

**When do interest groups lobby legislators in strong presidential systems?**

## Abstract

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (*Gatekeeping Hypothesis*). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (*Legislative Activity Hypothesis*). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6,479 lobbying audiences and over 2,300 bills.

**Keywords:** strong presidential system; lobbying; gatekeeping, legislative activity.

In Chile, most initiatives to change relevant policies are in the hands of the executive, and legislators can hardly introduce particularistic bills that benefit their districts. Yet, in every legislative session, Chilean deputies hold thousands of meetings with interest groups, lobbyists, and individuals to discuss issues, even in those policy areas where the executive holds extensive legislative powers. When do interest groups, paid lobbyists and individuals target legislators in strong presidential systems<sup>1</sup> like in Chile?

We draw upon the literature on interest group access-seeking behaviour to propose and provide evidence for two hypotheses about the factors leading to relevant regularities of lobbying in Chile. First, interest groups have incentives to focus their efforts on those legislators who have gatekeeping authority in issues that concern the group's agenda (*Gatekeeping Hypothesis*). These incentives still emerge in policy areas where the

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<sup>1</sup> The expressions “strong presidential systems” and “strong presidentialism” refer to institutional frameworks where the president holds extensive legislative powers, such as exclusive legislative initiative in certain areas, veto, urgency legislation and the like. Siavelis (2000: xiv) has labelled Chile as a case of “exaggerated presidentialism”. Meanwhile, Alemán and Navia (2009: 402) defines Chile as a “prototypical case of strong presidentialism”. Similarly, Faundez et al (2022) refers to the Chilean institutional setting as a case of “strong presidential system”

executive has the exclusive prerogative of initiating bills. The reason is that gatekeepers, like committee chairs, can allow or block the discussion of bills, so lobbying emerges as an effective way to influence these decisions. Second, for policy areas where legislators have appreciable authority to introduce bills, groups and lobbyists are prone to target representatives who sponsor bills on issues of common concern (*Legislative Activity Hypothesis*). We do not offer a unifying theory for why these regularities of lobbying may differ from other settings. Still, our results and the original dataset naturally allow for comparative analysis. Most literature examining the relationship between groups and legislators relies on the United States Congress, where representatives and senators concentrate substantial agenda powers in most policy areas. By testing the determinants of lobbying in a case of presidential “strong proactive legislative powers” like the Chilean (Faúndez et al., 2022), we can contrast the US experience with systems like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru or Uruguay (Negretto, 2013, 256-262). In those cases, the chief executive also has extensive legislative powers,<sup>2</sup> and the connections between lobbies and legislators are less clear than in the US.

To test our hypotheses, we have collected a novel dataset on meetings between Chilean members of the Chamber of Deputies and interest groups, paid lobbyists, and individuals for 2014-2020. We are the first to exploit the information available since the 2014 Lobbying Disclosure Act implementation, which mandates the record in a public registry of all meetings involving representatives and other public officials. We classified almost 6,500 individual meetings, committee appointments, and 2,337 bills sponsored by Chilean deputies in the same period. To code the (issues) policy areas of meetings and bills, we follow the Comparative Agenda Project (Baumgartner et al., 2019) criteria.

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<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, stronger than the Chilean chief executive (See Negretto, 2013; Shugart and Carey, 1992).

Overall, evidence shows that bill sponsoring and committee chairing are significant factors explaining the targeting of groups, lobbyists, and individuals. While the gatekeeping effect is still strong in policy areas that the chief executive controls, bills seem to narrow down the influence to non-presidential issues.

Our article provides direct observational evidence on how lobbyists and constituents target legislators in Latin America. The relevance of this feature becomes apparent when considering the challenges of observing lobbyists' access to policymakers. In this regard, our paper is close to Dommett et al. (2017), who use data on lobbyists' access to ministers in the United Kingdom. As for Latin America, the literature on interest groups and lobbying is scarce. We add to those recent works that study interest groups in the legislative arenas of Ecuador (Vallejo Vera, 2021; Timoneda and Vallejo Vera, 2021).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present our framework and specify the observable expected results of our model. Section three explains the choice of the Chilean National Congress as the case of study and describes the main institutional features. In section four, we describe the data and the coding strategy. Finally, we present the results of our analysis and further discuss the main implications.

## **TARGETING LEGISLATORS: EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES**

The primary goal of organized interests is to influence legislation and policy (Awad, 2020; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2020; Butler and Miller, 2021; Holyoke, 2021), "(...) to affect the legislative process and ultimately to leave their fingerprints in the legislation adopted" (Binderkrantz, 2014, 526). A prominent mechanism to exert influence is

informational: interest groups and lobbyists strategically transmit information to legislators to bias their decisions toward their most preferred outcome (ie., Chalmers, 2013; Schnakenberg, 2017). That explains why most interest group activities involve producing and disseminating information (Grossman and Helpman, 2001, 104).

To effectively communicate relevant information, interest groups must first gain access to policymakers; the most typical access activities being personal meetings with legislators, which concerns this article (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi, 2014). The relevance of direct contact with legislators becomes apparent in several survey studies (Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 152). For example, Baumgartner et al. (2009, 151) account that over three-quarters of the surveyed lobbyists in the United States declare to build personal contacts with members of Congress.

Access-seeking activities are not random but strategical because building relationships with legislators is costly (Bauer et al., 1963; Ellis and Groll, 2020). Groups and lobbyists have incentives to select the "right" legislator to approach and establish an effective relationship (Kingdon, 1989; Heberlig, 2005; Victor, 2007). At this point, the question about the primary determinants of legislators' selection naturally emerges. From the literature, we derive two observable factors affecting access-targeting: gatekeeping roles and legislative activity. Next, we explain how these factors apply to strong presidential systems, like Chile, where the executive holds extensive legislative powers in a number of policy areas. We also explain why, or why not, we should expect these factors to be conditional on the areas of the exclusive domain of the president.

The role of committee chairs is one factor associated with targeting. Interest groups typically target legislators who are members of committees with jurisdiction over their areas of interest (Kim and Kunisky, 2020; Heberlig, 2005).<sup>3</sup> However, not every committee member has the same power and influence (Berry and Fowler, 2018).<sup>4</sup> If interest groups are more inclined toward “powerful legislators” (De Figueiredo and Richter, 2014), we should expect lobbying strategies that target party leaders, committee chairs, and members of key committees (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Kingdon, 1989; Miller 2022). Committee chairs are particularly appealing because they can provide cues to other lawmakers or affect reporting bills to the floor by setting the agenda in their jurisdictional areas. As a result, they call the attention of organized interests with more frequency than other legislators. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) document, over 60% of the groups surveyed declared having contacted committee leaders and other members in “gatekeeping positions” (p. 152).

