortcomings in its formative stage of development, enabling it to survive these hard times.<sup>146</sup> Indeed, by the early 1930s, it had gained enough popularity for the Church and the politicians to begin worrying and to start reacting back – the Church through excommunicating left-wing intellectuals, the established politicians through ostracising anyone supporting radical ideas, and the press through scourging articles, denouncing the ideology of the communists as both atheistic and unpatriotic.<sup>147</sup>

Perhaps the most important problems for the young Communist Party arose from its wavering and often contradictory positions on national issues.<sup>148</sup> This proved to be a

serious limitation in a society in which nationalist ideology had achieved hegemonic predominance (even though, as we saw, the harder nationalist positions were temporarily in retreat). KKK's pro-independence, anti-*enosis* platform, linked with the Comintern's policy on the Balkans, was hardly convincing: The idea of an independent Cyprus joining a wider Balkan Federation seemed far-fetched and highly unrealistic, precisely because that area was ridden with conflict, and the federalist spirit totally lacking. In fact, to many Greek Cypriots, this linkage of Cyprus' future to the Balkans, was reminiscent of the Comintern's support for the creation of a Balkan (Con)Federation, in which Macedonia and Thrace (both inhabited, at the time, by a majority Greek-speaking population) would be incorporated, after their secession from Greece and subsequent independence. This position had already created many problems for the Communist Party of Greece, since Greek people saw it as a blatant betrayal of their country and its national interests. It was subsequently to change both by the Greek and the Cypriot communist parties.<sup>149</sup>

The way the young KKK handled the 31 October uprising in Cyprus is a good example of the party's ambivalent stand on national issues. The uprising was preceded by the 1929 Elementary Education Law (through which the British tried to increase their hold on education), plus by an attempt to impose new taxes through the 1931 budget. The mounting frustrations of the Greek Cypriots, combined with the difficult economic conditions of the times, had created an explosive atmosphere. In this milieu, a group of radical nationalists,<sup>150</sup> who had the backing of the Greek consul in Cyprus,<sup>151</sup> was preparing to announce their radical platform of "fanatically seeking the union of Cyprus with the Greek whole". In an apparent step of pre-empting this move, the till then moderate Bishop of Kition, Mylonas, took the lead himself in declaring a more radical stand against the British, which led to a spontaneous rising – first in the capital, then quickly spreading to the whole island.<sup>152</sup> The KKK initially condemned the uprising as a "nationalist, chauvinist" act of provocation by the local big capitalists. Shortly after, once the party's leadership ascertained the broadly based support of the revolt, it shifted to a more positive stand, underlining the national-liberation, anti-imperialist nature of the uprising, and even sought the creation of a 'United Front', in which it wanted to have a leading role.<sup>153</sup> But it was too late, for the Orthodox Church, through Mylonas, had managed to assert its leadership; not only that, but it had managed to transform its previous, mostly passive, role into a more uncompromising, dynamic stand, under the rallying cry of *enosis*. Once again, the Church had proved capable of

re-affirming its *ethnarchic* function, as the only force capable of giving political expression to Greek Cypriot feelings and aspirations.<sup>154</sup>

After the *Octovriana*, the Colonial regime removed its liberal facade and imposed harsh authoritarian measures, further limiting the political and cultural freedoms of the Greek Cypriots. The measures included the abolition of the Legislative Council, the banning of municipal elections, press censorship and the prohibition of the flying of Greek or Turkish flags. The Church was "practically stripped of its leadership", since two of the bishops were exiled, which made elections to replace the deceased (in 1933) Archbishop impossible. Since the Communist Party's militant insubordination was a constant cause of concern, the British tried to suppress its activities, culminating in the imprisonment of twenty-eight leading figures of the party, along with the outlawing of the party itself, in August 1933.<sup>155</sup>

Yet whereas, for the nationalist forces, the 1930s was a period of retrenchment, for the young KKK, it proved to offer blessings in disguise. First, the curtailment of political freedoms and KKK's outlawing, forced the party to focus more on trade union activity (a new law in 1932 had made the operation of unions legal), which was to pay multiple dividends from the end of the decade onwards.<sup>156</sup> Developments in the economy were favourable to the growth of the trade union movement: Since the late 1920s, the mines had been expanding their activities and were becoming a large employer of workers; the mines were owned by foreign capital and brought together thousands of workers in conditions of impersonal relations to their employers, very different to the small family units and the associated patronage relationships between owners and employees, prevalent until that time. These novel conditions were conducive to emerging feelings of class solidarity and class consciousness, so that the trade unions of the mines were to become the most powerful and militant arm of the working class movement.<sup>157</sup>

Second, the ideological shifts in the international communist movement, espousing the need to build broad anti-fascist fronts, led to an attenuation of the anti-nationalist rhetoric of communist parties worldwide. The 7<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Comintern (Summer 1935) adopted the new policy of creating 'Popular Fronts' against fascism and imperialism. Building on this opening, the 6<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of Greece (December 1935) re-adjusted its policy on Macedonia, which, until then, had left it exposed to accusations of treachery: Abandoning the stand of a "united and

independent Macedonia", it adopted the new thesis of "full equality of minorities". These shifts allowed the Greek Communists the opportunity to step out of their political isolation, into a new role of increasing prominence; the combination of social with national rhetoric enhanced its appeal and following, rendering it a significant political force, and the leading national liberation power (through EAM and ELAS) in the years of Nazi occupation.<sup>158</sup>

These developments created important opportunities for the Cypriot communists. The new ideological directions allowed them to seek new political alignments. The rallying call of the mid-1930s for a 'Popular Front' implied that all socio-political forces, including the nationalist bourgeoisie,<sup>159</sup> had common interests and objectives, since they all comprised "the people". Put differently, the new discourse emphasised whatever united the people against the external Nazi threat; this was a shift from the position of unity on the basis of class, to that of unity on the basis of nationality. This new policy allowed KKK a new role within the Greek Cypriot community<sup>160</sup> – but it was also going to ultimately limit its role among the Turkish Cypriots.

Having altered its policies as regards "national issues", and being now more mild as regards a number of matters which previously acted as stumbling blocks for most Greek Cypriots (viz its anti-Enosis and anti-Church/religion stands), KKK found it easier to approach the workers and to help them organise into trade unions. Thus, whereas until 1935 there were only two registered unions,<sup>161</sup> by 1937, they became six (with 367 members) and, by 1939, they reached the number of forty-six (with 2544 members)! In addition to directly creating new unions of their own, the communists managed to infiltrate and to take over most of the unions formed by right-wing or independent unionists.<sup>162</sup> This was to be the base of the left's subsequent impressive growth, for as Bartolini reminds us: "No strong communist party developed after the second World War, if it had not already made considerable inroads between the world wars".<sup>163</sup>

### **The Left-Right contest and the two variants of nationalism**

With the start of WWII, Britain saw the need to win its subjects' co-operation so it began to introduce more liberal policies in its various colonies. In Cyprus, political parties were legalised and municipal elections announced, in the context of measures



for increased political participation. On 14 April 1941, AKEL<sup>164</sup> was launched, at a gathering of left and other "progressive" Greek Cypriots, who aimed to form a "party of principles" as an alternative to the short-lived, leader-oriented, clientelistic parties of traditional nationalist politicians. The still outlawed KKK saw AKEL as a legal venue of expression, through which it could widen its mass appeal.

From inception, AKEL's discourse fused together socio-economic, political and national demands.<sup>165</sup> Its very first declaration enumerated the various economic problems of the working classes, and proposed concrete measures as remedies (such as, progressive taxation, labour legislation). But it also criticised the colonial regime for its policy of denying the national identity, consciousness and traditions of the "Greeks and Turks of Cyprus" (who were thought to "live in full harmony, without any racial or national enmity separating them apart"), demanding the recognition of the "*national essence*" of the two neighbouring communities. Finally, it criticised the colonial regime for depriving the locals of their political rights and for its meddling with the "church and religious-related concerns of the people", pushing for the restoration of the church's "full political rights" through the election of Representatives via universal suffrage, in conjunction with communal autonomy, as regards the selection of local authorities in villages and towns.<sup>166</sup>

A few months after the creation of AKEL, in June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, whereupon the latter promptly joined the anti-fascist Allies camp.<sup>167</sup> The common external enemy attenuated confrontation between the Greek Cypriots, allowing the new party a breathing space for attracting followers. Furthermore, the newly adopted anti-nazi, anti-fascist discourse of AKEL, enhanced its appeal with the masses. The victories of the Red Army on the Eastern Front tremendously increased the popularity of the Soviet Union. Moreover, in Greece, the main resistance forces were those of the left. At the same time, AKEL's open adoption of a pro-*enosis* stance in late 1941, its militant style in seeking socio-economic change, its organisational capabilities in mobilising the masses for demonstrations and rallies (constituting new forms of anti-colonial struggle for the Cypriots), greatly enhanced its legitimacy and its appeal with the masses.<sup>168</sup> A part of AKEL's early success can also be attributed to the fact that it did not have to face any other already established parties (such as, liberal, socialist, or even nationalist) in those initial, formative years. All these factors, explain why it grew from strength to strength, whereas tens of other parties, which were hastily put together at this time, disappeared with equal speed, without leaving behind

any trace of their existence. At the same time, the lack of alternative parties, and the fact that AKEL's leadership, constituency and ideology were not narrowly working class, allowed the party to play a much wider role than its predecessor. Furthermore, the combination of an internationalist perspective, with civic concerns and a stress on trans-communal cooperation, turned it into a party of moderation.

In November 1941, the till then disparate unions, formed a common Pancyprian Unions' Committee (PSE, later re-named to PEO);<sup>169</sup> through achieving control of PSE, the left managed to keep the trade union movement under its own influence – and to gain from its increasing strength and popularity.<sup>170</sup> At the same time (like all strong, post-WW II communist parties), it sought to expand its inroads to the countryside, through the formation of a network of peasant unions, organised subsequently into the Union of Cypriot Agriculturalists (EKA). With the support of the unions and the elaborate network of party controlled organisations (including cultural and athletic clubs), but also with the forging of a Popular Front, bringing together all "progressive forces", AKEL had a land-slide victory in the first municipal elections of March 1943.<sup>171</sup>

Meanwhile, the nationalist forces, which now started calling themselves the "Right",<sup>172</sup> were in complete disarray: The 1930s outlawing of political organisations and activities (including the dissolution of the Legislative Council), the co-optation of prominent elite figures by the colonial regime, and the fact that the ethnarchic Church had been headless for some time now, depriving it of its collective leadership and of all its vitality, were all contributory causes to the Right's malaise. To these extra-ordinary developments, one should add the perennial problem of traditional politics in Cyprus – that of division along patronage figures, and along different stands (soft/hard) as regards the "national" issue, which prevented the dominant classes from consolidating an effective front of the Right. Yet the rise of the Left as an important new player, in the early 1940s, was enough to cause alarm to, and the re-awakening of, the nationalist forces.<sup>173</sup> The electoral victories of the Left in the 1943 and especially the 1946 municipal elections, as well as the Left's success in getting the candidate it backed elected as the new Archbishop of Cyprus, in 1947, amounted to undisputed proof of the new threat. Pulling themselves together, anti-communist forces started creating, one after the other, their own organisations: the Agrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK),<sup>174</sup> the Cyprus National Party (KEK),<sup>175</sup> the New Trade Unions – which, soon after, joined together to form the Federation of the Workers of Cyprus (SEK)<sup>176</sup> – as well as their own religious, cultural and other associations. Henceforth, there would be

two opposing political camps, each with its full array of mass organisations (political parties, trade unions, peasant unions, cultural and athletic clubs – and so on), ready for battle! Indeed, this cleavage within Greek Cypriot society was to become deeper and deeper, ending up as the dominant division – even more pronounced than the rift between the Greek Cypriot community as a whole and the colonial regime.

A number of factors contributed to the reinforcement of the cleavage between the two camps. Among others was the alignment of social forces and ideologies in Cyprus with the respective camps in Greece and the wider world. Thus, whereas during WW II, the unity of the allied forces had contributed to an amelioration of social tensions within the Greek Cypriot community (which had allowed a space for the rise of the Left), the end of the war and the gradual growing apart of the allies, culminating in the Cold War, had a different impact on Cyprus, as each of the two local rivals identified with a different superpower – along with the respective world-views, ideologies and values entailed.<sup>177</sup>

More important was the impact from developments in Greece: There, the British helped the traditional politicians of the Right to contain, and eventually to take over, political power from the Left (1944-1945) – despite EAM's unrivalled military prominence all over the country. Subsequently, during the ensuing Civil War (1946-1949), the British, and then the Americans (1947), assisted both militarily and economically the allied forces of the Right and Centre, to win over the Left.<sup>178</sup> The aftermath of the Civil War in Greece left devastation of immense proportions – thousands of dead<sup>179</sup> and wounded, hundreds of thousands made homeless or refugees, enormous material damage suffered (which kept the country on its knees for years to come); terror, insecurity and unbearable pain reigned among the people. Yet, as Tsoucalas reminds us, these were only a part of the picture, for "the decisive legacy of the civil war was not the enormous human and material disaster, but the unprecedented political, ideological and cultural cleavage between what was labelled 'the national attitude' on the one hand, and the remnants of the progressive forces on the other".<sup>180</sup> After the Civil War, thousands of the defeated leftists (but also many progressives, whom the establishment conveniently identified with the communists) were persecuted, exiled, imprisoned, tortured and executed. Yet the Right was not content in imposing only its material power on the victims – it attempted to also impose its own culture and ideology on society. Ever since the 1922 destruction and the death of the "*Great Idea*", which had dealt a severe blow to the developing

bourgeoisie,<sup>181</sup> the latter were in constant search of a new ideology and identity. The congruence between the nation and the limited territory of the Greek state had now to be taken as granted. In the late 1930s, Metaxas' regime underlined the importance of "state nationalism" in upholding the "national state". The state was seen to be the "manifestation of the organised will of the nation", but the nation was prior to the state, being the diachronic "soul", or a "spiritual community" – "its members being imbued with the national spirit" [*ethnikon fronima*].<sup>182</sup> State nationalist ideology revolved around combining Hellenic and Christian ideals (which would together foster the "*Third Hellenic Civilization*"). To these ideals was now added anti-communism, a "general-purpose ideology to justify the regression into the dried-up womb of Greco-Christian traditions";<sup>183</sup> in practice anti-communism was utilized to totally silence all critical and dissenting voices, in the name of conservative ideals (nation, country, religion and family).

These developments in Greece greatly influenced the Greek Cypriots. To begin with, both the Right and the Left tried to play the card of patriotism – albeit with changing emphasis, depending on developments in Greece. We have seen how the Left's rise in Greece, and its shift to patriotic or nationalistic positions, encouraged AKEL, in the early 1940s, to adopt a similarly patriotic or nationalistic discourse. Since the Greek Right depended on the support of the British in its contest with the Germans, and subsequently with the Left, it could not adopt a strong anti-British or pro-*enosis* stand, as regards Cyprus; consequently, the Cypriot Right could not be so vocal in its own campaign for *enosis*. This, again, allowed AKEL to be more militant in supporting *enosis*, and thus to appear more patriotic than the Right (which it actually accused of being subservient to colonialist and imperialist interests), something which certainly helped it gain in popularity and electoral appeal.<sup>184</sup>

The British found themselves caught in the cross-fire, between the nationalist Right and the communist Left. In search of a way of sidetracking attention from *enosis*, and to appear more in tune with the liberal-democratic spirit prevailing after the war, in July 1947 the British came up with the proposal for a Consultative Assembly [*Diaskeptiki* ], which would advise the government as to a more suitable form of Constitution, than the one of 1882, still largely in force. After some wavering on both sides, the Left decided to take part in the negotiations. The Right, fearing that future free elections for a Parliament, under a more autonomous regime, would be won by the Communists, chose to abstain from the Assembly, and to accuse AKEL of a

supposedly unpatriotic move.<sup>185</sup> In the middle of these developments, the moderate Archbishop Leontios died, and the nationalist and fanatical anti-communist Bishop of Kyrenia took over as his temporary replacement. Taking advantage of his position, the temporary Archbishop openly allied himself with the Right and won the elections. Soon after, the allies managed to get their own anti-communist candidates voted-in for the three vacant Bishop sees. With a now rejuvenated, anti-communist Church hierarchy assuming the role of leader of the Right, the balance of power was starting to change again.

Meanwhile, the Left was taking part in the Consultative Assembly process, under the banner of "*self-determination-enosis*",<sup>186</sup> in other words, supporting the idea of "*full self-rule*" as an intermediate, in-between objective, which would open and prepare the road for the eventual, ultimate aim of *enosis*. The Right, however, with the help of the Greek mainland government, managed to create the impression that somehow a deal between Greece and Britain was imminent, bringing *enosis* only a breath away – thus rendering the Consultative Assembly and any talk for self-government meaningless, and even suspect for undermining impending developments; thus the Left's participation in negotiations with the British was rendered tantamount to treason.<sup>187</sup>

The climax of the escalating confrontation between Left and Right was reached in 1948. The division of the world into two opposing camps, aligned with the two superpowers, and the fierceness of the Civil War in Greece (which was approaching its final stage, and the victory of the Right) was the external context of the contest. But developments within Cyprus were equally intense: The left-controlled Trade Unions were heavily involved in battle with employers – local ones, in the construction and manufacturing industries, and foreign ones, in the mining industry; plus the government-as-employer, in the public service sector. Strikes and mobilizations of all sorts, mostly instituted by the Left through its unions and other organisations, were shaking Cyprus. The employers were answering back, using every possible means – firing 'troublemakers', declaring lock-outs, calling in strike-breakers, while at the same time appealing to the state and the police to restore law and order! The Church, clearly siding with the Right, assisted it in the creation and consolidation of its diverse organisations, including the New Unions; during the historic strike of the mine-workers of the American owned KME (1948), the Archbishop went out of his way to put pressure on the striking workers, by issuing a circular calling on them to stop the "communist inspired" strike, and to return back to work, certain that God would reward

their trust, and satisfy all their reasonable and just demands.<sup>188</sup> The cycle was joined by outsiders, namely members of "Xi", Grivas' paramilitary, extreme right-wing group in Greece, who were imported to Cyprus to help fight the left unionists, engaged in battle with right-wing strike-breakers.<sup>189</sup>

In such an atmosphere, fraught with tension and conflict, politics and negotiations, such as those for a Constitutional Assembly, ceased to be the terrain of logical argumentation and the different political positions turned into symbols of the waging all-out warfare. When the British finally submitted their proposals, those did not, as promised, provide for full self-government (neither at that, nor at a future stage), as the Left was hoping, bringing the whole process to a dead end. The British proved unwilling to trust the Cypriot Left. Although they initially did see AKEL as a possible ally against traditional nationalists, what eventually prevailed was their fear of the party's militancy and pro-Sovietism. The Cold War, and the division of the world into the West and East spheres of influence, placed Greece and Cyprus in the anti-communism camp. In Greece, the British were collaborating with the Right in its fight against the communists – it was not easy for them to do differently in Cyprus; hence, external considerations overshadowed local realities and prejudiced the British attitude toward AKEL. The British choice not to make sufficient concessions in the negotiations, effectively bringing about the collapse of the *Diaskeptiki* and the undermining of AKEL and other voices of moderation, inflamed the forces of extreme nationalism and gave a new impetus to the "dialectic of intolerance" – which was to culminate in the '55 struggle, but also in the intra- and inter-communal violence which ensued.<sup>190</sup>

The collapse of the negotiations for a Constitutional Assembly hallmarks the end of the brief period of the ascent of the Left.<sup>191</sup> Henceforth, the Left would be contained: The rejuvenation of the Church with a new, militant, nationalist, anti-communist leadership, openly collaborating with the Right; the colonial government's adoption of a strong anti-left stance (including firing communists from government posts); some unsuccessful strikes which disheartened the workers; above all, the colonial government's failed promises as regards the prospect for self-government, which left AKEL exposed to accusations of treachery and anti-hellenism (since it was ready to accept self-government instead of *enosis*) – were the new realities that the Left had to grapple with. In contrast, the Right emerged as the great victor from developments: After a temporary set-back, it had succeeded to re-coup and to produce a full sway of supporting organisations; it managed to rally the Church, the paramount institution

within the Greek Cypriot community, in its support; it had the financial backing of employers, whose interests it served; it also enjoyed the sympathies and the quiet support of the colonial government, which did not wish to allow the pro-Soviet Left a more prominent political role (especially so in a more autonomous future polity).<sup>192</sup>

Yet, despite its containment, AKEL had achieved important inroads into the traditional, conservative Cypriot society. We saw above, some of the reasons explaining the Left's spectacular post-WWII growth. Other features or strengths were to help AKEL survive the hard times which it now had to face. One such strength was the party's peculiar combination of radicalism and pragmatism. AKEL had managed to keep many of the radical features of KKK: The strong organisational structure of the party and the associated skills and discipline of its leadership and cadres; the ability of utilising these skills in mass mobilisations, such as rallies, protest activities and strikes; its militant and confrontational style. But, at the same time, it succeeded in transcending KKK's extreme radicalism and parallel marginalisation: Its discourse managed to combine orthodox Marxist-Leninist dogma, with workerist, liberal-democratic and national liberation demands; the former elements were important amongst the leadership and the core nucleus of the party, whereas the latter were stressed when addressing the wider public, non-core members, and allies. Consider its attitude on important social institutions and values. The Communist Party did not challenge religion and the church in toto – but rather concentrated its fire on the practices of the higher clergy and on the church's scant concern with social justice and the lot of the underprivileged (hence, its opposition to the accumulation of land and other wealth by the Church).<sup>193</sup> Similarly, the party was not critical of the patriarchal family as an institution, but advocated more equal, non-exploitative relationships among family members. It did not antagonise the educational system as such, but worked within it, through left students' organisations and left teachers' alternative discourse. Furthermore, the party never emphasized the need for a violent revolution to seize power, the elimination of private property, collectivisation, and control of the means of production by workers; instead, it concentrated on achieving instrumental goals for improving the lives of working people. The theoretical justification was usually couched in terms of the "stages of struggle" and respective priorities (hence, during British rule, the primary objective was "liberation from colonialism's chains").<sup>194</sup> Meanwhile, all victories of the party were hailed as important steps in the great march forward of the "forces of progress" (the Left and its allies).

On the negative side was AKEL's empiricism – whatever 'worked' was right. Lacking in theory, maturity and self-confidence, when it came to the crucial juncture of dealing with the collapse of the *Diaskeptiki*, there was a failure of nerve, and a resort to solutions from above – the views of the communist parties in Greece and the Comintern more generally. We saw earlier on how the views of KKE had tilted the balance in favour of a harder nationalist line. This dependence of AKEL's leadership on the views of 'higher authorities' was to have multiple effects in its future development. After 1948, internal dialogue on the most crucial issue facing Cyprus and the party had to come to a halt: Witch-hunting began, so as to determine who were not adhering to the "correct doctrine" (*enosis*). Heretics, who had supported self-government, had to publicly confess their error – or be expelled from the party instead. Party surveillance, so far a means to protect the party against external dangers and intrusions, was henceforth turned against internal enemies. Democratic centralism was to shift from an emphasis on democracy (a method of systematically gathering views from below), to a practice of centralism (a rigid system of control by the leadership, whose proletarian origin somehow secured the wisdom and fairness of its decisions).<sup>195</sup> Worse still was the fact that AKEL's harder nationalist stand now adopted was to further alienate its Turkish-Cypriot supporters, or to expose them to the mounting nationalist pressures from within their own community. The only party which kept the bridges open between the two ethnic communities, with its allied organizations, would thus be turning inwards towards its own community, thereby consolidating political closure along communal lines.

### ***The anti-colonial struggle and the entrenchment of the cleavages***

By the late 1940s, the two Greek Cypriot camps were of almost equal strength, and a very delicate balance of powers prevailed – which from another point of view, amounted to an impasse. The intra-communal contest had become both polarised and generalised, affecting all walks of life, and justifying the use of any method in achieving supremacy.<sup>196</sup> In this climate of polarization there could be no 'middle' positions, for everyone had to take sides and join one of the two rival camps. By now, there had been separate newspapers, trade unions, cultural and athletic associations: Henceforth, were to be added separate coffeeshops, groceries, pharmacies, barber-shops and even brands of cigarettes, drinks and coffee!<sup>197</sup> Through every choice Greek Cypriots had to make – whether in shopping, or smoking, or going to a doctor – they



would be declaring their political identity. And through every choice, the division into Right-wing/nationalists and Left-wing/communists would be reinforced.

After the collapse of the *Diaskeptiki*, and of accepting as sacrosanct the views of the Greek Communist Party, AKEL changed line and leadership (August 1949). Self-determination was deemed to be a misdirected platform, imposed on the party by "petit-bourgeois elements" among its leadership. The new, hard-headed leadership was of undisputed proletarian origin, and was soon to adopt the dominant patriotic slogan of "*enosis-and-only-enosis*". Indeed, soon the Left would outbid the Right in initiatives promoting the unionist causes. A fierce contest ensued, over who were the most loyal and sincere supporters of *enosis*, and, accordingly, who were the best patriots. Thus, for instance, in 1949, AKEL started an initiative for organizing an *enosis* plebiscite; soon after the *ethnarchy* announced a similar initiative and, since AKEL realized that the Church's involvement would ensure the success of the former, it abandoned its own campaign and joined efforts with the *ethnarchy*; the 1950 plebiscite produced a massive 95.7% Greek Cypriot support for union.<sup>198</sup>

In 1954, after many pressures from the *ethnarchy*, the Greek government took the Cyprus demand for *enosis* to the United Nations. The internationalization drive caused the British to escalate its 'divide and rule' policy by actively involving Turkey with the problem.<sup>199</sup> Frustrated with developments, the Greek Cypriots were soon to initiate the 1955 EOKA<sup>200</sup> anti-colonial struggle. This was a decisive step of the Right, under the political leadership of Archbishop Makarios and the military leadership of General Grivas, in augmenting pressure on the British, but, at the same time, in consolidating their nationalist hegemony as against the Left. In the first proclamations of EOKA's pre-cursor (EMAK),<sup>201</sup> it was made clear that the communists were not welcome to participate in the armed struggle; similarly, the Turkish-Cypriots were re-assured that they had nothing to worry of, but the struggle was surely not theirs. AKEL was initially sceptical of the suitability of the form of struggle chosen: Since its early steps, in the relatively liberal environment of the 1940s, its involvement and success in fighting municipal and church elections, as well as its experience in waging battles for the widening of political freedoms and for improving the lot of the working classes, through industrial action and mass rallies, it had developed great faith and the necessary skills in open, mass democratic forms of struggle. Hence, the EOKA choice for an underground or guerrilla form of warfare, waged by select brave young men [*pallikaria*], did not meet with its approval. After some initial negative reactions,

however, realising that EOKA was quickly gaining the sympathies of the masses, it moved to active support of the struggle through demonstrations and mass rallies – obviously, in an attempt to overcome its exclusion and its feared future marginalisation.

But the EOKA struggle, aiming for *enosis* with Greece, could certainly not have included the Turkish-Cypriots, whose ethnic consciousness had been developing separately and in opposition to Greek Cypriot aspirations. Nevzat documents how, after the island's take-over by the British, the Turks of Cyprus continued "to interact with the Ottoman Empire socially, economically, politically and intellectually".<sup>202</sup> Turkish Cypriot schools multiplied, though at a slower pace than Greek Cypriot ones. Those who sought to advance their studies went primarily to Istanbul (in the same way that Greek Cypriots went to Athens). The first Turkish Cypriot newspaper was published in the 1870's and the first public reading room (where local newspapers, along with ones arriving from the wider Ottoman Empire, could be read) was established in the 1880s. By the early twentieth century, the emphasis was shifting from Ottomanism to Turkism – the virtues of the Turkish nation, culture, language and history.<sup>203</sup> These tendencies were to be strengthened in the 1920's, with the formation of the Turkish state; by the end of the decade, young politicians influenced by Kemalist ideas, managed to pose a challenge to the traditional anglicised elite, still clinging to Muslim values. In the 1930s, there were calls to reform, in emulation of Turkey, and a further shift from the Islamic to an ethnic secular identity; characteristically, self-identifications changed from "Muslims" to "Turks of Cyprus". In 1943, the first mass-organisation – the Association of the Turkish Minority of Cyprus (KATAK), was formed. In 1948, the "Special Turkish Committee" was formed (with British approval), whose main objective was to facilitate closer relations with Turkey: School teachers and educational materials were to be imported from Turkey, Turkey's national days to be commemorated, and so on. But intercommunal tensions escalated after the EOKA struggle commenced and Turkey got more involved in Cyprus affairs, at British prodding. Characteristically, the 'Cyprus Turkish National Party', formed back in 1945, was renamed, in 1955, to the "Cyprus is Turkish Party". Towards the end of 1955, the Turkish Cypriots set up their own armed underground organization called Volkan, which, in 1958, gave its place to the more violent TMT.<sup>204</sup> In August '55, the British formed the "auxiliary police force", staffed exclusively with Turkish-Cypriots, to combat EOKA insurgents: Expectedly, after the death of the first Turkish policeman, the Turkish Cypriot masses took to street rioting.

Within a few years after the commencement of the anti-colonial struggle, AKEL was gradually recomposing itself, after losing ground to the Right – to the extent that Grivas started seriously worrying about the Left seizing power after a future political arrangement.<sup>205</sup> To forestall such an outcome, Grivas gave orders for EOKA to start (in early 1958) executing Greek Cypriot leftists under the accusation of treachery, aiming at the humiliation and stigmatisation of the Left – and its future banishment from political power.<sup>206</sup> For analogous reasons, the Turkish Cypriot TMT started murdering Turkish Cypriot leftists, mostly collaborators of AKEL.<sup>207</sup> This cycle of violence led to an escalation of the conflict between the two communities.

Meanwhile, the British were resorting to a tougher game. In December 1956, Lennox-Boyd waged the threat of double self-determination on the Greek Cypriots. In mid-1958, the Macmillan Plan was a concrete step towards the institutionalisation of partition, pushing Makarios, who was becoming increasingly worried over developments, to publicly declare his support for Independence as a compromise solution:




Figure 4.1: Ideal and compromise positions of the two communities in the late 50's

AKEL, being under fire by Grivas and the extreme Right, but also realising the dangers from the escalation of conflict among the Greek Cypriots, and between the two communities, endorsed Makarios' turn. A few months later, however, AKEL would disagree with Makarios on the provisions of the Zurich-London Agreements, calling on him not to sign but, instead, to abandon the guerrilla warfare, and shift to a peaceful, democratic mass struggle. Since the ethnarch ignored its call and proceeded with signing the Agreements, AKEL resorted to cooperating with the extreme nationalists(!), who also rejected the Agreements for their own reasons, and together they fought Makarios in the first elections for an independent state. Makarios won the contest, securing a large 67 per cent of the votes, entrenching himself as the undisputed leader of the Greek Cypriots, and becoming the first President of the newly-born Republic.<sup>208</sup>

Makarios and the Right were the great victors, cashing-in the returns of the glorious anti-colonial, liberation struggle. AKEL was the great loser: Not only was it excluded from the armed struggle and branded as a party of traitors, it also lost badly in the elections. A little later, it would come to a compromise with Makarios, joining the pro-independence camp and being allocated a small number of seats in the Parliament of the young Republic. For the years to come, AKEL was going to live in Makarios' shadow, accepting a subservient role, in order to gradually regain its lost legitimacy.

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Colonialism was to bestow on Cyprus a dismal legacy of division and strife. To some extent, this was not the fault of the British, since they had inherited a colony governed along communal lines, where bonds of loyalty and solidarity, as well as networks of civil society organisations, had been developing along ethnic lines. The British simply built on this pre-existing basis, re-inforcing, politicizing and (often) manipulating social divisions. Early on, they resigned themselves to a view of Cypriot society as plural and deeply divided, and made few efforts to construct a sense of over-laying unity. And any such attempts towards fostering a common imagined community, a sense of Cypriotness, came too late and aimed at Anglicizing the locals, so that they would be more loyal to colonialism, rather than in building a common identity over and above the communal ones, to facilitate their co-habitation. This was similarly the case with the other dimensions of social closure.

Consider legal closure: Ensuring the equality of all before the law was indeed one of the great benefits of British rule, yet this did not concern all aspects of life, for communal law maintained its validity as regards the personal sphere (hence, in matters relating to the crucial institutions of family and marriage, for instance, Greek Cypriots came under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church). Public law did separate Cypriots from aliens, but private law maintained a separation between Cypriots themselves.<sup>209</sup>

But, as we have seen, the potentially more explosive cleavages related to the political sphere. The consolidation of ethnically-based political divisions in the Legislative Council and the municipalities, enhanced the feelings of separateness, irrespective of whether the communal or the individual (majoritarian or liberal democratic) principle was used in sharing power and in political decision-making. Once again, political

closure was accomplished along ethnic, and not national, lines. The Orthodox Church, acting as the quasi-state of the Greek Cypriots, played an important role in pushing social closure along ethnic (rather than national) lines. The Church had a key contribution in fostering the desire of becoming a part of the Greek imagined community – taking over the leading role from the bourgeoisie. Finally, as regards military closure, EOKA (much as TMT) managed to harden the division along ethnic lines, through excluding Turkish Cypriots, and, to a large extent, Greek Cypriot leftists, from the anti-colonial armed struggle.

Yet, as we have seen, inter-communal cleavages were not the only ones, for intra-communal divisions had grown to be equally, if not more, strong. Within the Greek Cypriot community, the appearance to outsiders that all adhered to an undifferentiated form of irredentist nationalism, was only a “public face”, the community’s “boundary”, symbolically simple and uniform (“all Greek Cypriots want *enosis*”). But the internal discourse, within the Greek Cypriot community, remained complex and diverse.<sup>210</sup> Again, this division was not merely along the lines of class or ideology – it had gradually become a much deeper cleavage between two historically constituted sub-cultures. Anthony Cohen reminds us that cultures have no stable, essential character, save the need to distinguish themselves from significant others: “Culture is thus inherently antithetical”;<sup>211</sup> the Left had developed as the antithesis of the established forces of the Right.<sup>212</sup> Overall, the two camps clung fast to the opposing poles of a distinct binary code. The Right upheld the nation, tradition and freedom of choice (and thus the free-enterprise system); the Left emphasized the people, progress and equality (and a system in which the state would ensure social justice). The Right, despite fighting an anti-colonial struggle, was pro-West. The Left was deeply suspect of the West and was vehemently anti-imperialist. But, perhaps, the most important difference had to do with the way the two camps related to the ‘national issue’: The Right saw *enosis* as purely a matter of ethnic ties, of joining the greater cultural community of the Greek nation. The Left shared the belief of ethnic continuity, but its constant wavering as regards the rationale, or the alternatives to *enosis*, betrayed its more instrumental or strategic approach to the issue.<sup>213</sup> In future, the exact content of the respective differences and identifications would vary:<sup>214</sup> What would remain constant was the deep cleavage dividing the Greek Cypriot community.

Independence was thus to find Cyprus a deeply divided society, both intra-communally and inter-communally. Up to this stage the intra-communal division was the dominant one. Soon, the ethno-national division would come centre stage.

## **Chapter 5 The Cyprus Republic: From bi-national to national state**

From the late eighteenth century onwards, Europe was increasingly organized into nation-states.<sup>1</sup> Although the form of these new regimes varied, all shared common characteristics and had a similar view of themselves and the world. Internally, there was a stress on the need for unity of the national community, which led to great energies expended in homogenizing the subjects. The latter were viewed as one people, sovereign over their own affairs and free to determine their fate. Above all, this self-determining people had a right and duty to control their own land, so that there would be a coincidence of territory, sovereignty and nationality. Externally, the world was viewed as constituted by sovereign states interacting with each other, whether in trade or war. The Jacobin project of organizing the nation into an all-powerful state as the motor of society's forward march, was the best, if extreme, exemplification of this new paradigm of political organization, which had swiftly established itself in Europe.<sup>2</sup> But transplanting the model to non-European countries did not prove easy:<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the most important reason was that western Europe was already reasonably homogenous in culture by the time the nation-state began consolidating; this was not so in many other parts of the world where, historical developments had produced different realities, for which the nation-state model was not well suited.

Such was the case with Third World countries, liberated from colonial rule. On the surface, one could find important homologies between these countries and Europe. If the French Revolution was Europe's "key moment at which nation and people became one",<sup>4</sup> anti-colonial struggles could be seen as the corresponding key moments in the Third World. Peter Alter proposes: "In much the same way as Risorgimento nationalism in Europe had been directed against existing structures of domination and the multinational empires, nationalism in the Third World was now channeled against colonialism and the political, economic and cultural imperialism of the Europeans".<sup>5</sup> Yet anti-colonial struggles did not automatically lead to the fostering of new nations, but only of new states, as instruments of central power.<sup>6</sup> In Africa, for instance, any pre-colonial national traditions were destroyed by Colonialism. Territorial boundaries were often quite arbitrarily drawn by colonial officers, with little regard to pre-colonial ethnic, religious, political or other social realities, and, at de-colonization, these were used to delineate new states – consequently, the states so created ended up incorporating an amalgam of peoples, with little to unite them. The new leaders and intellectuals of these emergent states then faced the task of forging a new nation out

of the heterogeneous materials at hand (tribes, clans, ethnic groups and so on); such particularistic impediments had to be transcended in order to create overarching identities and loyalties, which were to be the 'glue' holding the new nation together.<sup>7</sup> Writing in the early twentieth century, and commenting on the Gold Coast (future Ghana), Attoh Ahuma painted a picture of his country as characterized by a "multiform composition of congeries of States or Provinces, independent of each other, divided by complex political institutions, laws and customs, and speaking a great variety of languages". Many refused to acknowledge this mix as a nation, yet Ahuma insisted on the "inalienable heritage of nationality" of his "people", which, despite divisions, had historically been sufficiently united to justify them being considered as "still a Nation": "If we were not, it is time to invent one".<sup>8</sup>

But how were the new nations to be forged? The prevalent vision was that a colony had first to become an independent state and then cultivate national consciousness and nationalism, to weld the diverse peoples and cultures into a nation.<sup>9</sup> As Holsti puts it, "the nationalist elites borrowed Western ideas of nationalism and the Western concept of the state, and melded the two". The problem was that "the crucial question of who, exactly, formed the new political community, the fundamental basis for the legitimacy of the state"<sup>10</sup> remained unclear, and was to plague many post-colonial states which carried within them "the seeds of political fragmentation".<sup>11</sup>

In Cyprus, developments were very different to both Europe and the prevalent model of the Third World; not only was society marked by heterogeneity, but local collective visions did not aim towards creating a new nation, since the two main communities on the island perceived themselves as already belonging to pre-existing distinct nations. Back in history, they had started as ethnoculturally heterogeneous religious communities, in the context of the Ottoman multicultural empire. But the politicization and institutionalization of ethnicity under British rule and the growth of antagonistic irreconcilable nationalisms, culminating in the intercommunal violence which sealed their conflict with blood towards the end of the anti-colonial struggle, had gradually transformed initial cultural differences into deep national heterogeneity. Ethnic differences in Cyprus were thus not seen as particularistic impediments which had to be transcended so as to create a common nation. They were not of the 'thin' kind, mere expressions of cultural attributes distinguishing one community from the other; they had, instead, grown to be of the 'thick' variety, "understood and experienced as constitutive of nationhood"<sup>12</sup> – only not of a common Cypriot nationhood, but of a



disjointed one, related to two other 'mother' nations, given voice by the transborder Greek and Turkish nation-states.

Independence and the creation of a common state was not the original choice of the two local communities, but an undesired, second best solution thrust upon them. The newly born Cyprus Republic was not the outcome of a shared vision but of a compromise, a balance between the many diverse internal and external powers and interests. Makarios, who was soon to be the first President of the new republic, was very clear as to what the Zurich-London Agreements had accomplished: "We have created a state, but not a nation".<sup>13</sup> The new regime was not going to be a nation-state; it was rather to be a multi-national, or more precisely, a bi-national, bi-communal state, which was to house the two "deeply divided" communities.

### ***Plural society and the bi-national, consociational state***

On the dawn of its independence, Cyprus had all the characteristics of a plural society divided by segmental cleavages – that is, deep, politicized social divisions along ethnonational and ideological lines, all its social institutions being organized on the basis of these cleavages. In plural societies, cultural distinctions are perceived to be deeply embedded in the very fabric of society, constituting an acquired 'second nature'. We have seen how religion, for instance, was no ordinary cultural trait: The Orthodox clergy were not only servants of God but of the Greek nation. Orthodox churches were the bastions of national ideals, and pulpit sermons aimed to indoctrinate believers into the values of both religion and nation. Similarly, the Greek and Turkish languages were not innocent channels of communication, since they linked the two communities not only with the cultures but also with the national ideologies of the two mother countries. Each community had its own newspapers, which carried mostly articles and news on the particular ethnonational community, from an ethnocentric point of view, with none or little coverage on the other community. The educational system was segregated and the schools of the two communities followed their own distinct curriculum, in line with that of the two mainlands. Most textbooks were imported from the 'motherlands' and most teachers had studied there. In language teaching, the local dialects were downgraded and the more standardized versions from Greece and Turkey were promoted instead. The narratives carried in the reading-textbooks, and discussed in class, familiarized Cypriot youth with the institutions,

values and other social realities of their cross-border counterparts, but not with each other. Greek history textbooks focused on the glory of Ancient Greece and the Byzantium, whereas the corresponding Turkish ones on the splendour and tolerance of the Ottoman Empire and on the achievements of the inheritor national state.

The public sphere was also split in two, with each community having its own political structures – political parties and other voluntary associations. The few institutions which encouraged bi-communal integration, such as the left-wing labour union PEO, which had in the past enlisted a good number of Turkish Cypriots in its ranks, had suffered severe setbacks after the ascent of extreme nationalism and, especially, TMT's violence and intimidation of Turkish Cypriot leftists. Even though territorially there was some mixing of the two communities, separation was on the increase.<sup>14</sup> Intercommunal marriages were not only few or non-existent, but they were increasingly becoming a "structural impossibility".<sup>15</sup> Besides ethno-national segmentation, there were deep intra-communal socio-political cleavages, while ideological differences had gradually led to the formation of discrete Left and Right sub-cultures.<sup>16</sup>

How could such deep fragmentation be dealt with? Lijphart, a prominent analyst of plural societies, proposes that there are five logical solutions to the problem of deep fragmentation – namely, assimilation, consociation, partition, mass emigration, and genocide (more recently dubbed ethnic cleansing). Noting that the last two are not political solutions which any contemporary democratic society would condone, O' Leary has proposed an amended list of six "ideal-typical strategies for stabilising segmented societies": Hegemonial control, integration (similar to Lijphart's assimilation), participation, internationalization, arbitration and consociation. Most of these methods of dealing with deep division, have been used in the case of Cyprus, to one degree or another, as we will shortly see.<sup>17</sup> But, starting with the dawn of independence, some options had already been eliminated: To begin with, *enosis* (which would have entailed integration of the smaller Turkish Moslem community, as happened with the other Moslem communities in mainland Greece), and partition, were explicitly ruled out by the Constitution of the new republic. And even though not specifically mentioned, a majoritarian form of government, leading to a unitary state, was similarly excluded, presumably because it could have ended up in the permanent exclusion from power of the Turkish minority community, by the Greek majority. Instead, the solution adopted was that of consociationalism, a system which aims to build on existing divisions,

transforming them into some form of unity.<sup>18</sup> Consociationalism is defined by four basic characteristics:

- (1) *Grand coalition*, is seen to be the determining feature, giving rise to a minimal definition of consociation as "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy"; put differently, grand coalition entails cooperation of the political leaders of the various "segments" or "pillars" of society to co-govern the country.
- (2) *Mutual veto*, which allows each segment or minority not to be outvoted by the majority on important matters concerning their vital interests (this is the same principle as that of "concurrent majorities");
- (3) *Proportionality*, ensuring that positions in the government and scarce state resources are allocated to each segment, according to its proportion of the population;
- (4) *Segmental autonomy*, which entails that the various segments are internally self-governed as regards matters that are of exclusive concern to them.<sup>19</sup>

Taking the segmental nature of plural societies as given, this approach attempts to use "consociational engineering"<sup>20</sup> to hold the fragments together. In the same way, the Cyprus Republic was premised on the existence of deep divisions separating the two communities.

In a comparative study of democracies in plural societies, Lijphart noted that the Cyprus constitution was "thoroughly consociational", and "elaborately embodied" "[a]ll of the principles of consociational democracy – grand coalition, proportionality, autonomy and veto".<sup>21</sup> As regards the *grand coalition* aspect, the executive branch provided for a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President, elected by their respective communities, through universal suffrage. The two office holders had the right of final *veto* on decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defense and security.<sup>22</sup> Obviously, the consequence was that the proper functioning of the executive branch relied "on the absolute cooperation of the leaders of the two communities".<sup>23</sup> And the provision for a "strong Vice President" was one of the many checks "intended to prevent the Greek majority from overpowering the Turkish minority".<sup>24</sup> The grand coalition arrangement was completed with a Council of Ministers, which had to consist of seven Greek ministers appointed by the President and three Turkish ministers appointed by the Vice-President.

The same *proportionality* formula (7 to 3) was also applied to the composition of the House of Representatives – thirty-five members had to be elected by the Greeks and fifteen by the Turks. The President of the House had to be Greek and the Vice-

President a Turk, elected by the Representatives of the two communities respectively – themselves elected separately by their communities. Most laws of the House required a simple majority, except in certain key areas (the electoral law, taxes and the municipalities),<sup>25</sup> where *concurrent majorities* of the Representatives of both communities were necessary. The seven-to-three ratio was also used in the public service and the police; in the armed forces it was fixed at six-to-four.<sup>26</sup> The Supreme Court was composed of a Greek, a Turk and a neutral judge (not a citizen of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey or Britain), who acted as president.<sup>27</sup> The over-representation of the Turkish minority in all cases (the population ratio was approximately 8:2) served to strengthen its voice as against the Greek majority.

Finally, the constitution provided for considerable *autonomy* of the two communities through the election of two “Communal Chambers”, charged with a competence on a number of issues relating to religion, education, culture and personal status; communal “courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters” were provided for, plus taxes to pay for communal institutions. Communal Chambers were also authorized to supervise the functioning, and to pass by-laws relating to, the municipalities, as well as to control producers’ and consumers’ co-operatives and credit establishments.<sup>28</sup> Another way in which autonomy was provided for, was through the establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns, run by Councils elected by the respective communities, in each town.<sup>29</sup>

The Cypriot constitution was thus strongly bi-communal and bi-national in character – it acknowledged, legitimized and built on bi-communalism, through an “intricate system of constitutional devices”.<sup>30</sup> According to consociational theory, that in itself was not a problem: What was a problem was that it made few provisions for fostering the unity of the Republic; not only that, but it legitimized the continuous attachment and dependence of the two communities on their ‘motherlands’, opening the way for the intervention of the latter into the internal affairs of the young Republic. The Cypriots were recognized as citizens via membership of their respective community, and not through direct relation to the state as individuals. Article 2(1) of the Constitution specified: “The Greek community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church”,<sup>31</sup> and Article 2(2) similarly delineated the citizens “who are of Turkish origin”, speak Turkish and are Moslems.<sup>32</sup> Article 3 specified as official languages both Greek and Turkish, requiring all

legal and other official documents to be written in both languages. Acknowledging the national cross-border ties to Greece and Turkey, the Constitution allowed "[a]ny citizen of the Republic or any body [...] other than public, whose members are citizens of the Republic", the right to fly the flag of the Republic or Greece or Turkey without restriction.<sup>33</sup> Public officials or bodies, as well as communal authorities and institutions, could fly the Republic's flag along with the Greek and Turkish flags on public holidays. Article 5 gave the two communities "the right to celebrate [...] the Greek and Turkish national holidays". Furthermore, the two communities had the constitutional right of receiving subsidies for their educational, cultural, athletic and philanthropic institutions, from the Greek or Turkish governments respectively; similarly, the two communities could receive teachers or clerics from the motherlands, to supplement their needs as necessary.<sup>34</sup> Finally, the Republic could give Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom the status of "most privileged state" in any agreement, of whatever nature.<sup>35</sup>

To complete the picture, we should add that, along with the Constitution, three other Treaties were ratified: the *Treaty of Establishment* provided for two sovereign military British bases on the island,<sup>36</sup> which "in essence, secured British influence in the Middle East"<sup>37</sup> and the Eastern Mediterranean; the *Treaty of Alliance*, which was a defense pact between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, providing for the permanent stationing of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops on the island. Finally, the *Treaty of Guarantee* was an agreement on Cyprus' "independence, territorial integrity and security"; it is this treaty which specified that union with another country (*enosis*), as well as partition, was to be permanently excluded.<sup>38</sup> Britain, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor powers, were assigned the right of taking action, jointly or individually, toward "reestablishing the state of affairs" in case the status quo was violated. Finally, a number of constitutional provisions, classified as "basic Articles" (including the ones outlined above), were declared as permanently unalterable.

But the Cypriot experiment in bi-communal co-habitation would soon fail. Why was it that a regime which was "thoroughly consociational" and meticulously embodied all the principles of consociational democracy, aiming to create unity in diversity, collapsed a short three years after inception? To respond to the above question is to address the issue of the conditions conducive to the success of consociational democracy. Theorists of consociationalism have in fact proposed a list of such factors, the main ones of which include: Segmental isolation, the presence of cross-cutting cleavages,

overarching loyalties, prior traditions of elite accommodation, a multiple balance of powers, external threats, and the small size of the country involved. Below, we will consider the main ones of these, while examining why the consociational state in Cyprus failed, what role nationalism played, and how the relationship between state and nation developed.

### ***The collapse of consociational democracy***

#### *Segmental isolation*

Segmental isolation relates to the functional and territorial separation of the component parts of a consociational regime, which ensures that there are limited contacts between people and groups from the different segments, thereby limiting the chances of the eruption of antagonisms into actual conflict. In the case of Cyprus, there was a strong degree of functional segmental isolation, resulting from the separate social and political organization of the two communities, but there was no absolute geographical separation. Prior to 1960, Cypriots lived in villages which were wholly Greek or Turkish, or mixed, and in towns which were mostly Greek but with Turkish Cypriot quarters. There was, thus, some intermixing and some separation.

It will be recalled that territorial separation, *taksim*, became the counter demand of the Turkish Cypriots as against *enosis*. So even though there was no complete geographical isolation, this in itself was not a cause of the subsequent breakdown of the consociational regime. It did, however, become one of the most important such causes, once the matter became politicized. The central issue of contention concerned the municipalities: Up to 1958, Cypriot municipalities were unified, but once inter-communal tensions arose, the Turkish Cypriots, with British consent, created separate municipalities for themselves. The 1960 constitution, with Greek Cypriot consent, required the creation of ethnically separate municipalities a few months into Independence, once practical issues such as municipal boundaries were settled. But the Greek Cypriots were soon to change their minds, first because of the difficulties involved in drawing the boundaries (deriving from the intermixed patterns of settlement), but, most importantly, because the early difficulties in co-habitation increased their concerns that separate municipal areas would constitute the basis of subsequent Turkish Cypriot demands for partition. Although lack of territorial isolation was not *per se* a cause of the 1963 breakdown, the latter did lead to the first step

towards the former; and complete geographical separation (and the creation of ethnically clean areas) was to result after the 1974 Turkish invasion.

### *The grand coalition*

The core principle of consociational democracy is grand coalition, the readiness of the segmental leaders to cooperate with each other, "in spite of the deep cleavages separating their segments".<sup>39</sup> This is presumably because they are committed to the unity of the country and because of the "self-negating prophesy"<sup>40</sup> – the recognition that if they do not cooperate through sharing power, disaster may follow. In the case of Cyprus, the consociational regime, which resulted from the Zurich-London agreements, was not the choice of the Cypriot political leaders, aiming to secure unity or to avoid conflict. The Greek Cypriots had long struggled for *enosis* and it was only when Makarios got worried that Britain would have gone ahead with the partitionist Macmillan Plan,<sup>41</sup> that he decided to opt for independence. When the basic framework of the agreements was laid down in Zurich, by the representatives of Greece and Turkey, the Cypriot leaders were not present. Later on, when they did have the chance to join the discussions, in London, little could be changed. Makarios seems to have felt uncomfortable with a number of the provisions and gave his consent only reluctantly, after pressures from the Greek mainland delegation.<sup>42</sup> He apparently maintained ambivalent feelings about the agreements and, on different occasions, gave contradictory explanations as to why he had accepted them.<sup>43</sup>

But even though Makarios consented, the more extreme nationalist Greek Cypriots were not that willing to do so. Grivas gave his last minute blessing grudgingly and only because he realized that if he did not, and had carried on with the struggle, he would have divided "not only the Cypriot people but the whole Nation", leading to more devastating consequences than accepting a compromise solution; he thus called on everyone to "rally around the Ethnarch, who constituted the only symbol of unity and might" of the Greek side.<sup>44</sup> Yet, after only a few months, he would publicly condemn the agreements, encouraging thereby the small group of staunch *enosis*ists, rallying around the Bishop of Kyrenia, to more vocally oppose independence. Overall, it quickly became obvious that the concern of Greek Cypriot leaders was not with the unity of the country, but with the unity of their own community and of the wider Greek nation. Similarly, they did recognize that disaster would follow if accommodation was not reached, not so much because of possible conflict with the Turkish Cypriots, who

were a much smaller and weaker community, but of the consequences of the action of more powerful third parties (Britain and, especially, Turkey). The agreements were thus seen to be the consequence of outside imposition, accepted under duress, and the hope was entertained that they could in future be improved upon.

Another aspect of the "grand coalition" idea, is that it should involve the participation of the leaders of all significant segments of society in governing a plural society.<sup>45</sup> Yet, in the case of Cyprus, one of the main intents of the agreements for a "guaranteed independence"<sup>46</sup> (guaranteed by three NATO powers), was the exclusion of the Left from power, and thereby the forestalling of a feared Soviet take-over of an island vital to Western strategic interests. Interestingly, beside the officially publicized documents (the Constitution and the three Treaties), a secret "Gentlemen's Agreement" was also signed by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, whereby the two agreed to support Cyprus' membership of NATO and to encourage the (future) President and Vice-President of Cyprus to outlaw the Communist Party and communist activities.<sup>47</sup> AKEL leaders were not aware of this secret agreement, but they were naturally opposed to the whole idea of guarantees by NATO powers and to various aspects of the Constitution – thus, at Zurich, they had advised Makarios not to sign the agreements and to instead abandon the armed struggle and revert to a mass political struggle. At the first Presidential elections they cooperated with the extreme enosists, forming an anti-Zurich alliance which contested the agreements and Makarios. After the elections, however, AKEL joined the pro-Makarios Patriotic Front and concurred on not staging the Greek Cypriot Parliamentary elections and to, instead, settle for a share of 5 out of the 35 seats in the House (even though it represented approximately 30% of the voters), and 3 seats in the Greek Communal chamber.<sup>48</sup>

AKEL's support of Makarios aimed at moderating the Right's relentless criticism for not having participated in the armed struggle – which the extremists saw as outright betrayal. Its options were limited since the majoritarian electoral system would have resulted in its total exclusion from the House of Parliament and, thereby, to its further political isolation. For Makarios, the gain was a further strengthening of his position, since he now commanded more than 95% of Greek Cypriot votes. Furthermore, the incorporation of the Left meant that he could count on sympathetic votes in the United Nations from the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as from countries in the non-aligned movement, many of which were experimenting with socialist ideas after liberation from colonial rule. Besides, his pact with AKEL was from a position of power



and did not entail apportioning any seats to it in the executive. Furthermore, his official tolerance of the communists went hand-in-hand with his parallel endorsement of an anti-communist orientation of the state apparatus, since most key positions in government were held by ex-EOKA fighters or associates, who espoused an extreme anti-left, anti-communist ideology.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, Makarios had early on tried to pre-empt the opposition from hardline enosists, through forming his first Council of Ministers exclusively from EOKA members or affiliates.

The overall impact of the above developments was that the Greek Cypriots tended to consolidate qua Greek Cypriots into a broad front, under Makarios, so that little room was left for a strong opposition which would have questioned Makarios on any of his policies. The common core of the pro-Makarios front was an ethnonational perspective which all participants shared and which translated into different degrees of dissatisfaction with the various provisions of the Zurich-London agreements. To make matters worse, the only real opposition remaining came from the small group of more extreme enosists, and this tended to shift Greek Cypriot positions to even more inflexible attitudes in their differences with the Turkish Cypriots.

