Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

Article

Cerrone, C., Hermstruewer, Y. and Robalo, P. 2021. Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. 129, pp. 114-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
TypeArticle
TitleDebarment and collusion in procurement auctions
AuthorsCerrone, C., Hermstruewer, Y. and Robalo, P.
Abstract

This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments – the exclusion of colluding bidders – on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter.

PublisherElsevier
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
ISSN0899-8256
Electronic1090-2473
Publication dates
Online01 Jun 2021
Print01 Sep 2021
Publication process dates
Deposited09 Jun 2021
Accepted11 May 2021
Output statusPublished
Accepted author manuscript
License
Copyright Statement

© 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
LanguageEnglish
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License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

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