Does the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games

Article


Capraro, V. 2017. Does the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games. Economics Letters. 158, pp. 54-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.015
TypeArticle
TitleDoes the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games
AuthorsCapraro, V.
Abstract

Many situations require people to act quickly and are characterized by asymmetric information. Since asymmetric information makes people tempted to misreport their private information for their own benefit, it is of primary importance to understand whether time pressure affects honest behavior. A theory of social heuristics (the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, SHH), predicts that, in case of one-shot interactions, such an effect exists and it is positive. The SHH proposes that when people have no time to evaluate all available alternatives, they tend to rely on heuristics, choices that are optimal in everyday, repeated interactions and that have been internalized over time; and then, after deliberation, people shift their behavior towards the one that is optimal in the given interaction. Thus, the SHH predicts that time pressure increases honesty in one-shot interactions (because honesty may be optimal in repeated interactions, while dishonesty is always optimal in the short run). However, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental studies have tested this prediction. Here, I report a large (N=1,013) study aimed at filling this gap. In this study, participants were given a private information and were asked to report it within 5 seconds vs after 30 seconds. The interaction was one-shot, and payoffs were such that subjects had an incentive to lie. As predicted by the SHH, I find that time pressure increases honest behavior. In doing so, these results provide new insights on the role of time pressure on honesty, and provide one more piece of evidence in support of the Social Heuristics Hypothesis.

LanguageEnglish
PublisherElsevier
JournalEconomics Letters
ISSN0165-1765
Publication dates
Online28 Jun 2017
Print01 Sep 2017
Publication process dates
Deposited26 Nov 2018
Accepted09 Jun 2017
Output statusPublished
Accepted author manuscript
License
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.015
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