How well does the idea of committee chairs being a determinant of targeting work in the Chilean case? In the Chilean Congress, the most decisive stages of the lawmaking process happen in the committees (Soto, 2015, 54), and chairs have considerable power over “narrow policy jurisdictions” (Alemán and Navia, 2016, 96).<sup>5</sup> Committee chairs hold gatekeeping powers (Alemán and Navia, 2016: 97; Carey, 2002), such as conducting debates, organizing voting schedules, declaring a bill or amendment inadmissible, or suspending a session (Soto 2015, 60-61).<sup>6</sup> Another aspect reinforcing the role of chairs in

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<sup>3</sup> Previous research shows that interest groups direct campaign funding to members of committees with jurisdiction over the policy domains that apply to them (Grimmer and Powell 2016).

<sup>4</sup> Legislators in powerful positions (e.g., committee leaders) have agenda-setting authority to decide which bills and how fast to move forward (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Deputies in Chile spend over 80% of their time in permanent committees considering bills, and the rest at the plenary (PNUD 2014, 337)..

<sup>6</sup> The regulation of the Chamber of Deputies establishes that a majority of the committee members must elect the chair. However, frequently, chairmanships are allocated following political agreements at the beginning of the session (Soto, 2015, 61).

Chile is the prerogative to invite experts, representatives of the civil society, and citizens to the legislative hearings.<sup>7</sup> Chairs in Chile also speak more often in legislative debates about the topics associated with their committees (Alemán, Micozzi, and Vallejo Vera, 2022). These prerogatives make chairs a potentially "profitable" target for lobbies. It is worth mentioning that the relevance of committees and chairs is not exclusive to Chile, but it is also present in other countries in Latin America. For instance, Vallejo Vera (2021) shows that legislative committees in the Ecuadorian Congress can control the flow of bill initiatives and the attendants at committee hearings. He also shows how chairs work as gatekeepers of interest group participation.

There are no apparent reasons for these prerogatives to work differently in committees on policy areas where the executive has exclusive initiation rights from those where legislators are unconstrained. A chair can delay equally the report on a bill about social security (presidential domain) or a proposal on education (non-presidential issue). Similarly, the chair can invite groups, lobbyists or experts to the hearings to delay the consideration of a bill in the presidential realm, say the ratification of an international treaty. Therefore, we do not see the relationship between the gatekeeping authority of chairs and targeting as conditional on the exclusive legislative domains of the president.

These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

**Gatekeeping hypothesis:** *Committee chairs are more likely to be targeted by groups and lobbyists than other legislators (on policy areas relevant to them), regardless of being on a president-exclusive policy area or not.*

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<sup>7</sup> The gatekeeping role of committee chairs in the Chilean congress becomes apparent by the evidence that shows roughly 80% of bills die at the committee level without consideration..

Legislative activity is the second factor explaining why interest groups target some legislators more often than others. The literature accounts for a positive relationship between legislator bill sponsoring and lobbying (see, for example, Kim and Kunisky, 2021). The logic is that interest groups allocate resources to target and then provide information to legislators who are more likely to promote or prevent policy changes that affect them. Then, more productive members are attractive, for they are more likely to influence the agenda by introducing bills or taking part in coalitions. Evidence showing that groups channel their contributions to members who more successfully introduce and pass bills corroborates this idea.<sup>8</sup> If lobbying, like contributions, requires resources, then the positive connection with legislative activity should also apply to access behaviour.

The existence of issues of common interests brings together lobbying and legislator productivity. Groups and lobbyists usually specialize in relatively few policy areas (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 73) and rely on issue-specific backgrounds to select their legislators (Victor, 2007). Rocca and Gordon (2010) show that lobbyists and interest groups use issue-level information to infer members' preferences. Bill initiation records, in particular, communicate to attentive audiences (i.e., interest groups, district electorate, and fellow members) the issues and policy areas legislators want to be associated with (Alemán and Calvo, 2013; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Lazarus, 2013; Mayhew, 1974; Schiller, 1995).<sup>9</sup> The empirical regularity that follows is that groups and lobbyists are more likely to contact legislators who are more productive in the issues they care about.

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<sup>8</sup> For instance, Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) use data from the 103rd and 104th US Congresses to show that PACs contribute more to "effective" representatives. In the same direction, Gui (2020) accounts for a positive relationship between the number of proposals and campaign contributions from lobbyists' assets (108th and 115th US Congresses.)

<sup>9</sup> Note that legislators who specialize in an issue are more likely to pass the committee threshold (Anderson et al. 2003).



That is why we test the alignment of the pair meeting-bill initiation in each policy area or issue instead of searching for the effect of legislative productivity overall.

We claim that, unlike the *Gatekeeping Hypothesis*, the relevance of issue-led legislative activity for explaining lobbying is conditional on the president's exclusive initiative that characterizes strong presidential systems like the Chilean. The rationale is as follows. The Chilean constitution (like the Brazilian, Colombian, and Uruguayan, among others) defines policy areas where the executive has the prerogative to introduce legislation (e.g., government spending, taxation, international affairs, collective bargaining, or social security).<sup>10</sup> Even though legislators' bills in those topics are unconstitutional, in practice legislators can still introduce bills on these issues. However, those proposals are unlikely to move forward or produce relevant changes to the status quo.<sup>11</sup> Either the chamber leaders or committee chairs do not admit legislator-starting bills on president-exclusive policy areas to debate, or the executive firmly opposes those bills (Soto, 2015). As a result, bill initiation records are less informative for interest groups and lobbyists in those policy areas where the executive has exclusive rights. In contrast, investing in building access to chairs, officials of the executive, or representatives of autonomous organizations such as the Central Bank offers higher expected payoffs. Therefore, the appeal of more active legislators (those who sponsor more bills) should apply only to non-presidential issues. Our second hypothesis is:

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<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed explanation, see the data and methods section.

<sup>11</sup> There are several examples of bills introduced by legislators in areas where the executive has the exclusive right to initiate bills. A few examples from our dataset are: Bill 10,708 on the private pension system; Bill 10,369 on collective bargaining of public workers; Bill 10,597 on taxes to the mining activities; Bill 12,519 on the code of Military Justice; Bill 12,940, on paying taxes in the region where companies operate and conduct business.

**Legislative activity hypothesis:** *Interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills in the policy areas relevant to them but outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive.*

To summarise, we build upon the literature on interest groups' access-seeking behavior and legislative politics to identify and provide evidence on the key factors that explain lobbying in strong presidential systems like the Chilean. These factors translate into two observables: gatekeeping appointments and legislative activity, the latter working only for issues of the exclusive domain of the president. In the next section, we characterise the Chilean presidential system. We also explore the implementation of Law 20.730, which regulates the exchanges between interest groups, lobbyists and other relevant parties with representatives and policymakers.

