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Understanding Responses to Political Conflict: Interactive Effects of the Need for Closure

and Salient Conflict Schemas

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Abstract

Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure and preferences for conflict-resolution strategies in two different samples of elite political actors. While research suggests that the high need for closure should be associated with competitiveness, we argue that this relationship should be strongest among political actors with a hostile "conflict schema," or representation of what a conflict is and how it should be dealt with. We provide evidence for this hypothesis using archival survey data on American foreign policy officials' attitudes toward international conflict at the height of the Cold War (Study 1) and our own data on the relationship between the need for closure and conflict-strategy preferences among samples of activists from two political parties in Poland – a centrist party with a reputation for cooperativeness and an extremist party with a reputation for confrontation (Study 2). The broader implications of these findings are discussed.

The discord associated with many political conflicts often conceals the fact that such conflicts may have positive outcomes and lead to needed social changes, if they are successfully resolved (Deutsch, 1973; Habermas, 1972). A variety of studies suggest that the course and the outcome of political conflicts depend heavily on the strategies adopted by members of parties to the conflict, particularly political actors at the "elite" level, such as government officials, party activists, and negotiators. Constructive agreements with a potential for valuable social improvements are most likely to emerge when group representatives consider their opponents' perspectives and take cooperative steps to achieve a peaceful solution. In contrast, socially disruptive confrontations are more likely when group representatives choose to single-mindedly pursue their own group's goals at the expense of their opponents' interests (Deutsch, 1973; Ross & Ward, 1995; Sherif, 1958).

Why do some political actors choose dialogue and cooperation, while others prefer a more coercive approach? While studies indicate that a number of situational factors may influence conflict-strategy preferences, there also appear to be stable individual differences in people's responses to conflict (Rahim, 1983; Rahim & Magner, 1995; Sternberg & Dobson, 1987; Sternberg & Soriano, 1984; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974, 1978; Tosi, Rizzo, & Carroll , 1990). In turn, these individual differences seem to be mediated by variance in decision-makers' understandings of a conflict situation (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995; Ross, 1990; Rothbart, 1993; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). Specifically, cooperation is more likely when a conflict is seen in a relatively complex way – i.e., as a mixed-motive situation in which the parties' respective goals are only partially incompatible. Conversely, confrontation and coercion are more likely in the context of simple, black-and-white perceptions of conflict, where the positions of one's own party are seen as indisputable and the opponent's perspective is not acknowledged or appreciated (Deutsch, 1973; Golec, 2002a,b; Wallbaum, 1993).

Why are some political actors able to form a complex understanding of conflict situations, while others understand them in simplistic terms? In the studies reported here, we focus in particular on an

explanation suggested by several recent studies: namely, individual differences in the <u>need for cognitive</u>

<u>closure</u>, or the degree to which one is motivated to seek out, possess, and rely on knowledge that is clear,

unambiguous, and stable (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). In this vein, several studies suggest that

individuals high in the need for closure may tend to construe conflicts in a one-sided, black-and-white

fashion. This suggests that a high need for closure should be associated with a more aggressive approach

toward intergroup conflict (e.g., Shah et al., 1998). However, we argue that a high need for closure may

be associated with conflict-strategy preferences not only by virtue of its relationship with simplistic

understandings of social reality, but also by virtue of its tendency to produce increased reliance on salient

beliefs about how conflict should be dealt with. On this basis, we suggest that the need for closure may

be associated with a competitive approach to the resolution of conflicts primarily among actors who

subscribe to a competitive "conflict schema," i.e., a model of intergroup relations which suggests that

aggression is the proper way of dealing with opponents (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989).

Conversely, adherence to conflict schemas emphasizing dialogue and cooperation may mitigate

aggressive responses among political actors who would be otherwise motivated to respond to conflict in a

coercive fashion. We begin our discussion with a more general look at the motivational antecedents of

responses to social conflict.

<u>The need for closure and responses to intergroup conflict</u>

A broader body of research on motivational influences on social perception highlights two

tendencies which may lead political actors to prefer aggressive responses to conflict: directional and non-

directional motivations (cf. Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). While directional

motivations are aimed specifically at producing a relatively favorable evaluation of the self or ingroup in

comparative situations (e.g. Pettigrew, 1979; Ross & Ward, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also

Diekman, Samuels, Ross & Bazerman, 1997; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer & Babcock, 1993),

non-directional motivations are not aimed at producing a specific view of social reality. Instead, they

merely influence the manner in which social reality is constructed, without reference to the content of the

perceptions that are eventually produced (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).

One of the most significant of these motivations – both in general and specifically with regard to the formation of conflict-related preferences – is the aforementioned <u>need for closure</u>. Defined more precisely, the need for closure refers to the way in which individuals approach and reduce cognitive uncertainty. It consists of a desire to quickly formulate and firmly hold onto a clear opinion on an issue, rather than accepting confusion and ambiguity. It manifests itself as a preference for order, stability and predictability in one's surroundings, as well as a closed orientation to new experiences and a preference for decisiveness. Research suggests that the need for closure has important effects on information processing when opinions about a new issue are being formulated and on the subsequent rigidity of these opinions (Kruglanski & Webster 1996, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). People characterized by a high need for closure are motivated to reduce the discomfort associated with uncertainty as fast as possible, usually by seizing on whatever cognitive cues are easily available in their social environment in an effort to achieve clarity. When an opinion has already been crystallized, they are motivated to protect the closure provided by this opinion. As a result, their thinking becomes rigid and their opinions are resistant to change even in the presence of disconfirming information.

The penchant for clarity, certainty, and simplicity associated with a high need for closure may push political representatives and decision-makers to favor a competitive approach to conflict. A refusal to compromise with or even acknowledge the prerogatives of opponents reinforces a simple view of the world in which the ingroup is right and outsiders are wrong, and it allows to avoid the tedious, closure-delaying process of having to adjudicate between competing interests and work out an integrative agreement (Bar-Tal, 1998; Golec, 2002a,b; Kruglanski &Webster, 1996; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, O'Brien 1995; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock & Ramirez, 1997). Moreover, the goal of competition – the defeat of one's opponents – suggests a finality and certainty consistent with the desires of those high in the need for closure (Jost et al., 1999, 2003; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Thus, while competition has the potential for destructive consequences, it may also provide decision-makers with a kind of epistemic satisfaction. All other things being equal, this satisfaction may attract decision-makers with a high need for closure to competition and aggression,

particularly under the stressful conditions which characterize many conflicts (Golec, 2002b; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). Consistent with these arguments, research on the role of the need for closure in bargaining situations suggests that negotiators high in need for closure are more influenced by stereotypes about the opposing party's behavior and characteristics and less likely to use information which allows them to understand a given conflict from perspectives other than own (De Dreu, Koole & Oldersma, 1999; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Golec, 2002a; Richter & Kruglanski, 1996).

