Aesthetic experience, novelty and consciousness in the comprehension of metaphors

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I, Ramona Ileana Pistol, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores theoretical ideas about the nature of metaphors and develops an account of metaphor that integrates both the rational and the emotional in an attempt to explain and embrace that which has not been theoretically addressed in any well-known theories of metaphor – metaphor's expressiveness. This thesis argues that *novelty* is the key source of meaning creation in the interpretative process of metaphors and explains how potentialities are at the core of the comprehension of new meaning. This epistemological study considers a wide range of approaches which aim to define cognition, emotions, consciousness, beauty and aesthetic experience.

The thesis argues that the interpretation of metaphor relies heavily on organism-environment interactions in the sense that bodily states create an experience which helps interpretation. Equally important, the experience includes *awareness* of the new association of the ideas because the newness can only arise from processes through creating possibilities and assessing them until arriving at an acceptable conclusion. After revising the theoretical path of metaphor, the thesis expands the idea of embodiment to include cognition as a *dynamic interaction* between humans, as interpreters and the environment. The argument is then directed to emotions and the critical role of mental imagery in the evocative function of metaphors, the aesthetic experience and the criteria for considering a metaphor to be successful.

Synthesizing all of these factors in an account of metaphor, the thesis seeks to address some of the problems in the understanding of the expressiveness of metaphor and the problem of obscurities of meaning. In particular, it clarifies the relationship between novelty/creativity and, on one hand, the moment when the connection in the comparison that gives the surprise is identified, and on the other hand, the awareness of what is significant to

arrive at the meaning of the metaphor and to what we choose to represent or to bring to

existence through the metaphor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

CMT Conceptual Metaphor Theory

CP   *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.* 1935, 1958. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. References by vol. and paragraph number.

CB   *A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Published Works of Charles Sanders Peirce.* 1986. 2nd ed., revised, by Kenneth Laine Ketner. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University. References by publication number (in *CB)* and page number (in original source).

EP   The Essential Peirce, 1998. vol. 2, ed. Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.

ML   Metalogicon, J.B. Hall and J.P. Haseldine (eds.) 2013, Turnhourt: Brepols.

W   Writings of Charles S. Peirce. 1982, 1984, 1986. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. References by vol. and page number.

Note: The formatting of the metaphors used in this thesis has been done in italics for the general metaphors and inverted commas for the quotes from poets and other sources.

INTRODUCTION

"A language is nothing but a necropolis of dead metaphors"

(Sparsholt 1974 p.84).

Why is metaphor important?

In its most general sense, metaphor can be defined as the use of a term for one thing to describe another on the basis of a similarity between the two things or some other relationship to other things. This well-accepted definition of metaphor as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003, p.5) has not just aided understanding metaphor in literary texts, or even in everyday speech; additionally, it has successfully established metaphor as a way of understanding a concept and a way to organise our thinking. On this basis alone, it can be seen that metaphor is not just a small matter of literary style, but a far-reaching issue tied up with human cognition.

However, the definition is simplistic since it does not do justice to the aesthetic response that metaphors create by their very nature, a matter which is still ignored in many theoretical discussions of metaphorical language. Additionally, despite explaining the mechanism of metaphor as describing one idea in terms of another, an action which can only be carried out through imaginative processes and the consideration of possibilities (Gibbs, 1994; Littlemore and Low, 2006), the imagination and the aesthetic response in the figurative comparison remains unexplored. Studies in cognitive science which have sometimes touched on metaphor have moved away from a computational view of cognition and behaviour in the production of speech towards theories in which the human body becomes a mediator between mind and world (Gallagher, 2017; O'Regan and Noë, 2009; Damasio, 2018; Merleau-Ponty, 1964b). For metaphor, such a consideration implies that the meaning of the metaphor is not embodied and stored information, but rather an active, open and ready-to-be processed, action or experience for meaning construal. Thus, among several metaphor theories, other

approaches that will be implicated in the present study are contemporary semiotics in the post-Peircean sense, which implicates cognition and the study of embodied cognition in the sense of Ecological-Enactive cognition. Central to this new approach to the aesthetic response to metaphor will be the question of *novelty*.

Why is novelty an issue in the studies of metaphor?

Paul Valéry (1976), in the "Philosophy of the Dance", eloquently considers the artful appearance of metaphorical meaning when he writes: "What is a metaphor if not a kind of pirouette performed by an idea, enabling us to assemble its diverse names or images?" Alongside the idea of movement, both as bodily movement and thinking forward and backwards which is highlighted here (and discussed at length in Chapters 2, 3 and 7) as part of being metaphorical and assembling diverse names and images or possibilities of language, metaphor is also presented as being able to "display" or "show" rather than just "naming" or "pointing to" a state of affairs. Such a characteristic is included in the cognitive linguists' (Johnson and Lakoff, 2002) definition, above, where metaphor *constructs* and *creates* (i.e. metaphor as a neural mapping) rather than *describes* conditions. However, the solution offered by cognitive linguists when they define metaphor as a conceptual structure based on comparison (in order to refute the view of metaphor conceived as mainly an element of ornamentation) equally becomes an issue if we consider metaphor to be only a mental ability. This is because many creative metaphors are not the result of finding fixed commonalities between embodied ideas in a type of deliberate reasoning as a linear process, as argued by cognitive linguists (Johnson and Lakoff, 2002; Fauconnier and Turner 2008; Tendahl and Gibbs 2008) but, rather, they are obscure and difficult to explain, being often associated with symbolism and complicated connotative meanings. For instance, Black (1955, p.288), with his *interactive view of metaphor*, draws attention to connotative ability and to the novel

patterns of implications for the literal uses of the words. Nevertheless, as will be seen in this thesis (Chapter 1, below), his theoretical discussion remains focused on metaphors' ability to make connections between different elements of concepts.

Other attempts to define metaphor (Ortony, 1993; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Carston, 2010; Glucksberg and McGlone, 2001) retain the aforementioned mechanical view of the world because they focus on conceptual information as a 'content', as well as 'comparison' and clichés. The way in which they do so leaves no room for an adequate discussion of novelty. In the present thesis, novelty is not a marginal or supplementary issue in metaphor study: the core idea of metaphor is strongly associated with 'the new'. Ironically, though, if metaphor's 'function' is to establish a new system or a new pattern, such a trait must be included in its definition, together with the notions of creativity or the promotion of novelty. The predominant theories of metaphor do not take this into account: they largely ignore the creativity and spontaneity upon which new metaphors rely. What we witness in new metaphors is an unprecedented meaning and experience, having almost nothing in common with what existed before. Despite this situation, theories of metaphor identify the substrate of metaphor either as 'concepts' or as already existing information stored in our mind (Gibbs, 2017; Johnson, 2015; Kövecses, 2015). Yet, as the research in this thesis reveals, a metaphor works on a similarity which is 'already there' (Geary, 2012), so it does not create a link or a mapping between separate ideas since the connection is pre-existing and it just needs to be discovered (see Chapter 2, below). In other words, the metaphor *reveals* a similarity and the process comes with enjoyment and surprise or other mental and physiological states that interpreters experience as part of the interpretation of metaphor. Concomitantly, surprise often makes the experience more enjoyable and creates pleasure, which Aristotle (the *Rhetoric*, 3.4, p.1-2 1406b) associates with *new knowledge* in metaphor's pleasurable dimension.

Despite a common agreement that metaphor depends on surprise (see Romantic poets, Ezra Pound, 1914), metaphor continues to be seen as 'models' or 'building blocks' of our cognition (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) rather than a process or experience. Alternatively, it is thought to be a mode of change, defined by Ricoeur (1975, p.23) as a "deviation on relation to a pre-existing logical order" where metaphor grounds the possibility of logical thought rather than an affective experience.

Notably, pure rationality might be used in common expressions and some types of figurative language such as idioms, but it does not define the aesthetic experience, the ultimately discovered good sense in which (effective) metaphors distinguish themselves from other types of language. Highly creative metaphors rely on feelings and originate playfulness, valuing creativity, humour, surprise and the like. A novel combination of words does not necessarily entail a powerful and good metaphor. For instance, *the ballerina is a butterfly* might contain a novel association for many interpreters, but it cannot be described as a poetic, highly creative metaphor because the idea of the ballerina as relatively light in weight and comparable to other weight, such as a butterfly's, is rather obvious. In contrast, creative metaphors rely on the newness of a combination or arrangement of ideas, but also on surprising possibilities and connections and an extra "nothing has been quite like this", as Rescher (1996, p.75) would characterise novelty. Interestingly, the contemporary theories of metaphor focus on the comparison process in metaphor and make a negligible difference between metaphors and similes, positing a similar formula consisting of A is [like] B (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Lakoff and Turner, 1989). The metaphor is treated either as an implicit simile, or as an analogical relation or a "weakened metaphor" (Ricoeur, 1978, p.248). A creative simile was used to describe the surfaces of a painting as "a sober flicker in which images flash and are gone like the sides of fish in dark, weedy water" (in Gaut, 1997, p.225). Here the metaphor relation draws our attention to features of a painting that we might

otherwise have been overlooked, such as a certain quality of movement in its surface. Importantly, while the metaphor allows us to see something which has not been exposed before, the new exposure or perspective also brings aesthetic qualities of restlessness and motion. These latter might stimulate our ability to imagine and experience a quality of restlessness and motion on the painting's surface in the process of attempting to understand the qualities *of* the surface. This example of metaphor highlights the aesthetic understanding (or appreciative understanding) which is somewhat neglected in the literature about the comprehension of metaphors, but which is as equally important as the logical understanding and, as such, must be integrated into any account of metaphor, as this thesis argues.

Thus, the gap that is identified in the literature indicates an insufficient and sometimes weak explanation of expressiveness in the studies of metaphor which centre on the cognitive dimension in terms of building blocks, sidelining or leaving unexplained the feeling of newness, of excitement or surprise that complement highly creative metaphors. Indeed, creative metaphors rely on a combination of ideas in unfamiliar and novel ways, exploring combinations; but they also invite "sense creation", as opposed to 'conventional' metaphors which "invite sense retrieval" (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005, p.199). This distinction is popular in the predominant theories of metaphor to the point where it is argued that creative and conventional metaphors require two different cognitive processes. If conventional metaphors can be explained with reference to concepts, the interpretation of creative metaphors is associated with higher order mental processes and the use of imagination (Carston, 2012; Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Woolf, 2000). Both, however, fail to provide an explanation of newness which incorporates the important notions, such as consciousness and affect, that this thesis seeks to analyse with relation to metaphor.

Equally important, a metaphor cannot exist without the comparison element; but, for the metaphor to be novel, the comparison must be made from a new perspective or to

highlight a new resemblance that exists between the compared elements. The association in the comparison of the elements of the metaphor reveals sharing qualities, a process that already exists, which means that it rather guides interpreters to identify a *likeness* or an *icon* in Peirce's (*CP* 2.277) terms, through a process of discovery. Novelty then, always contains a similarity which has existed as a component, but in a modified form since there must be a shift of perspective which brings the surprising element and the 'shock' which is part of the human experience. Most researchers who offer explanations of metaphor (Johnson, 2017; Fauconnier and Turner, 2008; Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008; Geary, 2012; Carston, 2010) either avoid this element intentionally or mention it superficially, without any attempt to integrate it. However, the surprise, the shock, the pleasure is part of the interpretative process of metaphors because it is part of the interpreters' experience of the world. A direct implication of any theory of metaphor is that novelty in metaphors must be theoretically addressed precisely because the novelty that emerges in interpretation is *genuine* in the sense that it is significant and ontologically valid. Moreover, it is the point of departure in searching for the emergent figurative meaning (see Chapter 7, below, especially). The newness of experience is central in explaining the meaning of metaphors and how a metaphor comes into existence. Every new metaphor is novel by being an extension of the past, mixed with new and unanticipated flavours. Thus, it is important to research how novelty is connected to complexity, because multiple choices, through hypothetical thinking, involve multiple complexities (see Chapter 4, below) and it is in the theoretical discussion of this that the thesis seeks to makes a contribution to knowledge.

This thesis does not, however, seek to reduce metaphor to novelty any more than it wishes to explain metaphor as only a mechanism. If metaphors rely on the newness of a situation which comes from something existent, the situation is not a clearly presented condition that leads interpreters from an A to a B point. It is, rather, a situation where we

think of a metaphor in terms very similar to Terry Pratchett's (2006, p.16) definition: "A metaphor is a kind o' lie to help people understand what's true." A metaphor is like a storytelling because it compares two dissimilar things by equating one thing with another; but it does so in ways that take the interpreter through a journey of experience. Seen as a meaning process which is experienced, rather than a logical relation that exists without necessarily being enacted, metaphors are clearly the object of allusion in Murakami's (2019, p.73) advice that, as consumers of them, we should not try to explain a metaphor but, instead, embrace the idea that they "are not something you should explain in words. You just grasp them and accept them." Metaphors are there to help us experience new ideas and new perspectives. The experience for consumers of metaphors is, in fact, mentioned in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980, p.5) definition as "we understand and experience one thing in terms of another"; yet they chose to emphasise things or concepts and made less of the expressive force and affective value of metaphor, what it possesses that allows it to charm their interpreters.

If we look at metaphor as a phenomenon that codifies meaning, it becomes clearer that metaphors are not bounded, with only an emotive effect, as Rorty (1982) defines it, but also extend into the area of logical effects. This has created an important issue for the main theoretical accounts, because considering the evocative nature of metaphors rejects the idea that metaphors have a cognitive content. Thus, despite the wide recognition of the *shock* that a metaphor creates, which is an outstanding characteristic of metaphor, the main metaphor studies still struggle to integrate the emotive effect. The kind of content that needs to be explained is related to the physical perception or sensation and often discussed under the notion of "image" as a mental representation of such experience. The "image" content is discussed in Chapter 5, using Damasio's theory of consciousness which effectively explains how our experiences include perception of our body and the environment, arguing that feeling is not separate from thought.

Thus, the research in this thesis has been pursued because emotions and the body are a source of information together with logical reasoning. Conducting research on how we arrive at meaning and where it comes from is important because it provides some clarity on how we understand the world and the newness which arises through metaphors. Consequently, metaphors are worth studying because they are the main ways to create new meaning. The framework I develop offers a way of understanding the relationship between how we logically process information when we interpret a metaphor and how we make meaning possible from representing the environment, bodily processes, feelings, and emotions.

Aims and objectives

Consideration of the issues discussed in the section above, as features of our aesthetic experience, together with my experience of speaking English as a second language and having to resort to metaphors whenever I felt that my vocabulary was not sufficient to express what I wanted, have led me on the path to study metaphor and consider that there is more to metaphors than an associative process. While metaphor can be studied from different angles and disciplines such as 'metaphor for second language teaching and learning' (Littlemore, 2019; Boers, 2013), 'metaphor in advertising' (Forceville, 1996; Philips, 2003), 'metaphor in media discourse' (Williams, 2013; Jue, 2020) , 'metaphors in design' (Gulari, 2015) and so on, I decided to focus on expressivity, vividness and the feeling of 'openness'. This is because they are essential considerations in the studies of communication where an explanation of why some metaphors are more metaphorical than others is needed, as is a discussion which can extend across a wide range of disciplines from both arts and science subjects.

The aim of this research, then, is to investigate the novelty and the aesthetic in the interpretation of metaphors.

The research question that the project addresses, therefore, is:

What is the role of novelty in metaphor after the conceptualist and enactivist

theoretical accounts?

Given the issues and gaps in knowledge outlined in the previous section, above, the objectives of this project are:

1. to construct a theory of metaphor that accommodates emotions as an important source of meaning creation alongside the more logical information that is given by embodiment

2. to identify what features of metaphor contribute to the creation of new meaning

3. to establish the process of meaning creation as arising from newness and creativity.

The theory of metaphor that this thesis proposes succeeds in beginning directly from novel metaphors and extending the analysis to settled metaphors. This contrasts with the approach in which they start from expanding from established meaning to metaphorical meaning in light of the conceptual mapping or models defined by cognitive linguists (Lakoff and Johnson,1999; Lakoff and Turner, 1989) which putatively organise our knowledge.

With the aim to analyse the uniqueness encompassed in a metaphor, the findings of this research, although criticising Conceptual Metaphor Theory, will also strengthen views on the exceptional role of metaphor in shaping thought and language. This is a role which Nietzsche (1979, p.3) refers to when claiming that "we possess nothing but metaphors for things - metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities" to highlight the ubiquity of metaphor and its role in creating concepts by equating unequal things. While I agree with the first part of Nietzsche's claim, the second part is far more problematic because I will argue that the analysis of the centrality of novelty reveals otherwise. These findings are used to illustrate how metaphor can be rethought not only as experiencing one thing in terms

of another, but also as an unlimited means of representing reality through an intertwined relationship between emotion and cognition. Thus, the findings of the study reveal not only that the aesthetic focuses on perception by means of the senses, establishing metaphor as the only way of representing the environment, but also reveals the importance of novelty for meaning construction.

Research methodology

The method that I used to conduct the current research is epistemological interpretivism because it shifts the focus to the production of knowledge in any aspect of communication, in this case metaphor. Interpretivism is useful because it can provide a helpful account of the production of knowledge (Pascale, 2011; Schwandt, 2003) in the analysis of novelty in metaphors and of the interpretation of metaphor as heavily shaped by human experiences and social contexts. Because figurative language relies heavily on interpretation and making sense of reality, as opposed to accessing an already established convention (literal meaning), it cannot be studied independently of the possibility of subjective interpretations. Interpretive research has generated interesting insights into the theoretical discussion of metaphors and new knowledge as it is discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis and it was helpful in constructing a new theory of metaphor that assigns to cognition and emotions an equal role in interpretation.

This research project also uses an inductive approach to look at several metaphor theories, modern semiotics and embodied cognitive science as the main approaches that are particularly implicated in the attempt to understand why we 'consume' some metaphors by 'having a feel' and searching for clarity rather than accepting the falsity that is created. An inductive approach can offer a close understanding of the expressivity of metaphors, on one hand and of the meaning construal from creativity and representing the world, on the other.

Recent developments in the domains of neuroscience and linguistics have created a new kind of approach to language, where the body is seen to operate together with the brain to create meaning. Interpreters may not necessarily have to access stored information traditionally known as concepts; rather, they may be in a participative process with the environment, especially in the area of epistemological quality of information. This, in turn, will affect the interpretation of metaphors. Knowledge seems to be an important factor in interpretation, and it has been examined here through an epistemological approach. In this thesis, I argue that, first, meaning is derived from both embodied and logical information plus emotions and, second, that creativity or newness is the basis of meaning creation in metaphors.

Structure

This thesis is structured as follows:

An <u>Introduction</u> which discusses the importance of metaphor in communication and explains why novelty is an issue when defining metaphor.

<u>Chapter 1</u> presents the key literature on the nature of metaphors, using a broad set of views in order to highlight that the Western tradition follows the Aristotelian treatment of metaphor as expression of resemblance or similarity of two concepts, neglecting to fully address and explain its expressivity. Vico established metaphor as an important cognitive process and highlighted the importance of senses (poetic wisdom) and the creative process in the construction of metaphorical meaning; but 20th century studies of metaphor embraced metaphor as a way of thinking and as an established relationship, choosing to focus either on the similarities expressed by metaphor (I. A. Richards, 1936 and Ricoeur, 1978) or on the

active interaction between two ideas in an A-is-B form, neglecting to investigate more complex metaphors (Black, 1962).

Derrida (1982) is shown to revive the idea about metaphor as needing to be fresh or novel to be valuable through his explanation of how meaning wears out and he also links emotions and feelings to the ambiguity in their interpretation. Similarly, Ricoeur (1977) is concerned with novel metaphors ("living metaphors") and discusses the vital function of the imagination of projecting new possibilities; but he remains focused on *resemblance*, which he believes enables us to function when interpreting new metaphors. Thus, the chapter evidences the lack of an explanation of the expressive power of metaphor and the beauty and pleasure that metaphors can add to discourse.

Chapter 2 discusses how we can arrive at a metaphorical meaning by undergoing an emotional experience rather than a logical one alone. The chapter explores Merleau-Ponty's notions of *style* and *expressio*n to show how many metaphors are experienced rather than interpreted and to show that his account of the body reveals that metaphor is an ontological condition of experience and not only an empirical phenomenon. This chapter provides supporting evidence for the crucial role of emotions in meaning and also their nature that gives rise to the research hypothesis that a metaphor, first and foremost, denotes newness or novelty. It considers the effects of assuming that newness enters the world through metaphor. The chapter explains how the similarity is a discovered relation rather than created and it also discusses the pleasure, entertainment and the energising value of metaphor. It discusses how each create an emotional response through sensory activation in unexpected and unlimited ways through which we continuously experience the world. These ideas help develop the point that metaphor is a new way of expression that is always *relational to* the world, as opposed to being *about* the world and having consequences for other points in other chapters.

Chapter 3 continues this exploration of metaphor as entangled with experience by turning to the enactivist (4E) approach to meaning creation. The chapter argues that the concept of enactive cognition is well suited for a theory of metaphor because it explicitly aims to incorporate the direct connection of the environment in the creation and processing of metaphors, successfully explaining the sense-making process as embodied and action-oriented. It presents the alternative view that metaphor creation rests on embodied, perceptual and enactive capacities as opposed to the interpretation of metaphor being simply 'in the head'. It discusses embodied and enactive metaphors (Gallagher and Lindgren, 2015) to point out that we *engage* with a metaphor in arriving at its meaning - this is important in understanding the 'felt sense' of lived experiences to which some metaphors give rise and why many metaphors do not have a determinate meaning. The chapter also explains the notion of *representation* from an enactivist account, which poses a challenge to the enactivist view of metaphor. The key objective is to understand how perception becomes a matter of bodily exploration and how metaphor should be construed as experience that involves coupling with the environment rather than a full representation of it (Noë, 2006).

Chapter 4 argues that the nature of emotions resides in the body and shows how we create knowledge from acts of feelings and feelings from imaginary states. The discussion of emotions is vital for explaining how, with novel metaphors it is possible to arrive at a meaning which is less likely to be based on logical analytical reasoning and comparison of two concepts. The discussion leads to an explanation of how arriving at metaphor's meaning can become a conscious process and prefigures the account of mental imagery offered in Chapter 5. Damasio's (2000, 2021) account contributes to understanding the affective and aesthetic dimension of metaphor and how feelings open the way to consciousness, which is

not the same as sensing. Moreover, understanding how feelings are made helps explain the consciousness on which novelty relies. Viewing feelings as conceptualised perceptions of emotions which are physiological responses helps explain how the meaning of a metaphor can be represented as a lived experience that relies on bodily movement and action. Damasio's point that imaginary states can create feelings is useful to highlight some hypothetical thinking and considerations of possibilities which are fully explained in Chapter 7. The reason for this is that these possibilities are crucial ways of arriving at the meaning of a metaphor and helpful considerations to explain novelty.

Chapter 5 offers a necessary discussion of *mental imagery*. Such a concept can no longer be ignored within the theories of metaphor because, as Chapter 4 shows, mental images are bound up in emotions and embodiment. The chapter examines how interpretation of metaphor includes *images* and *imagination* as a necessary source for the comprehension of metaphors because perception and action are intertwined. Images are argued in this thesis to possess a multimodal nature and be the result of the awareness of our body states, as Damasio (2018) describes them. Defining imagery is important for understanding the role of novelty in metaphors because the evoked imagery that results from associating two ideas contributes to the aptness of a metaphor by being consciously processed and hypothesised. This chapter starts with a revision of the controversial notion of *mental imagery* and defines the term using strong theoretical views (Damasio 2018, Gibson 1979) where the role of the senses is important in meaning creation. It discusses metaphors as *affordances* (Gibson 1979) which are cues in the environment and which explain how a metaphor can be intuitive and with obscure meaning and how it can be revived. This chapter proposes a new framework that incorporates a definition of mental images as emotions and experiences because they arise

from neural patterns or feelings which are based on representations of the body (Damasio, 1999).

Chapter 6 explicates how we are capable of an expressive understanding and how we appreciate the metaphor and its vividness by discussing aesthetic considerations in perception. Having previously established that perceiving a metaphor as beautiful relies on a process of awareness of a representational or imaginative process, this chapter argues that novelty relies on aesthetic considerations in perception, considerations which amount to more than straightforward perception. The chapter uses Tolstoy's (1960) claim that description is insufficient to convey feelings because his view is congruent with the idea pursued in the current research in which metaphor is analysed as a unique and personal experience of reality. This chapter also explains how mainly original metaphors remain open to interpretation by using Wollheim's (1987) "seeing-in" to show how the artistic expression of metaphors is the cognitive stock which brings aesthetic perception into interpretation. The newness or novelty influences aesthetic preferences because its ambiguity and unsettling nature create multiple possibilities with which we participate within the interpretative process. These points are important for this thesis because they extend the emphasis on the aesthetic judgment over the conceptual and embodied logic that features in the accounts that this thesis supersedes.

Chapter 7 identifies the conditions that make a metaphor 'good' and 'successful', including vagueness, multiple possibilities and a relational movement between possibilities and their root in the resemblance. It presents metaphor as a process of *creative discovery* and explains how metaphors arise in our imagination by using Peirce's notion of *abduction*. This is

because the issue of imaginative pleasure, such as that encountered in hypothesising, pertains to what makes a good metaphor. Peirce's (later forsaken) notion of *effete mind* helps explain how we create a determined path or order from vagueness or chaos with the aim to understand how metaphors become regularities. This chapter also explains how the "resemblance" on which all the main theories of metaphor rely, and which is an "icon" in Peirce's (CP 2.222) terms, may be a possibility that can only be processed through an imaginative act, a point which allows description of how we process the ambiguity and multiplicity in the meaning of a metaphor. The chapter establishes that the novelty of a metaphor lies in how odd and strange it is and in the shock that it creates; but, moreover, it argues that the common conception of metaphor must be inverted because we should begin with metaphor that requires interpretation and then discuss the move to a potential mechanism or device.

Lastly, Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions of the thesis and addresses the consequences of proposing a new theory of metaphor. The thesis concludes that metaphor is not only the building block of our thinking, or the way we represent the environment, but a way of enquiry into the world or a way of representing what is not known already. The second conclusion reveals that novelty is what supports the creation of possibilities or combinations of views, which can be both a rearrangement of what is actual or real in the world and a combination of possibilities in an ideal word.

CHAPTER 1: LITERARY APPROACHES TO METAPHOR WHICH PRECEDE CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a survey of historically influential contributions to discussion of what metaphors are - from the classical views of Plato and Aristotle to the works of several prominent 20th century theorists of metaphor from I.A Richards to Ricoeur who herald an important change in the treatment of metaphor. The metaphor debate is rich in arguments, with the main differences deriving from the origin of metaphor either as a matter primarily of language, as many classical theories assume, or as a result of thought, a view commencing with Vico in the 18th century and taken up in accounts of metaphor in recent decades. The overview of theories aims to sketch the ongoing debate regarding the influence of language on thought and the role of representations that are believed to provide a mechanism for metaphorical thinking.

A comprehensive analysis of metaphor, especially one which broadens the semantic perspective, must be able to show the dramatic development of the phenomenon which, even after millennia of discussion, is far from being clearly defined. This is because such an overview shows how the current studies in metaphor explain only the rational feature of metaphor, seemingly being unable to integrate creativity into their accounts. The chapter presents models of metaphor based on *comparison* (the classical approach to metaphor) and *interaction* (following Richards and Black's *tenor* and *vehicle*) in order to demonstrate that novelty in metaphorical meaning remains a pressing issue since it cannot be accounted for by either model, nor by a hermeneutic approach of meaning as action. The summaries of metaphor in this chapter will provide the basis for further discussion in Chapter 2 (focused on subjective experience) and Chapter 4 (focused on emotions) of the problem of novelty as the result of a close relationship between body and mind.

The present chapter begins with Plato's deprecated view of metaphor as a detachable element in language, followed by the views of Aristotle who highlights metaphor's communicative heuristics and its freshness in language, as well as Vico's account, which, despite following the tradition of both of his predecessors, is rather distinctive because it explicitly focuses on metaphor from the perspective of language and the body, considering metaphor an instrument of thought. These ideas are introduced because some of the aspects to which they refer have led to the current widespread, but confusing, view of metaphor either as a figure of speech, as it appears in dictionaries and/or as a way to understand and talk about an idea in terms of another. Additionally, the basis of similarity in metaphor remains a theoretical puzzle. Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 review the first analytical models of metaphor, showing metaphor's pervasiveness and concerning themselves with the interaction between two thoughts rather than a change of one word meaning. The chapter ends with the accounts of two recent philosophers in the Western tradition who have called into question the notion of meaning and the world of experience, favouring instead the risk of relativism and the importance of context.

1.2 Pre-cognitivist models of metaphor comprehension: The early accounts of metaphor
1.2.1 The classical tradition of rhetoric: Plato on metaphor

Although not considered in discussions of metaphor as often as Aristotle who was his student, Plato's view of metaphor (the *Republic*) is important because of the metaphysical and epistemic distinction he makes between opinion and knowledge, corresponding to the sensible world (the visible) and the intelligible, a division that is still present in current discussions of metaphor that address the nature of beauty and truth (see Chapter 6, below). The *visible* includes images and their corresponding objects (for example the painting of a tree and the actual tree) but images are linked to imagination and perception. Knowledge or

the *intelligible* results from mathematical objects (beliefs) and the Forms, which are what is true and real and represent the thought and the ability to hypothesize.

Plato thus presents metaphor as an image, a likeness (*eikôn, phantasma or eidolon*), resulting from our imagination and perception, which has a structure as a model (*paradeigmata*) in identifying the similarities and differences between two entities, *a* as the model for *b* (the *Statesman* or the *Politicus* dialogue 360 B.C.E./ 1995 306d1, 286a1-2). For example, a model (example or rule) is the use of weaving as an illuminating analogy for politics (the *Politicus*, 306a3). It is important to point out that Peirce (CP 2.281, 1.558) (Chapter 7, below) considers likeness to be an icon and a sign because likeness is a mutual connection between an idea, the object represented and the representation of it. For Plato, images provide the conditions for analogical thinking - the image of imaging. As Pender (2003, pp.55-59) notes, the types of images that Plato discusses are based on comparison or likeness between two things, *a* and *b* and his view of metaphor seem to rely on a semantic clash between a word and its context, openly embraced by Richards (1936) and Ricoeur (1978).

Since images establish a comparison, they are defined by Plato as resembling the original in some way. More precisely, sculptors and artists create likeness through representing the original entity. However, metaphors, just like comparisons and similes, bring the original subject for discussion into a comparison, just for the sake of it, without representing it, because the subject exists independently, just as the soul is compared to the state in the *Republic* (559e-560e). While Plato uses image (*eikon*) for copies or imitations *(mimesis)* in works of art, in order to connect the world as experienced to that of the supreme power on everything that exists (e.g., God as the creator of the universe), in the *Republic* (402c6) he also uses the term as imitation or copy outside an artistic context.

Yet, Plato ultimately condemns images and does not seem to show much interest in the enjoyment and appreciation of metaphors since he considers them a sort of deception and misleading. By condemning the use of figurative speech and rhetoric - plus poetry overall - as genuine arts (the *Republic*, 511a), he also belittles emotions when comprehending metaphors. Although he recognises that pleasure comes from images as resemblance-making arts, he believes that this only occurs when images are 'correct', i.e. when they are true or false, depending on their representations in the world. This belief implies that images can be part of pleasure only if pleasures involve 'true' thought or images. However, it is hard to imagine a metaphor that leads to what can be considered a correct thought and, thus, in the Platonic account, ambiguity does not exist, despite being a characteristic of metaphor. Thus, a poetic metaphor can never become primary in his view because the likeness or the image it creates is inferior to the reality it reflects or represents.

In conclusion, for Plato a metaphor involves comparing two different domains and functions very similar to an image because it can prompt analogies. His distinction between a fixed reality and the images and likeness of it (imagery, illustration) can only support metaphor as a supplement to reasoning. Plato certainly does not accept the ubiquity of metaphors in common language usage; but he does introduce the terms 'model' and 'likeness' and, in this way, he reveals his belief that metaphors rely on viewing a less familiar concept through some characteristics of a more familiar one. This anticipates the consensus that metaphors elicit new insights – or that somehow, a 'good' metaphor must involve novelty (see Chapter 7). The analogy and comparison in metaphor is further developed by Aristotle, discussed below, who gives metaphor special weight by recognizing its animated trait.

1.2.2 The conventional view: Aristotle's substitution model

In contrast to Plato, for whom metaphor is a misleading intentional act of communication or a mere embellishment of language (discussed in 1.1.1), Aristotle (384 -322 B.C.E) acknowledges the mundane use of metaphors alongside their function in rhetoric and poetry, discussed in two major works: the *Poetics* (1932/1457b) and the *Rhetoric* (1932/Rh.1.2). Aristotle defines metaphor as "the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy" (the *Poetics* 1457b.7). Although such a definition is ambiguous, it has become known as the Classic Theory of Metaphor (Lakoff, 1993, p.202) because it implies the cognitive function of metaphor, and it establishes several fundamentals.

Whilst his definition clearly identifies on one hand the *transference* from one context to another in comprehending metaphors and on another hand the *resemblance* which lies at the heart of metaphor, Aristotle also points out the effects of metaphor, such as the creation of pleasure. Firstly, the transference process provides the basis of understanding metaphor exemplified in *Here stands my ship* (a genus-species metaphor, since mooring is a kind of standing) and his famous example of the lion and Achilles, where Aristotle not only points out that both have courage in common in order to show the transference, but he also argues that metaphors are similes in disguise, an idea which is shared by the mainstream theories of metaphor.

Secondly, for Aristotle metaphors allow us to *see likeness in things* and perceive similarities between disparate elements instead of simply *telling* that one thing is like another, a feature which has since been widely believed (Black, 1962; Searle, 1983; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) to set metaphors aside from other rhetorical figures. Aristotle's note of *resemblance* at the heart of metaphor has also been recognized as the concept of *analogy* by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Furthermore, as Halliwell (1987, p.162) notes, the particularity

that Aristotle assigns to metaphor is also made clear by considering metaphor "a sign of natural gift because to use a metaphor well is to discern similarities" (1459a5-7) and as "a thing one can never learn from another", praising writers who use metaphors expertly – "it is the token of genius" (the *Poetics* 22.16-17). In Aristotle's categorization of four kinds of metaphor, the fourth type - which is "a matter of analogy" (*the Poetics* cited in Hawkes, 2018, p.7) - is considered more complex and productive because it aids instruction and the learning process of the reader and helps to clearly discuss metaphor as a cognitive tool, as emphasized by Ricoeur (1977; see also below). Aside from Vico in the 18th century, the cognitive bearing of metaphor was not discussed until the 20th century.

Thirdly, Aristotle notes the intellectual and sensual pleasure that people often receive from metaphors; but he explains only the special cognitive status of metaphor that derives from resemblances. In other words, the process of perceiving resemblance is a learning process, which is itself pleasurable. Aristotle believed that some metaphors result in greater enjoyment because hearers are surprised by the unexpected comparison which offers them an "intellectual pleasure" to discover the meaning (McCall, 1969). The learning process – "we learn above all from metaphors" (the *Rhetoric*, 3.10.12) - allows for new perspectives to be created, a process which is pleasurable because it involves more inspection and because the relationship between terms is discovered (easy learning), as opposed to being created.

As noted by Boys-Stones (2003, p.13), Aristotle recognizes the aesthetic appeal of metaphors (the *Rhetoric* 1405b 19), especially the striking visual impact as in Homer's personification *the spear rushed through his chest, quaveringly eager*, where he observes that expressions indicating human activities are vibrant. While he explicitly remarks the "novelty or freshness" of metaphors, he does not consider novelty to be a paramount feature (Levin,1982, p.27). More recent research (Johnson, 2017; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006; Roncero and de Almeida, 2015) would seem to concur, considering the *familiarity* of

metaphors as a central factor to be evaluated in any analysis. As Danesi (1993, p.123) points out, the Aristotelian model that relies on a comparison view in the form *A is B* has never been completely discarded.

Whilst for Plato (see section 1.1.1) metaphor does not represent proper knowledge, being a particular type of poetics rather than a rational form of discourse, the Aristotelian view is more subtle, with metaphor being unique in its ability to be used pedagogically and to switch perceptions to create meaning through the process of learning. For Aristotle, metaphor is heuristic, a method of inquiry or a process of discovery which can act as a guide to our understanding of the world (Ricoeur, 2003, p.22). If, for Plato, nature was secondary to art and reason (*Laws* 892b5-8), for Aristotle (Physics II 8, 199a15-18), art is an imitation of nature, a belief which allows metaphor to be considered a method of investigating nature with the more precise role of finding similarities between distinct phenomena.

Undoubtedly, Aristotle's view of metaphor relies heavily on likeness or similarity between elements whilst he recognizes its mundane use in making new facts easier to grasp. As opposed to Plato, Aristotle's view of metaphor draws marginal attention to its cognitive aspects (Kirby, 1984, p.538 argues that Aristotle's view has a "cognitive background"), positing that metaphors facilitate learning. Aristotle's concept of metaphor has framed the debate and still influences the predominant contemporary accounts of metaphor. The next section explores Vico's view of metaphor which builds on the Aristotelian view's cognitive implications of metaphors and their cognitive-aesthetic effects.

1.2.3 Vico's account of metaphor and *fantasia*

Metaphor as a creative force for the growth of knowledge is strengthened by the Italian rhetorician Giambattista Vico (1710), who was the first to explicitly argue that metaphor is an instrument of thought; an idea which has become the foundation of modern cognitive

linguistics (Danesi, 1993). Vico (New Science 1725; 1984) believes that metaphor is rooted in culture and views it as a process, a powerful mental force in reasoning. It is what people use to create new knowledge by bringing together the separated mental language of images into new metaphors when they engage in creative imagination or *fantasia* ("the making imagination" according to Verene, 1991), a central concept in Vico's account of reasoning.

Danesi (2017, p.76) defines Vico's *fantasia* as "a mental faculty that generated consciousness, language and ultimately culture" and sees it as the ability to imitate and change because fantasia is a "poetic state of mind" with the power to create new realities. Opposing Descartes' principle that knowledge is based on observation, Vico (1710) formulated the *verum factum* principle according to which creation or invention lays the basis of reasoning. As Verene (1991) points out, Vico had to ensure that his idea of poetry as a necessity for thought could address Aristotle's consideration of poetry as being more philosophical than history and Vico does so by claiming that human thoughts initially appeared from the power of imagination and only then developed into reflection and abstract thinking. Thus, he relates imagination to the beginning of language (poetic wisdom or *sapienza poetica*), claiming that humans must have begun to imitate natural movements and sounds (for example, the thunder sound which they must have perceived as a voice) by using their creative power of *fantasia.*

Vico's re-examination of the Aristotelian idea of creative associations to make the dissimilar similar is covered by his notion of *poetic logic* which explains how metaphor creates cognitive activities. Thus, metaphor becomes equally important as *fantasia* in Vico's account since both concepts interchangeably form the basis of human thought, with metaphor being the tool for *fantasia* to make things true (Vico, 1948, p.404) because the first people could only imagine 'metaphorically' in light of their limited body experiences which is discussed as *poetic logic* or the ability to form metaphors (Vico, 1948, pp.116, 129).

Vico's analysis of novelty depends on his notion of *poetic wisdom* or mythical thought as he considers the first people to have a creative capacity and be poets by nature (and not art in the sense of reflective thought) being able to sense the objects and physical forces in the world around them. Using their imagination, they could recall and represent the feelings in vivid images, which leads Vico to make the important point that the first expressions of meaning were imitation representations of sense experience. This point implies that metaphor has an experiential basis where expression is born of the body, as opposed to the idea that new language is given by a genius. For example, Vico's discovery of the true Homer as conceptual, the collective voice of Greeks rather than an individual, refutes originality as the gift of a creative individual. Ong (2002, p.42) draws particular attention to the difference between the Romantic Age's conception of originality investing in a gifted lone thinker and to how Vico and subsequently Merleau-Ponty (discussed in Chapter 2) consider novelty or new language as being able to create the human world and our experience of reality from reconfiguration of commonalities. The 'new' emerges from altering the available or the pre-established language and the topics in cultural memory.

For novelty in metaphor, the Vichean perspective emphasises the imagination in understanding and implies that metaphorical uses of language must precede literal uses since metaphor is, in fact original thinking based on imagination to explain more logical thinking. Imagination is the manufacturing of knowledge through the wonder, the senses and the effects of the environment, which for Vico was the orality that precedes the writing or the poetry of popular people which can no longer be found in the modern era. If humans at the beginning were all poets, as Vico argues, the ability is no longer common for adults, who, as Colabella (2015) points out, have become deaf to the sounds of nature and accustomed to the passive habits of the modern ways of life.

Vico connects imagination to the body and senses, attributing to the body a great importance for thought and meaning creation. This brings him very close to the cognitive linguists' idea of embodiment although, as Nuessel (1995, p.130) points out, cognitive linguists avoid referencing Vico's notions and principles. Nuessel draws attention to Vico's statement that "It is true that these faculties (*fantasia, ingegno,memoria*) appertain to the mind, but they have their roots in the body and draw their strength from it" (Vico, 1744 / 1984, p.280 section 819) to make clear that Vico is emphatic that imagination is an ability attached to body and senses.