On the Turkish Cypriot side, unity was more easily achieved. The increasing strength of the enosis movement during Colonial rule, and especially after the second World War, had rallied the Turkish Cypriots together, to face this imminent threat. The EOKA struggle and, especially, the shedding of Turkish Cypriot blood, had turned tensions into open conflict. Britain's encouragement of Turkey to more actively involve itself in Cyprus had added another dimension to the problem. And TMT's attacks on the Turkish Cypriot Left had severed the few remaining links between the communities.

The smaller size of the Turkish Cypriot community, facing the more numerous and mightier Greek Cypriot community, its less differentiated social structure, and the more monolithic domination achieved by TMT, rendered the community more cohesive. Added to these, the fact that the Zurich-London agreements had given them a number of privileges to compensate for their minority status and had, effectively, made them equal partners with the Greek Cypriot majority, rendered them on the whole more satisfied with the new state of affairs. An indication of Turkish Cypriot solidarity was the fact that Fazil Kuchuk was unopposed in the first elections of the Republic (3 December 1959), for the Vice-Presidency.<sup>50</sup> His party went on to win all 15 Turkish

Cypriot seats in the House of Parliament; Rauf Denktaş was elected President of the Turkish Communal Chamber.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, it must be pointed out that most individuals who were to assume leading political roles at independence "found themselves in power before they had matured".<sup>52</sup> On the contrary, most of them had risen to prominence through their involvement in the nationalist movement, where they had to demonstrate traits of toughness, single-mindedness, and uncompromising determination, to win against all odds. They had little chance to learn the skills of governance, compromise and conciliation, which are so vital in consociational regimes.

### *Overarching loyalties*

Another important principle of consociationalism is that deep cleavages may not necessarily lead to conflict if "overarching loyalties" moderate their impact.<sup>53</sup> In the case of Cyprus, the anti-colonial movement involved only the Greek Cypriots since it aimed at *enosis*, an objective which alienated the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>54</sup> The latter had initially wanted the British to stay on, so that they would not end up as a powerless minority in a Greek dominated land; once Turkish national consciousness gradually took root and Turkish nationalism gathered force after the second World War, especially in the late fifties, in response to the growing militancy of *enosis* nationalism, it acquired a more reactionary form, passionately advocating "*taksim* or death".<sup>55</sup>

Makarios was the first Cypriot leader to espouse the idea of an independent state, not because he believed in a bi-communal partnership, but in order to forestall the British partitionist plans. Independence became the solution everyone agreed upon because, for different reasons in each case, it happened to secure, at that particular juncture, the conflicting interests of Britain, America, NATO, Greece, Turkey and the two warring communities in Cyprus. The fact that independence was only a second best, compromise solution, which the local communities had never really sought, plus the fact that it was backed by outside powers with diverse relations and interests in Cyprus, rendered the idea suspect to many Cypriots, who could not readily identify with, or feel loyalty towards, a regime they never desired or had fought for. Only a week after the signing of the Zurich-London agreements (25 February 1959), the leader of the hardline *enosis*ists, Bishop of Kyrenia, in a letter to the head of the Greek Parliament, was confiding his great fear – that independence meant permanent

alienation from Greece: "Whilst in British hands Cyprus was maintained as a Greek heritage, whereas now it is to be finally severed from Mother Greece's body. The sacred and inviolable right of self-determination, which is exercised by the very blacks of Africa, is forever thrown away".<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, the Bishop feared that the consequence of the provision which prohibited any activity likely to promote (directly or indirectly) *enosis*, would be the encouragement of activities for steering "Cypriot patriotism", and associated with this was the aim of the "enemies of Cyprus" who always harboured the "perennial and only objective of dehellenization".<sup>57</sup> Obviously, the idea of an overarching patriotism was not perceived positively, as linked to the possibility of uniting the two communities; it was viewed as simply a threat to Greek Cypriot identity, much in line with British colonial policies.

Makarios was severely criticized by the extreme nationalists for his turn to independence and for forsaking his sacred oath for union, which turned him into *enosis*' "gravedigger". Yet the Archbishop was not only the leader of the Greek community but was now President of all Cypriots, and had just agreed to power-sharing and co-habitation with the Turkish community – thus, he did seem to be in search of a new ideology, suitable for the common future which lay ahead. The historic public speech, which he delivered upon his return to Cyprus (1 March 1959), right after signing the agreements in London, is characteristic of a discourse still deeply embedded in an ethnonationalist outlook, while seeking to transcend it so as to move towards a new overarching ideology, which would build bridges between the two communities.<sup>58</sup> In the initial part of his speech, Makarios sought to emphasize that the new Cypriot state constituted a victory for the Greek Cypriots – for "the darkness of old is giving way to the sweet light of day". Attempting to draw legitimation from the past, he carried on to declare that from the "depths of history" the immortal spirit of "our ancestors" is visiting to "spread the glorious message":

...We have overcome! Today Cyprus is free: Celebrate ye brothers! [...] for the first time in our three thousand years of history we are taking into our hands the responsibility of our future. For the first time after long centuries of slavery we are becoming free. [...] Let it not be assumed that the present day constitutes the finishing point. On the contrary it constitutes the starting point of new long, peaceful struggles [...] It constitutes the starting point of new ventures for securing popular well-being and progress, and for making our country into a land which is prosperous and where the rule of law abides.

Obviously, the "brothers" whom he was inviting to celebrate victory after "three thousand years history" were the Greek Cypriots. At the same time, however, he

proceeded to stress that they needed to see positively the ethnic Others and to "cooperate wholeheartedly and honestly with the friend neighbour Turkish element"; he thus called on everyone to adopt a new vision of becoming peace's bridge-builder:

...We are called upon to transform our island into a golden bridge which will unite and not separate opposite forces. We are called upon to transform our island into a great cross-road, which will materially and spiritually link North and South, East and West...

In closing, he stressed that Cypriots were a "small people" who could only rely on "spiritual might" and "moral splendour", so he called his people to envision "a country free at last, full of youthful rigour and strength", "walking down the road of civilization and progress":

Close this vision in your soul and be assured that the state, which is founded today with your love and sacrifice, will grow to be a real state of welfare, progress, morality and justice, a state of God.

A year later, in his speech to all Cypriots, on the date of the official establishment of the Cyprus Republic (16 August 1960), Makarios was more pragmatic as to what could hold the two communities together, this time emphasizing the common benefits which all stood to have from the many socio-economic gains which would accrue to all classes in the future independent state; at the same time, he did not fail to underline the need for the new polity to "implement the principle of equal rights, equal treatment and equal opportunities to all citizens, irrespective of race, beliefs and religion", calling on all to cooperate in a "spirit of solidarity and love". Ominously, while the Archbishop stressed the equality of all citizens *as individuals*, in the new state, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, Kutchuk, was stressing the equality *of the two communities*.

Yet it seems that Makarios was torn between his past oaths for commitment to *enosis* and the need to forge a new ideology. The problems of sharing power with the Turkish Cypriots had already started appearing during the transition period between signing the agreements and the declaration of independence. His nationalist opponents were using these difficulties to step up their criticism of the agreements and his own capabilities as leader. Even more moderate Greek Cypriots were increasingly questioning the various provisions of the Constitution, as they started witnessing the difficulties the political leaders were facing in sharing power.

There was yet another factor which influenced the social milieu of the times. Since the termination of the struggle and the acceptance of independence were presented as a victory, EOKA was naturally considered as the harbinger of the new regime. Also, since the first appointments to positions of power were of EOKA members or associates, having close relations or being a supporter of the organization and of its ideology was gaining new ground! Thus the spirit of nationalism lingered on, acquiring new forms and followers. Fearing that Grivas and the extreme nationalists might win substantial inroads into the Greek Cypriot community, through monopolizing the powerful *enosis* ideology, Makarios felt it necessary to pay homage to the ideals of the anti-colonial struggle and to convince his audiences that independence was yet a new phase of the liberation effort. In a speech, just a few months before formally assuming the office of President of the Republic, he declared:

The epic grandeur and glory of EOKA's liberation struggle has laid the foundation-stone of national freedom. This freedom it is our sacred duty to safeguard and complete. National struggles never come to an end. They merely change their form [...] The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements... The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we celebrate today, has secured us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for our independence. From these bastions we will continue the struggle to complete victory.<sup>59</sup>

These trends magnified with time. Instead of withering away, ethno-nationalism was simply changing forms. Indeed, since Cypriots were now in control of the state, "official nationalism"<sup>60</sup> was for the first time finding expression – only this was not a 'civic' form of nationalism, rallying loyalty to the common state. Instead, state offices were used in the service of a communally oriented nationalism: "On Sundays, and on 'national' occasions, memorial services were held in honour of the dead of the struggle, in which Makarios himself, his Greek ministers and other politicians made patriotic speeches. Streets and squares, social clubs and athletic games were named after EOKA heroes".<sup>61</sup> The media published articles and put out programmes extolling the heroic deeds of EOKA and of the Greek people and nation more generally.<sup>62</sup> The new power contest between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas supporters, which translated into pro-independence and pro-*enosis* core positions, kept pushing the official Greek Cypriot views into a synthesis which stressed the temporary nature of independence, as a step to the unfulfilled longer term national goal of *enosis*.<sup>63</sup> Some have argued that this was mostly talk, on behalf of Makarios and his supporters, as a defence against staunch *enosis*ists. But it made the Turkish Cypriots increasingly suspicious of Greek Cypriots for what they perceived as the latter's double-talk; which caused them

to cling even more tenaciously to their rights enshrined in the Constitution, especially those underlining their separate and equal status as a community. This pushed them nearer their own original goal of *taksim* and further away from the Greek Cypriots. In turn, such a stand provoked the Greek Cypriots, who themselves suspected the Turkish Cypriots of double-talk, and of secretly harbouring partitionist plans.

Overall, the Greek Cypriots felt they were double losers. Not only had their preferred collective vision of *enosis* not materialized, but their second best solution of independence was not working to their liking either. Although they were the ones to wage the anti-colonial struggle, and despite the fact that they were the majority, they were forced into a situation where they had to share rule with the Turkish Cypriots – the ethnonational Others who had tried to frustrate the liberation struggle and who, after all, were a mere minority. Meanwhile, a few months after Cyprus won its freedom, the United Nations had adopted the 1960 Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People.<sup>64</sup> Self-determination and majority rule were the order of the day in most emerging Third World countries.<sup>65</sup> The Greek Cypriots felt they were deprived not only of *enosis* but of their 'natural rights' as a majority. Hence "Makarios tried to make good in government practice what Zurich and London had denied him – namely, a pattern of government where the majority will prevailed, albeit with some guarantees for the minority".<sup>66</sup> So, for instance, when in May 1961, the Turkish Cypriots refused to vote for the renewal of the tax law, he nevertheless gave orders for the collection of the taxes – despite Turkish protests that he was thereby violating the Constitution.<sup>67</sup> Hard-line Greek Cypriots concluded that whenever a provision of the Constitution became a source of friction between the two communities, the answer was simply not to "stick to the letter" of the particular provision.<sup>68</sup> Others argued that if Greek Cypriots "wanted to survive as Hellenes and especially as the hegemonic element on the island"<sup>69</sup> then they had to control the state. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots felt that the Greeks were using their numerical strength to pass pre-determined decisions in the Council of Ministers and in the House of Parliament, without really paying attention to their concerns as a minority, contrary to the spirit of the consociational power-sharing arrangements: "In essence, the Turkish Cypriots felt that, whatever the constitutional package they were being excluded from government".<sup>70</sup>

Voices of moderation were rare and feeble, and few paid much attention to them. AKEL spoke from a position of weakness and tended to adopt positions which were not

very sensitive to Turkish Cypriot concerns, seeing the latter as mostly stressed by the extremist leadership of the minority community.

Among the liberal bourgeoisie, N. Lanitis represents a clear and prophetic voice which Greek Cypriots did not heed to, at their own detriment. Back in the 1940's, Lanitis was one of leaders of the Social Progress Society, which had been arguing against extreme *enosis* positions, proposing instead an evolutionary process of "constitutional development and the acquisition of self-governing powers", after which self-determination would be assured, so *enosis* would still be an option. That road was not followed and the Cypriots had to live with the Zurich agreements, reached "by force of circumstance". In a series of articles, published in March 1963, just a few months before the collapse of the bi-communal Republic, Lanitis argued that the main advantage of Zurich was that Cypriots were now masters of their own house which they had to "put in order". The main disadvantage was the division of the country, effected mostly through the separate Communal Chambers and, to a lesser extent, the separate municipalities, both of which prevented unity – "an essential provision for progress". Lack of unity and trust between Greeks and Turks had led to the problem with the municipalities, as well as inefficiencies in government, the economic war between the two communities and other evils. Lanitis stressed that Greek Cypriots, as the majority community, had more of the burden of exercising responsible leadership.<sup>71</sup> This included avoiding to "blatantly celebrate on Greek national occasions", which caused "fear and hatred amongst the Turks" – who, in reaction, "indulge in their own celebrations". Instead, "purely Cypriot occasions" such as Independence Day, should be celebrated. Greek Cypriots had to work hard at gaining the confidence of the Turkish Cypriots otherwise the latter would be forced to increasingly "rely on Turkey". After all, besides the "ostensible differences of religion and language", there was more that united the two communities: "Basically we should be one country and one people. The Turks are above all Cypriots; and so are the Greeks". Hence the "idea of Cyprus" as an independent country had to be fostered, through giving prominence to its own symbols and commemorations.

Here, then, were clear views arguing in support of an overarching identity and loyalty – which, however, in the intolerant milieu of the times, were considered unfounded and unpatriotic. In his articles, Lanitis had warned that if differences with Turkish Cypriots were not addressed, they would turn into hatred and open conflict – which would mean the loss of control of the situation by the political leaders, and power passing

into “the hands of irresponsible gunmen” – which is exactly what happened a few months later, in December 1963.<sup>72</sup>

### *Traditions of elite accommodation*

Consociational theory proposes that a pre-democratic historical tradition of moderation and compromise can be an independent favourable factor that can “appreciably strengthen the chances of consociational democracy.”<sup>73</sup> In his brief commentary on “Consociational failure in Cyprus, 1960-1963”,<sup>74</sup> Lijphart opines that the “only mildly favorable element” for the consociational experiment in Cyprus, was its “historical experience [...] of being ruled under the Ottoman millet system”,<sup>75</sup> which he obviously associates with multicultural toleration. Judging from the end result of failure in Cyprus, however, he carries on to pessimistically conclude that “[t]he Cypriot example again shows that such prior traditions are not of decisive importance”. There are two main problems with such a position: First, Cyprus’ experience under the Ottoman millet system was not as unequivocally positive as is implied (see chapter three). Second, aside from the exact nature and record of the Ottoman regime in Cyprus, the most important influence on elite traditions was surely the subsequent period of British Colonial rule, which lasted for almost a century, and was the midwife of the independent state.

We have seen (chapter four) that far from contributing to the creation of a liberal spirit of pragmatism and moderation, British rule had a determining role in the fostering of exactly the opposite tradition. Kitromilides sums up the three aspects of Colonial policy which mostly contributed towards nurturing a culture of intolerance:<sup>76</sup> First, institutionalizing the system of communal representation, which had the consequence of politicizing ethnicity and stirring passions along ethnic lines; second, the very structure of the Legislative Council, which deprived the Greek Cypriots of having a real say in the governing of the island; and third, the British attitude towards the Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination and self-governance, which became increasingly inflexible as British strategic interests on the island acquired higher significance – leading to the parallel growth of intransigent attitudes among the locals, and the undermining of all voices of moderation. The combination of these three factors with irredentist nationalism led to the prevalence of immoderation and extremism in the relations of the two communities. This “dialectic of intolerance”, as Kitromilides aptly calls it, had important consequences in Cyprus’ political life – such as,



subverting all initiatives for reforms whenever these appeared (viz. the case of the *Diaskeptiki* in 1948), forestalling most forms of public criticism, and hindering support to alternative political forces which would have been more committed to transcending the dialectic. Overall, the latter amounted to the “mutual isolation” of the two ethnic communities, which led them to develop separate political visions, which in turn constituted the basis of subsequent intercommunal conflict; furthermore, within each community, hegemony in the political sphere became associated with adherence to “nationalist orthodoxy”.<sup>77</sup>

It is important to recall that the prevalent nationalism was imported from two motherlands which had several times in the past engaged in war: Especially in their latest clashes (1919-1922), hundreds of thousands from each nation were killed and millions violently displaced – indeed, the exchanges of population which followed the war were perhaps the first instance of state-led ethnic cleansing in modern European history. Both states were guilty of organized mass atrocities and had “authorized the murders of unarmed civilians as part of their war policies”.<sup>78</sup> In consequence, the social representations of the two communities in Cyprus held the respective other nation as their worse external enemy; and leftists/communists as the dangerous internal enemy.<sup>79</sup> The fact that EOKA had taken up the armed struggle against the British, and had established its dominance through killing British soldiers, but also Greek Cypriot leftists or “traitors”, as well as Turkish Cypriot regime collaborators, had normalized the use of violence as a means of solving political problems; TMT had also used violence for similar purposes among the Turkish Cypriots. Thereby, a “habit of lawlessness” and disrespect for law and its organs was inherited from the period of emergency.<sup>80</sup>

During the transition period, between the Zurich agreements and the declaration of Independence, the authorities found it difficult to press for the surrender of all weapons of EOKA and TMT: Some members of the former were not happy with the agreements and kept their weapons just in case patriotic duty would call on them to continue with the unfinished struggle in the future; TMT patriots similarly wanted to hold on to their weapons, worrying that EOKA might use their guns against Turkish Cypriots. Yet the primary form of violence in the first years of Independence proved to be intra-communal. On the Greek Cypriot side, as already mentioned, the Right started showing signs of a fracture into pro-independence and pro-*enosis* factions, which amounted to a pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas division respectively, especially after

Grivas publicly criticized the Zurich agreements, in July '59.<sup>81</sup> Pro-Grivas supporters were in the minority, in terms of numbers, but managed to aggravate their opponents by using a discourse which was "harsh, fanatical and intolerant".<sup>82</sup> Pro-Makarios supporters proved to be equally prone to immoderation: Initially, they reacted at verbal provocations with attacks on the personnel of enotist newspapers in both Athens and Cyprus.<sup>83</sup> By a year later, verbal attacks had given way to physical abuses and, in August 1961, the first murders occurred of two pro-*enosis*, ex-EOKA members. Greek Cypriot newspapers were lamenting the reign of an atmosphere of "fear and insecurity". Ierodiakonou documents how between 1959 and 1962 political violence and terrorist acts had become a daily phenomenon – including threats, shootings, gang attacks, sabotage, and continuous rumours of planned or imminent conspiracies.<sup>84</sup> Evidence indicates that Greek Cypriot members of the executive (and especially the powerful Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Giorkadjis) were behind most incidents of pro-Makarios violence – the extent of Makarios' complicity being difficult to assess. Little police action was taken and no case was cleared or taken to court. Furthermore, public condemnation by state officials of pro-state violence was often quite lukewarm and, sometimes, it was even justified as an inevitable response to the provocative or inflammatory language of the pro-*enosis* victims.<sup>85</sup>

The enotist opposition also resorted to physical violence even if, initially, to a lesser extent, due to its smaller numbers. It was more guilty of ideological violence, an "aphoristic and extreme" discourse which stirred "passions and antagonism"; pro-Makarios circles proved utterly intolerant of such caustic criticism of their leader, so they would resort to 'punishing' the irreverent opposition members. The press proved unduly partisan and did not help the situation, since its coverage was usually "inflammatory, exaggerated and uncorroborated", serving the interests of its particular side or patrons. Meanwhile, TMT was equally active on the Turkish Cypriot side: For instance, during the transition period, it executed Turkish Cypriot policemen who proved zealous in cooperating with the British in collecting illegal weapons held by members of their own community; it was also instrumental in enforcing the campaign "from Turk to Turk", which aimed at making the Turkish Cypriot community more economically independent from the Greek Cypriots;<sup>86</sup> similarly, it imposed adherence to a policy of Turkish Cypriots not talking or writing in Greek.<sup>87</sup>

On 25 March 1962, bombs blew up two mosques on the Turkish Cypriot side, whereupon Kutchuk and Denktas accused "extremists encouraged by the Greek Press

and the Greek leadership" as the guilty parties. When two Turkish Cypriot lawyers-politicians, publishers of the opposition newspaper *Chumhuriyet*, started dropping hints in their articles that the bombings were a Turkish Cypriot provocation, they were swiftly silenced forever by TMT, and accused posthumously as collaborators of the enemy.<sup>88</sup> What actually differed in the two communities was that, in the Turkish Cypriot community, TMT had not dissolved, was pretty cohesive, and under the constant political leadership of the hard-liner Rauf Denktas, the military leadership being provided by Turkish military officers. On the Greek Cypriot side, EOKA had officially disbanded right after the Zurich agreements, and there was initial antagonism between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas groups. This was soon to change, however, when in October '59, the British intercepted *Deniz*, a Turkish vessel, in Cyprus waters, carrying weapons and ammunition to the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>89</sup> The incident put the Greeks on the alert, and soon they sent a delegate to Greece to make arms deals.<sup>90</sup> The effort was stepped up about a year later, once the first problems in political decision-making caused tensions to escalate: Worrying that the Turkish Cypriots were deliberately trying to push things to the limit so as to cause Turkey's intervention, Giorkadjis himself flew to Greece to request the government weapons; since the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Averoff) turned him down, he ended up securing the secret help of Greek military officers. With the guns he received, he set up a para-military<sup>91</sup> chieftain (*kapetanato*), called *Organosis*. Giorkadjis, code named Akritas, was the chief of the Organisation, with other high officers of the government manning the executive committee.<sup>92</sup> The Organisation's backbone became an anti-communist network that Giorkadjis managed to set up with American funding.

Two other para-military organizations were also set up, again indicating the splits and lower cohesiveness of the Greek Cypriot community. One of them was led by Nicos Sampson, an ex-EOKA leader, who was disgruntled for not having shared the spoils of power at Independence, and was contesting Giorkadjis' monopoly of violence. The other, Vassos Lyssarides, the private physician of Makarios, was of socialist leanings. As Attalides points out, if Sampson was "between Grivas and Makarios", Lyssarides was "between AKEL and Makarios", creating a delicate balance of para-state power.<sup>93</sup> Interestingly, since the two communities never agreed on setting up a common state army, as provided by the constitution, a security vacuum was left, and when conflict erupted in December 1963, these three *chieftains* were to do the fighting on behalf of the Greek Cypriots – with TMT organizing the defence on the Turkish Cypriot side.

Documentation that came to light subsequent to the '63 clashes, demonstrates that the two communities had been preparing for an eventual showdown. On the Greek-Cypriot side, the secret *Akritas plan* was premised on the unjust nature of the Zurich-London agreements, seen to be imposed by force, and the pressing need for their revision. In case of Turkish Cypriot reactions and ensuing conflict the insurgents were to be swiftly contained, so as to prevent or pre-empt outside intervention by Turkey; in case of a wider escalation of violence, *enosis* would be declared – otherwise the plan was for “removing the fetters of independence” so that the ultimate aim of full “self-determination of the people” could be secured, which would have allowed for union in the future.<sup>94</sup>

On the Turkish Cypriot side, corresponding plans<sup>95</sup> were premised on Greek Cypriot non-compliance and delays in implementing various provisions of the constitution; the Greek Cypriots were to be provoked into taking the first step to change the constitution, whereupon Turkish Cypriot officials in the government and Parliament would withdraw to form their own “Cypriot” or “Turkish” Republic, under Vice-President Kutchuk (who would become president), and which “motherland” Turkey would “immediately recognize”. Predicting a dynamic reaction by the Greek Cypriots, the plan provided that Turkish Cypriots, at that time spread across the whole island, would be “forcibly concentrated in one area”, which they would thereby “be obliged to defend”; subsequently, Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey would be encouraged to return and settle in Cyprus (this provision demonstrating the minority’s worry of their opponents’ numerical superiority).<sup>96</sup>

The para-military organizations received weapons and advice from Greek and Turkish military officers, respectively. By the end of 1962, they had started enlisting and training members, who had to take oaths of secrecy and obedience; the communists were obviously excluded, since they were still considered internal enemies and haters of the nation<sup>97</sup>. Men from the two communities were thus coming together to demonstrate solidarity to their own people in preparation for the oncoming confrontation. The problem, of course, was that this “totalizing doctrine of [collective] responsibility”, and the “coming together of men capable of violence, with a historically justified mission to defend their ethnic group against a ‘traditional enemy’”,<sup>98</sup> could easily turn, with the slightest spark, into uncontrollable intercommunal violence. Makarios’ thirteen-point proposal, for revising the Constitution, provided that spark.

### *A multiple balance of powers*

Consociational theory proposes that a "multiple balance of power among the segments of a plural society is more conducive to consociational democracy than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of its segments".<sup>99</sup> A multiple balance implies that no segment or subculture may acquire majority or dominance on its own, which ensures cooperation will have to prevail; such "multipolarity" is characteristic of the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, and seems to considerably contribute towards the success of consensus politics in these countries. On the other hand, a dual balance may lead to instability as the leaders of either or both segments may attempt to dominate (shifting the system to a dual imbalance), thereby hampering cooperation. Furthermore, dual balance situations may lead to "an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game" so that a gain for one segment is viewed as a loss for the other.<sup>100</sup>

In the case of Cyprus, Lijphart believes the dual imbalance of power was "the main reason why consociationalism failed":<sup>101</sup> The Greek Cypriots constituted a clear majority and wanted to act as one; they "reluctantly accepted" power-sharing in 1960 but viewed the main provisions of the consociational constitution with "increasing distaste", therefore, cooperation became unpalatable to them. On their part, the Turkish Cypriot minority proved too rigid, "and insisted on the faithful adherence to every consociational principle and overused their veto power". Presumably the lesson is that consociationalism "cannot be imposed against the wishes of one or more segments in a plural society and, in particular, against the resistance of a majority segment" – such as the Greek Cypriots. Yet Lijphart's analysis is again quite limited. For one, it is not merely numerical majority which made the Greek-Cypriots feel justified to dominate, but the fact that they had identified democracy with self-determination and majority rule – concepts which were enjoying universal acceptance and legitimation by the 60s. Belief in these principles, in conjunction with the strong ethno-national feelings which had been deeply embedded within the Greek Cypriot community (as of course they had been among Turkish Cypriots), made cooperation very difficult – unlike the northern European countries, where differences were mainly religious, cultural or ideological, and thus not as unbridgeable as in Cyprus. Secondly, the "segments" in the case of Cyprus were more than two – if we remember how deep the Left and Right cleavage was. But, again, it was the influence of ethno-nationalism which diminished the salience of ideological segmentation, since, as we saw, AKEL had

to accept the hegemony of Makarios and of the Right more generally, having been stigmatized and marginalized after the anti-colonial struggle. The new regime was predicated on securing the external interests of the guarantor powers and ensuring the Left would have few chances of rising to power.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the importance of interventions by outside powers – which had a determining effect on the internal developments. For instance, the rigid behaviour of the Turkish Cypriots cannot be properly understood outside the context of Turkey's support, on which the former counted on for equalizing the power of the Greek Cypriot majority. Again, ethno-nationalism was at the root of the problem – and not the mere imbalance of numbers.

### *External threats and interests*

Early theories of consociationalism tended to view society and the state as closed systems, change presumably coming about only, or mainly, as a consequence of internal dynamics. The only case in which the impact of external actors was acknowledged was that of external threats, seen to foster the internal cohesion of a system. More recently, McGarry and O'Leary have underlined the role that external actors may play, emphasizing their possible contribution in *promoting* consociational arrangements.<sup>102</sup> Yet this position is itself limiting for it is preferable to consider societies as open systems in continuous contact with their outside environment, the one impacting on the other in multiple ways: External actors can have a significant influence, not only through constituting an outside threat, but through the material or ideal interests they may develop in connection with a particular society – as happened in Cyprus.

We have already seen how, in the case of Cyprus, external agents (Britain, Greece, Turkey, NATO, the United Nations), while pursuing their own different interests, were all instrumental in promoting the Zurich-London consociational agreements. A common external threat could henceforth have pushed the grand coalition of Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites towards more cooperation and unity. Indeed, in all Western European consociational democracies (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), the great stir towards the consolidation of grand coalitions was given during periods of international emergency or conflict, such as the First and Second

World Wars. Yet the connection is not automatic: For an outside threat to lead to unity and solidarity, there must be two conditions – first, that all segments share a commitment to maintaining the prevailing social order and, second, that the threat is perceived as equally dangerous by all the segments of the plural society. As we have noted, the two communities in Cyprus, and especially the Greek Cypriots, were not very happy with the new regime, which did not fulfill their ideal goals. They were not, therefore, committed to maintaining the prevailing status quo, seeking instead to radically alter it. Furthermore, what was perceived as an external threat by one, was seen to be a source of security by the other, and this drove the two communities further apart. For the Greek Cypriots, for instance, the greatest external threat came from a possible military intervention by Turkey; while for the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey's backing was precisely what they needed as a counterbalance to the superiority (numerical and political) of the Greek Cypriots.

But, most importantly, as we have noted, the impact of external actors was not only as constitutive of outside threats. Having played a role in instigating the initial settlement, they each continued to have a part in supporting or subverting the new regime. After all, the Zurich-London agreements had "constitutionalized"<sup>103</sup> foreign interests in Cyprus. Lehbruch has underlined that when internal cleavages correspond with international fault-lines of division, this "results in the internal replication of international conflicts, especially in the case of religious and ethnic conflicts".<sup>104</sup> This was certainly true as regards the constitutionalized interference of the two 'motherlands' in Cyprus. Turkey for one, kept encouraging the Turkish Cypriots towards adopting more separatist positions. In one of the most important controversies between the two communities, in which the Greek Cypriots wanted to keep the municipalities unified and the Turkish Cypriots wanted to keep them separate, it proved practically impossible to move towards more segregation simply because residential patterns were quite intermixed: Although Turkey seemed to acknowledge the practical difficulties involved, it still insisted on separation for political reasons – so that the Turkish Cypriot community would have a territorial base in case it wished to push the option of partition at a future date.<sup>105</sup> A second example relates to the way Turkey outrightly rejected Makarios' 1963 proposal to change the Constitution – even before Turkish Cypriots had the chance to give their own response.

Greece was not so interventionist in the period under consideration (1960-1963), as the Karamanlis government felt quite vulnerable regarding Greece's external balance of

powers. Yet the Greek opposition was extremely critical of the Zurich-London agreements, hurling charges of treachery and betrayal of the national cause, so as to undermine the government and cause its downfall – and this it eventually accomplished in the summer of 1962. George Papandreou's opposition, and subsequent rise to power, were thus signals to the Greek-Cypriots that Greece would be supportive in their efforts to change the Constitution.

Additionally we should not forget that both countries were secretly providing illegal military assistance (weapons and expert advice) to the two Cypriot communities, helping them in their preparation for the oncoming clash.

It should not be assumed, however, that outside parties were just imposing their wishes on the locals, as, in most cases, the latter invited or manipulated the former into intervening on their behalf. And this did not relate only to Greece and Turkey, but to other outside powers the assistance of which each community tried to solicit for its own purposes. This was primarily true of the Greek Cypriots who felt deeply dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed upon them by the Agreements. Realising that it was almost impossible to change any part of the deal, to loosen the grip of the guarantors, and that Greece itself could do little to help them in this count, since it was totally committed and dependent on the NATO alliance, they tried to forge other external alliances. It is thus no wonder that the Greek-Cypriots made sure to secure for themselves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representation at the United Nations. Despite the secret "Gentlemen's Agreement" entailing the request of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers for Cyprus to join NATO, Makarios consciously promoted a policy of non-alignment, against the views of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President;<sup>106</sup> subsequently Makarios made openings to the Soviet camp. Obviously, the Greek Cypriot side was preparing the ground for future battles in the United Nations. They surmised that the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, in conjunction with Article 103 of the UN Charter, which in cases of clash of its principles with other agreements (such as the Zurich-London ones), assigns priority to the Charter, would constitute strong weapons in a possible future contest against Turkey and its entrenched rights of intervention in Cyprus.<sup>107</sup>

This involvement of outside parties in Cyprus, either because they wanted to promote their own interests or the locals wanted to use them for their own purposes, was to



become a constitutive feature of political life in Cyprus and to have dire consequences on the future of the new Republic and on the relations between the two communities.

***The first partition: Captured state and the resurgence of enosis (1964-74)***

The main consequence of the intercommunal conflict, which began in December 1963 and continued intermittently until late 1967, was the exodus of large numbers of Turkish Cypriots from areas where they were in the minority into a number of self-contained enclaves, where they set up their own separate administration; this was the "first partition"<sup>108</sup> of the island, which was to radically change the centuries-old pattern of mingled cohabitation, leading to extensive territorial separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.<sup>109</sup> Many of those who moved did so for security reasons, following the outbreak of violence which led to numerous casualties, atrocities and the taking of hundreds of hostages by both sides.<sup>110</sup> Others seem to have moved after the prompting of their leadership; most importantly, once they did move into the enclaves they were strongly discouraged, and even intimidated, so as not to return. Within a year, 20% of the Turkish Cypriots had moved and half of the community was cramped in the enclaves, which covered a much smaller percentage of land (2-4%) as compared to their ratio of population (18%) at the time.<sup>111</sup> The barricaded enclaves were guarded by irregulars and living conditions were difficult since important public services, such as electricity and telecommunications, were in Greek hands. Hardship increased when the Greek side imposed an embargo on "strategic goods", presumably to prevent their usage for military purposes, but also to discourage the consolidation of the enclaves and thereby of separation; for instance, building materials were disallowed for fear of being used for military fortifications, but this also made difficult the repair and building of houses. Since thousands of jobs, primarily in the public sector but also in Greek enterprises, were lost, unemployment among Turkish Cypriots increased dramatically and they had to rely heavily on Turkey's financial aid for survival.<sup>112</sup>

At the initial stages of separation, the Turkish Cypriots organized politically under the leadership of the Vice-President, who acted as head of a loose administration, comprised of the three ministers, the fifteen members of the House of Representatives and the Communal Chamber; similarly, other officers in the Cyprus Republic undertook the corresponding functions in the new administration. Patrick notes that a mainland

Turkish military officer was attached to each enclave, whose job was to support the administration but also to ensure compliance with Ankara's policy guidelines and to aid the efforts of maintaining a united communal front. Obviously, dependence on Turkey was all round – economic, military and political.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership viewed these developments as temporary and as "necessitated by the crisis". Since, as we will see below, the Greek Cypriots swiftly managed to gain international recognition for the now mono-communal Cyprus Republic, Turkish Cypriots maintained that they were effectively pushed out of the state, which was usurped by the Greek Cypriots; they upheld the validity of the 1960 Constitution and charged the Greek Cypriot controlled government as illegal and unconstitutional, claiming that they themselves had no intention of creating a separate state. Indeed, their first move to giving a political flavour to their autonomy came only at the end of 1967, after a major set-back in Greek Cypriot plans, whereupon they took the first step towards formalizing their separate status by declaring an autonomous "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration".

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots had failed to contain the Turkish Cypriot reaction, as they had planned, but had found themselves with de facto control of the state. Yet the legitimacy of the now Greek Cypriot controlled government was questioned by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, since the essence of the Constitution rested on bi-communal power-sharing. Furthermore, Turkey kept threatening to invade, according to its "constitutional right" as a guarantor of the status quo. An equally important threat came from Britain and the USA, which were trying to help with peace restoration, but wanted to make sure the problem was handled within NATO circles, so as to best serve their own interests (preventing a conflict between Turkey and Greece, while avoiding the involvement of the Soviet Union).<sup>113</sup> Makarios successfully managed to steer through all external pressures and took the issue to the UN Security Council instead. There, the Greek Cypriots argued that the cause of the problems in Cyprus was the unfair 1960 settlement, imposed on Cyprus by outside powers without its free consent, which rendered "the doctrine of unequal, inequitable, and unjust treaties relevant";<sup>114</sup> they similarly argued that the Treaty of Guarantee violated the UN principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states, and its provisions endorsed the unlawful use of force.<sup>115</sup> The Security Council vindicated Makarios, unanimously adopting a resolution (183/1964) which mostly endorsed Greek Cypriot positions. The resolution acknowledged the "sovereign Republic of Cyprus" and urged

all parties to respect "the territorial integrity and political independence" of the island. The decision further called for the creation of a "United Nations Force of Cyprus" (UNFICYP), to "preserve international peace and security" and "to co-operate with the government of Cyprus in restoring law and order"; finally, it recommended the appointment of a UN mediator to promote a "peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem".<sup>116</sup> As Joseph puts it, "the Security Council resolution became a political wild card in Makarios' hands",<sup>117</sup> for the bicomunal Cyprus Republic could now start functioning as a true sovereign and independent country, with the blessings of the international community, despite the absence of one of the two founding communities.

Soon the now Greek controlled House of Representatives started passing legislation which incorporated most of Makarios' thirteen proposed amendments to the 1960 Constitution, which had originally sparked the crisis<sup>118</sup>: A first law placed the Police and Gendarmerie under a single command; a Conscription Law created the National Guard into which all the "irregulars" were to be housed, along with young male conscripts;<sup>119</sup> the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice were incorporated into a single Supreme Court; a Municipalities Law gave powers to the Council of Ministers to appoint Municipal Councils, thereby providing necessary continuity after the expiry of the previous Municipalities Law (December 1962); the Greek Communal Chamber was abolished and replaced with a Ministry of Education; a law extended the term in office of the President and the members of the House until elections were held; another law provided for the abolition of separate electoral lists, as well as the separate electoral districts, for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and replaced these with unified electoral lists and electoral districts, for the elections of the President and Members of the House of Parliament.<sup>120</sup> But, all of these could have been questioned by the Turkish Cypriots, since the Constitution could not change without their consent – let alone the vital provisions which were altogether unchangeable. The issue was solved through a decision of the Supreme Court which determined that the Constitution could be interpreted as implying a "doctrine of necessity in exceptional circumstances", deemed necessary in order "to ensure the very existence of the State".<sup>121</sup> Since the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the crisis was that the minority community had undertaken a rebellion (*antarsia*) against the Republic and had abandoned it, they felt justified in taking control of the executive and public service, and in distributing the various posts and powers the departed rebel members of the government enjoyed, to Greek Cypriot members.<sup>122</sup> As Tzermias observes, all these

changes effectively amounted to a "*hellenization*" of the Republic<sup>123</sup> and were directed toward establishing a majoritarian "unified state with 'unfettered' independence".<sup>124</sup>

Meanwhile, an important development was the coming to power (February 1964) of George Papandreou in Greece. The new Prime Minister was strongly pro-*enosis* and encouraged Makarios in this direction. Yet there were important differences in the two leaders' approach: First, Papandreou saw Greece as the "national centre" of Hellenism, which meant that Athens had to have a certain precedence over Nicosia in decision-making regarding "national matters"; second, Papandreou felt uneasy with Makarios' inclusion of the Cypriot communists (AKEL) among his allies, and with his seeking help from the Soviets – which allowed many countries of the western world to charge that the Greek Cypriots and especially Makarios were influenced by the communists and that, thereby, Cyprus ran the risk of becoming a new "Cuba of the Mediterranean". Makarios, on the other hand, felt that the real problem was the negative attitude of western powers (namely Britain and America), which made Greek Cypriots turn to assistance "from the East". Overall, however, he maintained that "Cyprus historically and culturally belongs to the West", even though it had to continue with its non-aligned foreign policy if it were to further its interests. Where the two men did seem to agree was on the fact that Greece was too far from Cyprus to be of any use if Turkey was to invade, so they decided on the secret dispatch to Cyprus of weapons and troops which would restrain Turkey from aggressive military initiatives, as well as strengthen the Cypriot government's political bargaining position. After the arrival of a Greek brigade on the island (April '64), the two heads of state agreed for Grivas to be sent to Cyprus (June '64), to coordinate the combined Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. Besides his manifest mission, Papandreou, as well as Britain and America, intended Grivas as an "anti-communist balance" to Makarios. Makarios had ambivalent feelings about Grivas but considered that his return to Cyprus was necessary to assuage the fears of the West and Greece, while holding on to his internal and external alliances with the communists, who were instrumental in his drive for 'unfettered' independence.

All these developments – the hellenization of the state, the victories in the United Nations, the rise to power of pro-*enosis* George Papandreou, the strong support of Greece and the coming of the Greek army, as well as the renewed cooperation between Makarios and Grivas, created an atmosphere of "pro-*enosis* euphoria", and Greek Cypriots felt that self-determination, leading to the "sacred vision" of *enosis*, was just down the corner. The Greek Cypriots were now completely united as against the

common threat of Turkey and were all equally resentful of the Turkish Cypriots who had unwittingly accepted to play the role of 'trojan horse' – since they constituted the cause of a possible Turkish invasion.<sup>125</sup> The newspapers were expressing the optimism of the times, predicting a vindication of national aspirations, students demonstrated in the streets in support of union, and civic organizations were publishing declarations in favour of *enosis*.<sup>126</sup> So convinced was the Greek Cypriot political leadership that *enosis* was near that the Council of Ministers asked its Minister of Finance to set up a team for studying the economic situation in Cyprus, in view of the upcoming union. Makarios went ahead to ask the Cypriot Ambassador in Athens to prepare a letter to the king of Greece, reporting that soon the Greek Cypriots would be dissolving the Republic, in order to declare *enosis*, so the Greek government should start making the necessary advance preparations. Makarios never sent the letter, fearing a Turkish invasion in case the plan was put into effect – but the incident demonstrates how ready the Greek Cypriots were to abandon their Republic, believing this to be their "moral and national duty", necessitated by the "dictates of history".<sup>127</sup>

Yet Grivas' presence and the rekindling of enotist nationalism were to set off an unpredictable dynamic to developments.<sup>128</sup> His authoritarianism, militancy and anti-communism were soon to cause disunity among the Greek Cypriots; furthermore, his presence contributed to the further alienation of the Turkish Cypriots and increased the risks of igniting a wider Greko-Turkish conflict in the area.<sup>129</sup> Indeed, the latter almost soon came true in August '64, when Grivas led an attack against the strategically important "Kokkina-Mansoura" Turkish Cypriot enclave.<sup>130</sup> Despite initial success, Grivas did not comply with orders from Athens to cease fire, with which he disagreed, and acknowledging his disobedience,<sup>131</sup> he proceeded to resign. This did not stop Turkey from reacting violently against the Greek Cypriot attacks, through bombing their positions in the vicinity of the area under attack (Tylliria), causing hundreds of deaths and casualties.<sup>132</sup> Ongoing conflict was to be one of the reasons why outside powers kept involving themselves with Cyprus, ostensibly to help with conflict resolution, but mostly to secure their own interests.

Ever since the inter-communal clashes of December 1963, the Cyprus problem had entered a course of increasing internationalization. Besides the involvement of the three "guarantor powers", the superpowers were trying to promote their own views and interests, as concerning developments. The USA, as the new western superpower, was trying to take over the place of Britain so as to ensure NATO's strategic interests

in the area and prevent a Greek-Turkish war. To counteract Western influence, the Soviet Union was increasing its own involvement, taking advantage of Makarios' need to secure allies in his struggle to loosen the grip of NATO powers, and primarily of Turkey, on Cyprus. Adding to its many internal problems, Cyprus became entangled in Cold War rivalry.<sup>133</sup> Once the Americans realized they could not deal with Makarios directly, they tried to push for a solution to the Cyprus Problem via Greece and Turkey.<sup>134</sup> In this they found a willing collaborator in Prime Minister Papandreu, who believed he could convince Americans to accept the idea of *enosis*, through stressing that union with Greece, already a member of NATO, would be the best way of guaranteeing that the "Red Priest" would not be allowed to take Cyprus down the road of communism; as he put it to the US President, the dilemma was between "Natoification or Cuba".<sup>135</sup> The problem with this line of thinking was that Turkey could claim something similar. No wonder then that the Americans soon came up with a proposal which became known as the "double *enosis*" plan. It was masterminded by Dean Acheson<sup>136</sup> (which is why the plan often goes by his name), and it mainly provided for Cyprus to be united with Greece, but Turkey to be given, in exchange, a military base on the island (plus the tiny Greek island of Kastellorizo, just off the Turkish coast); Cyprus was to be divided into eight cantons, two of which would be controlled by the Turkish Cypriots, who would be granted a self-governing regime.

The Acheson Plan<sup>137</sup> thus aimed at bridging the conflicting national goals of *enosis* and partition, bringing peace in Greek and Turkish relations, and restoring Cyprus to firm NATO control; at the same time, the dissolution of the Republic would marginalize Makarios and would eliminate the internal and external communist danger. But Makarios saw through the plan and its implications, so he promptly dismissed it, despite American, Greek and Turkish pressures. Some authors believe that one of the reasons he approved of the Kokkina operation had to do with sabotaging the American initiative; others believe the Americans tolerated the Turkish bombings in Tylliria in order to put pressure on Makarios to accept the plan. To get out of the bind, Makarios turned to Soviet help again, and the Kremlin responded by sending a strong message of warning to Turkey. At the same time, Greek Cypriots appealed to the Security Council, charging that Turkey had "obtained the full consent of NATO headquarters for the air attacks".

The Acheson Plan provided perhaps the first opportunity for important differences to become apparent in the approaches of the Nicosia and Athens government. The key

divergence had to do with Nicosia's stress on "true" or "pure" *enosis*, without giving away territory or other powers to Turkey, which could constitute props to future Turkish demands for partition, or even the full annexation of Cyprus; Athens seemed to be open to discuss concessions to Turkey, believing the most important issue to be the fact of *enosis* as such, and the removal of a constant source of tension in the relations of the two countries, which weakened the southern flank of NATO.

In the ensuing years, Greece went through long-term political instability, culminating in the 21 April 1967 coup of the military junta. The regime of the Greek colonels had little sympathy for Makarios, who insisted on resisting the wishes of consecutive Greek governments, and had acquired the reputation of a strong democratic leader of non-aligned, anti-imperialist leanings, who kept close relations with the communists. Soon after their seizure of power, the Greek colonels declared their determination to renew dialogue with Turkey and to press for *enosis*, but indications were that they too were ready to grant territorial concessions without Cypriot involvement or consent. In Cyprus, the press and politicians were quite critical of the junta, while Makarios tried to calm them down by stressing the need to cooperate with the government of the mainland, whatever its ideology or policies. On 26 June 1967, the Cypriot House of Parliament adopted a unanimous resolution which supported the continuation of the struggle "without any inbetween halt, until it was consummated in the union of the whole of Cyprus with Mother Greece."<sup>138</sup> While at face value the resolution appears to be straight-forwardly pro-*enosis*, on closer look the reference to the union of "the whole" of Cyprus with Greece was a clear message against double *enosis* and any territorial concessions to Turkey. The junta understood too well the message of the Cypriot House and, on 1 July 1967, it released a strongly worded communiqué against the "communists and their allies", as well as the "hypocrites" and "opportunists" who pretended they wanted *enosis*, while they rendered *enosis* unfeasible through attaching to it unrealistic conditions.

But the more important crisis to face the Greeks and Greek Cypriots came with the Kophinou events in November 1967: These had to do with yet another attack of Greek Cypriot forces on a Turkish Cypriot enclave, after initial provocation by the latter. This time Turkey did not stay with threats of an invasion but its military units started embarking on warships, while planes started flying over Cyprus, and a war atmosphere prevailed. As the Greek junta was unprepared for a clash with Turkey it ended up

accepting the latter's ultimatum demanding, among other things, that Athens withdraw the Greek contingent.

Most Greek Cypriots saw the withdrawal of the contingent (December 1967) as a severe blow to the *enosis* dream. Feelings of regret were mixed with anger at the "betrayal of the national centre";<sup>139</sup> to add to it all, at the end of December 1967, the Turkish Cypriots took advantage of the weakened position of the Greek side, and declared the formation of the "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration": The 'first partition' thus received its symbolic seal.

On 12 January 1968, Makarios called a press conference to declare a new approach to the Cyprus Problem. After referring to the dead-end in the Greco-Turkish dialogue of the previous few years and the decision of the Athens government to withdraw the Greek troops from the islands, both of which militated for a new realistic policy on the Cyprus problem, he stressed the need for peaceful co-existence with the "Turks of Cyprus" – who were recognized as "equal citizens" and could be given further "special privileges" in the form of a "Charter of rights". The crux of his message was that the solution to be sought had to be "in the context of what would be feasible (*efikto*), which does not always coincide with what is desirable" or ideal. In effect, Makarios was declaring *enosis* a far distant dream, if not completely dead. This was a dramatic change in policy, involving the abandonment of the sacred ideal which generations of Greek Cypriots had adhered to, for more than a century. Makarios accompanied his announcement of the new policy with a call to Presidential elections, intending these as a sort of a referendum in judgment of the new historical turn away from *enosis*.

### ***Incipient state nationalism Vs militant ethno-nationalism***

At the time of the 1968 Presidential elections, the only organized party was AKEL.<sup>140</sup> Makarios declared elections on 12 January, set to take place on 25 February 1968, which gave little time to the opposition to organize. Nevertheless, staunch *enosis*ists of various shades decided to contest the elections, with Dr. Takis Evdokas, a psychiatrist, as leader of the quickly put together initiative, which was to become the Democratic National Party (DEK).<sup>141</sup> In the February elections, Makarios won a landslide victory of 95.4%, to 3.7%, but the pre-election campaign was marred by acts of provocation and violence of pro-Makarios supporters against Evdokas (with the tolerance, if not



instigation, of Giorkadjis). The Presidential elections, the formation of DEK, and the commencing of bi-communal negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, gave a stir to the formation of new political parties – such as the socialist EDEK of Lyssarides, the short-lived Eniaion of Clerides, Papadopoulos and Giorkadjis, and the Proodevdiko Komma of N. Sampson.<sup>142</sup> All of these, shared the feature of being connected to powerful or influential 'personalities', rather than having a clear ideology and constituent base; and all kept close links with pre-existing para-state militias, which they used as props for their operation.<sup>143</sup>

Less than a year had passed from the time Makarios announced the policy of *efikton* when a new pro-enosis organization, named "National Front", made its appearance. Subsequent evidence was to show that the Front was closely linked to the Greek junta, and was guided directly by hard-line Greek military officers in Athens, working closely with Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard, as well as with ex-EOKA fighters;<sup>144</sup> other recruits came from various nationalist right-wing associations (conservative Orthodox societies, cultural organisations and so on). Much like the first EOKA and the Akritas Organisation, its members had to be bound by an oath, swearing allegiance "to God and Greece", and to declare "commitment to national freedom and the cleansing of the country". The latter implied the need to purge Makarios' government and other public offices from "corrupt" and "vicious" elements, who were viewed as taking advantage of their positions in order to undermine the national ideals and the sacred vision of *enosis*; the Front was to ensure that all those who were doing damage to the national problem would be "severely punished". Initially, the Front appeared not to blame Makarios himself, considering he was the victim of "bad influences" from his corrupt associates or wider circle. At a later stage, as it attracted disgruntled supporters of the embittered Giorkadjis (Makarios' powerful minister who clashed with the Greek junta and had to therefore submit his resignation, after which he blamed Makarios for not having supported him against the junta),<sup>145</sup> the Front was to include the Cypriot President in its targets.

The Front's early activities consisted of distributing leaflets with accusations and threats against Makarios' close associates, or pro-Makarios journalists and newspapers (all charged of being "communists and cryptocommunists"), as well as other supporters of the policy of *efikton*. Soon it turned to more violent methods, such as the planting of bombs, murder attempts and sabotage. In late August 1969, the Council of Ministers declared the Front illegal, temporarily suspending its operations –

but after reorganizing and recomposing itself, the Front recommenced activities, this time aiming at collecting guns and explosives. In March 1970, there was an assassination attempt against Makarios himself; a week later, Giorkadjis was murdered. Evidence that has subsequently surfaced confirms that Giorkadjis had been collaborating with National Front figures against Makarios, including the attempt against the latter's life; once the attempt failed, Giorkadjis had to be silenced, so that the identity of those responsible (viz. Greek military officers) would remain secret.<sup>146</sup>

During his years in power, Giorkadjis had used his post as Minister of Interior not only to control the police but to create a parallel network of power and influence which was dependent and deeply loyal to him. The legal state security apparatus seems to have had close links and often many overlaps with the illegal para-state apparatus. The key functionaries in both networks came from ex-EOKA fighters and shared the bonds deriving from their common 'agonistic heritage'. Many members of the parallel structures had close connections with each other and with Giorkadjis himself – either directly or through his close associates. As long as Giorkadjis was a member of the government his control of both state and para-state security networks rendered them loyal to Makarios and his policies. Similarly, it ensured that few ex-EOKA members would join the opposition against Makarios. The pro-Makarios, para-state networks used quite heavy-handed methods to intimidate their opponents, thus cultivating a culture of intolerance, violence and monolithic allegiance to Makarios. When Grivas and the Greek government started undermining Makarios, they acted as counter forces, restraining Giorkadjis' impact. Even after he resigned from government, Giorkadjis maintained a strong influence over these parallel power networks; and when he started questioning and subverting Makarios, a lot of his associates followed along. Giorkadjis' links with the police explain the successes of the National Front in its many raids against police stations to collect weapons, which had to heavily rely on internal collaborators. The peak of the Front's action was the attack of the Limassol police headquarters, which its men easily managed to bring under their control: Not only did they steal large supplies of armaments but they left behind leaflets calling upon policeman not to obey their leadership but the National Front instead!

The reasons for the prevalence of such para-state military organizations in post-independence Cyprus are thus obvious: First, they were initially put together so as to compensate for the non-existence of a legal state army; second, they received widespread legitimacy when they defended the Greek Cypriot community in the 1963

conflict; third, they were used by state officials themselves to promote their purposes, including the containment of the opposition; finally, their use of nationalistic symbols and rhetoric gave them a certain aura of legitimation, even when their actions, as in the case of the National Front, violated the laws in the most flagrant way.

Two of the main weaknesses of the National Front, which contributed to its demise, had to do with – first, its high fragmentation, consisting of cadres from widely differing backgrounds which remained largely uncoordinated and heterogeneous; and second, its omission to cultivate links with the wider nationalist constituencies.<sup>147</sup> These problems were to be addressed by the next contender of Makarios, General Grivas, who re-appeared on the Cyprus scene in August 1971, determined that the struggle he had set as his life's goal be "brought to a successful conclusion".<sup>148</sup> Grivas' first priority was to launch a new military organization, named EOKA B – the choice indicating his intent to reap the benefits of his involvement in the "glorious" anti-colonial struggle; after some time, he stirred the formation of the Committee for Coordination of the Enosis Struggle (ESEA),<sup>149</sup> as the political wing of the enosists, who were henceforth to come directly under his own control – despite the existence of Evdokas' DEK.<sup>150</sup> For two years, between January 1972 and January 1974 (when Grivas died), EOKA B would escalate its actions – from securing arms and explosives (mostly from National Guard camps), to bombings, attacks against police stations, ambushes of policemen and other opponents, acts of sabotage, beatings and executions of Makarios supporters, the kidnapping of Makarios' Minister of Justice, plus a number of coup plans and attempts at overthrowing Makarios and his government, which did not materialize or were not successful.

While accusing Makarios as a traitor of *enosis*, Grivas seems to have been ready to accept concessions to Turkey as a trade-off for union. He thus considered the Acheson Plan as a lost opportunity for which Makarios was to blame: A few months before his arrival on the island, he sent the Acheson Plan to the extreme right-wing newspaper *Patris* in Cyprus, and to two other nationalist newspapers in Athens, asking them to highlight the rejection of the plan as evidence of Makarios' anti-enotism. This infuriated Makarios, who was for some time trying to avoid references to *enosis*, so as not to offend the Turkish Cypriots and the ongoing bi-communal negotiations. But as in the past, the fear of allowing Grivas the monopoly of *enosis* sloganeering led Makarios to start re-introducing the "age-old" vision. Characteristically, in a speech in

Yialousa, located in the Karpasia area, where the Acheson Plan provided for the proposed Turkish military base to be located, he declared:

Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history and will remain Greek; Greek and undivided we have inherited her, Greek and undivided we shall preserve her, and Greek and undivided we shall deliver her back to Greece.<sup>151</sup>

Naturally, the speech upset the Turkish Cypriots, who took it as direct evidence of Makarios' double talk – but it is interesting to see how the *enosis* discourse served primarily intra-communal politics, in this case Makarios' public criticism of Grivas' version of *enosis*, involving concessions (such as the granting of a base in the Karpasia areas), which he viewed as against Cyprus' best interests, violating the island's long history and Greek identity.

