When to stop - A cardinal secretary search experiment

Article

Angelovski, A. and Guth, W. 2020. When to stop - A cardinal secretary search experiment. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 98, pp. 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102425
TypeArticle
TitleWhen to stop - A cardinal secretary search experiment
AuthorsAngelovski, A. and Guth, W.
Abstract

The cardinal secretary search problem confronts the decision-maker with more or less candidates who have identically and independently distributed values and appear successively in a random order without recall of earlier candidates. Its benchmark solution implies monotonically decreasing sequences of optimal value aspirations (acceptance thresholds) for any number of remaining candidates. We compare experimentally observed aspirations with optimal ones for different numbers of (remaining) candidates and methods of experimental choice elicitation: “hot” collects play data, “warm” asks for an acceptance threshold before confronting the next candidate, and “cold” for a complete profile of trial-specific acceptance thresholds. The initially available number of candidates varies across elicitation methods to obtain more balanced data. We find that actual search differs from benchmark behavior, in average search length and success, but also in some puzzling qualitative aspects.

KeywordsBehavioral OR; Optimal stopping; Secretary problem; Sequential search mechanism
PublisherElsevier
JournalJournal of Mathematical Psychology
ISSN0022-2496
Electronic1096-0880
Publication dates
Online15 Jul 2020
Print01 Sep 2020
Publication process dates
Deposited14 Sep 2020
Submitted14 Aug 2019
Accepted29 Jun 2020
Output statusPublished
Accepted author manuscript
License
Copyright Statement

© 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102425
Web of Science identifierWOS:000579479700005
LanguageEnglish
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