## **THE CHILEAN CASE**

The records on lobbying in Chile provide a unique opportunity to study how (and when) groups/lobbyists and individuals target legislators. Other countries in Latin America also regulate and record lobbyists' participation in the law-making process (OECD, 2020). Yet, the data availability is not as suitable for research as the Chilean. For instance, Peru was the first country to regulate lobbying in 2003. However, the public records of officials' meetings with interest managers have been mandatory only since 2019. Argentina introduced similar regulations in 2003, albeit they apply only to the executive branch. Mexico regulates lobbying activities involving government officials but not legislators. In other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, the legal frameworks for lobbying are still in the debate stages.

The records of legislative lobbying activity in Chile date back to March 2014, when the Chilean National Congress passed the bill that regulates the representation of private interests upon elected authorities, officials, and civil servants (Law 20.730).<sup>12</sup> The law aims to increase the transparency of the exchanges between organizations and individuals with officials and representatives.<sup>13</sup> This legislation reaches a wide range of public officials such as ministers, service directors, governors, ambassadors, the president and vice president of the Central Bank, and high-ranking members of the armed forces. The law also frames Chilean deputies and senators as subjects of lobbying.

In this article, we exploit the data that results from the registry that Law 20.730 mandates to study the targeting of legislators by groups and individuals. For the National Congress, the law establishes that deputies and senators must report all their meetings with lobbyists, interest groups and individuals.. The records of these meetings include information about the attending person, organization or group, their representatives (lobbyists) when applicable, the date, and the issue discussed. The law also establishes sanctions for those legislators who failed to report the mandatory information.

Data constraint has also conditioned the research agenda on lobbying in Chile. Still, previous works provide insightful results. Some works examine the participation of civil society groups in legislative debates. Gamboa et al. (2016) (also Segovia and Gamboa, 2019) show business organizations are the most active actors in legislative hearings. The evidence on participation in legislative debates is relevant, for it is how groups access the

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<sup>12</sup> In March 2014, a new government took office.

<sup>13</sup> The law distinguishes lobbying as a paid activity from private interests promotion, an unpaid one (Article 2).

legislative body in full. However, it falls short in capturing the actual connection between private interests and individual legislators. Here, we rely on more direct evidence of these exchanges using observational data from meetings.

As mentioned above, Chile has a strong presidential system where the executive has exclusivity over several policy areas, meaning that legislators cannot introduce new bills.<sup>14</sup> The *president's issues* include public budget, taxation, and public debt (see the Political Constitution of Chile, Article 65). Also, the Constitution (Article 32) grants the president the power to establish international relations, including relations with foreign powers and international organizations. The executive holds the sole authority to conduct negotiations and sign treaties and commercial agreements. Congress can reject or approve the international treaties previously signed by the executive. There are three additional relevant issues in the presidential domain. One is defence. The constitution grants the executive a set of decisions on armed forces: troops mobilisation in case of war (Article 32), the appointment of top authorities in the Armed Forces, and the allocation of the Armed Forces throughout the territory according to national security needs. The second is social security/pensions (Article 65), where only the executive can change the status quo, and legislators cannot initiate bills. Labour is the third issue and includes collective bargaining, salaries in the public administration and minimum wage.

We group the policy areas where the executive has exclusivity under the general category of president's issues. As for individual policy areas, we use the names in the Comparative Agendas Project as follows: macroeconomics, foreign trade, defence, international affairs, social welfare, and labour. This being a paper on access to legislators, we consider

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<sup>14</sup> For a thorough description of the exclusive initiative in Chile, see Soto (2015).

only policy changes through new legislation (Article 62), leaving out administrative policies (Soto 2015: 96-97), where the president can act by fiat.

## DATA AND METHODS

We first examine the relationship of legislator bill sponsoring and committee chair appointments with the decisions of interest groups about whom to target on specific issues. For this purpose, we classify meetings, bills, and committees into 25 policy areas (or "issues"), as presented in Table 1. Our primary classification follows the coding rules of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP),<sup>15</sup> in which categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, non-arbitrary and allow for the comparison with previous work.<sup>16</sup> We further identify the policy areas in the president's exclusive domain, the president's issues: macroeconomics, defence, foreign trade, international affairs, social welfare and labour. Following CAP, we have coded 6,479 meetings between legislators and both organized groups and individuals, 2,337 bills introduced or cosponsored by Chilean deputies and all committee assignments that have taken place from December 2014 to January 2020.

In the specification of interest group targeting, the dependent variables, *Meetings*, are the number of meetings between legislators and lobbies on each issue or policy area. The source of *Meetings* is the registry of audiences mandated by Law 20.730 (<https://www.infolobby.cl>). We assign a meeting to its relevant policy area using the

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<sup>15</sup> See [https://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets\\_codebooks](https://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets_codebooks).

<sup>16</sup> The CAP classification comprises 21 issues plus "other" for non-classified ones. We have coded fishing, forest and mining as separate categories because they are relevant sectors in Chile. In CAP, fishing belongs to agriculture, forest to public lands or the environment, while mining is not part of the list of issues.

information from the description and the principal theme that the registry reports for that meeting. In addition, we corroborate the policy area by recovering the information about the represented organizations, groups and individuals from the Registry of Lobbyists and the organizations' websites. An example may help illustrate our simple coding procedure. If the registry of meetings reports that an interest group (e.g., a union) lobbied a legislator on healthcare, it will add to the count of "Meetings" in the category "Health".

Perhaps, because accepting a meeting request is not mandatory, our data reflects not only interest group selection strategies but also legislators' decision to accept or reject a meeting.<sup>17</sup> Legislators in more powerful positions, like committee chairs, would have more room to choose the lobbyists or groups to meet. It can be that legislators make these decisions based on the characteristics of the groups. However, here we look at issues or policy areas and not the type of groups. Does a legislator receive invitations to discuss many issues and then accept only a few? The problem with this argument is the implicit assumption that interest groups incur zero or low costs when screening legislators; thus, they will intend to approach and potentially meet many legislators. Instead, we depart from the idea that screening and establishing relationships with legislators is costly, so selecting the "right" legislator pays off. Here, we claim that sponsoring bills and chair appointments play a crucial role in the selection strategies of interest groups and so is what the data reflect.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See Brodbeck et al. (2013) for a discussion on access to members of the US Senate.

<sup>18</sup> Note that even if legislators select the meetings to accept, maybe because they face a time constraint to meet interest groups, our results should probably hold and are likely to under-report the effects we propose in the hypotheses.

