

# Flood vulnerability, risk and social disadvantage: Current and future patterns in the UK

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## Abstract

Present day and future social vulnerability, flood risk and disadvantage across the UK are explored using the UK Future Flood Explorer. In doing so, new indices of neighbourhood flood vulnerability and social flood risk are introduced and used to provide a quantitative comparison of the flood risks faced by more and less socially vulnerable neighbourhoods. The results show the concentrated nature of geographic flood disadvantage. For example, ten local authorities account for fifty percent of the most socially vulnerable people that live in flood prone areas. The results also highlight the systematic nature of flood disadvantage. For example, flood risks are higher in socially vulnerable communities than elsewhere; this is shown to be particularly the case in coastal areas, economically struggling cities and dispersed rural communities. Results from a re-analysis of the Environment Agency's Long-Term Investment Scenarios (for England) suggests a long-term economic case for improving the protection afforded to the most socially vulnerable communities; a finding that reinforces the need to develop a better understanding of flood risk in socially vulnerable communities if flood risk management efforts are to deliver fair outcomes. In response to these findings the paper advocates an approach to flood risk management that emphasizes Rawlsian principles of preferentially targeting risk reduction for the most socially vulnerable and avoids a process of prioritisation based upon strict utilitarian or purely egalitarian principles.

**Keywords:** Flood, risk, social vulnerability, disadvantage, social justice, climate change, climate justice

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## 32 **Introduction**

33 Developing a better understanding of flood vulnerability in disadvantaged communities is a  
34 prerequisite for delivering a socially just (i.e. fair) approach to prioritising flood risk  
35 management (FRM) efforts. Such an approach emphasises Rawlsian principles of  
36 preferentially targeting risk reduction for the most socially vulnerable, and avoids a process  
37 of prioritisation based upon strict utilitarian or purely egalitarian principles (Johnson *et al.*,  
38 2007), and is recognised as a central component of a strategic approach to flood risk  
39 management (Sayers *et al.*, 2014).

40 Social vulnerability in the context of floods relates to how flooding impacts on, and creates  
41 losses in, people's wellbeing (Tapsell *et al.*, 2004, Lindley *et al.*, 2011, England and Knox,  
42 2015). Delivering socially just FRM thus requires two central research questions to be  
43 addressed. The first relates to the geographic nature of flood disadvantage and the ability  
44 to identify those communities where high levels of social vulnerability combine with a large  
45 number of people exposed to flooding. The second relates to the systemic nature of flood  
46 disadvantage and the ability to assess the degree to which FRM policy (and its  
47 implementation in practice) can be considered successful in delivering socially just outcomes  
48 (as expressed by the comparative risks faced by the most socially vulnerable communities  
49 when compared to the average).

50 Following a short discussion of the concept of 'fairness', the analysis presented here  
51 explores the geographic and systemic aspects of flood disadvantage today and how these  
52 may change in the future. In doing so, the influences of changes exogenous to FRM (*e.g.*  
53 climate change and population change) and influences that are largely endogenous to FRM  
54 (*e.g.* FRM policy and its broader impacts on issues such as insurance) are considered. Both  
55 present-day and future flood disadvantage are explored through a quantified analysis at a  
56 UK scale (using the UK-Future Flood Explorer, UK FFE, Sayers *et al.*, 2015, 2016). Based on  
57 this evidence, a series of policy recommendations are made with the aim of promoting  
58 social justice and improving resilience in the most socially vulnerable communities across  
59 the UK.

### 60 **What is meant by a 'fair' approach to FRM**

61 Notions of social justice have long been debated by philosophers and theologians. The  
62 purpose of this paper is not to provide new philosophical debate but rather to consider how  
63 these concepts inform (or not) FRM and how they can be used to frame a quantitative  
64 national assessment of 'fairness'. Interpreting social justice in the context of FRM is not  
65 however straightforward. This is because the nature of 'justice' is disputed, and can be seen  
66 from many perspectives (*e.g.* Vojinović and Abbott, 2012). Three broad theories are  
67 however generally accepted as central to these discussions (Johnson *et al.*, 2007, Penning-  
68 Rowsell *et al.*, 2016, Sayers *et al.*, 2017).

69 First utilitarianism, as introduced by Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832 and John Stuart Mill 1806-  
70 1873, provides the underpinning advocacy for a benefit cost approach to determine the  
71 worthwhileness of an investment in a single intervention measure (or portfolio of  
72 measures). In FRM practice however utilitarianism often defaults to a rather narrowly

73 defined cost benefit approach that tends to consider only those benefits and costs that can  
74 be readily monetised and often fails to take account of complex externalities, such as the  
75 impact on ecosystem health (e.g. Sayers, 2017) and the wider social impacts of flooding (e.g.  
76 the significant costs of mental health impacts from floods may still fall on the public purse  
77 but to other government departments than those financing FRM, Waite *et al.*, 2017). The  
78 implementation of FRM measures is often criticized because of this narrow focus and its  
79 tendency to suggest that it is preferable to maximise the collective outcome for the many to  
80 the detriment of the few; thereby prioritising efficiency over all other considerations.

81 Secondly, egalitarianism, or rights based theories of justice, recognise that the framework of  
82 society (its laws, institutions, policies, *etc.*) give rise to variations in the distribution of  
83 benefits and burdens across the members of that society (e.g. Sen, 1992). Egalitarianism is  
84 concerned with this distribution (distributive justice) and seeks to ensure that all citizens  
85 have equal opportunity to have their risk managed and have equal voice in decision-making  
86 processes and governance (procedural justice). Both of these general propositions influence  
87 FRM. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the principle of 'solidarity' seeks to  
88 provide a high level of flood safety for all individuals (e.g. van Alphen, 2014) despite the  
89 implications for resource efficiency. In UK, the combination of the significant spatial  
90 heterogeneity in the flooding process, the long history of urbanisation and the associated  
91 significant sunk investment in flood defences means that such an approach, even if  
92 achievable, would be either grossly inefficient (diverting resources from more beneficial  
93 activities) or not meaningful for those affected (e.g. if the minimum level of safety would  
94 need to be set very low, to be practical everywhere (Defra, 2004)). This does not mean  
95 however that no effort is made to maximise the number of people that have their risk  
96 managed. The incremental Benefit:Cost Ratio (iBCR) test applied in England, for example,  
97 examines the marginal increase in benefits compared with the marginal increase in costs  
98 associated with delivering a progressively higher standard of protection (Defra, 2014b). This  
99 approach attempts to support utilitarian efficiency and distributive equality by directing  
100 limited national investment towards maximising the number of properties and their  
101 occupants provided with a minimum degree of protection, and away from providing higher  
102 standards in a few locations (despite the latter achieving a greater economic return).

