Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)

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Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P., Acze, B., Barbosa, F., Bègue, L., Branas-Garza, P., Chmura, T., Cornelissen, G., Døssing, F., Espín, A., Evans, A., Ferreira-Santos, F., Fiedler, S., Flegr, J., Ghaffari, M., Glöckner, A., Goeschl, T., Guo, L., Hauser, O., Hernan-Gonzalez, R., Herrero, A., Horne, Z., Houdek, P., Johannesson, M., Koppel, L., Kujal, P., Laine, T., Lohse, J., Martins, E., Mauro, C., Mischkowski, D., Mukherjee, S., Myrseth, K., Navarro-Martínez, D., Neal, T., Novakova, J., Pagà, R., Paiva, T., Palf, B., Piovesan, M., Rahal, R., Salomon, E., Srinivasan, N., Srivastava, A., Szaszi, B., Szollosi, A., Thor, K., Tinghög, G., Trueblood, J., Van Bavel, J., van 't Veer, A., Västfjäll, D., Warner, M., Wengström, E., Wills, J. and Wollbrant, C. 2017. Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science. 12 (3), pp. 527-542. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624
TypeArticle
TitleRegistered Replication Report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)
AuthorsBouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P., Acze, B., Barbosa, F., Bègue, L., Branas-Garza, P., Chmura, T., Cornelissen, G., Døssing, F., Espín, A., Evans, A., Ferreira-Santos, F., Fiedler, S., Flegr, J., Ghaffari, M., Glöckner, A., Goeschl, T., Guo, L., Hauser, O., Hernan-Gonzalez, R., Herrero, A., Horne, Z., Houdek, P., Johannesson, M., Koppel, L., Kujal, P., Laine, T., Lohse, J., Martins, E., Mauro, C., Mischkowski, D., Mukherjee, S., Myrseth, K., Navarro-Martínez, D., Neal, T., Novakova, J., Pagà, R., Paiva, T., Palf, B., Piovesan, M., Rahal, R., Salomon, E., Srinivasan, N., Srivastava, A., Szaszi, B., Szollosi, A., Thor, K., Tinghög, G., Trueblood, J., Van Bavel, J., van 't Veer, A., Västfjäll, D., Warner, M., Wengström, E., Wills, J. and Wollbrant, C.
Abstract

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the “social heuristics” hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013, Verkoeijen et al., 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, pre-registered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original paper (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the Time Pressure condition and 7.5% in the Forced Delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and observed a difference in contributions of -0.37 percentage points, compared to an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original paper did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared to a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

PublisherSage
JournalPerspectives on Psychological Science
ISSN1745-6916
Electronic1745-6924
Publication dates
Online01 Mar 2017
Print01 May 2017
Publication process dates
Deposited23 Feb 2017
Accepted30 Jan 2017
Output statusPublished
Publisher's version
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Copyright Statement

Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P. P. J. L., Aczel, B., Barbosa, F., Bègue, L., Brañas-Garza, P., … Wollbrant, C. E. (2017). Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(3), 527–542. © The Author(s) 2017. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624
LanguageEnglish
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