Vico's *fantasia*, with its important role in creativity, is similar to the notion of *abduction* coined by Peirce (1877) to refer to human reasoning as opposed to deductive processes (see Chapter 7, below). Defined as the process of "forming explanatory hypothesis" and "the logical operation which introduces any new idea" (Peirce, 5.171), abductive reasoning is a process of discovery which helps form hypothesis in metaphors and has a logic of its own, relying on associations. Vico makes the case that association is a creative process, to which Peirce adds abductive reasoning as the primary way to interpret the outside world. For Peirce, too, metaphor is the result of linking ideas based on similarity. The resemblance between ideas explains why metaphors can be highly creative following the connections that they create and the possibilities for hypothesis, leading to the open-ended character of highly creative metaphors, which is explained in Chapter 7, below. This characteristic of metaphors given by abductive reasoning is completely ignored by Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) cognitive theory of metaphor which could have benefited from the Peircean notion, as Haley (1999) remarks.

In the Western philosophical tradition, human imagination was denied significant implications in knowledge construction. For both Plato and Aristotle, imagination is not an important faculty and metaphor for them is an analogy, a form of reasoning based on finding

similarities and transference. In contrast, Vico's new perspective allows imagination to create language and reasoning by transforming sensory experiences into reflective mental processes, making reasoning, in this way, rely on culture and nature. For Vico, metaphor is no longer only a manifestation of analogy, but the origin of signs and concepts through employing imagination. The Vichean view puts metaphor in a proper position in philosophy, allowing for metaphor to be a process rather than a defined rule. It also aids understanding the development process of metaphor which has begun, but as will be seen in later chapters, left underdeveloped by cognitive linguists (April Pierce, 2014, p.25).

1.3 20th century accounts of metaphor

Vico manages to shift the perspective from metaphor as a matter of the word or sentence to metaphor as discourse, predominantly seen in Ricoeur's works. The 20th century brought a change in direction and an increasing interest in the conceptual nature of metaphor with the main debates attempting to discuss metaphor as a feature of human expression rather than a rhetorical tool. Still, the focus is placed on models and interaction or tension between two concepts to explain how new meanings can emerge with a metaphor. Another point of focus is the rhetoricians' idea that metaphors express similarities which has been accepted by I. A. Richards (1936) and Ricoeur (1978) who expand the Aristotelian comparison theory, maintaining at the same time a view of metaphor in the Vichean way as an origin of signs and concepts. In contrast, a rejection of similarity or the comparison view of metaphor becomes the direction of many studies that follow Black (1962) who was the first to influence this trend by explicitly positioning himself against the comparison view of metaphor. The next section focuses on prominent theories within the interaction tradition, namely Richards, Black, Derrida and Ricoeur who have contributed greatly to the development of a new view of metaphor that highlights the rational nature of metaphors.

1.3.1 The interactionist view of metaphor: I. A. Richards

In his influential *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936) (in which Conceptual Metaphor Theory finds its philosophical source), I.A. Richards continues the Aristotelian view of association between two domains either as comparison or substitution (A is B or A implies B) and adds an interaction process between the two (Danesi, 1993, p.124). His fresh approach focuses on the *interaction* of thoughts to produce meaning when he defines metaphor as the result of "two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (Richards, 1936, p.93). In the creation of new meaning, the semantic interaction between two domains retains properties of both (domains) which Max Black (1962) refers to as systems rather than discrete units in order to emphasize their interaction. Thus, metaphor is seen to achieve meaning by creating a tension in our minds, described as "the spring of the bow, the source of energy" (Richards, 1936, p.125), a tension which results in interaction of two thoughts, totally different from the traditional view of metaphor as an ornament that adds power to language.

Undoubtedly conceptual, Richards model is known as *tenor-vehicle*, which is one of the most widely recognizable models of metaphor (Douglass, 2000, p.405). Here, the *tenor* is the principal thought, an idea or principal subject and the *vehicle* is the part that provides the description, the likeness or what is compared to the other subject. For example, in *The man is a lion*, the tenor *man* is described in terms of the vehicle *lion* and the semantic interaction brings together semantic attributes in an open-ended act of revealing thought patterns. Thus, as Danesi (1993, p.125) clarifies, the model shows that paraphrasing a metaphor with literal language can never capture its essence. Richards maintains that the metaphor's essence is not the resemblance between the two elements, but the examination of relationships between them which he illustrates by using an example taken from Kames: "A

stubborn and unconquerable flame / Creeps in his veins and drinks the streams of life"
(Richards, 1936 p.102). Even though the tenor is unexpressed but described as a flame, it can
be easily identifiable that the metaphor is a way to describe fever by allowing interpreters to
see fever as a flame and examine the relationship between them.

Further, beside the conceptual basis for understanding metaphor, Richards (1936,
p.90) ascribes omnipresence and ubiquity to metaphor. While Plato devalues imagination for
pragmatic reasons and while Aristotle considers imagination to be characteristic only to
gifted people, Richards maintains the classical tradition as imagination endowed with a
fundamental role in poetic creation, but he opens our imaginative ability to mundane
communication. Thus, Richards is the first to indicate the commonality of aesthetic
judgements and the importance of the response of the audience as well as the belief that
metaphors are important because they have an effect on us, which is largely our response to
something which we consider beautiful (see Chapter 6, below, for a discussion of 'beauty').

However, Richards does not investigate the theme of subjectivity further, but he
can be credited with pointing out the pervasiveness of novel metaphors and their cognitive
force alongside conventional metaphors. His point is important for the current thesis because
he highlights how metaphor creates new knowledge through creativity and how we broaden
the knowledge through metaphors. Richard's model offers the base for Conceptual Theory of
Metaphor where the vehicle becomes the source domain and the tenor the target domain
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Both views consider the degree of
open-endedness of the interaction of a metaphor as a direct indicator of the novelty and
creativity (Danesi, 1993, p.125). Later, Lakoff and Johnson offer a precise distinction
between novel metaphor based on rich imagery content and conventional metaphors that rest
on analogy and are characterized by low imagery.

Richards' model has been criticized for the uncertainty of its terms, the lack of clarity in the relation of tenor to vehicle (Kittay, 1987; Black, 1962; Ricoeur, 1977) and even difficulty in applying the model to some examples (Hausman, 1989); but what is clear in his account is that metaphor does not include a transfer of meaning at the word level, but an interaction process, described as a comparison process that relies on differences and similarities, allowing metaphor to create original meaning and sorting and re-arranging existing meaning at the same time. In *Science and Poetry* (1926), he makes a two-fold division of language use into scientific and emotive, which are analogous to the denotative and connotative functions of words; the first refers to language use for reference, true or false, while the latter refers to pseudo-statements when references and symbols are distorted by devices such as metaphor and rhythm. The emotive use of language does not consider logic, but aesthetic experience and beauty, which Richards describes as a state in the reader or the beholder and not an undefinable mystery in the work of art.

He points out that the words used in a poem are the source for the creation of an experience. He believes that more attention should be given to the senses and implications of words, rather trying to find the comparison and exemplifies this point with Denham's (1668) metaphor: "O could I flow like thee and make thy stream / My great example, as it is my theme! Though deep, yet clear, though gentle, yet not dull, / Strong without rage, without ore-flowing full". Here, Richards (1930, p.122) points out the obvious, that such metaphor cannot be understood by finding likeness between two ideas, but rather by considering the denotations and connotations of the words. For instance, *deep* when associated with stream can mean dangerous or suitable for swimming, but when it is used to describe the mind, it can mean mysterious, with considerable knowledge and so on. What is said in the metaphor about the mind does not come from the stream, but this does not mean that interpreters should pay no attention to it. On the contrary, "the vehicle is still controlling the mode in which the tenor

forms" (Richards, 1930, p.122), which directly implies that finding similarities is not the only route to metaphor comprehension.

Consequently, Richards' theory of metaphor lacks observations on important aspects of metaphor such as affect, novelty and surprise that were indicated in earlier studies (Bilsky, 1952 p.130; Beardsley and Wimsatt, 1971, p.237). Although Richards (1930) notes the non-cognitive factors which support metaphors when he establishes various parameters for metaphor such as metaphors derived from sense (where the similarity is between sensations) and those derived from emotions (the similarity is between feelings), he does not embed them into his theoretical model. He observes that in some metaphors there is similarity between feelings and sensations evoked by the two elements and there may even be the case that the word in the tenor or vehicle would be replaced by a sense or emotion. For instance, when a man is called a swine, it might not result from resembling features, but from having a feeling towards that person, similar to the feeling one might have towards pigs (Richards, 1930, p.221). He asserts that affective dimensions of metaphor are vitally important; but he offers a limited analysis mainly based on the model's use. The model raises many problems especially regarding the relationship between tenor and vehicle when applied to creative metaphors not in the *A is B* form. Richards seems to be aware of the model applicability issue since he points out that some metaphors rely on other relations than resemblance. For instance, he uses William James' "blotting paper voices" to point out that the relation between the metaphorical elements is not one of resemblance but obscurity, "even too obscure to be discovered" (Bilsky, 1952, p.133).

Undoubtedly, the merit of Richards' model is that it transcends the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the relationships between its elements, since he establishes metaphor as a matter of thought rather than language and invites an analysis of metaphor reception. However, Richards fails to provide an account of novelty which incorporates the surprise and

pleasure that often comes from metaphors. Yet, as Douglass (2000, p.412) notes, Richards'

arguments have had a significant impact on his contemporaries' understanding of metaphor

and his work marked the beginning of the modern approach to metaphor. Having discussed

how Richards' model of metaphor encourages a pragmatic perspective, the next section

presents Black's attempt to clarify Richards' model and build on the semantic interaction in

metaphor.

1.3.2 The interactionist view of metaphor: Max Black

While I.A Richards introduced a model of metaphor to discuss metaphor in relation to the

functioning of language, Max Black (1962, p.28) attempts to improve this model and defends

metaphor's cognitive status by introducing his own terminology of elements of *focus* and

frame of metaphor where *focus* is the word being used metaphorically (Richard's tenor) and

frame represents the context, the rest of the words in a sentence which are not used

metaphorically. More specifically, metaphor relies on placing a particular subject, the *focus,*

into a new context, the *frame,* which implies that the context determines whether or not a

word is a metaphor. In the famous *Man is a wolf, man is a* is the frame of the metaphor and

wolf is the focus, used metaphorically. Moreover, maintaining an interaction view of

metaphor from Richards in the semantic sense, Black presents the *focus* as a filter; but, at the

same time, he considers the entire metaphor to be a filter. The double filtering idea means

that in the above metaphor *wolf* is a filter which allows transfer of certain aspects of wolves

onto a man, but the metaphor is also a filter which emphasizes the traits from one entity to

another. The aspect in the interaction view of metaphor that Black maintains from Richards

refers to the interaction of two thoughts which are brought together in the use of metaphor to

produce the meaning, which cannot be reduced to a literal counterpart. Most importantly, the

meaning produced through interaction is new because the *frame* demands an extension of the

meaning of the *focus*. Thus, Black brings novelty into the theoretical discussion of metaphor, but he does not develop the idea.

As Scherzinger (1995, p.90) notes, Black agrees with Richards that in order to understand a metaphor, a reader must attend to both the old meaning and the extension of the meaning, but Black does not agree with Richards' view of the mechanisms that create the extension which relies on a comparison process and common characteristics (literal meaning) between the terms. Instead, Black (1955, p.537) emphasizes the dynamic character of metaphor given by an active interaction between two thoughts. As he puts it, in *Man is a wolf*, the reader will construct a corresponding system of implications about *man* from the ideas and associated commonplaces (all the qualities that one can think of about wolves and man that can come together to form a new meaning) the reader harbours with regard to *wolves*.

As Black (1962, p. 28) rightly argues, in his model the *combination* of the two subjects constitutes a metaphor and if the frame is changed, the association of words might not be a metaphor anymore. As such, by clarifying that a metaphor is the result of the use of a word within a particular context, Black also draws attention to Richards' point that the metaphor is the result of the interaction of words. Black goes on to say that interaction happens both ways as a reciprocal action, which means that the subsidiary term acts on the principal and that the principal term acts on the secondary. The implication of this point in regard to novelty is that metaphor starts acting from the familiar (wolf and man as two unrelated ideas) to novelty (man as a wolf), making metaphor to be the carrier of its terms towards novelty. What actually 'interacts' is the new ideas, the interaction between what is familiar and what is not, mixing the discordances. But despite establishing that metaphor lets novelty come, Black does not link novelty to his 'interaction' in a clear manner. The dynamic

interaction between two notions moves back and forth, forming the 'likeness', the resemblance or the analogy which is what reaches out to novelty.

It is notable that one of Black's main points is that interaction metaphors create new meaning - a view criticized by Ricoeur (2004) as will be seen, below (section 1.2.3)- as opposed to mere analogical relations and the new meanings refer to new referents or objects. In other words, Black (1962) rejects the idea that metaphor formulates a pre-existing similarity in favour of the belief that a metaphor *creates* a similarity between two ideas. His term "resonance" refers to the interdependence between the range of disparity of the semantic properties of the two concepts and the novelty and dynamicity of a metaphorical expression. Black's account is redolent of the Aristotelian notion of *resemblance* in *Poetics* (Ricoeur, 1977) and he limits himself to the semantic resonance: despite its importance in establishing the theory of novelty in metaphor, Black's account leaves aside the expressiveness and imaginative personal influence that novelty can bring.

Despite several claims about the activity engendered by metaphor - such as that metaphor understanding is "like deciphering a code or unravelling a riddle" (Black, 1955, p.280) and "the purpose of metaphor is to entertain and divert" (Black, 1955, p.282) - Black does not delve into the influence of emotions on the construction of meaning. He limits himself to the argument that some metaphors work differently from others and believes that only certain metaphors are interaction metaphors. In *More About Metaphors* (1977), he distinguishes between vital and less vital metaphors, a distinction which, as Bache (1980) points out, leads Black to indirectly suggest an interactionist account where two thoughts actively illuminate each other, plus a substitution or comparison respectively. Nontrivial metaphors are the only metaphors which can provide new information and trigger insight, inform and enlighten at the same time, whereas trivial metaphors are limited to merely reformulating what is already known.

Black's contribution to the debate about novelty resides in his refreshing 'interaction view' which advances the "power of enquiry" (Black, 1962, p.46) in metaphors. His account is an alternative to the 'substitution view' which holds that a metaphor creates pleasure by diverting from the strictly appropriate meaning and 'comparison view' where a metaphor is a condensed simile which implies a comparison. His interaction theory presents a way in which metaphor, as a mode of thinking, expands the referential field, creating new insights and models of reality, highlighting that metaphor creates novel meaning. Thus, Black's contribution is that he exposes the shift in meaning, presenting metaphor as a way of creating insight and generating novelty as an unusual combination of predictability, from what is comfortable and old.

1.3.3 Deconstruction of metaphor: Derrida

The conception of metaphor in terms of interaction discussed in the previous section opened the way for understanding how originality is given by metaphors but it ignored important elements from its expressive power. Both Ricoeur and Derrida add a creative dimension to metaphor by arguing that metaphor and symbol are the primary interpreters of reality, leading to perception, expression and meaning in speculative thought, bringing together the world of experience and the meanings of objects in that world and creating a turn in phenomenology. Their deconstructive approach brings attention to the way in which metaphors can no longer be seen as an only association of concepts and the opposite of literal language.

Derrida (1974, 1998) changes the view of metaphor as the result of analogical thinking by relating metaphor to 'fleshliness' and embodiment. He deconstructs hierarchical binaries between writing and speech and body and mind to offer a comprehensive explanation of the metaphoricity of language (Reynolds, 2004). For Derrida, metaphors are the point of intersection between the textuality of writing which he offers a new interpretation

of, seen as language and the sensuality of embodiment. Textuality is the performativity of writing and the text is the whole field of signs and an intertwined relation between writing and the body. Derrida (1998) shows how writing is not a mere representation of speech, acting as a "dangerous supplement" to the full presence of speech, or a literary notion, but writing is rather the source feature of language– "the question of the origin of writing and the question of the origin of language are difficult to separate" (Derrida, 1998, p.3) and "disruption of presence in the mark" (1982 p.327), providing only a questionable and possibly a distorted view of what the speaker meant. Derrida argues that writing (as language) should be understood as a text because writing operates even in the absence of the writer when the text continues to speak even though the author is physically absent, whereas speech would not. On this view, writing has no writer or reader because writing can repeat itself (iterability) and provides only a questionable and possibly a distorted view of what the speaker meant. This leads Derrida to observe that if our concepts and meanings are historically influenced, then they can only signify a conception of the world that is shared with other people, rather than convey the world as it is. Derrida's point provides an explanation of Peirce's (1868) claim (see also Chapter 7) that it is almost impossible to think without signs, which he mirrors in his statement that "from the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs" (1974 p.50). If each sign signifies another person's conception which is itself a sign, then what is said and written is not a signified or a representation of the external world or the truth, but it is rather somebody else's sign or conception. This view implies that language is not a process of representing the non-linguistic world but a free play of signs or, as Richard Rorty (1982, p.142) observes, a process of creating significance, of inventing rather than finding reality.

Moreover, Derrida introduces the concept of *différance* to refer to meaning as constantly evolving, a characteristic of highly creative metaphors and to highlight the origin

of meaning as a continuous negotiation between concepts, the play of signifiers. Because *différance* subverts any structures, meaning must be constructed of and by difference rather than identity. As Derrida (1998, p.44) notes, ambiguity "requires the logic of presence" and words which refer to abstract ideas are often vague. Like Peirce (discussed in Chapter 7), Derrida believes that we cannot think without signs and thus there is no direct and unmediated access to consciousness or its objects. Such a view stands in opposition to traditional epistemology where knowledge is believed to be accurate representation made possible by special mental processes (Rorty, 1979). Derrida's *différance* is essential when justifying the obscure meaning characteristic of not only poetic metaphors, but also common ones used in advertising, law and technical fields, such as *yellow dog contract*, *blue laws*, *silver platter doctrine* (metaphors taken from Mellinkoff, 1963). Thus, Derrida's account makes clear why figurative language might appear difficult and confusing.

As Derrida (1974, p.242) explains, the understanding of metaphor since Aristotle's *Poetics* relies on resemblance, which implies moving from one sense to another. *Similarity* is therefore the precondition of metaphor, creating a sense "of a regular semantic loss" (1974, p.13) which inspires Derrida to borrow Nietzsche's remark that metaphor is traditionally defined as the "unveiling of a Truth". As discussed in section 1.2, above, in the Aristotelian account the reward for pleasure and knowledge in a good metaphor results from the discovery of an implicit relation between terms; for example, in *old age is the evening of life*, old age is to life what evening is to day. Derrida notes the risk that Aristotle mentions too, that the third or fourth term might never be found, leading to an unhappy and ignorant interpreter. Yet, for Derrida (1982, p.243) the risk becomes the *secret narrative* in the sense that there might not be a satisfactory end (i.e. there is only *différance*, without a transcendental signified) and therefore there is no need for a logocentric functioning, a reference or even a term for metaphor (Bennington, 2014, p.94).

Derrida criticises the analogical relationships between pre-existing terms in metaphors based on the pre-determined absence which means that metaphors can "always miss the true" and are just a "moment of detour where Truth can always lose itself". Metaphor is linked to truth when Derrida (1974, p.37) notes that "what makes metaphor possible (what makes a good and true metaphor possible) is what makes truth possible". Rather than searching for the truth of a natural origin, deconstruction requires interrogation of competing interpretations that combine to produce meaning. As Derrida points out, novel metaphors are structures without a fixed centre and for this reason they extend the play of interpretation (signification) indefinitely, allowing originality and imagination. It is almost impossible to find a fixed core and an agreed upon meaning in the metaphor "As this life is not a gate, but the horse plunging through it" (Hirshfield, 2011, p.12) or Dickinson's (1955, p.179) "dying is a wild night and a new road". How we understand meaning in such instances involves a prolonged process of questioning and subverting assumptions, a play as signifiers in a constant movement in Derrida's terms. The wondering about metaphor is done with the retrieval of the proper name: "metaphor also opens the wondering of the semantic" (Derrida, 1974, p.241), making it possible for meaning to be a constant wondering (a point which is also discussed in Chapter 2).

Novel metaphors are thus able to create reality, but conventional metaphors, with their settled meaning, no longer have this ability since they belong to speech communities and a system that dominates language. Conventional metaphors are closer to the literal truth because in Derrida's terms we choose to use our words to function in the manner of discovery as opposed to the manner of creating significance. We willingly choose to disrupt the play of language and restrict the meaning of some signs. The widespread belief that conventional metaphors once had creative power can be found in Derrida's argument when he observes that the origin of literal uses is in fact a free and unrestricted interaction of signs, in the

system of differences that he calls *writing*. When we artificially restrict a sign and once meanings become determinate, we automatically create a metaphor. This is the reason why, for Derrida, all language is metaphorical and there is no literal meaning, only metaphorical, an idea which can also be found in Vico's approach to metaphor and Nietzsche's (1873/1979) view of meaning. Yet, while Vico views metaphor as a conceptual and categorical progress of the species, grounded in cultural and historical reasoning, Derrida defines metaphor as a form of creativity that destroys old assumptions. Where Vico argues for resemblance between words and patterns in nature, Derrida (1970) uses *différance* to point to the gap between what something is and what it is called.

Another important contribution that Derrida brings to the studies of metaphor is his discussion of the wearing out of the meaning which greatly helps in accounting for how new meaning is created. The *play of wear*, or *usure* as wear and tear (1970, p.12) is used to refer not only to the process of metaphor, but to presence as truth, discussed above, which equals consciousness, continuity and identity. Traditionally, a metaphor is created by simply forming a concept; but Derrida shows that through *usure* the metaphor is rather absorbed by concepts, just as the sensible is elevated by the intelligible. What is more, he views concepts as hidden, or dead metaphors. Following on Nietzsche's (1873/1979) point that concepts can become stale, and metaphors constantly vary in novelty, in an interview with Ree (1992), Derrida advises that a Holocaust memorial should change frequently in order to constantly refresh the metaphors associated with the concept of human rights. The process of *wearing away* shows that the original sensory meaning of any terms becomes worn away through repeated usage. The live/dead metaphors distinction that Derrida makes, following Hegel in his *Aesthetics*, reveals that metaphoricity resides in the consciousness of our sensations (Lawlor, 1954, p.27), a point which is discussed in Chapter 4, below. Similarly, the belief that there are 'dead metaphors' is also rejected by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) who argue instead

that stale metaphors influence our conception of reality (see also Chapter 3, section 3.3, below).

Directly relevant to novelty is Derrida's point that language does not have stable meanings that reflect reality. What appears to be a determinate meaning is a deceit because signs never stop interacting with each other in an unrestricted play. By destroying the metaphysical baggage that is given to signs, Derrida (1974, p.9) can explain the absence in any signified, an idea which is comprised under *erasure* (borrowed from Nietzsche), which makes it possible to explore the literal meaning in order to convey a specific sense.

Overall, Derrida makes a fundamental point concerning metaphor, as he has not only shifted the treatment of metaphor from conceptual analogy, but he made possible a remodelling of the philosophical field to show a new function of metaphor in the evolution of our cognitive system. Metaphor becomes something which is far from being a defined rule or an exception to a logical rule and it obtains the possibility of being endless and evasive because it is a process of a play that undermines conventional meaning. While Derrida's discussion remains mainly focused on the role of metaphor in philosophy, the next section introduces the hermeneutic turn of Ricoeur who focuses on metaphor in spoken and written discourse and on the ability to coin new metaphors.

1.3.4 Ricoeur's hermeneutics

Derrida choses to focus on the status of philosophy as part of the problem in defining metaphor, but Ricoeur combines a semantic theory of metaphor with imagination and feeling, being able to discuss how metaphors use imagination to discover and redescribe reality, focusing in this way on "living metaphors" in opposition to what he considers dead metaphors (*toe the line*) which he claims were the focus in Derrida's and Nietzsche's theories.

For Ricoeur (1975/1978, p.291), metaphor is a linguistic process which creates new meaning, being dynamic and able to redescribe reality (*creation as discovery*). Ricoeur follows the work of I. A. Richards and Max Black who argue for a contextual theory of meaning; but, unlike both, who consider resemblance the proper outcome of metaphors, Ricoeur believes that resemblance is a mere functional feature of metaphors since to perceive resemblance is connected to the ability to *imagine* or *see as.* Moreover, metaphor depends on the imagination because imagination is the "seeing" which dictates the change in logical distance by providing insight into likeness. Insight is an act of thinking that makes it possible to combine possibilities. Ricoeur (1978, p.303) summarises this idea when he defines metaphor as "living by virtue of the fact that it introduces the spark of imagination into a 'thinking more' at the conceptual level".

As Simms (2012, p.76) notes, for Ricoeur, the most important and noticeable type of metaphor is the *living metaphor* understood as the new and lively metaphors characterised by "seeing the similar within the dissimilar". This is possible because such metaphors animate human thought by compelling people to use their imagination in interpretive ways – metaphor "forces conceptual thought to think more" (Ricoeur, 1978, p.303). A living metaphor does not rely on an already existing likeness, but it rather creates one which was not perceived before. For Ricoeur (1978, p.368), "dead metaphors are no longer metaphors", but they become literal meaning, extending polysemy.

A fundamental difference between Derrida and Ricoeur results from their view of how meaning is conditioned in context. As pointed out by Stellardi (2000) and Simms (2002), Ricoeur places importance on the discourse and on the phrase rather than the noun, moving from analysis of lexis to one of the sentences (from rhetoric to semantics, in his terms). It follows that the metaphors should be understood as the poetic discourse, one of many possible modes of discourse. Derrida believes that metaphors involve more than *Aristotelian*

resemblance and even proposes to deny the proper name on this basis, choosing to define metaphor as a *movement* of metaphorization from the initial word meaning to a metaphorical one and back again (discussed in section 1.2.3, above). By contrast, Ricoeur sees meaning as the result of both sense and reference which leads to considering literal meaning to be the current or "usual" sense with reference to a word's polysemy and which self-destructs in order to give way to a metaphorical meaning.

Although both authors distinguish between dead and live metaphors - a distinction taken from Nietzsche (for Ricoeur, a live metaphor exists only in the awareness of it) - and focus on the conceptual understanding, there is little reference to the feelings aroused by aesthetic judgment for the creation of meaning. Ricoeur states that the semantic shock, the novelty, created by a metaphor "produces a conceptual need but not as yet any knowledge by means of concept" (Ricoeur, 1978, p.296). In other words, he points to the tension that is generated by the semantic shock, but he does not consider the novelty to be knowledge gained through concepts, but only as a demand of concept. As Simms (2002, p.73) notes, Ricoeur considers that what is important in metaphor is not the semantic clash, but the "solution to the enigma" that metaphors create for interpreters and this is the reason that metaphors are valuable, because they force an interpretation - hermeneutics.

With *living metaphor,* discussed above, Ricoeur wants to address the problem of novelty when he relates metaphor to an enigma, avoiding in this way the semantic borders. He presents new metaphors as able to recreate reality and imagination, to force us to think because they present a new idea. Yet, what he calls a creative activity finds its roots in a system of associations and is not able to account for non-lexical implications, despite the fact that he declares that "imagination and feeling are not extrinsic to the emergence of the metaphorical sense" (Ricoeur, 1978b, p.246) which reveals that metaphors stimulate emotion. He suggests that novelty defines metaphor, but novelty is an issue both in his account and in

the cognitivist theories because of concept stabilisation, which Ricoeur seems to limit himself to, mainly because he outlines his account of metaphor with the purpose of explicating conceptual connectivity.

Ricoeur brings a hermeneutic or linguistic turn to studies of metaphor by arguing that live metaphors are the result of sentences, not words, which create possibilities to redescribe reality. However, despite his emphasis on creative instances of language and on imagination, he lacks an explanation to integrate the type of feelings that a person experiences in a 'deeper' type of meaning.

1.4 Conclusion

The philosophical conversation about metaphors reveals that the attempts to define metaphor has had a convoluted trajectory, starting with the idea of it as a deviant sense covered in a single term, to it being recast as the source of thinking. Ancient philosophers presented metaphor mainly as ornamental or supplementary to putatively ordinary referential language, closely associated to the idea of change from only one direction. However, the interactionist approach – where meaning is acquired through the involvement of one term with the subsidiary one - introduced the relationship between the metaphor's elements and context, imbuing metaphor with a cognitive nature. The relationship between text and meaning becomes even more important in the deconstructionist view. This chapter concludes that there is a need to integrate the role of affect in any theoretical approach to metaphors since metaphors are pervasive ways of capturing the vividness of first-person experiences, despite the general agreement that metaphor is at the heart of language use.

The Western tradition of metaphor generalised and developed variations of Aristotle's emphasis on representing the world and his idea of resemblance. In the twentieth century metaphor became 'how language works'; it was no longer an addition to language but

constituted the very nature of how language operates. Richards and Black are more concerned with linguistic issues for metaphor, whereas Ricoeur and Derrida ascribe metaphorization to the role of the hidden origin of conceptual thought. The issue of novelty is almost always discussed in relation to Nietzsche's distinction between stale and creative metaphors and the sensible and intelligible (non-sensible), but mainly considering metaphor as cognitive content. However, a focus on the shocking and the visceral characteristic of metaphorical effect can hardly explain the highly touching and lasting effects of metaphors. For this reason, the next chapter (Chapter 2) discusses the relationship between body and cognition and the effects of the body on our judgments, which influence how we feel and process information.

The developments in the Continental phenomenology movement in the 20th century brought a focus on the role and functions of the body in reasoning. As will be seen, expressiveness, self-awareness and other features of consciousness studied under the phenomenology movement amount to serious challenges to the assumptions of the Western tradition of metaphor, with its rigid theory of truth and the strict division between the literal and figurative modes of reality.

CHAPTER 2: PHENOMENOLOGY, PERCEPTION AND EXPRESSION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter shows how the linguistic meaning in metaphor can be traced back to a layer of perceptive experience as the primary source of sense. It focuses on embodiment, and it presents perception as expression as opposed to the Cartesian notion of perception being a direct grasping of the real world. More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to explain the expressive characteristic of metaphors by connecting the meaning of a metaphor to how we understand the world, which is important in explaining the abstract meaning in the comprehension of metaphor. The chapter uses Merleau-Ponty's pivotal point of a reciprocal differentiation between senses, a reference to the human practice and action, where the body is the medium of perception which realises this unity. Thus, concepts can no longer be viewed as independent logical intuitions which can be applied to a single point in nature and linguistic meaning functions as a process generating conceptual meanings from the perceptive field. The chapter shows how metaphors accomplish the passage from an affective level of meaning to a linguistic meaning with the help of an expressive body.

The previous chapter reviewed some of the relevant theories of metaphor which range from viewing metaphor as merely a literary device to highlighting the conceptual and emotional side of metaphor. While there are several important theoretical views which assign emotions a role in comprehension, there is a need to clarify the relationship between mind and the body or the objective world and the experienced world, which the current chapter aims to examine.

The discussion starts with the phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty which has been revitalised and progressed by enactivists (see Chapter 3, below) in their attempt to provide an account of lived experiences. Section 2.2 draws on Merleau-Ponty's notions of *style* and *expression* because it helps explain how mind is embodied, which

influenced the Conceptual Metaphor Theory and how we use our experience to arrive at meaning. This draws out the connection between the aesthetic elements and bodily depths of meaning given by feelings and emotions as based on bodily interactions with the world and people. It helps in understanding how we experience many metaphors emotionally rather than rationally, as well as noting how novel metaphors are based on emotions as bodily interactions. Section 2.3 discusses the importance of pleasure and humour which can be immediate responses in the interpretation of metaphor and how the interpreter engages with these two notions of aesthetics as expression and perceptual thinking, rather than mental representations through abstract ideas. Section 2.4 explores the relationship between a powerful metaphor and perception in order to show that a fresh insight and perception contribute greatly to the interpretation of metaphor. Section 2.5 discusses perception that results from experience-based sensations to show that the meaning of many creative metaphors can be arrived at by focusing on the sensations experienced, rather than creating logical relationships between embodied concepts.

2.2 Merleau-Ponty: language as style and experiencing the world

Expression and *style* are two central notions used by Merleau-Ponty (1969/1973) to explain consciousness, the perceptual interaction between an organism and its environment and the body's dialogue with the world (Landes, 2013). The two notions can enhance the understanding of how metaphor can be a phenomenon of *expression* and why many metaphors are experienced rather than interpreted or decoded, a view which is common in several renowned cognitivist accounts of metaphors, mentioned below, as pointed out by Landes (2013, p.43). For example, Black's interactive view of metaphor (discussed in Chapter 1) includes an interpretative distance between uttering the metaphor and understanding its meaning, since in *Man is a wolf*, the meaning must be decoded by filtering

man through the notion of *wolf*. By contrast, *man* can be immediately seen as a *wolf* through an account of meaning as *experience* developed by Merleau-Ponty and detailed in this section. Additionally, as Landes (2013, p.44) notes, the famous cognitivist view of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) relies on a rigid structure which cannot explain the creative side of *finding* the metaphor in addition to relying on the meaning of the words in metaphors, despite the fact that each metaphor shifts the meaning of the words. These instances of thinking about metaphors greatly benefit from the Merleau-Pontian emphasis on the function of metaphor to reveal the need to understand how one thing can "be another thing while also not being that other thing" (Barbaras, 1998, p.274 cited in Landes, 2013, p.32). Additionally, because *expression* for Merleau-Ponty refers to the whole which possesses meaning, not the individual parts, the notion can help explain why some metaphors seem unclear or undefinable and, moreover, how associations of words can create unquestionable and powerful metaphorical senses. In other words, a metaphor should be approached as not requiring a logical interest, but rather as an act of expression seen as movement and direction, always open to development and review.

When explaining meaning, Merleau-Ponty assigns an important role to feelings and emotions. Merleau-Ponty's distinction between intelligent knowing and "knowing by sentiment" (1968, p.150; 1964, p.297) renders a clear explanation why, in some metaphors, we have a "feel" or a newly acquired sensitivity which becomes sedimented. Johnson (2010, p.32) clarifies that Merleau-Pontian use of "feelings" and argues that he conjoins perception or sensibility with "feelings" and the relevant meaning is more like "having a feel for something" than the mere state of pleasure or pain. Certainly, feelings are part of our perception, and it becomes clear that in many novel metaphors, interpreters *have a feel* rather than other sedimented feelings or states of pleasure. This is certainly true in the case of "there was an invisible necklace of nows, stretching out in front of her along the crazy, twisting

road, each bead a golden second" (Hardinge, 2014, *Cuckoo Song*). Having a feeling helps to "know", the vague idea given in such literary metaphors, where the language is "veiled with shadows" (1968, p.150; 1964, p.195), a kind of knowing which is different from the logical knowing. This means that there is a kind of meaning which can only be known through the particularity of sensible contact and opposes the precise knowing that results from concepts. Despite being pre-intellectual knowing, it *is* a kind of knowing and it greatly helps in understanding the ideas in metaphors.

As pointed out by Johnson (2010), Merleau-Ponty borrows from Kant's view of aesthetic experience when he states that "in experiencing the beautiful I am aware of a harmony between sensation and concept, between myself and others, which is itself without any concept" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.xii). Such a declaration makes clear that, for him, sensations are ways of gaining knowledge. In his later lecture notes from 1950-1960, *Nature*, Merleau-Ponty develops this idea and includes imagination, to which he assigns an important role in helping understanding, pointing to the non-conceptual nature of the experience of the beautiful, in a way which is reminiscent of Vico's view (see Chapter 1, above) of the function of imagination in creating beautiful ways of expression.

Merleau-Ponty clearly states that emotions are not internal mental events, hidden in our head but, rather, "variation(s) in our relations with others and the world which is expressed in our bodily attitude" (1964, p.53). Thus, emotions are inseparable from their bodily expressions (2012, p.372) which can be seen in novel metaphors where comprehension does not stem from a process of association but, rather, a processing of the internal felt reactions to an association of words. As Merleau-Ponty indicates, the expression of an emotion, including its linguistic expression is not secondary to an emotional experience, but integral to it. The words, according to Merleau-Ponty, express the "emotional essence" of their objects, in ways which are inseparable from how those objects are experienced

emotionally (1945/2012, p.193). Emotion-as-variation sets up the difference between an emotional disturbance and a more mundane experience of something as significant. For instance, mundane and cliched metaphors are often treated as plain and precise referential meaning. Examples such as *kick the bucket*, *she is on top of her assignment now*, *I'm a little rusty today*, *He broke down*, are unsurprising and not disruptive. Even if they might often surprise second language learners, their meaning is found in dictionaries and often given by recourse to Lakoff and Johnson's famous conceptual theory of metaphor. However, a metaphor such as "beneath the moon that was really a disco ball" (the lyrics in a song by Lady Antebellum) is experienced differently. There seem to be episodic emotions which rely on experiencing potential or even actual perturbations of one's experiential world. Perhaps the difference seen in these types of metaphors can be thought of as Merleau-Ponty's (1945, p.202) distinction between a sedimented language, which needs no effort of expression or comprehension and a speech that disrupts the usual constraints and establishes new meaning. Habitual or established language is limited in its possibilities because of its restriction given by norms, habits and other cultural elements.

Merleau-Ponty (1973a, p.83) considers lexical significations to be approximations, since they help meaning to take shape, but they remain limited in the sense that they are mere parts of meaning, which is given by the whole, not by each part. Considering this Merleau-Pontian idea, metaphorical terms have no signifying power in 'isolation' but when they are joined together, they make unquestionable sense. "Signs, morphemes and words, taken one by one, signify nothing" (1973, p.83). It cannot be the case that any language construction should be considered a finite or complete expression because words individually do not cover "the whole of my thoughts" (1973, p.70) and they are not a signifier of something precisely signified. Understanding in human interaction is different from comprehension because it involves considering the whole panoply of linguistic features such as intonation as well as

accompanying nonverbal communication. Lexical items become a special mechanism which can carry the interpreter towards what is expressed.

As noted by Silverman (1997, p.171), Merleau-Ponty argues that only through *style* can one express feelings and lived experiences because style is given by our manner of existing, which results from experiencing the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1973a, pp.42 – 43). Merleau-Ponty explains aesthetics by considering affect to be behaviour and consequently, style. Emotions as bodily manifestations are visible from the outside and are not "inner realities" which are represented in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.372). For example, feelings like fear, anger, joy are externalized, embodied in bodily and facial expressions. Feeling angry involves the clenched fist, which is itself anger and also communicates anger, leading to the assertion that posture and movement embody their meaning. The view of emotions as bodily changes and their important function in reasoning has been embraced by other researchers such as Damasio (1999), whose account of consciousness is detailed in Chapter 4, and Noë (2004), in Chapter 3, below. The enactive approach initiated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch with *The Embodied Mind* (1991) and explained in the following chapter is not only directly inspired by Merleau-Ponty's account, but it continues his account, as clearly acknowledged by enactivist scholars (Gallagher, 2005).

Merleau-Ponty (1973a, p.59) proceeds to relate meaning to his notion of *style*, through which one can signify and manifest meaning. *Style* relates to expressivity and creativity which are compelling in novel metaphors and it is a new way of expression from the already known information, rather than a personal manner or an exterior model of representation. For example, a woman's walk is already a certain expression because her way of moving and the impact of her footsteps are a "variation of the norm of walking, looking, touching and speaking" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.54). Thus, style is identified as behaviour, actions and thoughts which do not only identify each of us, but are also a manner of existing,

illustrated in Merleau-Ponty's statement that "other people exist for me as a style" (2012, p.145). In other words, an individual and their body create the objective world, contributing to how meaning is shared amongst people, similarly to how consciousness can manifest through bodily action to transform the objective world. Therefore, it is possible that the same metaphor can have a different perspectival structure or slightly different meanings for various interpreters, supported by Merleau-Ponty's point that having a conscious experience is given by the body through which we experience the world. It must be noted that Merleau-Ponty understands the body not only as the physical body but as a source of knowledge and a reciprocal expression of one's existence, as always giving sense. By arguing that the body is engaged in the world, he emphasises the bodily aesthetic experience as opposed to a mind thinking with a representation. Language is style because the meaning (signification) of the words is a style of behaviour that the body grasps and the sense (direction) of words is "like the behaviour of the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp.134, 184, 192, 425). Merleau-Ponty's notion of *style* which simultaneously suggests some kind of order or structure and hints at some sort of absence is a way to represent the environment through a process of engagement with it.

In art, style becomes an elaboration of a style that appears already in perception (Merleau-Ponty 1973a, 1964b). An artist (painter, writer) would elaborate on the style, creating something new from something which was already present in experience. The same operation is characteristic of metaphors since metaphors unveil a resemblance and something pre-existing (Geary, 2012) rather than creating new relations of likeness. Moreover, considering style as perception, as Merleau-Ponty does, helps in understanding how creative metaphors make sense. In the same way that a literary work, according to Merleau-Ponty's notion of *style*, would bring something forward that which we already see or understand through language, but in a way that it takes us beyond our habitual ways of seeing and

reading, a metaphor can be treated as a *style* which is a way to create new meaning from the old and the established.

Additionally, Merleau-Ponty believes that style begins as soon as a person perceives the world and organize it into meaning. He stresses that a writer cannot even intentionally create style, because style is an experience given to every one of us and which an artist can only express through language for his/her readers. Merleau-Ponty (1945) offers a detailed investigation of literary expression, an argument which allows for an effortless explanation of the transformation of creative metaphors into more sedimented language. He argues that literary writings create new linguistic conventions through which we then come to grasp our experience, which in turn, become established and no longer seen as originated in a creative act. The points presented have shown that language cannot be considered as the representation of the thought or as already formed worlds, but instead language is an expressive system, a way we inhabit the world, as defined by Merleau-Ponty, which gives us the means from an affective level to a linguistic meaning. Such a view supports the evocative function of metaphor alongside its expositional characteristic which is often seen in more conventionalized forms. This function will become apparent in later chapters, in particular in Chapter 4 when discussing Damasio's account of feelings and in Chapter 5 when discussing imagery. Furthermore, communication can no longer be seen as a process of emiter-code-receiver since meaning is expressive and not something that resides in pieces of information. Peirce's concepts of sign and sign action, discussed in Chapter 7, below, supports Merleau-Ponty's argument that interpretation and mediation are experiences in the process of meaning creation.