103 Finally, a Rawlsian perspective promotes a theory of justice in which 'fairness' plays a  
104 central role (Rawls, 1971). Rawls argues that a 'fair' approach seeks to maximise the  
105 minimum outcomes by making the choice that produces the greatest return for the least  
106 advantaged (the so-called '*maximin rule*'). This is a powerful concept that suggests even if  
107 considerations of efficiency indicate differently, it may be 'fair(er)' to spend taxpayers'  
108 money unevenly if it maximises the benefits for those who have little welfare resource. The  
109 delivery of forecast and warning services is often implicitly Rawlsian, for example, typically  
110 providing information in multiple languages and prioritising the physically disabled  
111 (Environment Agency, 2009). The only direct expression of Rawlsian principles within the  
112 FRM investment decision-making process however is in the formula used to determine the  
113 maximum contribution to a specific FRM scheme from general taxation. Through the Flood  
114 Defence Grant-in-Aid (FDGiA) formula (Defra, 2011) preferential weighting is given to  
115 schemes that reduce flood risk to deprived households (as defined by the Index of Multiple

116 Deprivation)<sup>b</sup>. The outcomes from investment in FRM for the 20% most deprived  
117 households are also explicitly monitored at a national level (*i.e.* Outcome Measures 2a<sup>c</sup>). No  
118 consideration, however, is currently given to degree to which this outcome is proportionally  
119 fair. It is also the case that HM Treasury guidance (that sets out the governing principles of  
120 economic appraisal to be used by UK central government, HM Treasury, 2003) is based on  
121 the concept of welfare economics and provides an opportunity to incorporate equity  
122 weightings, noting that the distributional implications of alternative options must be  
123 '*considered during an appraisal and promotes the use of distributional weights to adjust*  
124 *explicitly for distributional impacts in the benefit cost analysis*'. Such adjustments are  
125 however seldom made in FRM practice.

126 Although these theories have been explored in a number of projects (e.g. Johnson *et al.*,  
127 2007; Nada-Rajah, 2010, Kind *et al.*, 2017), and 'fairness' has been recognised as part of  
128 'good' strategic FRM (Defra, 2013; Sayers *et al.*, 2014), there has been little quantification of  
129 the degree to which FRM delivers 'fair' outcomes for socially vulnerable communities and  
130 how climate change and current adaptation efforts may influence these outcomes. The  
131 need to address this latter topic is increasingly recognised at a global scale (e.g. Hallegatte  
132 *et al.*, 2016) as well as within the UK and is the motivation for the analysis presented here.

### 133 **Why assess 'fairness' of flood risk management at a national scale**

134 National assessments of flood risk are widely recognised as providing important evidence to  
135 inform policy decisions (e.g. Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Such assessments have been pursued  
136 actively by the Environment Agency since 2002 (covering England and Wales, e.g. Sayers *et al.*  
137 *et al.*, 2002, Hall *et al.*, 2003) and their predecessors since 1998 (Burgess *et al.*, 2000), and  
138 more recently by Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) since 2011. This  
139 importance arises because of the role of a national level determination of risk in setting the  
140 pace of adaptation and shaping the policy response and resource inputs (e.g. Environment  
141 Agency, 2009; Defra, 2011). Their importance has been further strengthened through the  
142 Climate Change Act 2008 that requires a UK-wide *Climate Change Risk Assessment* (CCRA) to  
143 be undertaken on a five-yearly cycle that is independent of national FRM authorities but  
144 which influences the scale and focus of adaptation measures (Committee on Climate  
145 Change, 2016). The assessment of flood risk at a national scale is consequentially the  
146 fundamental basis for policy making and the directing of risk reducing investment.

147 The *Climate Change Risk Assessment - Future Flooding Studies* (Sayers *et al.*, 2015), for  
148 example, suggests that in a +4°C climate future (an extreme but plausible assumption) flood  
149 risk is likely to increase despite on-going efforts to adapt and encourage the adoption of an  
150 'enhanced whole systems' approach to adaptation. The evidence provided to national  
151 policy makers has, to date, however included very limited insight into either geographic or  
152 systemic flood disadvantage and the CCRA says little about future flood disadvantage or the  
153 policy responses that may be needed to specifically target socially vulnerable communities.  
154 The absence of a social justice lens also permeates the Environment Agency's programme of

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<sup>b</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/297377/LIT\\_9142\\_dd8bbe.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297377/LIT_9142_dd8bbe.pdf) Accessed June 2016

<sup>c</sup> <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/research/planning/122070.aspx> Accessed January 2017

155 flood and coastal erosion risk management for England. This plan sets out a six-year  
156 investment plan (2015-2021) for capital spending on FRM, which includes £2.3 billion of  
157 public expenditure (Defra, 2014a) yet there is limited alignment between planned  
158 investment and areas where high levels of vulnerability and exposure combine (England and  
159 Knox, 2015).

## 160 **The changing context of flood risk management and its potential implications for social** 161 **justice**

162 The focus of FRM is changing, away from a narrow economic risk focus to one that seeks to  
163 deliver broader social and ecosystem resilience (*e.g.* Sayers *et al.*, 2014, 2017) based on an  
164 understanding of the risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities (Sayers *et al.*, 2016 –  
165 Supplementary Figure S1). The national Flood Resilience Community Pathfinders Scheme  
166 (2013-15), for example, sought to stimulate approaches to community FRM that better  
167 enable communities to move towards greater resilience to flooding (Defra, 2013). An early  
168 review of this programme however highlighted some of the difficulties in understanding  
169 what is meant by resilience and how this understanding shapes the nature of the solutions  
170 proposed, noting '*the way resilience is framed will lead to different actions and emphases*'  
171 (Twigger-Ross *et al.*, 2014). The relationship between social vulnerability and resilience also  
172 emerged as a central message from this review, with the suggestion that community  
173 networks (between individuals and more formal organisations) play a central role in both.

174 The political framework within which FRM is delivered is also changing. The ongoing  
175 process of devolution (*i.e.* to Scotland and to Wales but also to cities, such as Manchester)  
176 has the potential to alter the powers and competencies at a local and national scale and  
177 hence the way issues of social justice are embedded in FRM investment decisions.

## 178 **Method of assessment**

179 To explore the degree to which FRM in the UK can be considered social just, the analysis  
180 here seeks to understand both the geographic and systemic nature of flood disadvantage  
181 and identify those neighbourhoods at greatest flood disadvantage now and in the future  
182 (through to the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s) across the UK. In doing so, the analysis  
183 differentiates the results by country (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), flood  
184 source (coastal, fluvial and surface water flooding), urban and rural settings and city regions  
185 in decline.

186 The large spatial scale of the analysis, the multiple future scenarios (Supplementary Figure  
187 S2) and the portfolio of FRM adaptation measures to be considered (Supplementary Figure  
188 S3) mean it is difficult to explore all the relevant combinations using conventional numerical  
189 modelling approaches (a challenge recognised in Kwakkel *et al.*, 2013). Instead, the  
190 approach used here builds upon lessons from past national scale studies undertaken in the  
191 UK (*e.g.* Evans *et al.*, 2004a&b, Sayers *et al.*, 2015) and insights from international research  
192 (*e.g.* Klijn *et al.*, 2004 and 2014, Bouwer *et al.*, 2010) to allow a rapid evaluation of the  
193 effects of climate and population change and adaptation using the UK Future Flood Explorer  
194 (FFE) – Supplementary Figure S4.