Once in Cyprus, Grivas worked closely with Greek officers in the National Guard, and especially the Second Bureau, which acted as his administrative headquarters. Grivas and EOKA B were also assisted by the local chapter of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (KYP), which was closely linked with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even the official Greek embassy was involved in aiding Grivas and his terrorist organization. A good example of how the Athens junta, the local Greek embassy, and Grivas circles collaborated to subvert Makarios was the crisis relating to the import of arms from Czechoslovakia.<sup>152</sup> Makarios had ordered these arms ostensibly to use in case of conflict with the Turkish Cypriots, as he had already informed Greek Prime Minister George Papadopoulos – but the real reason had to do with the mounting evidence of Grivas' preparations for a military confrontation with Makarios, and the latter's realization that he could not depend on the National Guard which was controlled by junta officers. When the arms arrived in January 1972, the Greek government decided to use the opportunity for pushing Makarios into a corner; it thus requested Makarios to hand over the cargo to the National Guard, but Makarios refused. The matter was leaked to the pro-Grivas press, which questioned Makarios' motives, wondering why the guns (including tanks) were going to the police. The Greek government colluded with Turkey in jointly requesting the United Nations for the weapons to be handed to UNFICYP, but again Makarios refused to comply; Athens kept the pressure on Makarios, demanding the reshuffling of his cabinet to form a 'government of National Unity' (excluding the communists but including Grivas' supporters), and his acknowledgement that Greece was the national centre whose decisions had to be abided by. Makarios was also asked to voluntarily resign the

Presidency and to withdraw to his church duties. Interestingly, the Greek ambassador had convinced the Athens government that once the Cypriot public became aware of the conflict between mother Greece and Makarios, it would spontaneously rise against the latter – after which a coup could easily be staged.<sup>153</sup> But this prediction proved utterly wrong, for Makarios commanded the loyalty of the mass of Greek-Cypriots. On the evening of 14 February, an unprecedented popular mobilization took place. Crowds of people from all over Cyprus gathered in the enclosure of the Archbishopric and outside government offices. Makarios, who had been informed of the plans for a coup, used the night to seek diplomatic interventions to forestall it. When, the following day, it was announced that the coup had been averted, a mass demonstration took place outside the Archbishopric. Addressing the crowds, Makarios thundered:

Cyprus Hellenism has demonstrated that it forms a wall of granite, on which any machinations aimed at Cyprus will shatter.<sup>154</sup>

The mass mobilization in support of Makarios put an end to the affair. A month after the Greek government's written demand for Makarios to resign, he sent his reply to Prime-Minister Papadopoulos in which he clarified his own views on Greece being the "national centre": Makarios stressed that Greek-Cypriots "are, and feel" themselves to be "a part of the Greek Nation" and accept that "the national centre is Athens"; he questioned, however, the "implication that the Greek government has a say in the internal affairs of Cyprus, and even further, that it has the first and last word concerning the type of solution to the Cyprus issue". Certainly if the chosen line was *enosis*, Athens would have precedence. "But if Athens was prepared to accept a solution not approved by Cyprus Hellenism, the opinion of the Greek Cypriots must have more weight. Because the consequences of whatever solution are to be borne by them, and they will be the ones to live with the conditions thereby created".<sup>155</sup>

Another example of the clash between Makarios and his opponents was the church crisis, which developed in the early 1970's. When Makarios ran for President in the first elections of the Republic, there did not seem to be any disagreements from within the church hierarchy. But by his second bid for office in 1968, the new policy of *efikto* seems to have made the Bishops increasingly uneasy and two of the three took a public stand advising him not to stand for re-election.<sup>156</sup> This was because the traditional role of Archbishop as *ethnarch* (leader of the church and its people), had of long been directly related to *enosis* as the ultimate goal of the struggle: When

Makarios declared the new policy which equated independence (till then considered only an intermediate step) with the end itself, the Bishops considered the move as sacrilegious. Their initial uncertainties were heightened when Grivas appeared, re-affirming his insistence on *enosis* and on the priority of the nation – so they were soon in communication with him, as well as with the Greek ambassador. They all agreed that the Bishops would proceed to ask Makarios to resign from the presidency and in this they “would enjoy the support of the national centre”.<sup>157</sup> In the Holy Synod meeting of March 1972, they tabled their demand for Makarios’ resignation on the basis that “the Apostolic Canons and those of the Ecumenical Synods”<sup>158</sup> did not allow the simultaneous holding of political and ecclesiastical office (a full twelve years after Makarios had been in power). Yet, once again, when the Holy Synod made its deliberations public, there were huge demonstrations in support of the Archbishop. In Nicosia, an impressive mass rally (estimated to be approximately a quarter of the Greek-Cypriot population) of “men, women, young and old from all over Cyprus carrying their banners and flags, gathered in the Archbishopric’s Square and shouting in disapproval of the Bishops and of the Athens junta, demanded of Makarios to stay where the Cypriot people with their votes had vowed him to remain – as both Archbishop and Ethnarch”.<sup>159</sup> In other towns such as Paphos and Limassol, where the Bishops had their seats, the latter were made the object of ridicule and harassment by the crowds or by pro-Makarios priests.<sup>160</sup> In letters that were subsequently exchanged, Makarios argued that his “conscience as a Greek and as an Archbishop” and his “mission as an Ethnarch”, did not “permit [him] to abandon the people at this time of great peril”, as this could be tantamount to “high treason”:

In the face of the oncoming wolves the good shepherd never abandons his flock to run away.<sup>161</sup>

In March 1973, the three Bishops convened a Synod but Makarios refused to appear before it, so they proceeded to convict him in his absence, sentencing him to defrocking and reduction to lay status. Soon after, Makarios himself called a Larger and Supreme Holy Synod, consisting of high clergy from the wider Orthodox world;<sup>162</sup> the Synod urged the three Cypriot Bishops to repent, in order for “peace and unity” to be restored in the Church, but the latter refused, whereby they were found guilty and dethroned. The Synod also confirmed the legitimacy of holding the offices of Archbishop and President of the Republic at the same time, as this was found not to be in contradiction to the Holy Scriptures and Canons, and as the two did coexist in the

"tradition of the Orthodox Church and the history of the Greek Nation".<sup>163</sup> After this decision new Bishops were elected who were known to be loyal to Makarios.<sup>164</sup>

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What explains the resurgence of *enosis*, in its militant and subversive form, after 1968? Part of the explanation is obviously the fact that *enosis* had been the dominant ideology since the dawn of the twentieth century, and had thus acquired immense symbolic and emotive strength. It had been completely identified with the anti-colonial struggle and liberation from foreign rule. And it had resurfaced as the collective Greek Cypriot dream after the collapse of the bi-communal regime of 1963. Between 1964-67 it commanded universal appeal, but two versions were distinguished: Makarios and his supporters (*Makariakoi*) insisted on 'pure'/'genuine' *enosis*, fearing that territorial concessions would lead to 'double-enosis' or partition; the pro-Grivas camp (*Grivikoi*) seemed to believe Makarios used the need for concessions as a pretext for avoiding *enosis*, having grown complacent with Independence. The turn to the policy of *efikton* after 1968 gave a new content to the division, from that between two versions of *enosis*, to that differentiating staunch pro-*enosis* (*enotikoi*) from pro-independence (*anexartisiakoi*) supporters.

Markides gives a good analysis of the social background of post-'68 *enosis* supporters, whom he calls the "disloyal opposition", in the sense that they were ready to undermine and destroy constitutional order while promoting their views.<sup>165</sup> Broadly speaking, they all belonged to the "quasi-crisis strata", that is groups of individuals negatively affected by changes in society impinging on their status, power or economic interests.<sup>166</sup> There were four broad such groups:<sup>167</sup> First, some members of EOKA who, for a number of reasons, were not co-opted into the Makarios administration in the early years of independence, plus a number of the followers of Giorkadjis (mostly policemen), who defected to the anti-Makarios front after their leader's assassination in 1970. Second, some "traditional intellectuals", mostly Athens-trained philologists, theologians and lawyers. Philologists were the most prominent sub-group: As the teachers of Greek language and history, the two subjects through which nationalist ideas were transmitted, they possessed significant 'cultural capital'. All of the principals and assistant principals of public secondary schools were philologists – and so was the first Minister of Education, Constantine Spyridakis. As Makarios steered away from *enosis* and as other groups (for instance, graduates from non-Greek

universities) started breaking their monopoly as guardians of Hellenic nationalist traditions, they became increasingly alienated – and either undermined Makarios' regime in class, or through direct involvement with EOKA B.

A third segment of the anti-Makarios camp were businessmen and professionals: Most of these were uneasy with the strength of AKEL, as well as with Makarios' tolerance of its existence, and his increasing reliance on Soviet and non-aligned support; others were concerned about the expansion of the co-operative movement, church enterprises and other state or communal institutions, which they took as indications that the free enterprise system was at risk (for these same reasons they were attracted to the Greek junta's anti-communism and pro-right rhetoric).<sup>168</sup> The fourth group which formed part of the disloyal opposition were the three bishops and some of their clerical followers. Although the election of the Archbishop as first President of the Republic appeared, on the surface, to preserve and even enhance the power of the Church, in reality this was not so. For, before independence, the bishops and clergy were held in high esteem and their views carried special weight. But, after independence, government officials and officers, members of parliament, technocrats and other members of the new elite started gaining increasing prominence. Parallel to this *objective secularization* (the decrease in the Church's prestige and power), there was a process of *subjective secularization* – so that church attendance started decreasing, and being mostly limited to middle-aged women and older people; religion gradually ceased being the central value system and the determining component of the identity of Greek Cypriots.

From the above four groups came most of the recruits of the anti-Makarios and anti-independence front. This does not mean that all or most in these groups condoned the violent turn of the pro-*enosis* campaign after 1968. In fact, before Grivas' re-appearance and take-over of the leadership of this camp, violence was exercised mostly by the ex-EOKA members and their followers in both the pro- and anti-Makarios camps. The small DEK was definitely not a part of the violence – in fact, its leader (Evdokas) was himself, as we have seen, the victim of abuse as the candidate opposing Makarios back in 1968; later on, once the game became violent, he was to separate himself from the pro-violence section of the Grivas camp. Yet it is interesting to consider the discourse of the members of *pro-enosis* supporters, to ascertain what united them as against pro-independence supporters.



In March 1970, after the attempt against Makarios' life and the subsequent murder of Giorkadjis, Edvokas wrote a caustic article, published in DEK's newspaper *Gnomi*, titled "Machiavelli to Makarios".<sup>169</sup> The article was supposed to be friendly advice to the 'Prince' (Makarios), as to how to deal with "internal anomaly" and better comprehend the malaise of the times. Edvokas starts by condemning violence and re-affirming his faith in democracy, but wonders whether resort to illegality and crime had explainable causes. He, in fact, proposes that violence could be the result of disappointment with the functioning of democratic institutions and with developments regarding the national issue – and the belief, by some, that remedies could not be had through democratic means. Turning first to the feelings of national discontent, Edvokas traced the steps of regress: One, EOKA fought solely for *enosis* and was "victorious on the battlefield", but this was turned into political defeat with the "shameful and treacherous Zurich Agreements"; two, after Independence, there was an effort at creating a "Cypriot consciousness" and for the parallel "erosion" of the "idea of Greece and *Enosis*"; three, the "anti-*enosis*" and "anti-Greece" campaign was intensified after the "Turkish rebellion", especially after Turkey's bombing of Tylliria in the summer on 1964 – when Greece frustrated Greek Cypriots' expectations for rallying to their defence; four, the Cypriot government torpedoed every plan which aimed at *enosis*, to the extent of losing both the latter but also independence itself – the new policy of *efikto* was vague and dependent on what Turkey would allow as the parameters of a solution. Makarios, who was the leader for the last 20 years (1950-1970), and had started with the 1950 *enosis referendum*, and the clear mandate of 96% of the Cypriots for union, was clearly responsible for the impasse reached, and for the consequent "national disillusionment" of "a large segment of the people". For some, these setbacks were tantamount to "national treason", which could explain their feelings of exasperation and their resort to violence.

As regards his assessment of democratic institutions, Edvokas charged Makarios of maintaining a "police regime", characterized by political assassinations, kidnappings, beatings and persecutions of those of contrary convictions, and in particular of the *enosis* opposition. During his ten-year stay in power, he established a regime characterized by "meritocracy, nepotism and the side-tracking of values", while at the same time he encouraged a personality cult, which viewed him as "irreplaceable", and as personifying the people ("Makarios equals the people").

These were heavy accusations and seemed to hold Makarios responsible for much that could have been the work of the strongman Minister of Interior and his network of patronage. In fact, the General Attorney of the Republic prosecuted Evdokas, accusing him that the article was libellous and offended the "honour of the Head of State", thereby violating the Legal Code. The court found Evdokas guilty and sentenced him to a two-month imprisonment.

Yet the ideas expressed by Evdokas were shared by many others in the pro-enosis camp. We may return to the three Bishops who, as we have seen, colluded with Grivas and the junta in undermining Makarios. In their Second Memorandum to Makarios, asking him to step down from the Presidency, they argued that the policies of Makarios' government "strayed from the straight national path", that is *enosis*, "aspiring in reality to the creation of a Cypriot consciousness". The language evokes the religious narrative of the straight and narrow path, leading to salvation, as against the wider and more pleasant but stray road to perdition. Carrying on, the Memorandum laments that whereas the "souls of the Church's faithful [were] previously filled with faith and hope in God and in [the prospect of] national vindication, they are now infiltrated by atheistic nihilism and disbelief towards the values and ideals of Religion and Country". Here, the conflation of religion and nation is complete, both in their presence (faith in God accompanies faith in the nation) as well as in their absence (atheism and disbelief in national values, go together). Makarios' turn to independence was next blamed for all the evils normally associated with modernization and secularization:

The extraordinary [...] for our National History policy of *efikton*, constitutes a vociferous rejection of *Enosis* which, once put into practice, will cut Cyprus for good from the National Body[...]. Whilst during the four-year EOKA fight Cypriot Hellenism engaged in a struggle replete of national virtue and godly zeal, and the Island was delivered to us by Dighenis [Grivas] vibrating with national conviction, we nowadays gaze at the disheartening view of its dehellenization and its orientation towards foreign countries. Ideals are mocked and all those insisting in the ideas of Hellas and *Enosis* are contested and variously persecuted [whilst] atheistic and anti-christian communism has been strengthened.<sup>170</sup>

Overall, the policy of strengthening independence was seen to lead to de-hellenization, a Cypriot consciousness, atheism and communism – in sum, the betrayal of whatever Church and Nation traditionally stood for. To recall Evdokas' expression, staunch *enosis* considered such a setback as tantamount to national betrayal, and could account for their "feelings of exasperation and resort to violence". But herein lays the

explanation of intra-communal violence, which was to lead to the coup of 1974 – in this justification of violence when carried out in the name of the nation, against those considered as acting contrary to the national interest, even if the latter are co-nationals. Prior to the inter-communal killings of 1958, EOKA had started with the killings of communists – not the ethnic Others, but the “internal enemy”, the traitors who were no longer members of “Us”, the “Likes”. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the traitors were those who abandoned the sacred ideal of *enosis*. As Reicher and Hopkins point out, in such cases of intra-national killings, three levels of construction underlie the deep emotions of hatred involved: Firstly, a particular construction of the national community in religious and messianic terms; secondly, a construction of particular acts (such as those by Makarios and his associates) as putting the community in danger. And thirdly, an interpretation of particular norms as allowing the elimination of those “construed as endangering [...] the community”.<sup>171</sup>

Let us now turn to the pro-Makarios or pro-Independence camp. Since Makarios commanded the massive support of more than 95% of the Greek Cypriots, it would not make sense to talk about the social origin of his supporters. But we can concentrate on the reasons why he commanded such vast support, as well as on those most loyal to him as a President, and to the Independence regime, as against *enosis*.

Makarios’ constant efforts to resist the pressures and machinations of Greek governments (and especially of the unpopular military junta), their Western allies, and local collaborators, won him the fame of a bold democrat, engaged in anti-imperialist and anti-junta struggles for defending his people’s best interests. His frequent resort to the masses, and his rallying of their support, in maintaining the integrity of the Republic, helped in fostering a sense of loyalty with the independent state, which Makarios came to symbolize or personify.<sup>172</sup>

Among the most loyal pro-Makarios and pro-independence supporters were the followers of the communist AKEL. We have seen how, although the party had opposed the Archbishop in the 1960 elections, charging that the terms of the independence agreements were a sell-out to the West, it subsequently made peace with him and joined the pro-Makarios front. When Makarios tried to amend the Constitution and do away with the Treaty of Guarantee, AKEL backed him up. Between 1963 and 1967, AKEL supported Makarios’ efforts for a form of *enosis* which would not have entailed granting NATO Turkey a base – or maintaining, in other ways, the Republic’s

dependence on Western guarantees. And when Makarios turned to the theory of *efikton*, AKEL became the policy's most ardent supporter – since *enosis* would have put Cyprus under the control of the fiercely anti-communist military junta and within the closer grip of NATO. Besides, finding a peaceful solution through inter-communal negotiations bode well with AKEL's internationalist philosophy.

The small socialist party, EDEK, was also pro-independence, largely in consequence of its strong commitment to the non-aligned movement, but also because of its critical stance towards the military regime in Greece, and due to its leader's close association with Makarios.<sup>173</sup> Aside from the two well organized left-wing parties, the Right was characterized by fragmentation and by political parties which were short-lived and based themselves on influential personalities; on the whole, they also appeared to be pro-Makarios and pro-independence, although on the eve of the coup they largely disintegrated, and small fragments joined the anti-Makarios camp.<sup>174</sup>

Party ideology was not the only factor contributing to the rise of pro-independence attitudes. Socio-economic factors were of equal, if not more, importance. Post-colonial economic development had been making great strides and most Greek Cypriots were very content with the achievements of Makarios' governments. In the ten-year period 1961-1971, the per capita GNP reached an average yearly rate of increase of approximately 70% (at constant 1958 prices). Between 1962 and 1971, the GNP annual growth rate was 7% (at 1970 market prices).<sup>175</sup> During the first twelve years of independence (1960-1972) the inflation rate did not exceed, on average, 2.2% per annum, and registered unemployment was on average 1.5%. The island was bustling with economic activity and was being rapidly transformed through the building of new roads, the expansion of communications, a boom in construction, and advancements in the fields of education and health. The growing affluence led to dramatic improvements in the standard of living and to increases in consumption, especially of durable goods (such as cars, TV and radio sets, and telephones). There was an impressive multiplication of business establishments, services, leisure outlets and shops which, as Mavros puts it, "constituted the sparkling facade of change and provided the spectacular 'proof' that independence could deliver the goods".<sup>176</sup>

Naturally, most Greek Cypriots benefited from economic growth and many developed vested interests linked with the success and future prospects of independence. For instance, the merchant bourgeoisie were benefiting greatly from increased imports and

consumption; many others found new employment opportunities in the expanding public services (between 1960 and 1973, the government sector grew by almost two thirds) and civil servants enjoyed the privilege of steady jobs, good salaries and high social status. The lot of peasants improved substantially due to corresponding improvements in agriculture (such as state infrastructural projects, better cultivating techniques, and new product marketing schemes).<sup>177</sup>

The performance of the Cypriot economy compared well with that of Greece. Even prior to independence the differences were substantial: After WW II, Greece had gone through the devastating experience of the Nazi occupation and the subsequent Civil War, whereas Cyprus had started enjoying the benefit of British ten-year planning (meant precisely to improve standards of living so as to lure Cypriots away from *enosis*), so that by the mid-fifties income per head in Cyprus was roughly double that of Greece, and the gap widened after independence. This revived argument by the critics of independence, who charged that improved life conditions and standards of living made the Cypriots complacent and undermined their drive for *enosis*.<sup>178</sup> In his speech to the House of Representatives, during discussions for the 1967 budget, the Minister of Finance had to defend modernization efforts, arguing that adverse criticisms were "shallow and anti-patriotic", since Cyprus could not postpone its efforts "towards development and progress", while waiting for union with Greece; on the contrary, economic success would cause the Turkish Cypriots to realize that their future lay with peaceful cohabitation and in the common effort for improving everyone's welfare on the island.<sup>179</sup>

Furthermore, greater post-independence contacts with Greece brought improved awareness of life and institutions on the mainland, and the realization that Cyprus was often better off on many counts – there was more political freedom (including the fact that the communist party in Greece was still outlawed, whereas the local AKEL was fully integrated into the political system), a much more efficient state administration system, and so on. At the same time, the presence of large numbers of Greek soldiers and officers in Cyprus created a number of problems in their relations with the locals; for instance, many of these, imbued with the junta's negative attitude towards Makarios, talked disrespectfully about the Cypriot President and his government, offending the Greek-Cypriots.<sup>180</sup> Overall, increased contacts with mainland Greeks widened the psychological distance with the Greek Cypriots, whose scepticism regarding *enosis* was enhanced.

At the same time, Greek Cypriots were getting used to the local social institutions, the Cypriot "life-world" as Mavratsas calls it, borrowing Habermas' term. But the significance of these institutions was not in their being 'naturally' Cypriot, a part of Greek Cypriot society: They were rather the direct or indirect creations of the Cypriot state, which, unwanted as it was by a number of Greek Cypriots, was becoming an important part of their lives.

### **The crisis of national identity and of Makarios' state**

In 1964, only a few months after the '63 collapse, Theodoros Papadopoulos published a landmark essay, titled "The Crisis of Cypriot Consciousness", which highlighted an "acute contradiction" facing the Greek Cypriots, deriving from the incongruence of nation and state. More specifically, the writer pointed to the fact that whereas since antiquity the "intellectual and cultural traditions"<sup>181</sup> of "Cypriot Hellenism" were similar to those of the Greek mainland (so that the Cypriots felt they were an integral part of "Metropolitan Hellenism"), ever since "Cyprus was detached from Byzantine Hellenism [1191]", so that "Cypriot institutions, with the exception of religious and educational ones, have never been identical with Greek ones". Papadopoulos linked this disjunction to the different historical trajectories of Cyprus and mainland Greece, and especially to the impact of British rule on Cyprus and the concomitant introduction of Anglo-Saxon institutions (as against mainland European institutions adopted by Greece).<sup>182</sup> As long as they were under foreign rule, the Greek Cypriots could do little about this contradiction. But now that they were masters of their future there were three alternatives "open to Cyprus" (meaning the Greeks of Cyprus): First, to go their own separate way, which would entail fostering a uniquely Cypriot national consciousness; second, to persist with the aim of integrating themselves with the "main body of Hellenism" – that is *Union* with Greece; and third, to settle with the compromise solution of political independence, with the parallel fostering of Greek identity and culture.

Papadopoulos argued that developing a Cypriot national consciousness was difficult because Cyprus was too small to be an autonomous nation and, therefore, incapable of creating new national traditions at will. *Enosis* was also difficult – partly because of the existence of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but also because of the noted differences between Cypriot and Greek mainland institutions. The third choice, of a politically

independent Cypriot state, while also fostering Greek culture, constituted a temporary solution, but did not remove the contradictions entailed in the previous two alternatives – if anything, it accentuated them through providing fertile ground for fomenting the contradictions. The crisis, he concluded, had to be resolved either through a “disastrous solution” or through “transcendence”, which would remove the contradictions. Ten years after this prediction, the Greek Cypriot controlled Cyprus Republic met with the disastrous floundering of 1974.

Although a full description of developments that led to the coup and the invasion is not within the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to highlight how the trends we have been focusing upon converged, to bring about the '74 disaster. Back in the early 1960's the consociational experiment had failed, as it did not constitute a successful national compromise between the two communities. An over-arching Cypriot consciousness proved impossible to build, and closure had proceeded along ethno-national lines, reinforcing previous differences. But even when Turkish Cypriots walked out of the Republic, a new compromise did not prove possible to achieve, not only because of the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also because of the divisions within the Greek Cypriot community, as well as between Cyprus and Greece. The pull in different directions, by Turkish Cypriots and enosists, created cracks in the new national compromise Makarios was trying to foster.




Figure S.1: The spectrum of ideal choices and compromise positions of the two communities in the late '60s and early '70s.

Once Makarios realized that *enosis* was not possible to achieve, he switched to the goal of consolidating independence and removing or minimizing the power-sharing rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Effectively he was aiming for majoritarian democracy,

with minority rights for the smaller Turkish community. But, as Papadopoulos had pointed out, this choice would not remove the contradictions. The Turkish Cypriots had already developed a strong ethno-nationalism and Turkey was there to support them. Yet the biggest danger proved to come not from the Turkish side, but from Greece and the 'disloyal' Greek-Cypriot opposition. Makarios did not manage to forge a new social compromise with the latter: There was, primarily, a disagreement as to the desired imagined community to aim for. Social closure had of long created a strong ethno-national identity, so that a new over-arching identity was not easy to accept. But besides this, the remaining mechanisms of social closure had also failed to produce a cohesive national state. *Military closure* was unsuccessful: We have seen how initially the Republic had no army of its own and had to rely on para-military forces; it then set up the National Guard and smuggled-in Greek soldiers and officers to supplement its defence, crowning the set-up with General Grivas – an enemy of Independence – as leader, but both the Greek military and Grivas ended up subverting Makarios' state. Since the army proved to be beyond the state's control Makarios had to resort to two remedies: First, in 1972,<sup>183</sup> he created a small auxiliary police force (*Efedrikon*), composed of carefully selected recruits, dedicated to the independent state and to Makarios himself, whose mission was to contain EOKA B terrorism. Second, in early 1974, he tried to regain control of the National Guard through various measures – such as putting under government control the decision as to which young Greek Cypriots were to be army cadets (up to that time, the Greek officers of the National Guard were giving strict preference to anti-Makarios candidates);<sup>184</sup> reducing army service to one instead of two years; and, finally, demanding the Greek government to remove Greek army officers altogether from Cyprus. The first policy met with considerable success and, by the early summer of 1974, EOKA B was mostly dislocated (Grivas died in January 1974 and shortly after EOKA B's deputy commander and many of its other leaders were arrested; important documents captured proved the junta's links with the terrorists). But the second policy misfired, for the junta had meanwhile changed hands from Papadopoulos to the hard-liner Ioannides, who assumed more direct control of EOKA B and decided to put an end to Makarios' resistance through a military coup – using the National Guard's power before Makarios managed to bring it under his own control.

*Political closure* was also problematic, since political developments were influenced by the interventions of the Greek governments and the local Greek embassy (and, to a lesser extent, of other foreign embassies): More specifically they influenced local



political actors, funded specific newspapers through which ethno-national propaganda was propagated, and worked with individuals conspiring against the legitimate government of the Republic. Parallel to outside infiltration, the Republic failed to develop strong political institutions, which would have supported the regime in times of crisis. Although the Greek Cypriots demonstrated great devotion to Makarios as their leader, this loyalty was mostly personalised and did not necessarily carry over to the state as an institution, or to the polity more generally. Makarios himself seemed to encourage this personal devotion and, on occasion, claimed "I am Cyprus" [*ego eimai I Kypros*], equating himself with the state and/or the people.<sup>185</sup> Political organizations were mostly feeble 'fronts' and depended on important political figures and/or Makarios, while maintaining strong links with para-military organizations, which fostered networks of patronage. Furthermore, almost all political parties had close links with other countries and their governments or political organizations, from which they received ideological and/or financial support, which, in turn, influenced their decisions and policies, but also their commitment to the Cypriot state and polity.<sup>186</sup> Loyalty to the state was further undermined by the timidity of the pro-Makarios elite – the bourgeoisie, the politicians, and high civil servants. Rather than a "genuine bourgeoisie", the former were primarily "an intermediary merchant group", with hardly any long-term investments and commitments, and lacking the ideology characterizing a truly "national" bourgeoisie.<sup>187</sup> High-ranking civil servants had learned to stay away or "above" politics<sup>188</sup> in consequence of the values of impartiality carried over from colonial times, but also in order not to be exposed to the attacks (verbal or physical) of the small but violent pro-*enosis* faction.<sup>189</sup> The pro-Makarios politicians, as well as other regime sympathizers, found it increasingly hard to take a clear stand for Makarios and the independent state, once the Greek junta's conflict with Makarios came into the open: The fact that the junta traded on the traditional values of nation, religion and family, plus anti-communism, touched the conservative chords of many among these groups, whose dedication to Makarios wavered.<sup>190</sup>

Finally, as regards *social security* provisions, which tend to enhance feelings of solidarity within a community, the Republic's record was positive but flimsy. The colonial heritage "consisted of a basic (albeit limited) social welfare system",<sup>191</sup> which provided a basis on which welfare policies were built. But despite improvements in the areas of mostly health services, social insurance and state educational provision, overall, public assistance remained minimal for two reasons: First, post-independence full-employment conditions and rising standards of living alleviated pressures for public

provision; second, the role of traditional institutions, such as the extended family and the Church, in providing social services deflated the need for the state to undertake responsibility in these domains. The corollary of this was that particularistic attachments remained strong, whereas loyalties to the state, and a strong civic consciousness, were feeble. The Cypriot state did collapse as a result of outside interventions. But its inner resistances did not prove strong enough to help it in its hours of need.<sup>192</sup>

## **Chapter 6 Unimaginable community: nationalist closure and the prospects of federalism**

Back in 1956, while facing the anti-colonial revolt and the increasing tensions between the two ethno-national communities, the British assigned Lord Radcliffe, an eminent judge, the task of suggesting a framework for a new constitution for Cyprus. Faced with the wishes of the Turkish-Cypriot minority community (constituting, at the time, 18% of the population) "to share power equally" with the Greek-Cypriot majority (80%), Radcliffe took a clear stand: Such an arrangement would only make sense under a "federation rather than a unitary state", since in the former equality of representation could be granted in the federal central body, "regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations of the territories they represent". But in Cyprus, he added, there was no base for a federal arrangement since the two communities were not territorially separated – so he proceeded to suggest a unitary system of government, with provision for protecting minority interests through legal means.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, Turkish-Cypriots began pushing for the autonomy of the municipalities in order to create the territorial basis for a future move towards a federal regime and/or secession.<sup>2</sup> In 1964 the UN mediator Galo Plaza had also ruled out the possibility of a federal system for Cyprus, on similar grounds: The population was intermixed throughout the island, and thus creating homogeneous territories would necessitate massive forced population transfers, something objectionable on economic, social and moral grounds, and totally contrary to the democratic values of modern times.<sup>3</sup>

The 1974 Turkish invasion and the forced population exchange which followed accomplished precisely what Radcliffe and Plaza considered unacceptable, namely dividing the island into two ethnically clean or homogeneous zones, at great human cost – yet thereby laying the basis for a federal resolution of the "Cyprus Problem". The Greek-Cypriots tried to use diplomatic means for averting the *fait accompli* but had no other choice than accepting the idea of federation.<sup>4</sup> The high level agreements of 1977 between Makarios and Denktas, and of 1979 between Kyprianou and Denktas, established the broad guidelines for a federal arrangement. Henceforth, the various UN mediators would try to combine consociational principles (deriving from the 1960 constitution), with federal ideas, to produce a new social compromise for the co-habitation of the two communities. Indeed experts on federalism concur that it is an "appropriate form of government to offer to communities or states of distinct or

differing nationality who wish to form a common government and to behave as one people for some purposes, but who wish to remain independent and in particular to retain their own nationality in all other respects".<sup>5</sup>

Federal systems have been around for some time now, the earlier and more well-known being those of the United States of America and Switzerland, but numerous other countries use federal principles in diverse ways. Opting for some form of federal regime has become so prevalent in the contemporary world that Daniel Elazar talks of a "federal revolution" which he considers to be "among the most widespread – if one of the most unnoticed – of the various revolutions that are changing the face of the globe in our times".<sup>6</sup> He in fact estimates that nearly 40% of the world's population lives presently in regimes which are formally federal, while another 30% lives in polities that apply federal principles in some way. Murray Forsyth introduces an important distinction between "classical" and more recent forms of federalism:<sup>7</sup> The former involved more "positive" motives for federal arrangements, entailing the closer integration of entities which were more loosely unified in the past; more recent forms of federalism relate to the "new historical challenge" of dealing with regimes which used to be unitary or integrated but have broken apart as a consequence of incompatible aims or visions, and have espoused federation as a means of re-constituting or re-integrating themselves on the basis of a new looser relationship. In the more recent cases, the constituent parts of a federal arrangement may aim at staying together in order to secure specific objectives (such as economic viability), while simultaneously maintaining some distance or autonomy as a consequence of the difficulties of co-habitation in the past, memories of violence, lack of complete trust, and so on – the kind of problems Cyprus has had. One of the strengths of federal regimes is precisely their ability to combine the seemingly contradictory aims of self-determination and co-determination, autonomy and unity, interdependence and independence.<sup>8</sup>

Yet despite the potential merits of federal arrangements, and the fact that both Cypriot communities have agreed to the basic guidelines of a future federal regime, no final resolution has been forthcoming, despite efforts spanning more than three decades, climaxing in the rejection of the UN proposal for a comprehensive solution (codified as the Annan Plan), in April 2004. The perspective of social closure and the specific nature of nationalist exclusion in Cyprus, provides a fruitful approach for better understanding why the proposed federal schemes, culminating in Annan's *United*

*Cyprus Republic*, failed to be accepted, so that a re-united regime proved a community beyond imagination – at least for the Greek-Cypriots.

### ***After the coup and the invasion: The ascent of Cyprocentrism***

The 1974 Greek junta sponsored coup and the Turkish invasion which followed, were to dramatically change every facet of Cypriot society. For the Greek-Cypriots the outcome reached the proportions of biblical destruction: There were thousands of dead, wounded, and missing;<sup>9</sup> about a fourth of the population were forcibly displaced from the occupied northern part of the island, where they had constituted 80% of the population; almost 40% of the land was captured; the economy was in disarray, with a third of the economically active population unemployed, and approximately half of the gross output, tourism capacity, agricultural exports, and industrial production lost. Besides the feelings of grief and despair, the Greek-Cypriots also harboured bitterness and a sense of great betrayal against those responsible for what had happened. To the popular imagination the extreme Right supporters of the coup, the Greek junta, and the Western powers (especially Britain and the United States), which seemed to be aware of the junta's plans but chose not to stop them, or even encouraged them, carried equal responsibility: Put briefly, the blame lay with the "Right and its allies".

Two years after the invasion, in 1976, two new parties were formed – DIKO and DISY.<sup>10</sup> The first was led by Kyprianou, ex-Foreign Affairs Minister in Makarios' government, a strong supporter of the non-aligned policy, who prior to the coup was removed from office, after pressures from the Greek junta. DIKO was actually put together after Makarios' prodding so that he wouldn't appear to be backed only by the two left wing parties. Thus, it was meant to be a party of the pro-Makarios forces identified as belonging to the Centre Right and Centre of the political ideologies spectrum (ranging from liberal to social democratic ideas – to the extent that these had any meaning in the largely nebulous ideological terrain of Cyprus at that time); in practice its most vocal supporters were various 'circles' associated with the Co-operative Movement and the Church, as well as individual politicians, civil servants, and professionals loyal to Makarios. The second party, DISY, was led by Clerides, past chairman of the House of Representatives and for many years the Greek-Cypriots' representative in the intercommunal talks; Clerides' more pro-West stance and more 'realist' attitude as regards the Cyprus Problem (he was the first Greek-Cypriot to

publicly argue that a bi-zonal federation was the only solution remaining to the island), allowed his opponents to brand him with defeatism and to denounce him for serving western and especially American interests.<sup>11</sup> DISY's constituency came mostly from the urban bourgeoisie (the previous supporters of the *Eniaion*, of which Clerides was the leader), including the wealthier members of the upper class; but it also accepted into its ranks individuals from the old enosist opposition – including the whole of Evdokas' DEK, plus many other pro-Grivas supporters who were considered as collaborators of EOKA B [*praxikopimaties*] – so its critics felt justified in declaring the party a "refuge of fascists", backed by big capital.<sup>12</sup> Clerides' line was that old enmities had to be put aside in the spirit of Makarios' call for reconciliation and his offer of unconditional amnesty and pardon, aiming at restoring unity among the Greek-Cypriots. The enosists, on the other hand, saw in DISY the only possible resort in the difficult times they had to face, having become the "major target of popular wrath because of the calamity they [had] caused".<sup>13</sup> Overall, DISY's pro-westernism and anti-communism made it the party to attract most of the traditional nationalists who, along with the middle and upper classes, shared a common dislike and fear of the Left – and especially of the communists. The new party of the Right was thus to articulate a peculiar ideology which combined conservative and sometimes extreme "Greco-Christian" ideals, expressing its nationalist component, with the more liberal values of the urban bourgeoisie – the party's much larger constituency.

In the highly charged milieu of the times and the need for scapegoats, DISY was completely identified with the "extreme" Right and came to be blamed for the 1974 treason and destruction, holding responsibility for "opening to the enemies the guard-door for entering Cyprus".<sup>14</sup> In the power struggle for gaining hegemony over Greek-Cypriot society in the new post-'74 conditions, it was the Left's turn to strike back at the Right. AKEL had been ostracized and marginalized since the mid '50s for not taking part in the 1955 armed struggle; EDEK had been accused of anti-hellenism by the Greek junta and its local supporters because of its critical attitude towards the regime of the Greek dictators. Now both left-wing parties felt vindicated for their loyalty towards Makarios and the Republic: It was the turn of the Right to be stigmatized and forced into retrenchment and banishment from political life. In the first post-invasion elections, of September 1976, the parties of the Left joined forces with the more "centrist" and "moderate" pro-Makarios DIKO, forming an alliance of the "democratic patriotic forces", against DISY. Since Makarios had avoided apportioning blame to anyone, the elections turned into a sort of "open court", which was "to put on

public trial and to punish all those guilty of national betrayal".<sup>15</sup> The main rallying slogan of the alliance was the need for "*catharsis*" – after the tragedy there was a need to release suppressed feelings of despair, fear and anxiety but also of deep anger towards those guilty of bringing about disaster. There were thus calls for punishment and for purging public offices in the government, the police, and the army, of all the "abominable elements" which had supported the coup as a prelude to the catastrophe. Such was the depth of enmities and passions of the period that the elections ceased being an ordinary ideological contest and turned into a clash of two worlds at war with each other, a struggle for the moral annihilation and total extinction of the political enemy. The majoritarian electoral system allowed a complete sweep by the alliance, which won all the seats in Parliament, thereby depriving DISY, which secured more than 25% of the Greek-Cypriot votes, of a public voice.<sup>16</sup>

More important perhaps was the fact that the 1974 developments brought the end of the *enosis* ideology and created a psychological distance from Greece, which was considered responsible not only for the coup but for subsequently deserting Cyprus to the mercy of the Turks. Many Greek-Cypriots were so disillusioned and angry at the motherland that they ended up blaming everything Greek, effectively equating the Greek junta with Fascism - Nationalism - Enosis - the Right – and Greece as a whole. In its extreme form, this 'equation' rendered everything Greek or Hellenic as questionable or suspicious. Since *union (enosis)* was now dead for good, the new ideal became that of the *re-union (epanensis)* of Cyprus – restoring the integrity of the island and negating de facto partition. The independent state was now the only resort left to the Greek-Cypriots in their struggle for survival: Restoring and strengthening the state became a main priority, since it was necessary for both internal and external purposes – for housing the refugees and for providing them with the necessary services, for stirring the economy to give jobs to the unemployed, and for solving the thousands of problems involved in picking up the pieces after the war, so as to bring life back to normalcy. At the same time the state was the Greek-Cypriots' only shield against Turkey's overwhelming military might; the legitimacy and international recognition of the state was to become a formidable political weapon in the Republic's battles against the acceptance of the realities on the ground, achieved through the military invasion.

With the death of *enosis* and the new stress on independence, a lot was to change. Perhaps the greatest transformation had to do with the redefinition of Greek-Cypriot

identity – of who the Greek-Cypriots were, to whom they related, and who were their significant Others; this implied a redefinition of the relation of the Cypriots to the motherland, and of the kind of political future that the island should be striving for. Up to that time the predominant expression used to designate collective national identity was “Greeks of Cyprus” – that, in any case, was the expression of the Constitution itself, and that is what was used in official discourse. But since the latter part of the 1960s, the hyphenated combination “Greek-Cypriot” was increasingly used, in line with the wider changes noted earlier. After '74 the duplet was consolidated through official and more widespread usage.<sup>17</sup> There was now a new stress on “Cypriotness” – the second component of the hyphenated duplet, expressing the commonalities of all Cypriots: The two communities were seen to share common traits of character, ways of life, problems, and hopes for a peaceful future. The enemy was singled out to be Turkey, and not the Turkish-Cypriots: Turkey was the terrible external Other, the aggressor who had attacked the innocent natives and had disturbed the pristine peace of the island, bringing violence, pain, and destruction. Turkey acted thus because it was “by nature” an expansionist state, harbouring long-standing evil plans for Cyprus (she was after all “Hellenism’s greatest enemy since time immemorial”).<sup>18</sup> The Turkish-Cypriots were similarly seen to be the victims of Turkey since they also suffered as a result of the 1974 clashes, being forced into dependence on Turkey and on living in a highly militarized land, cut off and isolated from the outside world. The division of the island was considered as something that the Turkish-Cypriot people did not want, an outcome imposed on them by Turkey in collusion with their nationalist, chauvinist and intransigent leadership, which was the puppet of the motherland.

Official Greek-Cypriot historiography had therefore to be re-oriented so that the past could be re-interpreted in such a way as to cater for present-day needs and purposes. In effect, there was a shift of paradigms, from primordialism and perennialism, which had dominated analyses until the late '60s, to classical modernism. The past ceased to be the monopoly domain of archaeologists, folklorists and traditional historians, who to a large extent had been using nationalism’s own categories in their work: The Greek nation’s existence since antiquity and its diachronic continuity to the present; the deep organic link between Greece and Cyprus resting on a bond which was natural as much as cultural, a part of the ‘order of things’, rendering the desire for *enosis* a natural sentiment or emotion (much like the bond between family or kin members). Greek-Cypriots were treated as an undifferentiated/homogeneous entity, whole, with similar interests, aims and desires; the Turkish-Cypriots’ ‘difference’ was refused or minimized,



so as not to acknowledge their claims being related to another nation, since it was feared that this would legitimize their demands for separate self-determination – thus every effort was expended to prove that they were mostly Christian converts to Islam; there was a constant pre-occupation with the cultural sphere and of documenting all kinds of connections with the Greek culture, while there was almost no interest in the 'material sphere' (hence there was almost no work on social history and political economy till the '90s); there was little reflection on nationalism's own nature and meaning, and in fact no use of the term as such, for *enosis* was viewed as a natural "passion" (much like biological instincts) for national restoration or fulfillment.

The new turn to modernist approaches entailed the involvement of social scientists, such as anthropologists and sociologists. These saw nationalism as a social construction whose existence was not simply given or natural, but had to be explained by reference to society and social dynamics; significantly, there was little effort to trace the roots of national belonging back to ancient times, but analysis started or focused on the modern period – since nationalism was seen as a product of modernity. Efforts were now expended in documenting "the progress of Greek nationalism" (the choice of words signifying that nationalism was not an unproblematic, natural desire, nor an unchanging one, since it could progress in relation/response to socio-historical circumstances). New studies tried to unearth the role of social forces or interests (such as the clash between social classes and/or political movements), as well as the part played by 'external' actors and interests (that is, international politics); Greek-Cypriots were now analysed as a heterogenous entity, comprised of different social classes or segments, each of which was guided by different material and ideal interests; Turkish-Cypriots were seen to have been legitimately different on the basis of their religion and culture (proving their racial purity was no longer necessary or important).<sup>19</sup>

A new interpretation of the past emphasized the traditional "harmonious co-existence" and "symbiosis" of the two communities under Ottoman and British rule; inter-communal conflict was seen to be solely the result of colonial policies of divide-and-rule, and of Turkey's subsequent stirring of passions which fed into the militant nationalism of a small group of Turkish-Cypriot chauvinists – who were not considered to be representative of Turkish-Cypriots in general.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the 1955 struggle for *enosis* was re-interpreted as an anti-colonial struggle for the liberation of Cyprus, which implied underplaying the emphasis on *enosis*; the Cyprus Republic was viewed

not so much as an end no-one intended or fought for, but as a distorted form of independence, fraught with problems deriving from the unworkable Constitution which outsiders had imposed on the Cypriots, and which became the source of bi-communal tensions leading to the 1963 conflict.<sup>21</sup>

Parallel shifts in meaning were gradually effected in all aspects of life. At the level of public symbolism, for instance, Independence Day celebrations came to acquire a new significance, whereas up to that time Greek national days and the date of the start of the *enosis* struggle were the only ones commemorated. For the first time after independence the Cypriot flag started to be hoisted widely on public buildings, complementing the Greek flag which up to that time was the one almost solely used.

This new emphasis on Cyprus and Independence has been termed "Cyprocentrism", in the sense that it represented a "turn" to Cyprus and the Cypriot state. Cyprocentrism was not so much a coherent ideology as a vague mix of elements, bound together by their relatedness to Cyprus – "whatever was of Cyprus" and could hold the fragments of the island together. Since the cohesive force of a shared nationality was lacking, this "whatever" ranged from the common territory, traits and habits characterizing the Cypriot people (from folklore songs and dancing, to eating habits), to common external enemies – mostly foreign/western powers or imperialism (depending on one's ideology) – comprising the basis of common ideologies of resistance (anti-nationalism, and anti-imperialism). For communist AKEL, for instance, the common link with Turkish-Cypriots was, as always, common class interests among the working people, but since the new stage of the Cyprus Problem was redefined as one in which the reunification of Cyprus had predominance over the class struggle, the unity of all Cypriots (including "Turkish-Cypriot brothers") as against imperialism was emphasized. Another important component of Cypriot commonalities and unity was the state itself, but since the Turkish-Cypriots were no longer a part of the Republic of Cyprus, a common civic identity did not prove easy to use as a basis of a new unity. As a consequence, all other components of commonality received the emphasis instead. Besides, even among the Greek-Cypriots loyalty to the Republic was still quite weak. Till Makarios' death (1977) he was the one Greek-Cypriots mostly identified with, than the impersonal state. After Makarios' death, there ensued fierce struggles between politicians as to who would be the legitimate heir of Makarios' legacy and heritage. Kyprianou managed to become the new President for two consecutive terms, and used his position to build up the power base of his own party (DIKO); this inaugurated a

new era in which the state came to be identified with narrow, particularistic interests, rather than as expressing universal values and representing all citizens equally, thereby commanding everyone's respect and loyalty. In this new era, party politics and battles for gaining hegemony over the state and its resources would be prevalent. As we will see further on, at a later stage, loyalty to the state was to be enhanced— but only at the expense of increasing distances to the Turkish-Cypriots.

One of the most interesting early attempts to formulate a perspective expressing the emerging Cyprocentrist awareness of the times, came from the Neo-Cypriot Association. The Association was founded a few months after the invasion (March 1975), by a small group of Greek-Cypriots who envisaged "a new Cyprus" rising out of "the chaos and destruction" of that period. Cypriots were called to build on the new premises of love of Cyprus (as a *topos*), bi-communal understanding, and a democratic way of life, which entailed "resistance to chauvinist attitudes which [have always] been a hindrance to the unity of the people."<sup>22</sup> The founding declaration of the Association, attempted an assessment of the causes of Cyprus' problems, arriving at important "lessons" for all locals:

In this land we reside as Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and others, who despite differences, real or imaginary, share common interests and objectives which determine our identity as Cypriots [...] The most important cause of the current sorry state of affairs is that the two larger communities lived in splendid isolation, without contact, [and] with wrong perceptions of each other [...] Although we cannot forget our national origin and cultural ties, we must [...] start thinking first as Cypriots and only subsequently as Greeks or Turks...Despite the fact that the Cyprus Republic is there for fifteen whole years, it has not managed to have any citizens [...] to love it, to respect it and to believe in it...<sup>23</sup>

The Association considered itself "Cyprocentric in its expositions", "in the sense that the guiding principle of all its actions was the interest of Cyprus". The primary objective was the consolidation of Cyprus' independence:<sup>24</sup> Although it did not advocate the cultural "detachment of Greek-Cypriots from Greece", it stressed that Cyprus was a separate political entity and that the Republic needed its citizens' "loyalty and devotion" if it was to survive and avoid the "danger of the partition of Cyprus or the dissolution of the state".<sup>25</sup>

The initial reception of the Neo-Cypriot Association from most quarters was quite positive, and a number of its suggestions were officially endorsed; for instance, the Association was among the first to push for the use of the Cypriot flag on public

buildings, and for the celebration of Independence Day.<sup>26</sup> Inevitably the Association became the early target of extreme nationalists and chauvinists; but strangely enough negative criticism was soon to be added even from supposedly friendlier quarters, such as journalists from the pro-Makarios camp, who charged the Association as bent on undermining the Greek-Cypriots' national consciousness. As one of these critics put it "Hellenism cannot be equated with the junta", for it "transcends any particular individual or government": If the Greek-Cypriots attempted to sever their links with the motherland (as the Association was charged of advocating), "they would not only be betraying Greece, but themselves as well".<sup>27</sup> Once more, the fear of de-Hellenization and de-ethnicization prevailed. Criticism against the Association kept mounting and becoming devastatingly negative, to the extent that eventually the word "neo-Cypriot" came to acquire all kinds of stereotypically derogatory meanings, ranging from traitor of country to shallow cosmopolitan, rootless, and imbued with nouveau-riche attitudes.

Part of the explanation of the latter characterizations may relate to the social characteristics of the carriers of this new ideology, since most of the supporters of the Association were state officials or employees, professionals, and more generally members of the western (mostly Anglo-Saxon) educated elite, who had come to espouse liberal cosmopolitan ideas and multicultural values while studying abroad. Obviously the interests of these groups were tied to the survival and well-being of the state and this made them suspect to their opponents of being self-serving.<sup>28</sup> Further than that the views of the Association were more positively received early on, at a stage when the state's very survival was still at stake. As time progressed and as a number of Cyprocentric changes were adopted, there was increasing concern of going too far in the other direction, away from the nation and Greece. As we will see further on, this became increasingly problematic as relations with Greece started improving and as it became evident that Greece was the only ally of the Greek-Cypriots in their battle against mighty Turkey. But another factor which was to prove equally important, was the resurgence of nationalism, albeit in a new form, which would fiercely resist Cyprocentrism of all shades. The end of the 1970's onwards is widely recognized as the period in which the impact of globalization started to be felt around the world. In Cyprus the associated socio-economic changes, combined with local realities, were to elicit responses calling for cultural resistance – which were to contribute to the rise of neo-nationalism and the return of the Right.

### ***The return of the Right, Hellenocentrism and neo-nationalism***

Despite the marginalization of the Right in the early years after 1974, in less than two decades it managed to recompose itself and return to power.<sup>29</sup> What made such a comeback possible? There are of course many factors and intricacies affecting Cypriot politics that we cannot here delve into. What interests us for our purposes is the trend of events connected to relations between state and nation, collective identity formation and social closure.

DISY started back in 1976 as the most well organized party of the Right, uniting under its ranks the largest segment of the urban middle classes (businessmen, professionals, and white collar workers), with the more traditional nationalists, under a common anti-communist, pro-West and pro-Greece orientation, at a time when other parties kept distances from both the West and from the motherland.<sup>30</sup> In Greece, after the junta's fall, Karamanlis had returned to power; even though the Greek-Cypriots were initially skeptical of him, because of his Zurich role, his moderate internal and external policies (democratization, legalization of the Greek communist party, European Union accession), soon gained him sympathies – which had a rub-on effect on Clerides and DISY who shared the same ideology with Karamanlis and his party (*Nea Demokratia*). But the other Greek-Cypriot parties kept their distances from the conservative, pro-Western Greece of Karamanlis. When the socialist Andreas Papandreou took over, in 1981, the Cypriot socialists (EDEK) were the second party to turn positive towards post-junta Greece.<sup>31</sup> Papandreou's more independent and assertive policy towards the West, promising to sever Greece's ties of dependence on foreign patrons, resonated well with the Greek-Cypriots in general, who saw in him a braver and more self-confident Greece, on which Cyprus could rely for resolving its own 'national problem'. A year after coming to power (February 1982) Papandreou was in fact the first Greek Prime Minister to visit Cyprus, rekindling local hopes for a speedy return to normalcy – the return of the refugees and a re-united Cyprus. Papandreou went out of his way to reassure the Greek-Cypriots that his visit aimed at healing the "wounds" resulting from the "feelings of desertion" of 1974; Greece was now ready to accept its responsibilities to the Cypriots, so henceforth the guiding principle would not be mere solidarity but "conjoined responsibility" [*symparataxi*, not *symparastas*]. The Cyprus problem was redefined as an issue of "invasion and occupation" by an expansionist aggressor (viz. Turkey), and not a matter of "bicomunal differences".<sup>32</sup> Consequently, any negotiations were to be carried out with Turkey, as the occupying power, and not with

the Turkish-Cypriot puppet regime, only after Turkey agreed to withdraw its forces and allow the return of the refugees plus freedom of movement, settlement and property acquisition. When the Turkish-Cypriots a few months later (November 1983) declared a separate state, Papandreou responded by proclaiming a "casus belli" policy, according to which any new, Turkish aggressive act against Cyprus would constitute a cause of war with Greece.

Meanwhile, Kyprianou had taken over as Makarios' successor – for the first five year period uncontested, and for the second term supported by AKEL, after the two parties agreed on a "minimum program" on how the country was to be ruled and on how the Cyprus Problem was to be resolved. On the latter, the policy proposed differentiated between "two dimensions" of the problem – the internal dimension, addressing the need to deal with inter-communal relations and the conflict with Turkish-Cypriots, and the international dimension, relating to the intervention of outside forces and primarily Turkey.<sup>33</sup> Papandreou was upset with the "minimum", firstly because of its prioritizing the "internal" aspect of the Cyprus Problem (which undermined his own emphasis of the problem as resulting solely from Turkey's expansionist designs), but also because Kyprianou's pact with the communists rendered his policy of internationalization of the Cyprus Problem more problematic. The Greek Prime Minister did not hesitate to interfere in Greek-Cypriot politics, in trying to undermine Kyprianou's cooperation with the communists (who, respectively, accused the former of interfering with the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign state). Shortly afterwards, DIKO walked away from collaborating with AKEL, and Kyprianou adopted Papandreou's harder stand, leading to the rejection of the "guidelines" proposed by the new U.N. Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, for resolving the Cyprus Problem. DIKO was thus the third Cypriot party to draw closer to Greece, whereas AKEL would maintain its distances and consolidate its image as the main carrier of the Cyprocentric ideology on the island.