Need for closure and the use of salient cues: The role of conflict schemas

However, there is another tendency associated with the need for closure that may have an impact on conflict-resolution preferences among political representatives and decision-makers. More precisely, a recent line of research suggests that a high need for cognitive closure may induce a general "group-centrism" – a syndrome of attitudes valuing the ingroup and its norms, particularly when that ingroup is highly homogenous. According to this line of work, people motivated by the high need for closure favor homogenous in-groups because their shared beliefs provide a firm, socially-validated definition of "reality" which can be seized upon amidst uncertainty (DeGrada, Kruglanski, Manetti & Pierro, 1999; Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro & Manetti, 2002; Shah et al., 1998; see also Jost et al., 1999, 2003).

What this suggests is that individual differences in the need for closure may not only have a direct effect on political actors' conflict-strategy preferences, but also an effect on the degree to which these preferences are influenced by salient beliefs about the appropriateness of various conflict-resolution strategies. Among other things, the need for closure may lead decision-makers to seize on norms provided by the conflict schemas that are most accessible in their minds. Conflict schemas are learned social constructs which define (1) what kinds of social situations may be regarded as conflicts, (2) when and how a conflict starts and how it should end, and (3) what the most desirable ways of dealing with such conflicts are (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989). These schemas are acquired through normal processes of cultural and political socialization. Their contents are imparted and reinforced by parents, educational and societal authorities, and the mass media, usually in ways which link them to broader ideologies, worldviews, and social identities. Importantly, there are a variety of possible conflict schemas: some

worldviews and identities may be associated with schemas which suggest a distrust of outsiders and a need to rely on "tough," aggressive strategies, while others may suggest schemas emphasizing a need for cooperation (see Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Golec, 2002b; Holsti, 1996; Jakubowska, 2002; Rokeach, 1967; see also Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, Dyer, Ohbuchi & Fukuno, 2001; Pearson & Stephan, 1998; Tinsley, 1998, 2001). In turn, these schemas constrain the strategic preferences of the group representatives and decision-makers, leading them to adopt the strategies defined as normative by their schemas (Bar-Tal et al., 1989). Since high need for closure individuals tend to adhere to whatever they perceive to be the normative response associated with salient cues, they may be more influenced by the conflict schema implied by an important worldview or political identity – whether competitive or cooperative – and adjust their preferences and actions accordingly in the midst of political conflict.

Thus, we argue that the relationship between epistemic motivation and conflict-strategy preferences of political actors may be somewhat complex. On one hand, a great deal of existing research on the impact of epistemic motivation in intergroup situations posits a direct relationship between the need for closure and a preference for competition: high levels of need for closure should lead to a need for black-and-white responses to conflict among political decision-makers, resulting in escalation. From this point of view, competition services the need for simplicity and finality associated with a high need for closure by pushing for the categorical defeat of parties thought to impede the realization of the ingroup's interests and values. On the other hand, research on epistemic motivation also raises the more complex possibility of an interactive process, in which the relationship between the need for closure and competitiveness may be more pronounced for some political actors than for others. More precisely, this relationship may be stronger when the conflict schema associated with a relevant worldview or political identity defines competition as normative. In this case, the preference for simplicity and finality described above and the effects of adhering more strongly to a salient conflict schema push conflict-strategy preferences in the same direction, i.e., toward competition. In contrast, if a salient conflict schema defines cooperation as normative, two effect of the high need for closure may push in opposite directions. The need for simplicity may increase a tendency to compete but it may be mitigated or even

canceled out by a tendency to cooperate associated with the increased adherence to a cooperative

"conflict schema" (see also Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2003). As a result, the relationship between the need

for closure and a preference for competition may be weaker among political actors with a less hostile

conflict schema. This suggests that any main-effect relationship between the need for closure and

aggressive responses to conflict may in fact be qualified by an important interaction between the need for

closure and the content of decision-makers' working models of conflict.

To our knowledge, neither of these interrelated hypotheses about the antecedents of conflict-

strategy preferences has been adequately explored in samples of real-world political representatives and

decision-makers. In the studies reported here, we examine these hypotheses in the context of two real-

world conflicts, using two unique samples of elite political actors. In Study 1, we examine archival data

on American foreign policy officials' attitudes toward international conflict during the Cold War. Here,

we looked at the relationship between a proxy measure of the need for closure and hawkishness among

foreign-policy officials whose conflict schemas varied in hostility. In Study 2, we generalize our findings

by looking at the relationship between the need for closure and conflict-strategy preferences among

activists from two political parties in Poland – a centrist party with a reputation for tolerance and the use

of conciliatory political strategies (i.e., the Union of Liberty), and an extremist party with a reputation for

the use of confrontational strategies (i.e., the League of Polish Families).

Study 1

As noted above, Study 1 examined our hypotheses in a unique sample of American foreign-policy

officials surveyed at the height of the Cold War. The data were originally collected by political scientist

Bernard Mennis in 1966, as part of a larger project aimed at understanding the beliefs of the American

foreign-policy elite (see Mennis, 1971). These individuals were all employees of either the U.S.

Department of Defense or the U.S. Department of State at the time, and can thus be considered elite

political actors charged with the duties of representation and decision-making on behalf of the United

States in the international arena. Fortunately, the Mennis dataset contained a number of "rigidity" items

that closely matched contemporary measures of the need for closure in terms of content, as well as several

items assessing the degree to which respondents saw the world as divided into warring groups of "friends" and "foes." Respectively, these two sets of items allowed us to construct satisfactory proxy measures of the need for closure and respondents' conflict schemas.

Using these data, we explored our hypotheses in the context of the Cold War confrontation between the USA and the USSR. According to the "simplicity" hypothesis described earlier, one might expect the need for closure to be associated with a hawkish approach to relations with the Soviet Union, since vigorously opposing the enemy reinforces the validity of the national cause and promises closure in the form of eventual victory. However, research on attitudes toward international conflict at both the elite and mass levels suggests considerable variance in the conflict schemas people bring to bear on judgments about foreign affairs (see Holsti, 1996). In this vein, studies have found reliable individual differences in the degree to which political actors rigidly divide the social world into "friends" and "foes," with any cooperative overtures toward the latter being seen as betrayal and weakness. Studies of this sort also find differences in the degree to which political and social life is generally viewed as a competitive, anomic struggle between self-interested agents (Holsti, 1996; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Wittkopf, 1990). In particular, those who gravitate toward the "hostile" end of this worldview spectrum tend to favor more aggressive ways of dealing with foreign powers, particularly those seen as immediate threats (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Holsti, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990). Accordingly, consistent with the qualification suggested by the "conflict-schema" hypothesis, we expected that the relationship between the need for closure and a hawkish approach to the Soviet Union would be most pronounced among officials whose worldviews make sharp "friend/foe" distinctions and depict compromise as dangerous.

