Towards a theory of decision-making without paradoxes.
Conference paper
Belavkin, R. 2006. Towards a theory of decision-making without paradoxes. Fum, D., Missier, F. and Stocco, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modeling. Trieste, Italy 05 - 08 Apr 2006 Trieste, Italy Edizioni Goliardiche. pp. 38-43
Type | Conference paper |
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Title | Towards a theory of decision-making without paradoxes. |
Authors | Belavkin, R. |
Abstract | Human subjects often violate the rational decision–making theory, which is based on the notion of expected utility and axioms of choice (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). The counterexamples, suggested by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), deserve special attention because they point at our lack of understanding of how humans make decisions. The paradoxes of decision–making are particularly important for the ACT–R theory which currently relies on expected utility. This paper presents two alternative methods: A random prediction method that uses subsymbolic computations and a method that uses symbolic reasoning for qualitative decision–making. Both methods are tested on ACT–R models of the paradoxes, and the advantages of each method are discussed. |
Research Group | Artificial Intelligence group |
Conference | Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modeling |
Page range | 38-43 |
Editors | Fum, D., Missier, F. and Stocco, A. |
Publisher | Edizioni Goliardiche |
Place of publication | Trieste, Italy |
Publication dates | |
Apr 2006 | |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 24 Mar 2010 |
Output status | Published |
Web address (URL) | http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/ICCM/2006/ProceedingsICCM2006.pdf |
Language | English |
https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/82077
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