Metaphor as a *style* in the Merleau-Pontian sense can be seen in the following examples where extraordinary meaning is created out of the seemingly mundane: the example from Lady Antebellum, again, "beneath the moon that was really a disco ball" and "The fog

came pouring in at every chink and keyhole and was so dense without, that although the court was of the narrowest, the houses opposite were mere phantoms" (Dickens, 1843, *A Christmas Carol*). After a conceptual metaphor framework (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), such metaphors are taken as novel instantiations of language which result from mental metaphors considered as associations of concepts. Similarly, a schema-based view of metaphor (Langacker, 1988) - although it emphasizes a dynamic, rather than static, version of categories of experience - still maintains that metaphors result from the domain of thought and become stored units of language without considering a more affective side of metaphors. Yet, such creative metaphors transcend the significance of the words used individually and endorse a new meaning which can be often an ambiguous experience or *lived language* (2012, pp.449- 451, 530), provoke attention and are heavily influence by style. Literary metaphors are more likely to be felt in the body through the imagery they create, rather than by finding logical relationships. Perhaps the "mapping" is there if we think of a moon as a ball; but if we consider it to be a disco ball, then there is another evocative scene of light patterns, music, movement and emotional states which are part of the understanding of metaphor and activated by how we perceive the world around us.

Consequently, the thoughts are not represented in words or works of art, but they are somehow 'present' in them because we always have an experience when we interpret the world (Merleau-Ponty 1973, p.60). It can no longer be the case that we know the intention of a writer or other artists (see Chapter 6, below, on Barth's (1968) death of the author for a dismissal of the belief that we know the definite origin or source of literary texts) because we give meaning to words when we interpret a message. Having an experience when we start the interpretive process of metaphors and not only, occurs in an ambiguous and creative way as opposed to a clear process. Ambiguity becomes an important feature of the experience and Merleau-Ponty (2012, p.230) points this out when he writes: "The experience of our body

[…] reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existing". It is worth noting that ambiguity becomes the ground of expression and the style and that ambiguity and vagueness are notions which help explain what a metaphor is. The association of metaphor to ambiguous language should be explored in the studies of metaphor because ambiguity involves uncertainty which becomes of crucial importance when describing metaphor as a mapping between conceptual domains (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Thus, ambiguity in metaphor provides a challenge for the definition of metaphor as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.3) which focuses on the relationship between two concepts by identifying a set of systematic correspondences or mappings between the source and the target, which cannot explain the expressivity in metaphors and especially the vagueness in highly creative examples where what counts as expressive is often unclear. An analytical foundation for arriving at meaning might be the case in building hypothesis, but ambiguity must be incorporated since it precedes establishing any true conditions (this idea is discussed in Chapter 7 section 7.4.1).

Certainly, Merleau-Ponty's opposition to the idea of language as an instrument of thought, of an internal mental life or "darkness crammed with organs'" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973a, p.133), offers a clear path for the future enactivist accounts of language (discussed in the forthcoming chapter). Seeing comprehension as a result of the way we experience and interact with our surroundings and have personal encounters helps explain new interpretations that novel metaphors require. *Style* in the Merleau-Pontian account is a useful notion to explain how new meanings are forged and how interpersonal interactions can dislodge us from familiar ways of experiencing, acting, thinking and speaking. Since *style* is a temporary organized pattern, it becomes a locus of experience given by possibilities of expression, gestures and activities which can be unfolded (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 342). The metaphors above introduce interpreters to new experiences and new perspectives

which are not ours but, as Merleau-Ponty (1973, p.90) points out, language has the amazing ability to destroy our prejudices. Without any doubt, metaphors succeed in questioning patterns and instead of limiting what we know, they bring new significations forward.

Considering the above, metaphorical language opens its ability to express more than the constrictive meaning given by what the words mean, taken individually or together. The virtue of the metaphor is not only in the comparison of the terms or words, just like the virtue of the novel is not in the theme but, rather, in the fact that the metaphor needs to be discovered, lived and experienced. As Merleau-Ponty (1973, p.88) notes, a novel (just like a painting) achieves expression through the experience and the imagination which the reader creates using the author's clues. He brilliantly exemplifies this idea with Stendhal's *The Scarlet and the Black* (1830) which becomes expressive by a good balance between what is explicitly mentioned and what it is omitted. The virtue of the novel is given by the connotations and the indirect meaning, that which is not simply given in the presentation of Sorel's states and emotions for wanting to kill Madame de Rénal for betraying him. The virtue is the "silence, that dreamlike journey, that thoughtless certainty and that eternal resolution which follows the news" (1973, p.88). As Merleau-Ponty (1973, p.88) points out, "the desire to kill is nowhere in the words", but between them, in what they signify, in time and in space. The virtue is similar to what Silverman (2014, pp.101-102) calls ambiguity in expressivity which comes with the new method of expression, represented by *style* in Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic account. Nevertheless, ambiguity is also what makes metaphorical language representative of creativity. Just as with artwork, metaphors signify because they reveal the existing world in a new way, making interpreters to experience the world and through live experiences such as feelings.

To exemplify the lived experience that Merleau-Ponty points out in metaphors, Landes analyses the metaphor *Juliet is the sun* (from Romeo and Juliet) as initially creating a

place where Juliet and the sun intertwine based on environmental elements, compelling the

interlocutor to engage in the world and then to further generate potential information.

Merleau-Ponty's logic of *expression* can be found in Landes's definition of metaphor as the

human ability to direct thought and express various options or potentialities through gestures

and emotions and not the combination of material-ontological facts, usually explained as

semantic structures in the form of x is y. Merleau-Ponty (1945, pp.42-43) gives primacy to

perceptual experience when he writes that:

> Pure sensation, […] defined as the action of stimuli on our body, is the 'last effect' of
> knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge and it is an illusion […] that causes
> us to put it at the beginning and to believe that it precedes knowledge. It is the
> necessary and necessarily misleading way in which a mind sees its own history.

The emphasis of experience as a primordial act makes possible a type of intelligibility

through which we can arrive at knowledge by using the body to enter into a relationship with

the world. In this way, we can explain how we can arrive at meaning from what we feel prior

to considering the intellectualised constructions. It is through perception, a pre-linguistic and

pre-rational experience and not thought, that we can arrive at meaning and it is upon this

instinctive and fundamental experience of meaningfulness which Merleau-Ponty (2012,

p.xvii) calls "the silence of primary consciousness" that knowledge is built. The perceived

world becomes a universal *style* because perception entails an active interaction with

perceived things.

For Merleau-Ponty, words themselves are characterized by *style* and carry sense in the

world. Landes (2013, p.91) clarifies this idea by discussing the way in which learning a word

is to catch on to its style, in the sense that it can creatively be used again according to its

sense. The word "light" from the metaphor f*ace...had a dismal light about it* signifies the

presence of sense in the word. "Light" becomes an expressive gesture, an expression which is

inhabited by sense. The word cannot function as a sign of thought because it creates the

expressiveness of the metaphor, which is delivered by senses since light has positive connotations of mainly a source of goodness, being a fundamental symbol. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty clearly defines meaning as the result of multiple signs and their connection to the world rather than by a single sign, which helps to understand moods and feelings that often accompany a more logical comprehension of metaphor or creates reactions more readily to the emotional than the rational. Such a view highlights meaning as always developing and language as a Gestalt in movement (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p.85; 2012 p.192) with people's perception and culture always altering the relation between signs and significance.

Despite not thematizing but using metaphor abundantly as Vanzago (2005a) remarks, Merleau-Ponty treats metaphors as expressions of *lived experiences*, similar to his treatments of speech as bodily gesture. Very often, interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's view on metaphor (Barbaras, 2004; Landes, 2013; Vanzago, 2005a, b) rely on his note for the unfinished manuscript *The Visible and the Invisible* (1959) where he writes:

> A 'direction' of thought——This is not a *metaphor*——There is no *metaphor* between the visible and the invisible (the invisible: either my thought for myself or the sensible given to the other for me): *metaphor* is too much or too little: too much if the invisible is really invisible, too little if it lends itself to transposition. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 221-222).

Despite their minor differences, the three accounts of Merleau-Ponty's view of metaphor highlight the expressive characteristic of metaphor as opposed to the purely evocative which is characteristic of other accounts. Thus, metaphors for Merleau-Ponty seem to result from the use of language to experience freely, without adhering to a sign or to a stable meaning. As Gallagher (2017, p.5) remarks, Merleau-Ponty's focus on embodied practice has a great influence on Gibson's notion of affordances (discussed in Chapter 5, below) which refers to the patterns of events given by the environment as clues for creating meaning.

Merleau-Ponty's work on style and meaning is a complex exposition of what is often considered conscious experience that results from our subjective immersion in everyday experience. His detailed description of the human's internal experiences is useful for showing how metaphor can no longer be seen solely as a mental operation or considered to be simply observed or noticed but is rather a matter of consciousness in such a way that the more creative a metaphor is, the most likely it is that it is the result of making meaning out of our emotions, alongside our conceptual knowledge. Merleau-Ponty's distinct phenomenological account places subjectivity not in the mind, but in the body, as the vehicle of "being in the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.83). Thus, at the centre of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy based on perceptual experience is the embodied subject and the subject's relation to the world.

To sum up, Merleau-Ponty's contribution to the studies of metaphor is pivotal because his phenomenological idea of embodiment influenced the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and the enactivist movement (discussed in Chapter 3, below) which is a perspective which tries to integrate the environment to explain consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's concepts of the lived body or corporeal knowledge is important for the accounting for the embodied concepts in CMT and for explaining habitual behaviour as argued by enactivists. He also pre-figures Damasio's view of emotions which is explained in Chapter 4. The Merleau-Pontian view of language as an expressive system shows that we can create linguistic meaning from an affective level. This view highlights the evocative function of metaphor rather than its expositional characteristic which is often seen in more conventionalized forms. This function will become apparent in later chapters, in particular in Chapter 3, section 3.3 on Damasio and Chapter 5 which highlight the role of feeling and experiencing in consciousness to provide an encompassing view of metaphors that brings some clarity to their evocative characteristic. In addition, the next section, 2.3,

discusses how the experience of pleasure and humour are bodily engagements and features of an affective world that forms the aesthetic experience.

2.3 Pleasure, entertainment and the energizing value of metaphor

One of the important characteristics of 'good' metaphors is their creation of pleasure and humour. This dimension is often overlooked by numerous theoretical perspectives which seem to rely heavily on metaphorical commonality. James Geary (2012) focuses on pleasure and humour and notes that mixed metaphors - and particularly meandering instances - are even more entertaining than simpler forms because of their puzzling character and necessity to find the link between cognitively dissonant elements. Indeed, the following metaphors taken from Geary are humorous and their interpretation involves a search for the connection, aligning similarities and enjoying the sensations that such a mental image can generate (see Chapter 4, below). Geary (2012, p.121, p.122) uses "Experience is a comb that nature gives to bald men", and the simile "Like two skeletons copulating on a corrugated tin roof" (to describe the sound of the harpsichord) to also point out that the comprehension process needs to follow the same thread as the one the creator had already established by finding the similarities between the metaphor's components. I must clarify that this thesis treats similes and metaphors as having the same roots and being very similar, a belief which follows Goodman (1976 [1968], pp.77-78) who claims that "the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible". Grothe (2008, p.13) wittily uses "A simile is like a metaphor" to observe that the two should be treated as being very similar to one another.

However, if the similarities between the ideas in the metaphor are too obvious, there is less enjoyment. There must be a challenge to reasoning which interpreters must overcome. Geary compares convoluted metaphors to riddles, in the sense that they raise similar challenges for judgment. He illustrates the problem-solving mental requirement in the

metaphor "He was deeply in love. When she spoke, he thought he heard bells as if she were a garbage truck backing up" (Geary, 2012, p.125). Just as in a riddle, understanding how the sound of bells can be similar to a truck reversing is challenging to the mind (because most have a horn or siren). It is hard to decide on a meaning of this metaphor; it is, rather, a more perceptual experience. Understanding such convoluted metaphors requires the ability to look beyond the words and turn our attention to sensations and other perceptual aspects of imagining possibilities.

Furthermore, Geary uses Vico's observation (section 1.2.3, above) that a metaphor is enjoyable because "it is more known by the hearer than presented by the speaker" (Geary, 2012, p.125). What Vico's means is, according to Hobbs (2002, p.87), the belief that the audience is pleased because they are making meaning by learning something new in a delightful way. This claim is directly related to the issue of expressivity that this thesis explores. As discussed in 1.2.3, above, Vico's account relies heavily on fantasia (the imagination) and perceptual sensations as well as the observation that the metaphor establishes new relations - a connection which might have been there already, but unnoticed until the metaphor revealed it. The metaphors above are clear examples that perceptual thinking might have a primary role over conceptual thinking. In such situations, it is hard to align with the tenets of cognitive metaphor theories and even some of their precursors, which assume the connection between embodies concepts, since what happens seems to be closer to Vico's idea that thoughts derive from sensory experience. Despite their reliance on blending conceptual spaces when explaining creative metaphors, the metaphors above are clear examples that the search for similarities between the metaphorical elements seems to derive from conscious sensations, rather than stored mental information, as the result of embodiment. Thus, the present thesis pursues the idea that aesthetic experience is given by newly lived sensory experiences as opposed to mental constructs resulting from them.

As mentioned briefly above and also described in Chapter 1, for Vico (1996) metaphor is a way to create new knowledge and a way to discover the beauty that the orator intended. Vico points out to the social aspect of metaphor and its ability to create and be original, an aspect of metaphor also emphasized by Ricoeur (1976) for whom metaphor is a vehicle of discovery and creation of an imaginative dimension of meaning. However, Ricoeur does not take into consideration the sensory dimension that novel metaphors bring. Yet, metaphor as a form of expression has been insufficiently studied in the cognitive theories of metaphor. Thus, this thesis has focused on both bodily and cognitive experience which seems to give metaphors their differential peculiarity. It takes Vico's account to be pivotal in proposing the idea that novel and creative metaphors are not mere embodied conceptual spaces, but are, rather, the direct result of the body whose manifestations remain active rather than stored mental representations.

The following sayings are also examples of the communication of feelings and states where lively sensations seem to be the base of comprehension: *busier than a one-legged man in a butt-kicking contest*, *useful as a one-legged man at an arse-kicking contest* or *He is as much use as a chocolate teapot*. A very similar simile with the same meaning of being busy is *Busier than a one-armed paper hanger*. These expressions create absurd imagery (drawing attention to the limitations that result from certain physical disabilities) with absurdity being the ruling element and the effects that these images produce are hilarious. It seems that in such cases of metaphor there is a much-needed imaginative response in their interpretation (discussed in Chapter 4, below) and that perception takes over logical relationships and conceptual associations and even goes beyond Vico's belief that the pleasure of metaphor is given by the logical hidden link between the source and the target which gives beauty.

The pleasure of metaphor seems to lie in invention and association, a complex discovery of something new which can even be taken as a game of following a discovery.

Perceiving resemblance is often a pleasurable experience, but pleasure often induces further responsiveness, which become problematic when trying to explain metaphors through concepts and mental images. The idea of responsiveness seems to be what Aristotle, whose view on metaphors is presented in Chapter 1, refers to as "energeia", or a sense of activity. Moran (1996/2017) interprets energeia as movement, something which is alive and perceived. Yet, on the one hand, Aristotle does not link imagination to 'bringing before the eyes' in his account of metaphor and, on the other, he believes that emotions are not the result of imagination (fantasia) alone, but rather something which is active and lived in the moment. As Moran (2017) points out, Aristotle argues that alive or vibrant metaphors must emphasise something which is happening in the present and not be restricted to their imagistic characteristic. However, Merleau-Ponty argues that imagining is not separate from our ability to perceive because the real and the imaginary, like the visible and the invisible or the conscious and unconscious of perception are not separate realms to be compared or opposed, but rather "the imaginary is lodged in the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973a, p.47) and the world is style, discussed in section 1.2, above. Thus, imagination involves not only making connections and associations, but also an emotional response. It can be concluded that the pleasure in metaphor is directly related to the ability to create images of contemplation for interpreters who would have to engage in a discovery process and an imaginative activity - experiencing for oneself rather than establishing direct conceptual connections.

2.4 Similarity as a discovered relation

As one of metaphor's characteristics is to show originality, highly creative meaning in both written, oral and pictorial form has become widely accessible especially in online advertising and marketing (Forceville, 1996). For example, despite being on the verge of becoming an idiom, *Red Bull gives you wings* established itself as a very successful brand metaphor

because it creates humour and it clearly establishes the connection between a drink and a state which you might enter into.

Geary's (2012) use of Max Black's theory of metaphor, which relies on the interaction of two thoughts, clearly shows that a metaphor is often effective and impactful when shared characteristics are easily brought to mind. Yet, as assessed in Chapter 1, above, Black's account seems to ignore the expressiveness and imaginative influence that novelty brings, focusing instead on the semantic resonance, which is reminiscent of the Aristotelian notion of *resemblance* (Aristotle, 1932). Even if the conceptual tie is a basic requirement for a metaphor, a metaphor stands out because "it creates novelty by combining the already familiar, not by finding the utterly new" (Geary, 2012, p.128). Thus, the metaphoric similarity is a *relation that is discovered*, not created (also discussed by Haley 1999 in relation to Peirce's iconicity and presented in Chapter 7). Creating new configurations of meaning or new associations of concepts based on existing similarities or links between them is often surprising because it is unexpected, unplanned and not strategized ahead of time as in the case of other linguistic expressions, including idioms. Certainly, the delight that novel and poetic metaphors usually carry can only be given not by creating a new meaning, but by calling forth evident common features which have never been highlighted before which is often seen in all major forms of art, including poetry, literature, painting and cinema. Seeing Granny Trill's nostrils as badger's holes as Laurie Lee did successfully (example taken from Geary, 2012, p.128) creates surprise but also amusement. Part of its richness derives from the search for the logic between the two concepts or ideas compared. A mental image would very likely focus on the oval shape of the two orifices, their dark entrance and the association of hair with tree roots. The mental image reveals the intuitive perception of the similarity in the dissimilar which, for Aristotle, is the basis for making a good metaphor, or the mark of a genius (*Poetics* 1459 a 3–8, The *Rhetoric* 1412 a 10).

Another metaphor which has been rated successful, in a study by Tourangeau and Rips as reported by Geary (2012, p.143), is "The eagle is a lion among birds". Participants decided it was a good metaphor because the associations are striking and emergent rather than obvious. As Geary points out, the success of a metaphor stands in its ability to establish similarity and reveal possibilities. In other words, what a metaphor does successfully is lead us to an imaginative process of what something is like but based on own experiences. Image creation in successful metaphors is central to this thesis: see the argument detailed in Chapter 4, below. However, resemblance and similarity seem not to be the only requirements for the quality of metaphor. Good metaphors are not limited to the imaginative process only, since creating mental images is often accompanied by having an experience, as Hutto (2015, p.69) points out. For example, the distinctive imaginative process seems to rely on Damasio's idea of "feeling the feeling" or becoming aware of our emotions (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, below). In Adams's (1980, p.35) simile: "The ships hung in the sky in much the same way that bricks don't", there seems to be a feeling of shock at the first encounter, given probably by the unexpected association of spaceships, as presented in science-fiction movies, with bricks, but the interpretation relies on perception.

An appropriate comprehension process seems to require the awareness of those feelings associated with thinking of a spaceship and a brick. Spaceships are often presented as sleek, light, whilst bricks are heavy objects which will drop to the ground instantly if lifted in the air. Thus, it seems logical to assume that feelings such as sleekness and ease of flying, as compared to the heavy fall of a brick, must be felt and conscious in trying to understand the connection between the metaphorical elements. However, it is also reasonable to assume that if senses are not involved and there is no engagement of bodily states, such metaphors remain unexplored and incomprehensible because emotions impact moral judgments, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, below.

By contrast, metaphors which fail to impress seem to do so mainly because the concepts which create them do not interact and interpreters do not obtain much in the way of connection from their imaginary states. According to Geary (2012, p.130), the following metaphor, created by Isidor Lucien Ducasse, is not successful because there is no engagement between the common features – "Beautiful like the accidental meeting of an umbrella and a sewing machine on a dissection table." Despite the disparity of the umbrella, sewing machine and the dissection table, there seems to be no clear connectivity between them and the search for meaning seems to have no clear point. Although the elements are clear and easily comprehended, the associations are not "clearly evoked" as Black (1962) concluded in his definition of metaphor. There is no "magnetic attraction of the similar" as Derrida (1982, p.220) refers to in his description of metaphor. However, when considering the major influence that Lautréamont had on the Surrealists, it is possible that this example is a calculated parody of metaphor with some deliberate proto-Surrealist intent. Another example of a metaphor that does not seem to work is given by Pilkington (2000, p.119) "Black as the inside of a wolf's throat" (his hand is as black as the inside of a wolf's throat) who believes that the metaphor does not create effective imagery effects, discussed at length in Section 5.4.1, below.

Furthermore, Wallace Stevens' poem 'Someone Puts a Pineapple Together', despite its sense of irony, creates a series of images which invite the use of senses and imagination of gestures, creating perceptions, some of which might be new. The poem, overall, describes the process of perceiving an object which turns out to be a pineapple. The poet successfully combines an objective reality with creative imagination when he writes:

> Universal delusions of universal grandeurs,
> The slight incipiencies, of which the form,
> At last, is the pineapple on the table or else

> An object the sum of its complications, seen
> And unseen. This is everybody's world.
> Here the total artifice reveals itself
>
> As the total reality (Stevens, 1997, p.696).

Stevens refers to a pineapple's seen and unseen qualities, building a world out of resemblances. The metaphor adds perceptions and to comprehend it we need to create a fictious world out of the wild images given by the poet as the means of the satisfaction that he envisages. In one of his notes on poetry, Stevens writes that "metaphor creates a new reality from which the original appears to be unreal" (Bates, 1989, p.198) and he also points out that when metaphors are not used, another way to create an altered reality or imaginative situation is by "by feeling, style, etc.", which strengthen the belief of metaphor as a sense performative device.

Particularly important is the semantic tension (also discussed in Chapter 7, below), which, as Haley (1988, p.16) notes, can be a metaphoric index for the creation of a metaphorical content. As Haley assumes, all linguistic anomalies can be metaphors in the right context. The semantic tension that exists in a metaphor becomes the very essence of it by directing interpreters to identify the *likeness*, or what Peirce (V2.56) calls an *icon* (discussed in Chapter 7), without which it would probably be impossible to have a starting point for the process of interpretation. As an indexical sign, the tension must indicate or point at something in an abstract way rather than a direct correspondence of concrete elements. Undoubtedly, an abstract similarity is exactly the opposite of the tenets of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory where there is a direct cross domain mapping for conventional metaphors only (love is a journey), a correspondence of the form A and A' and the shared material that two inputs have in common. Yet, the metaphorical similarity, as it has been argued above,

cannot be a simple picture or image because highly creative metaphors are too expressive

when they open up unexpected views.

To sum up, good metaphors are exploratory and at the same time able to create a fresh

insight. The power of a good metaphor is not limited to its ability to give rise to startingly

vivid cognitive images as the power is also found in the surprise of a process of discovery

and experiencing as imagining. The following section further supports the idea that

metaphors can function as an instrument of perception.

2.5 Sensory content: Synaesthetic metaphors

This section shows the complementary relationship between the elements of a metaphor as a

source of emotions and a stimulus for bodily reactions, bringing more evidence to support the

importance of the movement of the body in the interpretation of metaphors. Metaphors such

as *Silence is sweet*, *sneezes are bright* and *facial expressions are sour* (examples taken from

Geary, 2012) and *sweet melody* are known as synaesthetic, a type of metaphor not only

common in poetry (Ullmann, 1959), but also in a wider range of communication.

Synaesthesia refers to perceiving one sense modality through a different one, as in for

example 'coloured hearing', our ability to associate colours to words, letters and numbers.

Geary notes that synaesthetic metaphors often derive from an inner sense or experience-based

sensations such as touch, taste and smell to describe a less immediate sensation such as sight

and hearing. For example, an unpleasant taste is experienced more viscerally than an

unpleasant colour. Geary (2012, p.83) cites neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran for

whom synaesthesia might have allowed for the creation of metaphor, an idea which can be

traced back to Vico's account of metaphor and is also present in Damasio's theory of

emotions. Geary (2012, p.74) explains that primal sensations such as warmth and cold ended

up being associated with feelings in examples such as "She has a warm personality" and

"He's as cold as ice", making it possible to refer to friendly people as warm and unfriendly as cold.

However, these are metaphorical uses which can be now easily considered to be idioms, as their meaning can be clearly articulated. At the other end of the spectrum, there are the spontaneous and original metaphors which require us to use our imagination and to experience the ambiguity of the message, at the same time. Sensorimotor embodiment in metaphors has been clearly presented by the cognitive accounts of metaphor; however, the cognitive accounts tend to limit themselves to sensory experience which is associated with concrete elements from the world. Conceptual theories rely heavily on embodied meaning and mental representations of external words, but in doing so they limit themselves to dynamicity of meaning activation. Yet, truly original metaphors seem not to require meaning activation and a stable organization of information in the process of finding similarities.

By contrast, because novel metaphors are often ambiguous, the focus is more on the sensations experienced, rather than a wider abstract or concrete meaning, as is always the objective in cognitive theories of metaphor. In the following examples, it is easy to see that the comprehensive process of the metaphor should involve an imaginative and creative process combined with behavioural awareness. F. Scott Fitzgerald's (2009, p.40) metaphor "All good writing is swimming underwater and holding your breath" calls for reliving the sensation of holding your breath while swimming underwater and the expressivity of this metaphor is perhaps given by the sensations that one would imagine or/and experience. In Dickey's lines "I am hearing the shape of the rain / Take the shape of the tent . . .."(Dickey, 1994, p.109), we need to imagine feelings and, more specifically, how we would perceive hearing through touch. It seems that perceptual processes in such examples are more important than the cognitive ones, which might not even be reached at any point in the comprehension process if we consider the ambiguity of highly creative metaphorical

meaning. Understanding such a metaphor seems to rely on an imaginative transformation of sensations and active participation in the imaginative process by becoming aware of sensations. A similar comprehension process appears in Raboteau's (2005, p.13) metaphor: "I see a sound. KKK… It looks like KKKK… I catch the sound and it takes me into the cold." The idea that a sound can take somebody into the cold points out the perceptual aspect of the metaphor. Such a sensory combination might be an extension of a conventional system of metaphorical thought, as conceptual linguists (Lakoff, 1993, p.246) believe; but it is not limited to this system of logic. Novel metaphors result from new combinations and cannot be successful without identifying the connection between the terms of the metaphor (as discussed in the previous section); but there are times when what is combined requires sensory activation in unexpected and almost unlimited ways, because sensations are not only meaningful, as discussed above, but they also form the basis of our more logical type of reasoning.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter began with Merleau-Ponty's argument of an expressive form of perception, which in creative metaphors takes place through moving 'body' and its generated emotions, rather than a direct interpretation or logical inferences because the Merleau-Pontian account explains the power of novelty that exists in language. This chapter has shown how the comprehension of metaphor can be seen as a mode of active engagement with the environment as opposed to a conceptual structure more loosely tied to a corporeal experience of reality and which is mainly given by an embodied view of metaphor which clearly lacks strength to explain metaphor's novelty. Embodiment as a mode of knowledge and expressive form is extended into an activity of exploration and an act of attentiveness, features of

meaning which a classic representational model, based on truth and logic (computation), is unable to integrate when explaining our ability to process metaphors.

Merleau-Ponty's description of perceptual experience has made an important contribution to the debate of the formation of 'meaning' in cognitive science by showing how affectivity is part of embodiment. By arguing that the body adapts to the intended meaning in the form of embodied consciousness, helps explain how we are able to form the knowledge in creative metaphors through our senses and it clarifies that consciousness is not a modular property because meaning is multimodal. However, although Merleau-Ponty stressed the role of emotions and the body in the creation of metaphors, he did not discuss the dynamics of brain-body-environment, which is more thoroughly addressed in the enactivist view of cognition presented in the next chapter, Chapter 3. Such a discussion is necessary in order to strengthen the argument that metaphor is not a mechanism that represents knowledge and bridges embodied experience and conceptual thought as presented by cognitive linguists (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Johnson, 2017) but rather is an active component of cognition that is reliant on environmental factors that are under a continuous change.

CHAPTER 3: EMBODIED AND ENACTIVE METAPHORS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the notions of embodiment and meaning-as-action. It does this with a view to demonstrating the enactive capacities in new constructions of metaphors - as opposed to the idea of metaphors being solely based on conceptual elements and representations as symbolic concepts inside the mind. Metaphors in this framework can be understood not as entities stored as conceptual information, but as the direct results of our senses and in a continuous process of being explored. The main focus of this chapter is on embodiment inherited from Merleau-Ponty, since it is one of the key concepts in enactivism (Gallagher, 2017; Hutto and Myin, 2013; O'Regan and Noë, 2001) and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). It is also highly relevant for an account of metaphor which aims to explain sense experiencing, often present in novel metaphors which are an intrinsic part of poetry and other forms of creative writing. That is, while the dominant cognitive metaphor theories rely on conceptualisation and passive comprehensive mechanisms (embodied experiences grounded in physical experiences) in metaphors, few have highlighted the role of the body both as a structure for meaning and as a source of emotions with the power to create rational decisions. Thus, the chapter offers a critical overview of the way enactivist – or '4E' - research might inform an understanding of meaning and advance the idea that feelings are an important element in comprehension of metaphor. A synopsis of core enactivist ideas is important and needed here in order to provide some contextualisation of how metaphors can be considered a process of action as opposed to an analogical match of information. The next chapter, Chapter 4, provides a more in-depth analysis of feelings in relation to the problem of consciousness, in order to advance the debate started in Chapter 2 regarding how we experience the world within and around us.

Section 3.2 gives an overview of several enactive theories of cognition with an emphasis on action, bodily experiences and creative cognition as sense-making because they accommodate gesture and creativity which are features of metaphors. Section 3.3 presents embodiment as a mode of knowledge and expressive form. Sections 3.4 uses Gallagher and Lindgren's (2015) notion of enactive metaphors to analyse engagement with metaphor as an act of sense-making in relation to the world, not just to language with the aim to show the embodiment as a dynamic process. Section 3.5 discusses Noë's enactivism which is based on sensorimotor contingencies, in order to clarify the controversial issue of the role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual understanding (conceptual system of the brain). It does this by clearly explaining how sensory details build on the embodied information to allow slightly different experiences in comprehension of metaphor, supporting the idea that language is 'non-local'. Section 3.6 presents the strong embodiment view which rejects representations but explains how conventional metaphors are the result of patterns of action. The end of the chapter proposes that enactivism offers an empirically grounded explanation of how metaphor is a way of engaging and activating sensorimotor capacities.

3.2 An enactive approach to metaphor

Despite the prominence of Lakoff and Johnson's view of an embodied mind and the definition of metaphor as resulting from "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.5), cognitive linguists seem to overlook the stimulation of sensorimotor experiences and altered bodily states and restrict embodied cognition to the mind and body only, without considering the ever-changing material reality that surrounds us. Yet, as an increasing number of research studies (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Malafouris, 2013; Harrison and Fleming, 2019, p.3; Gallagher, 2017) show, reasoning involves more than brain and body since we can process variable information from

the surroundings. For the same reason, several prominent metaphor researchers (Cameron, 2008; Gibbs, 2018; Jensen, 2017) criticize the classical cognitive linguistic view where metaphor is a cross-domain mapping between conceptual domains that result from a static embodied cognition, in the sense that we experienced the world and we stored information. Such a view does not allow a dynamic process which is often associated with metaphors, because the comprehension of metaphor does not seem to be located in single words or actions, as also argued by Merleau-Ponty (presented in Chapter 2, section 2.2).

In the enactivist view, language is used for action and social interaction and, as a result, linguistic utterances acquire their meaning in context, as opposed to in syntax and semantics, which also seems to be the case of those metaphors which have almost no meaning outside context or when placed in a different context such as "all the world's a stage" which makes sense in *As You Like it*, but if uttered as "All the world's a restaurant" would not carry much meaning (Yarbrough, 2007, p.381). Additionally, a static mapping status of metaphors has been also criticized by applied linguists who associate metaphor with dynamicity in discourse (Cameron, 2008).

The view of cognition as enactive is the result of considering cognition as situated between brain, body and world (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007), an account known as enactivism or *4E cognition* - embodied, embedded, extended and enactive/affective (other equivalent terminology is 4EA - Gallagher 2016; Hutto, 2011). Such a view can help explain why many novel metaphors do not rely on mappings between conceptual domains and seem to involve what Malafouris (2013) calls improvisational thinking, a process of meaning construction through interactions with the real environment rather than derived from stored information alone. The idea of enaction developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) entails that cognition is the use of skilful know-how in situated and embodied action and that experience is not a secondary phenomenon that accompanies reasoning but is central to any

understanding of the mind. Varela (1987, p.48) metaphorically describes enaction as "laying down a path in walking", where the path is our understanding, which is not preestablished, but rather develops from the internal and external environment. Moreover, enactivism relies on both sensory-motor processes and affective processes and both have an equal influence on how we perceive the world (Gallagher and Bower, 2014).

Consequently, cognition as embodied and enactive opposes the cognitivist model of the mind as a computer, where cognition is totally separated from action and perception (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1986). Despite the abundance of models (Thompson, 2007; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Gallagher, 2005; Rowlands, 2010), enactivists share the proposition that cognition can only be explained with reference to embodiment since mental activity is believed to consist of patterns of perception and action that are continuously implemented by the entire organism (brain and body), in a continuous interaction with the world, as opposed to pre-established analogical thinking. Hence, cognition is an activity realized by the body (Noë, 2009, p.13) and an action producer (Clark, 1997; O'Regan and Noë, 2009), rather than a passive knowledge cluster as held by computational theories of the mind.

Crucially, what enactivists such as Varela et al. (1999, p.81) develop is the view of not only an embodied mind, but a mind which is emotional-affective. They argue that complex cognitive processes such as stimulus perception and long-term memory originate from much simpler subsystems, the result of the interaction between "neural components and circuits" (Varela et al., 1999, p.76). For them, affect is "pre-verbal" and "pre-reflective dynamic in self-constitution of the self" (Varela et al., 1991, p.80), an idea developed in more depth by several accounts of consciousness (Damasio, 1994, detailed in Chapter 4, below; Prinz, 2004). Before looking at how, exactly, affect is integrated in reasoning by enactivists,

it is useful to clarify the theoretical core of the 4E approach and different forms of embodiment.

As Ward and Stapleton (2012) clarify, the 4E approach proposes cognition as embodied (Gallagher, 2005; Shapiro, 2011) because the entire body motivates cognitive processes, which is the same view used by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) to explain metaphors. For example, affection is warmth and similarity is proximity because we experience warmth and proximity through our senses of touch (for warmth) and vision (proximity), together with introspection, which is abstract, in respect of the target domain. Cognitive processes can also be *embedded* in the sense that one's thinking is the result of the social, physical and cultural environment (Clark, 2008; Malafouris, 2013). For example, smartphones and agendas used as an extrasomatic memory or a blind's person cane become facets of cognition through interaction with human organisms. Moreover, processes are *enactive* because they emerge from "sensory-motor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided" (Varela et al., 1991, p.176), a view which draws directly from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account (see Chapter 2). Thus, perceptual adjustment and adaptation in everyday life (opening a door) and more complex activities (viewing a painting) are presented as a gradual and bi-directional. Gallagher (2017, p.47) argues that such perceptual processes help the mind to respond to the world, rather than to represent it. Moreover, he points out that not only biological needs such as hunger can couple the body to its environment, but also emotions such as pain can lead to cognitive processes (2017, p.41).

Additionally, mind is seen as *extended* (the 'extended mind thesis', Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008) in the sense that cognitive states and processes result from the interaction of brain, body and environment as a whole, rather than the internal properties of each (Ward et al., 2017). Yet, the extended mind framework maintains that some bodily processes are cognitive, such as the epistemic use of gestures (Clark, 2008, p.123). Thus, as

Menary (2010) points out, what these currents of research share is the impetus to incorporate the physical body of an agent into cognitive processes, in this way opposing both Cartesian cognitivism - which abstracted cognition from bodily mechanisms - and the computational view of mind - which seems to ignore emotional states since cognition results from internal cognitive symbols or representations that represent external reality (see Fodor, 1975, 1983).

Generally, embodiment is associated with a 'felt sense' of lived experiences. Felt sense according to Gendlin's (1981, p.3) definition is "a special kind of internal bodily awareness … a body sense of meaning". This felt sense involves an interaction of cognitive agents with the environment (Gallagher, 2016), reminiscent of the Merleau-Pontian notion of lived experiences, discussed at length in Chapter 2, above. To illustrate, there is much support for the idea that gesture does not only help communication, but actually facilitates verbal expression and thinking, such as when people scratch their head or pace around in a circle when they try to think hard (Cole et al., 2002). Furthermore, research on metaphors highlights the association of gestures with metaphorical speech and even gestural metaphors such as vomiting to express disgust or yawning for boredom (Bouissac, 2008). Gesture is important for the account of metaphors that this thesis addresses, because sense-making can be a direct result of the bodily interactions with the environment. Additionally, as Gallagher and Bower (2014, pp. 234 - 236) remark, sense-making does not only include sensorimotor interactions with the environment, but also affect, which can be manifested as proprioception (sensing the stimuli within the body), kinaesthesis (sensing the location of the body parts and how they are moving through space) and "perceptual interest" or the motivational body-world interaction. Thus, enactivist embodiment entails that the body is not a mere entity in the world, but a centre of subjectivity and interiority (Thompson, 2007), in line with Merleau-Ponty's (2020, p.106) description of the lived or experienced body. The enactivist frame, then, is useful in

understanding how the interpretative process in metaphors take place and how sense-making occurs when interpreters find significance in the world.

Thus, the embodied action model of cognition proposed by Varela et al. (1991) emphasizes that cognition is an aspect of the sensory body, always changing, allowing an explanation of how highly creative metaphors depend on a constant sensorimotor activity, a co-arising metaphorical meaning as opposed to a pre-existing mental meaning.

3.3 Embodied metaphors in Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The idea of embodiment in the production and comprehension of metaphor has received great support from a large number of studies offering strong evidence. For example, Littlemore (2019) asserts that metaphors trigger a strong physical association, eliciting neurological responses and incorporating sensory experiences. Similarly, Neiser (2003) describes metaphors as activities for coping with the world because we use them to understand lived experiences. Both views support the traditional cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor where the basic sense of the words activates concepts. Moreover, embodiment of metaphor has been the ground of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980, 2002) influential theory of metaphor which they use to argue that metaphors (and meaning in general) result from experiencing the environment through embodied sensorimotor and cognitive structures (Johnson and Lakoff, 2002, p.248). To exemplify, metaphors are created as a result of our bodily experience such as basic bodily movements (moving forward, moving back), spatial situations (being inside, being outside), posture and so forth. Whilst Lakoff and Johnson favour a process of both understanding and experiencing since the "essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.5), they mainly focus on the process of understanding since they use the mapping process between conceptual entities. In a metaphor such as *Our relationship is going nowhere*, people

establish correspondences between the love relationship and a journey and between lovers and travellers by experiencing the target concept 'love' in terms of the source 'journey'. However, even if such embodied approaches to metaphor successfully establish the bodily basis of apparently abstract or disembodied concepts, they do not accommodate the instances of metaphorical language where the meaning cannot easily be explained as the result of a mapping process between concepts. Furthermore, as this thesis argues, an approach to metaphor should take into considerations signs, as the building blocks of our reasonings, as they are presented by Peirce (1998), discussed in Chapter 7, below.

A core notion in Lakoff and Johnson's theory is the *image schema*, defined as a pattern of information that recurs in our everyday bodily experience, such as containment because we experience our body as a container, or the relations of up and down and so on (Gallagher and Lindgren, 2015). Image schemas are viewed as source domains in the comprehension process of metaphors to determine the embodied nature of metaphors, a view which relies on the idea that we understand one entity metaphorically in terms of another. For example, Gibbs (2018) argues that the schema implied in "My new research is off to a good start" is possible because movement along a path is a pervasive bodily experience that creates thinking about the more abstract notion of progress towards a goal. But as Gallagher (2005) remarks, although embodiment according to Lakoff and Johnson involves neural structures as concepts, Lakoff and Johnson avoid the strong representationalism that consists of meaning and reference found in Fodor (2008) and Pylyshyn (2005).

A study conducted by Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio (2008, p.38) analyses how metaphor creates sensorimotor responses and suggests that when first encountered, metaphors rely on body movement. For example, *grasping the situation* may have been complemented by hand movement in order to be understood, but once lexicalised or culturally embedded, there was

no need for such representation. The study supports the idea that novel metaphors create more vivid sensory interactions.