<div align="center">Method</div>

Data

As noted above, the data for this study were taken from Bernard Mennis' 1966 survey of American foreign-policy officials (see Mennis, 1971). Individuals from both civilian and military backgrounds were considered. The respondents (N = 95) were asked about their attitudes toward American foreign policy, the nature of the Soviet threat, the domestic and international impact of the Cold

War, and various strategies for the management of international conflict. In addition, measures of respondents' basic political attitudes, worldview, and levels of cognitive rigidity were also included in the survey. All respondents were male, and the overwhelming majority of them (i.e., 93) were White.

Measures

In this study, two independent variables – a proxy measure of the need for closure and respondents' conflict schemas – and one dependent variable – hawkishness in the Cold War context – were considered. All of these variables were recoded to run from 0 to 1 prior to the analyses. For all variables other than the demographics, descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are provided in Table 1.

Need for closure proxy. As noted above, the Mennis (1971) data included a number of "rigidity" items. They were fairly similar in content to contemporary individual-difference measures of the need for closure and served as an adequate proxy. While there were 22 rigidity items in all, only those that mapped onto the content domain of the contemporary Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) were used to create the actual measure. Each of these items was answered on a 1-to-7 scale ranging from "disagree very much" to "agree very much." (see Appendix A). Together, they formed a reliable scale (α = .76) with higher scores indicating a high need for closure. In order to validate our use of this scale as a proxy for the need for closure, we had a sample of college students (N = 520) respond to both the proxy items and the 42 items from the actual Need for Closure scale. LISREL's full-information maximum-likelihood procedure (Joreskog, Sorbom , du Toit, & du Toit, 2001) was then used to obtain the correlation between latent factors corresponding to the proxy items and the actual NFC items. This allowed us to estimate the disattenuated correlation between the two measures while correcting for missing values on the scale items. In this sample, the factors corresponding to each scale were indeed highly related (φ = .82, p<.0001), supporting our proposed use of the proxy items.[2]

Conflict schema measure. In order to test our model, we also needed an index of the degree to which members of our elite sample possessed a general worldview indicative of a competitive conflict schema. In particular, we were interested in measuring the extent to which respondents generally made sharp "friend/foe" distinctions and regarded compromise with "foes" as dangerous. For this purpose, we

chose seven survey items included in the original dataset, which were averaged to form a scale ($\alpha = .54$; see Appendix A for the actual items). These items focused specifically on the degree to which respondents perceived social life in terms of black-and-white conflicts between those who were right and those who were wrong, viewed compromise with moral suspicion, and saw human relations as competitive and anomic. We believe that the scale formed by these items comes close to measuring the conflict-schema dimension we were interested in. Consistent with our interpretation of the measure, it was correlated with our dependent measure of hawkishness (i.e., $p<.01$; see Table 1).[1] Moreover, it was reliably correlated with a single-item measure of political conservatism (see below; $r = .25$, $p<. 01$), a dimension which has also been linked to hostile perceptions in the international domain (Holsti, 1996; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1990). Higher scores indicated a more competitive conflict schema

Hawkishness. Four items were used to measure the hawkishness of respondents' attitudes toward how to deal with the Soviet Union: (1) "Do you think arms control and disarmament are questions worth discussing" (answered on a 1-5 scale ranging from "definitely worth discussing" to "not worth discussing"); (2) "Relative to other foreign-policy concerns, how much attention should these proposals get" (answered on a 1-3 scale, with the response categories "much," "some," and "little"); (3) "What is your feeling about further arms control agreements between the United States and Russia" (answered on a 1-7 scale ranging from "strongly approve" to "strongly disapprove," with "neutral" as the midpoint); and (4) an item asking about support for the 1963 Test Ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union , i.e., "The United States and Russia recently concluded a bilateral agreement banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Do you approve or disapprove of this East/West agreement?" (answered on the same 1-7 scale as item 3). All items were coded such that higher responses indicated greater hawkishness. Together, the items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .86$).

Controls. Importantly, recent research suggests that the need for closure may be bound up with a number of other predispositions – such as political conservatism – that allow individuals to manage fear and uncertainty through support for the status quo and conventional ideas (e.g., Jost et al 1999, 2003). Moreover, research on foreign-policy attitudes suggests that these predispositions may also overlap with

conflict-schema dimension whose effects we are primarily interested in (Holsti, 1996; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1990). This raises the possibility that the explanatory power of our primary independent variables may actually be attributable to these other worldview factors. As such, three measures of constructs related to the management of fear and uncertainty were also included in the analyses. Two of these tapped general conservatism. The first item measured ideology: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as liberal, conservative, or independent?" Respondents answered this item on seven-point scale ranging from "strong liberal" to "strong conservative." The second item measured party identification: ""Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?" Respondents answered this item on seven-point scale ranging from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican." Both of these items were coded so that higher scores indicated a stronger tilt to the right. Finally, a third measure assessed religiosity, another conventional worldview dimension that has been linked to the management of anxiety (Jost et al, 2003). Two items were included: (1) "Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, or never?" and (2) "How religious would you say you are?" Both of these items were answered on a three-point scale, and responses were coded so that higher scores indicated greater religiosity. The two items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .85$).

Demographics. Four demographics were also included: (1) education (1 = high school degree or less; 2 = bachelor's degree; 3 = master's degree; 4 = doctoral degree); (2) age (in years); (3) number of years in foreign service; and (4) a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was in the military or not (-1 = civilian; 1 = military).

Results

In order to examine our hypotheses, we estimated a series of hierarchical ordinary least-squares regression models. The hawkishness index was used as the dependent variable in these analyses. In addition to looking at the main and interactive effects of the need for closure proxy and respondents' conflict schemas, these models also included the three controls and the four demographics. The inclusion of these measures allowed us to adjust the estimates for the influence of conflated factors related to the management of fear and uncertainty and respondents' background characteristics. All independent

variables were centered, and Huber-White robust standard errors were used in order to protect against the possible effects of heteroskedasticity (Long & Ervin, 2000).

