Appropriation behaviour predicted by environmental uncertainty, but not social uncertainty, in a common-pool resource game
Article
Spencer, R., Bonfrisco, M. and Russell, Y. 2025. Appropriation behaviour predicted by environmental uncertainty, but not social uncertainty, in a common-pool resource game. Journal of Evolutionary Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-025-00904-x
Type | Article |
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Title | Appropriation behaviour predicted by environmental uncertainty, but not social uncertainty, in a common-pool resource game |
Authors | Spencer, R., Bonfrisco, M. and Russell, Y. |
Abstract | The tragedy of the commons is a difficult problem. Overfishing, for example, is detrimental to all, but is a social dilemma for the fishers: do they overfish (maximising one’s benefit) – or do they inhibit their consumption (accepting a reduced benefit)? Our study investigated factors that contribute to inhibition. Using a common-pool resource game, we recorded the consumption choices of 83 dyads (166 participants) in a multi-round game where each player decided on how many units of currency to consume from the common pool. The game had four rules: (1) the game ends if the dyad jointly consumes ≥ 100% of the pool, (2) the game continues if the dyad jointly consumes ≤ 50% of the pool (pool is then replenished), (3) the game continues if the dyad jointly consumes 51-99% (“depletion”: pool is not replenished) and (4) no communication between players. Our study had a 2x2x3 factorial design: first factor (within-dyad) had two levels – pre or post-depletion – comparing consumption before/after a depletion event. The next two factors (between dyads) were “environmental uncertainty” (where players had complete or incomplete knowledge of the pool size) and “social uncertainty” (based on whether players knew each other in real life). In our results, we found no significant effects of social uncertainty, but significant effects for depletion and environmental uncertainty. While consumption decreased across all participants after resource depletion, the magnitude of this reduction differed depending on the certainty condition: the decrease was especially pronounced when the resource availability was initially uncertain. Furthermore, games lasted longer when there was certainty. In our results, we found no significant effects of social uncertainty, but significant effects for depletion and environmental uncertainty. While consumption decreased across all participants after resource depletion, the magnitude of this reduction differed depending on the certainty condition: the decrease was especially pronounced when the resource availability was initially uncertain. Furthermore, games lasted longer when there was certainty. |
Keywords | CPR games; Appropriation behaviour; Environmental uncertainty ·; Social uncertainty · |
Sustainable Development Goals | 12 Responsible consumption and production |
Middlesex University Theme | Sustainability |
Publisher | Springer |
Journal | Journal of Evolutionary Economics |
ISSN | 0936-9937 |
Electronic | 1432-1386 |
Publication dates | |
Online | 17 May 2025 |
Publication process dates | |
Accepted | 30 Apr 2025 |
Deposited | 19 May 2025 |
Output status | Published |
Publisher's version | License File Access Level Open |
Copyright Statement | This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-025-00904-x |
Language | English |
https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/24x8x7
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