In general, cognitive linguists admit that novel metaphors might not result from mapping conceptual details, but they see them as either extensions of existing conceptual mappings (Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1993) or the result of mapping mental images rather than concepts, naming them image metaphors such as *My wife whose hair is brush fire* (Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Gibbs and Bogdanovich, 1999). In such cases vivid thinking seems to take over more analogical connections and interpreters seem to be immersed in processing mental images. Another example is Hirshfield's (2013, p.7) interesting and unusual metaphors "The tongue says loneliness, anger, grief,/ but does not feel them / […] As this life is not a gate, but the horse plunging through it". It is difficult to reject the possibility that in such metaphors pictures and emotions are more important than analogical thinking and a specific meaning that characterises words individually. It seems that thinking when comprehending such unusual metaphors is carried out in more visual terms. Even when the associative process comes into effect, when imagining life as a horse plunging through a gate, as we understand the metaphorical language because it is grounded in physical experiences, the description is accompanied by vivid and visceral images. As Neisser (2003, p.38) puts it, metaphors provide models of limbic system structures to process emotion and learning, rather than providing definitions and rules. Moreover, emotions help us assess beauty and aesthetics (discussed in Chapter 6, below), thus providing the means to influence meaning, on the one hand and consider non-semantic features on the other. Therefore, embodiment in such cases seems to be insufficient to explain the emotional power of unusual metaphors.

While Lakoff and Johnson's embodiment conveniently accommodates standard metaphors, most of them highly conventional, the conceptual account they propose does not address creativity in the production of metaphors. Moreover, even with attempts to integrate

creativity into static conceptual structures such as domains (Kövecses, 2005), several important aspects of the aesthetic experience of metaphor such as pleasure, surprise and emotions, still remain to be addressed within the conceptual metaphor framework and beyond (see Johnson, 2017, p.140). The following section (3.4) augments the theory of embodiment in a way which can accommodate a more active process of sense-creation.

3.4 Enactive metaphors

Gallagher and Lindgren (2015) challenge the widely held view of embodied metaphors in which comprehension relies on a relatively passive process of mapping between concepts. Instead, they propose *enactive metaphors* (following Winner et al., 1979), a way of engaging with metaphor as opposed to a type of metaphor. Thus, enactive metaphors are active ways of expressing, engaging, putting into action or bringing into existence through action, or enactment, because they manifest through embodied processes such as gesturing and playing. For example, when we pretend that a banana is a phone, we enact the metaphor because we engage with the environment by using the human body to create meaning. Enactive metaphors oppose what Gallagher and Lindgren (2015) call *sitting* metaphors to refer to conventional metaphors such as *the legs of a table*, *time flies*, *to magnify an issue*, which are unlikely to require much imagination because they are systematic and do not call for attention. In enactive metaphors, experiencing one thing in terms of another does not remain at a conceptual mapping level, but opens up a dynamic relationship between body and the word, as Gallagher (2017, p.181) notes. Malafouris (2013, pp.221-222) provides a clear definition of the dynamicity by explaining that cognition as situated does not mean that cognition is located somewhere, but it refers to how "the situation (environmental, technological, cultural, or social) can shape and/or become part of the embodied thinking process". Thus, a static mapping process which cognitive embodiment relies on cannot

account for all metaphors. Gallagher and Lindgren (2015, p.2) make clear that some metaphors such as "I feel like a million bucks" are almost impossible to be acted out, because some abstract concepts such as mass and beauty are not susceptible to such a process.

Additionally, enactive metaphors contribute to the establishment of the body as an important medium in meaning creation because they combine enactive perception and gestures. As Gallagher and Lindgren (2015, p.11) explain, the understanding of the new connections and possibilities that a metaphor brings is expressed through the body. The evidence of bodily movement and its important role in comprehension of metaphor can be clearly seen in their "meteor" experiment. In this study, children engaged with a virtual meteor in a virtual reality simulation, through jumping, running and physically enacting the movement of the meteor, to the point that children identified with the meteor, making statements such as "I am the meteor". Gallagher and Lindgren believe that the physical enactment of the movement of the meteor leads to a more comprehensive and flexible understanding of the principle of gravity and movement through space. Another important example of an enacted metaphor is when a banana is used metaphorically as a phone, especially in pretend play by children who, in this case, enact the metaphor (Gallagher and Lindgren, 2015; Gallagher, 2017, p.194). In a similar experiment conducted by Shoval (2011) and mentioned by Gallagher and Lindgren (2015), students who used specific bodily positions when reasoning about angles were demonstrably shown to have learned more than those who did not. Such research findings suggest that mental comprehension is often accompanied by bodily movements and gestures (Cole et al., 2002; Glenberg et al., 2004). Thus, it is concluded that action-oriented processes determine our experience and comprehension of the environment.

Gallagher and Lindgren (2015) argue that a metaphor is considered 'good' on the basis of its ability to show something which was not shown before and create new insights

(the very definition of novelty) but only if the strength results from how well we engage with the metaphor. A novel or highly poetic metaphor might be considered just as a compilation of words which might not make much sense if there is no engagement from interpreters. A good illustration of this point is Ogden Nash's (1942, p.5) quote "Life is not having been told that the man has just waxed the floor" which might seem to carry little meaning, if any, when consumed passively. By contrast, when interpreters start perceiving details and making connections, they open up possibilities for interaction with objects, as if they were involved in actions. An unfolding metaphor for enaction such as the following excerpt from Atwood (1985, p.321) can only have meaning if treated as an active event: "Time has not stood still. It has washed over me, washed me away, as if I'm nothing more than a woman of sand, left by a careless child too near the water." There is clearly an active event that needs to happen for such a metaphor to gain meaning. One of the reasons for an active action-oriented interpretation is because the metaphor mapping posited by early cognitive linguists does not allow a more reflective state of mind or a way to explore personal experiences through embodiment. Lakoff (1993, p.214) argues that the source domains of many conceptual metaphors are derived from recurrent patterns of sensory-motor experiences, defined as image schemas. If metaphors are indeed reflections of conceptual associations as Lakoff claims, then it is nearly impossible to map recurring patterns (image schemas) when referring to a woman of sand who has been left near the water. Engaging the imagination is needed in such instances and understanding this metaphor would not be possible without pairing its elements with sensory details (time washed me away, a woman of sand), which amplifies the metaphorical effect and allows readers to feel what the metaphor involves, rather than finding logical connections between conceptual patterns. Such original metaphors must be enjoyed for a deeper exploration, observed, meditated upon. Such a mode of processing meaning evokes what Oakeshott (1959) considers to be thinking in a "poetic" mode because poetry,

for him, is a contemplative activity. Certainly, assessing a metaphor for being a 'good' one needs, in addition to an interpretative context, a willingness or involvement to create a new type of visualization, experimentation and consideration of new perspectives.

Furthermore, finding similarities in uses of metaphor and considering other perspectives is, in enactive metaphors, an active process, a form of pretend play or *as if* and leads the interlocutor to see *as if*. According to the enactivist framework, such action-oriented capacities are given by our perceptual ability to see similarities in objects combined with sensorimotor skills which make embodiment possible (Gallagher and Lindgren, 2015). Consequently, the process of acting when a metaphor is enacted is an embodied process. Thus, the new insight offered by an enactivist account results from engagements with metaphor being forms of pretend play or *acting-as-if* one thing is another; a very important point that helps explain the novelty of metaphors. Undoubtedly, pretend play is a thinking skill. To see or to think of a woman as made of sand and placed near water, as in the previous example, we need to create a situation, a possible mental scenario where we act *as-if*. The creation of such a situation is not a narrow process and it opposes the restricted mapping process offered by the cognitive theories of metaphor. Gallagher (2017, p.194) rightly points out that action, social interaction, gesture and pretence together accomplish imaginative thinking, similar to how indirect language accomplishes thought in the Merleau-Pontian account, where bodily movements are a way of accessing the world (discussed in section 2.2, above). Additionally, Peirce's notion of sign strengthens the argument that imagination is a source of meaning. As discussed at length in Chapter 7, below, Peirce's sign stands for its object, despite not being the object, which means that an object can be an imaginary situation, a dream, a feeling or even a hallucination. Thus, the meaning of original metaphors can no longer be expected to be closely related to reality if meaning can be also arrived at from imaginary situations.

Crucially, as Gallagher and Lindgren (2015) assert, recognizing similarities or *acting-as-if* is an active event which is not limited to just sensory-motor contingencies. Just as in the banana example, above, where the child imagines that the banana is a phone and uses gestures, emotions and language, the act of imagination and seeing new connections between things involves *affective* and *intersubjective* dimensions (emotions, gesturing, context sensitivity and linguistic skills) that create meaning and also internal or external engagement. Instances of pretend play must be given more focus when explaining metaphor, because the visualizations they create can, in turn, create feelings that accompany them. An example is given by Rucinska et al. (2019) where a child uses the metaphor of 'switch' to mean shifting between attitudes (people "switch" to another position when they are angry) rather than a light switch on the wall.

Moreover, Gallagher and Lindgren see metaphors as affordances for actions as opposed to linguistic tools, which means that metaphors relying on active bodily experiences have the power to create visualisations and feelings that come with them. Gallagher's (2017) analysis of the idea of metaphor as affordances leads him to believe that metaphor activation may be determined by a pre-personal affordance space. Alongside visualisations, metaphors have the power to *create* feelings that necessarily come with these mental images.

Nevertheless, Gallagher and Lindgren point out the flexibility of metaphorical meaning which is the result of the context and the interactions from which it emerges, an idea similar to Ricoeur's (1978) argument that metaphor exists only through the act of interpretation (see section 1.3.4 in Chapter 1, above). If seen as flexible, metaphor can indeed be re-used with slightly different meanings in different contexts. Even a metaphor which is considered conventional can mean something different depending on the context in which it is used, despite the widespread belief (Giora, 2010; Glucksenberg, 2009) that conventional metaphors are understood more quickly than novel ones because of their familiarity. For

instance, Ritchie (2013) points out that relational and emotional effects such as vocal tone and gestures can lead to other interpretations. *Robert is a bulldozer* is often analysed in literature (Wilson and Carston, 2006; Vega-Moreno, 2007) to mean that Robert is obstinate and inconsiderate. However, the metaphor can also be used as praise (Will Robert get the contract for our company?) or blame (Did Robert consider your objections to the proposal?) (Ritchie, 2013, p.65). What is made clear here is the flexibility of metaphorical meaning which can often be determined by context and by the interactions from which it emerges. The idea of 'movement' and 'action' in the meaning of a metaphor is further discussed in the next section, in relation to Noë's belief that perception arises as one moves actively in the environment.

3.5 Noë's enactivism: sense-making and representations
3.5.1 Representations as sensorimotor contingencies

The enactivist view rejects the long-established idea that our perceptual experience depends on the activation of internal representations which is the foundation of the majority of accounts of metaphor. For example, in cognitive linguistics, representations are subcomponents used internally by a cognitive system in order to process information about external things to the system. Cognitive linguists (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1987b) who follow the conceptual metaphor framework proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) see metaphor as a representation and thought which rely on conceptual structures - either concrete and embodied experiences or more abstract ideas, both represented in terms of domains. Representations are even stronger in propositional accounts such as Relevance Theory where metaphor results from altering concepts which are direct representations of entities in the world, despite the contextualist position where determinate meaning is created in communicative contexts only (Carston, 2012).

However, similar to Gallagher's (2015) view of perception as action, O'Regan and Noë, (2001) argue that by incorporating sensation and movement rather than one's internal experience, the perceptual model is made more comprehensive because perception becomes a matter of bodily exploration of the outside environment. Such an innovative account relies on the belief that our ability to perceive the world is driven by our *sensorimotor contingencies*, a notion which remains at the core of the theory. Sensorimotor contingencies are the "structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor actions" (O'Regan and Noë, 2001, p.941) which means that they are the ways in which sensory stimulation (understood as informational input from the sense organs or sensations) are regulated by bodily movements. Sensorimotor contingencies are important for the study of meaning because they can create a conscious perceptual experience which very often lays the basis of comprehending artistic metaphors. Although the widely accepted definition of metaphor is that we experience one thing in terms of another, the majority of studies of metaphor focus only on content such as concrete and abstract conceptual characteristics, avoiding the whole process of experience and being conscious as a mode of understanding (see Chapter 4, below, for the account of consciousness that informs the current thesis). This can be illustrated briefly by the following metaphor in Hardinge's *A Face like Glass* (2012, p.374): "Wishes are thorns, he told himself sharply. They do us no good, just stick into our skin and hurt us." To engage in bodily exploration of experiencing pain, the interpreter must create an action or experience and deploy practical knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. Somebody who has experienced the pain of thorns previously would most likely embody that experience, becoming perceptually aware of how pain (as a bodily interaction with the environment) contributes to the meaning of the metaphor.

O'Regan and Noë's (2001) belief that there is no re-representation of the world inside the brain is a radical view, but they strongly argue that conscious perceptual experience

depends not just on the brain, but also on the perceiver's implicit practical knowledge (Noë, 2004, p.117) or mastery of sensorimotor contingencies (O'Regan and Noë, 2001, p.943). Notably, Noë (2006, p.29) points out that experience involves a *coupling* with the environment, rather than a *representing* of the environment. He adds (Noë, 2006, p.31):

> Perception is an activity of sensorimotor coupling with the environment [.] experiences are not acts [.]; they are not representations; they are activities, events themselves; they are temporally extended patterns of skilful engagement. When you perceive an event unfolding, it is not as if you occupy a dimensionless point of observation. You live through an event by coupling with it.

Thus, Noë reduces the nature of perception to the sensorimotor realm which helps when considering metaphor understanding as not unreliant on isolated concepts or building blocks of our reasoning resulting from embodiment, but integrating experience from non-conceptual content. Thus, Noë's argument is important for metaphors because it takes into account how meaning can show up in experience, as opposed to a picture in the head. Whereas accounts such as Black's (1955, 1993) are important because they demonstrate that metaphors are used to organize our thoughts in the sense that some features are emphasized over others when one concept acts as a filter thought which a second concept is viewed, Noë's account shows how the external world contributes to the creation of meaning through experience or a perceptual mode which is action-based.

In this way, sensorimotor contingencies help define representations as bodily exercise of sensorimotor knowledge and, on the other hand, clarify embodied action as the process of how information or knowledge from the external world is acquired (Noë, 2004). As such, sensorimotor knowledge is equivalent to vivacity or an implied "know-how" in which individuals understand perceptual experience because they have an understanding of how things look or work. For example, we perceive a tomato as a whole, although we can see only one part of it (presence in absence) because we can "feel" the unseen part as present as a result of having the ability to experience the world through sensorimotor contingencies.

Moreover, as Noë stresses (2012, p.16), even an impression of a tomato is an episode of individual engagement and interaction with a tomato because we might be conscious of what we see, but we also add habits from the data of sense (sensorimotor contingencies). In the same way, we use words and other meaningful utterances to experience what they mean through the environment and not through some impressions that we might have. The sweetness of marshmallows is something that is experienced through senses in "You're a marshmallow. Soft and sweet and when you get heated up you go all gooey and delicious" (Evanovich, 1995, p.271).

Hence, when we perceive, we experience objects or ideas, components of which may not even be present - but we can still experience meaning in the lack of a sensation or physical magnitude because of the sensorimotor knowledge. The idea that cognition is based on "knowing how" instead of "knowing that" means that perceivers access the memory by engaging in bodily exploration of the environment. From this, it also follows that although the brain plays a role in perception, information can be extracted directly from our ability to possess associative knowledge of the ways in which objects exist and manifest in the environment.

However, action as presented by enactivists seem to oppose the representation notion which I use in Chapter 7, below, when I discuss the process of considering hypothesis in the interpretation of metaphors using Peirce's original ideas on cognition. I would like to clarify here that action and representation can coexist; plus enactivism (Huto and Myin, 2013) and Peirce's semiotics can both enrich discussions on reasoning and imagining. As discussed in Chapter 7, Peirce (CP 7.160) also sees mind as continuous to the world (he calls the continuity of mind and matter *synechism*) and argues that everything is in a *continuum*, but he believes that there is a universal rule such as patterns and habits that embed a concept in a specific context in the world and this is how meaning is acquired though experience. Peirce

(CP 4.531) believes that a thought is a sign of a belief, but never the belief itself. By contrast, as discussed in the previous sections, enactivists rely on sensorimotor skills and habits as main ways for cognitive processes because they view perception as a direct form to relate to the world.

The role of internal representations is played by the world itself, which serves as an outside memory (O'Regan and Noë, 2001, p.946). An internal representation of the world is no longer the result of our vision or *seeing*, but rather an activity or a way of exploring the environment. O'Regan and Noë maintain the idea of representations as bodily exercise of sensorimotor knowledge, which is well suited to explain how, in creative and novel metaphors, interpreters seem to become conscious of their perceptual experience. Noë further clarifies the nature of sensorimotor contingencies when he refers to them as knowledge, stressing that "thought and experience are, in important ways continuous" (2004, p.118). He uses the Eiffel tower as an example of something that he can think of but not perceive, being only visually aware of something which is out of his view. Undoubtedly, metaphors undertake a similar path, where finding analogies between terms is a process which involves perceptual impressions given by action and exploration. In this way, the movement in language can be related to Derrida's (1974, p.158) belief that "there is nothing outside the text" presented in Chapter 1, above, which encompasses the idea that meaning and representation are how we interpret signs because perception is representation, as opposed to meaning inscribed in the sign and meaning delineated by mental conceptual structures.

3.5.2 Meaning as experience and activity

Noë (2012, p.151) develops the view of meaning as experience and considers the aesthetic judgement which he defines as "cognitively rich perceptual accomplishment". He clearly defines experiences as *activities* or *events* which oppose the notion of representations as

logical acts of judgement as described in the philosophical tradition. His explanation greatly

helps in understanding how meaning is given not by a single point, object or idea, but rather

by experiences which he defines as "extended patterns of skillful engagement" (Noë, 2006,

p.5), thus highlighting the movement and the action in the process of arriving at meaning. For

instance, writing is not only a cultural convention, but it is also "the mirror of language"

(2015, p.37) because we consider language to be writable and writing also shapes the way we

think of language. We think of and experience language through its ability to be represented

by written words. Words are also the elements that create the metaphorical meaning in

writing, but they limit themselves to just the source, not the result of what the metaphorical

meaning involves. Noë's observation that language, especially writing, limits itself to

expressing experiences in the world may be an important factor regarding why many creative

metaphors are not limited to mere highlighting of relevant semantic features.

As Noë points out, it is almost impossible for a word to encapsulate the experiences

mostly given by sounds from outside, because writing is a method of representing speech, not

sound from the natural environment. For example, a door's actual squeakiness or the floor's

creaking cannot be represented in writing because words do not model sounds from the

environment since we "we can write only those sounds that are already words" (Noë, 2015, p.

64). Such a case is different from onomatopoeia which creates words that phonetically imitate

sounds from the environment. A word such as 'cat' is spelled by spelling out the

representations of the sounds as letters, which are not in fact sounds as defined by the physics

of sound. The representations are limited in that they do not encompass the embodiment of

sensual or tactile elements. This is because representations are mere pointers to pre-given

ideological meaning rather than creating meaning from feelings or a possible scenario

involving imagination (see Chapter 5, below) that we experience and which has the power to

create the perspective from which we look at things to derive meaning.

Of course, the interpretation of conventional metaphors relies on our cultural baggage and ideology because the way we access conventional meaning is by retrieving stored information, which is a fabric of culture alongside sensorimotor skills. As Noë (2012) argues, *sensorimotor* knowledge together with relevant cultural and contextual knowledge are both fundamental forms of knowledge in the process of comprehension. However, it must be highlighted that metaphors that do not have novelty have too much cultural baggage already which can be easily noticed in idioms (*a few eggs short of a dozen, not pulling a full wagon*) which have become patterns and reflections of the culture as observed by Boers and Stengers (2008). By contrast, metaphors with novelty have less cultural knowledge or representations in the sense of what enactivists would consider them.

Consequently, Noë (2012, p.91) asserts that experience is only possible in setting the familiarity, which means that interpreters can only expand their experiential repertoire from what is familiar to them. Trying to interpret a new metaphor is a process of becoming familiar with the words and what they represent and beginning to experience what the words refer to. This process of experience can become richer when the interpreter is willing to work through the cognitive load or mental effort. If new metaphors might be meaningless at a first encounter, experience is what makes them structured and motivated. Noë (2012, p.92) attempt to reconcile action and representation when he mentions that experiences might be thought of being something similar to representations, but he makes it clear that experiences are not acts, but rather activities, events or temporary extended patterns of skilful engagement. Noë clarifies that when one perceives an event as unfolding, one lives through the event by coupling with it. Thus, when interpreters perceive an unestablished meaning of a new metaphor as unfolding, they experience the new metaphor by tracking what the association of the two ideas in the metaphor does over time and thus coupling with the event. Noë's idea of coupling seems similar to Peirce's notion of *abduction*, a type of non-deductive

inference used to discover, enquire and form hypothesis through which new ideas are introduced, discussed in Chapter 7, below, since both views present a stage where meaning is unsettled.

Following Clark's (2016) idea that there are no novel experiences (a point which is also discussed in Chapter 7, below), Noë (2012, p. 32) asserts that "the conditions of novelty, are, in effect, the conditions of invisibility" which means that we comprehend something that we experience only by becoming familiar with it and by knowing it. The process of becoming familiar with something, systematize or 'domesticate' the idea (Noë, 2012, p.37) seems to be the reason why it is believed that novel metaphors take longer to process (Gentner and Bowdle, 2006; Giora et al., 2004) and why it can be assumed that there are different cognitive routes of processing for the comprehension of familiar and novel metaphors (Carston 2010). Noë (2012, p.37) sees perceptual consciousness (defined as a form of intentional directness) as *access* or *availability* to something new but from a background knowledge which in metaphor is provided by each of the terms too.

However, considering the example: "There were sheep in the distance wrapped in mist, the trees wearing mist as scarves. The light curdled like old milk" (Wood, 2015, p.57), the background understanding rests in how we culturally understand what each of the words means, but the meaning of the metaphor is arrived at through a process of engaging with the description and enacting sensations such as the quietness of such a morning and other similar emotions. The metaphor *trees wearing mist* uses words (stimuli) to denote a sensorimotor representation, although it is not clear which sensorimotor property may be involved. Thus, in addition to a sensorimotor interaction, the metaphor creates an affective reaction which, according to enactivists, influences perception.

To stress the idea that perceptual and practical modalities of understanding are action-based, Noë opens his *Varieties of Presence* (2012) with an explanation of how we can

understand something which might seem incomprehensible. Although he uses painting as an example, the same process of understanding can apply to peculiar metaphorical uses which are often hard to understand such as the simile "Lightning pirouetted like a drunken ballerina across purpling clouds and a sky the colour of regret." (Buchanan, 2004, p.77). Here, to understand how lightning moves in a pirouette and how a ballet dancer performs when drunk involves more effort from the reader rather than a more literal affirmation that might result from a preposition which represents a possible state of affairs. The metaphor invites discovery, similar to how a work of art challenges the viewer to *see it* or to *get it* as Noë (2015, p.99) puts it, as if a work of art would be able to utter: "See me if you can, or Bring me into focus, if you can". Similarly, the idea of a perceptual and imaginative act that contributes to meaning creation can be found in Wollheim's (1980,1987) experiential nature of expressive meaning (detailed in Chapter 6, below) which relies on experiencing perceptual delight through imagination. Despite the belief that in *lightning pirouetted* there is a more abstract and a more concrete concept which provides information about the target (lighting), the metaphorical meaning does not seem to be based on an associative process between concepts. Even if the concept of "pirouetting" is thought of as embodied or mapped within our sensory-motor system, comprehension relies on more than sensory-motor systems which provide structure to conceptual content that leads to the semantic content.

Noë points out that although a work of art might seem incomprehensible at first when looked at, there is a point where the comprehension of the abstract meaning becomes clearer as the result of an increased attention, recall of similar objects which can spark an idea, other people's comments about the work of art or just by sharing thoughts with others. Thus, the experience of the art becomes meaningful because it has transformed while the piece of art remains the same and what it could not be perceived as before becomes meaningful. Many creative metaphors may seem incomprehensible at first, but when their meaning starts

unfolding, they are considered creative and even outstanding. Just as Noë points out in the

example about art, in a metaphor - although the words and their context remain the same -

there is a shift in perception when meaning starts unfolding. As Noë explains, when we

understand, we do not discover something new, but we actually perceive something that we

could not perceive before. Certainly, to understand how a drunk ballet dancer performs, we

need to put in more effort and give more attention to explore such a possibility.

Another point that deserves attention is the two modalities of reading a metaphor,

noted by Yarbrough (2007), with the first being a passive and preservative modality when we

react emotionally to the unexpected and the second being active and creative, requiring an act

of will shift our perception of how things are. The shift is similar to how we can change our

perception in Jastrow's famous duck-rabbit sketch in the figure below, which demonstrates

our ability to change our perception following an act of will.

Fig: Jastrow's duck-rabbit sketch (1899, p.312)

A metaphor is often an encouragement for interpreters to shift perception and consider new

sets of relationships. However, the relationships must exist already in the content for the

metaphor to make sense, but they just need to be manifested.

Undoubtedly, the simile above sets itself as a literary work of art mainly through the

delight that it can create in beholding the beautiful. By drawing on the concept of aesthetics,

Noë (2015, p.127) is able to argue that aesthetic responses are actions or modes of

participation because he defines them as judgments or cognitive achievements cultivated and

nourished by communities that often establish conversations. He compares them to the process of getting a joke because understanding requires wit and insight. Moreover, Noë (2015, p.129) is critical of the idea of art as a phenomenon to be explained and defines art as a mode or activity of trying to explain. The two important notions of art and beauty which can help define the openness of metaphor are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Additionally, Noë's (2015, p.298) belief that meaning is always changing and it is closely related to style (or manner) follows Merleau-Ponty's (1973b) phenomenology presented in 2.1.

Furthermore, what sounds like a paradox is Noë's (2012, p.20) elaboration that "To perceive something, you must understand it and to understand it you must, in a way, already know it, you must have already made its acquaintance." What his statement implies is not only the idea that we need understanding to perceive, but that we do not really perceive real novelty. According to Noë (2012, p.32) novel experiences do not exist ("there are no new experiences") because the experiencing involves understanding which means that what is lived in the present moment, has already been experienced as sensorimotor by the body. A direct implication of this on cognition is that the body already knows what the thoughts are. Thus, in Noë's account, thinking results from the sensorimotor experience of the environment. As Noë (2006) exemplifies, meaning in language is given not only by linguistic understanding and relevant cultural and contextual knowledge, but also by sensorimotor knowledge (sensory effects of movement), in this case auditory and visual sensorimotor skills because we can *hear* language or *see* it. Yet, when hearing an unknown language, it is almost impossible to distinguish and hear individual words because of the lack of familiarity. The language example supports the idea that genuinely novel experiences are almost impossible if there is no sensorimotor *coupling* with the environment that leads to perception.

To sum up, Noë's enactivism highlights the ever-changing nature of meaning and assigns the body the primary role in meaning creation. He succeeds in explaining how the

information in the world can be directly accessed through sensorimotor knowledge, without the need to be stored and accessed as representations; an argument which helps in understanding how conscious awareness is an important factor in novel metaphors. Noë's argument for the sensorimotor knowledge alongside other types of knowledge serves the current thesis of metaphor in the manner that a consideration of metaphor is something else than featured in the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999). Consequently, metaphor can be seen as not only as an active mode of investigation ingrained in the relationship between a person and their environment, as opposed to a structure such as A is B, but also as a dynamic process that occurs in a context (which includes the environment) and allows us to experience newness and bring the unfixed, dynamic and changing environmental properties to something more stable. While Noë successfully theorizes consciousness as being what we do, a dynamic and active process, he only points out that feelings are an expression of consciousness. However, considering the expressive power of metaphors and the fact that emotions are part of a meaningful environment, an analysis of feelings is provided in the Chapter 4, below. Before we can do this, we need to look at how creative metaphors rely on action which fades away in more conventional metaphors.

3.6 Patterns of action in conventional metaphors and radical enactivism

A more radical view of representations within the enactivist framework than the one presented above is given by Hutto and Myin (2013, p.11), who abandon the notion of "content" and "knowledge" in favour of "strong embodiment". This is the idea that perception is constituted by and must be understood solely in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity. To explain more lexicalized instances of language whose meaning is often classified in dictionaries, Hutto's account seems to offer a better alternative. Hutto (2008, p.80) explains that when we are not actively enacting, we rely

on perceptual re-enactments operating in *off-line mode*, which are images (in different modalities such as smells, sounds, etc.) rather than actions, but with the same sensorimotor nature as perceptual enactments. Undoubtedly, conventional metaphors ranging from idioms such as *raining cats and dogs* to metaphors used in specific contexts such as *a weak heart*, *a battle against cancer*, *brands fight to get attention*, *customer journey*, have become perceptual habits which give us a world, but one which we are part of without being aware of our perception. Such metaphors are mechanical because they no longer require an interpretative process. Additionally, just as with any other conventional uses of language, they remain patterns of action which form our basic cognition in Hutto and Myin's view. Yet, some common metaphors such as *Music is sweet* and *the sweet life of the South* could become sensorimotor interaction with the environment if we chose to explore denotations of the word sweet, such as the modality of taste to possibly include even aromas. On the contrary, such metaphors can be limited to considering the sweet taste only from existing memories, mainly provided by embodiment.

As a radical enactivist for whom linguistic cognition is full of content, Hutto makes clear that he considers words to be stimuli and that the linguistic symbols that create thought are public items such as words, rather than stored in the mind. Hearing the word table might trigger images of a table, rather than being the label for a concept. Similarly, *sweet* in the metaphors above might prompt images of a sweet taste intensity of food. Words, as signs, allow us to organize our experience of the world. Moreover, hearing a word activates a network of memories (Thibault, 2011) which are sensorimotor in nature. Information stored as memories form our conceptual abilities, but these, as Kravchenko (2007) points out, are connotational rather than denotational in nature and such a reason supports the hypothesis that settled meaning is directly retrieved from memory.

Hutto's division between *on-line cognition* when we perceive and react to an existing external object, creating an action or a sensorimotor interaction with the environment and *off-line cognition* when remembering an object, helps clarify how meaning is created from perception within the broad enactivist framework. Hutto and Myin (2013, p.62) claim that basic cognition cannot be explained through representations which give the content ('the language of thought'), but rather basic cognition is given by patterns of action. Moreover, they point out (2013, p.65) that if informational content, supplied by the senses (as different from the representational content), is not to be found in the world, it cannot be used as information for cognitive processes. Such a remark raises several issues with the accounts of metaphor which rely on prepositional content such as Relevance Theory and the accounts which rely on embodied concepts such as Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory. Each of these needs to incorporate mental processes which are created as hypothetical situations and mental images with no direct correspondences or representations in the real world. Hutto's (2008, p.80) clarification that images do not represent objects, mainly because they do not have a referent, seems to help explain why in creative metaphors the interpretative mode is similar to an experience which helps give the metaphor's meaning. For Hutto, images are off-line modes of thought without the appropriate compositional structure to account for associative and analogical thinking, which they can only sponsor, not support (Hutto, 2008, p.83). For example, imagining a table involves a re-enactment of the embodied experience of seeing a table and this is a process of active engagement with an imagined table (Myin and Zahidi, 2012). Similarly, imagining a "hyena in syrup" (Yevtushenko, 1987, p.2) remains a dynamic process that results from sensorimotor re-enactments, being more about sensations rather than logic. Thus, according to Hutto, having an experience encompasses an act of imagining. In general, enactivists see imagination as an intentional mode used to direct consciousness to non-existent objects and situations, which

frequently happens in highly creative metaphors where interpretation relies on the creation of a world of fantasy or other situations or possibilities which are then further assessed for suitability. But, for enactivists, particularly 'radical' enactivists, emotions are noncognitive. Notwithstanding this, enactivists present emotions as embodied, even though many still make recourse to emotions being representational in nature (Prinz, 2005).

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has challenged the notion of embodiment upon which studies of metaphor rely as being a simulation of bodily experiences which become long-term memory traces or representations. The chapter has argued, instead, for a view of embodiment as a dynamic interaction and experience because these two characteristics facilitate an understanding of how the meaning in metaphors is enacted or engaged. New metaphors create novel environments which are the basis of a new awareness or a new construct. Certainly, considering metaphor as the result of experiencing the world, as in enactivism, helps understand why many novel metaphors do not have a determinate meaning, but instead are open to exploration and interpretation. Although the enactivist account clearly explains the sensorimotor coupling as the interaction with the outside world and the dynamic relationship between perception and action which greatly helps to understand meaning making in metaphor as a type of behaviour, the sensorimotor accounts have little to say about the affective states in embodied perception, given that emotions would involve an engagement with the environment too based on the internal states of an interpreter. Noë's argument that perception is for action supports the dynamicity characteristic of embodiment, but it remains a simplistic account because it does not consider perception to also be aesthetic and affective; something which happens in novel metaphors where we often process the surprise of what the percept helps create.

Because enactivism has had less to say about the role of affect and how we perceive emotions as bodily expressions, the next chapter (Chapter 4) explores how emotions create meaning using Damasio's influential account of affectivity and its role into cognition and consciousness. His account explains how consciousness emerges from emotions and feelings and it strengthens the argument of this thesis that comprehension in novel metaphors can often be instantiated by the occurrence of a feeling, rather than logical thinking.

CHAPTER 4: AFFECT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses recent theories on the nature of emotions in order to explain how, through aesthetic experiencing, the meaning in many novel metaphors can become a conscious process. The importance of this discussion stems from the claim made by cognitive linguists that metaphors are particularly well suited for expressing emotions (Lakoff, 1987a; Kövecses, 2000) but which has remained unexplained. Because emotion is a factor in comprehension of metaphor, the discussion focusses on Damasio's understanding of consciousness, his division between feelings and emotions and their relation and significance for the meaning of novel metaphors. His account contributes to understanding why being conscious is not the same as sensing and how feelings open the way to consciousness.

Commencing with an introduction to the relationship between language and emotion in theoretical debates, the current chapter discusses the idea that language comprehension is given by cerebrally stimulating experience and that meaning is naturally affective. Section 4.3 introduces the difference between modal/embodied and amodal accounts of cognition because feelings, emotions and sensorimotor elements can only be explained with reference to a modal view of cognition. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explore Damasio's (2000, 2021) distinction between emotions and feelings and explain how they become consciousness and why all the three notions are important in interpretation of metaphor. Lastly, section 4.6 stresses the view of emotion as a key component in interpretation. Where Chapter 3 discusses the strong influence of body memory in the process of meaning, the conscious and unconscious decisions including rational and emotional sense making and provided clarity on the notions of embodied and enactive, Chapter 4 offers a detailed explanation of emotions. It considers how we create knowledge from feelings, since in many highly original metaphors there is almost no possibility for a logical analytical

correspondence between the metaphorical elements, but the knowledge being given by processing emotions.

4.2 Emotions as a source of meaning

Language, cognition and emotion can no longer be discussed as separate processes following the growing interest in enactivism (see Chapter 3, above) and the long-acknowledged relationship between language and cognition (Casasanto, 2008; Damasio, 1994; Gibbs, 2018; Kövecses, 2015). Theorising about the relationship between language and emotions is still in its early stages, but the growing number of studies point to the important role of feelings in rational decisions (Damasio, 1999, 2021; Lindquist et al., 2015; Hutto, 2006). Hutto (2006, p.14) rightly points out that, from a philosophical perspective, emotions used to be considered a nuisance because they do not only relate to feelings and sensations, phenomena which have been acknowledged but surprisingly not theoretically explained, but they were believed to *interfere* with rationality and constitute part of the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 1995). Furthermore, mainly because the sphere of the emotional was long seen as the opposite of the rational (Reddy, 1979), most of the research in linguistics has focused on the intellectual aspect of language and most accounts of metaphor, whilst acknowledging the emotional nature of metaphors, find it difficult to overcome their strong attachment to a linguistic/cognitive basis.

Further, even if the embodiment aspect of cognition highlighted by cognitivists in the 1980s stressed that metaphor is particularly well suited for expressing emotions, cognitive metaphor theories still consider emotions to be part of conceptual information (Lakoff, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988; Kövecses, 2000). For example, Kövecses (2000) highlights the relationship between metaphor and language in respect of emotion but keeps his account in line with the standard cognitive linguistic locus of metaphorical meaning. When someone is

white when fearful, *red when angry*, *exploding with anger*, *bursting with joy*, it is thought that the feelings are of a conceptual nature and belonging to the conceptual domains of a more basic mental structure of association. Even a novel metaphor such as *A blue flame shot out of his eyes* is presented as the result of the conventional mapping ANGER IS HEAT (Barnden, 2015). Thus, although cognitive linguists indicate how common emotion metaphors are, their theoretical model, relying on transfer, does not allow them to integrate emotions in relation to the intellect into metaphorical meaning. Instead, they refer to emotions as part of conceptual meaning and, by doing so, they ignore the possibility of emotional learning and awareness when interpreting metaphors.

An extensive recent study on the predictors of "metaphor goodness" or the pleasure-evoking characteristics of metaphors was conducted by Jacobs and Kinder (2017) who indicate that the more ambiguous a metaphor is, the more apt it is perceived as. For example, literary metaphors such as Shakespeare's *the sun is the eye of heaven* are considered beautiful because the interpretation is vague and with several possibilities. Additionally, word concreteness in the vehicle was a predictor for metaphorical meaning. However, the study used only the A is B format, where the vehicle B should provide new information about A. In general, A is B metaphors are more likely to be considered as the transfer of information between two ideas, without the need to explain their emotional valence.

However, despite the conceptualist classification, many other researchers (William James, 1884; Damasio, 2003; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Zinck and Newen, 2008) stress the non-cognitive character of emotion, following the belief that the basis of emotions is physical and dissociated from aspects of general cognition. Such a perspective is offered by Damasio (1994, 2021), discussed at length in section 4.4 below, who, despite maintaining that there is a conceptual element of emotions, offers a satisfactory explanation of how emotional processing can affect reasoning and the role of body in the act of feelings. This is

largely unexamined in studies of metaphor, despite its immensurable importance for discussing novel meanings. Other researchers, such as enactivists Gallagher (2008, p.536) and Hutto (2011), discussed in Chapter 3, above, remain non-representationalist and maintain that emotions are of a perceptual nature rather than inferential. According to Gallagher (2016, p.123), meaning results from perception and it is to be found in the gesture or enactment. For example, we can perceive when somebody is sad or angry because we directly perceive their body gestures, without making inferences. Additionally, Hutto's radical enactivism stands out as distinguishing very clearly between basic visceral responding in the form of contentless intentionality directed at the environment (biosemiotics) and linguistically-mediated thought which bears content and propositional attitudes. In Hutto's (2013, p.63) terms, *content* refers to mental states that are directed at possible states of affairs. Contentless intentionality refers to the beliefs or intentional attitudes that are pure in the sense that they do not enter into standard analytical reasoning and thus are open to revision by rational means.

In short, the relationship between emotions and language has only recently been included in accounts of meaning. Furthermore, whereas many efforts have been put into defining emotions and integrating them into accounts of language and cognition, relatively little has been written about the actual role of emotions in interpretation. The next section (4.3) discusses the embodied and disembodied views of mind and reveals that neither include the nature and function of emotions in human comprehension. The discussion is important to understand novel metaphors because the definition of metaphor as "a conceptual mapping across two different experiential domains" (Johnson, 2015) rely on the belief that metaphor is the way we understand abstract concepts (target domain) through a source domain which is experiential and includes bodily perception, feelings and other structures involved in perception.

4.3 Linguistic meaning in the embodied and disembodied views

Even if the majority of recent theories of cognition and meaning embrace an embodied (modal) perspective, entailing that linguistic meaning is created via the sensorimotor and emotional systems (Bergen, 2012, p.10), they still struggle to clearly explain the role of emotions in new meaning creation. This also means they cannot account for the intensity that emerges from many metaphors because the mapping frame is too rigid to allow an active process of meaning as changing and evolving in relation to how we perceive the world, a view which is discussed in Chapter 3, above. Even the "strong embodiment" proposed by Gallese and Lakoff (2005), where abstract concepts are believed to derive from sensorimotor experiences following the Merleau-Pontian (1968) view of the body as a medium for experiencing the world, theories relying on conceptual mapping are still deficient. They seem to avoid explaining the kind of aesthetic embodied meaning making that can include humour, sadness and other feelings that are included in many interpretations of metaphor. Even in a relatively simple metaphor such as *feeling crushed*, the affect can become conscious and rational and the interpretation can become motivated by feelings, increasing its impact.

Perhaps emotions are still an issue for the embodied accounts because these accounts were initially a reaction to the mind-as-a-computer paradigm, considered to be a disembodied or amodal perspective because it relies on the notion of computation in mental and non-mental explanations (see Johnson, 2015). The disembodied view follows the computational theory of mind or Fodor's 'language of thought' (Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 2005; see also Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory, 1995) and treats affective phenomena as peripheral to and disruptive of, cognition.

Further, amodal accounts assume that lexical items encode different conceptual representations and in general they treat emotions as non-propositional effects of communicating attitudes and feelings. Under the amodal view, the input to reasoning is

sensory-perceptual representation (auditory, visual) and the output is also a representation, a notion which many current theories of cognition still rely on (Chapter 3, above and Chapter 5, below, offer details on how representations are defined in the enactivist and conceptualist accounts). The notion of intellectual representation, which John Searle (1983, p.11) describes as the most "abused term in the history of philosophy", in many theories of metaphor reveals that even current discussions of metaphors still share some beliefs in an absolute truth, an idea which is discussed at length in section 1.3.3 (Derrida) of Chapter 1, above and Chapter 5, below.