The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 2. In this table, Model 1 examines the first-order effects of the need for closure and the conflict schema measure, as well as the effects of the controls and demographics. This models reveal a positive relationship between a hostile worldview on the conflict-schema measure and hawkishness ($\underline{b} = .40$, $\underline{p}<.05$). Moreover, it also indicates a weak but marginally significant effect of being in the military ($\underline{b} = .04$, $\underline{p}<.10$), such that foreign-policy officials with a military background were more likely to express hawkish views. Moreover, as the "simplicity" hypothesis would suggest, a high need for closure was indeed associated with hawkishness ($\underline{b} = .61$, $\underline{p}<.01$). None of the other coefficients were significant (all $\underline{p}s>.10$)

However, the conflict-schema hypothesis suggests that this relationship should be moderated by the endorsement of a hostile conflict schema. Model 2 examined this effect by adding the two-way interaction between these two variables. The coefficient for this interaction was significant and in the right direction ($b = 3.01$, $p<.01$). In order to probe this interaction, simple slopes for the relationship between the need for closure proxy and hawkishness were computed at one standard deviation below (for a less hostile worldview) and one standard deviation above (for a more hostile worldview) the mean for the conflict-schema variable. The relationship between the need for closure proxy and the dependent measure failed to reach significance among those with a less hostile worldview on the conflict schema variable ($\underline{b} = .24$, SE $\underline{b} = .24$, $\underline{p}>.30$). However, the need for closure was positively and significantly associated with hawkishness among those with a more hostile worldview on the conflict-schema measure ($b = 1.02$, SE $\underline{b} = .23$, $p<.001$). Thus, our results suggest that the interactive conflict-schema model may provide a more detailed description of the relationship between the need for closure and aggressive responses to conflict in the Cold War context.[3]

<div align="center">Discussion</div>

On the whole, our analysis of the 1966 foreign-policy officials data provided an interesting first look at our hypotheses. Consistent with the "simplicity" hypothesis and previous research, our results

indicated that high need-for-closure officials were more hawkish. However, consistent with our "conflict-schema" hypothesis, these results were qualified by a significant interaction between the need-for-closure proxy and the conflict-schema measure: a high need for closure was significantly and positively associated with hawkishness among officials with relatively hostile schemas, but not among officials whose schemas were low in hostility. While these results are certainly instructive, they suffer from a few weaknesses. The archival nature of the data forced us to improvise with regard to the measurement of the need for closure: instead of using the contemporary Need for Closure Scale, which was not published until the mid-1990s (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), we relied on a conceptually-similar proxy measure. Moreover, while our sample did consist of a historically important group of elite decision-makers, it was both culturally and temporally narrow, raising issues about the generalizability of the findings to other groups of elite actors. In order to deal with these shortcomings we undertook a second study, in which we looked at the attitudes of activists from two Polish political parties with markedly different reputations for behavior during conflicts: the Union of Liberty and the League of Polish Families. This not only allowed us to repeat our basic analysis using the actual Need for Closure Scale (see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and samples from two political groups with very different conflict schemas, but it also allowed us to generalize and extend these findings in a sample of political actors from a different society and time period, who were choosing strategies of action towards political opponents in a different political conflict, i.e., the domestic conflict between supporters and opponents of Polish accession to European Union.

<div align="center">Study 2</div>

<div align="center">Method</div>

Sample and Procedure

The political parties. As noted above, we surveyed young representatives from two different Polish political parties: the centrist Union of Liberty and the nationalist League of Polish Families. On one hand, the Union of Liberty (Unia Wolności; UW) is a moderate political party that emerged after the demise of the communist regime in 1989. Its leaders had previously formed the intellectual core of the democratic opposition during the communist period. It has a broadly liberal-democratic orientation

(Golec, 2002c), and its members favor a free market economy, a secular state, and European integration. In its approach to political problems – and in its rhetoric – the Union of Liberty favors dialogue with all political groups and tends to adopt a conciliatory stance toward its opponents. Consistent with this description, the Union's manifesto characterizes itself as "a party of reason and moderation; a party...open to all social organizations and social groups" (http://www.uw.org.pl/).

On the other hand, the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin; LPR) consists of individuals who had previously formed the core of the more nationalistic, right-wing element of the communist-era opposition. In its program, rhetoric, and actions, the LPR takes a confrontational, right-wing stance toward most issues currently faced by Polish society. Members of the LPF favor a rigid, sometimes-exclusionary defense of Polish national traditions and the role of the Catholic Church in public life, and they oppose Poland's application to join the European Union. The party's orientation is somewhat hostile to democracy in its classical-liberal form (Golec, 2001, 2002c), and it is often regarded as an extremist party, both at home and abroad. Accordingly, the party's manifesto firmly asserts that "obviously, we can cooperate only with those groups and organizations which share our political program" (http://www.wszechpolacy.pl/).

In accordance with these characterizations, the UW can be regarded as having a relatively cooperative conflict schema, while the LPR can be though of as having a relatively competitive conflict schema (Golec, 2001, 2002c). Below, we report analyses confirming this distinction. According to our conflict-schema hypothesis, a high need for closure may result in support for conflict-escalating strategies among members of the LPR, whose conflict schema pushes them in the direction of confrontation, but not among members of the UW, whose conflict schema places less emphasis on the aggressive confrontation.

The conflict. On 13 December 1997, Poland was invited to join the European Union, and official negotiations over conditions of the accession started in March 1998. Thereafter, the Polish political scene (and the broader society) became divided with regard to the issue of integration, although a majority of Poles supported the move. Supporters argued that European integration would have a positive economic and social impact: accession to European Union would invigorate commerce, attract foreign investors,

facilitate access to European aid programs, improve national security, stabilize democracy, reduce unemployment, and improve educational opportunity and ecological conditions. Opponents of European integration argued that accession was problematic and endangered Polish national sovereignty: it would be too costly in economic and social terms; it would destroy Polish agriculture, industry, and commerce, allowing foreign domination in these domains; and it would endanger Poland's traditional value system and national identity. The referendum was carried on June 7-8th, 2003. With 59% turnout, 77% of the nation's eligible voters supported integration. Nevertheless, prior to the vote, Polish accession to European Union was still a live, divisive issue; it was at this time that our study was conducted. In particular, the two parties described above took vastly different positions on this issue: the Union of Liberty strongly supported integration, while the League of Polish Families strongly opposed it.

Data collection. The data for the study were collected in April 2003, prior to the referendum on EU integration. As noted above, the issue of accession was still a live one at this point. The data were provided by activists and functionaries representing the two political parties described above. Data collection was carried out in the local headquarters of the parties' youth organizations in Krakow, a major urban center. Permission to conduct the study was obtained from party leaders by the first author, and both the respondents and party leaders were assured that the data would be kept confidential and used for scientific purposes only. The respondents themselves were contacted through leaders of the youth organizations within the parties of interest, and they were recruited for actual participation during weekly party meetings. Respondents were recruited on a volunteer basis and paid the equivalent of U.S. $10 for their participation (i.e., 40 Polish zloty). They were then asked to fill out a questionnaire containing the measures described below.[4] Respondents were fully debriefed after the study. The final sample contained 100 respondents: 50 representing the Union of Liberty and another 50 representing the League of Polish Families. The UW sample ranged in age from 15 to 34 years (M = 21.82). Thirty-one of them were men and 18 were women (one person did not report their gender) Nine of them had primary education, 15 had high school education, 19 were students, and 5 had university degrees (2 subjects did not report their education). The LPR sample ranged in age from 16 to 29 years (M = 22.23), and included 44 men and 6

women . Across both parties, 3 respondents had a primary education, 17 had high school education, 17 were students and 4 had university education (three subjects failed to provide educational information).