At this point, it is pertinent to introduce another dimension of Greek-Cypriot politics, namely the division between soft-liners<sup>34</sup> and hard-liners on the basis of their different attitudes pertaining to the solution of the Cyprus Problem.<sup>35</sup> In the early post-'74 period the hard-liners' camp included EDEK, AKEL and DIKO,<sup>36</sup> whereas DISY adopted Clerides' more compromising stand (in the expectation that only the mediation of Western powers, and especially of America, could help solve the Cyprus Problem). Soon after, AKEL was to cross over to more pragmatic positions,<sup>37</sup> while maintaining a strong anti-imperialistic discourse which differentiated it from DISY.<sup>38</sup> When Kyprianou

abandoned the 'minimum' program and cooperation with AKEL, and carried on to reject the U.N. Secretary General's proposal towards resolving the Cyprus Problem (known as the de Cuellar Plan), the communists put up a fierce battle against the President, to the extent of trying to pass a law in the House of Parliament, backed by DISY, to force Kyprianou into accepting the UN plan. But, as we noted, AKEL had built its post '74 identity around its opposition to DISY – the party of "big capital" and "fascist" tendencies, "hosting EOKA B supporters": What was seen by many as its pact with the devil led to its losing a large chunk of its votes, which migrated to DIKO and EDEK.<sup>39</sup>

The conflict between Kyprianou and AKEL led the latter to support Vassiliou's independent candidacy for the 1988 presidential elections.<sup>40</sup> Once in power Vassiliou tried to stir a new course, combining elements from the two conflicting approaches to the Cyprus Problem. On the one hand, he attempted a more conciliatory approach to the Turkish-Cypriots and even Turkey (emphasizing, for instance, the "need to take Turkey's strategic needs into consideration"). On the other, he encouraged an all-round improvement in relations with Greece (for instance, through providing access to the Greek national television channel (ERT) to freely transmit its programs in Cyprus); he also considerably increased defence spending, while at the same time stressing the huge economic benefits to be derived by the two communities (but especially by the financially weaker Turkish-Cypriots) from the solution of the Cyprus Problem and the consequent defence cuts or even the demilitarization of the island. Vassiliou believed that the federal solution envisaged would turn Cyprus into a new Switzerland, in terms of the multi-national co-habitation entailed; similarly, that the commercial and other financial benefits accruing once political stability was consolidated, would turn Cyprus into the "Mediterranean's Singapore".<sup>41</sup>

But although Vassiliou brought a fresh approach to Cypriot politics, and managed to stir new hopes for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, he did not manage to get re-elected into a second term in office. Whereas in his first bid to power, he had received support from all three parties comprising the "democratic patriotic forces" (still united as against the Right, at that time), by 1993 Clerides, leader of the still stigmatized DISY, managed to achieve the support of DIKO, and the indirect consent of EDEK, which secured him the Presidency. Beside the many other factors which may explain this shift, two were paramount: First, that a few months prior to the elections Clerides hardened his positions as against a new attempt by the UN Secretary for resolving the political problem (known as Boutros Galli's "set of ideas"), and in doing so pushed

himself nearer the positions of the more hard-line DIKO and EDEK – and thereby nearer to what seemed to be a more acceptable national compromise at the time. The second, related to the rise, during Vassiliou's office in power, of neo-nationalism – a new wave of nationalism in Greek-Cypriot politics, focusing this time not on union with Greece, but on a new politics of identity. Neo-nationalism was to prove a formidable enemy of Cyprocentrism and of Vassiliou, contributing to the latter's fall and to the return of the Right.

Neo-nationalism's conditions of emergence may be traced to structural developments in Cyprus' economy and society, linked to globalization and modernization, and to the unique circumstances on the island after the 1974 events. Briefly put, after the devastation of the economy and the displacement and consequent unemployment of the masses of refugees, there quickly followed in the late 70's and early 80's a period of rapid reconstruction and development, which foreign analysts dubbed "the Cyprus economic miracle".<sup>42</sup> The main reasons contributing to this "miracle" related to the successful planned, expansionary economic policy of the state, the availability of the cheap labour of the refugees,<sup>43</sup> which stirred the growth of light industries (mainly in clothing and shoe-making),<sup>44</sup> the new opportunities which opened up for Cypriots to work or do business in the booming Middle East markets (this was the time many Arab countries were investing their profits from increased oil prices in the 70s), the many incentives the Cypriot government made available for new entrepreneurial ventures, and the restraint shown by the trade unions in limiting labour demands.<sup>45</sup> This period saw the transition of a largely agricultural economy, with little industrialization, into a service economy with an emphasis on tourism.<sup>46</sup> Rapid growth was soon translated into a situation of full employment, with a substantial increase in the Gross National Product and the per capita income.<sup>47</sup> The newly found wealth was to lead to a rampant increase in the consumption of all kinds of goods and services – new houses, cars, television sets, higher studies for the young, and at a later stage holiday traveling abroad. Consumerism, a new affluence and nouveau-riche attitudes were to characterize the 80's onwards, which in turn were to lead to new social phenomena and problems, consequent to the rapid modernization of the 90's – the weakening of family and kinship ties, increases in divorce rates, secularization and the decline of church attendance, youth delinquency (small theft, burglaries, and the beginnings of the drugs problem), environmental problems, and so on.<sup>48</sup> In these new conditions the issue was not so much how to strengthen the state (as was the primary need right after 1974), but how culture and especially national identity could best be protected.



Put differently, as global forces were seen to infiltrate Greek-Cypriot society from all directions, the need for cultural resistance acquired pre-eminence. A similar point is made by Miroslav Hroch who observes that in the late twentieth century ethnic or nationalist resurgence is often "a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society. When society fails, the nation appears as the ultimate guarantee".<sup>49</sup> Indeed, in this phase of Cyprus' history traditional society was changing at an unusually rapid pace, producing the feeling that nothing was stable or certain any more – hence calls for erecting "barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world," and for a return to ethnic roots and certitudes, fell on fertile ground.<sup>50</sup>

The main carriers of neo-nationalism in Cyprus were intellectuals on the fringes of the socialist EDEK, or altogether unattached to political parties, who had become radicalized in the fervent milieu of the early 70s and the post-74 period, thus turning critical of the status quo and traditional society and politics. Others had been nationalists in their youth days before '74, and had become disappointed and disillusioned with the turn of events leading to the coup and the invasion, and with the guilty role assumed by extreme nationalists at that time. In terms of social background, they were mostly young and middle class (professionals, journalists, academics and lawyers). The common factor uniting them was their anti-imperialist and anti-authoritarian orientations, stirred by their experiences in the mid-70s. One of their main difference to traditional nationalists was their critical attitude towards the West and its values; a segment of the neo-nationalists sought their values in the neo-Orthodox movement, which was on the rise in Greece, advocating a return to a more 'uncontaminated' version of Orthodoxy and to the "long pushed aside traditions of the nation [from which] answers could be drawn to contemporary problems";<sup>51</sup> others drew from various traditions of critical and anti-establishment thinking, and yet others, at a later stage, from post-materialism. Neo-nationalism shared with traditional nationalism a belief in the priority of the nation, rather than the state. The re-defined common new focus was not on *enosis* but on Greek identity and culture, and on a renewed relationship with Greece. Hence the slogans "we are firstly Greeks – and then Cypriots", "Cyprus is Greek", which were the exact opposites to the Cyprocentric "we are first Cypriots – and only then Greeks or Turks", and "Cyprus belongs to its people". Greek- and Turkish- Cypriots were not considered as autonomous collective actors, but as parts of the larger mother-nations and of their wider conflict. Greece was seen as vital for the military protection it could afford the Greek-Cypriots, and Greek identity as a necessary weapon for cultural defence against the encroaching forces of modernity.

Contrary to Cyprocentrism, the new emphasis was on asserting ethnicity as a vital component of one's identity. Co-habitation with Turkish-Cypriots was not to be achieved through hiding or underplaying cultural or historical differences and conflicts, since these were real and impacted on contemporary realities. The idea of peaceful co-existence in the past was a myth, as it involved a pre-industrial stage of development, characterized by cordial personal relationships between peasants in a mostly agricultural society, which had little to do with sharing power in a modern context. Similarly, the policy of rapprochement wrongly assumed that the root cause of the Cyprus Problem was bad inter-communal relations, whereas the real problem was Turkish expansionism. It followed that the solution did not have to do with mending intercommunal relationships, and passively waiting for third-parties to mediate between the two sides; it rather involved seeking an active "liberation strategy" (defined variously, at different times, from military resistance with the aid of Greece, to an intifada-style rising). Federation was thus seen with suspicion and even as a 'racist' solution since it sought to re-institutionalize power-sharing on the basis of ethnic or racial origin.

The new perspective was to gradually gain increasing influence on all levels of society, for it re-asserted the old Hellenic cultural values and symbols through a new perspective which was not conservative and rigid but more creative and assertive. A good example is the case of the women's walks (or marches) organized by groups of Greek-Cypriot women, contesting the occupation and the imposed divide of the island:<sup>52</sup> In 1975, the first such event, which gained significant international participation and publicity, ended with a peaceful demonstration which stopped at the border. In January 1987, the second protest march was still peaceful, and the women carried white flags and banners, stressing "we come in peace" – culminating in an attempt to cross into the buffer zone, but not to transgress the border. Yet, apparently, the women groups were already divided between the two alternative perspectives, so a third march (November 1987) culminated in crossing the border – to be stopped violently by the Turkish army. Finally, after a split in the movement, the last march (July 1989) ended up stressing ethnic symbols (for instance, the date of the march was chosen to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion; the chosen protest site was a Greek school and a church in the buffer zone, where a Greek and a Cypriot flag were raised and a priest commenced the Orthodox liturgy), causing the violent attack of Turkish-Cypriot policemen, and the arrest and trial of the participants.

Neo-nationalism managed to graft a new spirit to the more traditional, conservative nationalism of the Right, but it also influenced the parties of the Centre (DIKO and EDEK). In the elections of 1993, DISY's candidate (Clerides) managed to outst Vassiliou from power, after a campaign which accused the latter of being too soft on the national issue, and imbued with a cosmopolitan spirit which rendered his national credentials suspect.<sup>53</sup> Clerides' initial years in power were marked by a return of Hellenocentric ideals and a nationalist agenda. Cooperating closely with Papandreou, who had returned to power in Greece (1993), the Joined Defence Doctrine (JDD) was introduced, which openly placed the Republic of Cyprus under Greece's military umbrella (entailing the coordination of military strategies, joint military exercises and so on), presumably so that in case of a military provocation by Turkey, the Greek side would be ready to defend itself.<sup>54</sup> In 1996, Clerides announced the Cypriot government's intention to acquire S-300 missiles from Russia,<sup>55</sup> which caused Turkey's intense reactions and threats.<sup>56</sup> Although the missiles were again meant to enhance the defensive capabilities of Cyprus, a second reason was political: The Greek side judged that the long but "false" peace on the island was contributing to the indifference of the West as to promoting a solution. The new tensions between Greece and Turkey as a consequence of JDD and the S-300 were re-introducing the danger of a flare-up between two NATO allies, so Western efforts at a solution would be rekindled.

Clerides won his second period in power (1998-2003) by appearing more resolute on national matters – but also for successfully stirring Cyprus' accession route to Europe. The former of these two prongs to power was soon to prove a mirage, since in December 1998, after two years of escalating tensions, the missiles had to be deployed in Crete instead, after yielding to pressures from Turkey, America, the European Union and the UN. But the road towards European membership was gaining important momentum: The 1999 Helsinki European Council lifted a previous condition linking membership to the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, making almost certain the Republic's accession to the EU in 2004.

These, then, were the important landmarks in developments regarding national issues in Cyprus, and the contest between the two rival versions of nationalism, at the close of the twentieth and the dawn of the twenty-first century. But how did these realities reflect on Greek-Cypriots' sense of attachment to state and/or nation? What was the impact of the return of the Right and Hellenocentrism, and the apparent retreat of

Cyprocentrism, on national identifications, attitudes towards the ethnic/national Other, and the prospects of reconciliation?

### ***Nation, state and Greek-Cypriot collective identities***

Up to this point, our analysis has been socio-historical, since the object was to trace the diachronic development of nationalism and the processes of attachment to state and nation, resulting in respective collective identifications which were at odds to each other – and again this we tried to determine through considering historical evidence, connected to social change in Cyprus. Yet as Goldthorpe observes, historical accounts are by nature finite and incomplete, for they have to depend on data gathered in the past, usually for purposes other than the research at hand.<sup>57</sup> The analyst of the past may obviously attempt to trace and unearth new 'relics', and to re-interpret the available materials (both of which we have been doing this far), but he cannot *generate* evidence through producing custom-made data which did not exist before. Since our study has progressed to the contemporary period, it became possible to utilize sociological tools of the trade, in order to create appropriate, specifically intended data, to supplement the preceding socio-historical analysis.

Relevant data were produced in the context of two surveys co-ordinated by the author, and a number of in-depth interviews with Greek-Cypriots on issues relevant to this thesis (details of all these are provided in Appendix 1). The first survey was carried out in 2000 and the second in 2006; as the referendum on the Annan Plan took place in 2004, the data from the surveys allow us to consider not only how the Greek-Cypriots felt prior to taking this major historical decision, but also whether any significant shifts in collective attitudes and identifications occurred as a result of the referendum experience. In-depth interviews with approximately 150 respondents in the year 2000 and another 100 just prior to the referendum (2004), provide valuable additional materials which complement the quantitative data, shedding light as to the meanings respondents attached to the various issues under investigation.


### *National identity and party affiliation*

Collective identities are complex constructs of individuals and are context dependent – rather than fixed characteristics or essences. As the social anthropologist Thomas Eriksen puts it: "Ethnic classifications are [...] social and cultural products related to the requirements of the classifiers. They serve to order the social world and to create standardised cognitive maps over categories of relevant others".<sup>58</sup> It is obviously not very easy to determine how Greek-Cypriots view themselves and the extent to which they identify with the nation and/or the state and, furthermore, to also evaluate how their political affiliations and adherence to specific political ideologies influence or interact with their ethno-national identifications.

William Bloom reminds us that ideologies on their own cannot "evoke identification" in a "psychological vacuum" but must be underpinned by "appropriate attitudes," modes of behavior, and "identity-securing interpretive systems" for dealing with real situations.<sup>59</sup> In other words, people identify with an ideology only if it is seen to adequately interpret experienced reality. Building on these observations, we may propose that the two antagonistic political ideologies and nationalist discourses in Cyprus provide Greek-Cypriots with identity-securing interpretive schemes through which they may comprehend the social world, the recent history of Cyprus, and everyday experienced reality. These interpretive schemes are obviously associated with "appropriate attitudes," which we now turn to consider.

The traditional social scientific tool for unraveling attitudes has been the survey method and the two social surveys mentioned earlier on (2000, 2006) included a question devised by Luis Moreno, aimed specifically at exploring dual national identities; indeed it has by now been extensively used in cases such as Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Euscadi, hence availing possibilities of cross-country comparisons. The specific question was: "As regards the issue of collective identity, which of the following best describes how you feel?"<sup>60</sup> The tabulation of the answers to this question (table 6.1) reveals interesting outcomes.

A first observation is that a large number of Greek-Cypriots acknowledge the "dual" nature of their identity (35 % say they are equally Cypriot and Greek and another 13% feel the two in differing degrees – an overall total of 48%).



Cypriot	46.8
More Cypriot than Greek	9.9
Equally Cypriot and Greek	35.4
More Greek than Cypriot	2.5
Greek	4.5
Cannot decide	0.8


Figure and Table 6.1: National identity of Greek-Cypriots (2000)

What is even more interesting to note, however, is that almost half (47%) of the Greek-Cypriots sampled give priority to their Cypriot identity. From one point of view, the strength of a unitary Cypriot identity comes as a real surprise, considering the hegemonic position of Hellenocentric discourse in recent history and the multifarious ways in which Greekness has been underlined all along. Yet, from another point of view, as our analysis has shown, this might have been expected for a number of reasons: We have noted how the different historical trajectories of Cyprus and Greece have naturally given rise to different social institutions, values, and overall social realities; of primary importance is the existence of a separate state in Cyprus with its own political, economic, and social institutions, its own international representation,

and so on.<sup>61</sup> More generally, "indigenous Cypriot institutions" have led to the gradual entrenchment of a Cypriot life-world that is responsible for the formation of an "everyday pre-theoretical consciousness", which seems to be the "stronghold of Cypriotness and Cypriot identity".<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, we have seen how identifying with Cyprus is more prevalent among the Left, since its particular historical and social experiences resulted in its sharing a different *habitus* (such as symbols, associations, networks and newspapers) than the Right, leading to different classificatory schemes and ultimate values.<sup>63</sup>

The extent to which their immediate *habitus* and social relations shape the political choices of most Greek-Cypriots, can be gleaned from their responses to the question whether the party they vote for is the same as the one their father supported: An affirmative response was given by 84% of AKEL, 81% of DISY, 69% of DIKO and 46% of EDEK respondents (see Appendix 2), which illustrates the importance of family values in political socialization, especially in the case of the larger parties of the Left and Right. Furthermore, the extent to which 'national issues' are the most important ones in determining Greek-Cypriots' decisions in politics, can be ascertained by considering the responses as to the criteria they use in voting for a political party: The modal position for the supporters of all parties indicates that they vote for the party with the "most correct" stand on the Cyprus Problem, with the exception of AKEL, the majority of which said they vote for the party which best "expresses their interests", the national issue still being their close second choice (see Appendix 3).

The survey outcomes can be scrutinized more closely by correlating identity with political ideology (to the extent that this is evinced in political behaviour or party choice). Table 6.2 presents a cross-tabulation of national identity and party affiliation. It is obvious from the results that the party adherents who mostly stress their Cypriot identity are AKEL supporters: By far the largest percentage (70%) of the latter view themselves as "Cypriot" and smaller percentages as "more Cypriot than Greek"(11%) or "equally Cypriot and Greek" (18%). Almost no-one among AKEL's supporters feels only "Greek" or "more Greek than Cypriot"! This result fits the preceding analysis, which accounted for AKEL's history of Cyprocentrism.



%	AKEL	DISY	DIKO	EDEK	ENOM DIMO	NE.O.	OIKOL
Cypriot	69.8	27.9	51.2	35.2	44.4	20.0	
More Cypriot than Greek	11.0	7.9	9.3	9.3	22.2		33.3
Equally Cypriot and Greek	17.9	47.9	34.1	53.7	22.2	60.0	66.7
More Greek than Cypriot		7.0	0.8			20.0	
Greek	0.3	9.1	4.7		11.1		

Figure and Table 6.2: National identity by support of political party among Greek-Cypriots (2000)

DISY is considered to be the polar opposite of AKEL and is widely perceived as primarily Hellenocentric in orientation. The survey results demonstrate that indeed, among the larger, more established parties, DISY adherents are the ones who least stress the Cypriot component of their identity (36%) – even this percentage, however, is quite high, considering this is the Hellenocentric party par excellence.<sup>64</sup> A similarly interesting finding is that the majority of DISY supporters do not go to the other pole or extreme to emphasize their Greekness but stress both components of the Greek-Cypriot identity equally. These findings seem to relate to a number of factors: Firstly, DISY's supporters represent a wider spectrum of political/ideological views and attitudes than is often assumed – indeed, the previous historical analysis has indicated



the coexistence of a spectrum of ideological currents in this party. Furthermore, it is possible that some of DISY's supporters feel more Greek than they are willing to admit, but choose to stress a more 'balanced' identity so as not to be perceived as adherents to an extreme Right ideology, which still carries negative connotations (that this does indeed seem to be the case is demonstrated further on, when we analyze the discourses of respondents).


DIKO supporters put the primary stress to being 'Cypriot' (51%) or 'more Cypriot than Greek' (9%). These may, again, seem surprisingly high percentages, considering DIKO's public image as a hard-liner on 'national issues' and its tenacious emphasis on the Greek heritage and the need to work as closely as possible with Greece. To a large extent, the pro-Cypriot stance could be traced back to the identification of the supporters of this party with Makarios and his latterly pro-independence policies. Successive leaders of DIKO tried to adhere closely to the policies of Makarios (both S. Kyprianou and T. Papadopoulos were his close associates), posing as his acknowledged heirs; this allowed DIKO, much like Makarios, to play a balancing role between the Left and Right, reaping obvious political benefits (including holding the office of President of the Republic three out of six terms, after Makarios' death). The party's long association with Makarios and the state must account to a large extent for the strong identification of its supporters with the 'Cypriot' component of their dual identity. This brings DIKO near to AKEL but, as we will see further on, there is an important difference: AKEL's Cyprocentrism more strongly relates to its emphasis on commonalities with the Turkish-Cypriots (the common interests of the people/*laos* of Cyprus and the equality of citizens in a common state) and thus tends to a 'state' or 'civic' form of nationalism; DIKO's emphasis is mostly on the integrity and sanctity of the state, but since Turkish-Cypriots have long abandoned the Cyprus Republic, and the state has effectively been taken over by Greek-Cypriots, such as emphasis amounts less to state nationalism, and more to another version of ethno-nationalism (focusing on the survival of a homogeneous/majoritarian Greek-Cypriot state).

#### *Perceptions of relations with significant national Others*

The way Greek-Cypriots view themselves, in identifying with nation or state, greatly impacts on how they view significant national Others. This was clear in questions where respondents were asked to evaluate the relations between themselves and

Turkish-Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, or to assign characterizations to the different nationalities. So, for instance, when asked whether they consider Turkish-Cypriots as “aggressive and violent”, among those viewing themselves as “Greek” or “more Greek than Cypriot” 59% and 65% respectively answered in the affirmative, as against 45% and 33% of those feeling “Cypriot” or “more Cypriot than Greek”.

There were even larger differences when respondents were asked to evaluate whether Turkish-Cypriots have more in common with Greek-Cypriots than with Turks. Those feeling more Cypriot were more confident that indeed they do so, whereas the majority of those feeling more Greek did not wish to acknowledge many commonalities with Turkish-Cypriots. Interestingly, however, when the question was reversed, to ask whether Greek-Cypriots have more in common with Turkish-Cypriots, not only did the concurrence of those feeling Greek drop down even more, to around 10%, but similarly for those feeling Cypriot it dropped to below 25%. Obviously Greek-Cypriot respondents tended to feel that their own identification with their national “kin” is more significant than that of Turkish-Cypriots with Turks. To some extent, this must relate to the post-74 Greek-Cypriot historiography’s stress (adopted by official discourse) on the largely Christian origins of present-day Turkish-Cypriots (whereas the origin of Greek-Cypriots is traced thousands of years back, to the links with the ancient Greeks who colonized Cyprus). There were also significant differences as to how Cyprocentrics and Hellenocentrics evaluate whether commonalities between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots are more than their differences – the former being much more positive in their assessment than the latter:




(%)	Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
T/Cs are violent and aggressive	44.7	32.7	36.8	65.4	58.7
T/Cs have more in common with the G/Cs than with the Turks	70.5	64.3	61.7	25.9	33.3
G/Cs have more in common with the T/Cs than with the Greeks	24.8	13.0	8.1	11.1	8.4
What unites G/Cs with T/Cs is more than what separates them	57.7	49.0	49.2	22.2	38.3

Figure and Table 6.3: Views about the Turkish-Cypriots by collective identity

Finally, as we would expect, much larger percentages seeing themselves as more Cypriot (than those seeing themselves as more Greek) feel that what unites Greek-Cypriots with Turkish-Cypriots is more than what separates them. To a large extent this reflects prevalent official and party positions: As we will see further on, this picture changes completely when we come to consider stereotypes regarding Turkish-Cypriots.

#### *Attachment to Cyprus, Greece and Europe*

Feeling more "Cypriot" does not necessarily mean that Greek-Cypriots do not value their connection with Greece. The 2006 survey included a question on how closely connected respondents felt towards neighbourhood, village/town, district, Cyprus, Greece, and Europe.



(%)	Neighbourhood	Village	City	District	Cyprus	Greece	Europe
AKEL	3.41	3.60	3.47	3.46	3.85	2.80	1.83
EDEK	3.37	3.41	3.50	3.38	3.85	3.33	2.22
DIKO	3.37	3.67	3.48	3.42	3.83	3.11	2.10
DISY	3.43	3.60	3.50	3.38	3.84	3.50	2.36

Figure and Table 6.4: Attachment to close and distant communities

It is obvious that there are no significant variations in attachment to the more immediate communities of affiliation – such as neighbourhood and village/town. But as regards the wider imagined communities, identification with Cyprus looms large, next comes feeling close to Greece, and lastly to Europe. Whereas there are no large variations between the various sub-categories as regards identity with Cyprus, there are significant differences in the case of Greece (those feeling more Cypriot or more Left indicating less attachment, than those feeling more Greek or more Right). This reverses when we consider feelings of closeness towards Europe – the biggest difference owing to AKEL, which for a long time maintained a degree of skepticism towards the European Union (as a part of the West and of big capital), which has obviously filtered down to its supporters.

\* \* \*

#### *Discourses on National Identity*

Useful and interesting as quantitative survey results may be, they cannot provide explanations on their own, since we do not know of the reasoning or meaning behind the various numerical responses. That is why we attempted to complement quantitative data with in-depth interviews carried out with a sub-sample of our respondents. The aim of the interviews was to elicit "commonsense" talk or discourses (views, opinions, arguments, narratives) on the topics under investigation and then to analyze these as social constructs, reflecting not only the personal beliefs of the interviewees but also the wider public discourses dominant in Cyprus at the current historical juncture.<sup>65</sup>

In the last few decades, the increasing attention to discourse, or language, has "contributed in the breakdown of artificial barriers between the various social science fields,"<sup>66</sup> including those among anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political science. This shift in emphasis helps move analysis away from considering ethnic or national identity as an underlying essence that must somehow be discovered and attitudes as the privileged pathway that provide access to this hidden reality. Rather, the different responses or attitudes of people are seen as actions in themselves (language is social practice), which try 'to do' or 'to achieve' things (for instance, to argue for or against a particular public discourse). To our knowledge such an analysis was not carried out in other countries where dual identities were scrutinized. In all such studies, respondents were asked to choose between a number of discrete identity categories (Scottish or British, Catalan or Spanish, and so on), but we have no way of knowing what the respondents' interpretation of each category was – and as we will see below, in the case of Cyprus at least, this is of determining significance.<sup>67</sup>

In what follows, the classificatory scheme used is based on "ideal types"; that is, the grouping together of views that have internal consistency regarding their meaning. In practice, no speaker ever sticks to absolutely consistent views (so that, for instance, a *Cyprocentrist* may espouse ideas properly identified with ethnic nationalism – much as a right-winger may adopt leftist positions on some matters).

Before we proceed with our analysis we must make an important preliminary point. All Greek-Cypriots are obviously Greek culturally, since they speak the same language, share the same religion and other cultural traits. At the same time, most Greek-Cypriots perceive themselves to be part of the wider "imagined community" of the Greek nation, which is seen to link together all the Greeks living in different countries around the world; this link is also seen to extend back in time, uniting the Greeks diachronically in 3,000 years of common history. Almost all Greek-Cypriots make a distinction between belonging to the wider Greek nation (*ethnos*) and to Cyprus as their "particular homeland" or country (*idiaiteri patriida*). It should not be forgotten that this is how the 1960 Constitution put it: Cypriots are either Greeks or Turks of Cyprus; there is no such thing as a Cypriot nation. Which leads to the distinction Greek-Cypriots make between Greek nationality and Cypriot citizenship – being members of the Greek nation, but citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Only extreme views diverge from this orthodoxy (as in the case of 'extreme' Cyprocentrics, which is presented below, who go to the extent of suggesting that Cyprus itself is a nation); the

issue is thus which of their loyalties is stronger – to nation or to state. This, in fact, is where in-depth interviews elicit important information, in demonstrating how respondents argue the choices they make, and how they thereby construct their collective identities.

#### LOYALTY TO NATION: HELLENOCENTRISTS

As expected, Hellenocentrists stress their primary identification with and loyalty to the nation (the *identity argument*). They are proud of the Greek nation and of being Greeks. They are concerned with diachronic and ontological continuity of the present with the past, and of the particular with the universal:

I feel Greek. I am part [*aneiko*, I belong] of the Greek nation, since our history, heritage and civilization has its roots in ancient Greece (129).<sup>68</sup>

As we already pointed out, most Greek-Cypriots seem to acknowledge their cultural links with Hellenism; what distinguishes Hellenocentrists is what they make of this cultural affinity. First, they underline their pride for their Greekness and for the Greek nation, the corollary of which is their underevaluation of Cyprus and its status as an autonomous entity; whatever value Cyprus has, is derivative, since it is seen to completely depend on its link to Greece and Hellenism. In a similar manner they underevaluate their own identification with Cyprus: "I feel more Greek than Cypriot, because I see no reason to separate out a tree from the wood. Cyprus is Greek." In fact, such comparisons may render Cyprus and Cypriotness a second-best option:

I feel very proud of being *Greek-Cypriot*. Cypriot says nothing. Cyprus has no history of which it could be proud, whereas Greece can be very proud of its struggles. I am very proud as a Greek-Cypriot, for many conquerors passed through Cyprus, but Cyprus managed to maintain its Greek identity (286).

Indeed, this feeling that Cyprus is relatively unworthy in comparison to the glorious past of Greece, which obviously reflects on present-day evaluations, leads some to exclaim that they would "rather be called Greeks" than Cypriots (176).

A second, related use of the 'given' association with the Greek nation, is to use it as a weapon in attacking their Cyprocentrist opponents and in responding to their arguments: Since Greek-Cypriots are a "part of the Greek nation consisting of Hellenes all over the world", there cannot be a separate "Cypriot nation, as some would want,

who wish to change the national anthem and so on". "It is bad enough we are not united with Greece, and we are independent" (10).

*Enosis* thus emerges as the underlying agenda, as an unfulfilled noble dream which has been sacrificed for the lower cause of independence. An older respondent ponders that in older times, "we never had a state ourselves, ever since we were born, and our parents and grandparents, we've all been slaves." But the state eventually founded was a disappointment too, not managing to attract its citizens' loyalties because "laws are not kept properly, everywhere connections and interests reign" (15). "I don't believe in a Cypriot state" complains another one, who considers it a mundane reality as compared to the nation which he deems to be "of a higher order" (19). For others the state is a distant apparatus, controlled by a faceless social elite that has power over ordinary people, turning the relationship into a vertical one, of domination, as against the horizontal and more equal relationships assumed by the brotherhood of nationals (26). This means that the symbols of the state do not elicit the same emotive response as those of the nation:

I was raised up with Greece, the Greek flag, the national anthem...When I see the Greek flag or hear the national anthem I am moved deep inside me, my eyes run, I am exhilarated..The Cypriot flag does not move me in the least, it's an ordinary piece of cloth for me (15).

To the Hellenocentrists the symbols of independence are unclean and despised: "I never care to hold or hoist [the Cyprus Republic's flag], it is like a bastard baby. Whereas the Greek flag does express me and elicits from me that enthusiasm which anyone must feel for his country" (10).

The theme of uncleanliness recurs in other contexts and perhaps best expresses the contrast between the sacred nation and the profane state: "The Greeks are proud of their nation. As Cypriots we haven't decided what we are: A bastard amalgam in search of an identity – sometimes we are all Greeks, at other times we are all Cypriots, and at others yet we are one with the Turks, the Maronites and the Armenians"... "What does the Cypriot flag stand for – beside the fact that we have a state, itself bastardized?" (24)

An altogether different set of arguments stresses the synchronic aspect, the present commonalities of all Greeks who constitute the "imagined community" of the Greek nation:

Cyprus may be thought of as a part of Greece, in the same way that Crete and Rhodes may have their own local traditions, but they simultaneously partake in the panhellenic heritage which unites all Greek people, including Greek-Cypriots (195; see also 789).

Similarly, other respondents comment that they "feel firstly Greek and then Cypriot," and they suppose this applies for the inhabitants of all the Greek islands: "They feel they are [firstly] Greek and then islanders." Or, again, the differences between mainland Greeks and Greek-Cypriots are explained analogically through comparing them to the differences between Greek-Cypriots who live in the various districts of Cyprus. These arguments imply that Cyprus could be seen as a district of, and thus as a part of, Greece.

The corollary to such arguments is the emphasis on vital differentiation with other nations, primarily, of course, the Turks (the *difference argument*). Turkey is seen to be the complete opposite of Greece, the eternal enemy of the nation: Lacking in history (because it is of recent origin, a mix of Asian/Oriental tribes which expanded through conquest and plunder) and thus lacking in civilization (because it is barbarous, violent, and cruel).<sup>69</sup> Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is seen as a logical expression of its violent and expansionist character or essence. "The most basic cause of the Cyprus Problem is Turkey's expansionism" is a recurring mantra or statement of faith, one that provides clear answers about the goodness and innocence of the collective Self and the evil and guilt of the collective Other. Turkey is evil, violent, and expansionist by nature; it has always been like that, and "Greek history bears witness to this, from the fall of Constantinople [Istanbul], to the destruction of Smyrna, and the invasion of Cyprus." An extreme Hellenocentrist carries the argument to its logical conclusion when he claims that the Cyprus Problem cannot be solved through political means, only through war:

I am ready myself to fight for my country at whichever time. I even contest Constantinople, Ayia Sofia, in the same way as [I contest the loss of] Kerynia and Apostolos Andreas.

Attitudes of Hellenocentrists toward Turkish-Cypriots vary considerably but they are, on the whole, quite negative. Since the prevailing views see them as Hellenes who were converted to Islam in Ottoman times, they are not seen as "foreigners". But "because they've been isolated" from the Greek-Cypriots they have developed a "different mentality" from the former, so they are not to be trusted: "I don't hate them, but I



won't open my house to let them in and embrace them" (10). "You cannot trust a Turk to be a Cypriot as you are. A Turk is a Turk" (17). But exactly how Turkish and how Cypriot are they? For most Hellenocentrists, "Turkish-Cypriots are more Turkish than Cypriot" because of the education, socialization, or indoctrination they had. This means -that-in-the eventuality of a-solution to the-Cyprus-Problem, "living together-may-be-impossible" (129). History is often quoted as proof of the impossibility of rapprochement and cohabitation (230). This may lead to complete rejection, a wish that they were not there – "I don't like them very much and I would prefer it if they had not existed at all or if we lived completely separated" (288). Alternatively, one is advised to keep as far away as possible from them, because nearness may lead to contamination – "we will be Turkicized, we will forget our holy and sacred." In such a case, the result will be national emasculation: "We'll be Cypriots only, not Greek-Cypriots" (17).

#### LOYALTY TO STATE: CYPROCENTRISTS

Most Cyprocentrists would not be as extreme as to deny their Greekness altogether. To stress the point once more, almost all Greek-Cypriots acknowledge they are culturally Greek, since they share the same language and religion. But whereas in dominant public discourse Greece is very often taken to be indistinguishable from Hellenism, and the Greek state becomes identified with the nation, Cyprocentric views often try to reassert these distinctions through various means and with varying intensity.

As shown in the previous section, Hellenocentrists' concerns revolve around the glory of the nation and identity with Greece and mainland Greeks. Extreme Cyprocentrists' views and opinions are in many ways the complete opposite of these, so that identity arguments become converted into difference arguments. The following are two quite extreme such views that do, however, highlight the vastly different evaluations involved:

I feel Cypriot, I am Cypriot. Greeks for me are foreigners/strangers [*xenoi*]. They are those who destroyed us. I feel Cypriot, I believe in the independence of my country, I believe we should have our own national anthem and hoist our own flag (604).

Our national identity as well as our citizenship must be Cypriot. I do not feel Greek. I grew [up] in Cyprus and I am Cypriot. Greece destroyed us. Greeks are

crooks, liars and self-interested [*symferontologoi*]. They are not hospitable [*filoxenoi*]. I also want to stress that we should only have a Cypriot flag and must be called Cypriots and not Greek-Cypriots (126).

One cannot help but be impressed with the intensity with which such views come across. This must relate to the fact that the speakers are contesting a firmly entrenched discourse: As outlined earlier on, Hellenocentrism has been the dominant ideology and interpretive scheme for so long that it seems invincible. Thus a contestator must fight harder. Furthermore, contestation must be total – compromises cannot be accepted. "Compromise" is the almost universally accepted, more "balanced" official view that Greek-Cypriots are bearers of Greek ethnicity/culture but holders of Cypriot citizenship. The extreme Cyprocentrist rebels against this orthodoxy and counterargues that s/he is not a Greek but a Cypriot; s/he "will not bow to Greek symbols" (flag and national anthem) but wants "our own," including the ultimate symbol of one's very name – which must be "Cypriot" and not "Greek-Cypriot." What are the reasons for this total rebellion? Rupture, discontinuity, the end of innocence. Greeks are held responsible for the great destruction [*katastrofi*] of 1974. The Greek junta is squarely blamed for the coup and for the subsequent Turkish invasion which it could not forestall – together this amounts to the "great betrayal" [*megali prodosia*]. As we saw earlier on, even though real responsibility lay with a relatively small group of junta members or collaborators, feelings of wrath were generalized to include "all Greeks" and "everything Greek," including all right-wing/hellenocentric Greek-Cypriots. This explains why for many Greek-Cypriots, such as the respondents quoted above, the "umbilical cord" with "mother Greece" was finally and brutally cut, so that Greeks are seen as "*xenoi*," "those who destroyed us," "crooks and liars." Another respondent comments: "I don't believe we are brothers with the Greeks. I used to believe that when I was young. Nowadays I've changed my mind"(533).

In many cases, Greek-Cypriots are still involved in a struggle to transcend the past and what happened in '74, to put the trauma behind and differentiate between those Greeks who brought the catastrophe and ordinary Greek people. This is more difficult for the generation actually involved with the tragic events: "There was a prejudice [...] that all evil that befell Cyprus came from Greece; without the Greek people being responsible – the Greek people I love, I overly love... [It is] because of the Greek junta, when I was in the army, [that] I was for many years prejudiced against Greeks; I must admit I still haven't got over it one hundred percent...Of course this was wrong, what I was feeling, but the conditions of the time influenced me greatly..." (40).

There are endless discussions among Greek-Cypriots about the Greeks of the mainland and the extent of similarities or differences between the two. On the main Cyprocentrists stress the uniqueness of the Cypriots, who are seen to be more easy-going, trustworthy, hard-working, committed to family and so on; whereas mainland Greeks are seen as selfish, arrogant, boastful, devious and not to be relied upon (66, 23). These are definitely different evaluations than those made by Hellenocentrists, who tend to stress the more positive traits of their "Greek brothers".

Let us also consider Cyprocentric views of the ethnic or national Other – Turkish-Cypriots and Turks. As expected, assessments of the former are much more positive. Turkish-Cypriots are seen to be "far from cruel and violent," proposed one respondent, who then proceeded to criticize the "social system" that turns Greek-Cypriots against Turkish-Cypriots. This respondent felt that the "wall that separates us is a false one" and that "we must change attitudes through education and other means" (201). "Cyprus belongs to all Cypriots," says another, reciting a well-known slogan of Cyprocentrists, pointing out that Cypriots of both ethnicities should leave behind whatever separates them and to approach each other once more to solve the Cyprus Problem.

Their attitudes toward Turkey are more ambivalent: "I am a Cypriot but I feel [like] a Greek too... Perhaps we "feel" Greece [*sic*] because of the Turks" (546). "The Cyprus Problem was the result of Turkish expansionism and the attitude of the Americans... We must have good relations with Greece, as it is the only country which supports us" (520). Thus, the arguments come full circle: Cyprocentrists may not feel strongly Greek and may not wish Greece's involvement with Cyprus; they want to have the chance to give it another go with the Turkish Cypriots. But because of Turkey's threat, they often fall back on the need for Greece...

#### DUAL IDENTITY AND THE BALANCING OF LOYALTIES

As shown in Table 6.1, the majority of Greek-Cypriots (48%) give credit to the "dual" nature of their national identity. Here is a "representative" account, coming from a DISY supporter, of what this may mean:

I feel [that I am] as much Greek as Cypriot. Greek as to ethnicity because we share with Greeks the same language, perceptions, civilization and religion; and

Cypriot as regards citizenship, since I was born in Cyprus and I am a citizen of the Cyprus Republic, with all rights and duties that any citizen enjoys (728).

Obviously, a "perfect balance" between the two components of one's identity is not always possible, and many Greek-Cypriots would stress one or the other component – but not at the cost of total rejection or at the expense of the remaining one (as in the case of "extreme" Cyprocentrists or Hellenocentrists). For instance, after opting for the more balanced option ("as much Cypriot as Greek"), many respondents would qualify their choice and/or stress the Cypriot component, giving various justifications for this: One points out that although he feels both Greek and Cypriot, this does not mean he will "support Greece over Cyprus in case of need" (378). Others add that "feeling Greek does not mean support for *enosis*" (12, 14) or "that Greece should get involved in the affairs of Cyprus" (290).

Conversely, many chose the more balanced option but then qualified their selection and/or stressed the Greek component. The justifications, once again, are quite varied: Some start with the admission that Greece is to blame for the destruction of 1974 but then proceed to make the realistic assessment that "she is our only help" (605). Others recognize that they "are Cypriots" but then stress that "Cypriots are more Greek than mainland Greeks" – for various reasons, such as that "our tradition" or "our language" is more "pure," concluding that it would be a mistake to "abort our Greekness" [*ellinikotita*] (1003).

Placing an equal emphasis on both components of one's identity seems to be seen as of paramount importance in itself, as it indicates a sense of the "golden mean," an avoidance of extremes. Consider the following statement, where the effort to reach a middle position with regard to both political ideology and nationality seems to acquire primary importance:

The party I support is DIKO, the center, I am not an extreme or absolute person [*akraios kai apolytos anthropos*]. . . I feel Greek-Cypriot, as much Cypriot as Greek. As I said, I am not an extreme person, to feel only Cypriot or only Greek. I feel Greek-Cypriot because I believe Greece and Cyprus can co-exist and without wanting to contradict myself I'd like to stress that I feel Cypriot and believe in the independence of Cyprus . . . for I live in Cyprus, but I feel Greek as well since I believe that we have common roots, and a common civilization – thus I am both, Greek and Cypriot (750).

Another respondent admitted loyalty to the nation, but then rushed to add (without solicitation) that he doesn't "consider it the best or greatest nation on earth, [thereby]

underestimating the other nations" – obviously in an effort to demonstrate that his adherence to nation was not an extreme, "nationalistic" one. Carrying on to declare a parallel loyalty to state, he admitted that in large part this was due to the fact that he served for many years as a senior public servant – so as a "power holder" his personal interests were closely tied to those of the Cypriot state. Without a state, he points out, "Turkey would have swallowed us up". He is much softer on the Turkish-Cypriots who he feels "suffered many tribulations", so the Greek-Cypriots, "as the bigger, more powerful, and wealthier community" must care for their survival – "for without them there can be no solution to the Cyprus Problem". Besides keeping a balanced position on national matters, he tries to do similarly on political and ideological affairs:

I am neither on the left nor on the right, since I do not fully accept the communist ideology and its statism [...] and I cannot sympathize with the Right which has brought so many calamities to our land, as a consequence of their conservatism, their fanaticism, their nationalism and chauvinism...I am a moderate person in my life, I am ready to defend any correct position wherever it is coming from, I want to be free and independent to decide, without fanaticism [...] hence I am thereby a man of the centre (63).

This need to maintain a balance seems to derive from various sources. Papadakis attempts to explain the centripetal forces involved through a structural analysis of what he calls the "dilemma of Greek-Cypriot identity."<sup>70</sup> He proposes that Greek-Cypriots are faced with a situation in which they need Greece to help them deal with Turkey, but in the process they must try not to alienate Turkish-Cypriots, whom they need to convince of their good intentions in accepting a unified state as a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Thus, a dilemma is created: "On the one hand, the dependence on Greece and the belief in the Greek origins and cultural heritage of Greek-Cypriots requires the stressing of the 'Greek' part" of their identity. "On the other, the need for rapprochement with the Turkish-Cypriots leads to a desire to stress the 'Cypriot' part [...] That it is not possible to definitely choose one over the other is the source of ambivalence. At the same time one has to choose position on [an imaginary] continuum; choosing any (with the exception of the middle) means that one would lean more towards one side. This makes the ambivalence acquire the form of a dilemma over which side to stress more".<sup>71</sup>

The preceding diachronic/historical account, as well as the synchronic analysis of the current politico-ideological "field of forces", help to complement and put into context Papadakis's situationalist perspective. The picture he paints has obviously not always been that way (for instance, decades ago the Greek component of Greek-Cypriot

identity would have been stressed more). The present emphasis on balance is the outcome of the fierce ideological contest between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism that has been waging since long. Expressing support for any one side in this battle would mean risking the chance of being identified with extreme positions and of being guilty of betraying the *ethnos* (anti-hellenism) or the state (anti-cypriotism). Many, of course, were ready to accept such a label while the contest was at its peak, and taking sides was an act of heroism and honor. But nowadays, after the dust from the ideological battles has largely settled, revealing convergence on a number of issues (witnessed, for instance, in the realist/conciliatory attitudes of AKEL and DISY regarding the Cyprus Problem), being moderate has merit. Thus, more "balanced" views and constructing a respectively balanced "dual identity" have gained wide acceptance.




Figure 6.5: The Greek-Cypriot identity dichotomy and dilemma

The basic dimensions of the tension/dilemma relating to Greek-Cypriot identity is represented in figure 6.5, which shows that the more a social actor identifies with the nation, the closer s/he draws to Greece, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental benefits (for example, identification with Greece's glorious past and the military security it provides against Turkey). Yet, such a move entails moving further away from Turkish-Cypriots, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental losses (for example, undermining the commonalities vital for reuniting Cyprus and the loss of a possible ally in the struggle against Turkey).<sup>72</sup> The opposite applies when the social actor identifies with the state.

This dilemma as regards the identity and loyalties of the Greek-Cypriots signifies the inherent tensions in the very constitution of Cyprus' bi-ethnic/ bi-national state with regard to the "dual identity" and "dual loyalties" of Greek-Cypriots: On the one hand, their loyalty to the political unit, the state, which carries the prospect of unifying everyone, despite ethnic origin, on the basis of common citizenship rights and obligations; on the other hand, a sense of affiliation with and loyalty to the ethnic community of their origin and the associated heritage of cultural features (language, religion, etc.), which constitute "social/ethnic markers" that set Greek-Cypriots apart from the members of other ethnic communities on the island (and, especially, of course, from Turkish-Cypriots).

The two variants of nationalism and the associated loyalties/identifications find expression in different symbolic codes which constitute different discourses and ultimately different conceptions of the world. One could propose that the more traditional division of the world on the basis of politico-ideological dichotomies (Left/Right, reflecting different emphases on moral-political issues, such as justice/freedom and so on) is losing its power and is being replaced, or at best supplemented, by these new divisions (see Appendix 4 for a fuller treatment of this point). Even this new polarity is gradually being attenuated as a result of a process of convergence that is very much like the dilution of the ideological polarity between Left and Right. Meanwhile, at the level of everyday consciousness, the two variants of nationalism have managed to imbue ordinary common sense with national ideas/symbols. Whenever there is occasion, such as at a political rally/campaign before election time, opposing concepts, themes, and stereotypes are "awakened, so that old adversaries will face each other in battle once again".<sup>73</sup>

#### SOCIAL CHANGE AND IDENTITIES IN FLUX

Obviously the above summary presentation only broadly captures how Greek-Cypriots view their identity, and how they try to deal with the disjunction between state and nation. Some of them, those at the extreme, see their identities as unchanging and often feel this as a source of pride, since it demonstrates steadiness and a respective firm loyalty to state or nation. Many others, however, understand their allegiances as temporary and shifting, dependent on life experiences, the changing realities around them, and their own perceived place in the world. It would be interesting to consider

in more depth how such changes come about and how Greek-Cypriots deal with them in some more detail. A good case study is offered by A.X., who seems to be shifting from a Hellenocentrist to a Cyprocentrist perspective.

A.X. is a young Cypriot in his mid-forties, born to a rural family of modest means, who studied abroad and returned to work in Cyprus. During the interview A. X. reflected back on his early years when he was "well raised" in a caring family environment and learned the values of "respect for other human beings and for older people", and had the benefit of a "good education". But there he paused and pondered:

When I was in primary school it was always the idea of a Hellene and the idea of Enosis with Greece...I was always involved with the various choirs where we sung patriotic songs...I remembered just the other day, the time we had a torch-procession in the village...the national commemorations, I used to be involved in school plays, and went to church...I had a lovely circle as a Greek Christian Orthodox – but primarily a Greek – who happened to live in Cyprus, itself a part of Greece...

The next important step came when he joined "the army" (the National Guard) where his education into a Greek, with an attendant Greek identity, was completed:

[We learned] that we were Greeks, that we have this great civilization which excels as compared to whatever anyone else could offer to mankind – a totally ethnocentric approach; we never learned of anything else that happens in other countries, in other cultures, to develop an appreciation for other civilizations; the measure of things was always us the Greeks, we were the bravest in wars, we were the most intelligent of all, we were the most creative of all...

A.X. had some exposure to different ideas at high school from some teachers who, after 1974, were radicalized and began to think more critically. Then he went to America for studies – "a great land", where he came in touch with "new, more liberal ideas" and a critical, liberal education which induced him to "keep some distance from whatever concerned Greece and Cyprus", instead of being totally immersed in the respective feelings associated with such identifications. The final distancing came after he graduated, when he visited Greece itself, whereupon he was totally disappointed: The real Greece had little to do with the Greece of his imagination; he felt like this was not "his own country", he felt "a stranger" [*xenos*] in his supposed home. He realized that he had a different way of thinking, speaking, and expressing himself than the Greeks, and he "felt a bit of an idiot when trying to put on the Greek accent" ("we studied Greek at school out of books, but this was not how we spoke at home, or the way we expressed ourselves in the village or in town").<sup>74</sup> More importantly, he did not



feel as if “we were kindred souls” with Greeks from the mainland, and this was perhaps why he felt such little bonding with them: He found them too ethnocentric, “looking at the future with their backs”, through the past, whereas he felt that “the Cypriots have learned their lesson after ’74 and look at the future head on”...

It was after these experiences that he started feeling that “first of all he was a Cypriot and not a Greek”. He now started feeling proud of being a Cypriot, since Cyprus was after all his own country; all of a sudden he began noticing the progress achieved after ’74 – how the economy was re-built from its ruins, how (Greek-)Cypriots opened up new businesses, were rushing abroad for further studies, and literally transforming the country altogether.

At the current stage of his life A. X. is “not sure” anymore as to whether he “belongs to the Greek nation”. Reflecting back in his early years, which he recognizes as formative to his Greek identifications, he feels that “it was prohibited for us to think that as Cyprus, as a nation, we are a different people”, or to think about “a Cypriot nation” altogether.

Through all these experiences and the reflection that went along with them, A. X. began seeing his identity as shifting and the process of identity formation as “a journey”. When he embarked on this journey, the identification with Greece was paramount. By now, the order of priorities had drastically changed: Nowadays he feels “strongly identified with [his] country [Cyprus], second with the state, and only lastly with the [Greek] nation”. He even realizes that how he currently feels may change, according to the particular situation: “During a conversation, within a context that I feel more attached [to things Hellenic], I will not externalize my own doubts about the Greek nation”. But overall he feels that in Cyprus “a small revolution is in the making”, and that Cypriots’ feelings of identity will keep changing, emphasizing more and more the Cypriot part, and he himself feels implicated in this important project – to “construct this new Cypriot identity”. The launch forwards, towards this new direction, was already a reality:

The day Cyprus entered the European Union [during that evening’s celebrations], I was greatly moved: When I saw the fireworks I felt absolutely a Cypriot [*apolyta Kyprios*].

## **Greek-Cypriot nationalism, national closure and the rejection of federation**

In April 2004 the UN plan for the "Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" (the Annan Plan)<sup>75</sup> was rejected by an overwhelming majority (75.8%) of Greek-Cypriots, whereas it was endorsed by most (65%) Turkish-Cypriots. Interestingly on the Greek-Cypriot side it was the Hellenocentric DISY which put up the strongest fight in support of the Plan, entailing extensive power-sharing with Turkish-Cypriots under a loose, federal regime; whereas AKEL, the Cyprocentric party par excellence, and long-time supporter of *rapprochement* and peaceful co-habitation with Turkish-Cypriots, was to turn the Plan down. What may explain this surprising reversal in positions? And what may explain the rejection of the Plan, pushed by the UN and the European Union, both of which the Greek-Cypriots had repeatedly pleaded with to mediate for the resolution of the Problem, so that Cyprus would be re-unified?

To understand Greek-Cypriot positions on the federal solution, and the Annan Plan, more specifically, we should briefly consider developments between the end of the 1990's (the decade of the return of the Right and of the rise of nationalism) and 2004. We have seen how in December 1999 the Helsinki agreement gave the green light for Cyprus to join the EU: An important detail was the stipulation that even though a settlement of the political problem would not be a precondition for Cyprus' accession, the EU Council was going to "take account of all relevant factors";<sup>76</sup> this implied it did not want the Greek-Cypriots to feel that their entry would be automatic, without their real efforts towards a resolution of the Cyprus Problem; in the same way, Turkey, which was given EU candidacy at the same meeting, could not stall Cyprus' accession process by simply refusing to cooperate in searching for a settlement. Both sides were thus given strong incentives to try harder. The Helsinki decision was to give a new boost to the improvement of relations between Simitis's Greece and Erdogan's Turkey. In this new atmosphere, Clerides was compelled to shed the 'harsher' nationalist posture and to cooperate closely with the UN Secretary-General, who started work on his new plan for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem in mid-2000, "with an eye to resolving the conflict before Cyprus' likely entry to the EU".<sup>77</sup>

We have already seen that the two sides had already determined, since the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements, that the solution had to be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Yet, beside this minimal basis of agreement, a great gulf separated the positions of the two communities. The Greek-Cypriots pressed for a federation

with a strong central government which would guarantee the unity and integrity of the state. Having started their collective struggle with the aim of *enosis* with Greece, they had accepted the compromise position of the consociational Republic of 1960, and had moved on to the policy of *efikton*, that is, a unitary state with minority rights for the Turkish-Cypriots, towards the end of the '60s and the early '70s; after the debacle of 1974 the next best position was a federation system with a strong central government. The negative aim was to avoid partition, or a very loose (con)federal system through which Turkey would directly control the north part of Cyprus (via the small and weak Turkish-Cypriot community) and, through the partnership agreement, have a determining say in the affairs of the south. The Turkish-Cypriots advocated the exact reverse positions: Starting from the ideal position of having their own separate state (partition), their next best solutions were a confederal or loose federal system, with a weak centre and strong constituent states, which tried to ensure as much autonomy for their community as possible. The negative aim for them was how to avoid domination by the more numerous and financially stronger Greek-Cypriots.<sup>78</sup>

Behind these positions of the two sides lay two different political philosophies. The Greek-Cypriot preferences derive from a majoritarian, liberal view of democracy, which is based on the individualist principle of one-man one-vote. Turkish-Cypriot preferences rely on a communitarian view of democracy, which stresses the equality of the two historic, cultural communities in forging a partnership regime (much like the Ottoman millet system).




Figure 6.6: Ideal and compromise positions of the two communities post-74

Many other conflicting positions derive from the above differing perspectives. For instance, the Greek-Cypriots insist that the future solution would have to evolve from a transformation of the Cyprus Republic: Firstly, because it is an already internationally

recognized sovereign state, and secondly, because in case of a collapse of the solution there could be a safe return back to the original state of affairs – with the Republic of Cyprus intact, maintaining its international recognition. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots insist on prior recognition of their own “state” (TRNC), so that the federation is constituted through the joining together of two sovereign states in a new partnership; in such a case, a possible collapse will find them with a recognized state, which is precisely what the Greek-Cypriots fear, as this would constitute a path to legitimizing partition.

The above briefly describes the different positions *between* the two communities. But there are great differences *within* the two communities: Basically the less nationalistic positions in each community tend to move towards the centre of the above axis, and thus nearer to the positions of the non-nationalists/moderates of the other community (for which reason there is always the danger that such positions will be accused as going too far in identifying with the enemy, and of betraying the interests of ones own community). The nationalists obviously gravitate to the two extreme ends of the continuum.<sup>79</sup>

These contradictory positions allow one to understand why the job of any mediator to the Cyprus Problem is always so tough. Trying to steer a path which would avoid the numerous hurdles and to bridge the vast gap separating the two sides, the Annan Plan was an elaborate scheme comprising the basic proposal of more than 150 pages, plus supporting documents nearing 1,000 pages. Building on the 1960 agreements, consociational principles, and federal provisions (inspired by the Swiss model of federation), the Annan Plan proposed among others:<sup>80</sup> Maintaining the three 1960 treaties (of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance) along with new treaties related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus – to be signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain; Cyprus to maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, and commit to supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU; the union of Cyprus with any other country, or partition, to be prohibited; the new Cyprus to be composed of a central common state and two component states with political equality; the common government and component states to be modelled on the Swiss type of relationship between federal government and cantons; the common state to be the voice of one Cyprus internationally and in the EU; the component states to exercise all residual powers not vested by the constitution in the common state government; a single Cyprus citizenship, complemented (but not replaced) by internal component state citizenship;

a common state parliament composed of two chambers (the Senate and Chamber of Deputies) – the Senate based on 50:50 membership and the Chamber on the proportion of the population of the component states; parliament decisions to require the approval of both Chambers by simple majority; the Presidential Council to consist of six members,<sup>81</sup> and the offices of President and Vice President to rotate every ten months among the members of the Council; the Supreme Court to consist of 9 judges (3 GC, 3 TC, 3 non-Cypriot), responsible for dealing with unresolved disputes between the component states.

Overall, the proposal aimed to combine principles from the liberal, majoritarian model of democracy, with the communitarian/consociational model. It is of course difficult to summarize all the provisions of a very complex and finely balanced document. But enough has been given to illustrate how fragile the proposed scheme ended up being, having to satisfy such contradictory initial preferences and constraints.