**Table 1. Coding categories by issue**

<b>President's issues</b>	<b>Non-presidential issues</b>		
Macroeconomics	Energy	Health	Fishing
Labour	Immigration	Technology	Mining
Foreign Trade	Transportation	Civil rights	Forest
Defense	Law and Crime	Agriculture	Education
International Affairs	Housing	Government Operations	Culture
Social Welfare	Domestic Commerce	Public Lands	Other
	Environment		

Two main independent variables explain interest group issue-specific targeting. *Committee chair*, a dummy variable, equals one when the legislator has been the chair of a committee associated with each issue; zero otherwise.<sup>19</sup> The other relevant regressor is *Bills*, which counts the number of bills co-sponsored by each deputy on a specific issue.<sup>20</sup> At this point, we find it convenient to discuss briefly bill sponsorship patterns in the Chilean case. In Chile, legislators cannot co-sign bills once the proposal has been already introduced. Importantly, sponsoring bills is not without costs. For instance, media outlets frequently report legislator productivity measured precisely by the number of bills introduced by each parliamentarian, alongside other indicators, such as attendance rate (La Segunda, 2015). The press is also constantly monitoring the quality of bills introduced by legislators (EMOL, 2014). As a result, drafting bills without an adequate technical background or signing proposals carelessly may cause reputational costs. The above is not politically inconsequential because career advancement in Chile is associated with bill patterns (Escobedo and Navia, 2020). Parties use records of bill initiation activity to promote deputies for Senate races or leadership offices in the legislature (Dockendorff, 2019). Another relevant feature of the Chilean case is that most bills have a national orientation, focusing on policy issues rather than specific constituency matters (Marenghi,

<sup>19</sup> See Table A.2. in Appendix A for a mapping linking committees (and chairs) to CAP policy areas.

<sup>20</sup> The classification of bills results from a procedure similar to the meetings'.

2009). Hence, bills are a good indicator of how dedicated legislators are to a policy issue. The estimate for *Bills* tests if bill initiation conveys legislators' priorities to interest groups and lobbyists. Press reports show that groups already monitor the content of bills introduced by Chilean legislators on the topics they care about.<sup>21</sup> We obtained the data on committee chair appointments directly from the Information Office of the Chamber of Deputies in April 2020 via email. For bill sponsoring, legislator profiles, and electoral records, the sources are the Library of the National Congress ([www.BCN.cl](http://www.BCN.cl)) and the official website of the Chamber of Deputies ([www.Camara.cl](http://www.Camara.cl)).

We use the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) to tackle the unobserved heterogeneity or over-dispersion (Long and Freese, 2014) that results from the count nature of our variables of interest, *Meetings*. We organize the data in two different formats. A first general specification uses the issue-legislator pair as the unit of analysis to capture the overall effect of positioning on lobbying. For example, one observation can be the combination of legislator number “three” with *Agriculture* or legislator “four” with *Technology*. That makes the total number of observations equal to the number of legislators times the number of issues. To illustrate further, the variable *Meetings* in this setting counts the number of audiences of each legislator on each topic. This procedure allows testing a model with general variables such as *Meetings* abstracting from the specific issues. Note that our hypotheses on the effects of *Bills* and *Chairs* are general and do not rely on the characteristics of specific issues, distinguishing only between presidential and non-presidential policy areas. In a second approach, we explore

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<sup>21</sup> For example, in 2014, the press reported that a young deputy, Vlado Mirosevic (Liberal Party, centre-left), was drafting a bill that permitted the use of free software in public offices. Representatives of Microsoft met deputy Mirosevic to persuade him to withdraw the bill from consideration. Lobbyists argued that the free software would not represent savings in the government budget. Moreover, they presented the parliamentarian with international experience accounting for free software pitfalls. The lobbyists provided a study from a prestigious Chilean university as supporting material (El Mostrador, 22 August 2014).



individual issues by organizing the data by legislator (and period). The goal is to identify the individual policy areas that best verify our hypotheses.<sup>22</sup>

Our models include a series of control variables that measure the legislator attributes, electoral performance, career path, and constituency context. *President Coalition* equals one when the legislator belongs to the same electoral coalition as the president; zero otherwise. This variable controls for the strategy of interest groups being different if the legislator (maybe the committee chair) is part of the president's party (or a coalition of parties) or the opposition. *Electoral safety* measures the distance between the share of votes of each legislator and their electoral safety threshold.<sup>23</sup> *Gender* equals one for a female legislator, zero otherwise. *Political Experience* equals one for a legislator who previously held a relevant office,<sup>24</sup> either at the national or subnational level, zero otherwise. This variable is pertinent, given that access-seeking behaviour is likely different for legislators with and without political backgrounds. *Distance to the Capital* measures how distant the constituency is from Santiago, the capital city of Chile.<sup>25</sup> It tests if legislators from remote districts are more likely to position on specific issues. We also include variables that capture the context of the constituencies that may affect legislators' attention to particular issues, for example, public health coverage, housing deficit, and index of conflicts, among others.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> As some deputies appear in the sample more than once, we cluster (by deputy) the standard errors to account for potential autocorrelation between periods (Rogers, 1993).

<sup>23</sup> In a D'Hondt system, the electoral formulae used in Chile, the safety threshold is  $100\% / (M+1)$  plus one vote, where M is the number of seats allocated in each district.

<sup>24</sup> The relevant offices are the ministry, mayor, or governor.

<sup>25</sup> *Distance to the Capital* measures, for each electoral district, the shortest driving distance in kilometres from the largest city in the constituency to the former National Congress in Santiago. The variable does not consider other potentially relevant characteristics, such as access to public transportation in remote areas. Our specifications below include other context variables at the district level that may control for characteristics that *Distance to Capital* omits.

<sup>26</sup> See Appendix A for a thorough description of the context variables.

**Table 2. Summary Statistics with legislators as unit of analysis**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby Meetings	276	22.7	20.3	0	96
President	276	3.6	4.7	0	35
Non-president	276	19.1	17.6	0	86
Lobby Minutes	276	858.9	921.7	0	6852
President	276	135.7	204.4	0	1735
Non-president	276	723.3	783.0	0	5624
Bills	276	66.7	36.0	0	231
President	276	8.4	6.9	0	46
Non-president	276	58.3	32.0	0	207
Chair	276	0.5	0.8	0	4
President	276	0.2	0.4	0	2
Non-president	276	0.3	0.6	0	3
Political Experience	276	0.4	0.5	0	1

Table 2 describes the main variables when the unit of analysis is the legislator. The total number of observations-276<sup>27</sup>, results from 213 legislators, with 63 of them being members of the Congress for the two periods of the sample.<sup>28</sup> The table shows each legislator attended, on average, 23 lobby meetings<sup>29</sup> for over 14 hours. In addition, the mean of bill cosponsoring per legislator is almost 67 for the period of analysis. On average, each deputy has chaired 0.5 committees, while 40% of the deputies in the sample have held at least one public office in the past.