195 The UK FFE uses available data on flood hazard, exposure and vulnerability to develop a  
196 credible representation of the behaviour of the UK flood risk system (that takes account of  
197 the flood defences where they exist). This approach was shown to support credible policy  
198 insights as part of the UK CCRA (Sayers *et al.*, 2015, 2016) and has been revised and  
199 enhanced in three areas for application here: the spatial resolution of the analysis, the  
200 characterisation of flood social vulnerability, and adaptation to flood risk differentiated by  
201 the vulnerability of the communities affected. These advances are briefly discussed below.

### 202 **Spatial resolution of the analysis: the ‘neighbourhood’ unit and adaptations**

203 The underlying spatial resolution of the flood hazard data used within the UK FFE varies  
204 from 2m-50m (depending upon flood source – coastal, fluvial or surface water (pluvial) and  
205 location). The data on exposure is based on residential point datasets (and hence has the  
206 resolution of a single property). The results however are not necessarily credible at these  
207 scales because of localised issues that may or may not be well reflected in the supporting  
208 data. The concept of the ‘neighbourhood’ is therefore used as a small, but locally  
209 aggregated, spatial unit to bring together flood hazard and exposure with census based  
210 social vulnerability data. The spatial scale of a ‘neighbourhoods’ varies across the UK and is  
211 based upon census Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England and Wales, Super  
212 Output Areas (SOAs) in Northern Ireland and the Data Zones (DZs) in Scotland (as defined in  
213 the 2011 Census). This definition yields a total of 42,619 neighbourhoods with the average  
214 population in each varying slightly by country: 1600 in England, 760 in Scotland, 1600 in  
215 Wales and 2000 in Northern Ireland.

216 For each neighbourhood, an Impact Curve is generated relating the return period of a  
217 current or future flood event to the magnitude of the impact (*i.e.* a loss of well-being as  
218 defined by one of several metrics, Supplementary Figure S5). Each Impact Curve is then  
219 manipulated within the FFE to represent the influence of climate and population change as  
220 well as adaptations to flood risk within a given neighbourhood (Supplementary Figure S6).  
221 For example, to represent climate change the Impact Curve is moved to the left along the  
222 return period axis. The raising of flood defences, however, would act to reduce risk and is  
223 represented by shifting the Impact Curve in the opposite direction.

224 This approach provides a significant increase in resolution from the analysis undertaken as  
225 part of the CCRA (based there upon the much larger Calculation Areas, defined using  
226 coastline and river boundaries to subdivide the floodplain, and 1km squares elsewhere) and  
227 represents an evolution of the previous present day assessments of flood disadvantage (in  
228 England, based upon Middle Layer Super Output Areas, MSOAs (Lindley *et al.*, 2011), and in  
229 Scotland based upon Data Zones (Kazmierczak *et al.*, 2015)).

### 230 **The characterisation of flood vulnerability**

231 UK FRM policy typically considers social vulnerability through the lens of deprivation (as  
232 indicated by the Index of Multiple Deprivation, DCLG, 2015) and this view provides the basis  
233 of the analysis presented in the CCRA (Sayers *et al.*, 2015). A focus on deprivation however  
234 does not necessarily reflect a community’s vulnerability to a flood (although flood  
235 vulnerability is significantly influenced by income deprivation, as clearly demonstrated by

236 Tapsell *et al.*, (2002)). To overcome this shortcoming, and build on the characterisation of  
237 flood vulnerability advanced by Lindley *et al.*, (2011) and more recently by Kazmierczak *et*  
238 *al.*, (2015), a new measure is introduced here: the Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index  
239 (NFVI). The NFVI expresses the neighbourhood's characteristics that influence the potential  
240 to experience a loss of well-being when exposed to a flood and over which flood  
241 management policy has limited or no control. In doing so, the NFVI builds upon previous  
242 studies (Tapsell *et al.*, 2002; Lindley *et al.*, 2011; Twigger-Ross *et al.*, 2014; Kazmierczak *et*  
243 *al.*, 2015) and requires consideration of five characteristics to provide a single vulnerability  
244 index at a neighbourhood scale (Figure 1).

245 The assessment of each characteristic is based upon one or more indicators (*e.g.* age, health  
246 *etc.*) that are, in turn, based upon one or more supporting variables (Table 1). Each  
247 indicator is normalised to a z score (derived by subtracting the mean value and dividing by  
248 the standard deviation). If a variable is already in the form of a rank (*e.g.* as is the Index of  
249 Multiple Deprivation), the equivalent z score is determined by assuming the rank is drawn  
250 from a normal distribution and calculating the number of standard deviations from the  
251 mean associated with that rank. The resulting z scores are then equally weighted to  
252 estimate each of the five characteristics (Susceptibility; Ability to Prepare; *etc.*). The only  
253 exceptions to this are the supporting variables associate with 'direct flood experience' and  
254 'primary school aged children' (Table 1; e1 and n3). These variables act to reduce social  
255 vulnerability (*e.g.* those with experience know how to cope better than those without;  
256 families with schoolchildren tend to have more local contacts (Tapsell *et al.*, 2002; Twigger-  
257 Ross *et al.*, 2014)), and hence a negative weighting is applied (to reduce rather than increase  
258 the relative vulnerability of one neighbourhood compared to another). The resulting values  
259 for each characteristic or indicator are then themselves transformed into a z score, and  
260 summed, with equal weighting. The final z score is calculated based on these results and  
261 used as the NFVI (Supplementary Figure S7).

## 262 **The differential capacity to adapt**

263 Good FRM adopts a portfolio of responses (Evans *et al.*, 2004a&b; Sayers *et al.*, 2014) to  
264 provide a 'whole system' management response (an approach that includes actions to  
265 manage the source, pathways and receptors of risk, Sayers *et al.*, 2002). In the context of a  
266 national analysis the effectiveness of individual adaptation measures is however often  
267 considered to be independent of the vulnerability of those at risk (as for example within the  
268 CCRA, Sayers *et al.*, 2015). To overcome this deficiency, the analysis presented here  
269 differentiates the effectiveness of individual FRM adaptation measures based on  
270 neighbourhood vulnerability (where there is evidence to do so). For example, despite the  
271 Flood Defence Grant-In-Aid (FDGiA) formula prioritising deprived areas in England and  
272 Wales (Defra, 2011) and the release of high level statements that aim to prioritise the most  
273 vulnerable across the UK, there is some evidence to suggest that the most vulnerable  
274 neighbourhoods are less well protected than others (England and Knox, 2015), with  
275 investment focused in urban areas (and away from rural areas) and towards more affluent  
276 areas (and away from deprived areas). This is reflected here in the assumed future  
277 adaptation of defence measures. There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that in inner-

278 city areas (where urban flooding and drainage is significant) a differential in the retrofitting  
279 of Sustainable Urban Drainage (SUDS) measures may exist. This is reflected in the analysis  
280 here by assuming no retrofitting takes place in more vulnerable communities (compared to  
281 10% elsewhere, ASC, 2014).

282 Spatial planning and development control are also important FRM measures and population  
283 growth and associated development are important drivers of future risk. Analysis of new  
284 residential developments (in England only) in the period 2008-2014 undertaken here  
285 suggests that the percentage of new properties built within the fluvial and coastal floodplain  
286 is around 14 per cent in the most vulnerable areas (defined by the top 20 per cent of  
287 neighbourhoods by NFVI) and 11 per cent in less vulnerable areas (Sayers *et al.*, 2017). This  
288 differential in current planning outcomes is assumed to persist into the future and is  
289 therefore carried forward into the analysis.