Meanwhile, in Greek-Cypriot politics, there was to be a change of scene. We have noted how in the post-Helsinki era Clerides had to move to a 'softer' attitude on the national issue, as a consequence of the need to be seen to be working hard towards a solution, prior to EU accession.<sup>82</sup> Improved relationships between Greece and Turkey were pushing him in the same direction, and so did the proddings of other interested international actors, such as the US (which wanted the Cyprus Problem removed as an obstacle blocking Turkey's EU accession). But Clerides' new attitude did not help him within Cyprus, for his 'softer' positions drove him further away from DIKO and EDEK. On the contrary, AKEL, worried for having stayed away from power for the whole previous decade, had begun 'hardening' its own positions, thus bringing itself nearer the two smaller parties of the political centre, which held harder positions on national issues. Accepting Papadopoulos, the leader of DIKO, known for his more conservative views on the Cyprus Problem, as the common candidate of the opposition parties (AKEL, DIKO and EDEK), in the impending 2003 presidential elections, AKEL ensured victory over Clerides.<sup>83</sup> The latter had campaigned for a short-term extension of his term in office so as to finalise details of the Annan Plan, solve the Cyprus Problem, and put a united Cyprus in the EU. The opposition and Papadopoulos expressed serious concerns over the provisions contained in the current, at the time, version of the Annan Plan (Draft 2) and campaigned for the need of a new, 'tougher' President who would re-negotiate the worse, for the Greek-Cypriots, such provisions. Papadopoulos won from the first round of the elections, something that had not been accomplished

since the 1983 presidential elections (when in the still much heated political climate of the times, Kyprianou, as leader of DIKO and supported by AKEL and EDEK, had achieved a triumph – which Papadopoulos was now repeating).

~~Once in power, Papadopoulos did appear to be trying hard towards achieving progress~~ in the negotiations. In fact, he pleaded with the U.N. Secretary to give a new stir to his initiative, which was making slow progress as a consequence of Denktas' stalling. But perhaps he was counting too much on the latter's intransigence. When an impatient Turkey pressed Denktas to take a more positive stand, during the New York negotiations of February 2004, the two Cypriot leaders surprised the world by accepting the UN Secretary-General's proposals, which entailed: That the two Cypriot leaders would commence direct negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan; that Greece and Turkey would join the negotiations if the Cypriot leaders could not conclude; and that the U.N. Secretary-General would be asked to fill-in the blanks where the two sides were not able to agree, so that the final version of the Plan could be put to a referendum prior to Cyprus' entry into the EU.<sup>84</sup> Effectively, this was a full-proof method for carrying the problem to its final conclusion.

In the ensuing negotiation period the two sides tried to improve on the provisions of the Plan each thought negative for its own community. In April 2004, one month before Cyprus' EU accession, the stage was set for the referenda to take place on each side. Within the Greek-Cypriot community, all the polls were indicating that the public was mostly negative on the finalized Plan. In the very tense campaign atmosphere for a "Yes" or a "No" in the referendum, the final verdicts of the President and the political parties were to be announced.

Papadopoulos' televised national address of April 7, 2004 confirmed the prevailing negative public atmosphere.<sup>85</sup> Papadopoulos tried to achieve the difficult task of speaking to his viewers as both "President of the Republic and elected representative of the Greek Cypriot Community" – as the leader of all Cypriots despite nationality, and as leader of the Greek-Cypriots' community on whose behalf he had taken part in the negotiations. In practice, almost all of his attention focused on the Greek-Cypriots whom he addressed as the "Hellenic Cypriot People" [Ellinike kypriake lae], the expression used by the deceased Archbishop Makarios; there was, in fact, an obvious attempt through the language used, tone, and whole mode of expression, to emulate the *ethnarch*, addressing his ethno-national community, so as to endow his speech

with the authority associated with that powerful institution and its charismatic incumbent.

Right from the start, Papadopoulos aimed to establish his message by embedding it within an essentializing discourse of a bounded community of destiny, moving together through time and now faced with "the most dramatic hours in its age-old history". At this critical juncture the (ethno)national interest was paramount, so there could be no distinction between those "more or less patriotic", for "safeguarding our unity is our highest duty to our country". After stressing that the Greek-Cypriots were not maximalist in their aims but limited themselves to "the minimum but very important target: The reunification of our country and our people", Papadopoulos gravely concluded that this was not achieved with the Annan Plan. The final version of the Plan served Turkish interests well, but not those of Greek-Cypriots. As a result of the provisions of the Plan, TRNC would gain legitimacy by becoming a "component state" of the federation; the Turkish-Cypriot citizens would become "legal citizens of the EU"; the settlers would stay; Turkey would remain a guarantor and maintain troops on the island, thereby securing a basis for the control and domination of Cyprus. At the same time, economic viability would become questionable, the Greek-Cypriots would get to shoulder most of the restoration and compensation burden, and their "standard of living, built with so many sacrifices" would be put in jeopardy. Human rights would not be served – since not all refugees would return, and there would remain "restrictions on movement, settlement, the right to acquire property [and] the exercise of political rights". Furthermore, whereas Turkish gains were to be achieved right away, the few Greek-Cypriot gains were to extend over different spans of time. Meanwhile, the Cyprus Republic was to dissolve "24 hours after the referenda", so the Greek-Cypriots had no way of ensuring that the deal would be fulfilled.

Papadopoulos also discussed the alternative: What would happen if the "sovereign people reject the Plan by their vote"? The 'yes' campaign had argued that in such a case Cyprus would remain divided, as there would be no more efforts at resolving the problem, and the Greek-Cypriots would be internationally isolated. But such arguments ignored the fact that Cyprus would still join the EU, which would "upgrade and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus": Why then "abolish the Republic of Cyprus [...] our internationally recognized state exactly at the very moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European Union?" Papadopoulos also warned that saying 'yes' to a federal state which would collapse as

a result of its non-viability (“functional difficulties, complicated procedures and dangerous ambiguities”), would lead with “mathematical accuracy” to “what we all [meaning, obviously, the Greek-Cypriots] want to avoid: partition through the international recognition of the constituent states”. After this grave analysis, Papadopoulos concluded with a much-quoted statement: -

Taking up my duties [as President] I was given an internationally recognized state. I am not going to give back a ‘community’, without a say internationally, and in search of a guardian.

Finally, having argued that the overall consequences of a ‘yes’ were “heavier and more onerous”, Papadopoulos called upon his “countrymen” to “say a resounding NO” and reject the Annan Plan in the upcoming referendum.

The two parties of the political centre predictably took a stand against the Plan. The question remaining was what would be the choices of the two larger parties of the Right and Left. From the side of AKEL, given its long history of anti-nationalism, good relations with the Turkish-Cypriots, and persistent pro-solution stand, the expectation was that it would advise for a “Yes” vote. Indeed the original decision of the leadership of the party was for a cautious ‘Yes’; but the party apparently had to face strong internal voices of dissent, supporting the rejection of the Plan, and threatening to leave the party in case it took a positive public stand. Party cohesion was historically of paramount importance to the communists, on which they had to depend to weather survival in a country which belonged to the Western camp, and in which the Right enjoyed unassailed predominance since the beginning of modern politics. AKEL had also to consider that a ‘yes’ vote would mean the immediate break of its partnership with DIKO and an exit from the government in which, for the first time in its history, a substantial number of ministerial posts were held by AKEL members. In the end, it opted for the peculiar stand of asking the UN Secretary-General to postpone the referendum for a few months, so that improvements on some of the provisions of the Plan (especially as regards security issues) could be effected, after which it would support the Plan. Otherwise, in case no postponement and improvements were agreed upon, the party advised for a lukewarm ‘No’ vote.<sup>86</sup>

The only large party which was to officially support a ‘Yes’ vote was DISY. To a large extent, this reflected the party founder’s (Clerides) previous commitment to steer towards a solution, but also the strong backing of the Plan by DISY leader, N.



Anastasiades. In the post-Helsinki period the latter had become an outspoken pro-resolution advocate, and had thrown his full weight behind the Annan Plan.<sup>87</sup> Unsurprisingly, considering the split power base of the party between moderates and hard-line nationalists, after heated debates and the final verdict for a "Yes", DISY fragmented into two: A small but significant splinter group officially left DISY and created a new party (which after the referendum united with the hard-line, pro-unitary state, New Horizons, to form the European Party – Euro.Co). On the day of the referendum, exit polls showed that even from the members of DISY who had chosen not to leave the party, the majority voted against the advice of their leadership.<sup>88</sup>

Let us now return to the question of why such a large majority of Greek-Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan. Most explanatory attempts have stressed the determining influence of Papadopoulos' stand and of the impact of the vehement 'No' campaign. In such explanations the 'No' supporters are considered to be the nationalists and the 'Yes' supporters the anti-nationalists (or non-nationalists). The first camp is portrayed as the 'bad' side and the second as the 'good' side. The masses of the people who voted 'No' are thereby seen as the largely passive receivers of nationalist messages, who were brainwashed by the hard-liners' propaganda and rejected a solution which would have ushered Cyprus into a post-nationalist age. There are, of course, the precise opposite accounts which portray the Annan Plan as the outcome of foreign (especially British and American) machinations or conspiracies, the 'No' camp as the patriots who tried to save Cyprus, and the 'Yes' camp as the small minority 'sold' to outside interests.

This analysis will maintain the more dispassionate explanatory approach it has followed so far, which tries to steer away from normative judgements of nationalism, and which seeks to understand how national phenomena are socially constructed, and how they then themselves contribute to the construction of the social world. Rather than seeing nationalism as a particular (good or bad) political strategy, we rather share Billig's view that nationalism constitutes "the condition for conventional strategies, whatever the politics",<sup>89</sup> for ultimately both nationalist and anti-nationalist approaches root their appeals in the national interest.<sup>90</sup>

In understanding the results of the referendum we should start from the observation that the pre-referendum polls revealed largely negative attitudes long before the official announcements of the President and the political parties were made. Our

explanation should also be in a position to account for the fact that dissenting voices in AKEL were so strong as to reverse the original 'Yes' stand of the leadership; for why DISY's decision for a 'Yes' caused the split of the party into two, and why most of its remaining supporters still voted 'No' in their majority, despite their leadership's wishes. It thus becomes clear that it was not so much the leaders who influenced the crowds, as the crowds' attitudes which forced the leaders into adopting a "No" position. There was obviously a dialectic between the two, as the people were listening to the public debates on developments regarding the negotiations and forming their attitudes accordingly.<sup>91</sup> But rather than seeing Papadopoulos as manipulating the masses, or as possessing a special 'charisma', or special 'traits', we may adopt the standpoint of recent analyses of leadership which view the leader as exemplifying a group's social identity, as the "ingroup prototype".<sup>92</sup> Papadopoulos apparently expressed the common denominator of intra-group views, of what the Greek-Cypriots thought, felt or feared during that particular period, and under those particular circumstances. It is no wonder that Papadopoulos' popularity soared in that period, and that for months, and even years, after the referendum he achieved ratings in opinion polls which only a real *ethnarch*, above and beyond political parties, could have achieved. What thus explains Papadopoulos' appeal at the time is that he came to embody, to represent, and to express the fact that the Greek-Cypriots had after all become a cohesive imaginary community. Not as Greeks, not as Cypriots, but as Greek-Cypriots. A new national compromise had been quietly and unobtrusively established – which went almost unnoticed, until the referendum forced the realization to the surface.

This is a good point to return to our main perspective of social transformation and national closure, to pursue this basic insight/argument – that despite the differences between the Greek-Cypriots, what gradually evolved within the community was a strong attachment to the independent state, which unwanted and despised by many earlier on, became the unarticulated new national compromise and the new sacred canopy identified with the very survival of the Greek-Cypriots – who proved highly skeptical and unwilling of letting it go, in favour of a federal regime whose future seemed uncertain and insecure.

Wimmer's "dimensions of closure" may help in rounding up the discussion. Consider first *legal closure* and the consolidation of feelings that the Greek-Cypriots constitute a legal community of nationally defined citizens, distinct from outsiders. We have seen how the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic managed, after 1963 and also after 1974, to

maintain legitimacy as the internationally recognized state representing all Cypriots – even though Turkish-Cypriots had long ago left the common bi-communal house. A year after the invasion the Turkish-Cypriots declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, and in 1983 they unilaterally declared their own autonomous state, TRNC, which received no international recognition, besides that of Turkey. These moves of the Turkish-Cypriots at forming their own state met with the ferocious resistance of the Greek-Cypriots, who refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the TRNC and its borders (we earlier saw the example of how, at the citizens' level, the women marches contested both of the latter). Since undoing the realities on the ground was difficult, Greek-Cypriots used every means and every forum to deprive their opponents of international recognition. The efforts of one side to gain recognition, and of the other to prevent it, resulted in a fierce semiotic warfare (constituting the continuation of politics by other means, to adapt Carl von Clausewitz's famous adage) which has been raging unceasingly ever since. As Constantinou and Papadakis put it:

This has extended to almost any imaginable activity of an international nature, from trade to the landing of civilian company planes in the north, from sports meetings to academic conferences, including meetings or events devoid of any explicit political content.<sup>93</sup>

To avoid giving recognition to the "pirate state"<sup>94</sup> the Greek-Cypriots put any references to TRNC and its institutions in quotation marks, or (especially in oral speech) use the prefix "pseudo" (often taken to great extremes as in pseudo-president, pseudo-major, pseudo-universities, pseudo-courts, and so on). Since preventing the seceding state from acquiring legitimacy is tantamount to protecting the survival of their own state, engaging in the discourse of non-recognition amounts to a Greek-Cypriot's "patriotic duty" – very much like defending one's country in times of war.<sup>95</sup> The overall result is that even though the Greek-Cypriot side does not officially recognize TRNC and its territorial borders, the reality of its presence and the war of (non)recognition policies has aided the strengthening of mental borders and the fostering of 'we'- 'they' feelings, pushing the two communities further apart. At the same time, it has heightened Greek-Cypriot feelings of constituting a distinct "legal association" in opposition to the Turkish-Cypriots, despite the official Greek-Cypriot discourse that all Cypriots constitute one people.

Interestingly, after the Turkish-Cypriot regime was almost forced by pressures from its own citizens to partially open the borders in 2003, the Greek-Cypriot government was hesitant as to how to handle the new situation, fearing again the possibility of giving

indirect “recognition” to the illegitimate TRNC: Initially, it discouraged citizens from crossing across the divide, and eventually it gave its blessings with great hesitation. Many Greek-Cypriots, including most politicians, have still not crossed to the other side, fearing of being accused that they are not patriotic enough<sup>96</sup> – which effectively demonstrates how mental borders are often stronger than territorial ones. At the same time, hundreds of Turkish-Cypriots, in the knowledge that the Republic would soon be entering the European Union, started applying to the Greek-Cypriot authorities for the Republic’s passports and ID cards – in order to thereby secure EU citizenship. These developments constituted an indirect acknowledgement by Turkish-Cypriot citizens, of the legitimacy of the Greek-Cypriot state, as against their own.

Let us now turn to *political closure* to consider how it was effected in the post ‘74 era. In the previous chapter we saw how during the first years of Independence political parties (except AKEL) were non-existent, and even after they did eventually emerge, after 1968, they were linked to para-state military organizations, and/or they were overshadowed by Makarios. It was only after 1974, and especially after Makarios’ death in 1977, that democratic party politics was gradually established. Initially, parties were quite unsure of themselves, and tried to use the state to consolidate their power; many citizens did not feel free enough to criticize the government and were still quite alienated from the state, which they felt to be associated to the party in power and its loyal followers, and not to every citizen. One’s political affiliation (judged often from the newspaper he read or his company of friends) often determined whether he or his children could get a job in the government, or a desired promotion, a good posting in the army – and so on. But by the early twenty-first century there were enough changes in government for democracy to be deeply entrenched so that all could feel a part of it: Even the allegedly “extreme” Right of Clerides had managed to exercise power for ten whole years and had, thereby, managed to shed a large part of the ‘74 stigma (in 2008, it was AKEL’s turn to power, completing the cycle of normalization of democratic political life, so henceforth no one would feel excluded from the system).

Not only was politics normalized, but the Republic grew less and less reliant on Greece and Greek governments. Obviously, Greece is still held in high regard as the national centre. Back in the period immediately after ‘74, Karamanlis had instituted the principle “Cyprus decides and Greece assists”;<sup>97</sup> and even though Papandreou, who succeeded him, did interfere more openly in Cypriot political affairs, this was mostly in the sense of pushing the Cypriot governments to go in the directions he preferred,

rather than plotting behind their back or subverting them, as had happened in the 1963-1974 period; in this period, the official principle governing relations between the two countries became that of "co-decision making" [*synapophasizomen*].<sup>98</sup> When Simitis got into power the relationship between the two countries became one of active Greek counsel and support, than of pushing or imposing policy preferences. By the time of the April 2004 referendum, the Cypriots were largely emancipated from mainland Greece patronage: Despite the fact that 3 out of the 4 parliamentary parties (*Nea Demokratia*, PASOK, *Synaspismos*) were in favour of accepting the Annan Plan, in Cyprus, 6 out of the 8 parties felt free enough to reject it.<sup>99</sup>

Similar developments impacted on *military closure*. Greece has obviously remained important to the Greek-Cypriots, as their main ally in defence matters, the Joint Defence Doctrine being perhaps the best example of how the two countries tried to deal with this issue – as if it was a military pact between two separate, sovereign, and self-respecting countries, while it was also transparent that the pact entailed protection by the "motherland" to a weaker kin state, creating a certain dependence by the latter on the former.<sup>100</sup> At the same time, one should note the conscious steps taken by the Greek-Cypriots to gradually increase their autonomy from Greece, to the extent possible, as regards this domain. One of the ways this was achieved was through the so-called "Cypriotization" of the National Guard, in other words, the gradual replacement of the hundreds of middle- and high-ranking Greek mainland officers in the National Guard, with Greek-Cypriots. It is true that the chief commander still has to be from the Greek mainland (usually a retired General from the Greek armed forces), but overall dependence on the Greek military has substantially decreased – which, incidentally, means a much smaller influence on the young men undergoing their military service in the National Guard. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as Cyprus' progression towards membership to the European Union, supported by Greece, became more confirmed, the need for military defence started losing in importance, since the EU is a "security community" which avails its members with multiple means of defence – and certainly not only, or primarily, military. Indeed one of the main reasons Greek-Cypriots have been strong supporters of the idea of joining the European Union, all along, was their perception of enhanced multifold security within the EU.<sup>101</sup> Unlike other, larger and stronger states, for the Greek-Cypriots, joining the EU did not present any dilemmas of losing their sovereignty – rather the contrary, they felt that this would be the first time they could really enjoy the sovereignty which statehood usually confers. Paradoxically, (as we have seen in Papadopoulos' address),


this sense of security which imminent accession to the EU was expected to bring, constituted one of the factors which made the Greek-Cypriots feel more comfortable with saying "No" to the Annan Plan, against EU wishes!

Let us finally turn to *welfare closure*, and the contribution of social security in strengthening the Cyprus Republic as a community of solidarity. As Pashiardes points out, back in 1960 the Republic had inherited an underdeveloped colonial economy from the British, with only a rudimentary social welfare system.<sup>102</sup> As we saw earlier on, the first years of independence (1960-1974) were characterized by sustained economic growth and development, which made possible the gradual introduction of social security provisions (the Church and family remaining important alternative providers), but the process came to a dramatic halt with the 1974 disaster. After the invasion, priorities revolved around meeting the basic survival needs of the displaced and reactivating the dislocated economy.<sup>103</sup> But, henceforth, welfare policies evolved rapidly, along with the rejuvenated economy. By 1980, a comprehensive social insurance scheme was introduced and there was good progress towards the provision of various services such as free public education, medical care and income security.<sup>104</sup> In fact, if we use Pierson's criterion – of social expenditure reaching over 3% of the GNP as the "national indicator" for a country to be considered a welfare state – then this was accomplished by the Cyprus Republic in 1981.<sup>105</sup> Since the '80s welfare provisions have been moving towards universalization and further expansion.<sup>106</sup> Even though the family and other communal institutions, such as the Church, still play a supplementary role to the state, citizens are increasingly expecting the latter to be the main welfare provider. Thereby, the Greek-Cypriot community has been consolidated into a community of real, material solidarity, "a hyper-extended family where everybody cares for the well-being of everybody else".<sup>107</sup>

In recent decades, the above process of closure was accompanied by a parallel, gradual hardening of the rules concerning entering and settling in the Republic. As the numbers of foreign workers seeking job opportunities, created with the booming economy and the rising standard of affluence, increased, the rules defining who may enter, work and settle in the Republic have grown harder and harder. Close control over who enters the territory thus became more important with the parallel growth of the welfare state, precisely because of the need to differentiate between those eligible, or not, for the various welfare benefits. This further strengthened the sense of solidarity between co-nationals, provided by the Republic.

We have thus briefly traced the process whereby social integration and closure have intensified in the decades after 1974. The process involved a "restructuring of the basic mechanisms of integration and exclusion": More specifically, the mechanisms of legal, political, military and welfare inclusion, previously organized on the basis of weaker or more diverse criteria of belonging, were re-adjusted to the "principle of national membership".<sup>108</sup> Each move towards more integration strengthened identification with the Cyprus Republic as an imagined – but also real – community of solidarity. Rather than causing a change in this trend, the Hellenocentrists' ten-year stay in power, has contributed to their incorporation and enhanced loyalty and identification with Cyprus and with the Cypriot state. But, mostly as a consequence of the contest of the two rival variants of nationalism, a new synthesis (or, to use Wimmer again, a new national compromise) was reached: On the one hand, Greek culture and Greek identity as a strong component of Greek-Cypriot dual identity, have been re-asserted – this has been the Cyprocentrists' compromise; on the other, the Greek-Cypriot state as a worthy end in itself, autonomous from Greece, has gained a new respect – this has been the Hellenocentrists' compromise. Effectively, the overall result is the confirmation of the independence and self-sufficiency of a "second Greek state": This is the new national compromise which allows a stronger unity among Greek-Cypriots – but which, at the same time, makes the incorporation of Turkish-Cypriots more difficult. Paradoxically, these changes translate into a stress on Cypriot identity which brackets away the "Greek" component *only because it is taken for granted*. Hence, even though the numbers of Greek-Cypriots feeling only or mostly Cypriot seem to be growing, this does not necessarily mean ethno-nationalism is fading away – and this explains why the desire for incorporating the Turkish-Cypriots into a new power-sharing regime is actually weakening.

Indeed, a comparison of national identifications between 2000 and 2006 shows that even in this short period, there was a further increase in the numbers of those stressing the Cypriot component of their identities:



	2000	2006
Cypriot	46.8	54.2
More Cypriot than Greek	9.9	7.9
Equally Cypriot and Greek	35.4	31.8
More Greek than Cypriot	2.5	2.2
Greek	4.5	2.9
Cannot decide	0.8	0.9

Figure and Table 6.6: National identity of Greek-Cypriots in 2000 and 2006.


Interestingly, the larger increase is of those who identified with the category "Cypriot" only (from 47% in 2000 to 54% in 2006). Also significant is the further reduction of those feeling only "Greek" (from the already low 4.5% to the even lower 2.9%).

Let us now turn to the great issue of Cyprus – the Cyprus Problem and its resolution, and of how the two communities feel towards co-habitation. To be sure, it is a fact that very few Greek-Cypriots would still wish for union with Greece. Let us compare how the numbers of those opting for such an outcome have dramatically declined over the years. In 1965, Stanley Kyriakides carried out a survey among the Greek-Cypriots and, among other matters, inquired as to what they considered as "the most realistic solution" to the Cyprus Problem. At the time, approximately 41% indicated Independence, 18% *Enosis*, and 31% self-determination.<sup>109</sup> When the question changed to what they "ideally" considered as "the most justifiable" solution, percentages changed to 30% for Independence, 53% for *Enosis* and 16% for self-determination.<sup>110</sup> Thus *enosis* was by far what the majority still preferred – even only



as an ideal. Thirty-five years later (2000), when we inquired as to what solution respondents would have preferred had the Turkish invasion not taken place, a large majority of 78% indicated Independence and 16% *Enosis*. Since our question more or less corresponded to an "ideal" situation, it is obvious that *Enosis* was down from 53% in 1965 to only 16% in 2006.<sup>111</sup>


Back in the mid-'60s, it appeared that *enosis* was more favoured by rural (61%) than urban (42.5%) dwellers, and by those more educated (60% college graduates, as against the 53% mean from other educational categories). In 2000, there was no significant variation between rural and urban dwellers, and only a small over-representation of university graduates (18% compared to the mean 16%). The characteristic which exhibited impressive differences was party affiliation: Whereas a large proportion of DISY respondents chose *Enosis* (36%) over Independence (59%), only 3% of AKEL which exhibited impressive differences respondents, 6% of EDEK, and 8.5% of DIKO showed a preference for *Enosis* (as against 95%, 91% and 84%, respectively, who vouched for Independence).<sup>112</sup>



	Independent state	Union with Greece	Cannot decide
AKEL	95.1	3.2	1.6
EDEK	59.3	35.9	4.9
DIKO	83.7	8.5	7.8
DISY	90.7	5.6	3.7

Figure and Table 6.7: Type of solution to the Cyprus Problem by party affiliation

When preference for *enosis* was correlated with national identity we found similar large differences, so that those considering themselves “Greek” or “More Greek than Cypriot” opted for *Enosis* by 56% and 67%, respectively, and those feeling “Cypriot” or “More Cypriot than Greek” by only 5% and 6%, respectively.




	Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
Independent state	91.0	92.5	70.7	29.6	41.7
Union with Greece	5.2	5.7	23.0	66.7	56.3
Cannot decide	3.8	1.9	6.3	3.7	2.1

Figure and Table 6.8: Preferable settlement in case there was no Turkish occupation by collective identity.

But does rejection of the age-old dream of *enosis* and a preference for Independence mean that the Greek-Cypriots are ready to take the next step, to move towards federation? Before addressing this question directly, we had to deal with a preliminary concern, namely that understanding how a future federal system would work is not easy, especially for people who have grown up in a unitary political system, like Cypriots. It would be difficult to comprehend how self-rule can be combined with shared-rule – how the centre can, in some matters, have a say in what happens in the constituent parts, and yet the latter to be largely free to take their own decisions in many other matters. It would be even more difficult for ordinary citizens to

understand the differences between federations and confederations, how the United States, Swiss and Belgian models work, and so on. In order to ensure that these complexities did not interfere with our results (so that respondents would be choosing options without understanding their meaning, simply because their party took a certain stand), we began our survey with the simple question of the type of relationship respondents would like to have with the Turkish-Cypriots – whether they wished to live “as separately as possible”, as “together/near as possible”, or somewhere in-between. The findings of the first survey, in 2000, were extremely interesting:



(%)	Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
Separately	22.6	19.8	22.3	33.3	35.4
Together	34.2	23.6	22.3	14.8	14.6
Neither separately nor together	43.2	56.6	55.4	51.9	50.0

Figure and Table 6.9: Desirable relationship with the Turkish-Cypriots

Two conclusions transpire from the above: First, that those who feel “Cypriot” (only or mostly) are much more ready to live in close integration with Turkish-Cypriots (58%), whereas those who feel (only or mostly) “Greek” prefer to be as separate as possible to the other community (69%) – indeed, the reverse symmetry in replies is quite impressive! Yet, considering that Greek-Cypriots have been arguing all along that there is little that separates them from the Turkish-Cypriots, one would expect that the choice of living separately would have had few adherents – and yet it received equal

support to living closely together. The second, even more significant, observation is how the majority said they wish to be somewhere in-between, not to be too far or too near to the other community. Choosing the in-between option indicates an uncertainty as to how to relate to the Other, whether to shift to complete distance or to closer integration. Again, considering that ever since 1974 the official Greek-Cypriot positions have revolved around the re-union and re-integration of the island, the respondents' 'in-between' preference is surprising. Unless they saw the 'in-between' option as precisely what federations are all about: Federalism has, after all, been described as "the constitutional combination of self-rule and shared-rule", or as "keeping together by staying apart", as "autonomy with unity", and so on. Is this what respondents were hinting at? Not necessarily: There could have been other reasons why Greek-Cypriots were not so keen of integrating "as closely together as possible" with Turkish-Cypriots. An important clue came from questions concerning the prevalent stereotypes of the ethnic Other. When respondents were asked to evaluate their own and the other community on the basis of ten features, half of which were positive and half negative, these were the rankings which emerged:

	Evaluations of Turkish-Cypriots	Evaluations of Greek-Cypriots
1	Lazy	Hospitable
2	Backward	Civilized
3	Dirty	Honourable Intelligent
4	Shifty (deceitful)	-
5	Barbarous	Honest
6	Hospitable	Shifty
7	Honourable	Lazy
8	Honest	Dirty
9	Intelligent	Backward
10	Cultured	Barbarous


Figure 6.10: Ranking of Greek-Cypriot stereotypes re. Turkish- and Greek- Cypriots.

What is striking is that the first five adjectives Greek-Cypriots chose to characterize Turkish-Cypriots are all negative, whereas the respective characterizations of their own co-nationals are all positive<sup>113</sup>.

But what, if any, is the significance of these stereotypes to our overall arguments? Early views of stereotypes saw them as exaggerated beliefs about particular categories or groups of people (for example, "black people are lazy"), which many saw as embodying "a kernel of truth". The cause of stereotypes was regarded to be individual misinformation, irrational judgment or even psychopathological prejudice.<sup>114</sup> The *social cognition* perspective saw stereotypes not as pathological symptoms but as normal features of individuals' cognitive processes, deriving from the need to impose order in a chaotic world, through classification and categorization.<sup>115</sup> *Social identity* theory shifted attention from individual views or attitudes to inter-group dynamics and comparative judgments ("they are x because they are different to us who are y").<sup>116</sup> More recent sociological analyses have shifted explanation even further, to emphasize the historical, cultural and ideological dimensions of stereotypes. Hence, they are now seen as elements of broad cultural practices and processes which carry with them specific ideological values and beliefs.<sup>117</sup> It follows that stereotypes regarding Turkish-Cypriots should not be seen as necessarily relating to actual characteristics Turkish-Cypriots may have, nor to mistaken, misinformed or pathological views of individual Greek-Cypriot beholders. They should rather be seen to relate to widespread and generally accepted prejudices that have become "common-sense" views among Greek-Cypriots, as a result of the historical development of ethno-nationalist ideas and ideologies, as outlined in this thesis.<sup>118</sup> National stereotypes turn cultural characteristics into natural, fixed, or "fossilized" givens, and remain fairly stable over long periods of time. One of their main functions is to secure social closure, to maintain the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', to counterpose Greek-Cypriot superiority to Turkish-Cypriot inferiority, Greek-Cypriot modernity to Turkish-Cypriot backwardness, and so on. Each of the two different cultures is seen to be "singular, unified and integrated", and this obscures intra-communal differences among individuals or groups, as well as inter-communal links and similarities.<sup>119</sup>


But how widespread are negative stereotypes regarding Turkish-Cypriots? Could it be that these negative stereotypes are held only by some Greek-Cypriots, those with the 'harder' nationalist views? The data disconfirm such an assumption. When we examined how the rankings were made by the different sub-categories of Greek-Cypriots (for instance, by political party, national identity), there was an impressive consistency as to the negative evaluations of Turkish-Cypriots, the only difference being the precise order of the negative stereotypes and the intensity with which these were assigned. Figure 6.11 shows how the views of individuals with a different (a)

party political affiliation and/or (b) national identity, varied; in all cases, the 'peak' of the curves indicates concurrence on the predominance of negative traits, whereas the lowest points of the curves indicate consensus on the lack of these more positive traits among Turkish-Cypriots.



(%)	AKEL	EDEK	DIKO	DISY	Total
Honest	6.6	7.1	3.4	2.8	4.6
Lazy	17.8	16.2	18.9	19.4	18.5
Honourable	5.5	5.8	2.3	2.8	3.9
Dirty	15.2	14.3	18.6	15.3	15.7
Hospitable	10.5	9.7	7.7	5.7	8.0
Shifty	12.2	13.6	15.1	15.2	13.9
Civilized	1.8	1.9	1.1	1.7	1.7
Backward	17.0	18.8	19.7	19.6	18.6
Intelligent	3.7	5.2	3.4	2.9	3.4
Barbarous	9.7	7.1	9.7	14.7	11.6

Figure and Table 6.11: Stereotypes of Turkish-Cypriots by party affiliation




(%)	Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
Honest	4.9	3.0	5.2	0.0	5.1
Lazy	18.9	18.1	16.9	22.7	18.4
Honourable	4.2	3.7	4.7	1.3	3.7
Dirty	16.7	15.6	14.3	18.7	14.0
Hospitable	8.3	8.5	7.8	4.0	6.6
Shifty	13.5	15.6	14.3	14.7	14.7
Civilized	1.9	3.0	1.6	0.0	2.9
Backward	17.2	20.0	19.9	22.7	17.6
Intelligent	2.9	3.0	4.7	1.3	2.9
Barbarous	11.4	9.6	10.7	14.7	14.0

Figure and Table 6.12: Stereotypes of Turkish-Cypriots by collective identity

What thus transpires is how close the views of the different sub-categories of Greek-Cypriots are when it comes to negative evaluations or stereotypes of Turkish-Cypriots. Equally impressive is how their views are again very close when they concern positive evaluations or stereotypes of themselves – their own imagined community.

Having noted these observations, the ground is now more ready to examine Greek-Cypriot attitudes towards federation. When, in 2000, we asked our sample more

specifically about their preferred political regime for a solution, the responses were as follows:




(%)	Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
Unitary state	45.6	60.4	51.1	46.8	46.8
Federation	24.4	17.0	28.8	27.7	27.7
Confederation	2.4	3.8	2.4	0.0	0.0
Two separate states	14.2	4.7	7.9	14.9	14.9
Cannot decide	13.4	14.2	9.8	10.6	10.6

Figure and Table 6.13: Type of solution to the Cyprus Problem by collective identity (2000)

Despite the Greek-Cypriot official backing of a federal solution to the Cyprus Problem, the majority of citizens expressed a strong preference for a unitary state. A federal regime was only the second-best solution, chosen by approximately half the numbers of those opting for a unitary state. This applies across the spectrum of national identity, political affiliation, or other characteristics. This was how Greek-Cypriots felt in the year 2000 – the very year that the U.N. Secretary-General submitted his first thoughts on the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.<sup>120</sup>



In 2006, two years after the Greek-Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, we re-visited the issue of preferred political regime. The findings are counterposed to those of 2000 for the sake of easier comparisons:



		Cypriot	More Cypriot	The same	More Greek	Greek
Unitary state	2000	45,6	60,4	51,1	37,0	46,8
	2006	18,1	26,1	26,0	38,5	62,5
Federation	2000	24,4	17,0	28,8	33,3	27,7
	2006	18,8	21,7	18,8	7,7	0,0
Confederation	2000	2,4	3,8	2,4	0,0	0,0
	2006	3,9	2,2	6,1	0,0	6,3
Two separate states	2000	14,2	4,7	7,9	18,5	14,9
	2006	17,8	10,9	17,7	7,7	12,5
Cannot decide	2000	13,4	14,2	9,8	11,1	10,6
	2006	41,4	39,1	31,5	46,2	18,8

Figure and Table 6.14: Type of solution to the Cyprus problem by collective identity: 2000 compared with 2006.

The emerging pattern is certainly more diverse and uncertain. The first preference among the various options was still the unitary state (down from mean support of 50% in 2000, to 27% in 2006), but now it was chosen primarily by those feeling more 'Greek', whereas all others seemed more hesitant. Support for federation had similarly

dropped across the board (from 25% in 2000, to 13% in 2006), but primarily for the Hellenocentrists. But the response for which the majority of Greek-Cypriots opted for was the "don't know"/"cannot decide" one (up from 12% in 2000, to 40% in 2006) – indicating that respondents were obviously unhappy and/or unclear about all options.

This pattern of uncertainty and indecision obviously relates to what happened after the 2004 referendum: Whereas the Greek-Cypriots were hoping that joining the European Union would strengthen their bargaining position, they soon found out that things did not unfold as they expected, for their 'resounding No' had a boomerang effect, alienating the UN, the European Union, and the international community more generally, who now became more sympathetic to the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey (seen to have tried hard for a solution, unlike the Greek-Cypriots). In fact, a few months after accession (December 2004), the EU decided to open up accession negotiations with Turkey (a country the Greek-Cypriots held responsible for their plight, and for consistently violating human rights and democratic principles – thus unworthy of being an EU member state). The tragic irony was that, despite how they felt, they realized that even though they were now members of the EU, they did not have the power to stop/veto the disputed decision. Yet, disappointment with the turn of things after the referendum and accession did not mean they regretted their negative vote for the Annan Plan: In fact, as our survey reveals, preference for federation as a solution dropped drastically between 2000 and 2006. What Greek-Cypriots came to be convinced of was that Papadopoulos' handling of the 'No' vote had alienated the international community; furthermore, the view gradually prevailed that Papadopoulos was not willing to try hard enough to regain the trust of Turkish-Cypriots, so that new efforts for a solution would start. Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriots had started construction works on land which had so far been left untouched, to return to Greek-Cypriots after a solution. The European Union and other Western powers started pushing for "ending Turkish-Cypriots' isolation". All these negative developments switched support away from Papadopoulos. In the Presidential elections of 2008, Demetris Christofias, leader of AKEL, managed to come to power after a campaign which stressed his moderation, his acceptability to the international community, but primarily his better relationship with the Turkish-Cypriots with whom a solution had to be re-negotiated. But for Christofias' positions to appear more mainstream, he had to adopt an even harder stand as regards the solution to the Cyprus Problem: Whereas at the time of the referendum, AKEL's position was that with some minor amendments, especially on security issues, it would accept the Annan

Plan, it now considered the Plan as just a basis for future negotiations, which could not be ignored, but which had to be fundamentally altered before the Greek-Cypriots could accept it. Such a position was a good enough compromise to win the consent of enough Greek-Cypriots to bring Christofias to power: But the issue remained as to whether this could be the basis of gaining the Turkish-Cypriots' consent, so as to lead to a new bi-communal national compromise.<sup>121</sup>

## **Chapter 7 Conclusion: A post-national future?**

This thesis has aimed to make a contribution to the study of Greek-Cypriot nationalism through tracing its genesis, the main stages of its diachronic development, and the ensuing identifications with nation and state. In this concluding section, an attempt will be made to draw the major threads of the historical narrative together, and carry on to consider the implications of the main findings as regards the future of nationalism in Cyprus, as well as of the prospects of success in the forging of a common federal national state, in the new context provided by membership in the European Union.

### *The growth of ethno-nationalism and social closure along ethnic lines*

Let us start by highlighting the main landmarks in the trajectory of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, noting how the present thesis differs from previous 'mainstream', as well as 'reformist' accounts.<sup>1</sup> In the early part of the historical analysis, we saw that the Greek nation and nationalism cannot be traced back to ancient times, as primordialists and nationalists routinely assume. But Greek culture, with local adaptations, and a "Cypriote Greek identity"<sup>2</sup> did develop, serving as connecting links to the rest of the Greek cultural world. During Byzantine and Medieval times, Orthodox Christianity became another strong cultural element of Cypriot identity, and the Orthodox Church grew as an important, autonomous institution around which the locals rallied, and through which they differentiated themselves as against their European rulers (Franks and Venetians). Although proto-nationalism seems to have been a feature of the last years of the Byzantine Empire, it had little impact in Cyprus; yet a definite concern with Greek culture and the local dialect did seem to characterize the Orthodox elite, along with an attachment to the Orthodox religion and Church. Orthodoxy was certainly the main source of identification of the lower classes as against their Latin/European masters, whose exploitative feudal rule they detested, to the extent that they considered the coming of the Ottomans as a form of liberation.

Mainstream Greek-Cypriot historiography presents Ottoman rule as Cyprus' "dark ages", characterized by enslavement, exploitation and oppression. Turkish-Cypriot official historiography portrays this period as one of relative peace and prosperity, marked by the regime's toleration, which "enabled the Muslim Turkish and Christian communities to live in harmony and equality together".<sup>3</sup> In our account, we

differentiated between the various stages of Ottoman rule, the valiance of the empire in the different stages, and the consequences on its subjects. Early Ottoman rule brought an initial improvement in the lot of the peasant masses, as regards economic conditions and the abolition of feudal serfdom; even more important was the new prominence the Orthodox Church acquired, which gradually managed to amass great wealth, and to assume a vital administrative and political role, as the representative of the Orthodox Christians of the island, protecting the surplus-yielding peasants from the rapacity of local Muslim governors and officials. But the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus came towards the end of the empire's golden era of ascent: The onset of its decline was associated with the end of further expansion, leading to the decay of the timar system and the shift to a market economy, which led to mounting pressures on the peasants – and, hence, to the increasing importance of the Cypriot Church. Parallel to these developments was the rise of the Greek Balkan Orthodox merchants, who were to become catalysts in the formation of national states in south-east Europe. The merchants played a key role in the spread of Greek diaspora communities (*paroikies*) all over Europe, where the Greeks came into contact with Western ideas.

Religious Orthodox consciousness was to gradually evolve into Greek ethnic consciousness due to a number of reasons – such as the use of Greek by the Church, the early development of Greek printing in Europe, the establishment of Greek by the Balkan merchants as the main Balkan language of commerce and culture, and the adoption of secular Enlightenment ideas by the Greek or Grecophone Orthodox merchants and *logioi*; these ideas were to form the basis of liberation plans in Ottoman controlled lands.<sup>4</sup> The Ottoman central authorities tried to forestall subversive developments through a number of reforms and the cultivation of *Ottomanism* as an over-laying identity, linking the religious communities comprising the empire into a modern multi-national state. But this effort at forging a new social compromise failed because the millets were already being transformed along ethnic lines. Mainstream historiography portrays the Orthodox Church as the depository of national identity and culture and, hence, the stalwart of nationalist initiatives; in fact, the Orthodox Church hierarchy, being closely connected to the Ottoman ruling establishment, showed preference for a transformed Ottoman empire under Greek hegemony (a resurrected Byzantium), rather than the formation of nation-states, which were associated with secular ideas. The creation of the Greek state and its related organisations (such as the various literary associations), were to give a boost to the spread of nationalist ideas – in the context of the *Megali Idea* irredentist ideology. Furthermore, the

creation of the Greek national church was to put religion in the service of the nation-state, and national ideas would no longer seem to antagonize religious ones,<sup>5</sup> removing a further hurdle from nation building. In Cyprus, there was little revolutionary agitation but, during the nineteenth century, religious consciousness was steadily being transformed into ethnic consciousness; the key carriers of nationalist ideas were Cypriot and Greek merchants and *logioi*, who were a part of, or closely connected with, the *paroikies* and Greece.

By the time the British arrived in Cyprus, ethnic feelings and ideas were already in place. Contrary to extreme modernist positions, which portray Greek-Cypriot nationalism as an export of the Greek state, or as a product of British colonial policies, the nationally inspired world-view had already taken root and played a determining role, acting "as switchmen in defining the pathways along which the dynamics of [material and ideal] interests",<sup>6</sup> relating to nationalism, were to move. The British viewed Cypriot society as "plural", in Furnival's sense of being already "deeply divided" along ethno-communal lines; they furthered the politicization of ethnicity by institutionalizing communal representation in the Legislative Council, as well as in other representative bodies, including the Boards of Education. Their attempt to foster an overarching identity, which would contribute to the closer unity between the two communities, came too late and offered too little, as it became obvious that it was not really meant to serve the local people but British imperialist objectives instead (to check the rising tide of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and foster loyalty to the empire).

The communist party's internationalism constituted one of the few attempts to question *enosis* and to push for cross-ethnic cooperation in fighting imperialism and capitalism, but the nationalist "desire" (*pothos*) was well entrenched by this time (mid-1920's, late 1930's), and the communists too weak to make an impact. The successor party, AKEL, in the post-WWII period, maintained the aim of bi-communal cooperation, but adopted *enosism*, which placed it in the mainstream of Greek Cypriot politics but was to, ultimately, limit its influence within the Turkish Cypriot community. Yet the Left's more strategic and instrumentalist stand as regards *enosis*, its stress on the need for unity of all Cypriot people (*laos*), as against the external oppressor, and its concern with economic, social and civic issues, were to differentiate its own version of nationalism from that of the Right and the *ethnarchy* (a more conservative, ethnic version). The alignment of the Church with the Right, the British handling of the *Diaskeptiki*, and the Left's own weaknesses were to tilt the balance of power in the

Right's favour; the monopolization of the armed anti-colonial struggle by the Right was to further marginalize the Left. The similar exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and the British resort to renewed divide-and-rule policies, as well as their involving Turkey in Cyprus' affairs, were to turn ethnic differences into deep inter-communal division and conflict, which led to independence as a way-out solution.

The 1959 Zurich-London agreements did not constitute a real social compromise between the two communities – they were mostly an unwanted compromise into which the Greek-Cypriots were pushed so as to avoid a worse evil (namely, double self-determination, leading to partition). But almost none of the ingredients required for a consociational regime were there, so the bi-communal arrangement collapsed three years after it was put together. After flirting with *enosis* again for four years (1964-68), and ascertaining the high costs involved in its implementation, Makarios turned to the policy of the *feasible* – aimed at consolidating independence, while eliminating or minimizing the powers of the Turkish Cypriots (turning them from equal partners in the 1960 consociational state, to a minority community within a majoritarian democratic regime). But this new social compromise needed the consent of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as that of other 'interested parties'. As we have seen, the insistence of a group of Greek Cypriots on *enosis* and their resort to violent means, in collusion with the Greek "national centre", was to lead to the coup – and the latter was to encourage, in turn, Turkey's military intervention.

After the 1974 debacle, the *enosis* dream had to be buried for good and there was a "turn to Cyprus" – to whatever united the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots and could, thus, re-unite the country. But Turkish-Cypriots were unwilling to return to a meanwhile (since 1964) Hellenized Republic of Cyprus. The ascendance of Cyprocentrism, the impasse of negotiations towards a solution, renewed relations with a now democratic and more nationally assertive Greece, and the impact of globalization, would lead to the rise of neo-nationalism and the return of the Right, now stressing hellenic culture and identity as 'means of resistance', as well as the importance of Greece as the only real guarantor of the security of the Greek-Cypriots. Meanwhile, a new national compromise based on federalist principles proved impossible to achieve: The Turkish-Cypriots were keen on retaining as much autonomy as possible, so their version of a solution was more of a confederation, the loose union of two equal and sovereign communities; the Greek-Cypriots argued instead for a federation with a strong central government, which would concede a measure of autonomy to the constituent states

but would also ensure the unifying role of the federal state, averting the risk of secession and partition. Intra-group differences within each community made a possible compromise even harder to reach, the staunch nationalists on both sides rejecting power-sharing arrangements and pressing instead for alternatives in which their own community would maintain the upper hand (hard-line Greek-Cypriots pushing for a majoritarian unitary state with minority rights for Turkish-Cypriots; and hard-line Turkish-Cypriots pushing for two separate, equal and sovereign states).

Yet there was a difference as to how the two communities were developing internally, brought to the surface by the 2004 referendum. On the Greek-Cypriot side, a new social compromise had been gradually forged around the mono-communal Republic of Cyprus. Although commanding few loyalties prior to 1974, the Republic had its own dead heroes in the '74 clashes during the coup and the invasion; it had played a key role in the reconstruction of the country and had managed to retain international political recognition; the economy thrived and the standard of living came to approximate that of the most advanced states of the West; welfare provisions were improving, converting the Republic into a real community of solidarity; the political domain had grown to be independent of outside patrons and influence, political parties had matured and now represented all shades of opinion, and state power changed hands regularly and peacefully. The only problem related to military closure, since Turkey's might forced the Republic to be dependent on Greece's support to enhance its defensive capabilities – but the imminent accession to the European Union was to solve this problem too, since it would make Cyprus part of a much stronger 'security community', affording multiple types of protection to its members. The Greek-Cypriots proved unwilling to sacrifice all this for a federal scheme which seemed to risk a return to uncertainty and which, in case of failure, would have left them 'homeless'. On the Turkish-Cypriot side, a similar social compromise had not developed around their "state" (TRNC had not managed to gain international recognition, and its economy, safety and political life depended heavily on Turkey). These considerations go a long way in accounting for the differing responses of the two communities in the 2004 referendum.

#### *Identifying with State and/or Nation: A cross-country comparison*

In the introductory chapter we noted a constant tension between nation and state in the constitution of modern national states and, subsequently, we saw how this tension



affected the formation of Greek-Cypriot national identities. How does the Cypriot case compare with other countries characterized by a similar tension between nation and state, leading to the formation of dual identities? To undertake such a comparison, we would need to be aware of the basic socio-historical background of each country, for, as Stuart Hall underlines: "Cultural identities come from somewhere, they have histories. But like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power".<sup>7</sup>

The Greek-Cypriot case can be compared with other dual-identity countries, such as Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Euscadi, using data from various surveys that have utilized the Moreno scale as their basis. In each case, different processes of social closure and national compromise have led to unique "routes" to national state formation and have had a formative influence in the construction of national identities.

Respondent feels (%)	Scotland	Wales	England	Catalonia	Euscadi	Cyprus
1. Scottish/Welsh/English/ Catalan /Basque/Greek (x)	23	13	8	20	31	5
2. More x than British/ Spanish / Cypriot	38	29	16	16	14	3
3. Equally x and British/ Spanish/ Cypriot	27	26	46	35	33	35
4. More British/Spanish/Cypriot than x	4	10	15	5	8	10
5. British/Spanish/Cypriot	4	5	9	23	14	47

Table 7.1:<sup>8</sup> National identity in Scotland, Wales, England, Catalonia, Euscadi and Cyprus.

Consider first the case of Britain: As Linda Coley's work demonstrates Britain was formed through the union of England, Scotland and Wales, national identity being forged through wars against France and Catholic Europe.<sup>9</sup> Britishness "sat lightly" on top of the constituent nations, which maintained various degrees of autonomy, depending on their relative strength at the time of joining. The *Scots* were an integral part of British imperial expansion, and the early modernization of their economy enabled them to reap the benefits of the large international market established by the

empire. The Act of Union preserved the institutions of Kirk (Scottish Church), education, and the legal system, which contributed to the maintenance of a distinct Scottish identity. From the 1960's onwards, the impact from the decline of empire, including the economic crisis and large-scale unemployment, led to a loss of faith in British institutions. After the discovery of North Sea oil in the mid-'60s, the nationalist demand for greater autonomy gained new momentum. These socio-historic developments account for the increasing identification of the Scots with Scotland, as against Britain (see table 7.1).

Whereas Scotland joined the Union at a time of relative strength (following its successful wars of independence against England), which put it in a position to better negotiate the terms of incorporation,<sup>10</sup> *Wales* was conquered by England early on and could not, therefore, push for much autonomy – hence, its more mild assertion of national identity. *England*, as the strongest nation, identified more closely with the 'centre' and thus had no reason to develop a separate identity to Britain – which accounts for the lack of English nationalism and of a strong sense of "Englishness".<sup>11</sup> It is interesting that a very large percentage of respondents (46% in the table above) identified with the option "Equally English and British", obviously because for them Britishness already incorporates Englishness, so that they do not feel a contradiction between the two parts of their identity (as Scots and Welshmen seem to do).

The case of Spain is equally illuminating. Catalonia had a long history of autonomy and enjoyed its own political institutions, law and culture, until the early eighteenth century, when it was forcefully integrated within Spain.<sup>12</sup> As part of the Spanish empire, it initially benefited from the union, but with the crumbling of the imperium, dissatisfaction set in. Despite incorporation, Catalonia managed to build a strong economy and, by the nineteenth century, it transformed itself into an industrial society, much like other advanced Western European countries, while the rest of Spain (except the Basque country) remained poor and underdeveloped. Discontent also related to the weak representation of the Catalan elite in the central state. But its strong culture helped Catalonia to both survive and to maintain non-violent pressure for autonomy, until its demands were heeded with the foundation of the Second Republic. These early successes may explain its "more relaxed contemporary stance" as regards issues of national identity.<sup>13</sup>

The incorporation of Euskadi was not as successful: Basque culture was highly fragmented, and this resulted in cultural assimilation by the centre. In a sense, nationalist violence acted as the necessary 'cement', in place of the non-existent common identity; state repression further bolstered the sense of unity. More recently, autonomy concessions have ameliorated tensions, but the weakness of Euskadi's culture tends to encourage sporadic outbursts of violence by extremists, as an alternative means of achieving nationalist cohesion.<sup>14</sup> This background explains its weaker identification with the centre, and the stronger identification with local culture, than the case of Catalonia. Finally, in both Euskadi and Catalonia, high immigration rates may partly explain why substantial minorities in both seem to view themselves as "Spanish" (rather than as Basques or Catalans) – as compared to the respective low percentages in the U.K. who view themselves as solely or primarily British.

The case of Cyprus is, in many ways, the opposite of the previous cases considered. The coming of modernity found Cyprus a colony of the British empire – and not a part of the ruling nation. Greek national identity kept growing in strength throughout British rule; but unlike Catalonia and Scotland, where the strong culture was used as the means of resistance in pressing for autonomy, rendering the resort to violence unnecessary, in Cyprus, Greek culture became the basis of the irredentist movement for *enosis*. British policies, Greek-Cypriot internal divisions, and the existence of another ethno-national community with antagonistic goals, all played a role in the Greek-Cypriots' eventual resort to violence, which led to the 1960 consociational Republic of Cyprus. After the 1963 events, Greek-Cypriots found themselves in charge of the now mono-communal Republic, so feelings of identity with the state and Cyprus started gaining ground; the Greek staged coup and Turkish invasion of '74 brought the death of *enosis*, so identifications with the nation lost further ground, as against the strengthening of a Cypriot identity. In many ways the case of Cyprus resembles more that of England, where there is low identification with the (English) nation, and a strong identification with the centre/state, simply because the English dominate the state – or the state bears a vivid English impress. Similarly, Greek-Cypriots nowadays identify more strongly with the Republic because they have its total control. One may speculate that if in the future they were once again to share a federal state with the Turkish-Cypriots, Greek national identity would regain strength.

### *Nationalism, federalism and the European Union*

The perspective of social closure utilized in this study has proven fruitful in examining the diachronic development of nationalism and national-state formation in Cyprus. Can it tell us anything useful about the future – and especially of the prospects of a federal solution to the Cyprus Problem, within the context of the European Union?

Students of federalism have pointed out a number of conditions, contributing to the success of federal arrangements. These include, among others: A homogeneous population (sharing a common culture or nationality); a multiple balance of powers (the smaller the number of partners, the more difficult co-habitation becomes, bi-polarity being the worse possible scenario); the existence of cross-cutting cleavages; the presence of a unifying over-arching identity, or loyalty to the whole, beyond commitment to the constituent parts; common interests (such as financial, or defensive) for binding the parts together; common external threats; availability of the necessary resources to cover increased costs (catering for the duplication of services at the federal and constituent levels); and the existence of a "federal culture" or "federal spirit", based on a tradition of tolerance, self-restraint and co-operation, which is necessary for counterbalancing other more negative features (such as ethnic heterogeneity).<sup>15</sup> Many of these factors are the same as those cited as prerequisites of successful consociational regimes, which have been examined in chapter five, where we noted their near total absence in Cyprus, leading to the collapse of the 1960 consociational partnership. Most, if not all, of these pre-conditions are still absent in contemporary Cyprus, and it seems there is little the Cypriots can do – the population is heterogeneous; bi-polarity is a fact; cleavages are cumulative rather than cross-cutting; there are no common external threats; Cypriotness as an over-arching identity is quite feeble; and the 'federal spirit' is hardly present.

One approach for improving the chances of success of a federal regime in Cyprus is to advocate the adoption of some of the features of other successful federations, in the hope that these would help overcome difficulties with a solution in Cyprus. As noted in chapter six, this was the logic behind some of the main provisions of the Annan Plan, which were based on the Swiss model: Switzerland was judged to be a good example of the application of federal and consociational principles, building on the "grand coalition" of the French, German and Italian elite, and their impeccable inter-ethnic

cooperation (involving, for instance, a rotating presidency, and minority vetoes, which the Annan Plan adopted).