<sup>27</sup> The Chamber of Deputies comprised 120 members in 2014-2018 and 155 in 2018-2022. Our sample size is 276 instead of 275 because Miguel Alvarado replaced Deputy Jorge Insunza, who became a minister.

<sup>28</sup> Our data covers the 2014-2018 legislative session, and half of the 2018-2022 session, until January 2020.

<sup>29</sup> 81% of the meetings in the sample involve companies and organizations, while the other 19% are individuals.

## RESULTS AND ANALYSES

We present different models to test our two hypotheses: gatekeeping and legislative activity. In Table 3, we show the overall estimates of targeting with the issue-legislator dataset. Table 4 presents the corresponding relevant marginal effects. Table 5 summarizes the average impact of *Committee Chair* resulting from the propensity score matching estimation. Tables 6 and 7 contain the (individual) estimates of *Committee Chair* and *Bills* on both president’s exclusive domains and non-presidential issues.

First, we want to test whether organized groups and individuals observe the distribution of issues that legislators positioned on (observable in their records of legislative activity and committee chairmanship) to decide whom to approach and lobby. Table 3 reports the results of regressing *Meetings* on *Bills*, *Committee chair*, and the interactions of these variables with *Executive* (a dummy that equals one when it is a presidential exclusive issue, zero otherwise). The main controls are *President Coalition*, *Political Experience*, *Electoral Safety* and all context variables. The unit of analysis is the issue-legislator pair.<sup>30</sup>

**Table 3. Determinants of lobbyists’ and groups’ targeting (issue-legislator pair)**

Lobby	(1)	(2)	(3)
Executive	-0.923*** (0.0806)	-0.913*** (0.0767)	-0.925*** (0.0758)
Bills	0.0716***	0.0866***	0.0871***

<sup>30</sup> The size of the sample in the “issue-legislator” setting is 6900 since there are 276 deputies (counting twice a deputy holding the seat for both periods) and 25 issues (24 plus the uncategorized “other”). A pair issue-legislator (on average) held 0.84 meetings and cosponsored 2.65 bills. See Table C.1.a. for the descriptive statistics of legislator-issue pairs.

	(0.00734)	(0.00705)	(0.00704)
Executive*Bills	-0.0897***	-0.0811***	-0.0797***
	(0.0254)	(0.0253)	(0.0249)
Committee Chair	1.191***	1.164***	1.217***
	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Executive*Chair	0.371	0.406	0.291
	(0.307)	(0.300)	(0.303)
President coalition		0.264**	0.283***
		(0.104)	(0.0969)
Distance to the Capital		0.000392***	0.000449***
		(0.000113)	(0.000160)
Pol. Experience	--	-0.272**	-0.319***
		(0.127)	(0.119)
Electoral safety	--	-0.0352***	-0.0313***
		(0.00652)	(0.00798)
Gender	--	-0.0577	-0.0271
		(0.129)	(0.142)
Context Variables	No	No	Yes
Constant	-0.329***	0.191	-0.762
	(0.0737)	(0.127)	(1.623)
Observations	6,900	6,875	6,875

*Note:* \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample size is 6875 instead of 6900 because Deputy Miguel Alvarado lacks *Electoral safety* since he was appointed (and not elected) to replace Deputy Jorge Insunza. One deputy times 25 issues accounts for all missing values. This table omits to report the estimates of the ten context variables. We report the full estimation in Table C.2, Appendix C.

The dummy *Executive* is significantly negative, shifting the constant term downwards when the issues are in the exclusive domain of the president. On average, we expect less lobby activity in congress to discuss the president's policy areas when all the non-constant (independent) variables are zero. The significant and positive estimates for *Committee chair* and *Bills* follow our hypotheses whereby, for non-presidential issues (i.e., *Executive*=0), gatekeeping and legislative activity are targets for interest groups. When interacting these variables with the condition of being part of the president's exclusive domain, the results are as follows. The interaction term of *Bills* and *Executive* is negative and statistically significant. Thus, for *Executive*=1, the relationship between lobby meetings and bill sponsoring is uncertain since it results from the sum of a positive (coefficient of *Bills* alone) term and a negative (coefficient of *Bills\*Executive*) one. An interpretation would be that for issues where the executive controls the agenda, it is not

clear that groups and lobbyists approach legislators who are more active in their areas of interest. The interaction between chairs and executive is non-significantly different from zero. This result seems in line with our gatekeeping hypothesis. Recall that if the coefficient of this interaction term were zero, then the effect of chairs on attracting interest groups would be, on average, equal for presidential and non-presidential issues. Meanwhile, the negative coefficient of *Electoral safety* suggests that interest groups target electorally vulnerable legislators. Also, *Political experience* is negatively correlated to meetings, meaning that groups, lobbyists and individuals contact inexperienced legislators more often.

**Table 4. Average marginal effects Chair and Bills (issue-legislator pair)**

d.Meetings/d.X	Executive=0	Executive=1
X=Bills	0.0915*** (0.01179)	0.0022 (0.00700)
X=Chair	1.2793*** (0.17147)	0.4522*** (0.08911)

We provide the average marginal effects of *Committee chair* and *Bills* in Table 4. These estimates allow for more intuitive interpretations than the coefficients in the negative binomial regression (which are differences in the logs of expected counts). A chair appointment translates into roughly 1.3 (0.5) additional meetings if it is a “presidential” (“non-presidential”) committee. Sponsoring ten extra bills on a non-presidential issue increases the count of lobby meetings in one. As before, bill sponsoring is not significant in the policy areas of the president (president’s issues).

**Table 5. Propensity score matching: Lobby and probability of committee chairing**

Lobby	Average Treatment Effects (ATE)
Chair (1 vs 0)	4.280974*** (0.8507697)
Chair	Logistic Estimates
Distance to the Capital	-9.01e-05 (0.000187)
Gender	-0.0113 (0.250)
Electoral Safety	0.787*** (0.291)
Political Experience	-0.405** (0.199)
President Coalition	0.104 (0.190)
Context	YES
Constant	-3.901** (1.886)
Observations	6,875

*Note:* \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In the logistic regression, the context variables Public Lands and Electricity are statistically significant. See the glossary of context variables in Appendix A, Table A.1.