290 Property level protection measures (PLP), warning services and insurance also all provide  
291 important FRM contributions, but all three can be difficult for the most vulnerable to access.  
292 Regarding property level measures, evidence suggests that the uptake by the most  
293 vulnerable in existing developments is likely to be significantly lower than in the population  
294 as whole (National Flood Forum, 2012). There may be multiple reasons for this including:

- 295 • property level measures can be expensive which may rule out installation for people  
296 on low incomes (National Flood Forum, 2012);
- 297 • the process of applying for a grant is bureaucratic and cumbersome (National Flood  
298 Forum, 2016);
- 299 • grants may be insufficient to encourage take up by the most vulnerable (based on  
300 evidence from the case studies undertaken in this research);
- 301 • tenants in rented accommodation have a reduced ability and incentive to install  
302 property levels measures; and
- 303 • developing an awareness of flood risk within transient communities maybe more  
304 difficult.

305 In combination, these barriers mean it is likely that retro-fitting of PLP measures in the most  
306 vulnerable neighbourhoods will be significantly less than elsewhere, and this differential is  
307 carried forward into our analysis. There is however little existing evidence that would  
308 suggest the uptake of such measures within new developments is any different in more and  
309 less vulnerable neighbourhoods.

310 There is also some evidence to suggest that social vulnerability influences a community's  
311 ability to respond to a warning (Thrush *et al.*, 2005). In part, this is already reflected in the  
312 NFVI (Table 1: f1, f2, k1) but social vulnerability can also influence the effectiveness of such  
313 measures due to, for example:

- 314 • *Barriers to receiving the warning:* many households (particularly low-income  
315 households) are no longer choosing to maintain a telephone landline but instead rely  
316 upon mobile technologies (see Money.co.uk (2017). This can create complications in  
317 trying to contact households to convey flood warnings, largely because there is no



318 published list of mobile phone numbers as there is for landlines. Loss of power  
319 during a flood can also prevent communication, as mobile telephones (and cordless  
320 landlines) require power to charge batteries (Pitt, 2007). Transient and travelling  
321 communities may also be difficult to reach.

- 322 • *Accessing the content of warnings:* Minority ethnic groups for whom English or  
323 Welsh is not their first language may be less able to respond (Thrush *et al.*, 2005).
- 324 • *Awareness of the need to be 'flood aware':* One of the factors that has been shown  
325 to have the greatest impact on levels of "awareness" is lack of previous flooding  
326 experience (Thrush *et al.*, 2005).

327 In combination, these challenges are assumed to lead to lower rates of uptake of warning  
328 services and the action taken in response to the warnings to be less effective at reducing  
329 economic damage in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods when compared to less  
330 vulnerable neighbourhoods.

331 Private insurance underpins FRM policies in the UK. This is one of the few FRM policies  
332 whose measures are universally applied across the UK (National Flood Forum, 2012).  
333 Penetration is, however, uneven. Based on the government's Household Expenditure  
334 Survey and evidence from its own members, the Association of British Insurers (ABI)  
335 estimate that the uptake of insurance in the UK is such that 93 per cent of all homeowners  
336 have buildings insurance that covers the structure of their home, but this falls to 85 per cent  
337 of the poorest 10 per cent of households purchasing their own property. The differential in  
338 contents insurance is much greater. Some 75 per cent of all households have contents  
339 insurance, but less than half of the poorest 10 per cent of households and even fewer who  
340 are tenants have this protection. This prompted Watkiss *et al.*, 2016 to note that "*while*  
341 *most owner occupiers have building insurance, there are much lower levels of contents*  
342 *insurance among tenants, with many in the lowest income decile having no insurance at all*".

343 Since April 2016 Flood-Re has created a pool into which all insurers contribute to subsidise  
344 the insurance premiums of those at greatest risk (Defra, 2014a). Householders purchasing  
345 flood insurance will not know whether they are in this pool or not, since they will deal with  
346 their conventional insurance company, but that company will cede the policy and the  
347 liability for claims to the Flood-Re pool if the cost of insurance exceeds certain thresholds  
348 and certain eligibility criteria are met (including excluding properties built after 1st January  
349 2009). The result is intended to make flood insurance affordable, including for example  
350 capped premiums linked to Council Tax bandings<sup>d</sup>. However, in high risk areas, it is unclear  
351 whether Flood Re has been successful in improving insurance uptake in the most vulnerable  
352 neighbourhoods and it does nothing to assist the uninsured. It is also the case that Flood Re  
353 has a life of only twenty-five years after which flood insurance will become fully risk-  
354 reflective. Watkiss *et al.*, 2016 discusses how this transition to market prices will, in the  
355 longer term, lead to substantially higher premiums for those at risk, and those at most risk  
356 will pay much more than at present. This transition to an actuarial accounting process could  
357 further discourage the most vulnerable from accessing insurance.

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<sup>d</sup> <http://www.floodre.co.uk/industry/how-it-works/eligibility/>

358 To establish a credible representation of the role of insurance within the analysis, and how it  
359 may be more or less effective in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods, several issues have  
360 necessarily been considered and partially modelled. First, regarding uptake by income,  
361 there is a marked difference in penetration levels with different levels of disposable income  
362 such that there is a 47.5 per cent difference between the lowest and highest income deciles  
363 (ONS, 2015). Secondly, insurance has lower levels of penetration across households in  
364 rented accommodation (ONS, 2015) – although local authorities and housing associations  
365 would typically be responsible for any structural repairs following a flood, and in the private  
366 rented sector the landlord will be responsible for structural repairs. Therefore, the  
367 insurance position of the landlord is what is critical in terms of structural repair. This  
368 however is not considered further here.

### 369 Risk and vulnerability metrics

370 As Cutter *et al* (2010) in the USA and Walker and Burningham (2011) in the UK have shown,  
371 the way in which flood risk, vulnerability and resilience are measured is crucial to the way  
372 they are understood and managed. Several new risk metrics are used here to unpack flood  
373 disadvantage. The first, used at the neighbourhood scale, is the Social Flood Risk Index  
374 (SFRI). This is used to identify those areas where the largest number of the most socially  
375 vulnerable people are most frequently flooded (*i.e.* return period, on average, of 1 in 75  
376 years or more frequent). The SFRI therefore directly supports an understanding of  
377 geographic flood disadvantage (defined earlier) and is estimated at both a neighbourhood  
378 scale and as an individual ‘average’ as follows:

- 379 • *Social flood risk index* (SFRI) helps identify those areas where many vulnerable people, as  
380 defined by the NFVI, are exposed to flooding and is calculated as the product of the NFVI  
381 and the annual expected number of people flooded as follows:

382

$$383 \text{SFRI} = \langle \text{Annual expectation of the number of people flooding} \rangle \times \text{NFVI}$$

384

- 385 • *Social flood risk index: Individual* (iSFRI) helps identify those neighbourhoods where the  
386 vulnerability of those exposed is high (even when only a few may be exposed) and is  
387 calculated simply by dividing the SFRI by the neighbourhood floodplain population.

