When do interest groups lobby legislators in strong presidential systems?

Article


Dockendorff, A. and Lodato, S. 2023. When do interest groups lobby legislators in strong presidential systems? Legislative Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12419
TypeArticle
TitleWhen do interest groups lobby legislators in strong presidential systems?
AuthorsDockendorff, A. and Lodato, S.
Abstract

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive’s exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6,479 lobbying audiences and over 2,300 bills.

Keywordsstrong presidential system; lobbying; gatekeeping; legislative activity
Sustainable Development Goals16 Peace, justice and strong institutions
LanguageEnglish
PublisherWiley
JournalLegislative Studies Quarterly
ISSN0362-9805
Electronic1939-9162
Publication dates
Online13 Mar 2023
Publication process dates
Deposited09 Feb 2023
Accepted31 Jan 2023
Copyright Statement

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Dockendorff, A. and Lodato, S. (2023), When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems?. Legislative Studies Quarterly., which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12419 . This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12419
Web of Science identifierWOS:000948319700001
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