Our results confirm the general gatekeeping effect that predicts higher lobby activity of those legislators presiding on the committees on policy areas that concern interest groups. As further evidence, we compare deputies with similar probabilities of chairing the committees on the relevant issues using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). This being a categorical variable, we interpret *Committee chair* as a treatment. The idea is to eliminate the potential bias in the difference in meetings led by the observables predicting the chair rather than the chair itself. That is why we use all the observables to calculate the probabilities of being a chair. The panel at the bottom of Table 5 reports the results of the logistic regression used to build the scores. The logistic model shows that the significant determinants of the probability of chairing a committee are *Political Experience*, *Electoral Safety*, and two context variables. The top of Table 5 shows that a committee

chair will have, on average, 4.3 more lobby meetings than a non-chair. Based on PSM, we can attribute this effect to the sole fact of presiding on a relevant committee. Our result is robust to different matching procedures and stays the same, even when the propensity scores of any deputy and their matches differ by less than 0.002.

**Table 6. President's issues**

VARIABLES	(1) Macro- economy	(2) Int. Affairs	(3) Foreign Trade	(4) Labour	(5) Social Welfare	(6) Defence
Bills	-0.148 (0.212)	0.784* (0.469)	-0.0817 (0.0531)	0.0170 (0.0367)	0.0826 (0.0763)	0.652*** (0.107)
Committee Chair	2.770*** (0.253)	2.842*** (0.403)	1.179*** (0.442)	0.368 (0.574)	0.00474 (0.467)	-0.777 (0.656)
President Coalition	0.0972 (0.278)	0.530 (0.326)	0.146 (0.333)	0.407 (0.337)	0.424** (0.205)	0.573 (0.368)
Dist. to the Capital	7.18e-05 (0.000197)	0.000223 (0.000260)	0.000294 (0.000265)	0.000243 (0.000231)	0.00047** (0.000210)	7.55e-05 (0.000439)
Pol. Experience	-0.337 (0.264)	-0.694 (0.482)	-0.192 (0.339)	-0.273 (0.357)	-0.355* (0.210)	-0.451 (0.443)
Electoral safety	-0.0597*** (0.0173)	-0.0488** (0.0236)	-0.00810 (0.0192)	0.00413 (0.0203)	-0.0516*** (0.0133)	-0.106*** (0.0238)
Gender	-0.572* (0.345)	-0.425 (0.491)	-0.393 (0.360)	0.296 (0.546)	0.773*** (0.225)	-0.199 (0.407)
Context	--	0.0455 (0.0583)	--	0.128 (0.0846)	-0.0001*** (3.70e-05)	--
Constant	0.628 (0.420)	-1.472*** (0.452)	-1.149** (0.556)	-5.894** (2.601)	-0.0243 (0.270)	-0.640 (0.534)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275

*Note:* Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. One missing value for the variable *Electoral safety* explains the sample with 275 observations.

We also analyze the relationship between position-taking and lobbying when the unit of analysis is the legislator. This approach allows assessing each issue individually and comparing the sub-sample of the president's policy areas with the issues where the executive has less control. Thus, the dependent variable, *Meetings*, is now the count of meetings involving a legislator in a particular policy area. As a result, we have as many dependent variables (and models) as issues. Similarly, *Bills* counts the legislative activity (and the *Committee chair* equals one) only if on the model's topic. This analysis includes

all our control variables. Table 6 presents the president's issues. While the effect of being a committee chair in the respective areas holds for macroeconomics, international affairs, and foreign trade, legislative activity (*Bills*) correlates with meetings in defence and less significantly with foreign trade. Hence, in line with our hypothesis, lobbying activity in issues that the executive controls seem to respond more to gatekeeping powers than (to) bill sponsorship, except for defence in Model (6).



**Table 7. Selected issues of non-presidential exclusivity**

VARIABLES	(1) Agriculture	(2) Housing	(3) Environment	(4) Technology	(5) Immigration	(6) Education	(7) Health	(8) Transport	(9) Culture
Bills	0.279*** (0.0627)	0.157*** (0.0294)	0.206*** (0.0381)	0.709*** (0.264)	0.140 (0.232)	0.174*** (0.0319)	0.119*** (0.0289)	0.0937*** (0.0259)	0.214*** (0.0593)
Committee Chair	0.265 (0.326)	1.340*** (0.498)	0.216 (0.533)	1.199* (0.629)	1.320*** (0.339)	1.067*** (0.385)	-0.0997 (0.615)	1.453*** (0.540)	1.903** (0.746)
President Coalition	0.519** (0.206)	0.424** (0.197)	0.334 (0.248)	0.155 (0.238)	0.179 (0.375)	0.313 (0.192)	-0.0994 (0.200)	0.0814 (0.161)	0.277 (0.290)
Distance to the Capital	0.000804*** (0.000153)	0.000531*** (0.000153)	0.000615*** (0.000199)	0.000528*** (0.000199)	0.000455** (0.000202)	0.000163 (0.000179)	0.000315* (0.000168)	0.000195 (0.000143)	0.000368 (0.000265)
Political Experience	-0.153 (0.210)	-0.103 (0.209)	-0.184 (0.275)	-0.989** (0.388)	-0.787* (0.433)	-0.284 (0.219)	-0.180 (0.204)	-0.381** (0.185)	-0.111 (0.305)
Electoral safety	-0.0568*** (0.0113)	-0.0472*** (0.0125)	-0.0261* (0.0146)	-0.0480*** (0.0153)	-0.00852 (0.0167)	0.00904 (0.00996)	-0.0555*** (0.0104)	-0.0154 (0.0112)	-0.0428** (0.0202)
Gender	-0.399 (0.289)	0.0730 (0.231)	0.167 (0.285)	-0.877* (0.472)	0.764 (0.471)	-0.103 (0.260)	-0.585** (0.252)	-0.0608 (0.216)	-0.137 (0.337)
Context	0.00612 (0.00801)	0.0649 (0.0493)			0.0986** (0.0496)	0.00537 (0.0769)	-0.00430 (0.00513)	-0.0193** (0.00870)	
Constant	0.358 (0.322)	-0.978** (0.436)	-1.147*** (0.341)	-0.622* (0.353)	-2.239*** (0.493)	-0.735 (2.372)	1.816*** (0.408)	0.698*** (0.196)	-0.843** (0.401)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275

Table 7 contains the results for issues outside the exclusive domain of the president. Here instead, bill sponsoring shows significant and positive coefficients across most policy areas. This outcome contrasts with the results in Table 6 (president's issues), confirming our expectation that legislative activity correlates to lobbying activity but only outside the areas where the president dominates the agenda. The exception is migration. This result may be explained due to the administrative authority of the chief executive in this item. The variable *Committee chair* shows positive coefficients, and it is statistically significant for housing, immigration, education, transport, culture, and technology.

