The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
Article
Colombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P. 2005. The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters. 90 (1), pp. 116-121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014
Type | Article |
---|---|
Title | The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames |
Authors | Colombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P. |
Abstract | We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes. |
Journal | Economics Letters |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
Publication dates | |
26 Sep 2005 | |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 27 Nov 2008 |
Output status | Published |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014 |
Language | English |
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