Not only can we describe many of our emotions with words (Majid, 2012), but many words (mother, murder) have emotional connotations and others directly express feelings and emotions, as for example: *a crippling heartache, having a heavy heart, a jolly person.* Additionally, diminutives, interjections (wow), intensifiers (terribly), euphemisms, constructions with expressive meaning such as *How nice/lovely* and a *bear of a man* express emotion. How we perceive (how we perceive anger in another person), and express emotions is thought to be possible because our conceptual system relies more intrinsically on embodied or sensorimotor representations (Barsalou et al., 2003). Such instances of emotional meaning have been mainly considered under the view that language helps constitute emotion and can even alter it (Lindquist et al., 2012). Yet, such a theoretical understanding is conceptualist and representationalist, since emotions are concepts (anger, disgust, fear) whose content results from 'simulations' of sensory experiences (Barsalou et al., 2003).

In line with the criticism by Varela et al. (1991) of disembodied concepts (mind) and considering the mind/body strong relationship, Johnson (1987, 2007) suggests that image schemata (e.g. *container, path, force* which are recurring patterns of perception) and cognitive metaphors (cognitive structures based on mapping) are in fact imaginative structures that allow the thought to arise directly from bodily experience. Thus, for Johnson

schemata are embodied patterns and active structures of organised experience such as bodily movements and perceptual experience which act as the source domain in primary metaphors (HAPPY IS UP). Additionally, Johnson treats metaphors as the main cognitive structures that bring information together from different domains such as body, society and mind which are in fact derived from one another. Barile (2016, p.74) believes that Johnson's structures of image schemata and Damasio's dispositions at a neural level (explained in section 4.4) have the same functional importance because neither are stored as knowledge, but they can both reconstruct knowledge by activating other mental processes. While the image schemas are pre-conceptual recurrent patterns (but not images in meaning construction), Damasio's dispositions are the result of the representations in image format or reconstructed knowledge.

However, even though the modal theories maintain a conceptual core to meaning, they consider emotions to be part of the conceptual information and demonstrate the activation of sensory and motor systems (Zwaan et al., 2002; Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2006b). Embodied concepts may remain highly debatable because the meaning they contain is still fixed and pre-existent, but they offer a viable alternative to fixed conceptual meaning because they comprise an abstract representation of the concept in relation to sensorimotor information associated with that concept. Embodied schemas as source domain, as Johnson presented them, are important in the process of the creation of novel metaphors because the source domains from bodily experiences help shape and structure abstract target domains. Although Johnson (1987, p.46) points out that "pre-conceptual gestalts" lead to image schemas which in turn are embodied building blocks to the creation of meaning, there is little to no connection between the creation of new metaphors and image schemas as source domains. Furthermore, Johnson (1987, p.169) believes that "creativity is possible, in part, because imagination gives us image-schematic structures and metaphoric and metonymic patterns by which we can extend and elaborate those schemata". Thus, it is clear from

Johnson's account that novelty is part of the creation of metaphor, but he chooses to focus on conceptual metaphors as ways to understanding new meaning. Before analysing the creative power of metaphor, it is important to explain emotions. Their important role in reasoning and the meaning construction process is highlighted in the next section.

4.4 Defining emotions

Damasio brings a noteworthy account of emotions which is applicable to the affective and aesthetic dimension of metaphor because he manages to integrate affectivity (feeling and emotion) into cognition and consciousness. As noted by Goatly (2007, p.113), Damasio's account is important for studies of metaphor because he presents emotions and thought as deriving from and reflecting bodily movement or changes, supporting in this way the cognitivist claim that cognition derives metaphor from embodiment. Damasio's arguments follow the belief that "the feeling is about the body" (1995, p.173) and "minds and brains can be both servants and masters of their bodies" (1995, p.254), meaning that what the body feels is not dissoluble from what the mind thinks, which is in total opposition to the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. To explain the role of emotions in thinking, Damasio distinguishes between *emotions* (disgust, fear, anger, admiration, pride, sadness, calm, tension) and *feelings of emotions* (fear, anxiety, sadness), building directly on William James' account (1884) of emotions as physiological changes used by the brain to create emotional experience. Hence, it is an account of how our bodies affect our feelings.

According to Damasio, *emotions* are physical bodily responses to external stimuli or internal conditions which can vary from facial expressions, change in heartrate, smooth muscle contractions to postures (2010, p.88; 1994, p.139). For example, seeing an angry dog triggers an interior mental representation (mental image – the notion is detailed in Chapter 5, below) and the result is the body's response to the mental image which may manifest through

bodily changes such as in colouring of the skin, body posture and facial expressions. In Damasio's terminology (2021, p.70), representing objects in the world often refers to how the nervous system, which is inside the body, uses sensory processes such as vision and hearing, to represent or map the external world. Yet, Damasio remains equivocal in his use of the term *representation*. What is certain is that he considers the representation of the body to be in an image format and correlated to neurons (neural representations) which are not the mental representations that are posited in the linguistic and philosophical tradition.

Additionally, Damasio (2003) argues that emotions are set off by an emotionally competent stimulus such as taste or smell. The emotionally competent stimulus can be, in the case of metaphors, the disparity of the ideas or what accounts for concepts used in conveying the meaning of metaphor. To exemplify, just like the smell of food one dislikes can trigger an emotion response of disgust, a metaphor can create emotions mainly by the surprise it arouses. A conventional metaphor such as *The idea stinks* is also often accompanied by a feeling of disgust manifested in facial expressions of the speaker and possibly of the hearer too. In more creative examples, the unexpected aspect of metaphor contrasts with a habitual shared property of words and expression in general. The feeling of surprise that results from being presented with the similarity between different subjects is often expressed in bodily manifestations (Kövecses, 2002; Müller, 2008b). Furthermore, surprise can be neutral or moderate, pleasant or unpleasant or even positive and negative. The following metaphor "Loneliness becomes an acid that eats away at you" (Murakami, 2010, p.616), particularly when encountered for the first time, may cause emotions of sadness, fear and isolation. These emotional responses, following Damasio's account, are movements and actions of the body which occur in the face, voice and other nonverbal behaviour, some of which are visible to others.

Damasio goes on to describe feelings as mental images (discussed at length in Chapter 5, below), conceptualised perceptions of emotions, mental experiences of emotions, mapped in the brain, that accompany bodily states. It is possible to *feel an emotion* because we perceive what happens in our body and mind (2010, p.88) but feelings remain hidden for others. Because feelings are linked with both physical and tactile experiences, there is an innate body intelligence which has a role in creating meaning while the body becomes represented by the mind, making possible the interaction of emotions with perceptions, or as Damasio (2003, p.32) claims, "the mind has to be first about the body, or it could not have been". A direct implication of the feelings as the brain's interpretations of internal stimuli on an account of metaphor is that firstly, the meaning of the metaphor is not derived directly from a mental point or pointer or a concept and, secondly, the first basis of the meaning is a lived experience in the form of bodily movement or action. Also, one of Damasio's important characteristics of emotions for an account of metaphors is their conscious element where feelings, as private experiences of bodily states, involve our awareness of the emotion (2003, p.85), one of the main traits of creative metaphors and without which comprehension might be impossible since emotions help understanding despite their complexity.

Damasio's account of feelings is similar to the cognitivists' idea of embodied concepts (resulting from the body and represented as neural connections), since for Damasio perception in general is mental and consequently, feelings are just as cerebral as other perceptions. In his view, emotions are interactive perceptions (Damasio, 2021, p.59) because they result from actions that happen within the body and their consequences. An emotional response, such as joy (*happy as a clam at high tide, I was tickled pink to see her*), or fear (*my blood runs cold)* can lead to further changes which are neither purely cerebral nor purely bodily and represent the mood. Many metaphors harbour the ability to contribute to our mood and this can be explained with reference to Damasio's point that new sets of feelings and

affective states (moods) are created from the brain-body relation. However, what still requires further clarification in both accounts is the idea that thoughts precede emotions, which seems to be a fallacy when addressing the embodied nature of thoughts, since embodiment means that concepts are formed as a result of interaction with elements from the environment, similar to perceptual experiences. The idea that bodily sensations or actions are involved in reaching meaning shares similarities with the embodied concepts of the traditional cognitive linguists, where the meaning of a metaphor is derived from concepts which are embodied or the result of body movements. While Damasio's theory can explain an active and ongoing process of perceiving body sensations, the cognitive linguistic mapping frame cannot support such a process.

Goatly (2007) suggests that Damasio's theory of emotions supports the cognitivist idea that 'emotion is movement'. As discussed in Chapter 3, above, for researchers who follow Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), metaphors are associations of embodied concepts. In such a view, emotions are also grounded in bodily experiences. Yet, Goatly (2007) and Kövecses (2000) use Damasio's account of emotions-as-physiological to strengthen their embodied view of metaphors and account for the emotional load of metaphors as bodily reactions. This is a much-needed improvement for any theory of metaphor, since the emotional load of meaning and meaning of a metaphor in particular can no longer be side-stepped or only casually included in embodied concepts, as conceptual metaphor theories often assume. Conceptual metaphor theories focus on conceptual combinations, maintaining them in the realm of cognition rather than emotion. Furthermore, cognitive accounts of metaphor rely on embodiment to create representations, but they still do not treat emotions as acts of experiencing. Additionally, current computational models of metaphor (the A is like B style metaphor such as presented by Relevance Theory) seem to be obsolete in their failure to address what it means for a metaphor to elicit an emotion. This is

especially the case considering that by conception, metaphors allow transmission of feelings

and ideas that might otherwise be difficult to express through their literal counterparts. The

following section describes the process of the creation of feelings from an imagined

experience; much needed when associating the elements of metaphors which often make

recourse to hypothetical situations until a satisfying meaning is arrived at.

4.4.1 Imaginary states and feelings

Another important claim that Damasio (2003, p.117) makes and which particularly pertains to

those metaphors characterised by ingenuity is that feelings can also result from imaginary

states. More specifically, as also pointed out by Goatly (2007, p.229), Damasio (2003, p.117)

notes that feelings are not necessarily the perceptions of bodily movements in the real world,

but also of imaginary states. This is an important point for accounts of metaphor because

hypothetical thinking seems to be part of how unusual metaphors are often understood.

Originality of metaphors might be given by bringing under scrutiny already existent

associations which were not thought of before; but the process rarely, or perhaps never,

happens in a real-world environment.

Notably, imaginary experiences and states can often be communicated through the use

of metaphors and are particularly seen in poetic and literary works. An example of an

imaginary world created with the help of metaphors is the following excerpt by Heller (2008)

which has been used (Carston, 2010) to point to the vivid imagery to which the metaphors

seem to give rise:

> Depression, in Karla's experience, was a dull, inert thing—a toad that squatted wetly on
> your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. The unhappiness she had
> been living with for the last ten days was a quite different creature. It was frantic and
> aggressive. It had fists and fangs and hobnailed boots (Heller, 2008, p.263).

This is a straightforward example of the ability of metaphors to create an imaginary world which will then contribute to the comprehension of metaphor by integrating the accompanying feelings. The reader would have to imagine a world of repulsive amphibious creatures with different kinds of characteristics (some sitting inertly on human heads, some kicking and biting) where feelings such as disgust and surprise might become the starting point for the interpretation of the metaphor. Following Damasio's account, the imaginary world in Heller's passage becomes a group of various images which all have the body as the intentional point of reference. Moreover, the affective states become conscious if we consider Damasio's (2010, p.216) relationality between consciousness and engagement, as in the following statement "the self comes to mind in the form of images, relentlessly telling a story of such engagements."

Other research supports the idea that imagination and hypothetical thinking relies on scrutinizing consequences and mentally simulating possibilities (Evans, 2007; Evans et al., 2015; Stanovich, 2011; Barsalou, 2008a). Thinking hypothetically involves "creating temporary modes of the word and test[ing] out actions (or alternative causes) in that simulated world" (Stanovich and Toplak, 2012, p.9). Additionally, Stanovich (2011) suggests that language is a tool that can help in decoupling secondary representations, that lead to pretend or simulation, from the world, or in other words the ability to create a hypothetical state because linguistic forms such as conditionals represent assumptions and hypothetical thought. Similarly, Pistol (2018) points out the importance of hypothetical thought in metaphors (see also Peirce's *abduction* in Chapter 7, below). Imagining a person with some natural characteristics of non-human animals in insulting metaphors such as *he is a snake /pig / cold fish* and so forth can trigger fear or disgust. In such instances, Damasio (1999) explains that the brain reads such bodily changes as emotions and the process is one involving imaginative representations of external stimuli. Thus, to imagine a person eating in a messy

way and associating it with how pigs eat is likely to conjure up perceptual images and involuntary emotional reactions amounting to physical changes such as facial expressions of disgust.

Moreover, hypothetical states can be associated with the creative force that characterises poetic metaphors. Following Damasio's claim that even imaginary bodily experiences are the foundation of thinking, the following novel metaphor by Frost (1916) can be analysed as an example of experiential hypothesis, an internal stream of feelings, or perceptions of imaginary emotions: "Two roads diverged in a wood and I— / I took the one less travelled by, / And that has made all the difference". Since Frost communicates feelings rather than a literal sense of deviating paths, this is an example of a metaphor which needs to be experienced, rather than finding commonalities between A and B. Comprehension in this instance cannot be limited by parameters such as embodied conceptual structures, since it is hard to refer to the target, following a cognitivist structure for metaphor of source-target, in the conceptualisation of life as a journey. Unusual metaphors modify imagination as Coleridge (1986, p.304) aptly puts it when he points out the poetic function of imagination which "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate". Furthermore, as emphasized by Punter (2007, p.13, p.40), metaphor stands out as a relatively easy medium to transmit emotions or moods and "come to grip with the issue in hand" which is obvious in highly evocative metaphors where there is no straightforward meaning or sense of the words involved, such as John Keats' metaphor from the poem Endymion (1873): "A thing of beauty is a joy forever", where a thing of beauty can refer to almost everything from one's own experience and imagination. Additionally, similar effects are given by the two significant metaphors from the film *Never Ending Story* (1984) - the fantasy, which is a metaphor for human thoughts and imagination and the clouds which represent the dark force, linked to ignorance or lack of imagination. In such cases, comprehension is reached through emotional

understanding, as opposed to logical and lexical understanding which are promoted by conceptual linguists as the main mode of comprehension metaphors. After all, as Xenophon (400BC) in *The Art of Horsemanship* suggests, "anything forced or misunderstood is not beautiful" and a struggle to find precise analogies between two ideas might take away the magic of metaphor that comes from the imaginative process and which let us explore ideas that lie behind our rational thought and can touch our hearts, or in Damasio's terms, have a conscious awareness of the feeling, detailed in the next section, 4.5.

Damasio offers a clear explanation of emotions which is used in further chapters to discuss the novelty in metaphors and show how novelty is the main cause of the pleasure and surprise included in the interpretative process. It is surprising that detailed accounts of cognition such as that of the enactivists (Hutto, 2008; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Noë, 2004; Prinz, 2005), despite relying on the consequences of emotions, hardly commit themselves to defining and analysing emotions. This is probably because the enactivist perspective builds on phenomenology. In enactivist discussions, emotions are considered gut reactions created by the body to let us know how we are performing in the environment (Prinz, 2005, p.69) or simple environmentally situated organismic activity (Hutto, 2013). Yet, regardless of the enactivists' specifications of emotions, they embrace an understanding of emotion as having intentional directness which implies that the imaginative acts that are involved in processing novelty are intentional acts of engagement, perceiving and acting the meaning.

To sum up, Damasio acknowledges the relationship between bodily changes and feelings. He also stresses the emotional imaginative aspect of reasoning which seems to be indispensable when considering the novelty of metaphors. Creativity in metaphors is often associated with creating experiences and Damasio's account of emotions provides a useful alternative to the rigid framework of embodied cognition. Before examining creativity in details, we should examine Damasio's account of consciousness in the next section, which

explains the relationship between mind and body when producing affective meaning, or the abstract and the subjective result of the role of the metaphor.

4.5 Damasio's account of consciousness in the interpretation of metaphor

The originality and uniqueness that is characteristic to many metaphors which encompass very powerful messages is closely related to their emotional bearing and we inevitably resort to emotions and feelings when trying to comprehend metaphors such as *a touch is a chill*, *her lips are like a volcano*, *she's my buttercup* (Elvis Presley's 'All shook up'). Often, we can choose to mindfully observe or focus on the physical sensations in the body that such metaphors can give rise to, becoming in this way conscious of our moods and feelings. According to Damasio (1999), the affective meaning and the stage of becoming aware of the changes in our bodies as a result of emotions is a stage of consciousness. He sees consciousness not as a local brain property, but as experience or feelings as the result of natural evolution. For Damasio, images (or representations of emotions in the brain which help make the world comprehensible; they can be integrated into knowledge by creating patterns and committing them to memory) are the *content* of consciousness and because we explore these mental images, we have a subjective experience. We become aware of mental images when sense representations are connected to body representations. I return to this topic in Chapter 5 Section 5.5, below, where I explore the relationship between emotional responses and mental images.

Damasio (1999, 2018, 2021) not only establishes the role of the body in the mental phenomenon as discussed in the previous section, but he also offers a definition of consciousness as a particular state of mind - the affective experience and its subjectivity that explains how perception interacts with emotions. His account helps in understanding how we can obtain meaning from metaphors with great emotional content such as the above, or

kingdom of God, or even more scientific metaphors such as *the tree of life* as a metaphor for evolution over time (developed by Charles Darwin in his postulation that life evolved from ancient species that diverged over time like tree branches from a trunk). It can be assumed that the only way to interpret the meaning in such cases of metaphors with strong and sensitive messages is by *feeling the feeling*, which is how Damasio refers to consciousness. The range of feelings that surrounds metaphors vary greatly from happiness in metaphors such as *happy as a clam*, *be on cloud nine*, to sadness in *gone west*, *fled* (Shakespeare's No Longer Mourn for Me, Sonnet 71) and some humorous undertones which can be found in "taking a dirt nap", "started a warm farm" (e e cummings, 1994, *Nobody loses all the time*).

Considering Damasio's account (detailed in 4.3), pleasure and pain, love and desire, hate, are all varieties of conscious experiences because they are stimuli that create reactions by making us mentally experience the feelings and by choosing to represent the body ("consciousness is rooted in the representation of the body", Damasio, 1999, p.37). They form a self-image which becomes our consciousness. For Damasio (2021, p.62) "*all* feelings are conscious" and their power comes "from the fact that they are present in the conscious mind" (Damasio, 2021, p.83). Feelings such as joy and sorrow bring some sort of knowledge that the brain will perceive and process after it registers physical changes in the body because "feeling provides us with knowledge of life in the body … and makes that knowledge conscious" (Damasio, 2021, p.29). Yet, as Damasio clarifies, sensing alone is not by definition conscious except when the senses become imagistic patterns in the mind which undertake a process of logical manipulation.

Such an imagistic process is likely to be explored in the interpretation of starting a "warm farm" where the interpretation relies on processing emotion states that become accessible for external observation. By bringing together humorous notes and the sadness of a situation, the metaphor creates an effect which can lead to shivers on your back or muscle

movement in disgust as bodily responses. According to Damasio, such a process of being

conscious of a feeling is based on the organism detecting that its representation of its own

(body) state has been changed by the occurrence of a certain object (a metaphor for example).

The conscious process becomes the result of both homeostatic feelings (hunger, thirst, desire,

pleasure) and also emotive reactions or emotional feelings (fears, joys). Perhaps that explains,

in short, why the interpretation of metaphor is not the same for every interpreter and the

interpretation results from subjective experiences. As Damasio (2021, p.117) clarifies,

consciousness "is a gathering of knowledge sufficient to generate, in the midst of flowing

images, automatically, the notion that the images are *mine*, are happening in my living

organism and that the mind is …well, *mine* too". How we process the images becomes a

subjective experience because the information comes from our background and internal

narratives based on cultural beliefs and embodied experiences. As Damasio observes, "we are

puppets of both pain and pleasure, occasionally made free by our creativity" (2021, p.89)

because we can create a virtual scenario, which is mostly what we do in unusual, extended

and literary metaphor. Imagining encounters, situations or places when interpreting

metaphors often triggers fear, pain, suffering, well-being and pleasure responses. These are,

in fact, mental experiences that we can choose to explore and be conscious of and thus create

meaning through neural representations, body and self, as described by Damasio.

An important characteristic that Damasio (1999, p.10) assigns to consciousness

alongside self-awareness (becoming aware of own body and sensing of the body states) is the

"the feeling of knowing" or "a specific kind of wordless knowledge" which results from the

brain forming representations of not only observed objects, but also representations of the

body in the process of observing. He details the idea of self-observing in *The Strange Order

of Things* (2018) by claiming that we have the ability to inspect the images in the mind. This

takes place not in a Cartesian theatre where general knowledge results from contemplating

internal ideas of mind and matter, but by "simply sense or feel … a sort of YOU" (2018, p.144).

The relevant part of Damasio's conception of consciousness for theories of metaphor concern the point at which the sense of self starts manifesting in the act of knowing. Additionally, although knowing is a rational process for Damasio, it is also an important feature in the comprehension of figurative language. A rational process seems to support the type of everyday, conceptual metaphors, but more poetic metaphors remain open to interpretation because of their heavy cognitive load. Not having a clear meaning but at the same time having the goal to establish meaning creates the paradox which gives metaphors its special status and the attention that has been lavished on it. Language and imagination can both stimulate imaginative ability and can also have the freedom to remain incomplete, in the sense that a whole can exist without all its parts. As in mathematics, in some cases it is impossible to know the 'parts', yet still perfectly possible to find the 'whole'. Imagining is a form of ongoing exploration just as seeing according to time and circumstances, individuals can use their intention to examine details and/or create new ones, allowing for a process of experiencing mental imagery.

"The feeling of knowing" characterises many metaphors that have a heavy cognitive load, part of which is often an emotional response that we find in detailed representations of imagery. For example, in "The sun was a toddler insistently refusing to go to bed: It was past eight thirty and still light." (Green, 2012), understanding how the sun can exhibit the stubbornness of a toddler, gives a feeling of knowing without focusing on concrete information but with an observation or feeling of emotions such as stress, frustration, anxiousness, anger which often accompany bedtime problems and which would be considered as manifestations of the sense of self in Damasio's framework. Damasio makes it very clear that only the mental images or sensory representations which interact with

representations of the body and fire neurons for representing the body are the ones that become conscious. The next section strengthens this claim that the interpretation of new metaphors relies on the processing of emotions, especially given the fact that metaphors are specifically used to express ideas vividly precisely because they capture the vividness of experience.

4.6 New metaphors and emotions

Despite a growing recognition that emotions, alongside mental imagery (explained in Chapter 5, below) are a factor in the comprehension of metaphors (Gibbs and Colston, 2012; Pilkington, 2010; Kovecses, 2003), the theories of metaphor preserve the belief that metaphors express chunks of information either in a succinct manner or information that is difficult or impossible to express literally (Ortony et al., 1988). Among the reasons for maintaining this belief is, firstly, the association of subjective experience with emotional experience included in the embodied characteristic of concepts by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) who initially considered them insignificant in processing metaphor and, secondly, a poor definition of 'affect' or 'emotional feelings' which might be the reason why these concepts have been disregarded in many theoretical frameworks.

The use of metaphors to describe intense feelings and a vivid phenomenal experience has been emphasised in several studies (Ortony et al., 1988; Crawford, 2009; Cameron 2008). Ortony et al. (1988) points out that one of their participants in a study chose to use the metaphor *a storm was brewing inside* over *resentment* in order to convey a more rich, vivid and specific subjective experience. Similarly, Crawford (2009, p.130) notes that "Metaphors are used in discourse about any topic, but they appear to be especially frequent when the topic is emotional and their frequency increases with emotional intensity". What is important in this statement is that metaphors can be used to communicate emotional states, despite the

ample research which focuses on communication of meaning in the form of information and not affect. Moreover, Cameron (2008, p.13) argues that "affect is fundamental to why and how people use metaphor" and her research stands out because of her discourse dynamic approach to revealing that metaphors can indeed offer insights into emotions.

One of the issues of integrating emotions in defining metaphors results from the fact that the role of emotions in metaphors has often been discussed by differentiating between conventional metaphors and novel or creative metaphors (Ricoeur, 1977; Searle, 1983; Gibbs and Colston, 2012). Although novel metaphors have been considered special by many researchers, they remain a problem for many accounts of metaphor. For example, Black's remark (discussed in Chapter 1) that only novel metaphors need "no artificial respiration" (Black, 1993, p.25) refers directly to their emotional power to provoke something which is new. Novel metaphors are often argued to evoke aesthetic feelings and involve more cognitive effort primarily because of their vivid aspect and the necessity to understand the nuances of the meaning and the interpreters' emotional experience (Gibbs, 1994; Carston and Wearing, 2015) (see Chapter 6, below). Importantly, the increased cognitive effort is usually appreciated by readers who report an "emotional-aesthetic pleasure" (Christmann et al., 2011, p.206) which implies that novelty is important for pleasure.

Because cognitive linguists cannot detach themselves from meaning in the form of information and verifiable truth, as opposed to a full experience in the phenomenological sense, they see novel metaphors as aiming to provide a precise embodied description of the speaker's emotional state and intensity. The 'precision' becomes problematic in the conceptual accounts of metaphor, particularly when trying to account for the novelty of metaphors, when segmenting the metaphor into conceptual components is difficult to do or the metaphor is difficult to rationalize. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, such innovative and novel metaphors are explained as the result of mapping mental images, not

concepts (Lakoff, 1993, p.246). For instance, in Larkin's (2003) poem 'Toad' – "Why should I let the toad work / Squat on my life?" - work (the target domain) is identified as a toad (the source domain) but there is no direct precise shared elements unless further comparison and imaginative processes are created, such as work is unpleasant, boring or work is a trap. It can be argued that toad might not be a good metaphor because there is a big leap and there are not many similarities between toad and work, or even that 'toad' might already be a metaphor for something else before becoming one for work, making the interpretation of this metaphor a two-way process, as Cobley (2022) suggests.

Furthermore, Punter (2007, p.17) asserts that one of the misconceptions of metaphor is to 'unpack' it because once this is done, "what is left is rarely of value". He exemplifies this point by looking at the first three stanzas of George MacBeth's poem 'Owl' (1963), reproduced below:

> Owl
> is my favourite. Who flies
> like a nothing through the night,
> who-whoing. Is a feather
> duster in leafy corners ring-a-rosying
> boles of mice. Twice
>
> you hear him call. Who
> is he looking for? You hear
> him hoovering over the floor
> of the wood. O would you be gold
> rings in the driving skull
>
> if you could? Hooded and
> vulnerable by the winter suns
> owl looks. Is the grain of bark
> in the dark. Round beaks are at
> work in the pellety nest,

resting.

(MacBeth 1964 p.117)

Punter explains that owl, as a key metaphor in the poem, does not only bring something into being - or what he calls 'incarnation', a human's transformation into an owl - but it makes what is communicated harbour no resemblance in the real world. Yet, if the metaphor can be so unusual and have no literal truth, it might be possible that we experience the emotions that the metaphors develop, rather than understanding them. The abundance of other metaphors such as the owl as nothing, the comparison to a feather duster, driving skull, add to the development and experience of the key metaphor which cannot be referred to as having a stable meaning. It must also be highlighted the use of metaphoric verbs 'ring-a-rosying' and 'hoovering' which enact emotionally juxtaposed with a commonplace verbs such as 'flies, call and looks'. Subsequently, the poem might grip the emotions. However, Goldie (2002) integrates feeling in the grip of emotion in his characterisation of emotional experience which includes an intertwining between desire, imagination, remembering and how the world is presented. As Goldie exemplifies, when somebody falls on ice for the first time, despite already harbouring judgments about ice in the form of knowing about the risks and consequences, they also develop new feelings which result from their own act of experiencing and understanding.

Maybe the idea that emotion as a key factor in comprehension of metaphor is easier to recognize in one of Hirshfield's (2011) poems "As this life is not a gate, but the horse plunging through it". Emotions, together with vivid images here, are a powerful part of how we focus on the metaphor. It is very unlikely that any reader will not imagine a horse going through a gate here. Moreover, it is likely that they will believe that Hirshfield used the metaphor explicitly and viscerally for her readers to experience the emotions of the bounding aspect of life, rather than a fixed meaning.

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Yet, as discussed at length in the next section, with a focus on Damasio's account, one of the conditions for the arousal of emotions is the physiological response. As Goldie (2002, p.237) claims, many emotions such as fear, anger and disgust, involve bodily changes. What is important for understanding that makes metaphors unusual and original is Goldie's related claim that bodily changes or feelings when we experience emotions can tell things about the world beyond the surface of our body. Thus, feelings may come from the inside, but they also say something about external objects with determinate properties. To take Goldie's example, a feeling of cold might attract the judgment that the heating is off. Likewise, your hair standing upright when the skin contracts due to fear is likely to create the belief that something nearby is dangerous. These bodily feelings can be misleading as the feeling of cold might be the start of flu while feeling the hairs going up on the back of your neck might be caused by nervousness. Goldie (2002, p.239) also rightly points out that "we should pay attention to or 'listen to' our feelings", because it is a way for us to observe the details in the environment so as to identify the object in the emotion. For example, the feelings of sweaty palms caused by somebody else's presence already tells you that you find the person to be frightening, but you need to determine in what respect.

Therefore, metaphorical language can no longer be considered solely in terms of its cognitive knowledge or the transfer of information between concepts, because metaphors are characterised by emotional experience and many poetic and creative metaphors induce greater emotional intensity. The instances of metaphor where it is almost impossible for a meaning to be fixed reveal not only that those emotions are a factor in metaphor comprehension, but that the novelty of metaphors and their expressiveness might be conveyed by emotions alone.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided arguments to support the view of emotions as an important source of knowledge (Damasio, 1994) and the nature of emotions as bodily grounded in such a way that they contribute to many cognitive tasks including the construction of meaning. Additionally, it has introduced Damasio's approach to consciousness which has considerable potential for the study of novelty in metaphors because the bodily component of emotions, feelings and consciousness allow us to bridge the gap between a cerebral to a personal level of experience. Because feelings have a cognitive status, they can bridge the gap between our rational minds and our bodies and support the subjective experience in creative metaphors. The chapter has attempted to show how emotion is meaning and how the meaning arises from the interconnection of reasoning and sensorimotor inputs or feeling which result in mental imagery or mental visualisation (visual, auditory, kinetic) that represents a core step when bringing unlike elements together in order to make sense.

The next chapter deals with the role of this mental imagery and aligns sensory information with mental images to show how metaphoric interpretation includes mental imagery as a necessary source for the comprehension of new and creative meaning in novel metaphors, both verbal (such as Exxon's Mobil marketing message *put a tiger in your tank*) and pictorial (such as Surrealist art).

CHAPTER 5: MENTAL IMAGERY

5.1 Introduction

The central theme of Chapter 5 is that mental imagery, a highly disputed phrase, has a central role in reasoning and implicitly in the meaning of metaphors. Since several cognitive linguists (Johnson, 1987; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) assert with no exaggeration that a theory of meaning and rationality is in need of a comprehensive theory of imagination, this chapter does not only assess the role of mental imagery, but also establishes the nature of mental imagery equally as a quasi-perceptual experience and as an action-oriented process based on emotional states which are representational content of perceptual consciousness. This view supports the argument that metaphor is the very essence of representational information (also discussed in Chapter 7, below). A thorough discussion of mental imagery as representational content contributes to novelty because the evoked imagery is consciously experienced in some metaphors by being interpreted and hypothesised as part of the entire process of understanding, contributing to a metaphor being apt, memorable, or pleasing. The images evoked in new metaphors become a strong base in the comprehension process because to understand is to interpret and new creative metaphors would have no meaning without interpretation. In the current accounts of metaphor, mental imagery is either considered to be conceptual information (Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Lakoff, 1987), or "lingering of the literal" (Carston, 2010; Camp, 2008), but an ecological perspective of cognition together with defining images as emotions, as discussed in this chapter, emphasises the multi-modal nature of images (Damasio, 2018) and aims to allow sensations and other body actions an equal status with conceptual information. Defining imagery is also important for the discussion in the following chapter (Chapter 6) in explaining the expressiveness that metaphors create.

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 explore some of the representational theories with the aim to define imagery. Section 5.4 argues that perception and action are not separated because our inner states are not passive 'pictures' of an external world, but are, instead, plans of action for engaging with the environment. 5.4.1 offers details on why considering representations as a type of action supports the belief that a greater supremacy of imagery results in a metaphor being more metaphorical and why some metaphors are considered more metaphorical than others. 5.4.2 explains how an ecological perspective helps accommodate the evocative characteristic of metaphors. Finally, section 5.5 presents Damasio's (2018) definition of a "mental image" as awareness of our body current state, or a mental pattern built on sensory modalities, because this view explains how we become conscious of our states and how we process the more expressive metaphors in poetry and literature.

5.2 Pre-cognitive approaches to imagery

The term *mental imagery* (or 'seeing in the mind's eye') was introduced in the 19th century (Francis Galton, 1880; Wilhelm Wundt, 1912) to describe a mental phenomenon that can be identified by quasi-perceptual experience in thinking and speaking. However, the idea of the *image* emerged in the modern sense in the late 17th century (Eagleton, 2007, p.140) when mental images meant something to oppose the figurative language because the meaning of a word was seen as the mental image it arouses or a clear representation of things and consequently, mental images were the primary means of thought. Aristotle (De Anima 420b) connects mental imagery (*phantasmata/phantasia*) to perception and creativity, highlighting their importance in cognition (discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, above); a belief which represents the basis of the theoretical discussions about mental imagery (Schofield, 1978). As Eagleton (2007, p.140) points out, ironically, "imagery" and "figures of speech" have come to be used interchangeably in some later criticism such as the imagism movement in the 20th

century when poets such as Ezra Pound, T.E. Hulme and William Carlos Williams were interested in creating precise imagery with simple language and great focus.

Previously, the Romantic movement managed to bring *imagination* and *mental images* together by ensuring that "even the clearest perception of the world involves the creative imagination" as Eagleton (2007, p.140) remarks, because the Romantics (e.g. Keats, Coleridge, Wordsworth) consider imagination as an element of aesthetics and contemplation of beauty (beauty as a concept is discussed in Chapter 6). Perhaps one of the most remarkable instances where imagery, rather than meaning, becomes the focus can be found in Byron's poem Darkness (1816) (Kroeber, 1960, p.55). Byron uses imagery to present "darkness" as a metaphor signifying the end of times from the first:

> I had a dream, which was not all a dream.
> The bright sun was extinguished and the stars
> did wander darkling in the eternal space (Byron 2005 lines 1-3).

What is remarkable here is that Byron's poem utilizes imagery to draw attention to the sense perception and meaning potential in the interpretation of his poem. Thus, images are no longer clear representations of reality, but they become part of the poetic imagination which is a source of creativity. Consequently, metaphors are now considered a mode of poetry or ways that allow poetry readers to experience feelings and emotions as directly expressed by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (2016/1811-12, *Lectures*) and William Wordsworth (1800, *Lyrical Ballads*).

Both follow Vico's (New Science, 1984/1744, p.129) belief in language as an instrument that shapes the thought and of metaphors creating vividness by relating the abstract to the concrete as the result of humans' need to express senses and passions. As Wordsworth (1800, p.110) asserts, pleasure is created when the reader perceives "similitude in dissimilitude and dissimilitude in similitude" which a metaphor encourages. Coleridge (2016/1811-12, p.251) sees metaphors as ways of expressing passions which, for him,

represent "the core of poetry" and can be only expressed through language. He believes that through their vividness, good and appropriate metaphors can activate the reader's mind by engaging imagination. In addition, Coleridge strongly advocates the idea that imagination enables associations and blending of ideas which is achieved through metaphors. Although different kinds of mental images such as sound, taste, smell, touch, bodily awareness, are available to poets and poets vary in how they present them, the putative effects are important. Some poets prefer tactile imagery, as is the case of Robert Browning's (1841) *Pippa Passes*:

> But marble!-'neath my tools
> More pliable than jelly-as it were
> Some clear primordial creature dug from depths
> In the earth's heart, where itself breeds itself!

where the imaginative world the poem creates is strikingly vivid and based on imagining the experience of tactile senses. Other poets' imagery might express movement, as with Percy Bysshe Shelley's "The waves are dancing fast and bright" from *Stanzas Written in Dejection, Near Naples* (1901). Thus, for the Romantics, metaphor became, as Eagleton (2007, p.141) points out, "a supremely privileged activity of the human spirit, not just a rhetorical device". Many Romantic poets and philosophers approached metaphor as a core element of language which, through the imagery it creates, gives rise to feelings, emotions and passions and they also emphasised that the importance of imagery is in the purpose it serves.

In the late 1800s, mental images formed the basis for the debate over whether imagination was indeed a phenomenon which allowed people to create mental images or whether imagination was the result of the social influence of people speaking in metaphors and being abstract when considering what something looks like. A widely accepted view was Francis Galton's (1880) finding that the vividness of mental images varies significantly amongst individuals who were asked to describe their breakfast table. Yet, there is still the

ambiguity as to whether imagery is the same as figurative language or it is confined to similes and metaphors (Eagleton, 2007, p.141).

Image as a quasi-perceptual experience is challenged by behaviourists such as John B. Watson (1913) and B. F. Skinner (1957). While both reject imagination and images as mental representations, Watson (1913) is fully committed to the nonexistence of mental picture, whilst Skinner (1957) posits mental imagery as phenomenology which means that images and emotions are reactions to verbal stimuli which can mediate behaviour. For Skinner, *imagery* is visualisation or 'conditioned seeing' as a form of behaviour but does not offer detail on how such a visualisation occurs. Thus, in "Juliet is the sun", an emotional response that both the sun and Juliet evoked in Romeo might mediate the understanding of metaphor, being a condition rather than a property of behaviour as in other accounts (Noble, 1952). Yet, a more contemporary account of cognition – the enactivist account (see Chapter 3, above), which sees perception created by implicit sensorimotor knowledge - may seem to share several commonalities with the main ideas of behaviourism, but this might be less likely when considering Noë's claim that perceptual content is constituted by sensorimotor *knowledge* which cannot be observed from outside the body and being unobservable, does not fall into line with behaviourism. Yet, an enactivist perspective may be closer to Dunlap's (1932) account of the nature of 'ideas' (mental pictures) since he focuses on the experience of imagery and its role. For Dunlap, mental images are actual muscular sensations involved in the process of seeing something rather than copies of visual sensations. Such an imagery account is similar to Damasio's emotions as states of the body (discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.4.1, above and Chapter 5 Section 5.5, below), which is rooted in the cognitive nature of mental representations expressed though the body. Damasio's view challenges the traditional definition of images as visual percept or visual pictures (introduced in Section 5.5)

because his ground-breaking account gives images a multimodal nature (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and somatosensory modalities).

After the 1950s, the rise of cognitivism shifted the focus on defining the physical processes underlying imagery and its properties, rather than its role in thinking, but it created a new dispute between the analogical model (Kosslyn, 1994) and the propositional model (Pylyshyn, 2003a, b) of imagery. Thus, mental images can be either seen as depictive or propositional representation in a debate which tries to clarify whether the mental image is a distinct form of mental representation, drawn differently from other representations, or not. While the analogical or depictive model states that mental images of objects and events have behavioural effects, very similar to perception, the propositional model considers images to be representations, created by using the same procedures applied in perception processes. The debate is ongoing and its implications are discussed in more detail in the next section. Overall, this section has shown that the theory of imagery "is in something of a mess" as Eagleton (2007, p.141) describes it; this has unhelpfully impacted the theories of metaphor because they struggle to explain their rich and expressive quality and the next section strengthens this point by discussing imagery in Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

5.3 The picture theory and cognitivism

Despite the ambiguity of the content and origin of mental imagery, the consensus is that mental imagery influences comprehension, recall and reception of language (Sadoski and Paivio, 1994; Zwaan et al., 2002) which is also embraced by the Conceptual Metaphor Theory with the conceptual mapping between conventional mental images (Lakoff, 1992). The description of the most influential theories of imagery presented in this section serves the new theory of metaphor presented in the current thesis. Contemporary theories depict the origin of a mental image as a *depictive representation* (the pictorial theory, Kosslyn, 1994;

Kosslyn et al., 2006), *an amodal description* (descriptive or propositional theory, Pylyshyn, 2005) and *non-directly representational schemata knowledge* (the enactive theory, Thompson, 2007, p.297). The traditional view discussed in Section 5.2 that mental imagery is a quasi-perceptual experience, very similar to visual perception because they can yield similar experiences and because imagery occurs in the absence of external stimuli (Marks, 1999), is used by the current accounts of metaphor. The Conceptual Metaphor Theory associates imagination with simulation and relies on the representations system with knowledge being stored in terms of concepts. For example, when trying to imagine entities such as an apple, we engage in mental simulation (we recreate) and can freely decide on its colour, place and size (Barsalou, 1999). Such a view of simulation relies on the final result of taking a decision to reach the meaning of a metaphor. However, as it is shown in Chapter 7, below, novel interpretation of a metaphor is potential meaning, because the expression of something novel triggers a process of assessing possibilities that, in turn, relies on triggering the value system automatically.

Whilst the overall debate is complex and images are now often discussed in relation to the nature of the mind, some cognitive linguists (Lakoff, 1993) still follow, to an extent, the *picture theory* (Hannay, 1971; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006) where mental images are simulated digitized pictures that result from seeing or imagining using representations from long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1994). Lakoff seems to use this view of images when he defines image metaphor (*My wife ... whose waist is an hourglass*) not as a mapping of knowledge, but as "conventional mental images onto other conventional mental images by virtue of their internal structure" (1987, p.219). Yet, Kosslyn (1994) sees mental images as mediators between the physical and perceptual world and the mind because the process is the same as for other visual inputs (the picture in the head hypothesis). However, this creates a problem because he does not consider imagery to be a prime vehicle of thought, which means that we

cannot explain the tactile senses and movement that Romanticist poetry demonstrates. The representationalist nature of imagery becomes problematic when Kosslyn views perception and imagining as different processes, arguing that mental images are representations described as voluntary and very close to the experience of perception. This independence of images contrasts with Damasio's (2000) embodied view of images which is discussed in Section 5.4 below.