Overall, our exercises produce additional relevant results. In the lexicon of the model, lobbying responds negatively to *Political experience*, though sensitive to the specification.<sup>31</sup> Also interesting is the negative association of *Electoral safety* with lobbying for most issues, which conveys that lobbyists prefer to approach members in vulnerable seats. One explanation is that "electorally weak" members have more incentives to support interest groups' campaigns. Something similar might happen with new or less tenured members.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article examines how interest groups and individuals target legislators under strong presidentialism. When the executive controls several policy areas, and legislative particularism is not part of day-to-day politics, the question of the rationale for legislative targeting becomes relevant.

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<sup>31</sup> When we replace *Political experience* with the legislator's tenure, i.e. the number of periods they served as deputy, coefficients are not statistically significant in most cases.

Overall, the results show that occupying a gatekeeping position within the legislature is a significant predictor of targeting, even in issues where the executive controls the agenda. The importance of committee chair assignments in a lobbying strategy is already well-established in the literature, especially for the US Congress. We extend the evidence of this effect to president-dominated assemblies, such as the Chilean. Therefore, our results apply to other countries where the executive has extensive legislative power, such as Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, to mention a few.

While the gatekeeping effect is significant in several policy areas regardless of the control by the executive, bill sponsoring is more present in non-presidential issues, as expected by our Legislative Activity Hypothesis. This result is in line with the literature that accounts for a significant relationship between politicians' issue attention and the lobbying strategies of interest groups. Our evidence suggests legislators' bills on non-presidential issues still transmit relevant information to interest groups, lobbyists and individuals.

The empirical test we put forward in this article contributes to the debate on the relationship between private interests and democratic representatives. However, our findings are far from conclusive. For instance, our analysis starts with the assumption that access and information transmission are analytically indistinguishable. As previous works have suggested (e.g., Wright, 1996), the lobbying process typically comprises two stages: positioning and messaging. First, lobbyists devote efforts to get access to a legislator. Then, in messaging, groups share information with legislators to sway or confirm their decisions. Namely, to influence legislators' voting or bill sponsorship activities in their

favour. Further work might take on the challenge of capturing the sequential nature of the lobbying process.

Future research may also focus on other relevant aspects of lobbying in Chile and Latin America. One example is to study if (and how) interest groups operating in Chile coordinate their efforts with groups alike during shocks or crises (Timoneda and Vallejo Vera, 2021). Also, future research may consider that lobbyists represent organizations or companies of different sizes and importance and explore how this heterogeneity affects the stages of lobbying and bias the representation in congress.<sup>32</sup> The relationship between politicians with lobbyists or special interests is under permanent scrutiny. Advancing our knowledge about contacts between legislators and lobbies in Latin America helps us better understand the representation system.

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<sup>32</sup> Gamboa et al. (2016) account for the disproportionate participation of business organizations in the hearings of the Chilean Congress.

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## APPENDIX A: Context variables and Chairs-issues mapping

**Table A.1. Glossary of context variables**

VARIABLE	Description	Source
Context Lands	Acquired land area by the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (1995-2019).	CONADI <a href="http://www.conadi.gob.cl/">http://www.conadi.gob.cl/</a>
Context Mining	Number of mining operations	Ministry of Mining and Energy
Context Electricity	annual electricity consumption in MWh	Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE)
Context Health	Health coverage at the municipal level	Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal <a href="http://www.sinim.gov.cl/">http://www.sinim.gov.cl/</a>
Context Migrants	Percentage of immigrants (region)	Censo 2017 <a href="https://www.censo2017.cl/">https://www.censo2017.cl/</a>
Context Conflicts	Number of environmental conflicts	Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos
Context Rural	Rural population (%) at the municipal level	Censo 2017 <a href="https://www.censo2017.cl/">https://www.censo2017.cl/</a>
Context Housing	Housing deficit at the municipal level	Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Context Education	Attend and educational institution (%)	Censo 2017 <a href="https://www.censo2017.cl/">https://www.censo2017.cl/</a>
Context fishing	Overall landing (ton.)	


**Table A.2. Mapping of Committee chairs into CAP policy areas**

Policy area	Committee
Macroeconomics	Fiscal (Hacienda)
International Affairs	International Affairs (Relaciones Exteriores)
Foreign Trade	International Affairs (Relaciones Exteriores)
Labour	Labour and Social Welfare (Trabajo y Seguridad Social)
Social Welfare	Labour and Social Welfare (Trabajo y Seguridad Social)
Defence	National Defence (Defensa Nacional)

Agriculture	Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Development (Agricultura, Silvicultura y Desarrollo Rural)
Housing	Housing, Urban Development, National Patrimony (Vivienda, Desarrollo Urbano y Bienes Nacionales)
Environment	Environment and Natural Resources (Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales)
Technology	Sciences & Technology (Ciencias y Tecnología)
Immigration	International Affairs (Relaciones Exteriores)
Education	Education (Educación)
Health	Health (Salud)
Transport	Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications (Obras Públicas, Transportes y Telecomunicaciones)
Culture	Culture and Arts (Cultura y de las Artes)
Domestic Commerce	Economía (Economy)
Civil Rights	Human Rights and Native peoples (Derechos Humanos y Pueblos Originarios)
Mining	Mining (Minería)
Energy	Energy (Energía)
Forest	Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Development (Agricultura, Silvicultura y Desarrollo Rural)
Government Operations	Fiscal (Hacienda)
Law & Crime	Citizens Security (Seguridad Ciudadana)
Fishing	Fishing, Aquaculture and Maritime Interests (Pesca, Acuicultura e Intereses Marítimos)
Public Lands	Human Rights and Native peoples (Derechos Humanos y Pueblos Originarios)


## APPENDIX B: Figures

**Figure B.1. Distribution of bills and meetings by presidential exclusivity**



*Note:* The y-axis on the left panel is the number of bill cosponsoring by policy areas where the executive has exclusivity or not. The y-axis on the right panel is the number of lobby meetings, again by presidential exclusivity. This panel includes the share of caseworks in total meetings. Casework belong neither to presidential nor non-presidential issues.

**Figure B.2. Distribution of per-deputy bills and meetings for selected issues**



*Note:* The y-axis on the left panel is the number of bill cosponsoring per deputy. The y-axis on the right panel is the number of lobby meetings per deputy. The horizontal lines intercept the y-axes at the respective means.