The problem, however, is that the Swiss (con)federation cannot serve as a good model for Cyprus precisely because it is *not* based on ethnic or national differences, as many seem to believe. Wimmer<sup>16</sup> proposes that this is because in the early, formative stage of the development of the Swiss national state (in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), civil society, for various historical reasons, grew impressively strong, allowing pre-state political elites to mobilize political support, without having to resort to their ethnic constituencies. Civil society organizations were nationally constituted, since they included members from the various cantons, religions and languages; they consciously rotated their meeting places in different parts of the country every year, and most rotated their presidency, so as to stress their national status. A strong ideology of Helvetism developed, which was distinctly republican, underlining equality before the law, citizenship and patriotism. Membership in the nation was not defined according to linguistic or ethnic criteria, but on the basis of belonging to a progressive community which was fighting against reactionary feudal enemies surrounding the country. Hence, trans-ethnic elites developed deep bonds and, when they came to found the modern national state, in 1848, they did not have to rely on their ethno-linguistic communities for support, but on nationally organized political movements whose organizational backbones were the various civil society associations. Hence, cleavages never crystallized along ethnic or language bonds but around other criteria, such as religion (which set religious citizens against secular ones, Catholics against Protestants, and so on). Movements based on ethno-linguistic commonalities with Germany, France or Italy never arose.

Nowadays, there are still no Swiss political parties or associations based on ethnic criteria; there is no representation of ethno-linguistic groups in government, and no public events at the federal level are linked to any particular ethnic community. Ethno-linguistic groups are politicized at the cantonal level, at which, however, they are not seen so much as 'national' groups but as "culturally thick, historically inevitable and durable entities".<sup>17</sup> Wimmer thus concludes that "it would be a serious misreading of the Swiss experience if we looked for a compromise between French-, Italian- and German-speaking elites, such as seen by the theory of consociational democracy that describe[s] the Swiss model as a cartel of ethnically defined elites".<sup>18</sup> It is obvious that the Swiss case shares little with Cyprus, where the networks of civil society

associations were organized on an ethnic basis since the early stages of modernity (late Ottoman/early British colonial rule). As we have seen, ethnicity was the basis for all kinds of associational bonds – webs of friendship, reading clubs, unions, and, later on, political organizations or parties.

Many Greek-Cypriots have argued that perhaps the American model of federation should be utilized, because it is the most 'advanced' such system, accommodating diverse nationalities, while maintaining a strong central government. Yet, once again, it is doubtful whether this model has much to compare with, or much to offer to, Cyprus, since, as O' Leary points out, ethno-national concerns have little to do with American federalism.<sup>19</sup> To document this point, it would be useful to utilize Kymlicka's distinction between two types of pluralism, leading to two distinct types of federation, each with different possibilities of success.<sup>20</sup> The first type he calls "polyethnic" pluralism, which involves regimes in which the origin of the various ethnic communities was migration (for instance, the USA and Australia). In these cases, the migrants joined the receiving countries mostly as individuals, and expected to succeed as such – thus, their respective ethnic communities amounted to loose cultural entities. Federations hosting such migrant communities do not take ethnicity to be an important factor in determining the nature of the regime. In fact, in America, the planners of the federation went out of their way so as not to link any of the component states with ethnicity: Hence, if in a certain region a non-Anglophone migrant community had larger numbers than local Anglophones, the borders were changed accordingly, or efforts were expended to increase the numbers of Anglophones, so that in no state would a migrant ethnic community constitute a majority.<sup>21</sup> Obviously, polyethnic federal systems have little to teach us about handling ethnic difference.

The second type, "multinational" pluralism, involves regimes in which the various ethnic communities were co-habiting together for long, as separate, autonomous entities, before the formation of the modern national-state (for instance, Belgium and Canada): In such cases, choosing a federal regime expressly aimed to accommodate the various ethno-national communities, allowing them to maintain their separate existence – hence, this type of regime is premised on a direct link between federal provisions and the existence of ethnic communities. It is this latter type of multinational federation which is, therefore, the one from which a country such as Cyprus could learn. Yet, even in these few cases, the link between federalism and ethnicity does not seem to be an easy one. Firstly, because federations based on

multinational cohabitation have to live with the contradictory objectives of the partners: In Canada, for instance, most Anglo-Canadians prefer a strong central government, while French-Canadians prefer as loose a federation as possible; this is because the two sides have a different view of what federation is all about – one side seems to view it as an agreement between two regions, or two culturally different partners, whereas the other as an agreement between different peoples. A second problem relates to what Kymlicka calls the “paradox of success”:<sup>22</sup> It is obvious that the more a federal regime tries to reduce the autonomy of a constituent ethnic community, the more the feelings of frustration grow (“we did not succeed in ‘x’ objective because the other community is discriminating against us”), enhancing support for secession. But, paradoxically, even where federal co-habitation, based on communal autonomy, succeeds, the feeling of difference is strengthened (“we succeeded because we stuck together”), encouraging support for even more autonomy, or for confederation.

Parekh reaches a similar, even more pessimistic conclusion:<sup>23</sup> He proposes that the attempt to contain strongly autonomous national communities, within a looser, wider political community, is fraught with problems. Since the citizens feel a stronger loyalty to the national communities, than to the centre, the latter cannot effectively pursue long-term common goals, or resolve the “inevitable conflicts” between the constituent communities. At the same time, the very existence and activities of the centre (such as shared economic development, and common educational standards) tend to erode the autonomy and cultural distinctiveness of the constituent communities, inevitably leading to tensions – which the center will have little power to control. Hence, strongly bonded nations cannot co-exist in larger units. “One must therefore either accept the inherent logic of nationalism and allow each nation its own state [leading to the creation of largely homogeneous nation-states], or dispense with nationalism altogether” – which would involve a “loosening up” of the constituent national communities (through their developing over-arching loyalties to the centre), so that they would effectively “stop being nations”, in order to become “open cultural groups” instead.<sup>24</sup>

But how can one “dispense with nationalism altogether”? And how easy is it for national communities to “stop being nations” as Parekh admonishes? Taking the Greek-Cypriot ethno-national community as a case in point, this thesis has demonstrated how its genesis and growth involved long and laborious processes of

construction – and not ex nihilo creation and swift maturation. Acknowledging that social reality is constructed, does not imply a belief that it can be easily changed at will.<sup>25</sup> The hegemonic ethno-nationalist paradigm furnishes Greek-Cypriots with *ways of seeing, structures of feeling* and *structures of action*, which are deeply ingrained into their biographies, and from which they draw meaning in making sense of the social world.<sup>26</sup> This is not to 'naturalize' the nationalist view of the world (which we have shown to be the creation of culture and history), and to assign it inevitability. It is, rather, to underline its *durability*. Membership of a national community "entails the acquisition of pervasive and powerful ways of structuring, experiencing and acting in one's surroundings", as well as "the internalization of a largely taken-for-granted view of a 'commonsense world', which informs many of one's practices and strategies".<sup>27</sup> National-states and existing configurations of power tend to reproduce the hegemonic nationalist view of the world. It is true that social actors are capable of reflection and of producing new ideas and interpretations, which may bring about social change; and that national communities provide a context which is not only constraining but also enabling. Yet, given the weight of history, of traditional institutions, and of the nationalist discourse, dramatic changes in national matters are not easy to come by. It is only at 'critical junctures' or in times of crisis<sup>28</sup> that previously taken for granted views of the world become the object of reflection, debate, and questioning. Greek-Cypriot society has undergone such a crisis in 1974, and we have seen that this experience led to quite a radical re-interpretation of the Cypriots' relation to nation and state.<sup>29</sup> The aftermath of joining the European Union without a solution to the Cyprus Problem has produced a new crisis and new criticisms of deeply entrenched views on national matters, and especially on sharing power with the Turkish-Cypriots. Can the European Union play a role in helping Cypriots transcend ethno-national views of the world, and build a post-national future?

As we have already noted, Greek-Cypriots entertained high hopes that joining the European Union would solve the Cyprus Problem, primarily because they would now be more empowered in demanding Turkey's compliance with norms of international justice, as well as with specific UN decisions, in terminating the occupation of northern Cyprus.<sup>30</sup> Even though this proved an unjustified expectation, many still maintain hopes that membership of the European Union may hold promise for a future solution, only in more indirect and complex ways.<sup>31</sup>



What is certainly true is that the European Union can provide both a good model and an appropriate context for facilitating plural co-existence in Cyprus. Membership may counterbalance many of the absent factors conducive to the success of federal regimes. For instance, with EU membership, the problem of bi-polarity (or augmented bi-polarity, once the 'mother' countries are taken into account) may be attenuated, since the Union adds new parties to the conflict, thereby reducing system rigidity and continuous stalemates, creating something akin to a multiple balance of powers. The European Union also provides an additional level of identification, a new over-arching identity over and above existing ethno-national identities, which would certainly enhance "we-feelings" among all Cypriots. This does not mean ethno-national identities would simply wither away, but that the simultaneous existence of various levels of identity may further the idea of multiple identities and loyalties.<sup>32</sup>

The EU itself draws on federal principles of political organization:<sup>33</sup> It is a supra-national union of states with a long history of independence, which have been working towards "ever closer union", in order to achieve a number of shared objectives, without sacrificing their sovereignty in the process. The EU also draws on principles of consociational democracy,<sup>34</sup> since it is comprised of a number of national states, governed through a "grand coalition" of national elites. Plural cohabitation rests on provisions for a mutual veto system, exercised in delicate national matters; proportionality in political representation; national autonomy on various culturally significant issues (such as education); and the overall combination of the principles of self-determination with those of co-determination.

Since a common national identity is lacking, what holds the Union together are the shared core principles of liberal democracy, respect for human and civil rights, as well as common political norms, values and expectations (including those of consensus politics, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and multi-cultural cooperation). These shared characteristics constitute the European Union as a democratic "imagined security community",<sup>35</sup> in which member states may trust each other and hold "dependable expectations"<sup>36</sup> that their differences will be resolved in amicable ways. Adler points out that such communities have at their disposal various types of power, through which they can exercise influence – including sheer power, ideological power, the power to set agendas and, perhaps, primarily, the power of setting the "underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play and to be able to get other actors to commit to these rules because they are now part of their self-

understanding":<sup>37</sup> This "most subtle and most effective form of power"<sup>38</sup> allows the EU to elicit agreement or compliance with the principles of liberal democracy, which govern political practice within the Union, not so much through pressure or force, but through encouraging member states to adopt a new self-understanding and self-definition, which considers these principles as constitutive of their very identity.

Many react against the use of these powers by the EU, in ensuring the compliance of aspiring entrants or new members with EU wishes or decisions, and consider them as part of a new Western hegemonic project, underpinned by globalization, and of the West's attempt to undermine the cultural resistance of new member nations. But, as Barnett and Adler argue, the European Union project entails "hegemony by invitation", since aspiring entrants "have demonstrated a greater interest in entering into the West than the West in admitting them".<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, the fact that the Greek-Cypriots themselves were the ones to knock on Europe's door does not mean they would be willing to accept all and any EU initiatives. We have seen how Greek-Cypriots have already rejected the Annan Plan, despite EU pressures; but we have also seen (in the previous section of the conclusion) that many key provisions of the Annan Plan may not have been suitable for Cyprus – Swiss civic world-views and identities are very different to corresponding ethno-nationalist Cypriot ones. At the same time, we have noted (in chapter six) that EU principles and norms have already been impacting on Greek-Cypriot self-definitions – the transformation of DISY is perhaps a good example of the EU influence. Yet the fact that identities and loyalties can change does not mean they are easily and infinitely malleable. Membership of the EU cannot help the Cypriots to "transcend" the nation-state (as Parekh would wish), for the Union itself is not "a project [for] replacing the nation/state".<sup>40</sup> If a solution is to be found in Cyprus, it cannot be but a loose form of federal union between the two ethno-national communities, which will surely maintain their existing identities and loyalties. The Cypriots are condemned to live in a permanent state of unstable equilibrium. The example and context of the European Union will not remove all the risks involved in such plural cohabitation, but it can certainly make the experiment easier. The EU itself constitutes proof that such experimentation may not only be a source of problems, but of innovation and creativity.

## **Appendix 1: Methodology of the surveys**

The thesis utilizes a part of the results of two surveys coordinated by the author, in 2000 and 2006. The surveys were carried out for wider purposes but the author had the opportunity of incorporating a number of questions relevant to the thesis.

The first survey, "Understanding Bicomunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on Political and National Perceptions", was carried out on behalf of the Peace Center and was sponsored by UNOPS. The Greek-Cypriot part of the survey<sup>1</sup> was conducted in the summer of 2000 and was based on a random sample of 1073 individuals, aged 18+, stratified according to district, urban/rural area of residence, age, and gender (in proportion to the size of the population for each of these classifications).<sup>2</sup> This sample size gives a confidence interval of 95% and a sampling error of +/- 3,0% (based on the population census of 1992).

The survey was conducted by personal interviews, using a universal "closed" questionnaire, as well as an "open" questionnaire for a sub-sample of approximately one out of every ten respondents (a total of 150 questionnaires were actually completed).

The second survey was part of the well-known world-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change – the World Values Survey (WVS). The Fifth Wave (2005-2006) of the WVS involved 99 countries, and Cyprus was included for the first time. It was carried out in mid 2006 and covered a sample of 900 Greek-Cypriots,<sup>3</sup> aged 18 to 75 years old, stratified according to the same characteristics as the 2000 survey (that is, district, age, and gender). The sample size gave a 95% confidence internal and a sampling error of +/- 3.3%.

The interviews for both surveys were carried out by experienced research associates of the Research Center of Intercollege/University of Nicosia, which went through special training by the author. Detailed directions along with relevant area maps were given to every researcher. Checks and verification concerning the completion of the interviews were conducted by the coordinating team for 6-8% of the sample (through phone calls for confirmation, made to randomly selected individuals who took part in the surveys).


Qualified personnel with experience in data inputting processed the completed questionnaires. All the quantitative data gathered were analyzed statistically, using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Subsequently, descriptive statistics were used to summarize the data, either numerically or graphically; basic numerical descriptors, like the mean and standard deviation were used, as well as cross tabulation analysis for comparing the results of two or more different questions in a tabular format. This kind of analysis ensures a better understanding between two or more different demographic attributes, related questions, or dependent items. Cross tab analysis allows viewing a grid of response totals for any two or more items, scale, multiple choice, and demographic question types; it also enables the researcher to quickly see a complete layout of the relationship between two or more survey questions and includes results that specifically highlight significant relationships between the items that have been analyzed. Furthermore, means comparison analysis was used, in order to examine the mean difference in subgroups.

Graphical summarizations include various kinds of charts and graphs. In addition, inferential statistics was used to model patterns in the data, accounting for randomness and drawing inferences about the larger population.

In conducting the above surveys, the researchers were aware of, and complied with, the general ethical principles regarding what is considered proper and improper. Important considerations included the following:


- (a) Voluntary participation of the respondents: Individuals were asked to participate after they were informed of the objectives of the surveys.
- (b) Anonymity and confidentiality – ensuring that the respondent's name would in no way be identified or used in any way against their interests.
- (c) Not deceiving respondents in any way, and letting them know of the identity of the researchers as well as of the real purposes of the study.
- (d) Special attention was paid not to endanger participants in any way, including exposing them to physical or mental stress.
- (e) Not invading the privacy of participants.

**Appendix 2: Party vote related to father's vote**



Political Part	Percentage (%)
AKEL	84.0
EDEK	45.8
DIKO	69.4
DISY	80.6

### Appendix 3: Criteria used in voting political parties



Political Party		Better pre-election program	Better serves my interests	Has a better leader	Has a better policy about the Cypriot problem	Family tradition
		%				
AKEL	1 <sup>ST</sup>	4.9	19.7	5.6	13.8	6.3
	2 <sup>ND</sup>	4.6	12.2	11.1	14.8	7.0
EDEK	1 <sup>ST</sup>	2.0	6.1	14.3	27.6	1.0
	2 <sup>ND</sup>	10.2	9.2	14.3	12.2	3.1
DIKO	1 <sup>ST</sup>	2.1	10.9	6.3	25.1	6.7
	2 <sup>ND</sup>	5.9	9.6	10.9	17.2	5.4
DISY	1 <sup>ST</sup>	3.5	10.8	8.8	17.8	9.5
	2 <sup>ND</sup>	5.5	9.1	12.2	15.1	7.7

#### **Appendix 4: The salience of the Left-Right and of the Nation-State axes**

In the developed West, the most important political cleavage throughout most of the twentieth century was that between Right and Left. Broadly speaking this related to the issue of ownership and/or control of the means of production and the distribution of income; it therefore implied that the two main ideologies rested on different social bases so that the working class identified with the Left and the middle and upper classes with the Right. In terms of policy choices the Left focused predominantly on social justice, translated into more state regulation and control of the economy (leading in the extreme to calls for the nationalization of important industries) aiming towards income redistribution; the Right stood for freedom of choice and enterprise, and consequently for limited state intervention. Ideological differences were not confined to different views on the economy but extended to all fields of life: The Left, for instance, saw most social problems as ultimately connected to the system of production and the associated social structures and relationships, so that radical change could only come about through the re-structuring of the economy and society.

Since the '60s the above realities and ideologies have been changing, leading to the increasing questioning of the wisdom of more state intervention and control. The Left-Right distinction is still alive, but it has acquired new meanings which vary from place to place, according to the local context and history.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, analysts propose that new axes of cleavage have become relevant on the basis of structural transformations in western societies. Inglehart, for instance, has been documenting a long-term transition from political cleavages based on class conflict and a focus on material advancement, to new cleavages relating to cultural issues and concerns with the quality of life – amounting to a shift from materialist to post-materialist values. More relevant to our purposes, Anthony Smith theorizes another set of differences based on the nation–state dichotomy, but he does not attempt to apply his insight to empirical cases, using social scientific methods of investigation, so as to document his analytical insights. The case of Cyprus is perhaps an ideal one for examining the relation between political ideologies and national identities. The Cyprus Republic was marked by the incongruence of state and nation, resulting in respective identifications which were at odds with each other. This legacy still lingers on and influences contemporary collective identities. We could thus propose that the Cypriot socio-political terrain cannot be comprehended by resorting to the traditional Left and Right dichotomy as a way of referring to sociopolitical ideologies, practices, and orientations, depicted as positions on an imaginary one-dimensional axis or continuum.<sup>2</sup> A better understanding may be reached by utilizing a second pair of polarities representing loyalty to nation (Hellenocentrism/ethnic nationalism) and loyalty to state (Cyprocentrism/territorial-state nationalism). If we depict this as an imaginary vertical axis that intersects the previous horizontal one, we end up with a two-dimensional grid that more accurately represents the field of forces previously analyzed (see Fig. 1.1). This two-dimensional grid allows us to demonstrate that political parties and individuals may be characterized by multiple loyalties and identities. AKEL and EDEK, for instance, may both be left-wing parties, but AKEL tends to put more stress on the state than the nation in contrast to EDEK's positions. Thus, we would expect a large majority of AKEL supporters to fall within the third quadrant and only a few in the fourth, and EDEK to have a smaller number of supporters than AKEL in the third quadrant. Similarly, DISY's supporters would be divided (not necessarily equally) between the first and second quadrants, and so on.<sup>3</sup>




Figure A.4.1: Loyalty to Nation and/or State

In our surveys we tried to gauge the significance of the various cleavages in the case of Cyprus, by using Inglehart's approach: The results seem to demonstrate that the traditional socio-economic distinctions between Left and Right are still relevant (even if to a decreasing extent), but the nation-state distinctions have gradually acquired greater comparative salience. In order to ascertain the significance and weight of the Left-Right division, we asked respondents to place themselves along a ten-point scale, consisting of items associated with left to right ideological positions. The specific question was:

"How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 5 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between".

Agree Completely

Agree Completely

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>1 Private ownership of business and industry should be increased</p> <p>2 Competition is good. It encourages people to work harder and take initiatives</p> <p>3 When one has opportunities of getting rich one tries harder. The government should increase such opportunities</p> <p>4 Individuals have responsibility to care for life's basic needs (e.g. medical care)</p> <p>5 When one has worked hard in his life, then he will succeed</p> <p>6 For some people to become rich others must become poor</p> | <p>Government ownership of business and industry should be increased</p> <p>Competition is bad. It encourages people to think selfishly of their own interests</p> <p>Inequality between rich and poor is unjust. The government should aim at decreasing inequalities through various measures (e.g. taxation)</p> <p>The state is responsible to care for life's basic needs (eg. medical care)</p> <p>Success is usually not the outcome of hard work – but of luck and connections</p> <p>Wealth can increase so there's enough for everyone</p> |
|--|--|



The results, when classified according respondents' (a) party affiliation and (b) self-identification as adhering to a Left or Right ideology, are shown in figures A.4.2 and A.4.3 below:




Figure A.4.2: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to party affiliation




Figure A.4.3: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to ideological self-identification

A similar approach was used for ascertaining the significance and weight of the Nation-State cleavage; we asked respondents to place themselves along a ten-point scale

comprised of items associated, in the case of Cyprus, with loyalty to Nation (Hellenocentrism) and loyalty to State (Cyprocentrism). The question asked was:

“How do you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between”.

Agree Completely

Agree Completely



- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>1 Cyprus is Greek</p> <p>2 Nationalism is a good thing; it underlines everything which unites us as Greeks (eg common history) and fosters love of everything Greek</p> <p>3 We must put the national interest above all</p> <p>4 The use of the Greek flag expresses and strengthens our national feelings</p> <p>5 Our education must be Hellenocentric</p> | <p>Cyprus belongs to all Cypriots no matter their nationality</p> <p>Nationalism is a bad thing; it underlines everything which separates us from others, and especially Turkish-Cypriots, and fosters hatred and fanaticism</p> <p>We must put social progress above all</p> <p>The use of the Greek flag undermines our state's integrity and sends wrong messages to the Turkish-Cypriots</p> <p>Our education must have Cyprus as its focus</p> |
|--|---|

After classifying the results according to party affiliation and self-placement on the Left-Right ideological axis, the results were as follows:




Figure A.4.4: Responses on national issues, according to party affiliation (2000)




Figure A.4.5: Responses on national issues, according to ideological self-identification (2000)

What transpires from the two sets of data is that the distinctions between the different political parties in Cyprus are comparatively clearer/larger as regards national rather than socio-economic issues:

POLITICAL PARTY	SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES (MEAN)	NATIONAL ISSUES (MEAN)
AKEL	3.19	3.70
EDEK	3.31	3.11
DIKO	3.10	3.08
DISY	3.14	2.30
Difference between two extreme parties	0.21	1.40

When we repeated the same questions six years later (2006),<sup>4</sup> the above results were confirmed, once again – i.e. differences between the followers of the various political parties were more significant as regards national issues than as regards socio-economic ones; in both cases however, there was a decrease in these differences over the six-year period:




Figure A.4.6: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to ideological self-identification (2006)




Figure A.4.7: Responses on national issues, according to party affiliation (2006)

<b>POLITICAL PARTY</b>	<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES (MEAN)</b>	<b>NATIONAL ISSUES (MEAN)</b>
AKEL	3.06	3.61
EDEK	3.00	3.35
DIKO	2.97	2.94
DISY	2.92	2.57
<b>Difference between two extreme parties</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>1.04</b>

## Notes to introduction

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<sup>1</sup> As will become obvious from the study, the usual term 'nation-state' does not fit the case of Cyprus, where the two communities feel they belong to two other nations (the Greek and Turkish ones). The term 'national state' is defined as "a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of [overall] unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity)": Smith 2001, p 17. Anthony Smith uses the word *national* instead of *overall*, but this may be problematic in cases such as Cyprus, where the members of the national state do not feel they are/constitute a nation. Besides, the strength of the term 'national state' is that it is open enough to allow the inclusion of both nation-states and multi-national states – Cyprus being a special case of the latter (a bi-national state). In any case, as Smith observes: "By making national unity and integration a variable, such a definition avoids the problem of 'national incongruence' – the fact that the boundaries of nations and the boundaries of states in so many parts of the world fail to correspond" (ibid).

<sup>2</sup> Pointing at general methodological problems in the study of nations and nationalism, Brubaker advises against realist and substantialist approaches which reify nations, viewing them as "real entities" – as "collective individuals, capable of coherent, purposeful collective action". He instead advises to view nations as "categories of practice", which should not be used as "categories of analysis" (Brubaker 1996, pp 14-17).

<sup>3</sup> Wimmer 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Oommen 1997, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Castells 1998, p. 51.

<sup>6</sup> This is the title of a book by Xydis (1973).

<sup>7</sup> Aloysius 1998, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Mannheim 1936, p. 228.

<sup>9</sup> Sztompka 1999, p. 204.

<sup>10</sup> Elias 1987, p. 226.

<sup>11</sup> Abrams 1982, p. x.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>13</sup> Tilly 1984, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Carr 1977, p. 66. See also Giddens 1979, p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Aloysius 1998, p. 13.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Aloysius builds on Gellner's definition of nationalism entailing the "congruence between culture and power" to differentiate between "two simultaneous movements": First, "a movement away from the other culture i.e. appropriation of power from without"; second, a "movement away from the past or pre-modern form of unequal or differential power–realization in one's own culture, i.e. homogenization of power within" (the latter meaning the "even distribution of power and recognition of equality of socio-political status among members, at least in principle"). Together, the two movements of power over culture "constitute the social change or transition to nation, demanded and affirmed by nationalism as an ideology" (ibid., p.16). As we will see in chapter 4, in Cyprus, the internal cleavages within the hierarchical, pre-modern society, which became politicized with British rule, were equally, if not more, responsible than the contradiction between Greek-Cypriots and the British, for the outcome of the nationalist movement and the failure of a more integrated national state to emerge.

<sup>17</sup> Ozkirimli 2000, p. 57.

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<sup>18</sup> Spencer and Woolman 2002, p. 27.

<sup>19</sup> Smith 1998, p. 146.

<sup>20</sup> Smith 2001, p. 52.

<sup>21</sup> van den Berghe 1987, especially chapter 2 (pp. 15-36).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> van den Berghe 1987, pp. 18-19.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>25</sup> Shils 1957, p. 138.

<sup>26</sup> Geertz 1973 p. 258.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>29</sup> Smith 2001, p. 53.

<sup>30</sup> Ozkirimli 2000, p. 85.

<sup>31</sup> Such an argument in the case of Greece itself would imply discontinuity – bearing in mind the massive influx of Slavs and Albanians on the Greek mainland between the 6-8 centuries AD, which drastically affected demography; this was, in fact, the basis on which the German historian Falmerayer advocated that modern (nineteenth century) Greeks were not the ‘real’ (biological) descendents of ancient Greeks, since they could not claim uninterrupted continuity with the past – a primordialism in reverse. These positions stimulated Papanhigopoulos’ response and laid the foundations of modern Greek historiography, advocating the cultural continuity of the Greek nation throughout history.

<sup>32</sup> Smith 1998, p. 149.

<sup>33</sup> Eller and Coughan 1993, p.187.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 192.

<sup>35</sup> Brass 1996, pp 18-40.

<sup>36</sup> Smith 1998, p. 157.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p.158.

<sup>38</sup> Brass 1996, p.74.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p.158.

<sup>40</sup> Connor 1994, p. 95.

<sup>41</sup> Smith 1998, pp. 22-23.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 23, 222-225.

<sup>43</sup> Gellner 1983, p. 61.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>48</sup> Loizos 1974, p. 37.

<sup>49</sup> Kedourie notes that the same applied for the Balkans, Greece and most parts under Ottoman rule: Nationalism became prominent and led to a number of uprisings, at a time when there was hardly any industrialization in the respective areas (Kedourie 1994, p. 143).

<sup>50</sup> Tsoucalas 1977, pp. 136-146

<sup>51</sup> Bryant 2004, pp. 129-155. But see Loizos 1974, pp 37-38 for an alternative view.

<sup>52</sup> Ozkirimli 2000, p. 146.

<sup>53</sup> Anderson 1991, pp. 35-36.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* 1983, p. 44.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* 1991, pp. 42-44.

<sup>57</sup> Kellas 1991, p. 48. Greenfeld adds that nationalism did not emerge at a time of religious decline, but quite the contrary, at the time of the Reformation, during which religion was rejuvenated. Religion actually aided nationalism to become established; even in later stages when nationalism would replace religion as the primary passion of people, religion was often not dismissed but rather incorporated as part of the national consciousness of a country. (Greenfeld 1993: pp 48-52)

<sup>58</sup> Chatterjee 1996, p. 216.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Anthony Smith specifies the aims of ethno-symbolism as to “uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations”, as well as to demonstrate “how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as they face the problems of modernity”: Smith 1998, p. 224.

<sup>63</sup> Smith 1986, p. 17. Before modern nationalism there was “a more long-lived and ancient ethnocentrism”.

<sup>64</sup> Smith 2001, p. 12.

<sup>65</sup> Accordingly, an *ethnie* is defined as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites”. On the other hand, a *nation* is “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all its members” (Smith 2001, p. 13). Elsewhere, however (e.g. Smith 2001, p. 12), he adds that a nation must have an “over-arching” common identity and a desire for “some degree of self-determination” or “autonomy”: Such supplementary comments were used to elaborate/clarify terms in table 1.0.



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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-13.

<sup>67</sup> Smith 1991, p. 29; 1998 pp. 191-192.

<sup>68</sup> Ethnicities themselves are the products of more loose ethnic groupings such as *ethnic categories* or *ethnic networks*. Ethnic networks result after the "appearance of genealogies", that is "kinship myths of ethnic origin and descent" handed down to new generations orally or in written chronicles and epic poetry. The stronger these memories are, the stronger the ties and sentiments of members become, turning them into dense ethnic networks (Smith 2001, p. 108).

<sup>69</sup> Smith maintains that it is extremely difficult to permanently impair the sense of cultural continuity and common ethnicity of the community.

<sup>70</sup> Smith 1986, p. 89.

<sup>71</sup> Smith 1991, pp. 52-53.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-61.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp. 61-62.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp. 64-65.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 51, 73.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., pp. 79-84. These, Smith proposes, are based on the 'civic-territorial' and the 'ethnic-genealogical' models of the nation.

<sup>81</sup> See the criticisms of O' Leary, Symmons-Symonolewicz, Breuille, and Calhoun, in Ozkirimli, pp. 183-186.

<sup>82</sup> Calhoun 1997, pp. 49-50.

<sup>83</sup> In the Weberian tradition 'social closure' is seen "as the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles. This entails the singling out of certain social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion". (Weber 1968, pp. 43-46; Parkin, pp. 44-45). Neo-Weberian accounts include those of John Rex (1986, 1996) and Frank Parkin (1979), whose work focuses mostly on the micro-sociology of ethnicity, as well as those of Randall Collins (1986, 1999) and Michael Mann (1988, 2001), who focus on macro-sociological aspects of ethnic relations and nationalism. The most recent and promising work for nation and nationalism is that of Andreas Wimmer (2002).

<sup>84</sup> Wimmer 2002, pp. 26-34. Social closure is seen as the exclusion of those not felt to belong, the drawing of a dividing line between the familiar and the foreign. Social closure thus refers to the formation of classes, sub-cultures, ethnic groups and so on: Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>85</sup> The concept of habitus was first developed by Bourdieu (1992, ch. 3).

<sup>86</sup> Bourdieu 1992, pp. 72-79.

<sup>87</sup> Wimmer 2002, pp. 33-34.

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp. 34-36.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>90</sup> I have borrowed the term 'axial principle' from Daniel Bell's 'The Coming of Post Industrial Society' (1974).

<sup>91</sup> Wimmer 2002, p. 55.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp. 9, 64-66.

<sup>93</sup> Or, as Barthes would put it, "naturalized" – mis-portrayed as a seemingly predetermined and inevitable fact of nature.

<sup>94</sup> Billig 1995.

<sup>95</sup> Wimmer 2002, p. 60.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp 61-62.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>98</sup> Also, it allows the increasing sophistication of government techniques, which ultimately make control of people easier (e.g. census data).

<sup>99</sup> Wimmer 2002, p. 66.

<sup>100</sup> Wimmer, pp. 70-79.

<sup>101</sup> Calhoun 1997, p. 25.

<sup>102</sup> Ozkirimli 2000, p. 228.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>104</sup> Hall 1997, pp. 26-33.

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## Notes to chapter 2

<sup>1</sup> For Karageorghis (1999, pp. 20-21), the “coming of the Mycenaeans” explains the “paradox” of Cyprus for over 3,000 years drawing closer to Greece, while being surrounded by ancient Oriental civilizations. For Alastos (1976, xiii), “the persistence of the Cypriots in their customs, beliefs and national attachment despite the many violent storms [...] gives to Cypriot history an unbroken continuity”. For Kyrris (1985, p. 13) “the beginning of Cypriot history is identical [sic] with the first traces of the Greek population of Cyprus in the late Bronze Age...” Similarly, Maier (1968, p. 17) traces the roots of the Cyprus conflict back to the coming of the Greeks (and presumably of the formation of Greek national identity).

<sup>2</sup> See discussion on Smith in chapter 1.

<sup>3</sup> These seem to have been transitory bands of hunter-gatherers, who had crossed over from Anatolia or Syria, looking for a possible land to colonize. Authorities date the first traces of life on the island around 8800-8500 BC – the Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) period.

<sup>4</sup> This is the Neolithic (New Stone Age) period. The 6<sup>th</sup> millennium BC Neolithic Khirokitia settlements (5800-4900 BC), demonstrate features of an agricultural village culture (Karageorghis 1982, pp. 9-30). Magic or primitive religion and the veneration of the dead was a feature of the Neolithic culture. In the next, Chalcolithic, stage there was an apparent turn to the veneration of life, through the worship of a divinity of fertility (Kyrris 1985, pp. 27-36).

<sup>5</sup> This isolation probably accounts for the fact that Cyprus, in those times, remained behind in development, as compared to the surrounding region of the Near East.

<sup>6</sup> For the Chalcolithic Age in Cyprus see Karageorghis *op. cit.*; for the Bronze Age see Karageorghis 1990. The Bronze Age arrived rather late in Cyprus, compared to developments in the nearby Mesopotamian civilization.

<sup>7</sup> Why didn't Cyprus give birth to a civilization equal in brilliance to Minoan Crete, since it had all necessary prerequisites – contact with Egypt (which had a stimulating effect on the Cretans), copper deposits, strong trade connections in the E. Mediterranean – and so on. The question was actually raised in 1909 by Sir Arthur Evans: Subsequent research was to provide the reply that the reason was that Cyprus at that crucial period fell under foreign domination – of the Hyksos empire (“a military people [whose] rule everywhere [was] associated with a decline of culture”; Cyprus' civilization began to rise again after their overthrow – Alastos 1976, pp. 23-24). Other authors stress the importance of the rivalry between Eastern and Western Cypriots, for the control of the copper mines and arable land (Kyrris 1985, pp. 42-45).

<sup>8</sup> The Cypro-Minoan script was not Greek (which, at the time, was not even known in Crete). Despite archaeological findings of the existence of this script, it still remains undeciphered.

<sup>9</sup> Maier 1968, p. 26.

<sup>10</sup> This destruction was probably the result of an earthquake. At the same time bands of raiders, known as the “Sea Peoples” threw into chaos the Eastern Mediterranean, bringing about the collapse of the “Ancient World”. Iakovides (1995) proposes that the disruption of sea communications and trade on which the Achaean economy depended, was the main reason for the collapse of Mycenaean civilization and the consequent waves of migrations to the Aegean islands, M. Asia and Cyprus.

<sup>11</sup> During the same period there were also waves of refugees from the M. East (Syria, Palestine), who were forced to leave their lands after the ravages and settlement of the Sea People in these areas. Thus Oriental influences were also to persist, along with the Hellenic influence accentuated through Mycenaean colonists.

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<sup>12</sup> Karageorghis 1981, p. 20; see also Coldstream 1999, p 47-50. One of the factors which facilitated the Mycenaean hegemony on the island was their technological superiority in metalwork and especially weapons (Kyrris 1985, p. 66).

<sup>13</sup> Kyrris 1985, pp 44-77; Karageorghis 1999, p. 46;

<sup>14</sup> Karageorghis 1981, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup> Thus Oriental influences were also to persist, along with the Hellenic influence accentuated through Mycenaean colonists.

<sup>16</sup> Coldstream op. cit., pp. 47-59.

<sup>17</sup> Maier 1968, p. 31.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>19</sup> There are wide-ranging controversies on the time of establishment, and nature, of the Cypriot city kingdoms. David Rupp proposes that they were established (or re-established) in the course of the later 8<sup>th</sup> century BC, much the same time as the city communities (*polis*) of Greece were probably appearing. Anthony Snodgrass suggests that they were rather established earlier on in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries BC, with the coming of the Mycenaeans, who imported (and adapted to local realities) their system of "warlike monarchies", with the king "performing a leading religious role as well as his political one". Meanwhile in Greece this type of Achaean kingdom was disappearing, to re-appear in the 8<sup>th</sup> century in a new form as city-democracies. Such an origin presumably accounts for the despotic nature of Cypriot kingdoms – though Snodgrass stresses that initially they were of a "more modest" form than the "grandiose absolutism that seems to have prevailed in later Cyprus" (Snodgrass 1995, pp. 103-110). Interestingly this account re-links Cypriot city-kingdoms more to ancient Greece than to the Orient (contra Maier 1968 and 1985, who sees the despotic element of the city kingdoms as rooted in oriental traditions).

<sup>20</sup> Hill Vol. I, pp. 112-122; Phoenicia itself had been under growing Greek influence (Maier op. cit., p. 42).

<sup>21</sup> Evidence for these contacts was the "growing influence of Ionian forms and styles on Cypriot art in the sixth century BC" (Boatswain 2005, p. 18).

<sup>22</sup> Herodotus VIII, p. 68, quoted in Maier op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> In fact Greece removed Cyprus from Persian control three times, within 30 years – but control kept reverting back to the Persians.

<sup>24</sup> Maier 1968, p. 46.

<sup>25</sup> Kyrris 1985, pp. 124-125.

<sup>26</sup> Hill I, pp. 199-204. Furthermore, an indigenous institution, the 'Koinon Kypriou' (the Confederacy/League of the Cypriots) attempted to unite the cities in the deification of the ruler – a form of worship introduced in this period.

<sup>27</sup> Such as Spyridakis (1974), Kyrris (1985), Georgiades (1995), Hadjidemetriou (2002)

<sup>28</sup> See Smith 1991, p. 8: "... we can speak of a Greek cultural and ethnic community but not of an ancient Greek nation"; see also Smith 1994, pp 21-46;

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., see also J. Hall 2002, pp 30-55; Smith 1991 pp 8-9, 47-48.

<sup>30</sup> Hall 2002, pp 56-89, 226-228.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 205-220; Hall 2000, pp. 34-66.

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- <sup>32</sup> Hall 2002, p. 228.
- <sup>33</sup> Smith 1991, p. 47.
- <sup>34</sup> Hall 2002, pp. 125-134.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 154-168.
- <sup>36</sup> The Olympic Games gave an early push in the 6<sup>th</sup> century for an “aggregative” self-definition, based on alliance building between regional ruling families; the Persian Wars in the 4<sup>th</sup> century shifted to an “oppositional” emphasis, of the civilized in-group V<sup>s</sup> the barbarian out-group (Greeks V<sup>s</sup> Persians).
- <sup>37</sup> Smith 1994, pp. 13-18.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
- <sup>39</sup> Several Greek cities betrayed the common cause for money. Even in the case of cities which did join the struggle against the Persians, the motives were often short-term goals, such as security or commercial gain vis-à-vis neighbours.
- <sup>40</sup> Eventually Athens managed to outmaneuver the Spartans, consolidating its hegemony through the Peace of Kallias. The stereotypes of civilized, free Hellenes as against lavish, barbarian Persians is found in Aeschylus’ “Persians”.
- <sup>41</sup> King of Salamis island, in Greece.
- <sup>42</sup> After Kerynia, near Aigion.
- <sup>43</sup> Also gave his name to the peninsula of Acamas.
- <sup>44</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 28.
- <sup>45</sup> This more unified regime was known as the “Kingdom of Alasia” and supposedly its “king was equal to all the great kings of the Near East” (Kyrris 1985, p. 13). The Cypriot kings seem to have possessed more powers than their equivalents in Greece – and this could have been due to oriental influences (more despotic systems prevailed in the Orient), but also to the Mycenaean model (which was similarly more “centralist-despotic” in nature), imported with the Greek colonization of the island. Furthermore private property and immunity, elements of the Mycenaean system (but not of the oriental one), were also characteristic of the Cypriot kingdoms.
- <sup>46</sup> *Cypria* is probably a post-Homeric epic poem, which uses the Ionic dialect.
- <sup>47</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 96; Coldstream 1999, p. 59. Hill seems to disagree, but yet concedes that various poems or hymns were recited at contests, prior to the reciting of the *Iliad* (Hill Vol I, p. 92).
- <sup>48</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 43.
- <sup>49</sup> Smith 1986, p. 39.
- <sup>50</sup> Consider material culture, frequently used as strong and indisputable evidence in support of the thesis. Jonathan Hall rightly cautions us against the ease of making spurious connections (Hall 2002, pp. 104-111). Cultural products cannot be measured by external and formalistic morphological or stylistic features, without considering the meaning producers or consumers attach to them. Adopting a style does not necessarily mean adopting an identity – much as contemporary artists who adopt an American, say, style of painting, or music, may not necessarily feel they “are” American, but rather that they have simply accepted a particular cultural influence – either because they liked it, or because they acknowledged its supremacy or hegemony and so on. Why would Cypriots in ancient times feel that their artistic expression implied a way of being?

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Similar arguments could be made against the assumption that the adoption of the Greek language implied adoption of a Greek identity. We already saw that there was no singular identity to begin with. In the same way there was no single Greek language, but many different dialects, associated with the various ethno-linguistic groups we noted earlier on; in fact Greek-Cypriot "Greek" is one more such dialect, with strong common roots, but also with significant differences to the other Greek dialects.

Furthermore, especially in the early stages, the influences on Cypriot culture were not only, or primarily, from Greece but from other countries of the region, or of the Orient more generally: Yet archaeologists do not talk of an *Orientalization* of Cypriot culture, when referring to periods of an accentuated Oriental impact. Perhaps a better way of describing developments, which would avoid essentializations (such as Hellenization or Orientalization), would be to simply stress that Cypriots were accepting, modifying, or rejecting continuously from among the many influences they were exposed to (Hall 2000, pp 170-181).

<sup>51</sup> Maier 1985, pp 32-39.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid p. 32. Maier suggests that the process whereby factoids become established have to do with the methods or habits of work of scientific communities: For instance, "linguistically, words or particles indicating the hypothetical character of a statement are dropped one by one in a process of constant repetition. The subjective is exchanged for the indicative", and eventually the factoid appears in an unqualified sentence, as a fact. Another aspect relates to the indispensable, to research, attitude of a "certain amount of implicit trust in the results of other scholars' research" (Ibid p. 32).

<sup>53</sup> See above, this chapter.

<sup>54</sup> Kyrris 1985, p.14, pp 116-121; Gjerstad (1948, pp 484-485) – quoted in Maier 1985, p. 32

<sup>55</sup> Zannetos 1997 [1910], Vol. I, p 291.

<sup>56</sup> Maier 1985, pp 38-39.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p.39.

<sup>58</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 112.

<sup>59</sup> Boatswain 2005, p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> Plutarch, text provided in Zannetos 1997, Vol. I, p. 254.

<sup>61</sup> The examples could carry on, for the whole of the ancient era. Consider the attitude of the Cypriot kings towards Alexander. The emphasis of most historical accounts is on the eagerness of the Cypriot kings to join Alexander's forces (Maier 1968, p.46, claims the Cypriots "spontaneously" joined Alexander; Karageorghis 1981, p. 27, that they did it because they "considered him their brother", and so on). In fact a careful reading of the historical sources shows that the Cypriot kings, still vassals of Persia, initially were a part of the latter's defensive naval forces (at the siege of Milotos, where in the end a naval battle was avoided), and only switched sides when Alexander won the decisive battle of Issos (333 BC) – various sources are quoted in Zannetos op. cit., pp 329-336. Again the issues involved seem to have been strategic considerations and predictions of the future turn of developments, rather than ethnic or national "brotherly" connections between the Cypriot and Greek kings.

<sup>62</sup> Zannetos 1997, Vol. I, p. 254.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 254.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 246.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 325.

<sup>66</sup> Or similarly, it is not surprising that Evagoras (on the prodding of Kononas, from Sparta ) assisted the Persians financially, to raise a fleet which (with Kononas' direction) won over Sparta, destroying the latter's predominance within the Greek world – to the benefit of her contestor, Athens (which Evagoras favoured). This, warns Zannetos, was detrimental to the Greeks in general and should not have

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happened: But for the ancient Greek and Cypriots the dilemma was not there, since all that mattered was the city they favoured – the nation simply did not exist for them, and thus there was no moral issue in cooperating with the enemies (of the presumed nation).

<sup>67</sup> One could add that even the citizens' loyalty to the city-states was not based so much on ethnic feelings – as on a civic bond, much like a social contract. That is why Kononas, for instance, didn't find it difficult to switch sides from Sparta to Persia, to seek revenge on the former when it did not render him the respect he felt he deserved.

<sup>68</sup> Given 1991.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193,190.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190. The basic thrust of these changes related to a shift “from symbols to rhetoric”.

<sup>73</sup> Hall 2000, p. 65. Hall, however, dates the early stages of ethnicity much earlier than Given, seeing it to be in place back in the eighth century, when the earlier Greek texts appear.

<sup>74</sup> As Zannettos wrongly implies (*ibid* p.326), when he proposes that Alexander forged together a “strong state” [*isxiron kratos*]. In many ways Alexander's empire was comprised of Hellenistic state-like entities, and in many of these the Hellenes and Hellenized subjects constituted a dominant element. Yet the basis of their unity was not their real or felt descent, but rather their cultural unity – as Isokrates was to clarify (“Hellenes are called those with Greek education – *paideia* – and not those of the same descent”).

<sup>75</sup> Michaelides 1999, p. 119.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>77</sup> Maier 1968, p. 53.

<sup>78</sup> With the exception of Justinian.

<sup>79</sup> See Runciman 1999, p. 136. The rise in the number of bishops of the Christian Church of Cyprus over the years is telling: In 325 AD there were only 3 bishops, by 344 AD the number had risen to 12, and by 400 AD to 15 (Papageorghiou 1981, p. 35; Runciman 1999, p. 137). One should also note, however, that many ancient/pagan religious practices still prevailed in the countryside, and were gradually transformed and incorporated into the Christian culture (e.g. the worship of Aphrodite was banned, but rites in her honour survived – and were transformed into Christian ceremonies for St Mary).

<sup>80</sup> The most important being St Barnabas, considered as the founder of the Cypriot church. Other saints included St Spyridon, St Hilarion and St Epiphanius (Runciman 1999, p. 137).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>82</sup> Papageorghiou 1981, pp. 35-36;

<sup>83</sup> Runciman 1999, p. 138.

<sup>84</sup> Since the early days of the Christian Church, the central sees of Christendom were located in the “three capitals of the Mediterranean world, Rome, Alexandria and Antioch”: Runciman 1961, p.109

<sup>85</sup> Independence was confirmed by a Synod requested by emperor Zeno and summoned by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Apparently emperor Zeno was positive to the idea of autocephaly for the Cyprus church, as part of a “deliberate restructuring of the balance of power of the Byzantine state” and church: In Syria the Monophysites were “gaining alarming strength”, whereas the Cyprus church was Chalcedonian – and the emperor possibly wished to strengthen the latter (Theodoulou 2005, pp 12-14).

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The autocephaly of the Cypriot Church would be confirmed once again in the 691 AD Ecumenic Synod (Papageorgiou 1981, pp. 38). The privileges bestowed on the Archbishop included those of carrying a scepter (rather than a staff), signing his name in purple (normally a sole right of the emperor), and wearing a purple cloak. All these are still enjoyed by the Cypriot Archbishops up to our days.

<sup>86</sup> It seems that the garrison and most of the settlers were withdrawn three decades later, in 681 AD (see Papageorgiou op. cit., p. 43). Yet after the Byzantine-Arab agreement on the neutralization of Cyprus (688 AD), Moslems were reported to be still living on the island, next to the Christians. In the first decade of the 10<sup>th</sup> century Imerios is reported to have “butchered all Moslems living [on the island]” (Papageorgiou op. cit., p. 45). Again, after the final victories of Nicephoros Phocas (965 AD) against the Arabs, “many Moslems” are reported to have emigrated and others to have converted to Christianity (see Runciman 1999, pp. 154-160). Obviously the numbers of Moslems kept dwindling, but some must have survived until Ottoman times, when their numbers were to increase more substantially and permanently.

<sup>87</sup> Runciman 1999, pp. 147-156.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp 156-166

<sup>89</sup> Purcell 1969, pp 144-177

<sup>90</sup> See Hill 1972, Stavrianos 2002 and Runciman 1999, for the late Byzantine period and its problems

<sup>91</sup> Karambelias 2006, pp 17-23

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp 101-119

<sup>93</sup> Edbury 1994, p. 17.

<sup>94</sup> At that time there were masses of dispossessed in Syria and Palestine, including many “idle kings” who had lost their fiefs after the conquests of Saladin (after 1187 AD), (Alastos 1976, p. 157; Edbury 1994, pp. 16-18).

<sup>95</sup> Alastos op. cit., p. 158

<sup>96</sup> Edbury 1994, p. 19.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 22: It must be added that the continuous influx of settlers from the West (including knights, clergy and merchants) “were eventually to transform the original predominantly French-speaking ruling class into a more heterogeneous cosmopolitan group” representing most regions of Western Europe

<sup>98</sup> A king from the Lusignan dynasty presided over the High Court (*Haute Cour*), a body comprised of all the barons, which was the highest authority in all matters (legislative, judicial and executive). There was a “precarious balance” of power between king and Assembly, as the latter’s “decisions, though binding on the king, had to be made after it had been called into session by the king and presided over by him”. There was also a Lower Court (*Cour des Bourgeois*) for matters relevant to other non-noble Latins.

<sup>99</sup> For an extensive debate on the nature of feudalism see Paul Sweezy et al, 1978. A written constitution, the *Assizes of Jerusalem*, utilized by the Lusignan regime in running Cyprus’ affairs, is often seen as setting out an archetypal feudal state.

<sup>100</sup> Exchanging a slave for an animal was abolished only in 1493, by Venice, after which exchange was limited to other slaves: Alastos 1976, p. 160.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 160-163

<sup>102</sup> The name derives from the Byzantine coin known as *hyperperon*: They had to pay an annual tax of fifteen heperpere.



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<sup>103</sup> Alastos 1976, pp 164-167, 186-202. In 1218 the Republic of Genoa was granted special trading privileges and the right of jurisdiction to its citizens living in Cyprus (who could not be tried by local courts except for criminal cases). They were also given land in the main towns to build houses, offices and shops – which effectively turned their areas into small “Genoese territories”. In 1306 the same privileges were given to the Venetians. Thereby the two Italian Republics, “antagonistic naval and commercial powers, at loggerheads at home, established their little rival states within [...] Cyprus”. (Ibid., p. 164).

<sup>104</sup> Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 202

<sup>105</sup> He cites the cases of a nobleman with “a pack of more than five hundred hounds, and for each pair of hounds he has a man to guard them, bathe, shampoo and keep them clipped”; another with a dozen falconers, and others with leopards for hunting the local wild rams (mouflons). Hunting expeditions lasted for weeks and involved caravans of pack animals carrying provisions, servants attending, and hawks, dogs and leopards for assisting with the hunting. Von Sudheim was particularly impressed with Famagusta, the “richest of all cities and its citizens the richest of men” – where even the harlots were exceptionally rich, “some possessing more than 100,000 florins” (Alastos 1976, pp. 166-167).

<sup>106</sup> Hill Vol II, pp. 6-7.

<sup>107</sup> First they needed to confer legitimacy upon their kingdom (the Orthodox Church was considered schismatic in the West, thus its blessing would not bestow the required status to the locally crowned kings). Then they had to cater for the religious needs of the settlers. Equally they needed a counterbalance to the Orthodox Church which remained the only institution around which the natives rallied once the Byzantine governors and elite fled, after the conquest.

<sup>108</sup> Which also benefited from incomes received as rents or tithes from royal and noble estates (whereas the Orthodox Church lost its entitlement to the collection of taxes)

<sup>109</sup> The Orthodox bishops were put under the jurisdiction of their Latin counterparts and their number was reduced from fourteen to four; they were to reside in remote localities in the countryside, the revenues of their sees would go to the Latin Church, and new ordinations were to have the Latin bishops’ approval. Furthermore, the Orthodox clergy were to pay homage to the Latins “like vassals to their lord”.

<sup>110</sup> Interestingly addressing the letter to “both Romans and Syrians”. The name “Romans” was the one used at the time for the Orthodox Cypriots and not Hellenes/Greeks. It is interesting to note that Orthodox Syrians were living in Cyprus at the time, in large enough numbers to be addressed separately.

<sup>111</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 181. Although the Latins were bent on controlling the Orthodox Church, they were at the same time aware of their minority status on the island, and on their economic dependency on the Orthodox peasants, thus they avoided pushing things to extremes, so as not to cause migration or open rebellion. The most violent incident relates to the case of thirteen Orthodox monks who refused to yield on doctrinal matters and were jailed and subsequently put to a cruel death. The thirteen monks were dragged by horses, then burned and their unconsumed remains mixed with those of animals and re-burned – apparently in an effort not to leave behind bones which could be turned into sacred relics by the faithful: That this story has entered folklore as symbolic of the violence exercised by the Latins on the Orthodox clergy, testifies to the importance of religion and the Church at the time and the perceived threat felt by the locals.

<sup>112</sup> Perhaps they compared Cyprus with the situation in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, where the Orthodox community proved very “co-operative” and had received a more lenient treatment in return (the church kept its lands, paid no tithes and had no numerical restrictions on those ordained). The difference of course, was that the Orthodox community of Jerusalem was a “religious minority, long habituated to Muslim rule”, and to compromise, so the coming of the Latins was just a change of masters, perhaps to the better. Coureas 1997, pp. 274-280.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 274.

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<sup>114</sup> For instance, Latin Bishops were given the right to visit Orthodox communities in their diocese, opening the doors to proselytism (and the cost of the visits would be charged to the communities themselves)

<sup>115</sup> “The church of the Greeks of the kingdom of Cyprus [...] should not in future be expected to have an archbishop of its own nation”: Acta Alexander IV, 96, quoted in Coureas 1997, p. 300. Note the use of the term “Greeks”, by the Latins, when the Orthodox used “Romans”. Also, the term ‘nation’ to refer to the Orthodox Cypriot Christians.

<sup>116</sup> This was evidenced by a series of protest letters from the Pope to the local rulers, complaining about the incomppliance of their heretical subjects.

<sup>117</sup> Father Pierre de Thomas.

<sup>118</sup> Dawkins 1980, pp. 90-91.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., pp. 90-91.

<sup>120</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 184.

<sup>121</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 228.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., pp. 229-231.

<sup>123</sup> Xydis 1968, p. 9.

<sup>124</sup> Smith 1986, pp. 60-61, 66.

<sup>125</sup> Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 22.

<sup>126</sup> Karambelias 2006, pp 189-190. Plethon’s new regime would encourage local industries, protected by tariffs, the restructuring of the taxation system, the formation of a citizen’s army to render unnecessary the use of mercenaries – but above all deep social reforms including the handing over to the peasants of the land they cultivated. Ibid pp.189-190.

<sup>127</sup> Quoted in Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 23.

<sup>128</sup> Runciman 1980, p 39.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>130</sup> Yet with time Hellene would become synonymous with Roman: Xydis 1968, p. 18.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., pp. 22 and 40. Since the Byzantium had shrunk to a number of city-states (such as Constantinople, Salonica and Mistras), it became “the authentic heir of the city-states of the ancient Greek world and demonstrated the same power of life and creativity in the letters and the arts”. Ibid p. 41.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p.19. Yet the distinction between elite and masses should not be exaggerated: For obviously, the long-run effect of state actions (the use of administrative, judicial, fiscal and military means, its efforts to carry out imperial policies) brought the masses “under the influence of the increasingly Greek and Hellenic culture of the nobles, clergy and Court – until this Hellenization process came to its abrupt hold with the fall of the empire.

<sup>134</sup> Hobsbawm 1992, p. 46.

<sup>135</sup> Vryonis 1990, p. 16: “...εως ούπω βαρβάρους έλαχεν Ιταλοίς το εκείσε δουλεύειν Ελληνικόν”.

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<sup>136</sup> Coureas 1997, p. 310. As Coureas points out during the subsequent Ottoman and British regimes, there was never such a rigid economic, spatial and social separation between the locals.

