Self-selecting into being a dictator: distributional consequences
Article
Ezquerra Guerra, L. and Kujal, P. 2020. Self-selecting into being a dictator: distributional consequences. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101559
Type | Article |
---|---|
Title | Self-selecting into being a dictator: distributional consequences |
Authors | Ezquerra Guerra, L. and Kujal, P. |
Abstract | We allow for principals to self-select into delegating, or not, the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game arises when principal´s choose to make the allocation decision themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent under delegation (or in the standard dictator game). Principals choose to be a dictator nearly half of the time. The average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more than half of the rounds is significantly higher than the quantity transferred by those who choose to delegate in less than half of the rounds. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or not, vary with less inequality obtained when the decision is delegated. |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Journal | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics |
ISSN | 2214-8043 |
Publication dates | |
Online | 24 May 2020 |
01 Aug 2020 | |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 09 Jun 2020 |
Submitted | 22 Nov 2019 |
Accepted | 13 May 2020 |
Output status | Published |
Accepted author manuscript | License |
Copyright Statement | © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101559 |
Language | English |
https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/88z91
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