Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment

Article

Cerrone, C. and Engel, C. 2019. Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment. Economics Letters. 183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616
TypeArticle
TitleDeciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment
AuthorsCerrone, C. and Engel, C.
Abstract

We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for "moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness.

PublisherElsevier
JournalEconomics Letters
ISSN0165-1765
Publication dates
Online17 Aug 2019
Print01 Oct 2019
Publication process dates
Deposited03 Aug 2020
Accepted12 Aug 2019
Output statusPublished
Accepted author manuscript
License
Copyright Statement

© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616
LanguageEnglish
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License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

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