Experimental subjects are not different

Article


Exadaktylos, F., Espín, A. and Branas-Garza, P. 2013. Experimental subjects are not different. Scientific Reports. 3 (1213), pp. 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep01213
TypeArticle
TitleExperimental subjects are not different
AuthorsExadaktylos, F., Espín, A. and Branas-Garza, P.
Abstract

Experiments using economic games are becoming a major source for the study of human social behavior. These experiments are usually conducted with university students who voluntarily choose to participate. Across the natural and social sciences, there is some concern about how this “particular” subject pool may systematically produce biased results. Focusing on social preferences, this study employs data from a survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample of a city's population (N = 765). We report behavioral data from five experimental decisions in three canonical games: dictator, ultimatum and trust games. The dataset includes students and non-students as well as volunteers and non-volunteers. We separately examine the effects of being a student and being a volunteer on behavior, which allows a ceteris paribus comparison between self-selected students (students*volunteers) and the representative population. Our results suggest that self-selected students are an appropriate subject pool for the study of social behavior.

PublisherNature Publishing Group
JournalScientific Reports
ISSN2045-2322
Publication dates
Print14 Feb 2013
Publication process dates
Deposited15 Apr 2013
Accepted03 Jan 2013
Output statusPublished
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1038/srep01213
LanguageEnglish
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