Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits

Article


Mavridis, C. and Serena, M. 2021. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy. 67, pp. 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101961
TypeArticle
TitleComplete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits
AuthorsMavridis, C. and Serena, M.
Abstract

We analyse a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.

PublisherElsevier
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
ISSN0176-2680
Publication dates
Online17 Oct 2020
Print01 Mar 2021
Publication process dates
Deposited22 Sep 2020
Accepted21 Sep 2020
Output statusPublished
Accepted author manuscript
License
Copyright Statement

© 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101961
LanguageEnglish
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