**APPENDIX C: Additional tables**

**Table C.1.a. Descriptive Statistics in legislator-issue pairs**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby meetings	6900	.839	2.076	0	36
Bills	6900	2.647	4.693	0	66
Committee	6900	.104	.306	0	1
Chair	6900	.02	.142	0	2
Political Experience	6900	.442	.497	0	1
Electoral safety	6875	.749	.327	.09	2.13

**Table C.1.b. President Issues: Descriptive Statistics in legislator-issue pairs**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby meetings	1656	.312	.901	0	10
Bills	1656	1.307	2.865	0	35
Committee	1656	.15	.358	0	1
Chair	1656	.03	.181	0	2
Political Experience	1656	.442	.497	0	1
Electoral safety	1650	.749	.327	.09	2.13

**Table C.1.c. Non-president Issues: Descriptive Statistics in legislator-issue pairs**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby meetings	5244	1.006	2.303	0	36
Bills	5244	3.07	5.064	0	66
Committee	5244	.09	.286	0	1
Chair	5244	.016	.127	0	1
Political Experience	5244	.442	.497	0	1
Electoral safety	5225	.749	.327	.09	2.13

**Table C.2. Mean of Bills sponsorship per issue**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>President exclusive</u>					
Macroeconomics	271	.229	.471	0	2
Foreign Trade	276	.051	.251	0	2
Inter. Affairs	276	.141	.369	0	2
Defense	276	1.051	1.599	0	15
Labour	276	4.946	5.55	0	38
Social Welfare	276	1.58	1.964	0	17
<u>Non-president exclusive</u>					
Civil Rights	276	2.533	2.429	0	16
Health	276	4.732	5.34	0	41
Agriculture	276	1.192	1.648	0	10
Immigration	276	.504	.88	0	6
Education	276	2.862	2.99	0	19
Environment	276	2.264	2.762	0	15
Energy	276	.656	.887	0	6
Transport	276	3.123	3.606	0	21
Law & Crime	276	12.105	9.327	0	62
Housing	276	2.703	2.465	0	14
Domestic Commerce	276	6.83	5.931	0	31
Technology	276	.417	.77	0	4
Gov. Operations	276	11.801	7.913	0	36
Public Lands	276	1.591	2.188	0	20
Culture	276	2.33	2.462	0	14
Other	276	1.467	1.826	0	18
Mining	276	.83	1.574	0	11
Fish	276	.692	1.408	0	8
Forest	276	.051	.278	0	3

**Table C.3. Lobby meetings on *Bills, Committee, Political Experience and Context***

Lobby	(1)	(2)	(3)
Executive	-0.923*** (0.0806)	-0.913*** (0.0767)	-0.925*** (0.0758)
Bills	0.0716*** (0.00734)	0.0866*** (0.00705)	0.0871*** (0.00704)
Executive*Bills	-0.0897*** (0.0254)	-0.0811*** (0.0253)	-0.0797*** (0.0249)
Committee Chair	1.191*** (0.151)	1.164*** (0.148)	1.217*** (0.146)
Executive*Chair	0.371 (0.307)	0.406 (0.300)	0.291 (0.303)
President coalition		0.264** (0.104)	0.283*** (0.0969)
Distance to the Capital		0.000392*** (0.000113)	0.000449*** (0.000160)
Pol. Experience	--	-0.272** (0.127)	-0.319*** (0.119)
Electoral safety	--	-0.0352*** (0.00652)	-0.0313*** (0.00798)
Gender	--	-0.0577 (0.129)	-0.0271 (0.142)
Context Social	--	--	-6.24e-06 (1.56e-05)
Context Mining	--	--	-0.000113 (0.000129)
Context Energy	--	--	9.48e-11 (1.31e-10)
Context Health	--	--	-0.00863* (0.00500)
Context Migrants	--	--	-0.0145 (0.0371)
Context Conflicts	--	--	-0.000490 (0.0155)
Context Rural	--	--	-0.00696 (0.00775)
Context Housing	--	--	-0.0164 (0.0398)
Context Education	--	--	0.0555 (0.0418)
Context Fishing	--	--	1.73e-08 (2.15e-07)
Constant	-0.329*** (0.0737)	0.191 (0.127)	-0.762 (1.623)
Observations	6,900	6,875	6,875

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample size is 6875 instead of 6900 because Deputy Miguel Alvarado lacks *Electoral safety* since he was appointed (and not elected) to replace Deputy Jorge Insunza. One deputy times 25 issues accounts for all missing values.

**Table C.4. Remaining issues with no presidential exclusivity**

VARIABLES	(1) Domestic Commerce	(2) Civil Rights	(3) Mining	(4) Energy	(5) Forest	(6) Gov Operations	(7) Law	(8) Fishing	(9) Public Lands
Bills	0.0510*** (0.0170)	0.0353 (0.0608)	-0.0710 (0.0762)	0.246* (0.128)	0.392 (0.772)	0.0616*** (0.0144)	0.0185* (0.0103)	0.553*** (0.121)	0.134** (0.0631)
Com. Chair	-0.0162 (0.509)	0.702 (0.794)	0.0564 (0.567)	-0.168 (0.734)	0.831 (0.914)	1.035** (0.488)	1.205** (0.518)	-0.469 (0.569)	-0.0406 (0.427)
President Coal.	0.557*** (0.149)	0.185 (0.173)	0.608** (0.273)	0.321 (0.202)	-0.0396 (0.370)	0.537** (0.222)	0.167 (0.165)	0.580** (0.290)	0.343* (0.202)
Dist. to Capital	0.0004*** (0.000134)	0.000287 (0.000186)	0.000172 (0.000195)	0.000454*** (0.000159)	0.000274 (0.000228)	0.000212 (0.000191)	0.00034** (0.000155)	0.00125*** (0.000197)	0.0005*** (0.000129)
Political Exp.	-0.459** (0.183)	-0.234 (0.197)	-0.473 (0.316)	-0.350 (0.266)	0.163 (0.394)	-0.198 (0.239)	-0.270 (0.198)	-0.309 (0.280)	0.0519 (0.200)
Elect. safety	-0.0304*** (0.00913)	-0.0635*** (0.0161)	0.0248 (0.0165)	0.000534 (0.0131)	-0.0113 (0.0215)	-0.0102 (0.0117)	-0.0359*** (0.00994)	-0.0700*** (0.0163)	-0.000772 (0.0118)
Gender	-0.0116 (0.290)	0.440** (0.186)	0.0954 (0.352)	-0.641** (0.269)	-0.355 (0.565)	0.319 (0.274)	0.172 (0.177)	-0.574 (0.350)	0.0905 (0.231)
Context		-0.00560 (0.0158)	0.00144*** (0.000242)	9.88e-11 (3.12e-10)	7.37e-05*** (2.71e-05)		-0.0277* (0.0149)	6.49e-07* (3.38e-07)	3.96e-05** (1.79e-05)
Constant	0.384* (0.199)	0.878*** (0.308)	-1.982*** (0.449)	-0.363 (0.580)	-1.477** (0.621)	-1.438*** (0.302)	1.405*** (0.244)	-0.371 (0.408)	-1.020*** (0.332)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275

*Note:* Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. One missing value for the variable *Electoral safety* explains the sample with 275 observations.