List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
Article
García Díaz, A., Hernán-González, R. and Kujal, P. 2009. List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 27 (6), pp. 719-727. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.03.002
Type | Article |
---|---|
Title | List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly |
Authors | García Díaz, A., Hernán-González, R. and Kujal, P. |
Abstract | List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader. |
Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
ISSN | 0167-7187 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 19 Sep 2013 |
Output status | Published |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.03.002 |
Language | English |
https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/84600
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