Leadership by example in the weak-link game

Article


Cartwright, E., Gillet, J. and Van Vugt, M. 2013. Leadership by example in the weak-link game. Economic Inquiry. 51 (4), pp. 2028-2043. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12003
TypeArticle
TitleLeadership by example in the weak-link game
AuthorsCartwright, E., Gillet, J. and Van Vugt, M.
Abstract

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four-player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned.

PublisherWiley
JournalEconomic Inquiry
ISSN0095-2583
Electronic1465-7295
Publication dates
Online05 Apr 2013
PrintOct 2013
Publication process dates
Deposited19 Sep 2013
Output statusPublished
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12003
Web of Science identifierWOS:000323385100008
LanguageEnglish
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