<sup>137</sup> Stavrianos 1957, p. 338.

<sup>138</sup> Dawkins 1980, pp. 674-679.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

<sup>140</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 207.

<sup>141</sup> Quoted in Alastos 1976, p. 208 fn 3.

<sup>142</sup> Similarly Georgios Voustronios, descendant of the French house de Bustron, wrote his own chronicle in the local Greek Cypriot dialect.

<sup>143</sup> Dawkins, *op. cit.*

<sup>144</sup> Hill *op. cit.*, p. 1097; Kyrris 1985, p. 242.

<sup>145</sup> One of the most interesting such examples were the "common liturgies and processions recorded since the Lusignan period and now becoming a common feature, especially at the celebrations of Cypriot Christi and Saint Mark" (Kyrris 1985, p 248)

<sup>146</sup> Hill notes that had the Lusignan ruling class have a stronger assimilative power, such as that characterizing the Norman conquerors of England, a new stronger ethnic breed – "a Cypriot nation" – might have been the result. But the Cypriots resisted the foreign occupation, so that the gradually decaying Latin regime left little of permanence to the islanders save a few traditions, which survived till the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and a few French words in the local dialect. Hill *op. cit.*, p. 755

<sup>147</sup> Hill III, p. 839.

<sup>148</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 245. See also Alastos 1976, pp. 232-234.

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## Notes to chapter 3

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed analysis of the history of the Ottoman Empire see Stavrianos 2002, pp. 33-213; Inalcik 1995, pp. 17- 98; and Quataert 2005, pp. 13-74.

<sup>2</sup> Papageorghiou 2004, p. 10. By way of comparison, England in those times had a population of approximately 5 million.

<sup>3</sup> Stavrianos 2002, p. 124.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 215-513; Lewis 2002, pp. 37-357.

<sup>5</sup> Inalcik 1995, p. 80. It seems that the economic decline in Cyprus started even before the Ottoman era, largely as a result of the discovery of new sea routes around the horn of Africa, resulting in the decreased economic significance of the Mediterranean – see Jenness 1962, pp 44-45.

<sup>6</sup> Inalcik 1995, p. 82. The same author explains the difficulties of the Cyprus expedition and the subsequent changes in the military balance of power in the area.

<sup>7</sup> The new type of battleship of the Dutch and the English was much more powerful than the Ottoman galeras; the increased taxation necessary for financing the changeover was to add to the financial strains of the Empire: "in actual fact the Empire had surpassed the limits dictated by its material capabilities" (*Inalcik op. cit.*, p 84).

<sup>8</sup> Quataert 2005, p. 37.

<sup>9</sup> Stavrianos 2002, p. 136.

<sup>10</sup> In 1566 and 1569; see Kyrris 1976 pp. 247 – 248.

<sup>11</sup> G. Diedo in Cobham 1908, p. 92. The Venetians began worrying about the possibility of an uprising of the locals: When a small movement against them did start off in one of the villages (Lefkara), they quickly put it down, killing some 400 men, so as to stop it spreading to the rest of the island. Even when it came to the defence of the capital, the mass of the peasants proved unwilling to "come to Nicosia to fight under the orders of the Venetians whom they hated" (Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 261). So the Venetians had to utilize mostly city residents in the battles. It is interesting how even in the hour of crisis the tensions between the Venetian masters and the Orthodox natives was manifest: during the siege, the Latins made a vow to build a church dedicated to the Holy Virgin, whose protection they sought. The natives, however, refused to contribute because the church that was going to be built would be Catholic (*ibid.* p 263). In a crucial instance of the attack, a Latin bishop urged all Christians to join their strength and "resist the fury of the barbarians, who sought [...] to profane their altars, trample down their religion and turn their churches into foul dens of a false faith" (Cobham *op. cit.*, p. 95).

<sup>12</sup> Calepio, head of the Cypriot Dominicans and eye witness of the battles, gives a vivid description of the violence and pain involved: everywhere was "heard nothing but the ceaseless wailing of poor women parted from their husbands, the shrieks of children torn from their mothers' arms, the sighs of the wretched fathers which mounted to the very heavens, the cries of maidens and lads who saw themselves separated from their parents [...]. Any man or woman who resisted was killed. The victors kept cutting off the heads of old women [...] split open the heads of men already surrendered. Did a prisoner try to escape he was caught up and his legs cut off Churches were desecrated, altars stripped, sacred pictures burnt, tombs opened, and those who took refuge in the Churches slain"... (Cobham *op. cit.*, p. 140)

<sup>13</sup> The most quoted incident used to demonstrate the savage brutality of the Ottomans being the flaying alive of the Venetian commander Marc Antony Bragadino; but the city's surrender did actually save it from total destruction.

<sup>14</sup> Alastos 1976, p. 194.

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<sup>15</sup> Karambelias 2006, pp 101-103. Karambelias quotes the Latin conquest, Nikitas Choniatis, who writes of a three day orgy of lootings, killings, rapes, kidnappings and so on; comparing these with the Saracenean conquest of Jerusalem, Choniates notes that the latter's behaviour was more humane, and they did not touch the Christian women nor did they desecrate the religious sites of the Christians – unlike the Latins' treatment of their co-religionists in Constantinople.

<sup>16</sup> Stavrianos 2002, p. 60.

<sup>17</sup> Inalcik 1969, p. 120.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>19</sup> Appointed officials (assisted by locals of the lower classes, but also by some Frankish and Venetian nobles who survived and showed readiness to collaborate) went from village to village, collecting information on the households and livestock, the extent of lands and its fertility and the crops produced in the past three years — and estimated the average annual income: this information was recorded in account books; they also counted the tax-paying, male population (ibid, p.123; Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 273).

<sup>20</sup> Grillo 1998, pp. 76-81.

<sup>21</sup> The original Arabic term meaning 'cattle at pasture' – the peasant subjects of the Sultan: Gibb and Bowen 2005, pp 309, 370; Grillo op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>22</sup> Grillo op.cit., pp. 76-81.

<sup>23</sup> From the Arab word "dimma", contract; dimmis were thus people protected by compact: Grillo op.cit. p. 79.

<sup>24</sup> Marx, Selected Correspondence p. 81, quoted in Anderson 1974, p. 365 fn 7.

<sup>25</sup> Gibb and Bowen 2005, pp. 84-106.

<sup>26</sup> The main category of state (*miri*) land was the *timar*, which was divided in various sub-categories. The size of the plot determined the obligation of the holder (e.g. for every 3,000 aspers, the timariot had to provide an additional horseman). Holders of high military offices and higher-ranking government officials received bigger plots, and the grand Vizir the biggest (Gazioglu 1990, p. 128; Quataert 2005, p. 29)

<sup>27</sup> Anderson 1974, p. 368.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 369.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. Furthermore, timar-holders depended on the dues paid to them by the peasant cultivators of their timars, so they had an obvious interest in the prosperity of the producers: The amounts paid were fixed by the Porte and not by the timariots, so as to prevent arbitrary determination by the latter.

<sup>30</sup> Stavrianos 2002, p. 100.

<sup>31</sup> Mouzelis 1978, p. 4. This absolute authority is what Weber called "Sultanism": "Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the ruler's personal autonomy. it will be called patrimonial authority; where it operates primarily on the basis of discretion. it will be called Sultanism". In practice, of course, no Sultan operated in a completely arbitrary manner, but had to take into consideration custom-bound norms and institutions . Weber noted this, but stressed the Sultan's ultimate power of discretion: "Sometimes it appears that Sultanism is completely unrestrained by tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists only in an extreme development of the ruler's discretion. It is this which distinguishes it from every form of rational authority". Economy and Society, 1, p. 232. 'But see Quataert p. 321 for a different reading.

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<sup>32</sup> The overall impact was very favourable to the peasants. As Anderson notes, during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, "the peasantry found itself delivered from increasing servile degradation and seigniorial exploitation under its Christian rulers, and transferred to a social condition that was paradoxically in most respects milder and freer than anywhere else in Eastern Europe at the time": Anderson 1974, p. 371.

<sup>33</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 253. A lump sum had to be paid initially, amounting to 1/10-1/3 of their annual produce; plus a yearly rent amounting to 45%-67% in kind. This reduced the status of ownership of land to that of perpetual lease and usufruct. Indeed Ottoman Land Law (Article 8(i)) provided that the "land of a village or town" was to be divided into "separate plots [...] granted to each inhabitant and a title-deed [...] given to each owner showing his right of possession". An owner by title-deed could transfer his land, after official permission, to someone else – either for a fixed price or as a gift (to his heirs or others). (Gazioglu 1990, p. 125)

<sup>34</sup> Inalcik 1969, p. 74.

<sup>35</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 253; this was not so in earlier times: Inalcik links this relative freedom to population growth in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, so that "the laws against who left the land became less stringent, encouraging the flow of population from the villages to the towns" (Inalcik 1995, p. 111). When, however, they left timar lands uncultivated, in moving elsewhere, they were obliged to pay an annual fixed penalty fee. In case, however, the reaya's absence went unnoticed, or the sipahi was evaded, for 15 years, no penalty fee was thereafter necessary, and he became a legal resident in the new place he moved to (Jennings 1993, p. 120).

<sup>36</sup> Inalcik 1969, pp. 125-136; Gazioglu op.cit., pp. 175-186.

<sup>37</sup> Braudel 1978, p. 663 (Vol II); Jennings p. 241. This class was the *parici*, "who made up over 80% of the island's population", and whose status was virtually that of slaves (Jennings op.cit., p. 240)

<sup>38</sup> Jennings, pp. 115-121.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Similarly the testimony of two non-Muslim eyewitnesses against Muslims was not accepted as sure proof, as was the case with Muslims.

<sup>43</sup> Jennings op. cit., p. 133.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> The term *millet* derives from *milla*, which in the Koran stood for religion; when used with the definite article, "the religion", it meant Islam. In Ottoman Turkish *milla/millet* meant "religious community"; in modern Turkish (and Persian) it has come to mean 'nation' (Grillo op. cit., p. 87).

<sup>47</sup> Stavrianos 2002, p. 104. As vizir the Patriarch enjoyed privileges and recognition due to Ottoman officials – for instance, he could ride a horse, something which other Christians were not allowed to do.

<sup>48</sup> Runciman 1988, pp 168-169.

<sup>49</sup> Sharing a written scripture, a holy word of revelation. This special tax was originally a land tax, then turned into a head tax, and finally into a military exemption tax (*harac-cizye*). Karpas 1982, p. 148.

<sup>50</sup> On the millet system see Karpas 1973, pp. 31-40.

<sup>51</sup> Respectively the use of Greek proved a serious hurdle for non-Greek speakers. For instance, in the

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Balkans "the replacement of Slavonic by Greek in the churches made the service incomprehensible to most faithful, excluded Slav-speakers from high church offices, and made resistance to the Ottomans more difficult". That is why Slav historians of Ottoman Balkans, speak about the "double yoke" of their countries – "the political-economic of the Ottomans, and the religious-linguistic of the Greeks": Sugar 1969, p. 30.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> Karpát 1982, p. 37.

<sup>54</sup> Karpát 1973, p. 13.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Karpát 1982, p. 147.

<sup>57</sup> Karpát 1973, p. 38.

<sup>58</sup> Arnakis 1969, p. 78.

<sup>59</sup> Gibb and Bowen 1963, p. 44, 1957 p. 234.

<sup>60</sup> According to Quataert, before this time the term millet was used to refer to "Muslims within the empire and Christians outside it": Quataert 2005, p. 176.

<sup>61</sup> Findley 1980, p. 21.

<sup>62</sup> Braude 1982, p. 74.

<sup>63</sup> Grillo 1998, p. 88. Ursinus points out that although the term 'millet' in the fifteenth century referred to Muslims only, by the seventeenth century it had "become an accepted element in the administrative language of the central bureaucracy to indicate the non-Muslim religious communities of the Ottoman Empire" – quoted in Grillo op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>64</sup> Itzkowitz 1996, p. 30.

<sup>65</sup> Coureas 1997, pp. 297-321.

<sup>66</sup> Kyrris 1985, pp. 232-233.

<sup>67</sup> Kyprianou 2001, p. 455.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 454.

<sup>71</sup> Inalcik 1995, pp. 82-83.

<sup>72</sup> Michael 2005, pp. 37-38; Inalcik 1969, p. 121.

<sup>73</sup> Michael 2005, pp. 111-117.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp. 116-117. Michael notes as a further reason for approaching the West a certain acceptance of the Catholic doctrine by some Cypriot high prelates. Kyrris reminds us that some of the latter were of Latin extraction and maintained close relationships with other Latins in the West.

<sup>75</sup> Michael 2005, pp. 103-111.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p 105.

<sup>77</sup> Michael op. cit., p. 108. Of course the prelates were to some extent expected to play such a role from the start, and to some extent they did play it. But the fact that very often Ottoman decisions were repeated demonstrates the need for a principle to be re-affirmed possibly because it had been forgotten through time, or submerged under new developments. Usually, as well, repetition of a principle entailed its clarification or its strengthening - as it did in the case under consideration.

<sup>78</sup> Michael op. cit., pp 85-91; Jennings op. cit., pp 69-106.

<sup>79</sup> Kyrris 1985, pp 253-259; Luke 1989, pp 79-82.

<sup>80</sup> Kyprianou, quoted in Luke p. 77.

<sup>81</sup> Kyrris op. cit., p. 263.

<sup>82</sup> Cobham 1908, p. 396.

<sup>83</sup> Michael op. cit., pp 81-82.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., pp 83-85.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>86</sup> Together with the lands of the Evkaf and of the *chifliks*, all large estates "amounted to 23.3% of total agricultural land in 1844". Sant Cassia 1986, p 10.

<sup>87</sup> The term *para* meant money, here obviously implying "the peasant's last penny".

<sup>88</sup> Cobham 1908, p. 449.

<sup>89</sup> Sant Cassia 1986, p. 11.

<sup>90</sup> For an account of the significance of *chifliks* as a factor in the decline of the Ottoman system, see Stavrianos 2002, pp. 140-142.

<sup>91</sup> See the estimates of Sant Cassia (1986).

<sup>92</sup> Quoted in Luke 1989, p. 81.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid p., pp 129-130.

<sup>97</sup> "... the local aghas [...] had grown in importance through their wealth, their dignity, and protection at the capital, [...] it was they who appeared then to be the masters and rulers of the island". Kyprianos, quoted in Luke p. 32.

<sup>98</sup> This is Sant Cassia's term; Luke calls it an "unholy alliance" (1989, p. 79).

<sup>99</sup> Louis Lacroix, quoted in Luke p. 126.

<sup>100</sup> Luke, pp 126-128; Kyrris 1976, p. 262.

<sup>101</sup> Dixon 1879, pp. 47-48.



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<sup>102</sup> Grillo.

<sup>103</sup> Stoianovich 1960.

<sup>104</sup> By the end of the eighteenth century strong groups of Greek and Armenian merchants in Constantinople did manage to convince the Sultan to extend to Ottoman subjects the benefits of reduced tariffs – while increasing the latter for Western merchants (Hasiotis 2005, p. 52).

<sup>105</sup> Obversely this had disastrous political effects for the Moslem merchants who had dominated trade in the area ever since Constantinople passed to the Ottomans

<sup>106</sup> Campbell J. and P. Sherrard 1968, p. 50; Mouzelis 1978, p. 8.

<sup>107</sup> Mouzelis *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9. The Phanariotes had close links with the Patriarchate of Constantinople from which they drew prestige and power, but which they in turn assisted in multiple ways. The interdependence between the Phanariotes, wealthy merchants and the Patriarchate was strengthened through the Porte's device of putting ecclesiastical positions on auction (so as to increase the Sultan's revenues): Members of the high clergy who aspired for a post, often had to resort to the financial support of the wealthy. This arrangement made it possible for the Phanariotes and other merchants to nominate bishops or influence the choice of Patriarch. Overall Greek economic power translated into greater political power, and stronger political muscle in turn enhanced economic opportunities.

<sup>108</sup> Attracted here by the pro-Orthodox policies of Peter the Great and especially, subsequently, of Catherine II.

<sup>109</sup> Vlami 2006, pp. 612-613.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 637.

<sup>111</sup> Emilianides 1937, pp. 38-40. These were obviously remnants from the Latin rule of Cyprus. Beside the Venetian consulate, all the others were satellites of main consulates in Aleppo (Luke pp. 86-102).

<sup>112</sup> Emilianides 1937, p. 41. Thus towards the end of the eighteenth century there were consulates which had neither local residents nor commercial dealings with Cyprus (*Ibid.* p. 42).

<sup>113</sup> Braude and Lewis 1982 (Introduction), p. 28.

<sup>114</sup> One should not exaggerate the abstention of Muslims from trade; Jennings reports that from the early period of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, many janissaries "acted as merchants and artisans, owned buildings, and lent money frequently" (Jennings 1993, p. 388). It is significant that sipahis were not so involved with trade, an indication of the lower status attached to the latter.

<sup>115</sup> Jenness 1962, p. 59, quoting Mas Latrie.

<sup>116</sup> Exporting agricultural products to the West was not allowed since there were great needs to cater for in the Ottoman lands themselves.

<sup>117</sup> Light, in Cobham *op. cit.*, p. 420 (quoted in Luke 1989, p. 101).

<sup>118</sup> Luke *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*; (see also Emilianides *op. cit.*,) for this arbitrariness of the Ottoman towards the consulates

<sup>120</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 16; Kyrris 1985, p. 284.

<sup>121</sup> Koudounaris 1976, pp. 76-91.

<sup>122</sup> Luke *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 166-169; Emilianides *op. cit.*, p. 40 fn 2.

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<sup>124</sup> In later years and in areas where the Cypriot Orthodox communities grew more numerous, they were to gradually set up their own coffeeshops and even churches, although schools were to continue to be mostly common with Greeks from, what came to be known as, the 'mainland'.

<sup>125</sup> Initially most of the teachers were clergy but increasingly secular *logioi* were used (Hassiotis 2001, pp 88-89; Vlami 2006, pp. 600-601).

<sup>126</sup> Greek speakers from different geographical origins spoke quite distinct dialects. Besides Greeks there were often other Orthodox co-religionists, such as Vlachs and Serbs who spoke other languages (although they usually spoke Greek too, the Greek language being the one utilized in the liturgy, but also in commerce, as will be explained further on).

<sup>127</sup> Kyrris 1985, p. 263. The grand Vezir (Sokoli), was of Serbian extraction himself and possibly the monk he promoted was his relative. Incidentally the incident demonstrates the impressive power of the Patriarch (even against as high an Ottoman high ranking officer as the grand Vezir), and the considerable autonomy of the Church in running its own affairs. What it does not demonstrate, contra Kyrris, is a preference for a co-national than a non-national, since such distinctions were still not important; in this particular case the significant criterion was knowledge of the Greek language, which was the language of the liturgy which is at the heart of Orthodoxy.

<sup>128</sup> This, in fact, is the reason why Slav historians of Ottoman Balkans speak about the "double yoke" of their countries – the "political-economic of the Ottomans and the religious-linguistic of the Greeks" (Sugar 1969, p. 30 )

<sup>129</sup> Stoianovich op. cit., p. 310, 290-291.

<sup>130</sup> Greek books were mostly printed by Europeans, until the nineteenth century, but the first Greek printing office dates back to 1627 (S. Xydis, in Sugar 1969, p. 212).

<sup>131</sup> The first Bulgarian book was printed only in 1810 (Pundeff, in Sugar 1969 p. 93).

<sup>132</sup> Jews and Armenians were also printing books since the sixteenth century, but since the first could not influence Orthodox Christians, and the position of the Armenians rendered them marginal to developments, Greek was effectively the language to influence other ethnicities (Tsoukalas 1977, p. 36)

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 310.

<sup>134</sup> Since women remained in the background, serving their families, they did not have to follow social trends, and thus generally remained unilingual, contributing in this way to the preservation of the ethnic identity of their group of origin (Stoianovich op. cit., p. 290).

<sup>135</sup> Following the Ottoman conquest of Serbia in 1459, the Serbian Patriarchate was put to an end; it was, however, restored in 1557. In 1766 it was again abolished, apparently after pressure from the Phanariotes on the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Ibid., pp 292-293)

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., pp. 290-311.

<sup>137</sup> Clogg 1992, pp 20-21.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., pp. 21.

<sup>139</sup> Kitromilides 1999, pp. 32-42.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 36. As the national revolution drew closer, however, some Phanariotes seemed to change heart, as seen in the case of Mikhail Soutsos, Grand Dragoman to the Porte (1817-18) and *hospotar* of Moldavia (1819-21), who was initiated into the Philiki Etairia and was active in the politics of independent Greece (Clogg 1992, pp. 24-25).

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<sup>141</sup> The existence of the *paroikies* became a pole of attraction for young people in the Ottoman occupied territories since there were hardly any opportunities for studies in their lands. In Cyprus for instance, Richard Pockoke, a visitor to Cyprus, in 1738, reported that young people who worked during the day had the chance of attending monasteries in the evening so as to learn how to read and sign psalms from the liturgy: Philippou 2000, p. 42. The *paroikies* provided a supporting environment for those who joined them for studies.

<sup>142</sup> In the case of Cypriot *logioi*, we find a small number who not only studied in cities where there were diaspora communities, but even taught at local schools or universities themselves; some published works influenced by the spirit of the times. An early example was Iason Denores who studied at the University of Padua in the last years of Venetian rule, returned to Cyprus but left again right after the Ottoman occupation, ending up teaching at the same university and publishing studies on ancient philosophers (an introduction to Cicero's Philosophy and an introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric). Another interesting case is that of Ilarion Kigalas (1624-1681), born in Nicosia to a father who was a priest and also a notary to the Archbishopric. He attended the Greek Gymnasium in Rome and subsequently became the head of a secondary school founded by a man from Verroia, in Thessaly, Greece. A few years after he "toured the East, founding schools", including one in Kefallinia (1663). Three years later he was appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople as director of all Greek Orthodox school teachers (*exarchos ton apantaxou didaskalon*) apparently a post much like a Minister of Education of the times. Finally he returned to Cyprus where he became Archbishop in 1674, and died of an illness three years after. What is interesting in Kigalas' case is the implied unity of the Greek Orthodox imagined community of the time, that made it possible for a Cypriot to be head of a school founded by a man from Thessaly, and then tour Greek speaking lands to establish schools there. Equally interesting is the Patriarchate's concern with education and with his decision to appoint someone to oversee the work of teachers; and yet progress in these difficult years was not easily forthcoming. For details on the above and other Cypriots who studied in Europe during Ottoman rule, see Philippou 2000.

<sup>143</sup> Philippou 2000, p. 43, 112.

<sup>144</sup> Other *logioi* included Ianos Laskaris (late 15<sup>th</sup> century) who worked on publishing the works of Greek classics; Demetris Chalcocondylis who taught Greek language and philosophy in the University of Padua; Constantinos Laskaris who wrote the first Greek language grammar and so on: See Koumariou 2006, vol.8, pp 145-148.

<sup>145</sup> Incidentally, this meant that Greece would progress into the Neohellenic Enlightenment phase, without first gaining from the experience of a full fledged Renaissance.

<sup>146</sup> Kitromilides 1994, I pp 52-57, IV pp 669-671, X pp. 77-78.

<sup>147</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XI p. 152.

<sup>148</sup> See Kitromilides 1994, IV pp. 667-676 for details on Balkan Hellenized *logioi*, such as Iosippos Mosiodax.

<sup>149</sup> Though Kyprianou is not always successful in this, Philippou's judgement that Kyprianou's work is rendered almost worthless of historical value is too extreme (Philippou 2000, p. 114); see Kitromilides 1999, pp. 118-122 for a much more positive and balanced assessment.

<sup>150</sup> ... "na evdokimisoun is mimisin ton axiomimiton katorthomaton ton Endoxon, opou is autin tin Patrida sou inthisan kai thi aftin eprospathisan": Kyprianou 2001, p. xiv.

<sup>151</sup> Kyprianou pp 12-13. Some comparisons of how Greece and the Greek world were imagined, would be of interest. An early attempt by Meletios Mitros in his "Old and New Geography" (*Palea kai Nea Geographia*) (1728) utilized ancient geographers' (e.g. Stravon's) accounts of Greece, and ended up excluding Thrace and the east Aegean and the Ionians (which his sources linked to Minor Asia); Cyprus was similarly excluded. The Philippides brothers published their Modernis Geography (*Neoteriki Geographia*) in 1791; utilizing criteria of religion, languages and demography they distinguished between the European and Asiatic Greek world and included Cyprus in the latter. Finally in Fereos' "Map of Greece" (*Xarta Ellados*), a historical delineation of ancient Greece and its colonies is used, plus elements from other historical periods, such as Byzantine Greece, as well as the new 'colonies' of Greece

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associated with the Phanariotes' presence in the Balkans (e.g. Moldavia): Fereos was attempting to diachronically integrate the pre-national Greek space, depicting the areas in which the Greek Orthodox in Ottoman controlled lands predominated. Cyprus is not included. Yet in the 1881 reprint of the "*Xarta*", Cyprus is included. Indeed in his *New Political Administration* (Nea Politiki Dioikisi) Fereos defines Greeks as "the people, descendants of Greeks who [now] live in Roumeli, Minor Asia, the *Mediterranean Islands*" and other Ottoman occupied lands where Greeks were a majority.

<sup>152</sup> Kyprianou p.75.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p.75.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p.76; see also p.61, p.92.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p.496. Elsewhere (p. viii and p. 590) he refers to the ancient Greeks as those "named Gods" (*onomasthenton Theon*).

<sup>156</sup> See for example his treatment of the Greek general Kimon, whom he presents as interested only in the liberation of the Greek-ruled cities of Cyprus, and not of Cyprus as a whole (pp 113-115). Or his account of Evagoras, whom he does not associate with Greekness or any particular love of Greece (pp 115-119). Finally his treatment of Helen Palaiologa from Moreas, as a *Roman*, born to a Roman father and with Roman characteristics (pp 308), which he does not relate to the Hellenes in any way.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 35.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p.100.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, XIV.

<sup>161</sup> From the report of the police director of Budapest J. Fr. Von Pucher, quoted in Myaris, p. 6.

<sup>162</sup> Fereos' text followed the more radical 1793 version of the French Constitution.

<sup>163</sup> Stoianovich, p. 308. Moreover, the insurrectionist plans were revealed to the Austrian authorities by a Greek merchant from Trieste.

<sup>164</sup> Kitromilides 1999, p. 459; Stoianovich op. cit., p. 308.

<sup>165</sup> Papageorghiou 2004, pp. 84-90.

<sup>166</sup> Freemasonry's origins go back to the medieval guilds of masons (builders), especially of cathedral churches. It grew to great strength in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its teachings focus on the great moral principles, charity and obedience to the laws of a country. Since in many countries, especially Catholic, their membership included many anticlericalists and free thinkers, Masonic societies came to be associated with national liberation movements.

<sup>167</sup> Protosalti 1971, p. 11; Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 60.

<sup>168</sup> Protosaltis, p.101 fn3. Archbishop Kyprianos has no connection to the 'historian' Archimandrite Kyprianos, (author of *Chronological History of Cyprus*).

<sup>169</sup> Hadjidemetriou op. cit., p. 306.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306. Nicolaos put the family commercial company in the service of the *Philike* through facilitating the travel of European *Phillelles* to Greece.

<sup>171</sup> Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 307.

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<sup>172</sup> Peristianis 2000, pp 779 – 781, 783. Other sources hold that the meeting took place in Marseilles (thus the document is referred to either as the Rome or the Marseilles Manifesto). Hill 1952, pp. 136-137; Koumoulides, pp. 78-80.

<sup>173</sup> Samaras 1999, p.9. Historical data indicate that approximately 1,000 Cypriots took part in the Greek revolution – a very high number considering the small size of Cyprus, the pre-modern economy, means of transport and communication, low levels of secularization – and all other indices associated with the rise of national ideas and awareness. Pollis underplays the significance of this fact, alleging that the Cypriots who took part in the Greek War of Independence “were few and seemed to be ‘mercenaries’ rather than nationalists”, and that their motives ranged from “profit, adventure, glory and perhaps occasionally commitment to Greek nationalism”. Pollis 1976 pp 51, 58.

<sup>174</sup> S. Papageorghiou 2004, pp. 79-83.

<sup>175</sup> Kordatos 1973; Papageorghion 2004.

<sup>176</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XII. pp. 8-10.

<sup>177</sup> Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 65.

<sup>178</sup> Michael 2005, pp 230-240. Michael re-interprets and revises previous mainstream views which took it for granted that the Archbishop was in support of Philike’s views and objectives (see, for instance Koumoulides op. cit., pp 41-42; Hill 1952, p. 124, Protopsalti 1971; Papageorghiou 1977.

<sup>179</sup> Michael 2005, pp. 226-230.

<sup>180</sup> The founding document is provided in Persianis and Polyviou 1992, pp. 91-92.

<sup>181</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18; Michael 2005, pp 232-234. In the same circular he warns the bishop of Kition to be especially cautious of freemasonry, obviously because Larnaka, his diocese, hosted most merchants – among the ranks of which masonry was more popular. Apparently the denunciation of freemasonry in Cyprus was “the most fierce throughout the Greek world”, which denotes the more conservative stance of the local Church but also that freemasonry in Cyprus was enough of a threat to cause the Church to react so violently (Katsiaounis op. cit).

<sup>182</sup> Official Greek historiography has assumed that he was made part of these plans and that he only promised financial help because Greece was too far and Turkey too close to Cyprus – see note 177 above.

<sup>183</sup> Kyris 1985, p. 279; Luke 1989 pp 128-133; Dionysiou 2006, pp. 454-456.

<sup>184</sup> Attalides 1979, p. 25.

<sup>185</sup> The letter is provided in Dionysiou 2006, p. 461..

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p. 463.

<sup>187</sup> The causes of the uprisings seem to have been primarily related to economic considerations and especially a new increase in taxation. The contribution of the ethnic dimension, to the extent that there was any, must have been very small; in the case of the Theseas uprising, for instance, both Christian and Muslim peasants were involved, thus the ethnic factor could not have been significant; furthermore, the grudges of the protestors were partly directed against the Orthodox Church and its perceived role in taxation. It is important to note that the Archbishop clearly condemned Theseas’ “pro-national ideas”, indicating that the Church leadership was either negatively disposed towards nationalist doctrines, or simply careful for fear of the Ottomans (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 20; see also Georgis 1995, pp. 183-185).

<sup>188</sup> As part of the Tanzimat reforms there was an effort to ban the tax farming system but, as elsewhere in the Empire, little was accomplished in consequence of fierce reactions (in Cyprus such reactions came primarily from Christian landowners acting as tax farmers!).

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<sup>189</sup> Stavrianos 2002, pp. 381-392;

<sup>190</sup> Many “causes” facilitated this shift, starting from “internal” ones, such as the type of economic development and the character of the social structure, the distribution of power between the various classes and groups, the social conflicts and alignment of interests and so on; but equally important was the influence of “external” factors, such as the European powers and their policies, especially as regards the future of the “Sick Man of Europe” – i.e. the Ottoman empire and its gradual dismemberment.

<sup>191</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 10-14.

<sup>192</sup> Quoted in Clogg 1992, p. 47. Interestingly Kolettis himself was a “Hellenized Vlach”, who shortly afterwards was to become Prime-Minister of Greece.

<sup>193</sup> Put differently the vision entailed a take-over of the ailing Ottoman Empire by the Greeks – its most dynamic element at the time.

<sup>194</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XI pp. 160-170.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>196</sup> For instance, at the inauguration of the Greek embassy and the first raising of the Greek flag, there was such jubilation by the Cypriots that the Ottoman authorities were upset; the Greek consul noted how it proved impossible for him to “control the passion and excitement” of the local “co-nationals” (*omogenois*, of the same *genos*), who “unfortunately exposed themselves, damaging their best interest” (Report of the first Greek consul in Cyprus, D. Margaritis, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, cited in Georgis 1995, p. 167). Indeed, the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis found the formal celebration of the inauguration needless and asked the consul to be cautious with Ottoman feelings in future (see Belia 1969, p. 246).

<sup>197</sup> The General Assembly was presided by the Archbishop, and had as members the bishops, the elders and other lay representatives; the Town Committees were composed of the Bishop and six laymen: Persianis 1978, pp. 73-74. Some authors propose that the system was modelled on the Second National Assembly of Greece, which met in 1823 and introduced the norms of indirect democracy. Persianis 2006 p. 133. Anagnostopoulou (2003) links it to the Tanzimat Reforms.

<sup>198</sup> Characteristically, while in 1839 there were only 10 Greek schools, by 1878 the number went up to 76. Kitromilides proposes that the traditional policy of toleration toward the religions of the Book, reinforced by the reformist spirit of Tanzimat era, allowed the space for nationalist ideas to be cultivated through education and cultural institutions (such as the public reading rooms): Kitromilides 1990, p. 9.

<sup>199</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XI pp. 177. The Patriarch was executed by the Ottomans not because he consented or encouraged the Revolution, but because he had not managed to contain it, as was his duty.

<sup>200</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>202</sup> Quoted in Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18. Hence, contrary to mainstream accounts, Archbishop Kyprianos was hanged on 9 July 1821, not because he instigated nationalist ideas, following a nationalist cause. It rather seems he was trying to keep a distance from radical or subversive (to Ottoman authority) actions; he was rather the unfortunate victim of the governor’s jealousy, as a consequence of the Church’s rising prominence and power.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>205</sup> Greece in 1833, Romania in 1865, Bulgaria in 1865, and Albania in 1932.

<sup>206</sup> Quoted in Kitromilides 1994, XI pp 181-182.

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., pp. 183-184. Kitromilides translates the term phyleticism, in the text, to racism, but I have retained the original Greek term judging that racism has other connotations.

<sup>208</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 15-17.

<sup>209</sup> Limassol had no actual consuls but consular agents instead, who were mostly local Cypriots, with no roots or connections to Europe. There were also a large number of residents who required Greek nationality. These groups formed the “nucleous of nationalist sentiment”, both in the town of Limassol and the wider district (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 41).

<sup>210</sup> The town also hosted the Ionian consulate since 1801, which represented the interests of the local Ionians, most of whom distinguished themselves as merchants. Finally it hosted most other consulates of the various European countries.

<sup>211</sup> Thus known as the *Kitiakon Zitima*, the problem of Kition: For details on the significance of this issue for socio-political developments, and as a precursor to the Archbishopric Issue which was to follow with the dawn of the twentieth century (1900-1910), see Michael 2005, pp 286-294, and Anagnostopoulou 2003, pp. 366-368.

<sup>212</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 52.

<sup>213</sup> Quoted in Katsiaounis op. cit., p.51.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

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## Notes to chapter 4

<sup>1</sup> Bruce Hall 1999, p. 215. The peak of empire expansion was reached in the years after WWI, “when it covered a fifth of the world’s land surface and incorporated a quarter of the world’s people”: Kumar 2003, p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> Wight 1946, p. 61.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 28-65.

<sup>4</sup> Grillo 1998, pp 98, 117. Grillo notes that in this aspect European colonial powers foreshadowed modern nation-states.

<sup>5</sup> Demetriadou 1998, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> See the compilation on Rokkan’s work provided by P. Flora et al (ed.) 1999, especially 47-49, 290-292, 307-312 and 334-339. Rokkan proposes that cleavages are tension-ridden divisions, which give rise to “especially strong and long-term conflicts, rooted in social structure”, which “tend to polarize the politics of any given system”. Cleavages emerged at “critical junctures”, or periods of radical change in the development of political systems. Bartolini (2000, pp 15-25) suggests that we should see a cleavage not as a descriptive concept, of a concrete reality, but as a link between social structure and political order. A cleavage has three dimensions: (a) a social constituency (the empirical referent, defined in socio-structural terms – e.g. the workers); (b) an organisational network (of institutions, such as political parties), which develop as part of a cleavage; (c) a normative or cultural dimension (constituting a set of values, beliefs, identities and the group consciousness of members involved). Thus, a cleavage is a diving line in a polity, combining all three above aspects.

<sup>7</sup> Obviously the two processes fed into each other and it is this interplay between the two which can help us better understand developments in this period. The two processes will be separated for analytical purposes and the clarity of the presentation, but the complexity of social reality must always be borne in mind.

<sup>8</sup> The text of Wolseley’s proclamation is cited in Zannetos 1977, pp 43-44. The proclamation was made in Larnaka, where Wolseley had arrived by boat, on July 22, 1878.

<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile Wolseley visited Famagusta (July 24), Limassol (July 25); in Nicosia (July 30) he was greeted by the Archbishop as official leader of the Christian community.

<sup>10</sup> The Turkish Cypriot representative gave a separate speech.

<sup>11</sup> Other versions of the events have the Archbishop deliver the first speech in Larnaka; again some versions include, as part of the welcoming address of the Greek Cypriot representative, a stronger and specific reference to *enosis*, which spelled out that the Greek population:

“accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that England will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected” (Hill IV, p. 297).

A lot of controversy has revolved around which are the actual historical “facts”: Obviously a more ‘nationalist’ reading would assume the Archbishop as *ethnarch* to be the one involved in this first and symbolically significant encounter with the colonizer, and would furthermore expect the *ethnarch* to have spelled out very clearly that the ‘consent’ of the Greek Cypriots to the new rulers, was given only temporarily and provisionally, on the understanding that soon the island would be handed over to Greece. Katsiaounis has argued that the contested quote was in fact ‘invented’ by the nationalist members of the Legislative Council in 1903 (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 27). The controversy also has to do with the dating of nationalism, as against national awareness, in Cyprus, and thus the periodisation involved – which obviously relates to the validity of different theoretical perspectives accounting for national phenomena. The fact is that strong statements specifically referring to *enosis* do seem to have been made by other Greek Cypriot representatives in the other towns (such as in Limassol). But at this stage such requests



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were certainly not so intensely made, as subsequently, when nationalism became the more widespread orthodoxy for the Greek Cypriots.

<sup>12</sup> The text is cited in Zannettos 1977, pp 46-47. Demetriadou 1998, pp 46-52, includes much material which clarifies who said what, and provides a balanced explanation of the errors made and the rationales involved in the various accounts.

<sup>13</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 17-18.

<sup>14</sup> Demetriadou 1998, p. 52.

<sup>15</sup> For servicing the 1855 Crimean War Loan.

<sup>16</sup> "In the old empire every colonial legislature was representative, and aspired to the condition of the British constitution; in the new empire, where the colonies start[ed] from less exalted premises, and [could not] claim the full rights of Englishmen, it [was] representative government itself that [was] the general goal, and every colonial legislature aspire[d] to an elected majority." Wight 1946, pp. 72-73. Of course in the old empire settled colonies would not be governed or taxed – or pay a tribute for that matter, without the agreement of a representative assembly (Ibid., p. 26).

<sup>17</sup> Holland and Markides 2006, p. 163.

<sup>18</sup> Demetriadou op. cit., pp. 78-104.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 19-28.

<sup>20</sup> Scott-Stevenson 1880, p. 300.

<sup>21</sup> Cavendish 1992, p. 49.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>23</sup> Salisbury to Biddulph, 4 July 1879, F0421/32, quoted in Holland and Markides 2006, p.166.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. Greek sources clarify that the request was to make Greek *one* of the official languages.

<sup>25</sup> Wolseley to Salisbury No. 20 Jan 13, 1879. SA. GS/1, quoted in Demetriadou p. 58.

<sup>26</sup> Wolseley to Layard, Aug 1, 1878, BLM, Add. MSS 39021: 149, quoted in Demetriadou op.cit. p. 58.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>29</sup> Gladstone 1880, pp. 288-9.

<sup>30</sup> Orr 1918, p. 163.

<sup>31</sup> On the early debates on the "Greekness" of Cyprus, see Emilianides 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Asmussen 2006, p. 172.

<sup>33</sup> Furnival 1948, pp. 304-308.

<sup>34</sup> Wight 1946, p. 89.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid p. 88. India followed in 1909, Ceylon in 1910, Kenya in 1923, the Straits Settlements in 1924, and Fiji in 1929.

<sup>36</sup> Henry Hall (1937). The Colonial Office, London: Longmans, p. 245, quoted in Barham 1982, p. 48

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<sup>37</sup> Kimberley to Biddulph. Oct 27, 1881 PRO. CO. 883/2, quoted in Demetriadou 1998, p. 133. Interestingly the Colonial Office secretariat objected not so much for the representation of the Turkish Cypriots but for the possibility that the majority votes of the Greek Cypriots would be sending to the Council members who would be strongly anti-British!

<sup>38</sup> Demetriadou op. cit., p. 128. Actually in 1881 the Greek members resigned as a form of passive resistance to protest the way the Council functioned.

<sup>39</sup> It is worth noting that Cyprus was the second country where representative government in the new empire was tried; it was firstly established in the Leeward Islands (1871), subsequently in Cyprus, and thirdly in Malta (1887): Wight 19746, p. 77.

<sup>40</sup> In 1906 the term for "non-Moslem" changed to "Christian", after strong pressures from the Greek Cypriots

<sup>41</sup> As Georghallides recognizes, despite its limitations, the "establishment of a Legislative Council in which there was a majority of locally elected members with the right [...] to enact the annual budget and all laws [...] was the simple most important reform which Britain introduced to effectively put Cyprus in an intermediate position between the colonies of British settlement and the African and Asian ones, where such powers would never have been given so soon after a British occupation": Georghallides!988 [1979], pp 13-14.

<sup>42</sup> Adamantia Pollis, for instance, has argued thus: "...the British took apolitical religious differences in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicized them and transformed them into nationality groups". (Pollis 1979 p. 52). But in fact, as Nevzat argues, electoral politics on a communal basis had already been introduced in Cyprus after the Tanzimat reforms, and political representation had already been along communal lines. Furthermore the "British maintained much of the administrative institutional framework of the Ottomans, only gradually remoulding certain elements"... Admittedly such divisions were not as highly politicized at the commencement of British rule compared to when they departed, but even their heightened politicization in the intermediate years cannot be solely attributed to British machinations". Nevzat 2005, pp. 112-114.

<sup>43</sup> Report of Donoughmore Commission, quoted in Wight 1946, p. 90.

<sup>44</sup> Rajasingham-Senanayake D. (1999), p. 115.

<sup>45</sup> Great Britain, Public Record Office, C.O. 67/259, August 15, 1935, quoted in Barham 1982, p. 86.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>48</sup> Storrs 1939, p. 488.

<sup>49</sup> "As if the handicaps of the Turkish Tribute and Greek nationalism were insufficient for a small, impoverished and highly-strung population, the Liberal Government had decided in 1882 to establish a Constitution on the basis of communal representation": Ibid., p. 489.

<sup>50</sup> For details on the development of municipal administration see Shanis.

<sup>51</sup> Indeed Greek Cypriot historical reports on municipal elections through history, presents this one case as an example of Greek Cypriot disunity and certainly a "national disgrace". Papapolyviou 2003, pp 10-13; 2008.

<sup>52</sup> Markides 2001, p.13.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p.13.

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- <sup>54</sup> Ibid p.15. In 1957 Turkish-Cypriots demanded a geographic area to come under their control; June '57 Turkish-Cypriot municipal councilors resigned *en masse* from all 5 major towns.
- <sup>55</sup> Markides 2001, p. 8.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 6.
- <sup>57</sup> Theodoulou p. 53. A number of prelates did so join the Council – as for instance Bishops Kyprianos, Kyrillos and Nicodemos, all of Kition, as well as the Abbot of Kykkos Gerasimos.
- <sup>58</sup> Letter of Archbishop Sofronios (December 1894), cited in Hackett p. 264.
- <sup>59</sup> Theodoulou 2005, p. 51.
- <sup>60</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 77.
- <sup>61</sup> Barham 1982, p. 95.
- <sup>62</sup> Persianis 1978, p. 49.
- <sup>63</sup> Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 June 1933, CO67/249/14 p. 125, quoted in Persianis 1978, p. 83.
- <sup>64</sup> Georgallides 1985, pp. 73-74.
- <sup>65</sup> See next section.
- <sup>66</sup> Given 1991, p. 15.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 186. For a fuller elaboration of Given's position on the Eteocypriots see Given 1998; but see also the counter position of Petit (1999).
- <sup>68</sup> G. Hill 1972, vol. 1, p. 94: "Obviously in the face of such a fact, attempts which have been made and will doubtless continue to be made, to prove that the Cypriots were pure Greeks, must be futile".
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid., p.16.
- <sup>70</sup> Storrs, in Georgallides 1985, p. 78.
- <sup>71</sup> Such was the reaction against the British attempt at questioning the Greek Cypriots' Greek culture and identity that many were weary of simply using the local Greek Cypriot dialect as a form of expression. Poetry written in the local dialect was thus turned down from publishing, with the rationale that "historical reasons" dictated the use of (mainland) standard Greek – lest it served the efforts of the British to present Greek Cypriots as a "special/unique nationality", with their own language, literature, traditions and so on. See Pavlou 2005, pp 317-333.
- <sup>72</sup> This was A. Sakkelarios' *Cypriot Matters (Ta Kypriaka)* (1855-1868). Back in 1841 the German scholar Wilhelm Engel had published a monograph on Cyprus (*Kypros. Eine Monographie*), in which he traced the origin of the Cypriots back to the Phoenician colonists, whom he considered the earlier settlers to leave their cultural mark on the island. Most subsequent studies, until the end of the nineteenth century, adopted similar views, including the idea that the Phoenicians were an important influence on the whole early Greek civilization. In 1868 a Greek Cypriot theologian-come-prelate, Ieronymos Myriantheas, was the first local to argue the case for the Greek origins of the Cypriots (*Peri ton Archaion Kyprion*, Athens 1868); apparently 500 copies of his study sent to Cyprus were intercepted by the Ottoman authorities and burned. By the end of the nineteenth century, archaeologists and linguists would increasingly adopt the view that the Greeks were the earlier dominant culture on the island.
- <sup>73</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XII p 23; in fact the very first book written on Cyprus by a Greek after the Greek Revolution and the formation of the Greek state, was authored by the first consul of Greece in Cyprus D. Margaritis ("A dissertation on Cyprus, containing diverse information; constitutional, geographical etc",

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published in Athens in 1849); although Margaritis calls the Cypriots “*omoethneis*” (of the same ethnicity/nationality), the text itself does not try to trace any organic or historical connection between the Greek Cypriots and Greek mainland Greeks – as others would do, a few decades after.

<sup>74</sup> Louka 1974: ιβ' [Intro, p.12]. Fallmerayer had the chance to witness the games Greek Cypriot children played, to attend a wedding and the wedding feast, and to visit the humble dwellings of shepherds and farmers: He got to listen to sounds, puzzles, proverbs and myths; in all cases he had to admit the continuity with ancient Greek customs and traditions.

<sup>75</sup> As Herzfeld points out, Loukas is here making more advanced claims than his Greek mainland counterparts, whose favourite metaphor was of Greece “resurrected” – as if it was meanwhile dead. Loukas' metaphor implies ancient Greece had always been alive in Greek lands, such as Cyprus – and simply needed to be rediscovered by contemporaries: Herzfeld 1986, p. 95.

<sup>76</sup> Quoted in Katsiaounis 1996, p. 52.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>78</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XIII pp. 4-14.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>80</sup> The first was founded in 1869 and the second in 1861: Persianis 2006, p. 44. In December 1871 the latter asked for details regarding schools in Cyprus (year of foundation, curriculum, textbook catalogue, teaching staff, resources and administration), so as to determine whether and how it could support them financially.

<sup>81</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XIII, p. 8.

<sup>82</sup> Papadopoulos 1991, p. 76.

<sup>83</sup> Kitromilides DI pp. 20-24.

<sup>84</sup> Compiled from Zannettos 1977, p. 974, and Barham 1982, p. 94.

<sup>85</sup> E. Belia 1969, pp. 253 -254, 248.

<sup>86</sup> Persianis 1978, p. 47.

<sup>87</sup> Katsiaounis *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>88</sup> Persianis 1978, p. 56, f<sup>n</sup> 68.

<sup>89</sup> During Ottoman years the Greek consul would circulate newspapers from Greece to the various cultural clubs, but also to the houses of prominent primates or teachers, where groups of notables would gather to read and discuss the news together: Philippou 2000, p. 307. For more information on Constantinides and the first newspapers in Cyprus see Sofokleous 2007.

<sup>90</sup> See Sofokleous 1995, 1998, 2006, Vols I (1878-1890), II (1890-1900), and III (1900-1914).

<sup>91</sup> For instance, in 1872-73 there were 28 subscribers to the periodical ‘Mentor’, of Smyrna – among which the Cypriot Archbishop. Cypriot *logioi* published various works in Constantinople, Egypt, Sparta and others: Papaleontiou 2001, pp. 12-13.

<sup>92</sup> Towards the end of 1898 we find a first effort to create a Cypriot “patriotic organization” in Athens, to promote Cypriot interests; apparently from here started an effort to export the organization to Cyprus in January 1899, aiming to form a Pancyprian Political Committee: Zannettos 1977, III pp 53-54. These Cypriot organizations in Greece exerted considerable influence in Cyprus throughout its modern history – being instrumental in the creation of EOKA in the ‘50s, but also in fostering pro-Enosis ideas, even after Independence.

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- <sup>93</sup> Persianis 2006, p. 55.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid p. 32; Kyrris 1967; in 1908, for instance, the board of a secondary school in Famagusta, wrote to the Greek Ministry of Education asking for its help to recruit a university graduate “of good character and holding to the pan-national ideal”, to assist with the reform of the school.
- <sup>95</sup> Persianis 2006, pp. 37-38.
- <sup>96</sup> Persianis 1978, p. 160.
- <sup>97</sup> Katsouris 2005.
- <sup>98</sup> Zannettos 1977, (Vol. III), pp. 133-137.
- <sup>99</sup> Interestingly the head of the Greek military, colonel Hadjiloannou, was the brother of Bishop Chrysanthos of Kerynia. This little detail underlines again the very close network of relationships Greeks in all Greek lands. Zannettos 1977 (Vol II), p. 231.
- <sup>100</sup> A peasant went down in History with his statement “let me feed my five children on grass; I donate my animal to the nation”. The Cypriots managed to donate 107 mules to the Panhellenic struggle as the Archbishop put it in an accompanying letter to Greek King: Zannettos 1977 (Vol. II), p. 194.
- <sup>101</sup> Papapolyviou 2003 provides a good summary for the various cases of participation of Cypriots in Greek national struggles.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid., pp. 185-186.
- <sup>103</sup> Zannettos 1997 (Vol. III), pp. 322-323.
- <sup>104</sup> As many noted nationalists had joined the ranks of the freemasons (whose membership was boosted with the coming of the British), the supporters of the Bishop of Kerynia charged the Bishop of Kition that he was a mason himself. Ibid., pp. 141-201.
- <sup>105</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, p. 232. It should be noted that the old division between Larnaka and Limassol as expressing the modernizers, and Nicosia as expressing the traditionalists was not so relevant any more (as it had been during the *Kitiakon Zitima*). The reason was that meanwhile Nicosia itself had modernized, having an increased number of schools, newspapers, cultural associations, and its share of hard – line nationalists like Katelanos, who shifted there from Limassol (Anagnostopoulou)
- <sup>106</sup> Bryant 2004, p. 82.
- <sup>107</sup> Angelides 1996, pp. 209-211; Christodoulou 1992, pp. 94-95.
- <sup>108</sup> Centralization brought about by government policies, the expansion of education and the printed word, decreased differences in culture and language within each community – thereby, however, increasing differences across communities: See Karoulla-Vrikki 2005, pp. 120-122.
- <sup>109</sup> For the changes in the economy during British rule see especially Jenness (1992), Hald (1968), Angelides (1996).
- <sup>110</sup> Additionally, a railway connecting Famagusta to Nicosia started operations in 1905.
- <sup>111</sup> Hald 1968.
- <sup>112</sup> Producing goods such as cotton, silk, leather, tiles and bricks, pottery, cigarettes and foodstuffs.
- <sup>113</sup> Within twenty years, the numbers of students rose from 4.907 in 1881 to 15.712 in 1901 (Newham, 1905, pp. 427-428). Illiteracy among men fell from 80 per cent in 1911, to 50.4 per cent in 1921, and to 41 per cent in 1931 (Census 1911, 1921, 1931).

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- <sup>114</sup> St John-Jones 1983, p. 34.
- <sup>115</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 29-33.
- <sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>117</sup> Panayiotou 1999, pp. 123-127.
- <sup>118</sup> Katsiaounis, pp. 30-32.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33. Katsiaounis suggests that social banditry, which flourished during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, might have been a pre-political “primitive form of organized social protest”, at a time when conditions for a more conscious response in the form of a social or political movement by the labouring poor were not yet ripe; see also Sant Cassia 1993.
- <sup>120</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 99-102.
- <sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 109-112.
- <sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 113-115. See also Bryant 2004, pp. 48-71, for an alternative explanation of the “apparent” “explosion of crime”, which, however, seems to ignore the impact of the real socio-economic changes described here.
- <sup>123</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 115-118.
- <sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 162-166.
- <sup>125</sup> Protopapas 2002, p. 25.
- <sup>126</sup> Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 237-240.
- <sup>127</sup> Attalides 1976, pp. 363-378.
- <sup>128</sup> Faustman 1998, pp. 41-77.
- <sup>129</sup> Some amateur politicians, encouraged by the British, stepped in as candidates and managed to be elected having captured enough votes on the basis of a populist platform, indicating that people were becoming disillusioned and impatient with the ineffective policies of the nationalists. (Protopapas 2002, pp 23-27).
- <sup>130</sup> This observation is also made by Constantinides 1995, p. 35, who, however, carries on completely ignoring this fluidity in his subsequent analysis, assigning too rigidly different shades of ideology to the various segments of the Cypriot bourgeoisie. See also Lyssiotis 1990, pp. 55-69.
- <sup>131</sup> S Bartolini, pp. 180-192.
- <sup>132</sup> R Bryant 2004, pp. 80-81, 97-98.
- <sup>133</sup> Prices of agricultural goods had risen during the War, leading the peasants to buy more land, using already owned land as collateral: The drop in agricultural prices after the War led many to ruin. For details of the colonial survey quoted; see SurrIDGE 1930.
- <sup>134</sup> The numbers of workers joining the mining industry are indicative of the changes in these decades:

Year	Numbers Employed in Minerals and Mining
1923	605
1924	1,151
1926	1,207
1927	4,355
1929	6,098
1932	1,690
1938	9,200
1949	5,330
1952	6,585
1956	6,660
1961	5,300

Source: Christodoulou 1992, p.75.

<sup>135</sup> Bartolini 2000, pp. 502-522.

<sup>136</sup> Reflecting the group's uncertainty as to which precise ideological direction it should follow, the paper initially defined itself as the organ of the 'Cyprus Workers' Party' (December 1922), then of the 'Cyprus Workers' and Peasants' Party' (June 1923), next of the 'Cyprus Workers' Party (Communist)' (November 1923), and finally of the 'Communist Party' (January 1924). Christodoulou 1992, pp. 251-252.

<sup>137</sup> Including the original founder and leading figure of the group, Panos Fasouliotis. Apparently they joined forces with another small group, led by a Greek Cypriot (O Yiavopoulos), who studied medicine in Greece, where he had become a member of the newly found Communist Party of Greece. In 1925 the British expelled Yiavopoulos from Cyprus and K Christodoulides (Skeleas) became the head of the new party. In 1926 Ch Vatiliotis (Vatis), a Cypriot communist with considerable experience in communist parties in Alexandria, Bulgaria and Greece (where currently residing), came to assist the young KKK and fill the gap left by Yiavopoulos. He was instrumental in organizing the 1st Pancyprian Congress of KKK, on 14 August 1926 – considered to be the official birth-day of the Cypriot communist left (Protopapas, 2002, p. 34). For the early days of the Communist Party, see also Lefkis (1984) and Adams (1971).

<sup>138</sup> *Neos Anthropos*, 1 January 1925, No. 1.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 1.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, esp. issues No. 5, 6, 20 and 21.

<sup>141</sup> *Neos Anthropos*, esp. issues No. 19, 35 and 78; the stand on distributing Church land to the destitute peasants was in fact part of KKK's 1st Pancyprian Congress decisions.

<sup>142</sup> The communists were continuously harassed, their offices and meeting places being raided by the police searching for documents of a "seditious" or "subversive" nature, their newspaper constantly being sued for libel and fined with amounts in court which the party could not afford to pay, hence often leading to suspension of operations or complete closure. Panayiotou, 1999, pp. 182-227.