Moreover, the turn of the cognitive movement with its focus on how cognition plays on reality brought an anti-representationalist approach, mainly supported by the ecological perspective (Gibson, 1979) and enactivism (Ellis, 1995; Noë, 2004). Not only enactivist but also descriptive theory (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2005) questions the plausibility of the notion of a mental representation of knowledge. In Pylyshyn's *descriptive* or propositional theory images are a sort of mental representation in the form of symbolic description, sometimes referred to as 'structural description', constructed from concepts. Following Fodor's (1983) modular cognitive architecture (where imagination is in fact restricted by the 'central' cognitive processes), Pylyshyn believes that cognitive processes such as mental imagery, reflection and introspection cannot alter our beliefs and he does not provide a ground for continuity and interaction between perception and action. As discussed in Section 5.2 above, certain metaphors are interpreted on the mental images they arouse, thus, artistic creativity, which is at odds with Pylyshyn's (2005) view of image as symbolic and *a simulation* of what it would be like to actually see the object or the scene.

As explored in Chapter 3, above, recent evidence supports a dynamic systematicity between perception, action and cognition (enactivism and the theory of affordances) and the current debate in the relevant literature is focused on the similarity between perception and imagery. This creates the distinction of whether mental images are a form of experience with metaphors being enactive (O'Regan and Noë, 2001) or strong representation when metaphors

are defined as embodied, based only on conceptual information. Yet, because defining

perception has caused considerable controversy, in this thesis I use perception in Noë's

(2004) sense of something that we do, an activity of the body as a whole rather than a process

in the brain on the opposite side of action. Thus, sensorimotor knowledge allows for

perceptual content and *perceptual consciousness (*Noë, 2004), similar to Damasio's account

of consciousness described in Section 5.5.

5.4 Imagery and the nature of representations

Although the nature of mental imagery remains an unsettled issue (see Section 5.3), there is a

common belief that some degree of visualisation occurs in all metaphors because meaning is

not only embodied and the human mind naturally processes bodily states and sensory

perceptions (Barsalou, 2008b; Gibbs, 2006a; Richie, 2013; Golding, 2015), but meaning is

also enacted and can result from emotions. In general, studies of metaphor that mention

imagery tend to focus only on a type of visualisation or the "image metaphor" which is

defined as a mapping structure in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory and considered different

from the prototypical conceptual metaphors as El-Rafae (2015, p.63) observes. On this

occasion, in the metaphor "My wife … whose waist is an hourglass", the concept hourglass

might be represented as an object's shape, or the sensation associated with it (El-Rafae, 2015,

p.64). Representations might seem to work well to support metaphorical concepts in

Conceptual Metaphor Theory which is also endorsed by the simulation theory based on

evidence that areas of the brain become active when we create visual properties of concepts

(Barsalou, 2008a). However, representations in the sense of input-output information, cannot

be used to support metaphors' vividness. An enactivist perspective is more suited for this aim

(as discussed in Chapter 3, above) because perception as action, as one of the tenets of

enactivism, can also contribute to the idea shared by many that some metaphors are more

metaphorical than others; an idea which includes reference to the imagery debate. However, considering representations in Peirce's sign-to-object representation (as discussed by Cobley, 2019, p.32) as a process of unlimited semiosis can clarify how interpreters have the power to determine the interpretation because of the vagueness of the signs (Chapter 7, below). The next section explains why imagery is important in a theoretical framework of metaphors and the following section proposes an antirepresentational view (ecological perspective) which accommodates the evocative aspect of metaphors.

5.4.1 Image power and metaphors' vividness

A greater dominance of imagery is in general linked to a metaphor being more metaphorical. Conversely, a metaphor is less metaphorical when there is less imagery, leading into the hypothesis that some metaphors are more metaphorical than others because they give rise to more vivid images. As Sadowski and Paivio (2001, p.87) suggest, particularly novel metaphors appear to use the imagery that they create as the basis for their interpretation. Metaphors' vividness has recently started being discussed under the term "metaphoricity" (Müller, 2008a; Jensen, 2017), a scalar value which can be enacted in different degrees, being a more dynamic view of metaphor than the mapping between conceptual domains supported by the cognitive turn in the study of metaphor initiated by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Thus, newly-minted metaphors seem to play an important role as highly productive devices of mental images and such claim finds support with poetic metaphors.

However, even if many metaphors are considered successful and good because their interpretation relies heavily on imagination, generating pleasure and becoming a conscious process (see Section 5.5. where consciousness is discussed), there are still metaphors which rely on imagination but where imagination does not help in interpreting the meaning and, more importantly, in experiencing pleasure. Imagination obviously requires the ability to

conjure up elements of the environment that are not present or may not even exist, but when the connection is missing, there is nothing to explore. The discrepancy between the object of the metaphor and the metaphor itself restrict the creation of surprise, pleasure and the reward of finding knowledge (see Chapter 7, below). As an illustration, Coombes's (1963, p.43) example (also mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.4) that appears in Pilkington (2000, p.119) "Black as the inside of a wolf's throat" (his hand is as black as the inside of a wolf's throat) seems to be an ineffective image, despite the originality of the metaphor, because the content that a wolf's throat is black is outside our experience, logic and imagination. Moreover, the metaphor might be easily considered "bad" because it does not only sound bizarre, but there is no existing link that the metaphor highlights and blackness and a throat are almost impossible to correlate. Coombes (1963 p.43) points out that a successful image "helps to make us feel the writer's grasp of the object or situation he is dealing with, gives his grasp of it with precision, vividness, force, economy." Such an image is created in "How does he feel / His secret murders sticking on his hands" (Shakespeare, 2010, Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 2, lines 16-17) because the image is an idea that revives a physical sensation, the stickiness of drying blood stains on the skin, and the concrete presentation and expression of feelings is what makes Shakespeare's metaphor to be considered creative and poetic. Such successful metaphors rely on cognitive effort but finding the thread of the meaning is more rewarding.

Hence, the view of the 'world in action' (described at length in Chapters 2 and 3, above) must be incorporated into explaining how interpreters work out the meaning of creative metaphors because the 'classical' view of cognition with its symbolic representations and inner states as passive 'pictures of' an external world, does not offer a satisfactory insight into how we act and understand the world and how we make meaning from the connotations of the words when understanding metaphors. As Clark (1997, p.49) notes, because the classical view separates perception and action, mental representations can be only 'passive'

inner descriptions stored by the brain with no ability to account for the affective characteristic of creative metaphors. Clarks considers perception and action to be entwined and proposes "action-oriented representations" which are plans of actions for engaging with the world which fit within the enactivist camp (discussed in Chapter 3, above) and the ecological perspective (see Chapter 5 Section 5.4.2).

Viewing representations as a type of an action plan fits nicely with how the comprehension process in creative metaphors rely on reflection, creating possibilities and aesthetic responses. In *the moon that was really a disco ball* the knowledge we have about the moon and a disco ball is fundamentally grounded in our physical actions, hence the wide accepted belief that metaphors are grounded in our physical actions. In processing the meaning, the information we have from several of our senses that we used to access the word is overlapping and we can imagine the moon as a disco ball in relation to senses such as vision, smell, hearing, taste and others. An interpreter's perceptual experience would be that of seeing the moon as a disco ball, even though it is the sensations that they experience that is being stimulated. Moreover, the words used in a metaphor constitute pointers from where thoughts grow, since metaphors are not literary true. The recent focus on the connotative characteristic of metaphors and the decline in the distinction between what is literal and what is metaphorical (Jensen and Cuffari, 2014; Linell, 2009) seems to be the right direction for theorizing metaphor as a phenomenon of experience rather than of cognition alone.

Although many enactivists do not recognise explicit mental representations neither as depictive (image like) nor descriptive mental representations that correspond to the percept or the content of mental images (Thomas, 1999; Valera et al., 1993; Clark, 1997), they unite action and perception to the point where *perception is viewed as perceptually-guided action*. Even though perception cannot produce explicit representations to be processed or inspected when one imagines the entity they represent, it actively engages with sensory inputs from the

world and 'interrogates' the environment, as contrasted with a passive acceptance of external stimuli as material for internal representations, as presented mainly by the first-generation cognitive linguists. For instance, imagining a cat requires activation of the perceptual processes that fit the stimulus of a cat and not creating or activating a mental representation that symbolises a cat. In this case, *schemata*, the procedural knowledge of how and when (Fusch, 2002) guides perceptual exploration of features and spatial relationships for recognising a cat, thus being coupled with the environment (see Chapter 3, above).

The debate over the representational content remains open, but this section highlights the fact that mental imagery can be used in explaining the imaginative and artistic trait in metaphors by using both enactivism which is anti-representation (Noë, 2004) or recognises a weak form of representation and the idea of metaphor being the essence of the representational (Gombrich, 1961/2010; see also Chapter 7, below). Where Noë (2004) defines perception as action, Gombrich (2010) defines representations as an act of making or influencing the represented. For Gombrich, representation is a substitute for something else and an example is a stick that can be considered a horse because of its capacity to serve as a substitute. But enactivists also emphasize pretence using the example of the banana as a phone used by children. Despite Noë's rejection of representations, his ideas seem to be similar to Gombrich, especially when he considers meaning to be experience (see Chapter 3 Section 3.6.2, above). It is worth noting that for Gombrich (2010) metaphor is the peak of the activity of representation because it reorganizes different elements and creates new orders, articulating the world in a new way, a process which reminds of Peirce's notions discussed in Chapter 7, below. One element that Gombrich successfully points out and which was not identified by cognitive linguists such as Richards (1936), Black (1962) and Lakoff (1987) is that the newness of metaphors is rooted in fixation. In other words, in the interpretation process, we search to attach new categories and images to something that we already know,

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using a new idea in a familiar way rather than using the words we know in a construal of metaphor in order to move from something familiar to something new. Thus, familiarization of the new is the representation of the visible (an idea also explained in Chapter 7), which leads to the conclusion that novelty originates in fixation or projection; in Gombrich's terms, of our expectations of the new.

In brief, imagination is a powerful element in metaphors because it becomes the means through which interpreters experience the possibilities that they create. Metaphors should be seen as representations of possible objects and this point is further developed in the next section and discussed under the notion of *affordances* (Gibson, 1979). An ecological perspective of cognition presents representational systems or "ideas" as ways of behaving and regulating our actions in the world (as opposed to mental phenomena alone) because it acknowledges the mutual interaction of an organism with its environment.

5.4.2 Metaphors as experiences or *affordances*

One of the alternatives to mental pictures as representations in memory (Kosslyn, 1994; Pylyshin, 1973) is the view of *mental images* as *experiences* in Gibson's (1979/1986) sense because for him sensation is perception (ecological theory). As pointed out in Section 5.4.1, perceptual awareness is needed to appreciate the embodied nature of metaphorical language and the richness of poetry, primarily because the environmental cues such as moods and emotions (affect) can become clues to an interpreter who is perceptive. Gibson (1979, p.22) calls these perceived signals or clues *affordances* because the environment *affords* or gives off patterns of events that educate attention (for example, a chair affords sitting and a cup's hollow shape is an affordance for filling), as opposed to the idea that what is immediately perceived is picture-like images or mental constructions of the environment that follow a

three-way relationship between a subject, an object and an internal representation of the object (see Section 5.3).

Although Lakoff and Johnson (1980) famously show how metaphor shapes thoughts and behaviour since how we do something is determined by the way we talk about it, such as *argument is war*, it must be pointed out that the way we talk about an idea is the result of how we imagine that idea to be. When we imagine an argument as war we tend to focus and become aware only of the warlike *affordances* of the argument, ignoring its possible cooperative abilities which might lead to positive outcomes. Thus, *affordances* lead interpreters to expect a certain behavior from metaphors (and from the sentences and the context) such as a feel or another state of mind. It is then no longer surprising that a novel metaphor can be intuitive enough but still open for future interpretations because the interpreter is guided by cues which emerge from behavioral responses and their continuous interaction with the world. Consequently, *affordances* can be considered invitations for interpreters to find new patterns and explore new meaning.

Considering that from an ecological perspective (Gibson, 1977, 1979), mental imagery is a kind of experience, the activity of imagining the action possibilities or *affordances* that a specific environment provides and then imagining the realization of one of these action possibilities, it can be concluded that novelty in metaphors resides in the possibilities created by associating the terms in the metaphor. Even if the starting point in interpretation might be the denotation of the word, the interpretation strays away from it because the association forces the meaning of the metaphor to reside in a broader connotative uncertainty of associations and images which bound them. Furthermore, from an ecological standpoint, metaphor becomes part of our actions in general (Steffensen and Fill, 2014), which means that the meaning of the metaphor enacts a system of experience because they are possibilities for different types of actions, similarly to how affordances are possibilities in

a physical environment. As an illustration, poetic metaphors often create images which invite for further actions such as playing with idea, elaborating or contrasting ideas. It can no longer be the case that an interpreter of metaphors can be advised to think about what the author had in mind as part of the preconception that the meaning is something retrieved or discovered (see Chapter 6, below). With the growing popularity of the 4E cognition (discussed in Chapter 3, above), metaphor is now discussed as meaning potentials explored and negotiated in communities (Cameron, 2007; Linell, 2009; Jensen, 2017). Conceptualisation is no longer static, but it becomes an active "doing" or as Merleau-Ponty would call getting a grip on the world (see Chapter 2, above). Because thinking and feeling are active explorations of the world, metaphors need to be looked at as a "doing" in the world.

Moreover, as meaningful features of experience, a*ffordances* can be set up for further action by gestures, facial displays, vocal acts, feelings and sensations. Particularly poetic metaphors offer a mode of experience par excellence. Their distinctive character of "image-based" experience adds to their distinctiveness. Creative metaphors subject feelings and establish themselves as memorable through the feelings engendered. Embodied interpreters engage the environment and *affordances* play a key role in perception by being modes of experiencing the environment and ways through which the interpreter remains an engaged and active perceiver. Importantly, seeking affordances is reliant on an affective stance that assesses an action's intrinsic attractiveness and or aversiveness in relation to the future of dialogical actions (Jensen and Pedersen, 2016, p.85). As Slaby et al. (2013, p.42) clarifies, emotions reveal what a situation affords in terms of possible actions. The ability to perceive affordances is linked with affective engagement which can no longer be ignored in theorizing poetic metaphors.

The words used in a metaphor also have *affordances*, some more explicit than others, which enables the metaphor to provide a set of *affordances*, which can be false or hidden

since the metaphor brings two things together which are dissimilar. Unlike physical objects, whose affordances are given by shape, size and weight, metaphors have their affordances (properties) from new associations, through the words used. We can easily say about a metaphor that it educates our attention because bringing two things together draws attention to their relationship. Gibson (1979, xv-xvii) makes clear that *affordances* emerge from interaction and Clark (2016) even compares them to surfing when he argues that our consciousness is predictive and not reactive, and the brain constantly updates the model of the world to predict what we will perceive. There are no cultural models or images that prepare an interpreter for understanding a new creative metaphor, but the whole interpretation process becomes a simultaneous experience of some little information which is known from the words in the metaphor and some other possible information that might become a pattern in future (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of Peirce's *abduction* and *the effete mind*). The process of creating possibilities is discussed in detail by Peirce (CP 5.303) for whom there are no mental images when interpreters imagine objects in the world. Peirce argues that we rather have consciousness that helps us recognize our thoughts through sensations, which are signs which helps us form representations. Importantly, for him representation is a relation between a sign and its object, but a relation which consists in the determination of another sign. Thus, representation can be viewed as a continuous and infinite action of signs or meaning. Embodiment might greatly help explain how metaphors draw on our experiences in the world, but in new and creative metaphors embodiment can transcend the physical moment in the sense that to comprehend the meaning of a metaphor relies on experiencing life through experiencing the new possibilities that the metaphor creates, which is the continuous act as described by enactivists (see Chapter 3, above).

A new metaphor might often set itself up as an unexpected, puzzling combination of ideas, creating confusion and wonder, but it then provides pleasure in recognizing new

insights. Creative metaphors demand multiple readings and responses from us and once the pattern has been clarified, it 'grabs' our attention and educates it for the future, just like a birdsong draws our attention and educates it rather than the hearing activity being initiated by people. The resemblance or the link of the two ideas in a metaphor result from the concrete knowledge of one and the abstractness of the other that affords innovation. Hence, we always have an anchor in the embodied knowledge, but the metaphor forces us to recognize pattern and regularities because our brain is predictive (this seems to be the Type 1 reasoning identified by Daniel Kahneman, 2011).

As a metaphor ages, it becomes cliché because the novelty and surprise fade to the point that some metaphors are considered dead metaphors. But as Jacques Derrida (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3, above) points out, a metaphor can be revived because words in general are charged with poetic potential which Burke (1954) strongly argues for when he considers that all forms of discourse have poetic aspects. Burke follows a rhetoric devised by Nietzsche (in *On the Genealogy of Morals*) (1998) for whom meaning making is prompted by a pathos of embodiment or our sensuous experience of being in the world and emerges from aesthetically generated images, which helps them to escape rationality. From this perspective, a novel metaphor might stand out through its vagueness, but the message might be clear on an emotional and aesthetic level. In this context, *affordances* are all the uncertainties or the representations largely dependent on the interpreter's experience and knowledge or embodiment.

Gibson's notion of *affordance* in the context of metaphorical language opens up the possibility of illustrating the interactive form making of a novel meaning. Thus, this section contributes to a new theory of metaphor by explaining how perception and acting are intertwined, leading to a view of metaphor as action.

5.5 Damasio's view of mental images as awareness of the body

Damasio's (1999, 2018) comprehensive theory of consciousness, first introduced in *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999), relies on the idea that feelings and emotions are not only embodied, (a point made in Chapter 4 and repeated here), but they are also a result of mental images. For Damasio, our ability to form mental images stems from our neural states (patterns) that manifest through changes in our body and brain (1999, pp.203 - 204). Thus, a mental image becomes a mental pattern built on the inputs of each sensory modality (Damasio, 1999). Yet, since feelings are mental patterns of experiencing bodily changes of emotions, as Damasio argues (see Chapter 4, above), then the process of understanding metaphorical language must include an explanation of the act of experiencing the emotional content and not be limited to an embodied experience.

Damasio's theory does not only focus on how consciousness happens, but it also provides a detailed analysis of how experience is produced and in this way, his proposal manages to surpass the limitations which a conceptual nature brings to word meaning and allows for more freedom to experience the sense of the words, similarly to how enactivists envisage the act of word comprehension. Furthermore, although prior philosophical and psychological studies have frequently questioned the origin of consciousness, they were not able to explain the relationship between concrete aspects and being conscious of them (Fodor, 2008; Marcel, 1998), which Damasio addresses successfully. As described in the previous chapter (Chapter 4), Damasio defines feelings as mental images of emotions.

Thus, Damasio's account of consciousness provides the basis of the analysis of novelty and creativity in metaphor presented in this thesis. Cognitive models of metaphor are still far from integrating aesthetic evaluation (see also Chapter 6), mainly because their rigid conceptual structure does not fully allow for the act of experiencing because they limit themselves to embodiment. As elaborated below, the experiential process in Damasio's

account considers the sensory aspects which are included in embodied concepts, but it also considers the co-experience given by a subjective process. As Johnson (2007, p.72) remarks, Damasio manages to make a strong claim that emotions, or *emotional responses*, play a role in reasoning.

Simply stated, Damasio's frame of mental imagery is useful in allowing imaginative processes which can be considered a fundamental part of the novelty of metaphor to rely on sensorimotor experience. By adopting Damasio's view, the aesthetic and novelty of metaphors can be explained by considering the mind to be the result of the brain forming images - "the ability to display images internally and to order those images in a process called thought. (The images are not solely visual; there are also "sound images", "olfactory images" and so on)" (Damasio, 1994, p.89). Thus, images in every sensory modality become the primary content of thought (Damasio, 1994, pp.106 – 108) and "most of these images correspond to objects and events of the world around you" (2018, p.145).

More specifically, emotional responses become the main stage in creating figurative meaning and there should be no longer a paradox as to why metaphors are often spoken about as images (Deignan, 2008; El Rafae, 2015; Golding 2015). Some relevant instances of metaphor where a situation and/or an object are visualised are as follows: "Delia was an overbearing cake with condescending frosting and frankly, I was on a diet." ― Stiefvater (2008). The image of the cake, here, to which Delia is compared, is likely to form when the metaphorical meaning is created. The cake image is closely linked to representations of the body. According to Damasio, emotions begin when the brain forms an image of an object, the cake in the metaphorical case and the image affects the body in the manners which correspond to anger, fear, pleasure, sadness, repugnance, etc. In general, seeing a cake leads to an emotional state of happiness and pleasure for those who like sweets but when enjoying a delicious desert is linked to the idea of being on a diet, it can lead to feelings of guilt or

regret. Although the text seems to focus on the comparison of two images - Delia and a cake - the meaning seems to focus on senses and emotions.

Here are other two examples of metaphors where mental images seem to form the base of the metaphorical sense and not the comparison or mapping process which represent the core of cognitive metaphor theories: "The sun was a toddler insistently refusing to go to bed: It was past eight thirty and still light." Green (2012, p.116) and "Memories are bullets. Some whiz by and only spook you. Others tear you open and leave you in pieces." (Kadrey, 2010, p.54). Imagining a toddler refusing to go to bed seems to be the core of the metaphorical meaning. The text seems to draw its readers into emotional engagement and make them see the sun and live the emotions of the parents' bedtime struggles. As readers, we try to recreate the emotions of the parent who puts the toddler to bed. Yet, creating emotions when imagining situations is, according to Damasio, creating representations that are similar to sensed objects. Damasio clearly claims that what we feel, or sense is represented cognitively by an image and thus, mental images for him are lived emotions. Damasio (2018, p.147) makes the further point that when stimuli such as a word or event connects to our previous experience and provokes a thought or emotional reaction, subjectivity starts being generated. It is the case with thinking about the sun as behaving like a toddler or considering memories to be bullets. For those who experienced toddler's tantrums or those who like shooting sports, the subjectivity becomes an experience rich in details. Yet, as Damasio points out (2018, p.147), the subjective experience depends on how much time we have to make it more consciously prominent. Perhaps the importance of the emotional content in relation to imagery is clearer in Kadrey's metaphor where the mental image of a bullet must be construed to reflect the emotional charge of a memory. However, imagining a bullet is not in fact rationally seeing a bullet in its shape or form and constructing the background, but it is rather the feeling of emotions in Damasio's terms.

Additionally, Damasio makes another pertinent point by arguing that emotions are not just random sensations which have nothing to do with rationality, but they directly contribute to reasoning proper. As Kadrey is explicit when he distinguishes between the bullets that whiz and those that can tear a person open, the metaphor proves useful to draw attention to its aim to invoke particular emotions. As Damasio mentions, positive emotions make some representation of an object more desirable while negative emotions make them less desirable and the pleasantness or unpleasantness can affect our decisions. Although all the three examples of metaphors mentioned so far show a relationship between two elements that was not shown before, they stand out as original. One of the reasons for their novelty is not given by the new relationship presented, but by the readers' emotional experience, which is subjective (see Chapter 4 Section 4.5, above, for a discussion of "the feeling of knowing").

Damasio's view of images works on the same principle of the tenet of embodiment of CMT. Images as feelings can be exemplified in an instance of metaphor provided by Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio (2008). When first encountered, the metaphor 'grasping the situation' may have used sensorimotor parts of the brain as a simulated hand representation. But when the metaphor is familiar, there may be no need for such representation, although it still can be retrieved upon individual preference. Hence, there is the belief that even conventional metaphors may involve mental imagery. What can be agreed is that novel metaphors generate more vivid imagery and they can rightly do so according to Damasio's account.

To sum up, Damasio's theory offers a possible solution to the shortcoming of representational theories of consciousness which have direct implications on the current theories of metaphor. Damasio argues that the interaction of mental representations of body images and world images gives rise to consciousness. Another important point that Damasio makes and directly relates to metaphor, is that emotions supplement logic. Indeed, the idea of emotions as experiences in the sense of thoughts which are felt because they are bodily

grounded must be included when considering the aesthetic experience of metaphorical

meaning and when originality of metaphor is addressed.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that mental images play an important role in how we create the

meaning of metaphors because they are in fact perceptual experience that result from the

interconnection between body and mind. Regardless of where one stands on the issue of

representations (as discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4), perception and our senses should be

considered important ways in which we can know the environment and make sense. The

chapter has reviewed key debates in mental imagery and showed that the quasi -pictorial

(Kosslyn, 1994) and description (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2003a) paradigms of mental imagery

cannot explain the unspoken powerful emotions conveyed by many metaphors. The intense

feeling states often included in interpreting creative metaphors often described are well

explained using the ecological perspective (the theory of *affordances*) because it supports the

variations in vividness and the expressive feature of metaphors. Hence, the account offered

here proposed mental images as experiences and active perception (action-oriented

representation) in the sense of Gibson (1986) and O'Regan and Noë (2001).

This chapter also proposed a new framework that incorporates a definition of imagery

as emotion because mental images arise from neural patterns or feelings which are based on

representations of the body (Damasio, 1994), explained in the final section of this chapter. No

theory of metaphor should neglect this finding which also becomes an argument that tries to

reconcile enactivism (explained in Chapter 2) to metaphor using the notion of

'representation'. So far, emotions have not played an important role in embodied and

enactive approaches to cognition, representation and even language. The idea that the

expressivity of metaphors arises through mental images should be seen as a contribution in

that direction. Since emotions are what sets novel metaphors apart from the conventional ones and idioms, the next chapter (Chapter 6) focuses on defining what is beautiful in order to further explain the aesthetic experience in creative metaphors and how the uncanny, pleasure and other emotions create an aesthetic position and the experience that lays the basis of the interpretative process of metaphorical meaning.

CHAPTER 6: METAPHOR AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

6.1 Introduction

With a focus on the creativity of metaphor and the power of metaphor to entertain imagination, this chapter discusses the factors that determine how we respond to beauty and art. The chapter argues that the overall appreciation of metaphor can not only be the result of logically processing the content it creates, but the appreciation can rather come from the way metaphors present such content through discovery, imagination, surprise or contemplation. The chapter seeks to show that anyone is capable of an aesthetic understanding of poetic metaphors when focusing their attention on the process of interpretation. The sensory contemplation and appreciation of a metaphor is directly related to imagining as a perceptual act. Because metaphors are 'false' in the literary sense and not do not conform to the restraints of literal, referential language, they require us to fill out the new through discovery rather than acts of correspondence. The discussion in this chapter explains how interpreters bring into existence this novelty or new beliefs in order to establish that the creativity of metaphor is a primary step into interpretation. Furthermore, the discussion aims to demonstrate that the richness of the expressive power of metaphors lies in multiplicity and abstractedness - in the novelty itself rather than in an existing system of beliefs - but which only acts as a point of departure for the freedom of an imaginative journey. This chapter's aim is therefore of primary importance to the thesis as a whole.

Where Chapter 5 above addresses mental images and argues that in metaphors imagination is life, the present chapter discusses the importance of an evaluative process or the activity of the interpreter in considering the connotations of the metaphor. Thus, Section 6.2 argues that beauty is influenced by our ability to imagine and use our emotions, which refutes the belief that beauty exists *in* objects or other elements of the reality that we perceive. Section 6.3 discusses perception of newness because imagining, which supports the

life of a metaphor, is perceptual. Here, Wollheim's *seeing-in* is useful to explain how

expressivity occurs and how interpreters become aware of the newness given by the

association of new ideas in a metaphor. Section 6.4 discusses the multiplicity of meaning in

metaphors and the importance of connotations in order to show that there is not always the

need for an analytical justification to consider the beauty in the metaphorical meaning.

Lastly, section 6.5 outlines Barthes' notions of *obtuse meaning* and *bliss* which he uses to

discuss pleasure; it does this in order to argue that the aesthetic experience we undergo with

creative metaphors is an action or a search for clarity, but without *the aim for* clarity.

Considering aesthetics in this way means that there is a detachment from familiar categories

in the interpretative process and that there is no definite meaning in metaphors.

6.2 *Beauty* and *aesthetics* in the philosophical tradition

Beauty is important when theorising metaphor because together with taste, it forms the

guiding principle of *aesthetics* which captures the essence of those metaphors which we

experience rather than understand and where meaning is not entirely grounded in words. As

Gal (2015) points out, a disinterested contemplation or aesthetic attitude allows for an

engagement with a work of art, a recognition of the value and the experience of it as an art. In

metaphors, an attitude of the interpreter becomes part of the meaning in the sense that

meaning is arrived at through a process of interpretation which extracts the content from its

form or words. The aesthetic attitude opposes the cognitive one where, with metaphors,

interpreters focus on the descriptive structure which is one of the tenets of the Conceptual

Metaphor Theory. The first generation of cognitive linguists (see Chapter 3, below) ignored

the aesthetic judgment when defining metaphors which has been controversial when

discussing beauty and aesthetic experience. The controversy stems in the tradition of

considering *art* to be materialised as an object, a view which was strongly influenced by the

thinking around the 18th century (Hume, 1757; Burke, 1757). Plato's (Book 10 Republic

596c-e) distinction between *beauty* and *art* and his view of art as *mimesis* (imitation) of objects and events of ordinary life has been so influential in art theory that Gombrich (1961, p.83) remarks that it has "haunted" the philosophy of art. Plato (377b–398b) considers poems and paintings as ugly in their mimesis and thus opposed to beauty. The latter he takes to be an objective quality not found in the response and experience of the observer but associated with the concept of good in an abstract world (*hyperouranios*) (Ross 1994). However, art as an 'object' and art as 'beauty' have been challenged by an assessment of art as socially constructed (Gombrich, 1961, 1995; Taylor, 1978) and not as a prior-existing entity.

More recent approaches, from the 18th century onwards, have featured a view of *beauty* in respect of a subjective state; in complementary fashion, *art* started to be presented as involving perceptual embodiments of ideas (Hume, 1777; Kant, 1790). Kant (1790) defines beauty as disinterested pleasure, not being based on desire and argues that the judgment of beauty is based on feelings rather than rationality, opposing the idea of works of art as mere copies of nature because imagination is at play in understanding art (Halliwell, 2002). Despite Kant's connection of *beauty* to personal experiences and the romantic poets' emphasis on *beauty* as essential (for example Keats' statement in 'Ode on a Grecian Urn', 1980 - "Beauty is truth, truth is beauty"), beauty began to be seen as pleasure, or as a psychological response, as opposed to being something of value (Tolstoy, 1960; Wittgenstein, 1966). Even with the Romanticism period, originality, which is a component of our modern conception of *creativity*, was not an early attribute of it (Runco and Albert, 2010). However, the criterion of creative worth was changed from traditional themes like the beauty of creativity to novelty in the mid of the 19th century (Dudek, 1999). A contemporary view of creativity includes novelty and innovativeness while also being appropriate in a particular situation (Plucker et al. 2004).

One notable challenge to the philosophical tradition of art as a coherent entity comes from the philosopher Roger Taylor (1978) who describes art as a form of life in the sense that the predominating class has the power to choose what might be considered of value, calling their preferences 'art'. The preferences of the upper-class including paintings, novels, poems become 'art' which leads to the preconception that what is beautiful can only be understood by certain people. For a similar reason, metaphors such as "All the world's a stage and all the men and women merely players." (Shakespeare, 1623) and "The sun in the west was a drop of burning gold that slid near and nearer the sill of the world." *(*Golding, 1954, p.59) might be considered of more value than other less famous metaphors such as "My thoughts are stars I cannot fathom into constellations." (Green, 2012, p.183) and "Bobby Holloway says my imagination is a three-hundred-ring circus." (Koontz, 1998, p.102). Some metaphors might be considered works of art by individuals, but if they are not deliberately accepted and chosen by the bourgeoisie to be preserved and labelled as works of art, they might remain unrenewed. It must be emphasised that such a modern conception of art as an exclusive value and superiority appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries (Voltaire, 1733; Diderot, 1995). In antiquity, art was seen as any rule bound activity, as suggested by Tatarkiewicz (1963, mentioned in Taylor 1978, p.32) which implies, also, that all metaphors were seen as art.

However, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory that was developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p.3) presents metaphor as an important part of thought because "our ordinary conceptual system …is metaphorical in nature". The theory focuses on conventional metaphors that are automatic while creative metaphors are still commonly referred to as poetic metaphors and explained with reference to poetic thought (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). According to the theory, novel metaphors are created by way of extending an already existing conceptual metaphor and, surprisingly, by creating a new conceptual mapping and "create a new reality" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.145). As an example of a new mapping, the

conceptual metaphor 'the mind is a computer (machine)' which was an original metaphor in the 1980s, influenced the way people speak about cognition using terminology such as encoding, retrieval, computational cost (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, p.138). The metaphor has been extended in creative ways to talk about culture as "the software of the mind" (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, while it is acknowledged that novel metaphors are open to interpretation while relying on established conceptual structures, the interpretation process has been looked at as a restructuring of our conceptual system or an imaginative extension of existing conceptual structures. Furthermore, novel metaphors are often discussed as harnessing surprise by having a new perspective of something already existing (see also Chapter 2, above) but the components of creativity are not addressed in the current theoretical discussion of metaphor. The research on creativity, including attempts to measure it, reveals a relationship between creativity and openness to experience, with facets such as fantasy (vivid imagination), aesthetics, feelings, variety over familiarity and questioning conventional norms (McCrae and Costa, 1997).

Feelings of surprise and shock when encountering new metaphors are in the realm of the sensuous, not attaining rationality. The imaginary situations and the possibilities can be indeed fascinating during the interpretative process, as the Marxist philosopher Roger Taylor (2018) points out. He discusses creativity as the production of "as-if" situations and objects because as-if behaviour creates the "magnetic" quality. Indeed, despite the consensus that original metaphors rely on imagination, the process is not theoretically explained. Predominantly, Taylor argues that what has value for us and what can be constituted as art is something which transmits emotions, a point also made by Tolstoy; Yet, unlike Tolstoy - who distinguishes between real art and art of the upper classes - Taylor believes that creativity is always present for everybody because we are always conscious, even when dreaming, to an

extent. Moreover, he argues that consciousness is physical, and it cannot exist without a body - the death of the body is the death of consciousness.

However, considering Tolstoy's (1897/1960) point that description is not enough, which means that description is only imitation and provides only existing information and no novelty, it becomes clear that descriptions can hardly acquire what a metaphor can when used as a literary technique. While I do not agree with Tolstoy's belief that the artist provides the viewer with content that creates emotional effect, one of the merits of Tolstoy's ideas is that he draws attention on abstract expressionism and the function of art to express emotions when he defines art as the communication of emotions. Description is the opposite of ambiguity and vagueness which characterises original metaphors where meaning is attempted through the use of imagination. A metaphor such as *the sun is a tangerine* offers clear details such as the shape and colour from the vehicle to the object and alignment of details from real life. By contrast, Picasso's quote in Grothe (2008, p.8): "Art washes away from the soul the dust of everyday life" suggests seeing art as a liquid but imagining art with cleansing properties does not rely only on concrete details from the real world as in the tangerine example, above. In the latter example, meaning relies on an act of perception that relates to senses to form a fictious experiences, or as aesthetic imagination in Dorter's (1990, p.42) terms. Moreover, the tangerine example can be considered a conventional metaphor to some extent, which leads to the assertion that how much explanatory detail a metaphor offers might be directly related to its emotional strength or artistic value, following Tolstoy's claim that description is insufficient.

Since detailed descriptions are only imitations (mimesis), they are not necessarily geared to harnessing the aesthetic contemplation that occurs in original or novel metaphors. It is widely acknowledged (Knowles and Moon, 2006; Gal, 2019) that what makes a metaphor effective is the way in which interpreters go through an interpretive process of unpacking and

deconstructing the metaphor, of considering diverse images to find associations rather than making mere conceptual analogies. Surprisingly, such factors are still evaded in the theories of metaphor. An original metaphor relies on the movement back and forth in a process of discovery, which is a process of guessing, which Tolstoy describes as affording pleasure (Tolstoy, pp.185-186). The bond between metaphors and riddles or puzzles can be traced back to Aristotle for whom "metaphors imply riddles and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor" (Rhetoric, III.2.1405b). All these tropes can rely on descriptive elements, but they also involve imagining, resemblances and crossed categories, elements which add to the cognitive load and require longer time as compared to a descriptive process. Thus, the analogical reasoning is complemented by a type of inferences which generate hypothesis when the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises. Hypothetical thinking is best explained by using Peirce's notion of *abduction* (see also Chapter 7, below) which stands for a mode of reasoning characterised by presumption, hypothesis and guessing.

The issue that concerns the definition of metaphor is that there is almost no mention that the comparison process involves guessing how the meaning of two ideas are like each other, while in riddles and puzzles such a process is highlighted. A case in point is *What do you call a sheep with no legs? A cloud* or *What can run but has no legs? A cloud* or *an engine*. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p.13) argue, metaphors conceal as much as they reveal. After all, a *lab rat* normally refers to certain characteristics such as somebody's persistent presence and dedication (calling scientists human lab rats); but it also evokes the idea of living in captivity or being the involuntarily subject of experiments. This is an idea that can be explored through imagining scenarios and situations which can be real, in the sense of being represented in the external world and also fiction (this point is discussed at length in Chapter 7, below and includes Peirce's account of signs).

Indeed, metaphors can be sophisticated enough to create feelings without being openly logical, a point which can be seen in Max Black's (1962, p.25) opening quote from the Fortunes of Nigel 2.2 "Metaphors are no arguments, my pretty maiden". Black's interaction view of metaphor, discussed in Chapter 1, above, also stresses the idea that metaphors give an insight, rather than providing explicit information. Moreover, processing emotions in decision-making means that not all responses are the same because of the variations in intensity (as discussed with reference to the work of Damasio in Chapter 4, above). Furthermore, the subjectivity of meaning and individuality of response is discussed by I.A. Richards (1924, p.194) who exemplifies it with the final lines of the Fifth Sonnet of Wordsworth's River Duddon (1820):

> Whose ruddy children, by the mother's eyes
> Carelessly watched, sport through the summer day,
> Thy pleased associated - light as endless May
> on infant bosoms lonely nature lies (1924, p.193).

Two readers can value different experiences such as the understanding that the gloom of lonely nature has no effect on children, as opposed to the reading in which gloomy nature can, in fact, help children by bringing "light as endless May". This example strengthens the idea that the understanding of metaphor that an interpreter develops is personal.

In short, this section has attempted to show how *beauty* is about emotions and how judging a metaphor as beautiful is based on perceiving them as imaginative and experiencing them in order to understand them. Before analysing how we represent beauty whilst constructing emotional experiences, we need to discuss experience as a specific mode of perception because it brings clarity to how we create representations from newness through our experiences.

6.3 Wollheim's 'seeing-in' and artistic expression of metaphors

Whereas the previous section focuses on clarifying that beauty consists in an emotional response that any interpreter can have, the current section brings support to the idea of the beauty and novelty of metaphors as being processed by interpreters through a percept or 'aesthetic seeing' which becomes a conscious process. Consciousness is given by the necessity of awareness of the impossibility of the comparison as reality, and of fictitious possibilities that metaphors create. The section explains the sensitivity to aesthetics which is present in the comprehension of creative metaphors by using Wollheim's (1991) account of the *experience of meaning* through the notions of *expressive perception* and the capacity to *experience perceptual delight* which are directly relevant to the aesthetic meaning of metaphors. As Wollheim (2015, p.2) argues, "we all do have such experience of poetry, painting, music, etc." which means that any interpreter can have an artistic experience of creative metaphors if they engage in an interpretative process. Furthermore, despite the belief that creative and novel metaphors are only present in poetry, fiction and prose, they are in fact common in several fields, including popular music and a few good examples are: Tom Cochrane's "Life is a highway / I want to ride it all night long" in Life is a Highway; or Michael Buble's "You're a falling star, you're the getaway car/ You're the line in the sand when I go too far" in his song 'Everything'.

We can choose how to look at these metaphors, by either refraining from trying to understand them because we do not want to process the cognitive load, or by directing attention towards arriving at a possible meaning. These two types of experience are discussed by Wollheim when he differentiates between an ordinary perception experience - the human ability to see the pictorial surface in a painting (*seeing-as*) - and another type of perception which allows for the discovery of a hidden meaning (*seeing-in*). The twofoldness (Wollheim 1987, p.360) in this sphere refers to two aspects of one state or activity of attention rather

than separate actions. Alloa (2011) remarks that *seeing-as* is to *see x as y* such as in the case

of looking at a painting or a photograph and seeing the colours and lines only, without the

realisation that they represent objects and people. Such 'seeing' only requires what is

commonly considered a straightforward or ordinary perception.

S*eeing-as* would happen in the conventional metaphors of the type A is B, where

information can be judged or known and where A is seen through characteristics or situations

of B, such as *Mary is an angel,* or *His house is a prison*. Perception in such instances is

'straightforward' and driven by a process which Wollheim (1980, 2019) describes as

'mediated by concepts'. When we perceive *x* as *y* or when *x* resembles *y*, we normally

conceptualise things that exist or occur, without involving any imaginative seeing. Merleau-

Ponty (2012, p.34) observes that ordinary experiences "draw a clear distinction between

sense experience and judgement" (see Chapter 2, above). Thus, if we experience something

we already know, we do so by relying on our ability to perceive something which we already

know and which is done through analogies between embodied concepts in metaphors.

