Ecological psychology, radical enactivism and behavior: an evolutionary perspective
Article
Dickins, T. 2021. Ecological psychology, radical enactivism and behavior: an evolutionary perspective. Behavior and Philosophy. 49, pp. 1-23.
Type | Article |
---|---|
Title | Ecological psychology, radical enactivism and behavior: an evolutionary perspective |
Authors | Dickins, T. |
Abstract | Ecological psychology and enactivism are close relatives in that they share an interest in positioning the behaving organism as an active agent and in interpreting this with reference to ecological and evolutionary ideas. But they also differ in their uses of biology and the concept of information. I review these uses, relate them to ideas in behaviorism, and conclude that a version of enactivism, championed by Daniel Hutto and colleagues, is the more viable hypothesis. I extend this radical enactivist effort into evolutionary enactivism as an exercise in parsimonious theory building that aims to avoid essentialism. |
Research Group | Behavioural Biology group |
Publisher | Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies |
Journal | Behavior and Philosophy |
ISSN | 1053-8348 |
Publication dates | |
05 Oct 2021 | |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 11 Sep 2020 |
Accepted | 06 Sep 2020 |
Output status | Published |
Publisher's version | |
Accepted author manuscript | File Access Level Restricted |
Copyright Statement | Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 1-23 (2021). © 2021 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. |
Web address (URL) | https://behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/BP-v49-Dickins.pdf |
Language | English |
https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/89103
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