<u>Measures</u>

The measures used in this study are described below. Descriptive statistics for members of each party and intercorrelations for the entire sample can be found in Table 5.

<u>Need for closure.</u> In this study, we used a Polish version of Webster and Kruglanski's (1994) Need for Closure Scale (Golec, 2001; 2002c). This scale consists of 42 items assessing the five aspects of the construct: a desire for predictability, a preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-mindedness. Higher scores indicate a higher need for closure (α = .86).

<u>Party identification.</u> Respondents were also asked to indicate their party identification in the questionnaire. A centered dummy variable corresponding to respondents' party membership was created for the actual analysis (-1 = Union of Liberty; 1 = League of Polish Families).

<u>Social dominance orientation.</u> This scale, an individual difference measure of degree to which one accepts social hierarchy and is willing to use dominance-oriented strategies in the pursuit of group interests, was included as a measure of whether the conflict schemas shared by the parties in our study were different. Prior work on this construct has defined it in terms of a Darwinistic view of intergroup relations, where some groups dominate and others must necessarily be subordinate (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Moreover, other studies have empirically linked SDO to various logical correlates of a hostile conflict schema, including Machiavellianism and "meanness" (Altemeyer, 1998), "toughmindedness," a tendency to see the world as a "competitive jungle" (Duckitt et al., 2002), and the negative end of "agreeableness" dimension of the Big Five (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On the basis of these findings, we assumed that greater SDO would indicate a preference for competition and dominance – rather than dialogue and understanding – as the basis of intergroup relations. A 14-item version of the scale was used in this study (SDO_5; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The higher the score on this scale, the higher the SDO level (α = .88).

Preference for competition over cooperation. In this study, we used a shortened version of the Strategies of Political Conflict Resolution Questionnaire (Golec, 2003). After asking subjects to indicate their positions in the conflict over European integration (100% in favor in UW and 100% against in LPR), we then asked them to indicate on a series of 7-point Likert scales how likely it was that they would choose each of 19 strategies for dealing with their opponents in this conflict if they were their party's representatives; responses were given on a scale ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). The 19 items included in the questionnaire were based on clusters of conflict strategies which emerged during content-analytic validation studies (Golec, 2003). Briefly, the strategy items were selected based on content analyses of 10 international and 10 domestic political conflicts. The conflicts were analyzed by four expert judges, who described the strategies adopted by parties to these conflicts and then sorted them into related clusters. Two independent judges (different from the first four) were then given a description of these clusters and asked to classify five new real-world political conflicts using them. The agreement rate between these two judges was 79.23%. The clusters were then adapted into the survey items used in the questionnaire, with one item for each cluster. The text of these items can be found in Appendix B.

Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses conducted on these items in other samples have consistently produced a three-factor solution, with factors corresponding to competitive, cooperative and mediation-oriented strategies (for details, see Golec, 2003). However, in this study we were primarily interested in the distinction between the use of competitive and cooperative strategies, so only the competitive and cooperative items identified by prior analyses were used. These items were used to generate scales for competitive strategies (α = .83) and cooperative strategies (α = .67) for each subject.[5] Finally, an overall measure of each respondent's preference for competitive versus cooperative strategies was computed by subtracting their scores on the cooperative index from their scores on the competitive index. Demographics. Three demographics were also included in the analysis: (1) education (-1 = no university degree; 1 = university degree); (2) age (in years); and (3) gender (-1 = female; 1 = male). Since a number of respondents failed to respond to these items (compared to the small sample size), all missing

values on the demographics were imputed using a maximum-likelihood expectation-maximization procedure prior to the analyses.[6]

<div align="center">Results</div>

In order to verify that respondents from the League of Polish Families were generally more competitive and hostile than members of the Union of Liberty, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance using party identification as the independent variable and scores on Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale – a well-established measure of the degree to which people generally perceive intergroup relations to be competitive and dominance-oriented – as the dependent measure. SDO scores were recoded to run from 0 to 1 for this purpose. The results of this analysis indicated that activists from the League of Polish Families ($\underline{M}$ = .48, $\underline{SD}$ = .18) were indeed more dominance-oriented than activists from the Union of Liberty ($\underline{M}$ = .32, $\underline{SD}$ = .13), $\underline{F}$ (1,98) = 26.47, p<.0001. This finding provides support for our assumptions about each party's conflict schema.

Having established this, we estimated a series of hierarchical ordinary-least squares regression models in order to test the main hypotheses. The difference score for respondents' preference for competitiveness over cooperation served as the dependent variable. All variables were centered, and Huber-White robust standard errors were again used. The three demographics were included in this model as well. The results of these regressions are summarized in Table 6. Model 1 simply looked at the first-order effects of need for closure and party identification, as well as the demographics. As the estimates for this model indicate, membership in the League of Polish Families was associated with greater support for competitive conflict-resolution strategies ($\underline{b}$ = .08, p<.001). So was the need for closure ($\underline{b}$ = .57, p<.01), consistent with what the "simplicity" model would expect. None of the demographics were significantly related to the dependent measure (ps>.10).

Model 2 added the critical interaction between need for closure and party identification. As the coefficient for the interaction indicates, this interaction was significant and in the right direction (b = .60, p<.01), suggesting that the relationship between need for closure and a preference for competition varied with party identification. In order to probe this interaction, simple slopes for the relationship between

need for closure and support for competitive strategies were calculated for representatives of each party. This was done by recoding party identification on a 0/1 basis; the group the simple slope was to be calculated for was given a code of 0 in each analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). As expected, the results of these analyses indicated that the relationship between need for closure and support for destructive conflict-resolution strategies was non-significant among members of the Union of Liberty ($\underline{b}$ = .03, SE $\underline{b}$ = .27, $\underline{p}$>.10), but positive and highly significant among members of the League of Polish Families ($\underline{b}$ = 1.23, SE $\underline{b}$ = .27, $\underline{p}$<.001).[7] Thus, in our elite sample of Polish political activists, the data again suggest that the conflict-schema model may provide a better description of the relationship between the need for closure and aggressive responses to conflict: a high need for closure was associated with competitive attitudes toward political conflict only among members of a party with a hostile conflict schema.[8]

<div align="center">Discussion</div>

In Study 2, we tested our hypotheses in a sample of activists from two Polish political parties, i.e., the League of Polish Families, which possesses a relatively competitive conflict schema; and the Union of Liberty, which possesses a relatively cooperative conflict schema. In addition to allowing us to conceptually replicate the findings of Study 1 in a different social, political, and temporal context, this study also allowed us to test our hypotheses with a measure explicitly developed to assess individual differences in need for closure and to make a clearer distinction between groups of political actors with different conflict schemas. In this dataset, we again found support for the basic "simplicity" hypothesis: higher need-for-closure levels were associated with a stronger tendency to favor competitive strategies (such as attack, threat, and slander) over conciliatory ones (such as mutual concessions and cooperation). Moreover, consistent with the assumption that members of the extremist League of Polish Families would be more prone to conflict, we found that activists from the latter were more likely to prefer competitive strategies over conciliatory ones. However, consistent with our "conflict-schema" hypothesis, we also found the expected interaction between need for closure and party identification: the relationship between need for closure and relative competitiveness was found only among functionaries from the League of Polish Families. As such, the results of this second study suggest that our findings from Study 1

generalize to a sample of political actors from a different society and time, who were dealing with a very different political conflict.