Yet, many creative and novel metaphors are often ambiguous because they do not

offer a simple process of understanding the abstract concept or the target domain's relation to

the concrete domain. The example discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5, "*I am hearing the*

shape of the rain / Take the shape of the tent and believe it" (Dickey, 1964) illustrates how

the expressive meaning of the metaphor supplants a logical interpretation which otherwise

would be almost impossible to perform. Furthermore, imagination takes precedence over

judgment but is bound by the possibilities of meaning created by each of the words used, as

discussed in section 6.4, below. When considering Wollheim's (1987, p.101) two-folded

perception (twofoldness) in this example, we can choose between seeing only what can be

materially presented that logically makes sense, or we could continue and let our imagination

take over the experience. 'Twofoldness' enables us to become conscious of imagining as a

mental process together with other specific characteristics which makes it a necessary condition of experience, as Crowther (2007) notes.

In Dickey's metaphor above, it is hard to image that one can arrive at meaning without having an imaginative experience as the basis for an aesthetic evaluation. In Wollheim's account, such an experience is an experiential process based on thinking as a form of 'seeing' when processing the aesthetic of paintings or language. The basis for creating an experience is given by a pictorial image of rain drops or a tent as descriptions of perceived reality and later used in an imaginative process (see Chapter 5, above, for a definition of mental images) which helps in the appreciation of the metaphor and supports the belief that aesthetic evaluation is bound up with how forcefully we use our imagination to create hypotheses.

Wollheim's (1980, p.90) notion of *seeing-in* is suited to explain the imaginative process in novel metaphors because it has an *experiential nature and* it contributes to the *expressive meaning.* As Kemp (2016) puts it, *seeing-in* is an imaginative and perceptual act, similar to Leonardo Da Vinci's instructions for his students to see something in the cracks of a wall (for example battle scenes, hills, clouds) encouraging seeing what exists beyond what is represented. To clarify, what I mean by 'represent' refers to the way we classify and know the world through a system of signs, or interpretations of what the signs point to or represent of a thing's physical properties. As discussed in Chapter 2, above, the system is grounded in the body which converts the external world of experience into an internal one of representations. The representational content, together with non-representational markings within which we see that content, become conscious and cognizant thought the single perceptual experience of *seeing-in* (Hagberg, 2016, p.117). For example, when we look at a painting such as William Harnett's *A Study Table* (1882), we can choose to focus on the experience of looking at the physical details (operational as a sign in Peircean terminology,

see Chapter 7, below), or we could focus on seeing the things they represent or signify in our culture, including religious, political and ethical values. The latter focus is the moment of fascination, when representational meaning is accessed.

William Harnett, *A Study Table*, 1882

Yet, for Wollheim (1987, p.77), representational meaning or the pictorial image is given by interactive elements that are culturally based foundation such as thoughts, beliefs, experiences, emotions, commitments and so on, which form our *cognitive stock* information or "a suitably informed and sensitive spectator". The cognitive stock seems to be the rational-imaginative pre-condition in the interpretation of metaphors and an important consideration in the relationship between metaphor and culture which is part of the debate of whether conceptual metaphors are universal, as for example TIME IS SPACE which can be found in English, Mandarin and Hindi (Kövecses, 2010, p.198).

However, in the metaphor "Beginnings are sudden, but also insidious. They creep up on you sideways, they keep to the shadows, they lurk unrecognized. Then, later, they spring." (Atwood, 2000) the interpretation relies on mental imagery that develops from our ability to see something new by using our existing knowledge of beginnings of things to perceive a certain kind of experience. Furthermore, by using the cognitive stock we can also make accessible the complexities of representational content that are in the metaphors, just

like in paintings. Thus, *seeing-in* or the artistic expression of metaphors is the cognitive stock which brings the aesthetic perception into interpretation. The words in the metaphorical constructions contribute to visualizing what is talked about. Consequently, as both Wollheim (1987) and Gombrich (1961) argue, an object picture and what it depicts depend on how we respond to it. Thus, we can choose to just focus on the individual parts of the metaphor and their denotation, or we could explore their vividness through an imagined perception which we become aware of. The twofoldness is a simultaneous awareness of the metaphor plus perception, and the character of the two aspects is what characterise metaphors as open to interpretation.

Perhaps an even better representation of Wollheim's notion of twofoldness and the information contained as applicable to novel metaphors can be found in Frank Auerbach's paintings related to Titian: 'Study after Titian 1' (1965) in Figure and 'Study after Titian II' in Figure 2. As noted by Hagberg (2016, p.143), the thickness of the paint on the canvas is the most observable feature initially which stands powerfully and directly for one side of the two-fold experience. Then, we can start perceiving the lines as faces, the bodies suggesting a male and a female and that they are moving. Interestingly, Hagberg points out that when looking at the latter painting after seeing the first, we can easily recognize the two silhouettes and the relationship between them, since the information in the first painting becomes cognitive stock for the second.

Fig. 1   Fig. 2

The process just described brings the same criteria of expression to which we appeal in extended metaphors. For example, Carston (2010, p.307) uses Heller's extended metaphor of 'depression' as an animal (discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1, above) to support the idea of a more reflective process derived from the creation of an imaginary world. Such extended metaphors seem to involve a process of looking back and forth at the image of depression like an animal to create the delight given by the text and follow a perceptual path which contains interconnected stages or simultaneity, similar to twofoldness. Nevertheless, each of the instances of metaphor intertwine as meaning, determining ways that create the overall experience of depression as an animal. Yet, the experience relies on our aesthetic perception without which it would be almost impossible to arrive at meaning, but at the same time the use and the choice of words contribute to the visual delight. The contemplation and savouring of words such as 'frantic', 'aggressive', 'assailed' can still linger while carrying on reading the passage above and the rest of the narrative.

Whereas in many metaphors the interpretative process seems to rely on analogical thinking, by relating something new to something else we already know (which is indeed the definition of metaphor) there are others, as pointed out above, where the interpretative process relies on the creation of the perceptual world. Wollheim's (1987) idea of an internal spectator, which refers to imagining as a process of distancing oneself or of freeing oneself from the restriction of perception, explains how we consciously become aware of the denotations of words but also their connotations. Additionally, the recognition stage in the *seeing-in* is an awareness stage where attention must be given to elements such as details and the new connections that they establish amongst them. Thus, the overall appreciation of a metaphor, has not so much to do with the content it creates, but rather with the way it presents such content, through discovery, imagination, surprise or contemplation. As a result, pictorial experience becomes a perceptual experience where aesthetic judgement results from

awareness and contemplation of beauty in something which is new, such as a novel metaphor for example.

Embodied concepts and perceptual experiences or beliefs, which are the basis of the definition of metaphor given by cognitive linguists, can only limit judgements, without allowing a widened perspective that relies on imaginative thoughts. For example, in *A bouncer at a club is a gorilla*, we see a person beneath the concept of a gorilla by considering the resemblance of the two concepts. We do not see him as being a gorilla because our belief is that he is not a gorilla, but we see him as *looking like a gorilla* because, through seeing aspects of objects, we think that he is visually similar to the appearance or the attitude of a gorilla. In other words, cognitive comprehension results from being aware of only one object, whereas *seeing-in* is the awareness stage which involves more distinct objects, similar to the picture and the depicted in Wollheim's account.

Overall, Wollheim's notion of *seeing-in* seems well suited to the exploration of beauty in linguistic constructions of metaphor. *Seeing-in* can not only help us to perceive aspects which are not in the reality-as-object realm, but it has the power to support consciousness or the stage when we become aware of possibilities (see Chapter 7, below) because it is an experience that does not involve conscious forms of reasoning or inference, but of imagining. Appreciation of the beauty that characterises many metaphors results from our ability to "see" something "in" them which becomes an experience ready to be explored. To support this point, the next section considers how the possibility of multiple meanings is a natural characteristic of novelty.

6.4 Multiplicity of meaning and connotations

This section argues that we process metaphorical meaning by considering multiple meanings that are the result of interpreting codes, defined by Cobley (2001, p.1970) as rules of

representing meaning because codes link signs to meanings, together with ideologies, as opposed to the traditional idea of guessing or decoding what the author had in mind when using metaphors. Although in the main theories of metaphor the discussion is focused more on how we comprehend metaphors as compared to how we create them, the theoretical discussion of metaphor implies that creative metaphors are tools that authors use to have effects on their readers by guiding their interpretation. However, as this section argues, it is impossible for an author to know what impact or lasting impression the metaphors that they create through unique analogies, might have on their readers. The authors do not regulate interpretation, but they offer a point of departure for a new perspective since powerful metaphors raise interest by seemingly encouraging people to see something in a whole new light.

The connotations that the association of two ideas opens are important in the interpretative process because to a great extent interpretation is controlled by readers who follow their social conventions in establishing meaning. In Barthes' (1977) theory, the freedom of the reader to interpret the text follows from the denial of an ultimate meaning to the text. Barthes opposes the view of texts as expressing the personality of the author and in his famous proclamation 'The death of the author' (1977, p.148) he rejects the author as a creative genius or godlike creator-figure expressing an inner vision and promotes, instead, freedom for the reader to interpret the text: "The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author". In *S/Z* (1970) Barthes deconstructs a Balzac short story, 'Sarrasine', to demonstrate that the text reflects more voices than just Balzac's alone and, generally, that the author does not have full control of what the text means because authors cannot always be conscious of the reproduction of emotional patterns. The same feature applies to creative metaphors where the interpreter can decide how much focus to give to the association component of the metaphor or, as Cobley (2015, p.14) asserts, how able the reader becomes

to enact textuality. It is impossible for an author to know the impact of their metaphorical language, as for example in the lyrics of Brad Paisley's song 'She's everything': "She's a Saturn with a sunroof / With her brown hair a-blowing / She's a soft place to land / And a good feeling knowing / She's a warm conversation". "She's a soft place to land" may refer to times when the singer feels like falling but having his lover able to cushion his fall. For somebody who has had similar experiences and shares the same values, the interpretation might occur at a deeper level than that of somebody who might not believe that a lover would be there for emotional support.

Undoubtedly, metaphor is one of the tropes that generate a high number of connotations. Changing the form of the signifier while keeping the same signified can generate different connotations. The choice of words often involves connotations as in references to, say, 'strikes' versus 'disputes'. A study conducted by Flusberg et al. (2017) found that using *war* instead of *race* to frame the effort to stop climate change cause participants to feel more pressure about reducing emissions. Another study conducted by Elmore and Luna Lucero (2017) supports the idea that metaphors reinforce culturally ingrained stereotypes as the findings reveal that talking about ideas as *light bulbs* rather than *seeds* made participants find Alan Turing's ideas more exceptional, but when used with female inventors, the ideas as seeds metaphor was found more exceptional. This is consistent with what Barthes considers mythological or ideological characteristics of signs when they reflect particular cultural views such as masculinity, femininity, freedom and so on.

One of the main inconsistencies of the theoretical views of metaphor lies in the conceptual nature of information which implies meaning as fixed. However, as Barthes (1977) argues, meaning cannot be fixed because words and language have the potential to establish and reveal an abundance of meanings. Barthes' (1977, p.143) statement "it is language that speaks, not the author" even denies any ultimate meaning, traditionally residing

in the author, to the text. Often, the text becomes open to different readings, which is seen preponderantly in creative instances of metaphors such as Wordsworth's River Duddon example discussed in section 6.2, above, where two conclusions can be drawn and which clearly illustrates the idea of the plurality of meaning used by Barthes (1977, p.10) to establish metaphor as a code or structure which is largely culturally determined. Another example of the multiplicity of meaning is given by Barthes in his analysis of Poe's (1845) story "The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar" when no one was "able to choose which is the 'true' one [code]", the true meaning or code (either scientific or symbolic code) (1977, p.171). The separate words, the small chunks of text, as well as the combined meaning contribute to our understanding of the text, which is a back-and-forth movement of ideas where some meanings can be forgotten and others can be overused. The central point is that in a creative metaphor, we use our imaginative ability to consider possibilities, examine them and perhaps decide on a suitable one, which Barthes describes as the process of conceiving, imagining and living the plurality of the text or "opening of its [text] significance" (Barthes, p.135). In literal metaphors we can postulate a loss of origin in Barthes' sense, just as the writing comes at the point where speaking ends in the sense that we can no longer locate who is speaking but the point where speaking has started because we take an imaginative path. We read metaphors, just like any other parts of a text, through the signs (words, images, sounds, odours, acts or objects which we assign meaning to and interpret them as signifying something) which cognitive linguists fit into their notion of embodiment. However, for Barthes, as Cobley, (2015, p.7) discusses, signs are material entities or *signifiants* whilst what they represent are the mental concepts or *signifié* (see also Chapter 5, above, for a discussion of mental representations and Chapter 7, below, for a brief discussion of signs). For metaphors, Barthes' account of meaning establishes the equal importance of both

connotations (socio-cultural and personal associations) and denotations (definitional or literal meaning), despite his later belief that they become indistinguishable.

In later writings, Barthes (1975, p.9; 1977, p.166) considers denotation as just another connotation based on the idea that denotation goes through a process of naturalization which is making cultural and historical values, attitudes and believes seem natural, objective and true reflections of reality. He claims that it is no longer easy to separate the signifier from the signified, or the ideological from the "literal", an idea also sustained by Derrida (1974, p.7) who also challenges the distinction. Novel metaphors seem to support such unity because they encompass both an aesthetic basis and a hidden ideological meaning. Moreover, connotations allow for the interpretation to remain open since they are given by the socio-cultural and personal associations (ideological, emotional) of the sign. Even some stability in interpretation such as in the conventional metaphor *He is a snake* would differ in connotations between the members of a Christian society in the eastern world and those of Hindu or Buddhism religion, for whom a snake is seen as beneficial to humans.

However, for Barthes, connotations are ideologies or myths which represent the use of signifiers for expressing the dominant values of a society class or historical period. In cognitive metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson,1980), myths help us to make sense of our experiences within a culture and help organize shared ways of conceptualizing something within a culture, but they do not "turn nature into culture" in the way described by Barthes. Importantly, Barthes (1975, p.206) sees myths as reflections of reality but driven by the ideological interests of the bourgeoisie who he claims seeks to "turn culture into nature". Yet, what accounts for reality and truth becomes problematic in the cognitive framework of metaphors where communication is based on metaphorical language derived from bodily experience and "human categorization is constrained by reality" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.186) and where concepts correspond to interactional properties and objects in the world.

The contrast between objectivism (a world made up of objects) and the myth of subjectivism (which prioritizes experiencing individual feelings and intuitions) remains a challenge for cognitive linguists (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p.186-8; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987, p.ix) who seem to avoid how myths emerge and who do not consider imagination and emotion to have a central role in creating meaning. Barthes (1975, p.206) makes an important point when he argues that myths can function to hide the ideological function of signs and codes (contrasting signs and ways or organising meaning) and in this way, myths can "go without saying" and without the need for interpretative processes.

Consequently, metaphors operate in the fashion of a code as part of a system of a culture or sub-culture and authors can master their usage. For the account of metaphor given in this thesis that includes the perceptual experience alongside the conceptual trait of metaphor, Barthes' clarification on the nature of codes becomes useful. Barthes (2005, p.155) makes clear that codes are associative fields, an organization of notations that creates a structure within a culture. Codes and signs have concrete aspects which is strongly argued by Derrida (1974, p.197) for whom specificity of words is a material dimension, supporting the view that signs are material things (although signs are not always material), including some kind of embodiment (whether in sounds, movements of the body, etc.). Such concrete aspects of metaphors become culturally available and dominant ways of thinking and talking about everyday life (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Consequently, in metaphors, as in general, it seems right to follow Barthes' (2005) belief that words act as an anchor with an ideological function for the preferred reading of an image. For example, "black milk of dawn we drink you at night" (Celan, 1948, p.54) refers to the horrible treatment of Jews in concentration camps during the Second World War and it would be incomprehensible to somebody who does not know some of the relevant history. Milk, especially through its colour, is often associated with innocence and life, whilst the

colour black symbolizes death. The image of black milk signifies innocence being corrupted. The mental images may offer a literal and symbolic meaning which, for Barthes, is the 'obvious sense'; but they also offer an elusive or '*obtuse*' meaning which Barthes considers to be much more interesting. The result of connecting the concepts of black and milk cannot remain only at a logical stage. The two words become an anchor to manifest sense perception and feelings associated with their connection. Perhaps the idea of words as anchors is clearer in Bernard Malamud's (1975) affirmation cited by Grothe (2008, p.10): "I love metaphor. It provides two loaves where there seems to be one. Sometimes it throws in a whole load of fish".

Overall, this section discussed the importance of connotations in theorising metaphor and presented Barthes' view on meaning which establishes the lack of real limits to understanding the associations between ideas. Barthes view of connotations as dominant ideologies and reflections of reality helps understand how a metaphorical interpretation opens to a mixture of considerations of the literal meaning, socio-cultural and personal associations and any other patterns that might come to memory. Most importantly, there is not always the necessity to seek an analytical justification of the meaning which happens in many original metaphors through some ideas which linger and remain open to exploration. Before looking at what motivates expressivity, we need to consider the nature of pleasure as one of the effects of metaphors which is discussed in the section that follows.

6.5 Novelty and pleasure

According to Barthes (1975, p.40), we evaluate the world based on the opposition between old and new, in such a way that "the new is not a fashion, it is a value, the basis of all criticism: our evaluation of the words no longer depends on, at least not directly, as in Nietzsche, on the opposition between noble and base, but on that between Old and New."

Considering that novelty opposes the stereotype and the mass culture, it becomes clear why original metaphors are special because newness is revolutionary and thrilling. Although some familiar metaphors might provide steady pleasure, new metaphors are also pleasurable but through their novelty. Yet, the concept of novelty is uses by Barthes to distinguish between pleasure and bliss (delight).

While pleasure can exist in familiarity and repetition of language or 'a mass banalisation', it cannot exist in an impulse toward the New, which is what Barthes (1975, p.40) considered to be bliss. For instance, with reading, we can experience pleasure even from a mundane metaphor such as *He is a shark*, because of the "comfortable practice of reading" that follows our cultural norms in Barthes's (1975, p.40) view. Common metaphors which are mainly of the A is B type -*He was a fish out of his water at his new school* or *He is a wolf/lion/pig* - seem to be logical and lead to a conclusion, accounting for a type of *horizontal* writing (1975, p.42) which does not offer the excitement of deciphering, which seems to be the main reason why such metaphors go unnoticed in mundane conversations. Clarity in literature and consequently in metaphors is associated with conventionality and familiarity, which Barthes points out that can offer only imitation, not exploration or the creation of a discursive world, which applies to original metaphors. The *horizontal* type of text is often saturated in cultural conventions, just as conventional metaphors are and a good example according to Barthes is the Balzacian text: "because of its cultural codes, it stales, rots, excludes itself from writing … it is the quintessence, the residual condensate of what cannot be rewritten (1975, p.98).

By contrast, bliss is discomforting (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom) because it is an irregularity which only comes with the absolute *new* because only the *new* requires an imaginative process and an awakening of consciousness (see Chapter 4, above). Yet, original metaphors unsettle our assumptions and create a whole experience by shocking and

surprising us through the unexpected, which in Barthes' terms becomes a *style* because the text invokes something else beyond mere realism and which can create pleasure and delight (jouissance). While pleasure is a state and it can be created by conventional metaphors, bliss is an action because the qualities can only be experienced and not defined. Highly creative metaphors follow this interpretation route of bliss as action because they are rich in imagery and consequently in lived emotions, or in other words representations of what we feel through our body, as discussed in Chapter 3, above, in relation to Damasio's account.

Furthermore, poetic metaphors are also convoluted because the interpreter must undertake an evaluative process in order to bring some stability in their interpretation. Here, it is important to explain Barthes' (1985, p.319) notion of *obtuse meaning* which he defines as a type of non-articulate meaning which takes place in an evaluative process during which interpreters explore possibilities and which provides access to a completely different experience. Such a meaning, which is in contrast to the symbolic, or obvious meaning (Allen, 2003, p.123) becomes relevant to the aesthetic experience in metaphors where expressiveness pervades understanding, because Barthes's definition of obtuse meaning clarifies how emotions are important in intellectual thinking and also shows that uncertainty is a feature of the metaphorical meaning.

Barthes' obtuse meaning is similar to Damasio's feeling of a feeling and the experience of inner tension (discussed in Chapter 4, above, section 4.5). Barthes (1985, p.322) clarifies that obtuse meaning is not the gestural or facial expression of an emotion since these belong to the reality and the obvious meaning, but it is something "indescribable" and "spasm of the signified", much like Damasio's (2000, p.174) argument for an emotion-orientated way of thinking. In the same vein as Barthes, Damasio understands that embodied subjectivity occurs through feelings that orient 'the inner speech' or our reflection upon our experience. Obtuse meaning becomes useful because the association of the components

creates significance by aiding embodiment of situations which result from something other than communication or expression.

As such, the obtuse meaning stands for how interpreters become embodied and affective and opposes other types when information is transmitted as often seen in descriptions or symbolic signification. For instance, like many other poetic metaphors, the following metaphor is ambiguous: "He was deeply in love. When she spoke, he thought he heard bells as if she were a garbage truck backing up" (Geary, 2012, p.125). The ambiguity here resides in an impossibility for a final or fixed meaning to be reached and also in the emotions which must be lived in order for the metaphorical expression to be understood. A creative metaphor can be seen as an operation where the interpretation can move back and forth between the denotation and hypothetical situations.

One of Barthes' points which should be included in any theoretical discussion of metaphor is that comprehension can be realised through imagination. The metaphor above illustrates such a point because we interpret the metaphor through imagining something improbable and through "the complete exploration of virtual elements" (Barthes, 1972, p.240). Hence, a metaphor can be comprehended not only by using existing and embodied information, but also by using hypothetical situations, through analogy and associated meaning (this point is further discussed in Chapter 7, below).

Barthes also highlights the indeterminacy of the order of metaphor and its explicit nature by claiming that "the metaphor is displayed in its entirety; circular and explicit, it refers to no secret: […] an open literature which is situated beyond any decipherment" (1972, p.243). Barthes's analysis of the *chiasm* strategy used by Bataille with "break an eye" and "put out an egg" instead of the expected analogy of *break an egg* or *put out an eye*, reveals that the associations between the metaphorical terms and the mental image they form are not open to endless possibilities and free associations because they are bound to the choice of the

terms which means that information can only be accessed from the finite series. The implication of this point for creative metaphors is that they are indeed bound to the signs and their denotation which act as a starting point and can always be used as a base in the exploration of connotations. Yet, for Barthes (1963, p.129-30), the selection of possibilities "becomes contiguity" and the metaphor together with the metonymy become syntagms and systems ordering human communication, which is reminiscent of cognitive linguists and their mapping system with embodied concepts.

The exploration of ambiguity in novel metaphors can only bring depth to the engagement between the metaphor and its interpreters and turn the interpretation into a constant wonder of what it offers and a searching or waiting for a truth that might not even be found. What Barthes calls "bliss" unsettles the interpreters' assumptions and break their cultural habits, creating surprise, fascination and even curiosity. A metaphor such as "You're my wonderwall" from Oasis can only be appreciated through the discomfort and the wonder, since we do not know what *a wonderwall* actually is and thus we cannot use already established conceptual information. By contrast, in metaphors such as *Love is a journey*, *blanket of clouds* and *stubborn stains*, meaning is based on clear elements in the analogy and gives an easy-to-understand meaning. Barthes would classify the latter examples as a comfortable practice, where meaning equates to truth because some stability has been found by conforming to ideologies, cultural habits and settling assumptions. However, Barthes' (1975, p.6) argument that the fascination lies in the interplay of absence against presence that restricts the interpreter's ability to comprehend, justifies the presence of pleasure in interpretation of original metaphors even when interpreters might observe the lack of meaning. Such aspects can be seen in Bataille's startling expressions "break an eye" and "put out an egg" or other metaphors such as *Q: How do poets say hello? A: Hey, haven't we*

metaphor? Thus, literary pleasure is bequeathed exactly by this inability to reach a final connotative characteristic.

To conclude, the interpretation of unusual and original metaphors often remains open ended but provides pleasure at the same time because the absence of meaning becomes a process through which interpreters become ready to assume any contours, to use imagination and hypothesise both ideas. In the absence of any intellectual associations, such a process becomes a model of multisensory activity where bodily and emotions reactions become conscious, thus connecting novelty in comprehension of metaphor to emotional comprehension. The expressivity of metaphors does not come from what can be analysed in the association of two ideas, but can only be experienced, escaping analysis and thus enjoyed.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to clarify the notion of *beauty* and the nature of aesthetics because of their importance in the subjectivity of the interpretation of metaphors, in the way that metaphors support an aesthetic judgement as opposed to a conceptual embodied logic, especially in poetic metaphors which always rely on an indefinite action of imagination and which do not have a definite meaning. Wollheim's view of artistic expression based on perception and consciousness has the power to cater for the imaginative process and perceptual experience that characterise creative and unusual metaphors. While we can all agree that some metaphors are beautiful, opinions can also differ greatly, with some novel instances being considered vague, difficult and even absurd. Thus, a rejection of an objective definition of beauty (Tolstoy, 1960; Taylor, 1978) leads to defining beauty as the pleasure we have from not only emotions or other states, but also from the whole ability to imagine and scrutinise connotations and possible meanings. Barthes' view of meaning is used to explain the experience involving our senses rather than an articulate meaning and explicit logic.

Thus, the chapter argued that beauty brings fascination, high cognitive engagement through our capacity to imagine and a kind of unity with the metaphorical meaning given by an emotional response. Where the current chapter brought together imagination and beauty as factors for the aesthetic quality of metaphors, Chapter 7 will identify the conditions of a successful metaphor and discuss interest and ambiguity in order to establish the role of novelty and imagination in the creation and appreciation of the associations of two ideas provided through metaphor.

CHAPTER 7: NOVELTY AND SUCCESSFUL METAPHORS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter explores a number of notions from Peirce's semiotics to argue that a metaphor is good and successful if, alongside the basic requirements of similarity and the semantic tension, the metaphor is also a way to discover possibilities, or, in other words, the metaphor is a process of creative discovery. A metaphor is original and spontaneous when its elements are placed together to emphasize one or more connections between them (semantic tension); but there is another type of mental activity which relies on the movement of ideas, imagination and probabilities, which contributes to defining metaphors as 'good'. This chapter explores the argument that metaphors arise in our imagination, a process which builds on conventionality in order to give rise to originality and further lays the basis of understanding that novelty/originality mainly draws from the fact that metaphor is an object of inquiry. Whereas the previous chapter covered the expressiveness of metaphor and its role in artistic creativity, despite his acknowledgement of the importance of aesthetics in philosophy artistic creativity is not addressed in detail by Peirce because his main interest was in *discovery* rather than *creativity* and in *thought* rather than *feeling*.

The current chapter begins with an outline of the conditions for successful metaphors with emphasis on how resemblance in imaginative acts creates possibilities, as opposed to actuality, since unusual metaphors force us to become attentive and put some effort into the interpretation. Section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 clarify how semantic novelty (the indexical tension) functions in a metaphor and how the possibilities for imaginative pleasure are created. Section 7.3 argues that stale metaphorical meaning can be revived because cognition and language are metaphorical. Section 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 explains Peirce's notions of *abduction* and *effeteness* to show the trajectory of meaning from an initial state of vagueness to a final habitual logic.

7.2 When a metaphor is good

A great metaphor might not be the result of mental genius, as Aristotle (Poetics 1459a) suggests, but one with a functional power for a productive open-endedness that gives interpreters an opportunity to create. An analogy (or a model) between terms might be a necessity for a metaphor, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 6, above; but it is not a sufficient condition for a successful metaphor, which reveals itself as a puzzle for the mind. We are often automatically inclined to want to solve the puzzle and the mystery included in interpreting a successful metaphor (Bearsdley, 1962; Black, 1962; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990), despite the fact that we do not have any instructions and the only boundaries are given by the limitations of what each word means. As discussed in Chapter 6, in the absence of the search process, an expression remains an analogy without becoming a metaphor because it only shows and explains concepts. An analogy such as *a coach is to football team what a manager is to a business* helps explain an idea by the process of comparison; but there is no deciphering the meaning as in a metaphor, because it is not needed.

What defines a good metaphor is well addressed by Haley (1988, p.14) who argues that creative metaphors involve a balanced use of signs in Peirce's second trichotomy of signs: *the symbol (world sign), the index (sign) and the icon (object, resemblance).* The second trichotomy of signs is a framework for the existence of knowledge, one of Peirce's three categories of sign which show the relationship between the sign and its object. Therefore, the relationship is given by a sign (representamen) that can refer to its object through relationships of similarity (firstness), contextual contiguity (secondness) or law (thirdness) and the sign may be termed an *icon*, an *index* and a *symbol,* respectively. Before defining metaphor through Peirce's terminology, it is useful to clarify several notions and principles from his semiotics. A sign (or Representamen) is defined as a stimulus which can be interpreted, either as signifying something or standing for something (CP 2.172).

Importantly, as pointed out by Cobley (2019, p.18), Peirce's sign refers to "a way to conceive a *collection* of signs" which means that a word, a sentence or a passage can be a sign. This characteristic is useful to explain the interpretation of metaphors which are extended over a length of text or of implied metaphors where only one element of a metaphorical construct is expressed. Additionally, Eco (1976, p.178) provides a clear explanation of what icon/index/symbol stand for in the Peircean semiotics. An icon is one possible type or form a sign might take, but as an imitation of an object or concept, such as a photograph which resembles what it represents. An index is the sign that resembles something that implies the object or concept, such as a footprint, which is the index of a foot. A symbol is learned association with the concept it represents or a learnt representation, such as the letters of the alphabet and the language. Just as icons and indexes can become symbols over time through repetition, metaphors which we consider settled or conventional might have undergone the same process of representation.

Furthermore, Peirce's trichotomies appear extended into ten classes of signs which denote possible, actual and necessitant, as in Fig. 3, below:


Figure 3: A diagram for 10 classes of signs from CP 2.264

These classes are the result of grouping the Sign itself, its Object and its Interpretant.
Returning to the trichotomies of signs, of which the second trichotomy is explained above, I
will briefly mention the other two since I refer to their components in the discussion below.
According to the first division, a sign can be a *Qualisign* (see 1 in the Figure 3, above) when
it is a quality, which means that it must be embodied, although the embodiment does not
provide its character as a sign (CP 2.264). A *Signsign* is an actual object or event which is a
sign and because it can be a sign only through qualities, it involves one or more Qualisigns. A
Legisign (map or ringing of a phone) is a law or convention which requires a *Signsign*
because *Legisigns* can only signify through being applied or through a Replica of them. In the
third trichotomy, a sign may be termed a *Rheme*, a *Dicent sign* or an *Argument* (see Figure 3,
above). A *Rheme* is a sign of Possibility for its Interpretant or representing a possible object.
A Dicent sign is a sign of actual existence for its Interpretant and it cannot be an icon. An
Argument is a Sign of law.

Because the words in a metaphor are signs for different concepts, their clash creates
the semantic tension which, in turn, is recognized by interpreters as a sign or an *index* for
something factual (icon), perhaps the shock when they recognize the expression as unusual or
as a metaphor. Finally, interpreters begin searching for likeness between the metaphor's
referents which is done in the form of an icon (resemblance in the sense of sharing qualities
since an icon is not strictly resemblance that suggests only visual likeness; because an icon
involves sharing qualities, it is related as a Firstness). Searching for the metaphorical
meaning can result in either discovering the icon, which will be interpreted in relation to its
object (the 'literal' topic), allowing in this way for the finding of a literal likeness.
Alternatively, it can result in a completely subjective interpretation if the icon is not found.
According to Haley (1988), the index of semantic tension acquires its own iconic force in

highly creative metaphors, changing and reshaping the interpreter's impression of the resemblance between the original image (icon) and its target.

Nevertheless, Peirce's account brings several important ideas to an in-depth discussion of what makes a metaphor stand out. As Haley (1988, p.16) notes, Peirce suggests that a pure resemblance or *icon* can be a highly imaginative act in the sense that the resemblance can only be a possibility, as opposed to an actuality. One of the direct implications is that it is difficult to argue that all metaphors result from establishing cognitive links, or mappings, as the first generation of cognitive linguists contend. This issue is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Instead, an imaginative act, as discussed in Chapter 4, is a possibility rather than an actuality and it often characterizes well the new and original metaphors, many of which can be found in literature, paintings and drawings. Further, Peirce's suggestion that a pure resemblance or *icon* can be only a possibility and not an actuality, characterizes well the new and original metaphors, many of which can be found in literature, paintings and drawings. For instance, through its title and the images depicted in it, the drawing named *Travelling to the other side of the mind*, 2019, by Enrique F. Gibert involves a phantasmatic scene. The resemblance can be only a possibility given by the unnatural or irrational juxtapositions. Interpreting such examples is often an unusual experience which goes some way towards explaining why metaphors are perceived as special and differ, in their operations, from literal reference. Nonetheless, other metaphors and similes represent their objects mainly by a broad process of resemblance as, for example, "We are like dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants" (John of Salisbury, *ML,* 1159).

As metaphors vary in their degree of metaphoricity, some metaphors have images as their dominant characteristic. Examples include *The boxer has an iron fist*; here, we process the sensory connection by imagining the feel of a boxer's fist, its solidity, weight and hardness. Other examples involve a classic analogy: *The president has an iron will* which

casts the president's will not so much in terms of solidity, weight and hardness but as immovability, stubbornness and imposing by reconfiguring this piece of abstract information and creating a relation of analogy that is needed for the comprehension process. Further, there is another type of metaphor which Peirce refers to as *something else*, equivalent to "those [hypoicons] which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else*." (CP 2.277). According to Haley (1988, p.37), for Peirce unusual metaphors are signs - but not like the other ordinary signs. They differ in kind from the image- and analogy-based metaphors. A highly creative metaphor is a sign which iconizes its object's own character as sign. This means that a highly creative metaphor obtains its iconic power by *representing a parallelism* in something else or a controlling iconic type. Metaphors dominated by image and analogy are likely to become lexicalised in language because of their symmetry; but unusual metaphors can maintain their degree of metaphoricity for longer because the similarity created can either not be fully understood or can be difficult to delineate and brought to a sufficiently concrete level in thought to make it adhere.

The boundary between what is real and what we can imagine is given by Peirce in his statement that "Of those [combinations] which occur in the ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all that occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.... [For] the sensible world is but a fragment of the ideal world" (CP 3.527). Haley (1988, p.108) explains Peirce's idea by comparing examples such as "a barking butterfly" with "a barking triangularity", which both require an imaginative process, yet have different origins. The first case is a non-possibility in the real world and we think about it by acknowledging the actual world (Actuality). Thus, the tension in the metaphor is moderate because we cross an existential boundary that requires only a moderate imaginative effort since the "gap" resides in something which exists, in Actuality. In mundane metaphors, the tension results from crossing a conventional boundary given by habitual associations, where no *boundary of*

experience or conception is crossed: this is the form of association that Peirce identifies as 'habit'. For example, we associate barking with dogs, but we talk about a person as *barking when talking* because we consider barking as a manifestation of aggression. The tension that the metaphor creates in such examples is minor, hardly noticed by interpreters because crossing the boundary reflects habitual usage, often linked to cultural attitudes.

Yet, in the latter example, "a barking triangularity", a conceptual boundary must be crossed because a change in concepts is required. Thus, the novelty in highly creative metaphors might be given by crossing of *a conceptual boundary*, but this *follows* the crossing of the existential and conventional boundaries as well. As an example, in "words float in syllabic nets of frost" (Sexton, 1985 cited in Haley, 1988, p.63), the language is unconventional and most unlikely to have been experienced before. For Haley (1988, p.63), "nets of frost" crosses an existential boundary because the interpretant is asked to experience by imagining a frozen breath forming in fine lattice in the cold air, which later helps in interpreting the more abstract part of the metaphor that resides in "syllabic nets". What is made clear, here, is that the degree of figural tension is influenced by the kind of boundary that a metaphor crosses - conceptual, existential or conventional - which also helps in interpreting and reinterpreting the possibilities given by the shared qualities aroused by the icon.

Additionally, Peirce's three categories: Possibility (results from a conceptual boundary), Actuality (existential kind of boundary) and Habit (conventional boundary), reveal that metaphors involve high, medium and low tension. To clarify, possibility relates to the idea of First (Firstness) which is about freshness, freedom and new. According to Peirce (CP 2.152), Firstness is pure sensation, the consciousness in which there is no analysis, comparison or any other process, but it possesses its unique quality that is unmatched by anything else. Firstness is similar to Wollheim's perceptual act of *seeing-in* (discussed in

Chapter 6) where the artistic expression finds its roots, since both notions refer to latent potentiality. The Secondness in Peirce's category is the level of consciousness where reality is experienced and intellectual categorisation is done, such as attributing the firstness of the quality of redness, to a flower. Thirdness is the mediator of the relationship between the First and the Second and corresponds to culture, the conformity or habitual mode of thinking through which thought, language, representation and semiosis takes place (Danesi, 2004).

Of course, any anomalous expression crosses the conceptual boundary, but it does not mean that the expressions are metaphors. Chomsky's examples in Haley (1988, p.106) "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" and "triangularity barks" cross a clear conceptual boundary but, even when placed into a context, they remain almost meaningless because it is impossible to find a clear similarity between their elements. By contrast, in Sexton's metaphor "Our words float before us / In fine syllabic nets / Of frost ....", the beauty and pleasure result from being directed to something close to a truth when we think of the impossibility of words being captured in syllabic nets. Crossing the conceptual boundary is still there in the metaphor and it can be used by interpreters to enhance the discovery that it allowed.

7.2.1 Metaphor as a creative discovery and the semantic shock as novelty

In Chapters 5 and 6 it was argued that the link and the similarity between the elements of the metaphor already exists. The link is not something that is created but, rather, it is discovered (Geary, 2012; Haley, 1988). More importantly, a new discovery is the result of instinctive reasoning, which is discussed below in Section 7.4.1, below, using Peirce's (CB 2.104) notion of *abduction,* described as an *instinctive reason* or a magical faculty by which the mind is attuned to reality. One of the implications of metaphor being a creative discovery is that we can no longer consider guessing what the creator of a metaphor had in mind

(discussed in Chapter 6, above). As Haley (p.10) points out, Peirce rejects the similarity as being a creation of the poet, as if the poet had thought of how interpreters might create the meaning. For Peirce, the similarity that is created by the metaphorical terms creates a *possibility* or *potentiality* which implies that the process of finding similarities in novel metaphors is a *creative discovery*, rather than an artifact bequeathed by the poet. Peirce's contention that perception of metaphor might be imaginary for poets but is real for interpreters explains how a metaphor obtains its expressive power and why not all anomalous associations and connections can be poetic metaphors.

As noted earlier, Haley (1988, p.48) stresses the process of discovery which he considers to be the principle of metaphor because discovery is an art-creation process of new meaning. In Keats' lines "the dark silent blue/ with all its diamonds trembling through and through" the metaphor *trembling diamonds* is the result of comparing *stars* to *diamonds* and *trembling* to *sparkling*. The similarity between stars and diamonds results from the sparkling quality that they both have and thus, *star diamonds* becomes a way of discovery. Here, the discovery process, as Haley (p.53) discusses, is reminiscent of Black's interaction theory where the metaphorical meaning is given by two thoughts being active together and interacting as opposed to resulting from a literal comparison or substitute. It is the interaction that creates the tension in the metaphor and from which interpreters draw the metaphorical meaning. Furthermore, using the Peircean terms, Haley considers *diamonds* to be an *icon* for the object stars because they both share the quality of sparkling, but he also points out that the same sensory similarity between diamonds and stars can be interpreted differently, as a "high value" related to the height of the stars. Thus, similarity in metaphor can have different interpretations and undergo a selective process.

Additionally, Haley (1988, p.14) suggests that Peirce's *indexical* component of metaphor should be considered the clash of dissimilarities in metaphors, the semantic shock

which gives rise to the perception of novelty. In poetic metaphors, the poet introduces the icon rather than creating the metaphorical meaning and the implication is that the meaning becomes subjective, embodied and enactive, as discussed in Chapter 2 and not related to the traditional idea of searching for 'what the author had in mind' when they created the metaphor. As Haley points out, the Peircean Icon in metaphor is similar to I.A. Richard's vehicle (discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1, above) and the semantic tension (the index) "arises most directly from the introduction of an icon into the metaphorical complex" (Haley, 1988, p.15). For instance, in *Man is a thinking reed*, the tenor *man* is a symbol for humanity, because it is associated to the literal topic or the object (what the metaphor is about) and *reed* symbolizes the figural icon when we imaginatively compare the referent, reed, to man. Moreover, using Max Black's (1962) model (discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2, above) to the same metaphor, the semantic tension which is created only when adding *reed* to the frame *Man is a thinking [...]* generates a *focus* as a first step of interpretation.

However, the 'nesting' characteristic of the process must be first explained before discussing how we process the symbolic thinking when interpreting metaphors. Considering Deacon's (1997, p.449) distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic modes of representation, which are not separate, but rather form a nested hierarchy, it can become clear how language and the words in a metaphorical construct build on each other in thinking symbolically. Building on Peirce's semiotic, Deacon (1997, p.22, 62) argues that language is an expression of a mode of thought of symbolic representation and because reference is not intrinsic to a sign, but is a response to a sign, reference becomes the result of an interpretive thinking which can determine different references for the same sign. Deacon develops Peirce's argument that interpretants can be categorically different by arguing for the existence of interpretants (Thirdness) from other references. Thus, the different possible interpretations of signs (iconic, indexical, symbolic) build on each other to lead to levels of interpretation.

