Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games

Article


Gillet, J., Cartwright, E. and van Vugt, M. 2011. Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games. Personality and Individual Differences. 51 (3), pp. 231-236. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003
TypeArticle
TitleSelfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games
AuthorsGillet, J., Cartwright, E. and van Vugt, M.
Abstract

We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well – earn less money – on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding.

KeywordsLeadership; Coordination; Evolution; Conflict; Personality
PublisherElsevier
JournalPersonality and Individual Differences
ISSN0191-8869
Publication dates
Online13 Jun 2010
PrintAug 2011
Publication process dates
Deposited19 Sep 2013
Accepted06 Jun 2010
Submitted25 Jan 2010
Output statusPublished
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003
Web of Science identifierWOS:000292675400005
LanguageEnglish
Permalink -

https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/8460v

  • 34
    total views
  • 0
    total downloads
  • 0
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month

Export as

Related outputs

Trust and trustworthiness after negative random shocks
Bejarano, H., Gillet, J. and Rodriguez-Lara, I. 2021. Trust and trustworthiness after negative random shocks. Journal of Economic Psychology. 86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102422
Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?
Gillet, J. 2021. Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness? Games. 12 (2), pp. 1-10. https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020048
Do negative random shocks affect trust and trustworthiness?
Bejarano, H., Gillet, J. and Rodriguez-Lara, I. 2018. Do negative random shocks affect trust and trustworthiness? Southern Economic Journal. 85 (2), pp. 563-579. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12302
Leadership by example in the weak-link game
Cartwright, E., Gillet, J. and Van Vugt, M. 2013. Leadership by example in the weak-link game. Economic Inquiry. 51 (4), pp. 2028-2043. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12003
Cartel formation and pricing: the effect of managerial decision-making rules
Gillet, J., Schram, A. and Sonnemans, J. 2011. Cartel formation and pricing: the effect of managerial decision-making rules. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 29 (1), pp. 126-133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.03.015
The tragedy of the commons revisited: the importance of group decision-making
Gillet, J., Schram, A. and Sonnemans, J. 2009. The tragedy of the commons revisited: the importance of group decision-making. Journal of Public Economics. 93 (5-6), pp. 785-797. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.02.001