Human right or mere procedure? The presumption of innocence at the International Criminal Court'

The notable nexus between human rights and international criminal law is perhaps most visible in areas where arguments erupt over which category a particular provision may fall into. The presumption of innocence is arguably at the center of this controversy as it is commonly thought to be a criminal procedural right, but is also recognized as a human right in most international and regional human rights agreements. This raises questions of which category does the presumption of innocence fall into – is it a substantive right or merely procedural? And does it matter?
Examining the presumption of innocence at the International Criminal Court this paper will attempt to answer these questions. The paper will present the theoretical arguments as to how the presumption of innocence could fall into procedure or human rights. Then it will look to the case law and foundational documents of the International Criminal Court to attempt determine where the presumption of innocence falls and how it is used in practice. Finally, it will discuss whether and how this matters to individuals seeking this right’s protections.