How a metaphor is interpreted depends on our capacity to interpret and use any of the interpretation modes. Although we would normally start the interpretation of a metaphor in a hierarchical order, using our ability to interpret signs iconically, before interpreting them indexically and then symbolically, the sign can be interpreted in any ways, as Peirce (5.237) points out. The iconic and indexical interpretative processes create relationships with other icons and indices, both real and imaginary. Hence, the referential relationships between the words in a metaphor allow words to be *about* indexical relationships, rather than being indices. Most importantly, Deacon (1997, p.89) suggests that the associative reference shifts into a symbolic reference and a shift brings a change, mainly because symbolic representation produces a medium for consciousness. For metaphors, this view means that we can look at the process of meaning creation as relying on the words' combinatory role and assumptions to make generalizations from the regularities in the relationships between the words of a metaphor, thus considering and emphasizing the relationships (and not just the content) of the embodied ideas as in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (to some extent the relationships are considered in the conceptual blending theory).

Certainly, the notion of *index* in Peirce's account explains aesthetic appreciation of novelty in metaphors. As a function of the metaphor's semantic tension the dynamic linguistic actualization must involve opposition between the metaphor's elements. Since the opposition is false and an impossibility, it "flags our attention" (Haley, 1988, p.97) and invites us to become aware of possibilities and creating a powerful truth of metaphor. Yet, when the index is interpreted as the metaphorical vehicle, the icon is considered in its role as the index's object, rather than in its own capacity as a sign of the metaphor's literal theme. Appreciation and understanding of creative metaphors is given not only by focusing on the icon, but by considering how the indexical tension (the semantic novelty) functions aesthetically and semantically in the metaphor and in its context. It must be emphasized here

that Peirce (5.213) maintains that all our knowledge takes the form of a hypothesis which we then test, classify and relate, but which can only happen because we have the ability to manipulate signs. Haley (p.16) draws attention to the patterns of indexical tension that are used to *shape* our perception of iconic truth when, in sophisticated metaphors, poets use shocking juxtapositions (indexical semiosis) not only for grabbing the readers' attention but also to direct attention to a link or relationship that might go unnoticed. In doing so, poets "shock us for the sake of truth, shock us with a linguistic 'lie' that contains a semeiotic truth, with an apparent impossibility that subsumes and requires that we sharpen our vision of possibility" (Haley, 1988, p.16). Thus, indexical tension is important because it becomes a building block in the interpretation of metaphors.

Moreover, Peirce (EP 2.307, 2.460) points out that a symbol is associated with conventionality, but conventionality is at the roots of idioms and conventional metaphors, many of which become symbols or voluntary and intentional agreements over meaning. It is wide accepted that the novelty of a metaphor lies in how odd and strange it is. In the *Ethics of Terminology*, Peirce (CP 2.222) explains that a symbol, defined above, is used metaphorically for different conceptions from its original only under two conditions: when the original and new meaning must be "strictly analogous in their principal suggestions" and also "*remote from one another,* both in themselves and in their occasions of occurrence". Those metaphors that meet both conditions are good, and an example is Keats's "The stars are trembling diamonds". This metaphor meets both conditions because the analogy is in the components' shared *sparkling* characteristic. Interpreters can easily identify the source of the tension from the instant clash of the sense of the words and their dissimilarity. The dissimilarity gives the possibility for imaginative pleasure, for playing with possibilities in the search for a higher truth beyond the boundary of the literal meaning.

7.2.2 What makes a metaphor successful

According to Haley (1988), one of the characteristics that define the most successful poetic metaphors is that the pathway of their complexity keeps leading back to an antecedent possibility and vagueness (Firstness in Peircean terminology) which precedes the metaphor's linguistic embodiment of it (Secondness in Peircean terminology). As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, above, a metaphor is more than just the activation of two concepts and the start of an interaction between them. Haley goes on to say that, rather, the entire interpretative process is a reaction to a substantive icon, a possibility based on real elements.

For example, in Shakespeare's lines about Ulysses in *Troilus and Cressida*, (I.iii.119-124) the metaphorical meaning is fundamentally created from a precise and substantial notion of true likeness:

Then every thing include itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite,
And appetite, an universal wolf
(So doubly seconded with will and power),
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.

The hypothesis of a real sharing of qualities in this example is specific and given by not only seeing "appetite" as an "universal wolf", but the recognition of the appetite of people for power and how dangerous that can be, identified as a real beastliness of men, an existing aspect of human nature. Haley (1988, p.61) clarifies that it is not Shakespeare's imagination that created the metaphor but, rather his recognition of filtered and narrowed information, his revitalisation of the truth which, for interpreters, becomes a revelation. Thus, the force of a metaphor can be found in exactly how hard it can strike interpreters through the discovery process.

However, in a novel metaphor it is hard to give a name or be specific when a new similarity is discovered, and it normally takes time to feel the *rightness* of the metaphor and its reality. For example, the songwriter Nicki Minaj clarifies the interpretation of her song "beez in the trap" as "that's our slang way of saying, 'I beez doing such-and-such-and-such. ' So it's really like, 'I am always in the trap. ' Now, the trap, [...] relates to anywhere where you get your money" (BBC 1, 2012). The two disparate elements *beez* and *trap* offer an instantaneous feeling of a Sisyphean moment, of bees always working and being trapped in the workplace. When the situation is transferred to people, it can reveal a new possibility to become the symbol for making money all the time which is linguistically coded through the words used in the construal of metaphor. In Peircean terms, *bees – trap* is a metaicon successfully realized by encouraging interpreters to see both bees and trap in a new way with a new meaning. Both examples, chosen from different artistic fields, are clear instances of how the discovery broadens the mind beyond the known by considering new associations beyond the original likeness. As Haley (p.64) points out, the finding of a fresh and striking similarity - which represents the logical aspect - prompts the quest for further possibilities. At the very least, it elicits that sensation of the ineffable, the idea that "more is there, if only it could be discovered", which becomes a realm of possibilities, both in a real world and a fictive one.

Despite being at the core of metaphor, the similarity offers insufficient grounds to support the novelty because outcomes such as wonder, surprise, shock and other reactions that a novel metaphor creates, are present in dissimilarities, making the metaphor rely on similarity and dissimilarity at the same time. This creates a tension which cannot be ignored in the interpretation (Haley, 1988, pp.10-11). As Haley discusses, interaction (as it appears in the accounts of Richards, 1924, 1936; Black, 1962 and Ricoeur, 1977) between metaphorical elements is important because it creates semantic growth. In Peirce's account, such growth is

indigenous to the realm of Thirdness and as Haley suggests, the growth of new meaning can be either a transitory conceptual expansion, a situation when interpreters temporarily see things in a new light, or a permanent one which can create a new symbolism. Permanent conceptual expansion is common in advertising and media where brands are symbols in Peirce's sense (see section 7.2.1, above for a definition of symbol) and some examples are the logos of famous brands such as Nike and McDonalds.

Haley (1988, p.55) observes that a new metaphor can be trivial when the similarity has little or no objective reality outside the metaphor itself and a good example is "Life is a verb, not a noun" because it seems unrealistic. He concludes that the feelings of a profound antecedent truth (the linguistic actualization of the metaphorical reality) that comes after the surprise of the discovery is a direct indicator of the substantive value in the metaphor. Thus, the meaning of the non-trivial metaphor is rooted in the possibility of the antecedent reality.

By contrast, in ordinary metaphors the icon is placed alongside the true object and the interpreter will be able to focus on the object itself in the pursuit of the truth (Haley, p.89). In some examples such as *the elephant in the room, he was a fish out of water,* the icons *elephant* and *fish* are brought forward as objects of the truth, helping the interpreters to focus on contemplating the qualities which the objects and icons share. The next section discusses the process of stabilizing meaning and explains how metaphors become conventionalised.

7.3 The degree of novelty: From novel to stabilized meaning

If metaphors are the building blocks of our cognition, as cognitive linguists argue and if they are also short ways to communicate information that is perceived as new (for example Black's (1962) claim that metaphor organizes our view of a subject), it might be right to assume that all metaphors were once *active*. That is, they were once perceived as new and unusual, regardless of the initial differential level of shock and surprise that they created. This

insight relies on the acceptance of the view that we cannot think without metaphors (Nietzsche, 1979; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In many discussions of metaphor, the emphasis is on the range from conventional and familiar forms (*bright student*, *He is a snake/shark/lion/pig/butterfly*, *You are wasting my time*, *She is a Bridget Jones*) to those highly poetic forms such as Frost's (1915) poem 'The Road Not Taken': "Two roads diverged in a yellow wood and sorry I could not travel both" or Hirshfield (2011), 'The Tongue Says Loneliness': "As this life is not a gate, but the horse plunging through it". For Hanks, this distinction underlies the idea that "some metaphors are more *metaphoric* than others" (Hanks, 2004, p.5). This is the core of the issue in the current cognitive linguistic metaphor accounts because it is difficult to offer a comprehensive explanation of *metaphoricity* (see Camp, 2008; Nacey, 2013; Steen, 2011), the property of metaphor which is often used to refer to the richness of metaphors and to distinguish the highly original and creative forms from those which are likely to become semi-lexicalised. Original metaphors are often considered to generate further readings because there is no specific, already established or known cognitive content; but, like many other linguistic expressions, metaphors' novelty becomes worn out or ossified in quotidian language use.

Thus, constant use is one of the main factors that lead to many metaphors being considered conventional and settled in language because the surprise, the shock and the possibilities that they create are no longer new. In *On Truth and Lies in an Ultra Moral Sense*, Nietzsche (2009, p.257) discusses how metaphors become tired when he defines truth as "a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms… which … are illusions that are no longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors that have become worn and stripped of their sensuous force". His definition challenges the dualistic perspective of "two extreme modes of thought – the mechanistic and the Platonic" that dominates Western (Greco-Roman) philosophy (Nietzsche, 1998, paragraph 1061). Considering both cognition

and language to be metaphorical and even considering concepts to be already metaphors because they direct meaning into singular events, Nietzsche affords metaphor a larger significance when he claims that, through metaphor, we are able to know the external world which we attempt to capture ultimately with concepts. In this view, "literal" and "figurative" are the constraints of a continuum of metaphor and not different realms because language begins as metaphor and "after long usage" it hardens or freezes into more stabilized meaning. However, even literal meaning cannot be considered as truth; but we can consider it as a more familiar meaning because it is more standardized and fossilized into communication.

Furthermore, the initial use of a language construction as a metaphor can be exemplified with *chess is war* which is no longer perceived in a metaphorical way because the analogy has faded. In one view, the game of chess was created to provide instructions to the students of war by representing war as a game (Klamer and Leonard, 1994, p.38); but contemporary games of chess no longer consider it as war practice but, rather, as a self-contained game. Thus, through familiarity and overuse, the figurative sense of an expression fades and it can eventually become lost. This is what happens with dead metaphors and idioms which have lost that oddness which was once a sign of a metaphor.

However, it must be noted that the sense of a metaphor can be revived. Klamer and Leonard (1994, p.39) offer a good example of how, in specific fields such as economy, a dead metaphor is brought back to life often by newcomers and outsiders who may build on the analogy and extend the metaphor, successfully reviving it - an idea which, as has been discussed, is also countenanced by Derrida (See Chapter 1, section 1.3.3, above) when he suggests reviving the metaphors that refer to the Holocaust. The fact that we can revitalize metaphors proves that our mind is metaphorical and that metaphors never die; instead, metaphors, become *ossified* or set in stone, where they can still be reanimated. Perhaps neither Conceptual Metaphor Theory, through its embodied concepts, nor other theories of

metaphor that follow it, emphasize well enough the idea that all metaphors start provisionally. The first generation of cognitive linguists (see Chapter 2, above) present so-called dead metaphors as the architects of our conceptual system and within such a view we say *she's on top of the world* because in many cultural systems we believe that MORE/SUCCESS IS UP. Although it can be argued that metaphoricity never ceases to exist (Radman, 1997, p.149), metaphors can become so sedimented into our culture that they will become dead metaphors. Like the chess example given above, the Euclidean space was initially conceptualized with the metaphors of lines and points, and it then became different in the way we think of it (Klamer and Leonard, 1994, p.40).

Many metaphors become entrenched, and this happens often in the scientific field because metaphors are ways to determine what makes sense and influence our thinking (*human capital*, *the economy is a machine*, *freshwater and coastal macroeconomists*). Perhaps Elbert Hubbard's (1856-1915) "A creed is an ossified metaphor" is a direct reference to how an individual interpretation can revive metaphors, can remake those metaphors that are tired or grew old. After all, Max Black (see Chapter 1, above) dismisses truly dead metaphors on the basis that a dead metaphor is no longer a metaphor. For cognitive linguists this consideration means that what they consider dead metaphors are, in fact, dormant and tired metaphors, since otherwise they would be just like any other literal meaning. Black's distinction between "weak" and "strong" metaphors can explain what we mean when we say that a metaphor is alive, because a strong metaphor is resonant in the sense that it needs elaboration and metaphorical resonance is an opportunity for creating thought and using our imagination. Perhaps a very good example when interpretation is clearly an ongoing process is in the communication found in painting and literature, works which invite interpretation and would rely on a process of imagination and consideration of metaphor that can lead to a more mechanical process. The implication is that imaginative thinking, as a first step in

meaning creation, is an inversion of the common conception of metaphors where the concepts

exist through embodiment and we, as interpreters, map characteristics from one to another.

The next section introduces Peirce's notion of *effete mind* which helps understand precisely

this metaphor development and the mechanization process.

7.4 Peirce: Originality from conventionality and the development of meaning

Relying on the claim that the mind is metaphorical (see previous section and also Chapter 1,

above), this section explains how a metaphor develops from its inception, using Peirce's

notions of *effete mind* and *abduction* as *abductive reasoning*, which feature in his semiotics to

show how metaphors are a trigger for the evolution of meaning and create change and

knowledge. Peirce's (1839-1914) notion of *effete mind* (which he did not explain but used in

support of his scholastic realist philosophy) applies to matter in *The Architecture of Theories*

(1891). Not only does it reveal how the mind deals with abstract thought, but it can also

explain the continuity of thought which is a determining factor in novel metaphors. In

addition, Peirce coins *abduction* to refer to the process of forming explanatory hypotheses in

the context of discovery and defines it as "the only logical operation which introduces any

new ideas" (CP 5.172).

7.4.1 Reaching to knowledge and the creation of new meaning

As discussed in Section 7.2.1, above, a metaphor is created by bringing ideas together, but

this acts only as a point of departure in the interpretative process since the author of the

metaphor leaves the rest to the interpreters. The interpreters would then need to make the

similarity or the vagueness more concrete, recognizing the similarity of the metaphor's

references. Such a process is explained below using Peirce's notion of *abduction* or

formulating an explanatory hypothesis. Peirce's argument is important in the discussion of

how metaphors are a trigger for the evolution of meaning and how they create change and knowledge. As Peirce argues, *abduction*s do not provide a high degree of logical certainty because they are acts "of insight, though of extremely fallible insight" (CP 5.181) that arrive in a flash; but they are the only way to generate new knowledge – by way of functioning as the only logical operations that can help getting an idea in the first place (CP 7.217-8, 5.172). This is the case, too, with new creative metaphors: as Feodorov (2018, p.200) points out, they carry the intellect from immediate reality into a *multitude of possible worlds*. Because unfamiliar, new and unusual metaphors have no pattern of recognition at their first encounter, *abductions* become the first logical processes to make perceptual judgements in order to explain surprising facts and merely *suggest* that something may be. In new metaphors, the association of metaphorical elements is unexpected and surprising for interpreters and corresponds to Peirce's "abductive" moment as the first stage of inquiry. Because metaphor implies a means of discovery and hypothesizing, there must be a more appreciative process given in the shock, uneasiness and disturbance created by the association of the words used in the metaphor. Yet, to reach the appreciative level, interpreters must first consider hypothesis as a starting point.

Coming across a meaning that is not yet known can be approached in various ways, depending on several circumstances. On the one hand, the interpreter might willingly put effort into the interpretative meaning, creating possibilities or hypotheses (*abductions*) by using the logic to determine uniformities. Generally, ambiguous metaphors of the kind often met in literature and music are circular and involve a fresh interpretation/new interpretation since incompleteness and vagueness are needed for a new interpretation. Such is the case of the following metaphor, "Neverfell shepherded her herd of frightened, woolly suspicions". (Hardinge, 2012, p.244). Interpreters can choose to test one of the hypotheses by trying to logically make sense of suspicions made of wool or by focusing on the emotions associated

with being anxious, panic and doubts. Thus, meaning can be interpreted in several ways; but Peirce distinguishes three ways in total: Emotional, Energetic and Logical. These can be implemented by interpreters in any order and can occur in stages of interpretation: the immediate, the dynamic and the final interpretation. This corresponds to Peirce's theory of semiosis, in particular the role of the 'object' and the 'interpretant' (Thirdness, discussed in brief in section 7.2, above). In semiosis, the interpretant is the "proper significate effects of signs" (CP 5.475) which manifest initially as a feeling produced by the sign, hence the emotional interpretant. Any further effects that the sign might produce are classed as Energetic and always involve a mental or muscular effort and always be mediated through the emotional interpretant. For instance, calling somebody a pig would create a facial response, but this depends on an emotional interpretant which is the interlocutor's feelings of recognition of some qualities. The last type, the logical interpretant gives the meaning of the concept (CP 5.476) and it does so by leading to an interpretant which is a habit, considered by Peirce (5.491) to be "a concept that words can convey". Most of the theories of metaphor consider only the concept in a process of finding similarities which can explain conventional metaphors but, as has already been admitted, it cannot fully explain novel metaphors.

Regardless of the interpretative route, the conclusion of *abduction* in the metaphor above "frightened", "woolly suspicions", is in an indicative mood because it introduces the hypothesis as an idea worth investigating in order to ascertain its role in logical processes. This is in opposition to the verdict on hypotheses as mapping onto deductions or as an idea unconnected to logic. The abductive inferences only offer a kind of representation, as the mind is inclined to consider an order in the world. On the other hand, an interpreter might decide that the metaphor is too ambiguous or too difficult and remain "wondering about" its meaning and might choose to think about it for a longer period of time, creating possibilities at a later time; or they might just consider it an artistic mode and abandon its interpretation.

Nevertheless, when interpreters are willing to follow the interpretation route, as Peirce recognized, the hypotheses (*abductions*) are then developed, as consequences, in the process of *deduction* and finally tested against experiences in the final stage of *induction* or ascertaining whether the hypothesis is right, modified or rejected. Hypotheses might be part of logic as Peirce believes, but their relationship with other logical operations is more of a speculative one. We are naturally inclined to search for logical connections when we are searching for meaning, which is the case in what Peirce discusses as the logical mind or the logical disposition that we have. This is considered by Peirce and others to be the most developed form of sign and that which makes the reasoning process of the enquiry into the meaning of a new and creative metaphor to be in fact an innate tendency towards a logical connection. Commitment to metaphors which are highly creative might, in fact, rely on a form of reasoning which is more fundamental than higher reasoning and riskier because of the kind of hypothesis needed. In many metaphors, both linguistic and pictorial, the similarity offered by the association of the elements cannot be reduced to logic. Logic is often associated with settled metaphors that have been assigned an equivalent to the literal meaning, such as idioms and other expressions (see Section 7.4.2). Original metaphors require creativity which cannot be attained by clear logical connections. This is the case with Peirce's (CP 7.554) metaphor/simile "Consciousness is like a bottomless lake" which he considers having great *aptness* because the metaphor becomes the best way to understand consciousness, a better and more revelatory way than any physiological hypothesis about the brain (Haley, 1988, p.29). Recent development in technology has influenced the view of consciousness as lakes which can now be arguably seen as a dead metaphor.

It should therefore be clear that the three stages of inquiry are interdependently connected in such a way that the hypothesis sets the basis for the selection of arguments and testing the possibilities. In trying to reach a conclusion for the interpretation, possibilities are

considered, evaluated, rejected and subjected to self-correction, in a continuous process. It is easy to imagine such a process when trying to understand the metaphor: "There was an invisible necklace of nows, stretching out in front of her along the crazy, twisting road, each bead a golden second." (Hardinge, 2014, p.409). An inquiry into the meaning in such cases of metaphor is an impulse that makes us search for the truth and one of the first steps to find the truth would be hypothesizing (using our hypothetical reasoning). Yet, hypothetical reasoning is rooted in attentiveness and careful observation, both needed to reach for the meaning of the above metaphor. Considering Peirce's observation, discussed by Raposa (2014, p.162), that the fixation of attention does not only cause an increase in the subjective intensity of some ideas, but it also becomes a way to recognize "what may lie hidden in the icon", previously shaded or obscured (CP 7.555). It can be concluded that a deliberate act of paying attention to the meaning of a metaphor is the act of contemplation.

It might be hard to decide on a final conclusion for unusual metaphors which highlight associations which were not shown before, but what this section aimed to argue is the abductive nature of metaphor inherent in its ability to create new knowledge. This point remains neglected in the current debates on metaphor. Sørensen and Thellefsen (2014, p.505) note that one of Peirce's merits in metaphor studies is the view of metaphor as an important semantic-cognitive mechanism that can provide new meaning and stimulate new experiences by abductive associations of the unknown with the familiar. As hypoiconic signs, the metaphor belongs to the category of Firstness, which is related to emotion, spontaneity, novelty and quality; by its unique ability to reveal that something is possible, it can provide one kind of assurance of truth (hypoicon) (an idea also discussed in the next section, 7.4.2, below).

If materialized by the intellect, the metaphor begins its own life. Under the influence of the habit-taking tendency inherent in all phenomena, the metaphorical expression has the

potential to accrue stable meaning and transforms into a symbol (an instance of Thirdness).

This process happens because as Peirce observes, reasoning needs order, not chaos and order

can only be accomplished through the 3 evolutionary principles: chance /Firstness,

habit/Thirdness and necessity/Secondness. This will be discussed in the next section, below,

using the Peircean notion of *effete mind*.

7.4.2 The ossification of metaphors through Peirce's "effete mind"

The development of metaphor can be explained in relation to Peirce's triad (icon, index,

symbol, detailed in the previous sections) where Firstness (a mode of thought as possibility)

is an example of vagueness and chaos which, under the natural law of the action of habit and

together with Thirdness (a mode of representation), it gradually acquires *effeteness* (similar to

intuition) and becomes Secondness (a mode of thought as actuality), described by Peirce as

the "nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all

spontaneity" (CP 8.317). In a similar way to Nietzsche's belief that language begins as

metaphors, Peirce argues that we have always had metaphorical thinking and that thought

never dies, but rather waits and becomes dormant until it regains its fullness (Mladenov,

2006). If metaphorical thought is the basis of our cognitive mechanisms, which is a widely

recognised characteristic in the current research approaches such as that of cognitive

linguists, then Peirce's idea that the universe originates from potentiality, which then grows

into habits, becoming more determined, seems to strongly support the journey of a metaphor

from its inception to the final stages when it often turns into a more stable meaning. Drawing

on Peircean ideas, Feodorov (2018, p.196) makes a strong point when he defines metaphor as

a medium for novelty that promotes rapid changes in the cognition of one individual or an

entire culture. Perhaps one of the most influential ways for such change is the narratives as

extended metaphors because they rely on hypothetic interpretation as discussed by Lee and

Cobley (2020). Nevertheless, the initial spontaneity of the mind, which is discussed at length in section 7.4.1, above, under the notion of *abduction*, is taken over by *effeteness,* the habit-taking tendency discussed by Peirce, and which causes metaphors to gradually lose their creative and explosive powers, amassing stable meaning. However, it must be noted that metaphor remains special even when it acquires a more widely accepted meaning because metaphors always rely on as-if situations and they constantly shift their place on the mind-matter continuum (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 section 1.3.3, above.).

Peirce's idea of matter as *effete mind*, or "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6. 25) is probably best exemplified with settled metaphors where comparison is already familiar, such as *He is a wolf/pig/shark* or when *Lucrezia Borgia* or *Lady Macbeth* is used as a metaphor for the 'real' power or motivation behind the throne. The fact that the usage has made these metaphors conventional means that repetition and habit lead to generalizations. Calling somebody a pig is a stereotyping of pig-like attributes which have become symbolic in Peirce's sense, through the accepting of habits of meaning. Yet, as Peirce notes, habits are laws of the mind (instances of Thirdness) or representations and the category of Thirdness has includes signs such as symbols, argument and legisings. *Effete mind* is what creates the general laws of thought, which entails familiarity and repetition, opposing what might be considered the living mind, as Mladenov (2006) notes. These two opposites, as Mladenov further asserts, provide originality when the living mind meets the patterns of the *effete* one. Thus, the *effete* mind contains the searching thought and takes the route of the cliché. Mladenov exemplifies this idea with the love story of Romeo and Juliet, which takes the path of the *effete* mind through love, passion, misfortune – all of which are accompanied by masterful effects of language use that suggest multiple possibilities of identification. Only by using imagination can one experience the enormous range of feelings that the story elicits, from those of lovers to those felt by their killers. Such an example is almost self-explanatory

for Peirce's consideration of the thought as a universe for itself because it is the case that "we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289). This is a redefinition of the nature of thought in contrast to the dominant demotic, linguistic and philosophical tradition. In the Romeo and Juliet love story, it is "we" who love, hate or kill as we experience such feelings; hence it is all our lived experiences (see section 3 in Chapter 3, above).

As Peirce notes, because of the habit-taking tendency, the mind becomes more determined and turns *effete,* creating order out of chaos. The metaphor evolves from a spontaneous consideration of possibilities given by a spontaneous mind to the law-bound matter (effete mind) through habit-taking tendencies. Undoubtedly, through usage, metaphors acquire habits and turn into norms or clichés whose meaning is described by Feodorov (2018, p.202) as exhausted or temporarily frozen semiosis. Similarly, Mladenov (2006, p.viii) observes that knowledge, which is often created by metaphors, can be seen as a layer of *effeteness* under which meaning is compressed and deposited through the habit-taking tendency, with its rigidity of law-bound behaviour, assisting a metaphor to transform from a spontaneous statement into a norm. Certainly, at a first encounter or at the level of firstness, a metaphor is vague because the thinking process is at its beginning when the immediate object of metaphor is uncertain and remains at an abstract level. Only later will the thinking process manifest in more developed thoughts or tangible acts since interpretation has a finite number of possibilities for deriving diverse combinations of information and mental images, helping the metaphor to become a symbol and acquire generality under the influence of habit. According to Mladenov, a metaphor acquires "being" only when the thought is materialized into action, such as when a literary text, a painting, a dance movement are realized as an instance of one general norm. Thus, once metaphorical meaning starts relying on habits in the intellect, it becomes a norm of the matter of mind, reaching new degrees of effeteness and,

through repetition, the new meaning of the metaphor becomes more general and universally recognizable.

Certainly, in the simile "The very mystery of him excited her curiosity like a door that had neither lock nor key" (Mitchell, 1936, p.55), we are guided not only to compare the man to a door that does not have a lock or a key, but we are helped to feel the feelings of allure and frustration that are given by a mystery that cannot be solved like a door that cannot be opened and thus become conscious of our feelings. Mladenov (2006) notes that Peirce's *effete mind* helps explain the "we" in between thought, when the two types of the mind meet each other. The continuous thought of searching for an interpretation and of being aware of "we" or "I" is the *effete mind*. This means that we are surrounded by thought but we become aware of it only when we become aware of our emotions and our thoughts. Crucially, Mladenov (2006, p.9) argues that in each metaphor there is a nucleus of *effeteness*, the code of similarity or the frequent likeness needed for making the comparison necessary in each metaphor. He claims that "the effete mind provides patterns for acting" (Mladenov, 2006, p.160) because metaphors represent and evoke meaning, which is embodied and comes from stored experiences and for this reason conceptualizing implies searching for an inactive, *effete mind* from which a metaphor is created.

Considering disciplines such as media, film, marketing and literature, we can observe that metaphors often give rise to symbols. In Peirce's terms, a symbol is a learnt contiguity between *signans* and *signatum* and it depends on a habit or natural disposition. Importantly, a symbol is not limited to a conventional sign and it is different from Saussure's notion of sign (Cobley, 2019, p.13, p.25). Peirce offers probably the best explanation of how a symbol acquires a symbolistic nature to become a conventional rule through the process of taking on habits of meaning (Secondness). Equally important is Ransdell's (1977, p.174) point, cited in Cobley (2019, p.25) that a symbol derives its value from "the fact that it will be interpreted in

a certain regular way". In the example given above, we form a representation of the animal pig from the information we have from our culture and we think of the characteristics of the pig when somebody might drop their food, eat inappropriately or are untidy. Thus, the metaphor creates a referent from where we can select the qualities which appear fitting, but the symbolic meaning of the metaphor relies on the fact that it might always be interpreted in a certain way.

In another example which appears in Anderson (1984, p.464), "the field smiles", the two terms 'field' and 'smiles' together give rise to a new symbol without losing some of their conventionality. 'Field' and 'smile' cannot be separated and the metaphor needs to be considered as a whole. The association does not make the meaning more precise, as opposed to analogies; this is why they are not metaphors. However, this point is perhaps part of the beauty of a metaphor since precision is replaced by vagueness. Thus, the new symbol that the metaphor creates does not only contain traces of conventionalized meaning, but it also evolves from vagueness. Yet, vagueness is inherent in all signs, as Peirce argues. Furthermore, vagueness is mostly given by feelings which are vague because they are pre-analytical, as explained by Damasio (discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.5, above). Peirce links vagueness with spontaneity when he claims that "the evolution of forms begins, or at any rate, has for an early state of it, a vague potentiality" (6.196). Thus, creative metaphors cannot be other than vague: but they must have potentiality for future meaning limited by the boundaries set up by what their individual words represent.

In short, the likeness that is the core of metaphors develops into an experience of making comparisons and the metaphor builds itself on the patterns of thought or the tracks of the *effete mind* as a method for revealing meaning. The experiences that are formed and formatted by the association of the elements of a metaphor become cliches and are re-used in the interpretation, contributing to the ossification process of metaphors.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at what elements contribute to deciding that a metaphor is good and the journey of metaphor from a new metaphorical thinking to becoming mechanical and ossified. Several elements of the semeiotic of C.S. Peirce were discussed as essential to clarifying that metaphors have a purposely interpretative nature. That is, how new metaphors require interpretation, mainly through imagination and considering possibilities and the interpretative process then moves more to mechanism, when similarities become patterns. An advantage of adopting notions such as *abduction* and *effete mind* is the fact that they highlight that metaphor should be considered widely and seriously in thinking and language as the main process to expand our reasoning and our use of language. It is therefore important to look at metaphors not simply as building blocks of our thinking, but also as processes. Metaphor is appropriately considered in contemporary influential cognitive theories mainly in terms of language use, but also as a boundless means of spontaneity and originality. As has been argued in this chapter, metaphors are indeed discoveries and experiences of similarities that can become regularities.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1 Summary and overall conclusion

In this thesis I have discussed the role of novelty in the interpretation of metaphor. The discussion started by examining the contention that the aesthetics of metaphor is not fully explored by current theories of metaphor and, additionally, that an identification of similarities between the parts of a metaphor is not a strong reason for the expressiveness of highly creative metaphors. This thesis has proposed a theory of metaphor that incorporates newness in metaphor, a topic which has not received the attention it deserves, despite the main role of metaphor in creating new meaning. The discussion has stressed newness and explained that what seems new in metaphor is an aesthetic feature that results from our interpretation of signs and in turn, from our experience of the world. I have shown why, in many metaphors, we do not arrive at a *specific* meaning or a *final* decision, but we still have a kind of understanding of the metaphor we encounter.

Chapter 1 showed that the logical-analytical treatment of metaphor remains unable to account for its expressivity. In particular, I argued that Black (1962, p.280) does not trivialize novelty and his analysis of metaphor in terms of an 'interaction view' shows that 'likeness' is not directly correlated with the power of a metaphor. The reason for this is that the most meaningful metaphors "span the greatest distance" and look forward in the service of adventurous novelty, without automatically corresponding to their compounding elements.

In Chapter 2, my focus shifted to perception and its role in both how we express new experiences of the world and how we recover the fullness of experience in metaphors. Using Merleau-Ponty's ideas on meaning, I argued that 'vagueness', a key characteristic of original metaphors, is no less valuable than 'precision' and that thought (what is known) is only created by the knower through feelings and lived experiences. I also argued that the similarity of a relation is discovered and not created, in this way introducing the idea that originality, as

a quality, is embedded in our knowledge of the world. I further use this point in Chapter 7 when I discuss originality and conventionality.

Chapter 3 introduced enactivism as a theoretical perspective that shows how meaning is originally created from a process of action - since cognition is based on continuity of life and mind – which helps explain how the interpretation of metaphor is a dynamic process. However, the sensorimotor contingencies proposed by enactivists can only be methods for understanding how cognition is interactive, since there are differences in the interaction. Additionally, representations are accepted in a weaker form or even denied by enactivists; but Chapter 7 clarifies how representations and action can be placed together through Peirce's sign to explain how the meaning of many metaphors is in the continuous altering movement of signs.

Chapter 4 explored the role of emotions and feelings in meaning creation because original metaphors are often expressive, with a powerful effect on interpreters. It was noted that the novelty of a metaphor is linked to the affective characteristic of a metaphor. The ambiguity that is present in original metaphors and those for which there is no simple process to arrive at a final interpretation is shown to be part of the experience of novelty given by bodily sensations to novel inputs from the world. Thus, novel representations of meaning are created from feelings, which act as affordances (discussed in Chapter 5) of the body as a medium.

Chapter 5 explored the notions of mental images and representations which are not directly addressed in contemporary theories of metaphor. In this chapter I suggested that novel meaning relies on creative engagement which entails imagery as consciously experienced and novel interpretation is potential meaning, as opposed to simulation.

In Chapter 6, I showed how meaning resides in abstractedness and multiplicity and takes forms only through interpretation. The discussion addressed how interpreters harbour an understanding of an original metaphor without reaching a final decision on the meaning of the metaphor and why we believe that some metaphors are beautiful.

The emphasis in Chapter 7 was on possibility. This was because ideas are considered as possible matches for the comparison needed in the interpretation of metaphor which contributes to seeing possibility as something that has a similar form to actuality (minus existence) or possibility as a combination of elements of actuality. The possibility or an 'imaginary world' provides a basis for understanding novelty. C.S. Peirce's abductive reasoning, with culture at the base of our thinking and perceiving and metaphor as its modus operandi, moves from a surprising case to its possible hypothetical explanation. This chapter concluded that the metaphor brings us originality by exposing the 'new', constraining us to process it from what is already known and what is old.

Overall, I proposed that metaphor should be understood in terms of affordances rather than cognitive ability and that interpretation should be looked at as an active process which relies on hypothesizing rather than a passive process of mapping. The theory that I propose brings newness first as the basis of departure for arriving at the metaphorical meaning and defines metaphor as a mode of creative development into new knowledge or new way of life that begins from a perspective of the familiar which is felt and experienced and which results in a new perspective which often becomes a new familiar.

8.2 Implications

This study has explored the role of novelty in the interpretation of metaphor and has clarified the conditions of metaphor which include the similarity condition, the creation of patterns through a discovery process of already existent relations and the imaginative basis of the interpretation of metaphors. Furthermore, the study established novelty as the main trigger of metaphor creation and of metaphor distinctiveness by supporting the belief that metaphor is the very essence of representationalism. Representation becomes less problematic if the 'action' proposed by enactivists is complemented by Peirce's semiosis as action, as a continuous process or cooperation of signs.

The importance of this research and its results lies in the obvious first implication for how we understand metaphor. This thesis brings a theoretical contribution to knowledge that relies on the project's epistemological perspective. The gap in research that was identified as the role of novelty, together with the need to include originality in accounts of metaphor, contributes greatly to the current theoretical understanding of metaphors as powerful means of communication. This is because metaphors create not only our reasoning (since metaphors are the essence of representational thought) but also our language since metaphors can become conventionalised.

The implication that metaphor is a kind of an argument in the form of hypothesis and inquiry adds to the turn that is taking place in the literature which emphasizes imagination. This thesis has shown that the interpretation of metaphor must be first hypothetical (which corresponds to Peirce's abduction and likeness, discussed in Chapter 7, above), considering 'guesses' or possibilities based on an existing similarity, rather than finding new similarities. The answer to the research question: 'What is the role of novelty in metaphor?' is that metaphor establishes itself from newness or possibilities, as opposed to mapping already engrained knowledge or embodied concepts. Thus, metaphor needs to be theorized from the

principle that we hypothesize the purpose of a new perspective given by an innovative comparison by reasoning while we perceive and interpret signs. Metaphor is first a process of creative thought or an 'interpretative' (rather than a code as noted by Cobley, 2019, p.26). Looking at metaphor as the architect of hypothesis highlights the inadequacy of metaphor as a correspondence that is mostly characteristic of drawing conclusions in inductive and deductive reasoning. Despite their predictability, even conventional metaphors remain open to scrutiny and hypothesis, and they can be revived (as discussed in Chapter 5) because dominant characteristics of "conventionality" are mainly given by cultural norms. Thus, interpretation becomes the core process upon which the metaphor relies, as opposed to the relationship of correspondence or mapping, which can only posit certainty as a relation that *must* exist. This argument is supported by recent research which encourages integrating emotions and imagination into the comprehension process of metaphor (Carston, 2010; Kohl et. al, 2020). Considering the point I have made that all metaphors were once novel and that novelty means uniqueness but also being fresh, it is pertinent to conclude that novelty is directly related to possibility in such a way that the more successful possibilities interpreters can find, the more novel the metaphor. The discussion of what makes a metaphor stand out is the main contribution to knowledge of this thesis.

Additionally, a theoretical implication of the function of metaphor to describe how we initially obtain knowledge and how we create and then transmit the knowledge would relate to combining the imaginative processes with the mapping or blending of the metaphor theory proposed by cognitive linguists. First, the newness in a metaphor is a stimulus for stretching our established knowledge so that a new knowledge and understanding is created. Then, by using imagination we compose knowledge, putting together ideas that belong to separate categories. After originating and composing knowledge, metaphor conveys that knowledge because meaning is understood through personal experience and perceptive comprehension.

These inferential processes support the well-established idea that metaphor is a tool of reasoning (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Gibbs and Colston, 2012); but although it considers analogical thinking to be the engine of creative thought, the current account integrates hypothetical thinking as a logical effort towards novelty, which has not been clarified previously. This thesis has shown that metaphor is our logic for understanding change because metaphor strains our imagination for new understanding, as in William Blake's (1803) "to see a world in a grain of sand" which emphasises the significance of perception and the possibility of finding meaning inside the smallest things. Another contribution to knowledge that the project makes is that it re-thinks the aesthetic value of the meaning of metaphors against the backdrop of emergent theoretical perspectives, such as enactivism and Damasio's theory of consciousness, which challenge how cognitive science relies on representations as static stored information.

Further work in the studies of metaphor ought to make use of expressiveness by looking at the interpretative process of metaphor as a process of movement where consciousness, defined as awareness of bodily reactions, is experienced. Because consciousness affects knowledge, it becomes important in explaining novelty which arises only when interpreters experience the body, the only object that the consciousness alters. The entire process of experience can be explained with reference to Peirce's triadic relationship because something is novel if it brings before our eyes an existing relationship: a possibility that already exists or might exist in an imagined scenario.

Another implication concerns the use of metaphors for learning and teaching. The importance of metaphors in both science and arts is acknowledged in Chapters 2 and 6 and the theory of metaphor presented there helps in the application of metaphors in pedagogy. This is because the mental images that novel metaphors provide can help learners and other audiences visualize an otherwise complicated concept. Because embodied and creative

learning is rich in metaphor, it can particularly influence how meaning is arrived at in both science learning and art subjects. Not only are metaphors inconspicuous but present across all disciplines, varying from politics and business to science and psychology, but studying metaphor is crucial as the foregoing account suggests that it helps improve communication and reasoning.

8.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research

It is important to mention here that it has been impossible to do full justice to the groundbreaking variety of ideas with regards to metaphor because of the wealth of studies of metaphor and their applicability to almost every field. The main objective was to consider a range of theoretical beliefs and frameworks that were highly influential in establishing the current theoretical path that metaphor has taken, present the evolution of ideas for what novelty amounts to in metaphor within the history of ideas, starting with Plato and continuing up to modern cognitivist views and then combining them with influential ideas that focused on affective meaning in order to analyze the function of novelty in metaphorical meaning. Thus, some of the limitations of this epistemological study were the focus on cognition and emotion, leaving aside the cultural influence and social aspect of metaphor. Additionally, the current project did not consider *intentionality,* which is a growing area of interest but is not a core element of expressiveness in metaphors.

The theory proposed by this project can be a source for several possible directions for future research. For instance, future studies of metaphor need to consider social factors that may influence interpreters' creativity, possibly by using primary data and considering the participants' mood while completing comprehension tasks involving unusual metaphors. In addition, future research could also explore the relationship between a wider variety of art forms - for example, language and music or sculpture, since these were not considered,

although thoughts on them began to emerge from looking over the affective phenomenal state created by metaphors in forms of art beyond writing. Future studies could also focus on testing the theoretical considerations empirically. The data on gesture and speech mentioned in Chapter 3 suggests a promising starting point. More rigorous experimental testing can be done on the aesthetic features of metaphors which is encouraging and exciting research demanding further enquiry into intuitive processes.

Despite these limitations of the research, this restricted foray into the question of metaphor shows that it remains a topic central to cognition and communication. It is important to continue to study metaphor, particularly after CMT and cognitive accounts because metaphors remain rich tools for communication and cognition. Study of metaphor can help the scientific community at large, especially with research advancements in AI and the focus on integrating bodily experiences into reasoning.

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