388 Secondly a metric of *Relative Economic Pain* (REP) is introduced in recognition of the varying  
389 coping capacity between more affluent and low income families. This metric captures the  
390 relationship between uninsured damages and household income: the larger the former in  
391 relation to the latter, the greater the REP. The REP builds upon previous research touching  
392 on issues of outrage (Evans *et al.*, 2004a,b; Sayers *et al.*, 2014) to express the ‘relative pain’  
393 of a risk and is defined here as the uninsured loss (represented by one minus the insurance  
394 penetration) times the EAD on the floodplain, divided by total income on the floodplain:

$$395 \text{REP} = \frac{(1 - I) \times \text{EAD}}{\text{Income}}$$

396 Where  $I$  = percentage of the loss covered by insurance,  $\text{EAD}$  = Expected Annual Damages,  
397 and  $\text{Income}$  = household annual income.

## 398 The validity of approach

399 The validation of any analysis of risk is difficult to determine, in part because flood events  
400 are rare and flood systems are non-stationary (Sayers *et al.*, 2016). The validity of any  
401 analysis therefore relies upon acknowledging assumptions and limitations and gaining  
402 confidence that the analysis is credible at the scales of interest and in the context of the  
403 objectives.

404 To provide appropriate confidence in the analysis presented here, three important aspects  
405 are discussed below. First, it is assumed that the input data used by the FFE (including, but  
406 not limited to, flood hazard, defence standards and conditions, property counts, census  
407 data) is credible at the scales of interest and in the context of the project objectives. This is  
408 reasonable given all the datasets are routinely used by various national and local  
409 organisations (Defra; the EA; SEPA), despite recognised controversy regarding the absolute  
410 values of some of the datasets (such as data based upon the National Flood Risk Assessment  
411 in England (Penning-Rowell, 2014, 2015, 2016)).

412 Secondly, to provide valid estimates of risk the FFE must provide a faithful reproduction of  
413 the underlying data. To provide confidence that this is the case the results of the FFE have  
414 been previously compared to standalone estimates of the number of properties nationally  
415 at significant risk and the resultant expected annual damages (as produced by Environment  
416 Agency's National Flood Risk Assessment, and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency  
417 (SEPA). Such comparisons have confirmed the ability of the FFE to produce known results  
418 (Sayers *et al.*, 2015).

419 Thirdly, to provide confidence that the extension of the analysis to represent  
420 neighbourhood vulnerability and using social flood risk indices is justified, three additional  
421 activities have been undertaken (Sayers *et al.*, 2017):

- 422 • *Engagement with an Advisory Group*: The analysis has been scrutinised as they have  
423 emerged by an extensive Joseph Rowntree Foundation convened Advisory Group.
- 424 • *Engagement with national policy leads*: Policy leads from England, Wales, Scotland  
425 and Northern Ireland have each been engaged to discuss the role of social justice in  
426 current policy approaches to FRM and the anticipated direction of travel.
- 427 • *Local case studies and review*: Four local case studies (in Boston, Cumbria, Blaenau  
428 and in York, the last undertaken in association with Robotham, 2016) have been  
429 used to ground-truth the estimates of social vulnerability and social flood risk. These  
430 discussions provided confidence that the relative distribution of social vulnerability  
431 was indeed locally representative (Sayers *et al.*, 2017).

432 To develop a UK wide view of adaptation to flood risk, the individual measures have been  
433 chosen to be a reasonable representation of current approaches across England, Wales,  
434 Scotland and Northern Ireland. For example, it is assumed that analysis of recent  
435 development in England (2008-14) is indicative of the effectiveness of spatial planning  
436 across the UK. This is of course a simplification and fails to reflect the full variation in  
437 national policies between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as the local

438 context within which risks are managed, but nonetheless is considered reasonable in the  
439 context of the national level analysis presented here.

## 440 **Discussion of results**

441 To understand the multiple and important messages that emerge from this analysis four  
442 aspects are considered:

- 443 (i) The relationship between social vulnerability, floodplain population and exposure to  
444 frequent flooding.
- 445 (ii) The economic risks faced by the socially vulnerable and the influence of differentials  
446 in income and insurance penetration.
- 447 (iii) The relationship between cities in relative economic decline, deprivation and flood  
448 disadvantage.
- 449 (iv) The evidence of greater investment in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods

### 450 **Floodplain population, vulnerability and exposure to frequent flooding**

#### 451 *The situation today<sup>e</sup>*

452 Today, approximately 6.4m people in the UK live in areas prone to fluvial, coastal and  
453 surface water flooding, with around 1.5 million of these (23.4%) living in the 20% most  
454 vulnerable neighbourhoods (as defined by the NFVI – Supplementary Table S1). Of the 1.8  
455 million people living in the coastal floodplain, 33% are within the 20% most vulnerable  
456 neighbourhoods and 10% in the 5% most vulnerable neighbourhoods (by NFVI). Of those  
457 exposed to frequent flooding, the majority (67%; 1.3m) live in the most socially vulnerable  
458 neighbourhoods (top 20% by NFVI) (Supplementary Table S2).

459 The proportion of socially vulnerable neighbourhoods exposed to flooding varies across the  
460 four nations. In Northern Ireland, 55% of the population exposed to flooding live in the top  
461 20% of neighbourhoods by NFVI and 25% of the total population exposed to frequent  
462 flooding are in most vulnerable communities (the top 5% by NFVI). This represents a  
463 significant systemic flood disadvantage. The disproportionality is less elsewhere (in Scotland  
464 9% of the floodplain population live in the top 5% communities by NFVI; in England 5%; and  
465 in Wales 3%).

466 Seventy-five local authorities (approximately one fifth of the UK total) account for 50% of  
467 those living in flood prone areas. The concentration becomes more marked when the most  
468 vulnerable neighbourhoods (top 5% by NFVI) are considered, with over 50% of the  
469 population exposed to flooding in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods located in just ten  
470 local authorities (Hull, Boston, Belfast, Birmingham, East Lindsey, Glasgow, Leicester, North  
471 East Lincolnshire, Swale District, and Tower Hamlets). Figure 2 illustrates this clustering and  
472 highlights concentrations of people in vulnerable neighbourhoods on the floodplain in  
473 Scotland's central belt, Belfast, the Humber, Lincolnshire, Birmingham, South Wales, and the  
474 Severn and Thames Estuaries.

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<sup>e</sup> Dateline Autumn 2016.

475 The drivers of social vulnerability (as in Table 1) are, in general, similar across all sources of  
476 flooding. In coastal settings, however limited *service availability* (Table 1: s1 to s4) plays an  
477 enhanced role and is a key contributor to the high levels of vulnerability observed, along  
478 with *physical mobility* (m1 to m3) and *information use* (f1 and f2) (Supplementary Figure  
479 S8).

#### 480 *In the future*

481 The number of people living in flood prone areas is set to rise (by 45% to 10.8m people by  
482 the 2080s, assuming a high population growth, Supplementary Figure S9). By the 2080s  
483 6.4m people will be exposed to frequent flooding, up from 2m today (assuming a +4°C  
484 climate future and a continuation of the current level of adaptation). In socially vulnerable  
485 neighbourhoods the increase is equally dramatic, increasing from 451,000 today to 1.4m by  
486 the 2080s and disproportional exposure to flooding of those living in socially vulnerable  
487 neighbourhoods that exists today continues (Supplementary Figure S10). Those living in the  
488 most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods exposed to fluvial flooding see their risk increase  
489 at a faster rate (increasing from 24,000 to 63,000; +263%).