<sup>143</sup> Ioannou, in Peristianis 2004, p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> Peristianis 2004, pp. xxix-xxxiii.

<sup>145</sup> See Faustmann 1998, pp. 41-77; also Attalides 1976.

<sup>146</sup> Panayiotou 1999, pp. 199-228.

<sup>147</sup> The Greek ambassador warned of how dangerous this could be in a land where attachment to party was so strong, that "anyone not voting a certain politician, would be baptized [labelled] right away as a communist" (Protopapas 2002, pp. 30-31). A newspaper warned that such methods of fighting the

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communists were in vain, the only realistic alternative being the improvement of the life of workers and peasants (Paphos, 1932, quoted in Sofokleous 2003).

<sup>148</sup> Indeed many writers have pointed to Marxism's limitation when it comes to matters of ethnicity and nationalism. See, among others, Smith 1998, pp. 47-69.

<sup>149</sup> Th. Lymberiou 2005, pp. 51-64; Karambelias 1998, pp. 45-51.

<sup>150</sup> National Radical Union of Cyprus [Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Kyprou (EPEK)].

<sup>151</sup> Alexandros Kyrou.

<sup>152</sup> For details about the uprising see Georgallides 1988.

<sup>153</sup> F. Ioannou, in Peristianis 2004, pp. 5-7. Ironically, the party was chastised for its stand from all sides: On the one hand the Comintern, of which the KKK had just recently become an affiliate member, rebutted the party's leadership for its initially negative stand as regards the revolt; on the other the British considered the party a chief instigator of the incidents, and found the opportunity to send its top two leaders (C Vatiliotis and K Skeleas) into exile, along with other nationalist agitators.

<sup>154</sup> Anagnostopoulou 1999, p. 210.

<sup>155</sup> Leventis 2002, pp. 91-109; Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 51-63.

<sup>156</sup> Gregoriades, 1994, pp. 51-62.

<sup>157</sup> Agathangelou 1997, pp. 109-115, 127-133.

<sup>158</sup> Karambelias 1998, pp. 52-60; Lymberiou 2005, pp. 111-113. Instrumental in this new phase of KKK's re-organisation and re-direction, was the charismatic new leader Ploutis Servas – an early young member of the Party, who had left (1927) for studies in Moscow and returned (via Greece, from which he was expelled) in 1935, to bring his valuable experience and talents to KKK.

<sup>159</sup> But still not of big capital, considered as an "agent of imperialism".

<sup>160</sup> At the same time it marked a regression in its relations with the Turkish-Cypriots. For up to now Turkish-Cypriots were seen as equal partners (with separate "racial" or ethnic origins, but with equal national rights), whereas henceforth, they were seen to be a mere political minority. KKK, and subsequently AKEL, continued to underline the importance of international solidarity with the Turkish Cypriots, (or, more precisely, Turkish-Cypriot working people), but henceforth their attention increasingly focused on gaining hegemony within the Greek Cypriot community, the common front and co-operation with Turkish Cypriots becoming a secondary consideration.

<sup>161</sup> Between 1932 and 1935 many unions became organised, but found it difficult to register due to difficulties created by the British. This changed with the approach of WWII and the more liberal shift in British policies.

<sup>162</sup> Gregoriades 1994, pp. 109-119.

<sup>163</sup> Bartolini 2000, pp. 521-523.

<sup>164</sup> Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People); Sofocleous 2003, pp. 215-220. See also Richter 2003, pp. 99-119.

<sup>165</sup> Even though AKEL was to take a stand on broader "national issues" from inception (see text above), it did not take a stand on Enosis itself. According to a report by two of its leading members (F Ioannou and A Ziartides) this was because of: firstly, the deeply held anti-Enosis feelings of the "communist wing" at the founding meeting; and second, because the "liberal petit-bourgeois" wing did not feel the existing conditions were conducive to an open struggle for national-liberation (being that the unfree laws



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on political parties were still formally in force, and there was uncertainty as to the stand the colonial authorities would take if a radical platform as regards Enosis was taken); quoted in Protopapas 2002, p. 38 fn.

<sup>166</sup> This obviously entailed utilising a majoritarian system of voting, which constituted a threat to Turkish-Cypriots.

<sup>167</sup> Meanwhile, during the initial stages of the war, many Cypriots seemed to be indifferent to developments, or were even hostile towards the Allies' cause, due mostly to the economic problems of the island, the restriction of political freedoms, and the attitude of the British towards *Enosis*. Subsequent to Italy's attack against Greece (October 1940), however, most Greek Cypriots, especially the nationalists, changed their attitude, and passionately rallied for the allied cause, joining the British army en-masse. Subsequent to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, it was the turn of Cypriot communists to shed any doubts as to which cause to uphold. Protopapas 2000, pp. 57-60.

<sup>168</sup> Panayiotou 1999, pp. 329-404.

<sup>169</sup> Pankypria Syntechniaki Epitropi.

<sup>170</sup> The number of trade unions increased dramatically during this period.

<sup>171</sup> Protopapas 2006; Christophorou 2006.

<sup>172</sup> The use of the terms Right/Left by the social actors, referring to political formations with a respective ideological content, actually began in the 40's.

<sup>173</sup> Peristianis 2006 b, pp. 251-255.

<sup>174</sup> Panagrotiki Enosi Kyprou; founded in November 1941, a year after the formation of AKEL.

<sup>175</sup> Kypriako Ethniko Komma, founded in early June 1943, only three months after AKEL's first victory in the municipal elections (March 1943).

<sup>176</sup> Synomospodia Ergaton Kyprou, the New Trade Union, was founded in October 1944.

<sup>177</sup> On the impact of the Cold War, in transforming party systems into a "polarized pluralism" system, see G Sartori 1976.

<sup>178</sup> By now comprising only the isolated Communists, even if Right-wing propaganda managed to identify the Left with Communism, so as to more effectively dominate in the ideological battles of the times.

<sup>179</sup> Estimates vary considerably: According to official figures the dead were approximately 40.000 – but unofficial estimates range up to 160.000.

<sup>180</sup> Tsoucalas 1969, p. 114.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>182</sup> Tziovas 1989, pp. 139-152.

<sup>183</sup> Tsoucalas op. cit., p. 118.

<sup>184</sup> Leventis 2002, pp. 229-251; Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 117-150.

<sup>185</sup> Fantis 1993, pp. 52-53; Katsis 2005, pp. 39-54; Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 257-265, 305-326. Ioannou, in Peristianis 2004, pp. 198-280.

<sup>186</sup> Aftodiathesis – Enosis.

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<sup>187</sup> Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 413-495.

<sup>188</sup> Fantis 2005, pp. 465-466, pp. 835-838.

<sup>189</sup> Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 490-495. The next step in this all-out confrontation came through economic warfare: The extreme nationalists called on all "*nationally-minded*" Greek Cypriots to stop employing left wing workers, not to advertise in leftist newspapers, not to attend cinemas and theatre-halls owned by communists, and similar; after some initial hesitation, the Left decided to return the fire, asking its supporters to buy only from leftists: "not even a penny from the hand of a *laikos* to the pocket of a reactionary": See interview of A. Fantis in Peristianis 2004.

<sup>190</sup> Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 24-30.

<sup>191</sup> Katsis 2005, pp. 47-54, 81-83. In a strange way this may have been one of the main reasons why AKEL managed to survive and maintain its strength ever since. The case of the Greek Communist Party provides an interesting comparison; KKE attempted to gain hegemony through a military contest against the established forces of the Right, assisted by the British. Since with Yalta's agreement Greece fell in the Western sphere of influence, Stalin gave little assistance to KKE – which eventually was defeated and crushed never returning to the prominence it enjoyed prior to the civil war.

<sup>192</sup> Protopapas 2002, pp. 96-147; Katsis 2005, pp. 84-96.

<sup>193</sup> Thus we read of the early KKK (October 1923), organizing the workers and peasants, and entering Ayia Napa church in Limassol en masse, carrying their red banners and flags (see Sofocleous 2003, pp. 85-87). Even more so AKEL, instead of promoting atheism, upheld an alternative version of Christianity, emphasising the communist practice of the early Christian church and Christ as a social revolutionary, who combined a message of brotherly love with an interest in the lot of the poor and of the suffering.

<sup>194</sup> With the signing of the Agreements for independence, the objective became the "completion of independence" for Cyprus, since AKEL saw the settlement as largely imposed by outside (imperialist) powers, serving their own interests rather than the real interests of the people of Cyprus.

<sup>195</sup> Sofocleous 2003, pp. 497-498; Protopapas 2002, pp. 134-138. For the wider context of the impact of the Comintern on local communist parties, see Claudin 1975.

<sup>196</sup> The Right would accuse the Left of anti-hellenism and of using terrorist tactics against the employers and the right-wing unions. And the Left would accuse the Right of collusion with the colonial and local establishment, for its violent anti-workerist methods (such as strike-breaking) and similar.

<sup>197</sup> Indeed, until today, a Greek Cypriot's choice of coffee or beer, often betrays his/her political affiliation.

<sup>198</sup> When in 1954 the young, new Archbishop Makarios (in the face of the British hardening their approach, while simultaneously renewing their proposals for a Constitution), dared to suggest that he was prepared to consider a temporary Constitution as a transitory measure towards *Self-determination/Enosis*, AKEL would promptly accuse him of a sell-out. See Faustmann 2001, in James Ker-Lindsay/Oliver Richmond (eds.), pp. 3-49.

<sup>199</sup> In the UN the British used Turkey to balance Greek claims. After neutralizing UN involvement it officially involved Ankara in the Cyprus dispute by inviting her, along with Greece, to the 1955 London tripartite conference, which gave her the opportunity to shift from the position of accused to that of disinterested mediator between two conflicting parties.

<sup>200</sup> National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters. For the escalating antagonism between Left and Right, which led to the EOKA struggle, see Katsis 2005, pp. 96-106.

<sup>201</sup> National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus. The full text of the first proclamation of EMAK is given in Servas 1985 (Appendix D).

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<sup>202</sup> Nevzat 2005, p. 102.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75, 141-152.

<sup>204</sup> Yennaris 2000, pp. 114-131.

<sup>205</sup> In various communications, Grivas was very clear on his intentions: "Communists must [...] be hit, humiliated, so as not to be in a position of promoting themselves in the political or military fields [...] Communists are our enemies whether we like it or not. It is imperative that we eliminate them as a political entity, so as not to be a force to be reckoned with, capable with its decisions to influence the national issue"... (see Papageorgiou 1984, and Papafotis 1996, for documentation of such circulars). In his memoirs Grivas adds: "Today the Communists [...] are politically organized and act with system, whereas we are asleep [...] I regret to repeat one more time, that we will win the military struggle and lose on the political front, whereas communism will take advantage of our blood" Grivas 1961, pp. 274-275.

<sup>206</sup> EOKA killed in total fifteen leftists considered as traitors: Fantis 1995, pp. 365-381. In some cases the manner of execution was extraordinarily hideous. One such case was that of Savas Menikou, who was arrested by masked EOKA men, who rang the bells of the village church, gathering a crowd which went on to stone Menikou to death – much like the early Christian martyrs: A Panayiotou 1999, pp. 575-576.

<sup>207</sup> This fostered the growth of Turkish-Cypriot organizations; after the TMT wave of terror in 1958, the membership of Turkish-Cypriot trade unions increased from 1,137 to 4,829: Attalides 1979, p.49

<sup>208</sup> Katsis 2002, p. 40.

<sup>209</sup> If we turn to social security, the input of the colonial state was insignificant until after WWII, when the British introduced systematic development and the first rudiments of a welfare plan (along the lines of Beveridgean principles). But most social needs were met at the community level, through the support system of the traditional family and the Church. Thus again there was little encouragement towards the development of mechanisms of solidarity on a national basis.

<sup>210</sup> The distinction between a symbolically simple "boundary", as the community's "public face", and a symbolically complex boundary, as the object of internal discourse is made by Anthony Cohen, 1998. Cohen, however, jumps from the level of the whole community, to the level of individuals, ignoring the in-between levels – of classes, blocks or other groups, which may constitute themselves as alternative- or sub- cultures, with their own unique discourses.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>212</sup> The full array of different party and allied organisations of each side, was only the basis for further differentiation. Each camp had its own rituals, commemorations and symbols. Each built on a range of formal activities (congresses, rallies, gatherings, lectures, athletic and cultural events), but even more so on informal filial interaction (within family and kin, coffeeshops and so on). The two levels cross-linked through the fostering of social networking and moral obligations. (For instance, becoming the best man at the wedding of a comrade at work, or the godfather of a friend's child, led to the enhancement of in-group loyalties and bonding.) In all these ways abstract ideologies or dogmas became embedded in collective discourse and action, being thereby rendered as more concrete social realities.

<sup>213</sup> Attalides 1979, pp. 114-116.

<sup>214</sup> Since cultures are symbolic constructions, and symbols have no inherent meaning, the antithesis between cultures is therefore contingent and relational – hence their content may change while the form still persists: Cohen op. cit., pp. 71-77.

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## Notes to chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> Grillo 1998, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> Holsti 2001, pp. 61-66.

<sup>4</sup> Spencer and Wollman 2003, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> Alter 1994, p. 111.

<sup>6</sup> Lahouari Addi (1997, p. 94) puts it succinctly: ...“the overthrow of foreign domination and the triumph of nationalist ideology does not spell the birth of a nation, but only of a central power”.

<sup>7</sup> This was described by Geertz (1973) as the “integrative revolution” – see chapter 1.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Holsti op. cit., p. 68. There are reminiscences here of Massimo d’Azeglio’s exclamation during the first meeting of the newly united Italian kingdom: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians” – quoted in Hobsbawn 1992, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> This, for instance, was Leopold Senghor’s vision, which many others followed – Holsti op. cit., p. 69. Often anti-Colonialist struggles themselves were instrumental in forming a common spirit and national identity and the construction of national founding myths, which served as new bonds, overarching more traditional, particularistic distinctions.

<sup>10</sup> Holsti op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>12</sup> Brubaker 1996, p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Makarios was thus reversing Massimo d’Azeglio’s statement (quoted above, fn 8), stressing the need for uniting the Italians under a single identity; the Cypriot Constitution would not talk of the “Cypriots”, or a Cypriot “people” – but of two separate communities, and of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus: See text further below.

<sup>14</sup> Peristianis 2000.

<sup>15</sup> Loizos 1988, p. 162.

<sup>16</sup> Panayiotou 1999, pp 405-479; Peristianis 2006 (b).

<sup>17</sup> Lijphart’s typology (from his *Power-Sharing in Africa*) is quoted by O’ Leary (2004), who proceeds to extend the classification as indicated; see McGarry and O’ Leary (2004), pp 99 (including fn 6) – 110.

<sup>18</sup> Consociational democracy does not attempt “to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy”: Lijphart 1977, p. 42.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-52.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 223-238.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>22</sup> Cyprus Constitution, Articles 48(d), 49 (d)

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- <sup>23</sup> Kyriakides 1968, pp. 60-61.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- <sup>25</sup> “Any modification of the Electoral Law and the adoption of the law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes” (Cyprus Constitution, Article 78(2)).
- <sup>26</sup> Cyprus Constitution, Articles 123 and 129.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 133 (1).
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 173.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Articles 186 and 187.
- <sup>30</sup> Kyriakides *op. cit.*, p. 56.
- <sup>31</sup> Cyprus Constitution, Article 2.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 1.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 4 (4).
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 108.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 170.
- <sup>36</sup> Of approximately 99 square miles.
- <sup>37</sup> Kyriakides *op. cit.*, p.54.
- <sup>38</sup> Cyprus Constitution, Article 185.
- <sup>39</sup> Lijphart 1977, p. 53.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.
- <sup>41</sup> Or worse still, that the British would withdraw from Cyprus, leaving the Greek Cypriots to the mercy of Turkey (much like they had done in Palestine in 1947) – Lambrou 2004, p. 61.
- <sup>42</sup> Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis warned that if the London Conference collapsed due to Makarios waverings, Greece would cease its assistance to the Cyprus struggle. Kranidiotis 1981, pp. 369-370.
- <sup>43</sup> At times he stressed that he considered it a necessary evil in order to forestall the worse (i.e. partition) and as a temporary step or solution until at a future time circumstances and power alignments would allow a more preferable solution.
- <sup>44</sup> Grivas Memoirs 1961, p. 403.
- <sup>45</sup> Lijphart 1977, p. 31: “The essential characteristic of the grand coalition is [...] the participation of all significant segments in governing a plural society”.
- <sup>46</sup> The expression is O’Malley’s (O’Malley and Craig 2006, p. 68).
- <sup>47</sup> Kranidiotis 1981, pp. 534-548.
- <sup>48</sup> Markides 2001, p. 59.
- <sup>49</sup> Droushiotis 2005, pp. 62-63; 2006, p. 20;

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<sup>50</sup> Kyriakides 1968, p. 75. Evidence shows that Denktash was the political leader of TMT, which again testifies to the monolithic unity within the Turkish Cypriot Community, in contradistinction to the Greek Community where Grivas and his followers operated from the margins.

<sup>51</sup> Ierodiakonou 1970, p. 349; Kyriakides op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>52</sup> Loizos 2001, p. 77.

<sup>53</sup> Lijphart 1977, pp 81-83.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>55</sup> The letter is published in Tziambazis 2005, p. 65.

<sup>56</sup> The extract in quotes comes from the Zurich Treaty of Guarantee, Article 1, but interestingly the ending in the Bishop's letter has changed; the original ending reads ...“likely to promote, directly or indirectly union with any other state or partition of the island”. The omission of the reference to the prohibition of partition serves to make the provision seem as especially aimed at the Greek Cypriots, silencing the parallel restraint required of Turkish Cypriots.

<sup>57</sup> Tziambazis op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>58</sup> The speech is quoted in various sources, such as Kranidiotis (1981), Servas (1991) and Persianis (2004)

<sup>59</sup> Quoted in Stavrinides 1999, p. 36.

<sup>60</sup> Kellas 1991, pp. 52-54.

<sup>61</sup> Stavrinides 1999, p. 36.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> The pro-Makarios forces were caught in a paradoxical position: In their contest with the more extreme enosisists they needed to appear as real enosisists themselves—only more pragmatic, in accepting independence as an inbetween step. To the Turkish Cypriots and the outside world they could not appear as pursuing a goal specifically banned by the country's Constitution, so they had to appear as accepting independence as an end-in-itself.

<sup>64</sup> United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

<sup>65</sup> Markides 2001, p. 81.

<sup>66</sup> Coyle 1983, p. 183.

<sup>67</sup> Kranidiotis 2000 (Vol I), p. 32.

<sup>68</sup> Machi 14 April 1961, quoted in Ergatiki Demokratia p. 44.

<sup>69</sup> Magazine “Agon” (no. 2) Aug. 1963, quoted in Ergatiki Demokratia, p. 43.

<sup>70</sup> Coyle 1983, p. 82.

<sup>71</sup> Lanitis 1963 – a reprint from *Cyprus Mail*, 3-7 March.

<sup>72</sup> Lanitis faced great pressures, even from his own friends, not to carry on with publishing his views, which they deemed to have a very negative reception among a Greek Cypriot public already prejudiced against the positions he advocated. He was actually impelled to self-exile himself abroad, never to return to Cyprus anymore. Personal communication.

<sup>73</sup> Lijphart op. cit., pp. 100-101.

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- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp. 158-161.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., 161.
- <sup>76</sup> Kitromilides 1981, pp 450-454. see also his original formulation in Kitromilides 1979.
- <sup>77</sup> Kitromilides 1981, p 453.
- <sup>78</sup> Loizos 2001, p. 156.
- <sup>79</sup> On the Turkish Cypriot side communism had never managed to grow into a substantial force, and thus AKEL was quite influential, especially through PEO, its labour union, until in the late 1950's when TMT started its intimidation campaign.
- <sup>80</sup> Markides 2001, p. 55.
- <sup>81</sup> EDMA was the first political organization to be formed, in April '59, expressing all "patriotic forces". This subsequently gave way to the looser "Patriotic Front". Whereas initially both pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas supporters co-existed under the same roof, eventually pro-Makarios followers dominated. AKEL soon joined this broader Pro-Makarios front. Servas 1991, pp 213-218.
- <sup>82</sup> Ierodiakonou 2003, p. 76.
- <sup>83</sup> In one of the first such attacks the newspapers and enotist politicians linked the violence to Makarios, and this stirred up mass rallies of Makarios supporters in condemnation of the allegations.
- <sup>84</sup> Charavgi 18 August 1961.
- <sup>85</sup> Ierodiakonou op. cit., pp. 71-77.
- <sup>86</sup> Papademetris 2004, pp. 105-107.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 106.
- <sup>88</sup> The two journalists implicated Denktas with the bombings. Years after, the latter admitted his involvement: Yennaris 2000, pp. 164-168.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 116.
- <sup>90</sup> Markides 2001, p. 67.
- <sup>91</sup> Droushiotis 2005, pp. 113-117.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp. 118-122.
- <sup>93</sup> Attalides 1979, p. 119.
- <sup>94</sup> The plan was initially published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Patris* on 21 April 1963, presumably leaked by Grivas. The full text is published in Hakki 2007, pp. 90-97.
- <sup>95</sup> Two such plans are published in Yennaris 2000, pp. 94-107.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>97</sup> Tzermias 2001 (Vol. I), p. 500.
- <sup>98</sup> Loizos 2001, pp. 163-164. One should add to this the values of "pallikarismos", i.e. male assertiveness, that males in the countryside grew up with, as part of their rural upbringing, which encouraged masculine

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tough-acting; for some extremists “killing was not a problem, but was much like hunting” (most Cypriot males engaged in hunting): San Cassia 1995, pp. 178-182.

<sup>99</sup> Lijphart 1977, p. 55. “Power” is here taken to mean primarily “the numerical strength of the segments”, since in democracies this may translate into electoral votes and parliamentary seats. Economic strength and cultural predominance comprise other aspects of power.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>102</sup> Mc Garry and O’ Leary 2004, pp. 4-9.

<sup>103</sup> Kyriakides 1968, p. 143.

<sup>104</sup> Lehmbuch 1975, p. 382.

<sup>105</sup> Markides 2001, pp. 96-102.

<sup>106</sup> Kutchuk complained especially about Makarios’ attending the Conference of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade (September 1961) and for the views expressed by the (Greek) Cypriot delegate in the United Nations, in support of the Afro-Asian countries. In December 1961 he complained of being side-pushed by the Greek Cypriots and of his veto-powers being rendered ineffectual in such matters. A little later he resorted to the Supreme Court seeking clarification as to the extent of his powers in foreign affairs: Ierodiakonou 1970, pp. 353-354.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 352-353.

<sup>108</sup> Droushiotis 2005, pp. 152-156.

<sup>109</sup> Hoover 1980, pp. 62-64.

<sup>110</sup> Estimates of casualties refer to 395 Turkish Cypriots and 215 Greek Cypriots until 1967; furthermore the accounts why Turkish Cypriots fled vary considerably between those stressing security reason and those stressing encouragement or even intimidation by their own leadership and TMT; see among others Patrick 1976, pp 45-88; Yennaris 2000, pp. 152-160.

<sup>111</sup> In 1963, the Turkish Cypriot population numbered 104,000 and lived in 235 villages and towns (either mixed or purely Turkish Cypriot). After the crisis approximately 25,000 moved and most found accommodation in larger Turkish Cypriot communities; about 4,000 had to live in refugee camps. The enclaves ended up with 59,000 Turkish Cypriots, or about fifty percent of their total population. Kyriakides *op. cit.* pp 112-113, fns 24, 25.

<sup>112</sup> It is estimated that 50% of the Turkish Cypriots were receiving some kind of aid for food and medical supplies, from the Red Crescent and/or Turkey: Tzermias 2001, p. 526; Droushiotis 2005, pp. 154-155.

<sup>113</sup> Among other things the NATO plan provided for a 10,000 force of NATO soldiers to restore order, to be accountable to an intergovernmental committee of representatives of the participating countries but not the Cyprus government; a mediator from a NATO country was to be appointed: Joseph 1997, pp. 83-84.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>116</sup> Security Council resolution 183/1964, adopted 4 March 1964.

<sup>117</sup> Joseph *op. cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>118</sup> As the General Attorney of the Republic was to put it subsequently, changes were necessary to give a new lease of life to the paralysed Republic:



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..the life of the State and its government could not be wrecked and had to be carried on, and the various organs of the Republic set up under its Constitution and vested expressly with certain competence had a duty to exercise such competence and to govern and no organs can abstain therefrom in as much as the functions and the status of the organ are conferred *intuitu personae*... (Tornaritis 1997, p 53).

<sup>119</sup> Kyriakides op.cit., p. 135.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., pp. 113-115; Kourtellos 2000, p. 39.

<sup>121</sup> Attorney General of the Republic Vs Mustafa Ibrahim (1964), Cyprus Law Review, pp 264-265, quoted in Kourtellos op. cit., p.40

<sup>122</sup> The arguments stressed that “The Vice-President, the three Turkish ministers, the Turkish members of Parliament and the Turkish public servants have deserted the government, while the Vice-President publicly stated that the Republic of Cyprus has ceased to exist... It deserves to be noted that the daily agenda of the Council of Ministers was sent for months after the 1963 events to the Turkish Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot ministers. They however kept refusing to attend the meetings and this in order to prove that the state no longer existed”: Tzermias 2001 fn 870)

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p 565.

<sup>124</sup> Kyriakides op.cit., p. 115.

<sup>125</sup> Attalides 1979, p. 91.

<sup>126</sup> Droushiotis 2006, p. 27.

<sup>127</sup> Kranidiotis 2000, pp. 256-257.

<sup>128</sup> Tzermias op. cit., p. 582.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 584.

<sup>130</sup> The ‘Kokkina-Mansoura enclave’ comprised the sea-side villages of Kokkina, Ayios Theodoros, Limnitis and Mansoura, in the north-west part of Cyprus, from which Turkey was sending reinforcements – both volunteers and weapons.

<sup>131</sup> “I am a rebel” (*antartis*) in disobeying, he admitted in a meeting of the Cypriot Council of Ministers to discuss military developments: Tzermias op. cit., p. 582.

<sup>132</sup> There were approximately 300 dead and wounded, in the Tylliria bombings.

<sup>133</sup> Joseph 1997, p. 61.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>135</sup> Tzermias op. cit. p. 570.

<sup>136</sup> Dean Acheson was former Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, well known in Greece and Turkey as the man behind the Truman Doctrine, through which US aid to fight communism was siphoned to the two countries in the 1940s: Joseph 1997, p. 62.

<sup>137</sup> Or better “plans”, as there were two versions Acheson prepared, the first providing for ceding a sovereign base to Turkey (approx 11% of Cyprus territory), the second for leasing it to her long-term. The first plan was rejected by Greece, the second by Turkey – and both by Makarios.

<sup>138</sup> Emilianides 2007, p. 101.

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<sup>139</sup> Christodoulou 1999, p. 31.

<sup>140</sup> In the early stages after Zurich, beside AKEL and the hard enosists (DEK), the only other political formation was the Patriotic Front – which won most of the seats in Parliament. After the events of 1963 the party system more or less froze, as there were no elections due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing. Any interest in politics was vented through the para-state militias. Even after new parties were formed, from 1968 onwards, they were still largely related/supported by their respective militias.

<sup>141</sup> Zavou 2002, pp 219-220; Evdokas 2007, pp 16-17 and pp 63-66. Interestingly DEK was formally founded in May 1968, that is three months after taking part in the Presidential elections.

<sup>142</sup> *Eniaion* was the largest and seemed to cover the majority of the moderate and conservative right. *Proodevtiko Komma* was shortly joined to *Proodevdiki Parataxi* of Odysseas Ioannides. It is interesting that Makarios had to go out of his way to make a plea, in June 1968, to solicit the creation of new parties Fantis 1995, p. 66.

<sup>143</sup> Droushiotis 1996, pp. 88-119.

<sup>144</sup> ELDYK was the name of the Greek contingent which under the Treaty of Alliance was to be permanently stationed in Cyprus, as part of the defense pact between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; it was to have 950 men. At the same time Turkey was to station its own contingent (TURDYK) on the island, comprised of 650 men.

<sup>145</sup> Markides (1977, p. 92) argues that Giorkadjis' "readiness to use extra-legal means to attain his goals apparently worried Makarios", so that the junta's demand to remove him from government (claiming evidence which linked him to an assassination attempt against George Papadopoulos), was a relief for him.

<sup>146</sup> In the initial stages of the Front's formation, Makarios apparently had personal contact with its leaders and was made aware of their intentions to create an organization – presumably for "promoting the national cause". Ierodiakonou speculates that one of the reasons he did not react at the time was his concern with Giorkadjis' increasing power, so it seems he was hoping that additional centers of para-state power would have counterbalanced each other.

<sup>147</sup> Ierodiakonou 2003, pp. 94-98.

<sup>148</sup> Kranidiotis 2000, vol. 2, p. 21.

<sup>149</sup> Grivas was an authoritarian who believed in strict discipline and order. He was not willing to share power with other Enosis figures, such as Evdokas. Even before he arrived in Cyprus, he had made sure to re-start "Patris" newspaper which was going to be his own mouthpiece – despite the existence of "Gnomi", Evdoka's nationalist newspaper which was set on using political means for its purposes. Patris re-started operations in March of 1970, at about the same time that Grivas publicized his intentions to start a new armed struggle for Enosis, while still in Greece.

<sup>150</sup> Committee for the Coordination of the Enosis Struggle [Epitropi Sintonismou Enotikou Agonos].

<sup>151</sup> Text cited in Makarios III, Archbishop of Cyprus, Complete Works [Apanta], Nicosia: Archbishop Makarios Foundation, vol IB, p. 281.

<sup>152</sup> Details on the case of Czechoslovakian arms are cited in most standard sources.

<sup>153</sup> Kranidiotis 2000, Vol. II, pp 172-174. Apparently Greece was broiling a coup, which provided that Grivas' irregulars would try to oust Makarios, causing the intervention of the National Guard to restore order and to appoint Grivas as President. The coup was aborted when Makarios appealed urgently to the UN and the United States (Nixon apparently dissuaded Papadopoulos, fearing a coup would cause a Soviet intervention).

<sup>154</sup> *Phileleftheros*, 16 February 1972.

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<sup>155</sup> Kranidiotis 2000, Vol. II, p. 184.

<sup>156</sup> The Bishop of Kyrenia was always a hard line Enosist, but in 1968 the Bishop of Kition joined him in questioning the wisdom of change of strategy and of heading a state which was not going to carry on the holy struggle of union. The third Bishop, of Paphos, birth-place and traditional stronghold of Makarios, was the last to be convinced. Apparently the newspapers gave no coverage of their dissent: See Committee for Election Campaign of T. Evdokas (1968): Black Bible – the Presidential Elections of 1968.

<sup>157</sup> Drousiotis 2006, pp. 84-87.

<sup>158</sup> Theodoulou 2005, p.118.

<sup>159</sup> Kranidiotis 2000, Vol. II, 175.

<sup>160</sup> Drousiotis 2006, p. 87.

<sup>161</sup> See Appendix E, letter (b), in Theodoulou, 2005, p. 157.

<sup>162</sup> The high clergy consisted of 2 Patriarchs, 4 Archbishops and 8 Bishops. Interestingly, the Ecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople and the Archbishop of Greece did not accept the invitation .

<sup>163</sup> Mitsides 1973, p. 59.

<sup>164</sup> Markides 1973, p. 113. The dethroned Bishops were thereby held by the enosist opposition as saintly martyrs who had suffered for the good cause – the national interest; since the defrocked Bishops no longer had access to their churches, a number of rough and ready churches or “catacombes” were utilized for Sunday services, reminding the enosist faithful who attended, of their persecuted status. The “catacombes” served as sacred rallying points for anti-Makarios opponents and as enemy sites for extreme pro-Makarios loyalists, who would often attempt to destroy or profane them – causing the two sides to engage in a vicious circle of accusations and counter-accusations.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., pp 76-121.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p.87.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., pp. 86-114.

<sup>168</sup> Attalides 1979, pp. 76-77, 136.

<sup>169</sup> Gnomi, 29 March 1970.

<sup>170</sup> Second Document-Memorandum of the Bishops to Makarios (27 March 1972), in Team of Theologians: The Incompatibility of the Co-existence of Prelate and Secular Power (ΕΣΕΑ: Nicosia 1972)

<sup>171</sup> Reincher and Hopkins 2001, p. 221.

<sup>172</sup> Markides has argued that Makarios owed his widespread popularity to the fact that he combined all three types of authority distinguished by Max Weber: *Traditional authority*, as leader of the Orthodox Church (Archbishop); *charismatic authority*, as the community’s leader (*ethnarch*) who led his people through a series of crises and into liberation; and *rational legal authority* as the able, just, and successful President of the new state. Markides 1977, pp. 35-54.

<sup>173</sup> Although close to AKEL in its socio-economic policies (to a large extent it maintained even more radically left positions in terms of advocating extensive nationalizations), EDEK was critical of AKEL’s attachment to the Soviet camp and charged it of social conservatism and monolithic party organization. Since AKEL was long established and tightly controlled the large left wing labour union (PEO), thus commanding the loyalty of traditional leftists, the socialists were to stay a small party appealing mostly to progressive intellectuals and the more militant leftists – attracted by EDEK’s more assertive stance.

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<sup>174</sup> Markides 1973, p. 71.

<sup>175</sup> In 1965 the World Bank ranked Cyprus 35<sup>th</sup> (out of 136 states) in terms of income per capita. Quoted by the Minister of Finance in his Speech to the House of Representatives, during the discussion of the budget for 1967.

<sup>176</sup> Mavros 1989, pp. 20-28. Between 1961 and 1968 the value of agricultural production increased by 70%: Attalides 1979, p. 76.

<sup>177</sup> Mavros 1989, p. 38.

<sup>178</sup> According to Evdokas, “the Cypriots saw the Greeks from the mainland as economically backward and as living in misery/poverty. Greece was, for them, a poor and weak country, “*psorocostena*”, inhabited by people who were different, crafty and cunning, “*kalamarades*”. Evdokas 1989, p. 177.

<sup>179</sup> Speech by Minister of Finance, as above [fn 175 above].

<sup>180</sup> Christodoulou 1999, p. 19. Since the Greeks spent extended periods of time in Cyprus, some sought relationships with local females, but often they would leave and thereby contribute to negative stereotyping of mainland Greeks as untrustworthy and exploitative; others became offensive for consuming American products (eg cigarettes) at a time Cypriots harboured strong anti-American feelings – and so on.

<sup>181</sup> The writer uses the word “*pnevmatikin [paradosin]*” which could be translated as either “spiritual” or “intellectual [tradition]”.

<sup>182</sup> Although the writer does not go into details Attalides proposes the difference of Anglo-Saxon institutions introduced by the British in Cyprus – such as the efficient Civil Service, the “flourishing cooperative movement”, the legalized operation of the communist party and others – as against the problematic functioning of respective Greek mainland institutions: Attalides 1979, p. 74.

<sup>183</sup> The decision to form the *Efedrikon* was taken by the Council of Ministers in November 1971: Christodoulou 1995, p. 120.

<sup>184</sup> These young Greek-Cypriot army officers’ were indoctrinated with anti-Makarios propaganda and engaged in subversive activities (eg aiding the stealing of National Guard arms by EOKA B). Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>185</sup> Evdokas 1989, pp. 206-210.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>187</sup> Attalides 1979, pp. 136-137.

<sup>188</sup> The civil service regulations did not actually allow state employees to be actively involved in politics. At the same time, because livings and promotions were largely influenced by political considerations, civil servants tried not to make known their political beliefs if they happened to disagree with the government – or to declare loyalty to the latter so as not to hamper employment prospects.

<sup>189</sup> Markides 1977, pp. 171-172.

<sup>190</sup> It is no wonder than the smaller right wing party collapsed even before the coup was staged (one of its leaders becoming the “President” during the coup’s week in power), and the largest (*Eniaion*) split in two when the coup came, one part remaining loyal to Makarios and the other defecting. Only sections of the police and the para-military forces of EDEK were to put up an armed resistance.

<sup>191</sup> Shiekkeris 2008, p. 2

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<sup>192</sup> This is contra Attalides, who concludes that it is “significant that there had to be a coup, for in spite of weaknesses, Cyprus had not fallen to gradual subversion”. Attalides 1979, p. 137.



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- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.
- <sup>17</sup> Papadakis 1993, pp. 42–49.
- <sup>18</sup> Papadakis 1998, pp. 70–79.
- <sup>19</sup> Papadakis 1993, p. 48.
- <sup>20</sup> Yennaris 2000, p. 29.
- <sup>21</sup> Again aided by Turkey’s stirrings for separatism and Britain’s complicity.
- <sup>22</sup> Neo-Cypriot Association, Founding Declaration, Nicosia 1975.
- <sup>23</sup> Neo-Cypriot Association, brochure titled: “The positions [theses] of the Neo-Cypriot Association”: Nicosia 21 June 1975.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* See also Neo-Cypriot Association, brochure titled “13 Answers to 13 Questions” [1990] which addresses a number of major criticisms lodged against the Association in the “first fifteen years of its life”.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>26</sup> Neo-Cypriot Association, “The Progress of the Neo-Cypriot Association – Thoughts and Suggestions”: Nicosia, 1985.
- <sup>27</sup> See various articles by Anthos Lykavgis, *Phileleftheros* June 1977.
- <sup>28</sup> Interview with J. Payiatas, long-time chairman of the Neo-Cypriot Association (April 2006).
- <sup>29</sup> It should be noted that the communist left (AKEL), stigmatized and marginalized in the late ‘50s, had still not managed to gain executive power in government, after almost half a century (even though it finally broke the spell in February 2008, 15 whole years after DISY firstly ascended to power).
- <sup>30</sup> Clerides’ central rallying slogan in 1976 was, in fact, wanting to unite the democratic and progressive Cypriots, so as to put an end to the “balancing” or determining role of the communists and their allies (in this case EDEK and DIKO). For the sake of comparison it may be noted that the objective of Kyprianou’s DIKO, was specified rather differently, as aiming to prevent “polarization”, and as providing an alternative to those who used the ideology of *‘ethnikofrosini’* – in the name of which “dictatorship and fascism was imposed in Greece, leading to the criminal coup in Cyprus”: See *Charavgi*, 16 May 1976.
- <sup>31</sup> This was the first time that Greek flags were to fly in Cyprus, by a party that till that time had kept distances with Greece and the “national centre’s” governments.
- <sup>32</sup> Karamanlis, on the contrary, believed that the Cyprus Problem was independent of differences between Greece and Turkey, and its resolution had to be sought through dialogue between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots: Christodoulou 1999, pp. 269, 281.
- <sup>33</sup> The latter was to be solved through an international forum – which interestingly was in line with the Soviet Union’s position at the time.
- <sup>34</sup> At times dubbed by themselves as realists or pragmatists, and by their enemies as retreatists or compromisers – *endotikoi*.
- <sup>35</sup> Self-defined as upholding a contestatory, patriotic line, and by their enemies as rejectionists – *aporiptikoi*. Christodoulou *op. cit.*, pp. 297–298.
- <sup>36</sup> Markides 1985, p. 61. EDEK’s militancy had a long history, traceable back to the 50’s and its founder’s (Lyssarides) split with AKEL’s policies over the armed struggle; Lyssarides subsequently

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joined EOKA as a member of the Patriotic Left. Some of the other key founding members of EDEK (eg Takis Hadjidemetriou) were pro-enosis in the early years of Independence, but distanced themselves from Greece after the military junta came to power. In the early post-'74 period, EDEK hosted two sections: The smaller of the two was more Marxist in orientation and more strongly espoused the internationalist left ideology of forging a common front with the Turkish Cypriot working class, against the "nationalist bourgeois classes" on both sides of the divide. The larger body of EDEK pursued a more mainstream left policy and, especially after Papandreou's rise to power in Greece, it utilized a more nationalist rhetoric. After an internal contest between the two sides, the "Left Wing" (*Aristera Pteryga*) was purged – thus nationalist voices in EDEK became more dominant.

<sup>37</sup> AKEL's long tradition of pragmatism and moderation dates back to the 40's, and its involvement in mass, yet peaceful, struggles against both the colonialist and capitalist 'bosses'. It initially rejected the idea of armed struggle; even after its subsequent support of EOKA, it kept insisting that a mass, peaceful struggle would be a better alternative.

<sup>38</sup> DISY's own "realism" derived to a large extent from the approach of its leader (Clerides), but also suited well its larger component, that is, its mostly urban middle class constituency.

<sup>39</sup> Hadjikyriacos and Christophorou 1996, pp 104-113. In the 1985 parliamentary elections AKEL dropped to 27,4% (from its previous 32,8% in 1981), whereas DIKO rose to 27,6% (from its earlier 19,58%). EDEK rose from 8,2% (in 1981) to 11% (in 1985).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, pp. 137-160.

<sup>41</sup> For Vassiliou's more general views as a President, see his "March Towards a Solution", 1992, especially pp. 35-48.

<sup>42</sup> Theophanous 1996, pp. 16.

<sup>43</sup> Especially of women, many of which were entering the labour market for the first time.

<sup>44</sup> The clothing and shoe industries, for instance, were given a great stimulus to development.

<sup>45</sup> Pofaides 2006, p. 641. In fact, the trade unions accepted a voluntary reduction of wages and salaries of 25%.

<sup>46</sup> The average annual rate of economic growth reached 14% in real terms, and by 1978 production had reached the pre-invasion levels! Planning Bureau 2000, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup> In the 1980s the economic rate of growth averaged 6.2% per year in real terms and unemployment averaged 2.9% (in 1990 it declined further to 1.8%). Statistical Abstract 2006 (National Accounts), p. 11.

<sup>48</sup> For indices on these changes see the annual Demographic Reports, Criminal Statistics, and Statistical Abstract. For instance the index of adult criminality (number of offenders convicted of serious offences per 100.000 inhabitants in the corresponding age groups) in the 1980s and 1990s rose as follows:

1974 ...115  
1980 ...120  
1990 ...150  
2000 ...162

During the same period, the number of divorces increased as follows:

1974 ...140  
1980 ...164  
1990 ...348  
2000 ...1.182

<sup>49</sup> M. Hroch, quoted in Hobsbawm 1990, p. 173.

<sup>50</sup> Hobsbawm 1990, p. 170.



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- <sup>51</sup> Korovinis V. & Ziakas Th. 1988, p. 10.
- <sup>52</sup> For the women marches see Stamatakis 1994, pp. 266-309, Peristianis 2000, and Loizou 1994.
- <sup>53</sup> Peristianis 1995, pp. 144-145.
- <sup>54</sup> Christodoulou 1995 Vol. II, pp. 423-427.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*; Droushiotis 1999, pp. 15-23.
- <sup>56</sup> Interestingly, when in 1998 AKEL backed Iakovou as a candidate for the presidency, his initial position was against the deployment of the missiles, but he quickly rescinded after realizing that public opinion was strongly in favour of the move, considering the missiles vital for Cyprus' defense.
- <sup>57</sup> Goldthorpe 2000, pp. 28-44.
- <sup>58</sup> Eriksen 1993, p. 60.
- <sup>59</sup> Bloom 1990, pp. 25-53.
- <sup>60</sup> This is a slightly amended version of similar questions asked in surveys investigating "dual identities," such as Scottish, Welsh, Catalanian, and Basque. In these cases, the question refers to how people see themselves in terms of their "nationality," which is considered a good proxy for national identity. In the Cypriot case, the term "collective identity" was used instead, as it was considered to be both more direct and neutral. Furthermore, we avoided using the negatively phrased version--for example, "Scottish, not British"--as it was felt that this would have triggered defensive, partisan replies (many would claim that there is no such thing as a Greek-Cypriot who does not feel Greek). A number of studies in other countries have made a similar choice.
- <sup>61</sup> Attalides 1979, pp. 74-77.
- <sup>62</sup> Mavratsas 1999, p. 97.
- <sup>63</sup> See chapter four, last two sections; see also Bourdieu 1977.
- <sup>64</sup> Papadakis 1993; Stamatakis 1991.
- <sup>65</sup> For an analysis of commonsense talk as expressing personal views and arguments, while also reflecting dominant public discourses, see Billig 1991.
- <sup>66</sup> Wood and Kroger 2000, p. x.
- <sup>67</sup> During the in-depth interviews, in asking the question on identity we used a figure showing an axis or continuum of identifications, and stressed that we were interested in the comparative strength of how respondents felt for the different options along the continuum. After this prompting an open discussion on identity in general was encouraged.
- <sup>68</sup> Parenthesized numbers are identification numbers of those who participated in in-depth interviews for the survey (see Appendix 1).
- <sup>69</sup> See Bryant 2006.
- <sup>70</sup> Papadakis 1993.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 136.
- <sup>72</sup> Again, this diagrammatic presentation draws upon and elaborates on Papadakis' work (1993).
- <sup>73</sup> Billig 1991.

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<sup>74</sup> The ambivalence in feelings resulting from using the Cypriot dialect in informal situations (e.g. at home) and the Standard Demotic in more formal situations (e.g. at school) is noted by Edvokas 1989 and Attalides 1979.

<sup>75</sup> The Plan came to be identified with the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, who masterminded the initiative. The latter actually started with the submission of the first version of the plan (Annan I) to the two communities, in November 2002; after extensive and extended negotiation, the final draft (Annan V), was put to the vote in two referendums on both sides of the divide in Cyprus, in April 2004. The Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan with an overwhelming majority (75.8%, as against 24.2% who endorsed it). On the Turkish-Cypriot side the result was the reverse: 64% accepted and only 35.1 rejected the Plan. Source: Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office.

<sup>76</sup> Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999.

<sup>77</sup> Yakinthou 2007, p. 128.

<sup>78</sup> Peristianis 1998, pp. 34-35.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (final version, 2004), a United Nations Document; see also summary by PRIO.

<sup>81</sup> Elected on a single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies

<sup>82</sup> Anastasiou 2006, pp. 213-215.

<sup>83</sup> Christophorou 2006 a.

<sup>84</sup> Anastasiou pp. 351-353.

<sup>85</sup> The full text of President Papadopoulos' historic address of April 7, 2004, can be found at <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Tassos-Annan.htm>

<sup>86</sup> Anastasiou 2006, pp. 388-394.

<sup>87</sup> It is difficult to explain the transformation of Anastasiades from a relatively hard nationalist start, to an ardent supporter of softer, pro-federation positions. Part of the reasons must relate to the re-grouping of AKEL, DIKO, and EDEK and its own consequent marginalization: A hard line on national issues would not have made it more attractive to DIKO and EDEK, since they seemed to be content with their alignment with AKEL, and their shares in power. A softer line had more chances of creating a rift within AKEL, and thereby between AKEL and the two hard nationalist parties. Another set of reasons related to the strong backing of a pro-solution stand by Europe and the US: Anastasiades perhaps saw that with the backing of these powers a solution was imminent, and thus support for the Annan Plan was a sound investment for the future. Besides, if a solution was to materialize DISY's Hellenic nationalism would have little to offer in a re-united Cyprus. But a pro-solution attitude and its pro-rapprochement policies as against the Turkish-Cypriots, were necessary steps in transforming DISY and getting it ready for a post EU Cyprus.

<sup>88</sup> Christophorou 2005.

<sup>89</sup> Billig 1995, p. 99.

<sup>90</sup> Reicher and Hopkins p. 54.

<sup>91</sup> It is true that till the last few weeks, even those favouring the Plan were careful in expressing their outright public support, so as to contribute towards sending a uniform message to outsiders that the Greek-Cypriots in toto expected improvements in the Plan – thereby helping the efforts of the President.

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It is also true that the 'No' camp organized itself much earlier than the 'Yes' camp, and that its campaign was both passionate and vitriolic; a number of prominent DIKO members were part of the campaign and the feeling was certainly conveyed that they had the President's blessing in taking this negative public stand (the President himself denied this, stressing the freedom of all to express their opinions). Despite these qualifications, the arguments to follow explain why the mass of the Greek-Cypriots chose to agree with the 'No' platform.

<sup>92</sup> Halsam 2001.

<sup>93</sup> Constantinou and Papadakis 2001, p. 129.

<sup>94</sup> This is Killoran's expression (1994).

<sup>95</sup> And thereby not accepting this duty is tantamount to betrayal.

<sup>96</sup> Constantinou and Papadakis explicate how in fact the "recognition discourse" has been mainly a weapon of the Right in Cyprus, which after being discredited in 1974 was seeking ways of re-establishing its hegemony and control over the Left or Cypriot society more generally: "the recognition discourse has become less reflective of a legal or political dispute and more illuminating of strategies of control and governance" (Ibid p. 126). Despite this dimension, it is obvious, as I argue, that this battle rallies Greek-Cypriots together, as against the Turkish-Cypriots, enhancing the "us" and "them" distinction and contributing to the increasing solidarity within each community.

<sup>97</sup> Christodoulou 1996, p. 269.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 362.

<sup>99</sup> Whereas on the Turkish-Cypriot side, Turkey tried to actively influence the course of events, and gave its full support to the Plan – which obviously affected to some extent the ascend of Talat to power and how Turkish-Cypriots voted in the referendum. Demetriou and Vlachos, 2007.

<sup>100</sup> On the Joint Defense Doctrine, see Christodoulou 1999 Vol. II, pp. 363-367.

<sup>101</sup> Peristianis 1998, pp 39-42. As Vassiliou put it: "On May 1 2004 Cyprus was accepted as a full member of the European Union. The dream of all Cypriots had become a reality; we could now feel safe and hope that the accession would be the last step before the reunification of the island" (Vassiliou 2005, p xii, pp. xii-xvi). Obviously those "Cypriots" who rejoiced and "felt safe" were not the Turkish-Cypriots but the Greek-Cypriots.

<sup>102</sup> Pashiardes 2003, p. 18.

<sup>103</sup> Shiekeris 2008, p. 4.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>105</sup> Pierson 1995, p. 107.

<sup>106</sup> Even though social expenditure in Cyprus is still lower than the EU-15, the gap is closing: Thus, in 1985, it amounted to 10% of the GDP but by 2003 it had grown to 18,6% (EU-25 28%). Eurostat

<sup>107</sup> Wimmer 2002, p. 62.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>109</sup> Which, as Kyriakides notes, to some respondents may have meant unfettered Independence, while to others it may have meant Enosis – and to yet others it may have had other meanings.

<sup>110</sup> As the author noted, once the question invited choice of an "ideal" solution, more than half of those who previously opted for self-determination now opted for Enosis.

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<sup>111</sup> Although we did not ask whether respondents would have chosen Enosis as a “most realistic solution”, we may logically assume that almost no-one would have responded affirmatively.

<sup>112</sup> Within the smaller parties it was chosen by 58% of New Horizons’ (*Neoi Orizontes*) respondents, which proved to be the party with the larger segment of *Enosis* sympathizers.

<sup>113</sup> Stereotypical Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of Greek-Cypriots were also very negative, although not to the extent of GC perceptions of TCs.

<sup>114</sup> Allport 1979, pp. 191-192; Adorno et al 1995, Pickering 2001.

<sup>115</sup> Stephan and Rosenfield 1982, p. 95; Hogg M. and D. Abrams pp. 5-6.

<sup>116</sup> Tajfel 1981, p. 16.

<sup>117</sup> Billing 1991; Pickering 2001.

<sup>118</sup> Billing op. cit; Billing 1995.

<sup>119</sup> Pickering 2001, p. 84.

<sup>120</sup> Submitted in July 2000, and called “Preliminary Thoughts”; this was a brief document designed to ‘sound out’ the two communities on various aspects of a possible solution.

<sup>121</sup> Christophorou 2008.

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## Notes for conclusion

<sup>1</sup> 'Mainstream' accounts include Alastos (1976), Kyrris (1985) and Georgiades (1995). 'Reformist' accounts include Pollis (1973, 1979), Kizilyurek (1990, 1999) and Hitchens (1989).

<sup>2</sup> Iacovou 2006, p. 58.

<sup>3</sup> Gazioglu 1990, flap-cover introduction.

<sup>4</sup> Men of letters/scholars, usually supported by the merchants

<sup>5</sup> Roudometof 2001, p. 235.

<sup>6</sup> M. Weber, quoted by Wimmer 2002, p. 35. The metaphor applies mostly to Greek Cypriots, whose elite did have a national world-view by this time.

<sup>7</sup> Hall 1990, p. 225.

<sup>8</sup> Sources: For Britain – Heath et al 1997, British General Election Cross-Section Survey; for Spain – Moreno (1995); for Cyprus – Peristianis et al 2000, Understanding Bicomunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on Political and National Perceptions, and Peristianis et al 2006, World Values Survey-Cyprus Data.

<sup>9</sup> Colley 1992.

<sup>10</sup> Which enabled Scotland to maintain the autonomy of key institutions such as the church and the legal and educational system.

<sup>11</sup> Kumar 2003; see especially chapters 1, 7 and 8.

<sup>12</sup> Whereupon Catalan institutions and liberties were abolished, the Catalan language forbidden, and Spanish made the official language.

<sup>13</sup> Conversi 1997; Brown 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Pi-Sunyer 1985; Diez-Medrano 1995.

<sup>15</sup> See among others Franck 1966; Elazar 1987; Hicks 1978

<sup>16</sup> Wimmer *op.cit.* pp. 241-249.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 247-248, fn 22.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

<sup>19</sup> O' Leary 2004, p. 163.

<sup>20</sup> Kymlicka 1995, pp. 11-26; Kymlicka 1998, pp. 113-119.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 1995, pp. 28-29.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 1998, pp. 139-141.

<sup>23</sup> Parekh 1999, p. 307.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>25</sup> Hacking 1999.

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<sup>26</sup> Karner 2007, pp. 27-35.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> For 'critical junctures' see the work of Rokkan, referred to in chapter four of this thesis; for the importance of crises in effecting social change see Bourdieu 1977, pp. 168-169.

<sup>29</sup> As Turkish-Cypriot society did in 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Diez 2002 discusses several versions of the expected "catalytic effect" membership in the EU was expected to have: for instance, the "carrot catalyst" version stresses that the Turkish-Cypriots would be attracted by the benefits of EU membership; the "stick catalyst" version stresses increased pressures on Turkey, also aspiring for EU membership; the "subversion catalyst" version stresses pressure on the Greek-Cypriots for concessions: Diez 2002, pp. 144-146.

<sup>31</sup> See, for instance, Peristianis 1998.

<sup>32</sup> There are, of course, many other ways in which the EU can contribute towards the sustenance of a viable solution. Tocci, for instance, stresses that many fears, which have traditionally prevented a possible solution, could be ameliorated within the context of the European Union. To take one example, secession, the greatest fear of the Greek-Cypriots, may lose its sting within the EU, since the Turkish-Cypriot state which would be the result of secession "would have to renegotiate the terms of its accession to the Union, with all the costs and problems that it would involve"; and if such a state remained within the EU, "the same freedoms would be granted to Greek-Cypriots as fellow EU nationals": Tocci 2004, p. 154.

<sup>33</sup> Denton 1993.

<sup>34</sup> Tsinisizelis 1996; Denton 1993.

<sup>35</sup> For the origin of the concept of "security communities" see Adler and Barnett 1998, pp. 6-9. See also Adler 1997.

<sup>36</sup> Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 34

<sup>37</sup> Barnett and Adler 1998, p. 424

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 424-425

<sup>40</sup> Waever 1998, p. 94.

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## Notes for Appendix 1

<sup>1</sup> The Turkish-Cypriot part of the survey covered 1048 individuals; since the thesis concentrates on the Greek-Cypriots, this methodology outline will not go into further details on the Turkish-Cypriot survey and results.

<sup>2</sup> The sampling procedure was as follows: Each of the five districts was sub-divided into two strata, urban and rural (except for Famagusta, where there is no urban area), and from the resulting nine strata a number of individuals proportionate to the real population demographics (according to area of residence, age and gender) was determined.

<sup>3</sup> For WVS purposes, a number of only 600 Greek-Cypriots were required, but another 300 were added so as to improve the accuracy of the present study. The survey also covered 500 Turkish-Cypriots.

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## Notes for Appendix 4

<sup>1</sup> Giddens, A. (1994) *Beyond Left and Right*. London: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers.

<sup>2</sup> Blundell, J and Gosschalk, B. (1997) *Beyond Left and Right: The New Politics of Britain*. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Inglehart, R. (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Two different scales were used (scale 1-5 for 2000 and scale 1-10 for 2006), so for comparison reasons we had to adjust the 2006 scale to be similar with the 2000 scale.



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