Soft commitment: a study on demand and compliance

Article

Anderberg, D., Cerrone, C. and Chevalier, A. 2018. Soft commitment: a study on demand and compliance. Applied Economics Letters. 25 (16), pp. 1140-1146. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2017.1400648
TypeArticle
TitleSoft commitment: a study on demand and compliance
AuthorsAnderberg, D., Cerrone, C. and Chevalier, A.
Abstract

This article explores the demand for soft, self-imposed commitment, and subsequent compliance behaviour, using a framed field study in a higher education setting. We find a substantial soft commitment demand and a remarkably high failure to comply with the chosen commitment.Students are more likely to demand soft commitment if they expect the task to be more time-consuming and their relative performance to be lower. Failure to comply is associated with previous grade and personality traits. We find no evidence that soft commitment affects grades.

KeywordsSoft commitment, deadlines, procrastination, education, C93, D91, I21
PublisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)
JournalApplied Economics Letters
ISSN1350-4851
Electronic1466-4291
Publication dates
Online17 Nov 2017
Print20 Sep 2018
Publication process dates
Deposited03 Aug 2020
Accepted31 Oct 2017
Output statusPublished
Publisher's version
License
Copyright Statement

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2017.1400648
LanguageEnglish
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