#### 490 **Expected annual damages and the influence of income and insurance**

##### 491 *The situation today*

492 Expected Annual (economic) Damages (EAD) across the UK is an estimated £351 million  
493 (residential property only), with the majority generated in England (79%, £277 million). The  
494 contribution from elsewhere in the UK is however more significant when considered in the  
495 context of the most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (Supplementary Figure S11). This is  
496 most significant in Northern Ireland where the 20% most vulnerable neighbourhoods  
497 account for 67% of the EAD (in Scotland the equivalent figure is 22%, in England 22% and in  
498 Wales 26%). Therefore, although Northern Ireland accounts for only 2% of the UK EAD  
499 when all neighbourhoods are included, when considered from the perspective of the most  
500 vulnerable neighbourhoods (*i.e.* the top 5% by NFVI) the contribution from Northern Ireland  
501 increases substantially to 10% of UK EAD.

502 These headline figures however mask the risks faced by individuals. When normalised by  
503 population across the four countries, those living in flood prone areas in Scotland are set to  
504 experience the highest EAD per person (on average, £113 per person) and over double that  
505 of England (on average, £50 per person) - Supplementary Figure S12. When considered by  
506 flood source, the highest EADs are experienced in fluvial (£97 per person) and coastal (£76  
507 per person) floodplains (in areas prone to surface water flooding we found the value to be  
508 much less at £16 per person). In many cases, these estimates change little between more  
509 and less socially vulnerable neighbourhoods, except in Wales where the most vulnerable  
510 neighbourhoods (5% by NFVI) are exposed to significantly lower risk (on average, £40 per  
511 person) compared to the average in Wales (£60 per person).

512 Lower incomes (~£7,500 per head in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods compared  
513 to ~£10,500 on average) and low levels of contents insurance penetration (~40% of  
514 homeowners and 25% of tenants compared to the national average of ~75%) mean the  
515 relative impact of a flood is higher in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods than elsewhere.

516 This is reflected in the substantial increase in '*relative economic pain*' (introduced above)  
517 with socially vulnerability. In areas prone to coastal/tidal flooding, for example, the most  
518 socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (5% by NFVI) experience over twice the average '*relative*  
519 '*economic pain*' (Sayers et al, 2017). In fluvial floodplains, the '*relative economic pain*' is  
520 three times higher than the average.

### 521 *In the future*

522 The EADs associated with flooding are set to rise (from £351 million today, residential direct  
523 damages only, to £1.1 billion by the 2080s, assuming a +4°C climate future, high population  
524 growth and a continuation of current levels of adaptation). At a UK scale the increase in  
525 EAD in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (defined by top 20% by NFVI) is, in general, in  
526 line with this overall increase; rising from £81 million today to £250 million by the 2080s  
527 (slightly greater than 20%). This is not the case in Scotland however, where the analysis  
528 suggests the contribution to EAD from the 20% most vulnerable neighbourhoods increases  
529 from 22% today to 29% by the 2080s.

530 The disproportionality in the risks faced by socially vulnerable neighbourhoods in coastal  
531 areas experienced today persists into the future (with substantial increases in risks  
532 experienced across all neighbourhoods). With fluvial and surface water flood risk the  
533 pattern of disproportionality in EAD also remains largely as today. When income and  
534 insurance are considered, the increase in EAD translates to significant increases in the REP  
535 across the UK and for all sources of flooding, particularly for the most vulnerable  
536 neighbourhoods.

### 537 **City regions in economic decline, deprivation and flood disadvantage**

#### 538 *The situation today*

539 At a UK scale, urban settings dominate flood risk, accounting for £264 million (75%) of  
540 present day EAD and 5.2 million (82%) of the people exposed to flooding. When considered  
541 from the perspective of socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (the top 20% by NFVI) the flood  
542 risks in rural neighbourhoods are however more significant, accounting for 45% of the total  
543 £47 million EAD and 30% of the people exposed to flooding (Supplementary Figure S13).

544 The relationship between deprivation and flood disadvantage is also striking. Sixteen of the  
545 24 city regions classed as in relative economic decline by Pike *et al.* (2016) experience levels  
546 of flood disadvantage above the UK average. This reflects a combination of influences but  
547 from the perspective of the analysis here is driven by higher than average levels of social  
548 vulnerability (as shown by the NFVI in those cities) and a greater than average number of  
549 people exposed to a frequent flood (in Glasgow, for example, those living in the floodplain  
550 are almost twice as likely to experience frequent flooding than the UK average). When  
551 income and insurance penetration are considered, the REP associated with flooding is  
552 significantly higher in these sixteen cities, reflecting the lower levels of income (on average)  
553 and lower levels of insurance (Figure 3).

554 This connection is, in part, recognised within government policy. The UK government, for  
555 example, collects data on deprivation across a range of domains (including income, health,  
556 housing quality, availability of services). These are combined into an Index of Multiple

557 Deprivation (the IMD – introduced earlier) and used across government to understand the  
558 distribution of social inequalities associated with a neighbourhood and to inform resources  
559 allocation. Although IMD is not however a measure of ‘flood social vulnerability’ *per se*,  
560 flood vulnerability (as defined by the NFVI) is much higher in deprived areas (as defined by  
561 the Index of Multiple Deprivation, IMD) and increases in line with the IMD (Supplementary  
562 Figure S14). This, of course, is to be expected as the NFVI and the IMD seek to express  
563 similar characteristics of a neighbourhood (although the NFVI is focused on those  
564 characteristics that make a neighbourhood ‘flood vulnerable’ rather than the more general  
565 expression of deprivation provided by the IMD). This distinction between the general  
566 measure of deprivation, given by the IMD, and the more specific expression of social  
567 vulnerability to flooding, as expressed by the NFVI, is important as flood risk in socially  
568 vulnerable areas (defined by the NFVI) is consistently greater than that in deprived areas  
569 (defined by the IMD). This suggests that the IMD fails properly to identify those areas that  
570 are at greatest flood disadvantage. The underlying reasons for this are difficult to  
571 determine without further research (and have not be explored further here); however,  
572 given the role of the IMD in FRM policy across the UK (including supporting the  
573 identification of investment priorities in England through the FDGiA) these differences may  
574 be significant and question if IMD is an appropriate measure for use in the FRM context.

#### 575 *Future risks*

576 In deprived neighbourhoods (as defined by the IMD) flood risk tends to increase in line with  
577 increases shown elsewhere. The focus on ‘deprivation’ however highlights the importance  
578 of income, and its influence in insurance penetration, in increasing the relative economic  
579 pain experienced by those flooded and is reflected in significant increases in REP into the  
580 future in the most deprived areas.

