Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: a laboratory experiment

Article


Angelovski, A., Brandts, J. and Sola, C. 2016. Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: a laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 121, pp. 114-129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.012
TypeArticle
TitleHiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: a laboratory experiment
AuthorsAngelovski, A., Brandts, J. and Sola, C.
Abstract

In many organizations the measurement of job performance cannot rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from three different treatments. For all three treatments we find escalation bias by managers. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. For three treatments we find that managers’ and employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired.

KeywordsEscalation bias; Hiring; Performance evaluations; Experiments
PublisherElsevier
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ISSN0167-2681
Electronic1879-1751
Publication dates
Online12 Nov 2015
Print01 Jan 2016
Publication process dates
Deposited09 Oct 2019
Accepted21 Oct 2015
Output statusPublished
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.012
Web of Science identifierWOS:000369558500008
LanguageEnglish
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