General Discussion

In a pair of studies using samples of elite political actors, we found evidence for two hypotheses about the relationship between the need for closure and conflict-strategy preferences. On one hand, research on epistemic motivation suggests that competition should help meet the need for simplicity and finality associated with a high need for closure, given its aim of defeating parties believed to stand in the way of the ingroup's prerogatives and values (e.g., De Dreu et al. 1999; Kruglanski et al., 2002). In accordance with this "simplicity" hypothesis, our results indicated that a high need for closure was generally related to a preference for coercion and confrontation in political conflict in of the samples we considered. However, our results also suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of this general relationship. Our results – and our broader argument – suggest that this apparent main effect may mask an interaction in which the relationship between the need for closure and competitiveness is more pronounced among (or even restricted to) political actors whose worldviews or identities suggest coercive approaches to conflict. In accordance with this "conflict schema" hypothesis, our results indicated that a high need for closure was more strongly associated with a preference for hawkish or competitive conflict resolution strategies among American foreign-service officers whose worldviews made sharp "friend/foe" distinctions and depicted compromise as dangerous (Study 1) and Polish political activists who belonged to a political party with an aggressive orientation toward the resolution of conflicts (Study 2).

More broadly, our studies draw a complex picture of the connection between variables related to cognitive style and political actors' conflict-resolution preferences. As noted earlier, these studies relate a simple cognitive style to a preference for coercion in conflict and a complex cognitive style to a preference for dialogue and cooperation (Golec, 2002b; Wallbaum, 1993). In particular, individuals with a high need for closure may be especially prone to intergroup bias and competitiveness as a result of their need to understand social reality in ways which reinforce black-and-white certainties and promise decisive outcomes (Shah et al., 1998; Kruglanski et al., 2002). As we have seen, however, motivational

variables related to these differences in cognitive style – such as the need for closure – may do more than push conflict-related information processing in the direction of greater simplicity: they may also be associated with a greater reliance on whatever cognitive content is salient for decision-makers. In turn, this content may have important moderating effects on the way in which the need for closure actually relates to conflict-strategy preferences.

If this is the case, then the tendency for the need for closure to be associated with a preference for conflict-escalating strategies may be stronger among political actors whose worldviews and identities incorporate conflict schemas that define a confrontational approach to political conflict as both normative and effective. In this case, a preference for simplicity and finality and stronger adherence to salient schemas both push conflict-strategy preferences in a competitive direction.   Conversely, among those with cooperative schemas, the tendency to adhere to salient cues neutralizes the tendency to compete associated with the need for simplicity. What this suggests is that political actors with a high need for closure – whose need for simplicity and finality may normally predispose them to choose more aggressive strategies – may put aside this predisposition in certain contexts. As such, there may be conditions in which a preference for cognitive simplicity may not be associated with competitiveness and aggression (see Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Sudefeld, Tetlock, & Ramirez, 1977).

An implication of this perspective is that increasing the salience of worldviews, identities, or situational norms associated with a "cooperative" conflict schema may cancel out or at least significantly reduce the likelihood of aggressive choices that might be otherwise associated with a high need for closure. Naturally, however, this raises questions about the conditions under which the tendency to adhere to conflict schemas associated with a constructive, cooperative approach toward political conflict not only suppresses but actually prevails over a tendency to choose destructive, confrontational strategies. In this regard, a key moderating factor may be the form taken by disagreements about the appropriateness of various conflict schemas in a given political context. Within most political communities, multiple conflict schemas are available. As a result, they can only provide what McClosky and Zaller (1984) refer to as 'contested' behavioral norms, i.e., guidelines that are accepted by one portion of the political

community but not others. This – for example – was clearly the case in the population of Cold-War era American foreign-policy officials sampled in Study 1: while they were largely in agreement with regard to the need to oppose communism, they differed with regard to how conflict with the USSR should be managed (Mennis, 1971). Nevertheless, even in the midst of disagreements like this, the set of norms associated with one conflict schema is typically regarded as a more "obvious" way of responding, all other things being equal. In some of the contexts examined here – like many others – the norms associated with the competitive schema may have been regarded as the obvious, dominant response (i.e., it was the most intuitive response; cf. Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Tajfel, 1970). Since decision-makers under a high need for closure may have trouble giving non-dominant responses (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), the normality of competition in these contexts may have worked together with the tendency highlighted by our "simplicity" hypothesis to further interfere with the expression of cooperative responses, even among those who might have accepted a cooperative schema.

However, the situation might be somewhat different in contexts where cooperation – rather than competition – is the "obvious," dominant response. In this case, the "normality" of cooperation may work in the same direction as the need for closure's tendency to produce greater reliance on cooperative schemas among those who adhere to them. In other words, when personal commitments and contextual tendencies are united in their support for cooperation, the cue-taking tendency associated with a high need for closure may actually overpower the simplicity tendency, producing greater cooperation. In practical terms, this suggests the value of promoting a broader cultural preference for cooperation in political communities embroiled in conflict, in an effort to make competition less of a dominant response (Bar-Tal, 1998). While we realize that this is no easy task, our results nevertheless imply that it is an important one.

Conclusion

In sum, our results suggest that the relationship between epistemic motivation and elite political actors' conflict strategy preferences is moderated by conflict schemas associated with various worldviews and/or political identities. Nevertheless, while we find these results compelling, we recognize their limitations as well. Importantly, our studies were conducted using data provided by unique samples of

public officials and political activists dealing with specific, real-life conflicts. The uniqueness and specificity of these samples naturally raises generalizability issues. At the same time, the two fairly different real-life settings of these studies helps our analysis go beyond existing work on relationship between motivational aspects of cognitive functioning and conflict-related attitudes. Above all, we believe our choice of settings contributes greatly to the ecological validity of our analyses. Although there have been many internally-valid studies of how the need for closure may play itself out in intergroup situations (e.g., Shah et al., 1998), the findings of these studies – obtained in laboratory settings using college students – may be difficult to generalize to the real-life settings they are intended to explicate (see Sears, 1986). In contrast, the moderated relationships we focus on here were replicated in two different political contexts, among "real-world" actors of varying nationalities, ages, and formal political roles. Moreover, they were observed in the context of both domestic and international conflicts. This suggests that the interactive effect of the need for closure and conflict schemas is reasonably generalizable, at least among those intimately involved in conflict-related decision-making in politics.