581 The greatest increases are seen in major and minor conurbations (experiencing an increase  
582 in EAD of 200% and 350% under a +2°C and +4°C climate future respectively) and rural  
583 towns and fringes in a sparse setting (increasing by 200% and 400%). In these settings, the  
584 most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods experience slightly higher percentage increases in  
585 risk when compared to less vulnerable neighbourhoods. This suggests that most vulnerable  
586 neighbourhoods in more dispersed settings (both urban and rural) may be particularly  
587 difficult to address within the current approach to adaptation and investment frameworks.

#### 588 **Long-term investment in England: Evidence for greater investment in vulnerable** 589 **neighbourhoods**

590 The Long-term Investment Scenarios (LTIS) published by the Environment Agency (2014a)  
591 explore the long-term investment case for reducing flood risk (in England) based on  
592 optimising the Net Present Value of the different investment choices, using a simplified set  
593 of policy options from ‘do nothing’ to ‘improve +’ with a time horizon stretching through to  
594 2100 (Supplementary Table S3). In doing so, LTIS considers costs and benefits but without  
595 any consideration of either who pays or the FDGiA rules that seek to positively discriminate  
596 in favour of the protection of deprived households (Defra, 2011). In this context, the LTIS  
597 investment analysis is based on the principle of ‘utility’, and although it does not attempt to  
598 set out priority short-term investments, the LTIS does set the long-term direction of travel.

599 The investment scenario which maximises the Net Present Value over the 100-year period is  
600 referred to as the “optimised investment scenario” (Environment Agency 2014). The  
601 analysis presented in the CCRA of the LTIS policy choices (Sayers et al., 2015) is extended  
602 here to explore the impact on risk in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods.

603 The results suggest that there is a strong case for improving the protection afforded to  
604 socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (with nearly 55% of properties assigned an *Improve* or  
605 *Improve+* policy option in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods, defined by the top by 5%  
606 NFVI, compared to c.35% on average; as illustrated by Supplementary Figure S15 that shows  
607 the percentage of residential property exposed to frequent flooding (*i.e.* a return period of  
608 1:75 years or less) that, under the optimised investment scenario, are assigned to each LTIS  
609 policy option). Residential properties in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods are also less  
610 likely to be assigned a ‘*do nothing*’ or a ‘*maintain crest*’ policy choice - indicating possible  
611 deteriorating or no change in protection standards - when compared to residential  
612 properties on average (c.48% compared to 61%). These results suggest that there is a direct  
613 long-term economic case for greater investment in FRM in vulnerable neighbourhoods,  
614 although this is an inference that which will need to be explored further in future research.

## 615 **Conclusions**

616 The research reported here reinforces the inability of existing metrics to properly capture  
617 the differential nature of the risks faced in more and less socially vulnerable communities.  
618 To overcome these deficiencies three new metrics are introduced to be used alongside  
619 existing metrics. Firstly, a *Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index* (NFVI) is shown to  
620 provide an improved expression of flood social vulnerability and is put forward as a  
621 replacement for the Index of Multiple Deprivation in FRM decision making. Secondly, the  
622 *Social Flood Risk Index* (SFRI) provides a combined expression of probability, exposure and  
623 vulnerability that enables flood risks in one neighbourhood to be compared with another in  
624 a way that explicitly accounts for social vulnerability. The thirdly, *Relative Economic Pain*  
625 (REP) index: by accounting for the influence of lower income levels and lowers levels of  
626 flood insurance the REP better reflects the experience of a given economic flood loss in  
627 more and less vulnerable neighbourhoods.

628 Based on these new metrics, and exploring our two research questions, the results highlight  
629 clusters of *geographic flood disadvantage* across the UK, with 50% of most socially  
630 vulnerable people exposed to flooding living in just ten local authorities. The results also  
631 highlight the *systemic flood disadvantage* experienced by those living in socially vulnerable  
632 neighbourhoods. For example, in economically struggling cities, coastal floodplains and  
633 dispersed rural communities the most socially vulnerable often experience levels of  
634 Expected Annual Damages above the average. When income and insurance penetration are  
635 considered (as represented by the REP index) the disproportionality in the risks faced is  
636 even more stark. This highlights the central role that lower incomes and lower levels of  
637 insurance penetration play in systemically disadvantaging the most socially vulnerable  
638 communities. Yet these communities contain people and households that are the least  
639 likely to be able to help themselves when flooded.



640 The spatial patterns of geographic disadvantage continue into the future with flood risks  
641 increasing for many neighbourhoods as a function of their geography (for example,  
642 assuming a continuation of current levels of adaptation the majority of communities at the  
643 coast experience significant increases in risk due to sea level rise). There is however a  
644 disproportional increase in flood risk faced by the most socially vulnerable. This acts to  
645 increase the systemic flood disadvantage and reflects the legacy of past investment and  
646 planning decisions, but is primarily influenced by the constraints on adaptation experienced  
647 by the socially vulnerable at both an individual and community level (including the limited  
648 capacity to make local contributions to the costs of FRM interventions, if such contributions  
649 are necessary).

650 Through re-examination of the optimised investment scenario in England within the Long-  
651 Term Investment Scenarios (Environment Agency, 2014) the research presented here  
652 reveals a strong long term economic case for improving the protection afforded to socially  
653 vulnerable communities (although the reasons for this future investment bias towards  
654 deprived areas are as yet unclear). Whatever the reason, it would appear there is a  
655 utilitarian argument for reducing the risk in the most vulnerable communities as well as a  
656 Rawlsian one. It is also clear that income (and consequently health, as in our NFVI but not in  
657 the IMD) are central drivers in flood vulnerability and are directly influenced by broader  
658 planning and economic development policy. Flood risk management investment should be  
659 geared up by supporting multiple parallel government and private sector funding streams.  
660 In England for example, the FDGiA process could be reconfigured to better support  
661 economic regeneration, for example in economically struggling city regions (highlighted  
662 here as centres of geographic flood disadvantage).

663 Many uncertainties remain and the results presented here will need continued research to  
664 better understand the root causes of flood vulnerability and disadvantage and how best to  
665 address them. This paper presents only a first step towards quantifying social justice  
666 dimensions in FRM, but already clearly highlights the systemic flood disadvantage that exists  
667 and the need to prioritise the most socially vulnerably if FRM is to deliver fair outcomes in  
668 the future (not least in response to climate change). To do so will require a greater  
669 emphasis to be placed on Rawlsian approaches alongside issues of utility and equality.  
670 Significant further research however will be needed to evaluate the ability of FRM policy,  
671 and broader spatial and economic policies, to deliver such outcomes.

