Polling in a proportional representation system

Article


Mavridis, C. and Ortuño-Ortín, I. 2018. Polling in a proportional representation system. Social Choice and Welfare. 51 (2), pp. 297-312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1117-5
TypeArticle
TitlePolling in a proportional representation system
AuthorsMavridis, C. and Ortuño-Ortín, I.
Abstract

We study the effects of opinion polls on election results in proportional representation systems. Moderate voters have preferences over the vote shares received by the parties so that an agent’s optimal voting decision might depend on the other agents’ behavior. A voter’s information about other voters’ behavior can be improved through a series of opinion polls. We show that the mass of undecided voters decreases monotonically with the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters who remain undecided have centrist ideologies. On average a series of polls brings the society closer to complete information even though specific polls may push the election result away from the complete information case.

PublisherSpringer
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
ISSN0176-1714
Electronic1432-217X
Publication dates
Online14 Feb 2018
Print31 Aug 2018
Publication process dates
Deposited15 Nov 2018
Accepted04 Feb 2018
Output statusPublished
Publisher's version
License
Copyright Statement

© The Author(s) 2018.
Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1117-5
LanguageEnglish
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