In addition, we must acknowledge the correlational nature of our data. Given the real-world contexts we focus on, we were unable to manipulate our key independent variables, and we cannot draw firm conclusions about the casual mechanisms involved in the relationships we describe. However, given that the dependent measures were highly specific, it is highly unlikely that they might have had a reverse causal effect on the general motivational tendencies associated with the high need for closure – i.e., the need for simplicity and the need to adhere to salient norms or beliefs. Another limitation of our data – also somewhat related to the unique nature of our samples – has to do with the content of our dependent measures. Although a focus on both attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of competitive approaches to conflict would have been ideal, we were only able to look at the former. While we do not believe that these limitations detract significantly from the overall contribution of our studies, we look forward to seeing them addressed in future work.

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Notes

[1] These items were similar to some of the items originally used by Rokeach (1956) to measure

dogmatism. Since Webster and Kruglanski (1994) note similarities between the need for closure and

certain aspects of the construct assessed by the full dogmatism measure, this raises the possibility that the

items corresponding to each of the two independent variables are indistinct. Therefore, we took several

steps to ensure that our independent measures tap different constructs. First of all, we have excluded

those items which tap mainly into rigidity in the abstract. It was <u>not</u> our intention here to measure

dogmatism as Rokeach (1956) defined it, i.e., as a politically "content-free" form of authoritarianism.

Moreover, in our interpretation of the included items, we do not go beyond their manifest social content

to make inferences about the degree to which they tap into a latent personality dimension. In a second

step, we performed confirmatory factor analyses using both sets of scale items. While the final need for

closure and conflict schema scales were correlated ($\underline{r}$ = .41, $\underline{p}$<.01) – as we expected – the confirmatory

factor analyses indicated that a correlated two-factor model fit the full set of items better than a single-

factor model, $\Delta\chi^2$ (1) = 11.28, $\underline{p}$<.001. This suggests that the two sets of items are indeed measuring

different constructs. Finally, in order to provide one additional check on the validity of our results, we re-

estimated all of our analyses using only the most directly "political" item ("The US and Russia have just

about nothing in common") as the sole indicator of respondents' conflict schemas. In this analysis, the

key interaction between need for closure and the conflict-schema index remained significant ($\underline{p}$<.01).

[2] The fit of this model was acceptable, with a chi-square-to-degrees of freedom ratio of 2.92 (with

df = 1946) and an RMSEA of 0.06 (Kline, 1998).

[3] We assume that respondents' conflict schemas are causally prior to their level of hawkishness,

but the correlational design of the study makes other interpretations plausible. For example, respondents

may adopt different conflict schemas in order to retrospectively justify their policy attitudes in the

international relations domain.   While this causality issue cannot be definitely addressed without

experimental data, we were able to use instrumental-variables regression in order to estimate the strength

of the causal effect in each direction (see Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, and West, 2003). In this analysis, age

education, party identification, religiosity, and a dummy variable indicating that the respondent was born in the South were used as instruments for the conflict-schema measure, while age education, party identification, employment in the military, and attitudes toward the role of government were used as instruments for hawkishness. Instrumental variables for the conflict schema measure and hawkishness were generated by regressing each variable on its respective instruments and calculating the predicted values; the proportions of variance accounted for in these first-stage "assignment" equations were $R^2 =$ .18 (for the conflict schema measure) and $R^2 = .12$ (for hawkishness). In order to estimate the effect of conflict schemas on hawkishness, the latter was regressed on the instrumental variable for the conflict-schema measure. In order to estimate the effect in the other direction, the conflict-schema measure was regressed on the instrumental variable for hawkishness. Consistent with our assumptions, this analysis indicated that conflict schemas had a significant estimated effect on hawkishness (b = 1.25, p<.01), while hawkishness did not have a significant estimated effect on conflict schemas (b = .26, p>.10).

[4] The study also involved an experimental manipulation, which was not analyzed here. Half of the respondents in each party were randomly assigned to an experimental group, where their party identification was made salient by asking them to write down their party name in the top of each page of the questionnaire. In the control group, respondents were merely asked to fill out the questionnaire. This manipulation had no effect on respondents' need for closure scores, their SDO levels, or their preference for competition over cooperation (Fs<1). Moreover, additional interactive models indicated that the main of the need for closure and the key interaction between need for closure and party identification were invariant across conditions (both ps>.20).

[5] Consistent with this operationalization and prior work, a series of LISREL confirmatory factor analyses indicated that a two-factor model fit these items better than a single-factor model, $\Delta\chi^2 (1) =$ 11.57, p<.001. Moreover, in the two-factor solution, the correlation between the "competition" and "cooperation" factors was strongly negative, $\varphi = -.79$, p<.0001. In general, this suggests that our respondents understood competition and cooperation not just as different responses, but as mutually exclusive ones.

[6] Unfortunately, we were not able to include measures of general "epistemic" conservatism and other variables clearly related to the management of fear and uncertainty in our survey of Polish political activists. Therefore, in contrast to the Study 1 analyses, the regressions reported here control for respondents' demographic characteristics only.

[7] For summary purposes, we relied primarily on the competition-cooperation difference score as an overall index of aggressive responses to the EU conflict. However, we also thought it might be useful to examine the relationship between NFC and the separate competition and cooperation indices among members of each party. Since competitive and cooperative responses were reciprocally related in our data (see Note 5), we expected NFC to be positively related to competition and negatively related to cooperation among members of the LPR, but essentially unrelated to either response among UW members. In order to examine these relationships simultaneously, we estimated a LISREL multigroup path-analytic model. Within each party, NFC was specified as an exogenous variable with direct effects on both competition and cooperation. The disturbance terms for competition and cooperation were allowed to correlate. Among UW members, NFC was unrelated to competition and cooperation ($\beta = .17$ and $\beta = .17$, respectively; both $ps > .20$). However, among members of the LPR, NFC was positively related to competition ($\beta = .99$, $p < .01$) and negatively related to cooperation ($\beta = -.89$, $p < .01$). Constraining these effects to equality across parties produced a significant decline in model fit, with $\Delta\chi^2$ (1) = 5.02 for the effect of competition; and $\Delta\chi^2$ (1) = 7.00 for the effect of cooperation (both $ps < .01$). Moreover, while the negative correlation between the disturbances was significant among UW members ($\psi = -.24$, $p < .05$), it failed to reach significance among LPR members ($\psi = -.13$, $p > .10$). This suggests that that NFC was able to completely account for the reciprocal relationship between competition and cooperation among members of the LPR, but not among members of the UW. Thus, when the competition and cooperation indices were considered separately, the need for closure was associated with responses consistent with a hostile conflict schema only among members of the LPR.