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677

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804

## 805 **Figures**

806 **Figure 1 The Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index (NFVI): Influential characteristics**  
807 **and indicators**

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809 **Figure 3 City regions in Relative Decline: Relative Economic Pain of flooding**

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811 **Table 1 Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index: Indicators and supporting variables**

## 812 **Supplementary Figures**

813 **Supplementary Figure S1 An understanding of vulnerability, risk, and uncertainty is**  
814 **needed to make informed choices (Sayers et al., 2016).**

815 **Supplementary Figure S2 Exogenous change: Climate change and population growth**

816 **Supplementary Figure S3 Endogenous change: A portfolio of adaptation measures are**  
817 **considered (after Evans et al, 2004a&b; Sayers et al, 2014).**

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819 **disadvantage**

820 **Supplementary Figure S5 Indicators of social flood resilience and disadvantage**

821 **Supplementary Figure S6 Neighbourhood Impact Curve: Example relationship return**  
822 **period v impact used within the FFE (after Sayers *et al.*, 2015)**

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824 **(NFVI)**

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827 **Supplementary Figure S9 Future change: Floodplain population: By country**

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831 **Supplementary Figure S12 Present day: Expected Annual Damages: Individual (By country)**

832 **Supplementary Figure S13 Present day: A comparison of flood risk in rural and urban**  
833 **settings**

834 **Supplementary Figure S14 Present day: A comparison of risks in deprived and vulnerable**  
835 **neighbourhoods**

836 **Supplementary Figure S15 Percentage of residential properties in areas receiving a**  
837 **particular policy choice**


838 **Supplementary tables**

839 **Supplementary Table S1 Present day: Population of flood prone areas**

840 **Supplementary Table S2 Present day: People exposed to frequent flooding (1:75 years or**  
841 **more frequent)**


842 **Supplementary Table S3 The LTIS policy options** (from Long Term Investment Strategy  
843 (LTIS) Improvements – Part 1 Technical Documentation, June 2014, Environment Agency  
844 (2014))

# Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index (NFVI)








**Population on Coastal Floodplain**




**Population on Fluvial Floodplain**




All neighbourhoods




Top 5% neighbourhoods



Top 10% neighbourhoods




Top 20% neighbourhoods



**Table 1 Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index: Indicators and supporting variables**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Supporting variables</b>	
Age	a1	Young children (% people under 5 years)
	a2	Older people (% people over 75 years)
Health	h1	Disability / people in ill-health (% people whose day- to-day activities are limited)
	h2	Households with at least one person with long-term limiting illness (%)
Income	i1	Unemployed (% unemployed)
	i2	Long-term unemployed (% who are long-term unemployed or who have never worked)
	i3	Low income occupations (% in routine or semi-routine occupations)
	i4	Households with dependent children and no adults in employment (%)
	i5	People income deprived (%)
Information use	f1	Recent arrivals to UK (% people with <1-year residency coming from outside UK)
	f2	Level of proficiency in English
Local knowledge	k1	New migrants from outside the local area (%)
Tenure	t1	Private renters (% Households)
	t2	Social renters (% households renting from social landlords)
Physical mobility	m1	High levels of disability (% disabled)
	m2	People living in medical and care establishments (%)
	m3	Lack of private transport (% households with no car or van)
Crime	c1	High levels of crime
Housing characteristics	hc1	Caravan or other mobile or temporary structures in all households (%)
Direct flood experience	e1	No. of properties exposed to significant flood risk (%) (acts to reduce social vulnerability)
Service availability	s1	Emergency services exposed to flooding (%)
	s2	Care homes exposed to flooding (%)
	s3	GP surgeries exposed to flooding (%)
	s4	Schools exposed to flooding (%)
Social networks (non-flood)	n1	Single-pensioner households (%)
	n2	Lone-parent households with dependent children (%)
	n3	Children of primary school age (4-11) in the population (%) (acts to reduce social vulnerability)





**Climate change**

Changes in mean sea level, peak river flow and short duration intense rainfall based on projected changes in Global Mean Temperature (GMT) of 2°C and 4°C (from the 1961-90 baseline as used in UKCP09) by the 2080s.

Changes in the chance of flooding

**Population growth**

Changes in population by local authority based on low and high growth projections as published by the Adaptation Sub-Committee (ASC, 2015) and used in UK CCRA (Sayers *et al.*, 2015).

Increased exposure to flooding

**Appropriately managing flooding processes**

- River and coastal defences
- Management of catchment run-off
- Management of shoreline morphology
- Management of urban flood processes

**Reducing the chance of flooding**

**Making good planning choices**


- Spatial planning and development control
- Building regulations

**Managing the exposure to flooding**


**Supporting individuals and organizations**


- Receptor Level Resilience measures
- Forecasting, warning and community response
- Insurance


**Reducing the vulnerability of those exposed**

































■ England ■ Northern Ireland ■ Scotland ■ Wales














**Supplementary Table S1 Present day: Population of flood prone areas**

	All neighbourhoods (000s)	Vulnerable neighbourhoods (000s)					
		Top 20% by NFVI		Top 10% by NFVI		Top 5% by NFVI	
<b>By country</b>							
UK	6,398	1,497	23%	802	13%	419	7%
England	5,508	1,216	22%	635	12%	316	6%
Wales	378	107	28%	45	12%	13	3%
Scotland	376	74	20%	56	15%	32	8%
Northern Ireland	136	74	55%	52	38%	37	27%
<b>By flood source</b>							
All sources	6,398	1,497	23%	802	13%	419	7%
Coastal (and tidal)	1,809	604	33%	340	19%	179	10%
Surface water	2,869	594	21%	293	10%	148	5%
Fluvial	1,720	299	17%	155	9%	71	4%

**Supplementary Table S2 Present day: People exposed to frequent flooding (1:75 years or more frequent)**

	All neighbourhoods (000s)	Vulnerable neighbourhoods (000s)					
		Top 20% by NFVI		Top 10% by NFVI		Top 5% by NFVI	
<b>By country</b>							
UK	1,985	1,333	67%	239	12%	122	6%
England	1,612	1,216	75%	174	11%	88	5%
Wales	117	36	30%	15	13%	4	3%
Scotland	200	51	26%	29	15%	17	9%
Northern Ireland	55	29	53%	20	35%	14	25%
<b>By flood source</b>							
All sources	1,985	451	23%	239	12%	122	6%
Coastal (and tidal)	489	164	33%	95	19%	50	10%
Surface water	870	103	12%	52	6%	24	3%
Fluvial	626	184	29%	92	15%	48	8%

**Supplementary Table S3 The LTIS policy options** (from Long Term Investment Strategy (LTIS) Improvements – Part 1 Technical Documentation, June 2014, Environment Agency (2014))

<b>Policy Option</b>	<b>Change to expenditure</b>	<b>Change to risk</b>
Do Nothing	Passive assets <sup>1</sup> : no expenditure on maintenance or replacement of passive flood risk management assets  Active assets: not included in expenditure	Passive assets degrade and fail over a short period of time. The level of flood risk will increase quickly over time as assets fail. Non-operation of active assets increases risk on the very short term
Maintain crest level	Maintain and replace current flood risk management assets to their existing crest levels	The level of flood risk will increase over time due to climate change.
Maintain current flood risk	Maintain current flood risk management assets, replace with larger/longer/more robust structures. Build new assets	The level of flood risk will remain static as the size of defences keeps pace with climate change
Improve	Maintain and replace current flood risk management assets. Assets to be replaced with larger/longer/more robust structures. Build new assets	The level of flood risk reduces as assets are replaced with ones that offer a better standard of protection
Improve+	Maintain and replace current assets. Assets to be replaced with larger/longer/more robust structures. Build new assets	The level of flood risk reduces as assets are replaced with ones that offer a better standard of protection

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<sup>1</sup> The term “asset” here refers to any structure or other intervention that influences flood probability. They are seen as assets as they have this valuable role (Sayers et al, 2015b).