Pay for performance with motivated employees

Article

Cerrone, C. and Manna, E. 2018. Pay for performance with motivated employees. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 18 (1). https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
TypeArticle
TitlePay for performance with motivated employees
AuthorsCerrone, C. and Manna, E.
Abstract

Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.

Keywordsadverse selection, intrinsic motivation, individual and team incentives, D03, D82, D86
PublisherDe Gruyter
JournalThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
ISSN1935-1682
Electronic1935-1682
Publication dates
Online23 Jan 2018
Print28 Jan 2018
Publication process dates
Deposited03 Aug 2020
Accepted11 Dec 2017
Output statusPublished
Publisher's version
Copyright Statement

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com - https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
The published article is made available in this repository in accordance with the publisher's policy - https://www.degruyter.com/page/repository-policy

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
LanguageEnglish
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