When efficient help is perceived as greed: experimental evidence

Article


Lodato, S., Güth W., Angelovski, A. and Mavridis, C. 2025. When efficient help is perceived as greed: experimental evidence. Public Choice.
TypeArticle
TitleWhen efficient help is perceived as greed: experimental evidence
AuthorsLodato, S., Güth W., Angelovski, A. and Mavridis, C.
Abstract

We study charitable behaviour when genuine donations can be misinterpreted as being greedy. This is relevant when private benefits from donating, like tax exemptions, bring into question whether donors are truly altruistically motivated. In our experiment, a potential donor, the distributor, decides how to split a sum of money between themselves, a paired non-distributor, and a charity of their choice. Choosing to donate part of the sum to charity is socially efficient because the charity receives four times the amount, with the difference covered by the experimenters. Our conditions vary in the choice set available to the distributor and whether the choice set becomes known to the non-distributor. With the choice set unknown, the distributor may be concerned that the non-distributor will believe the money has been split unfairly, with the distributor
keeping a larger share. Overall, we find this not to be the case: the number of individuals who donate to charity is not significantly lower when donating could be perceived as greedy.

Sustainable Development Goals10 Reduced inequalities
Middlesex University ThemeHealth & Wellbeing
PublisherSpringer
JournalPublic Choice
ISSN0048-5829
Electronic1573-7101
Publication process dates
Accepted17 Feb 2025
Deposited18 Feb 2025
Output statusAccepted
Accepted author manuscript
File Access Level
Open
LanguageEnglish
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