Investment in education under disappointment aversion

Article

Anderberg, D. and Cerrone, C. 2017. Investment in education under disappointment aversion. Economics Bulletin. 37 (3), pp. 1533-1540.
TypeArticle
TitleInvestment in education under disappointment aversion
AuthorsAnderberg, D. and Cerrone, C.
Abstract

This paper develops a model of risky investment in education under disappointment aversion, modelled as loss aversion around one's endogenous expectation. The model shows that disappointment aversion reduces investments in education for lower ability people and increases investments for higher ability people, thereby magnifying the gap between them generated by the riskiness of education.

JournalEconomics Bulletin
ISSN1545-2921
Publication dates
Online02 Jul 2017
Publication process dates
Deposited03 Aug 2020
Submitted17 Dec 2016
Accepted02 Jul 2017
Output statusPublished
Publisher's version
Copyright Statement

The article is published by Economics Bulletin as: Dan Anderberg and Claudia Cerrone, (2017) ''Investment in education under disappointment aversion'', Economics Bulletin, Volume 37, Issue 3, pages 1533-1540.
The published article is reproduced in this repository in line with the publisher's terms.

Web address (URL)http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2017/Volume37/EB-17-V37-I3-P138.pdf
LanguageEnglish
Permalink -

https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/item/89078

Log in to edit

Download files

Publisher's version
EB-17-V37-I3-P138.pdf

  • 12
    total views
  • 3
    total downloads
  • 0
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month

Export as

Related outputs

Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Cerrone, C., Hermstruewer, Y. and Robalo, P. 2021. Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. 129, pp. 114-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
Soft commitment: a study on demand and compliance
Anderberg, D., Cerrone, C. and Chevalier, A. 2018. Soft commitment: a study on demand and compliance. Applied Economics Letters. 25 (16), pp. 1140-1146. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2017.1400648
Pay for performance with motivated employees
Cerrone, C. and Manna, E. 2018. Pay for performance with motivated employees. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 18 (1). https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment
Cerrone, C. and Engel, C. 2019. Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: an experiment. Economics Letters. 183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616
Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination
Cerrone, C. 2021. Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination. Economic Inquiry. 59 (1), pp. 315-328. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12928