[8] One problem presented by this analysis has to do with the possibility of variance among party members in adherence to each party's conflict schema. If within-group variance in schema adherence is

high, this may have the effect of making party identification a less-reliable indicator of the conflict schema used by any given individual. Statistically, this should not compromise our results, since a less-reliable measure of the moderating variable would make it harder rather than easier to detect moderation (making the analysis in Table 4 a more conservative test; see Aiken & West, 1991). Nevertheless, we decided to repeat the analysis using our "check measure" of the parties' conflict schemas – i.e., SDO – as the moderator instead of party identification. This allowed us to replicate our basic finding using a continuous measure of respondents' conflict schemas (rather than a binary one).   In this analysis, the dependent variable was regressed on the demographics, party identification, SDO, NFC, and the interaction between NFC and SDO. This analysis indicated that the critical NFC × SDO interaction was significant ($\underline{b} = 2.37$, SE $\underline{b} = 1.00$, $\underline{p}<.05$). Simple slope analyses further indicated that the relationship between NFC and a preference for competition was non-significant one standard deviation below the mean on SDO ($\underline{b} = .30$, SE b $= .21$, $\underline{p}>.10$), but positive and significant one standard deviation above the mean on SDO (b $= .82$, SE b $= .29$, p$<.01$). Thus, the results of this analysis confirm the primary findings of this study.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Key Variables (Study 1; 1966 American Foreign-Policy Officials Data)

Variable	Descriptives		Intercorrelations				
	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Need for closure proxy	.48	.13	--				
2. Conflict schema	.24	.13	.41***	--			
3. Ideology	.37	.30	.32**	.25*	--		
4. Party identification	.40	.29	.15	.14	.49***	--	
5. Religiosity	.56	.31	.33**	.21*	.07	.26**	--
6. Hawkishness	.32	.24	.47***	.33***	.34***	.16	.11

Note. All descriptive statistics are for 0-1 variable codings.

*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

Table 2

Interactive Effects of Need for Closure and Conflict Schema on Hawkishness (Study 1; 1966 American

Foreign-Policy Officials Data)

Predictor	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE b	b	SE b
Education	-.09	(.11)	-.09	(.11)
Age	-.001	(.004)	-.001	(.004)
Years in the service	.0004	(.001)	.0004	(.001)
Military	.04[+]	(.03)	.04	(.04)
Ideology	.11	(.11)	.09	(.11)
Party identification	-.04	(.10)	-.04	(.10)
Religiosity	-.03	(.08)	.01	(.08)
Need for closure proxy	.61**	(.19)	.63***	(.18)
Conflict schema	.40*	(.19)	.27	(.19)
NFC x Conflict schema	--	--	3.01**	(1.17)
Constant	.34***	(.02)	.31***	(.02)
F (degrees of freedom)	5.45 (9, 80) ***		7.28 (10, 79) ***	
R^2	.328		.363	
N	90		90	

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and Huber-White robust standard

errors. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

[+]p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations (Study 2; Polish Party Activists)

Variable	UL M	UL SD	LPF M	LPF SD	1	2
	Descriptives for each party				Intercorrelations (full sample)	
1. Need for cognitive closure	.49	(.09)	.59	(.08)	--	
2. Social dominance orientation	.32	(.13)	.48	(.18)	.30**	--
3. Preference for competitive vs. cooperative strategies	.26	(.15)	.49	(.18)	.49***	.56***

Note. All descriptive statistics are for 0-1 variable codings.

[+]p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 4

Interactive Effects of Need for Closure and Party Identification on Support for

Destructive Conflict-Resolution Strategies (Study 2; Polish Party Activists)

Predictor	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE b	B	SE b
Age	.004	(.01)	.01	(.01)
Gender	.03	(.02)	.04[+]	(.02)
University degree	-.01	(.03)	-.01	(.03)
Need for closure	.57**	(.21)	.63***	(.19)
Party identification	.08***	(.02)	.07***	(.02)
NFC x Party ID	--	--	.60**	(.19)
Constant	.36***	(.02)	.32***	(.03)
F (degrees of freedom)	13.39 (5, 94) ***		15.09 (6, 93) ***	
R^2	.407		.474	
N	100		100	

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and Huber-White

robust standard errors. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

[+]p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

APPENDIX A

Items from the American Foreign Policy Officials Study (Mennis, 1971)

Conflict Schema Items:
1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth-while goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
2. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
3. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
4. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
5. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
6. Of all the different philosophies that exist in this world there is probably only one that is correct.
7. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

Need for Closure Proxy Items:
1. I am a methodical person in whatever I do.
2. I often find myself thinking of the same tunes or phrases for days at a time.
3. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
4. I try to follow a program of life based on duty.
5. I have a work and study schedule that I follow carefully.
6. There is usually only one best way to solve most problems.
7. I always put on and take off my clothes in the same order.
8. I always finish tasks I start, even if they are not very important.
9. I usually check more than once to be sure that I have locked a door, put out the light, or something of the sort.
10. I think it is usually wise to do things in a conventional way.
11. I find it easy to stick to a certain schedule, once I have started it.
12. I dislike to change my plans in the midst of an undertaking.
13. I believe that promptness is a very important personality characteristic.
14. I an often the last person to give up trying to do a thing.
15. I do not enjoy having to adapt myself to new and unusual situations.

APPENDIX B

Items from the Strategies of Political Conflict Resolution Questionnaire (Golec, 2003)

Now imagine that you are an important and powerful representative of your party. You can decide about its actions in this conflict. Take a while to think over what sort of actions would you undertake. Below you will find examples of various actions parties can assume in conflicts. Please indicate how likely it is that you would choose a given action as the representative of your party.

Escalatory strategies:
1. You will use fraud and deception in order to weaken your opponent's position
2. You will spread negative information about your opponent
3. You will oppose all of your opponent's proposals and pressures
4. You will act as if you are never giving in, in order to discourage your opponent
5. You will criticize all of your opponent's actions
6. You will attack your opponent
7. You will demonstrate your strength in order to intimidate your opponent
8. You will humiliate and disregard your opponent

Cooperative strategies:
9. You will explain your position and listen to your opponent: you will search for a 'middle-of-the road' solution
10. You will propose concessions and indicate what you want the other side to concede
11. You will calm your opponent down and convince them that the situation is not as bad as it seems
12. Together with your opponent, you will define your problem and search the best solution

Remaining strategies, not included in analysis:
13. You will act offended and break off all relations with your opponent
14. You will find allies and rely on their support in order to convince your opponent of your position
15. You will try to convince your opponent to give in
16. You will ask an independent third party to adjudicate this conflict
17. You will ask an independent third party to mediate in talks between you and your opponent
18. You will avoid any action
19. You will do what your opponent wants you to do