The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Article

Colombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P. 2005. The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters. 90 (1), pp. 116-121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014
TypeArticle
TitleThe suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
AuthorsColombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P.
Abstract

We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes.

JournalEconomics Letters
ISSN0165-1765
Publication dates
Print26 Sep 2005
Publication process dates
Deposited27 Nov 2008
Output statusPublished
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014
LanguageEnglish
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